An Army helicopter lands on board an ATC(H) during a medical evacuation mission in the Delta.
main-force elements of the Viet Cong's 261st and 263rd Battalions and the 511th Dinh Tuong Provincial Mobile Battalion. The operation, which began on 28 July, was designed to counter an enemy threat against lines of communications in Dinh Tuong province and to ease the mounting pressure on the U.S. base at Dong Tam.

Total enemy losses during CORONADO II and a concurrent ARVN operation (CUU LONG 64) included 675 killed. In addition, over 500 suspects were detained. Among the 68 Viet Cong captured was the deputy commander of the 263rd Battalion; under interrogation the prisoner revealed that his battalion commander had been killed during the operation. Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that the structure and resources of the 263rd and 511th Battalions were severely disrupted by the combined operations. Of the enemy casualties, 73 were killed by elements of the MRF and 122 by Vietnamese Marines operating in close coordination with the MRF. At the same time, nine U.S. soldiers were killed and 31 sailors and soldiers were wounded. At least 12 craft of the Riverine Assault Force were struck by heavy-weapons fire during the operation; however, none were damaged seriously.

Upon completion of CORONADO II, Major General George G. O'Connor, USA, Commanding General, U.S. NINTH Infantry Division, sent the following message to CTF 117 and the Commanding Officer, Second Infantry Brigade:
1. I WISH TO EXTEND MY APPRECIATION TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE FOR THEIR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE DURING OPERATION CORONADO II.

2. THE RAPID REACTION AND RELOCATION OF YOUR FORCES FROM CAN GIOUC TO DING TUONG PROVINCE WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE OVERALL SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION. THE DARING SORTIES BY BOTH NAVAL AND ARMY ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE WERE HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL IN FINDING AND FIXING THE ENEMY. THE BLOCKS PROVIDED ON SUCCEEDING DAYS AFTER THE ENEMY DISPERSED WERE ESPECIALLY REMUNERATIVE. THE MRF HAS CONFIRMED ITS REPUTATION AS A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND VERSATILE FIGHTING FORCE AND AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THAT RIVERINE WARFARE MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

3. PLEASE PASS ON TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF YOUR FORCE MY CONGRATULATIONS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

Operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone

On 4 August the Mobile Riverine Force moved to Vung Tau and, on the 7th, commenced Operation GREAT BEND IV (later re-named CORONADO III) in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Between the 7th and the 16th, search and destroy missions were carried out in the Can Gio and Quang Xuyen districts of Gia Dinh province; the operations were aimed primarily at reducing Viet Cong pressure on the main shipping channel to Saigon. Light contact with the enemy occurred during this period as MRF elements destroyed seven enemy bunkers (three by naval gunfire) and seized a quantity of weapons and explosives.

On 16 August the Mobile Riverine Base moved to the junction of the Vam Co and Soirap rivers to prepare for Operation CORONADO IV. Since the scope of CORONADO IV involved the conduct of certain missions at a considerable distance from the MRB (up to 40 miles),
the operation's logistical aspects received special emphasis during the planning stage. As a result, it was decided to load six ATCs with all classes of supplies, and to position the craft six miles from the area of operations to serve as forward supply points.

CORONADO IV was launched on 20 August. Initially, units of the Riverine Assault Force conducted reconnaissance-by-fire missions along the banks of the Van Co River, 38 miles from the MRB. Following the reconnaissance phase, U. S. NINTH Infantry Division troops of the 3/47th and the 3/60th battalions were landed on both banks of the river. The subsequent search and destroy sweeps failed to produce any major contact with enemy forces. However, in the course of conducting a series of small-unit skirmishes, troop elements killed 49 Viet Cong and seized a number of weapons. Six U. S. soldiers were wounded during the two-day mission. Throughout the operation the supplies loaded in the ATCs were fully utilized and effectively forestalled any logistical problems that might have otherwise developed.

On the second day of the operation, the boats assigned to the forward area were re-fueled from a tanker truck. Because of the prevalence of soft mud banks, the truck was unable to approach close enough to the river to reach the boats. Accordingly, the truck and craft were diverted to a nearby bridge at Ben Luc. There the truck lowered its fuel hoses over the sides of the bridge and
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successfully re-fueled the boats waiting below.

From 23 August to the end of the month, the Mobile Riverine Force conducted search and destroy missions in Can Giuoc district. During the two-day period ending 30 August, MRF units killed ten Viet Cong and captured five others. At the same time, over 90 enemy bunkers were destroyed and a quantity of munitions, including "claymore" mines, blasting caps, detonating cords, and several thousand rounds of small-arms ammunition, were seized.

*****
U. S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, DANANG

During August the enemy continued to mount numerous attacks against the craft and facilities of the Naval Support Activity, Danang and its outlying detachments.

On 6 August, in the fourth mining incident to occur in the Cua Viet waterway system since 15 May, NAVSUPPACT's LCU-1537 was mined in the Thach An River while anchored 200 yards from the LCU-LCM ramp at Dong Ha. At 0120 two mines exploded simultaneously on the craft's starboard side and near the centerline forward. Forty minutes later a third mine was detonated on the craft's port side.

The LCU sustained extensive damage. The explosions tore six-by-eight-foot holes in the craft's bow and starboard side, and a four-by-ten-foot hole in the port side. Flooding was restricted to the area forward of the watertight bulkhead at frame 13, and the damaged LCU was subsequently towed to Danang for repairs.

Sporadic rocket and mortar attacks continued to harass the Dong Ha combat base area during the latter part of the month. Enemy fire was received on the 26th and again on the 27th. The next day a heavy rocket and mortar attack destroyed a number of fuel storage bladders, resulting in the loss of 100,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and JP-4 fuel. There were no casualties to Navy personnel.

The NAVSUPPACT LST ramp site at the entrance to the Cua Viet
also received sporadic artillery fire on the 28th and again on the 31st of August. Two NAVSUPPACT personnel were wounded as a result of these incidents.

At Hue, operations at the LCU ramp were restricted to daylight hours during August because of the increased enemy activity in the area. Shortly after midnight on the 27th, the ramp site was struck by two rounds of mortar fire. One Navyman was wounded during the brief attack.

On 30 and 31 August, NAVSUPPACT harbor security forces conducted combined operations with Vietnamese Navy units and searched, during varying periods, all junks and sampans entering or leaving Danang Harbor. As a result of the operations, a total of 532 craft were searched and 14 craft and 43 personnel were detained.

During the month the volume of cargo processed by NAVSUPPACT Danang again surpassed previous levels. At the Port of Danang the month's throughput rose to 232,679 short tons. In addition, new highs were established for the amount of cargo handled at Hue and Dong Ha. The combined throughput for all I Corps ports also reached a new high—331,409 short tons.

The month's cargo operations at Danang were highlighted by the arrival, on 1 August, of SS BIENVILLE, whose entry into port marked the beginning of conventional containership service in South
Vietnam. The ship’s cargo of 228 containers, including 55 reefers, six flat beds and one open-top container, was off-loaded within 18 hours. The delivery of containers to ultimate consignees began thirty minutes after the first container was discharged from BIENVILLE.

Fifty-one ships arrived at Danang during August and 48 completed off-loading for a net decrease in backlog of 1,365 short tons. Over 153,000 short tons of cargo were discharged and almost 79,000 short tons were back-loaded for transshipment to other ports.

The month’s combined net supply effectiveness figure for Danang and Chu Lai dropped slightly from July’s 93 percent to 91 percent in August. Combined gross effectiveness remained stable at 94 percent.

The Port of Danang was visited 108 times by SEVENTH Fleet ships during August. The ships were provided with over one and one-quarter million gallons of diesel fuel and over two million gallons of potable water, in addition to mail, freight, courier, transient billeting and disbursing services.

Meanwhile, the Naval Support Activity’s small craft repair facility completed the overhaul of 35 engines, 53 transmissions, and 622 injectors during August. The facility also changed a screw on an MSTS tank landing ship, and completed the overhaul of two

* A simple and economical delivery system involving the movement of cargo in large steel containers by ships specially configured for that purpose. The containers, ships and certain associated services are furnished by a civilian contractor.
Tanang's containership service facilities, adjacent to the port's deep-water piers.
LCM-6s, one LCM-6 "pusher" boat, and a patrol boat. In addition, a total of 21 craft, including LCU-1537, were dry-docked during the month.

On 31 August the Naval Support Activity personnel level was 8,588. That same day the number of United States and other Free World Military Assistance Forces supported by NAVSUPPACT was 131,800.

*****
Portside bridge area of MSB struck by enemy fire during 3 August mortar attack on Nha Be.
Between 0005 and 0025 on 3 August, the facilities of the Naval Support Activity's detachment at Nha Be came under an intense mortar and recoilless-rifle attack. The attack, involving approximately 40 rounds of fire, originated from Viet Cong positions across the Soirap and Long Tau Rivers, and was evidently aimed primarily at the PBR piers located along Nha Be's east waterfront.

Overall damage to the base and boats was generally light. The quick reaction of the boat crews in getting all boats underway and clear of the pier area minutes after the attack began helped avert what might have been a major success for the enemy. An MSB that was dry-docked for overhaul sustained a direct hit and a supply warehouse was damaged extensively. In addition, all of the buildings along the east waterfront received minor shrapnel damage. During the attack 24 U. S. Navy personnel were wounded slightly by shrapnel; all were returned to duty after receiving medical treatment.

A second mortar and recoilless-rifle attack, of short duration, took place early on the morning of 5 August. Again, overall damage was light as only two of the nine rounds fired by the Viet Cong fell within the perimeter of the base. No personnel injuries occurred during the second attack.

On 1 August the NAVSUPPACT detachment previously stationed at Can Tho was officially redesignated NAVSUPPACT Detachment, Binh Thuy.
Throughout the month work continued on base defense projects at Binh Thuy. Among the construction projects that were completed in August were a series of watchtowers and personnel bunkers.

NAVSUPPACT, Saigon's ships and craft hauled a total of 1,408 short tons of cargo to the various detachments during the month. At the same time, NAVSUPPACT aircraft transported 4,649 passengers and 201.5 short tons of cargo.

The number of line items carried by NAVSUPPACT increased by three percent in August to a total of 33,393. Meanwhile, overall gross and net material support effectiveness decreased slightly to 42 and 65 percent, respectively.

During the month NAVSUPPACT completed an extensive analysis of the status of PCF and PBR spare parts. Based on the information supplied by the study, Commander Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet forwarded to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC) in Columbus and the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and U. S. Fleet Material Support Office in Mechanicsburg, a list identifying 772 critical parts, and supplementary data concerning usage, quantities on hand, quantities due, and requisition numbers. A card deck for each item was also forwarded in an effort to assist DCSC and SPCC in expediting the shipment of the needed parts.

In August the Selected Item Management (SIM) system was instituted at six of NAVSUPPACT's detachments. The system's monthly
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Report analysis was designed to help the detachments and the headquarters in Saigon to identify excess, fast-moving or critical items, provide readily-available information for the redistribution of items on hand, and facilitate the allocation of funds for all items. By month's end the detachments were already experiencing some of the system's benefits.

As of 31 August NAVSUPPACT, Saigon had 1,114 personnel on board and was providing support to approximately 15,000 military personnel in the II, III and IV Corps areas.

*****
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGAD1 COMMAND STRUCTURE

CONCAPAC

COMBAC

THIRD MCB

30TH MCB

MCB 1

MCB 2

MCB 3

MCB 4

MCB 5

MCB 6

MCB 7

MCB 71

MCB 74

MCB 133

JRD MCB REPRESENTATIVE SLOW

CPACERT RYN

SEABEE TEAM 0303

SEABEE TEAM 0309

SEABEE TEAM 0406

SEABEE TEAM 0607

SEABEE TEAM 0701

SEABEE TEAM 0702

SEABEE TEAM 1009

SEABEE TEAM 1108

J2GD MCR

MCB 3

MCB 11

MCB 121

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

Eight Seabees were killed during August and 45 were wounded as a result of extensive mortar, artillery and rocket attacks conducted by enemy units throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone.

On 13 August, in Danang East, 23 members of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 (MCB 133) were wounded when two huts at the Camp Faulkner base sustained direct mortar hits. On the 19th a Seabee of MCB-11 was wounded by shrapnel during an attack at Lang Ve, 18 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone. At Dong Ha four members of MCB-11 were killed and three were wounded when their base camp was struck by enemy artillery fire on 26 August. On the morning of 30 August an artillery round struck the berthing area of MCB-3 at the Gia Le base near Phu Bai, killing two Seabees and wounding 17 others. And in two separate incidents that occurred eight miles north of Danang in the Hai Van Pass, two members of MCB-1 were killed by sniper fire and the detonation of a "claymore" mine.

The August attacks, coupled with an increase in Viet Cong-initiated acts of sabotage, inflicted diverse damage to bridges and culverts as well as construction equipment. Nevertheless, as a result of expeditions repair carried out by various Seabee battalions and U. S. Marine units, the overall impact of the damage on logistical and tactical support capabilities was minimal.
However, if the scope and intensity of the attacks were to continue to mount, the resulting increased workload could affect Seabee plans for completing certain improvements to I Corps' Route 1 prior to the start of the northeast monsoon season.

During the month MCB-11 upgraded 14 miles of Route 1 between Gio Linh and Song Bo. Meanwhile, a 58-man detachment from MCB-74 began work on a 17-mile roadway section connecting Phu Loc and Lang Co. MCB-6, based at Rosemary Point near Chu Lai, relieved MCB-8 during the first week in August and continued the work begun by MCB-8 to improve the 27-mile stretch of Route 1 running between Chu Lai and Quang Ngai.

Among the construction projects in progress during August were MCB-71's work on a Republic of Korea Army medical facility at Binh Son, and MCB-8's construction of a two-wing addition to the provincial hospital at Tam Ky. In Danang, MCB-7 completed two buildings earmarked as quarters for nurses attached to the station hospital.

On 8 August MCB-121 relieved MCB-62 at Phu Bai and continued a project to erect 35 Butler buildings; at month's end 32 of the structures had been completed. The newly-arrived battalion also improved 4.5 miles of roadway and continued the work on building "hootches" (huts), cantonments and a 500-man calley.

At Dong Ha MCB-11 constructed 23 helicopter pads for Marine Air
Group 16 and built two Butler buildings and 50 strongbacks for use by units of the Third Marine Division. At the Cua Viet landing facility, members of the battalion completed 8,000 square yards of the planned staging area and continued the work on a concrete LCU ramp.

At Danang's Camp Haskins MCB-7 completed three of seven planned increments for Ammunition Supply Point Two. Similar supply points were under construction at each of the major combat bases; the barricaded storage areas were designed to provide better support and protection against losses due to sabotage or mortar and rocket attacks.

On 28 August, following an enemy rocket attack on the Marble Mountain air facility in the Danang area, members of Camp Adenir-based MCB-7 assisted in fighting fires and repairing damaged sections of the steel-natting runway. On 29 August, 15 miles southwest of Danang, the 2,000-foot Liberty Bridge (spanning the Thu Bon River) was opened to traffic. Constructed by MCB-1 and finished seven days ahead of schedule, the bridge served to complete the link connecting Danang with the developing complex at An Hoa.

On 1 August a second Naval Construction Regiment--NCR-32--was established, with headquarters at Phu Bai. Commanded by Commander Richard L. Foley, CEC, USN, until the arrival, on the 26th, of Captain James M. Smith, Jr., CEC, USN, NCR-32's area of responsibility
Rear Admiral James V. ARTLETT, CEC, USN (right), accepts the command colors of the THIRD Naval Construction Brigade from Captain Albert R. MARSHALL, CEC, USN, during change of command ceremonies held 31 August in Japan.
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extended to all Seabees operating north of the Hai Van Pass. The headquarters of NCR-30, meanwhile, remained at Camp Haskins, north of Danang, and the regiment's area of responsibility was revised to include Seabee units operating south of the Pass.

In another administrative move that occurred during the month, the headquarters of Commander THIRD Naval Construction Brigade was shifted from Saigon to Danang on 1 August. A representative remained in Saigon for liaison purposes.

On 31 August Rear Admiral James V. BARTLETT, CEC, USN, relieved Captain Albert E. MARSCHALL, CEC, USN, as Commander THIRD Naval Construction Brigade in a ceremony held at the brigade's headquarters in Camp Haskins. During the ceremony Rear Admiral Kenneth L. VETH, USN, Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, presented the Legion of Merit to Captain MARSCHALL for "...exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service..." At the same time, Captain MARSCHALL was relieved of his duties as Commander 30th Naval Construction Regiment by Captain Charles W. TURNER, CEC, USN.

*******
A water-taxi in the Delta prepares to come alongside a PBR for a routine inspection.
The commander of My Tho-based River Division 53 recently received a letter of appreciation signed by members of a Water Taxi Association in Kien Hoa province. The letter was sent via the province chief of police and read as follows:

"We, all patrons, workers of motorized sampans and merchants traveling on the Ham Luong River every day, have the honor to convey to you our gratitude for PBR activities. The fact that we have been provided with security is due to PBR activities day and night. It was not too long ago that the Viet Cong set up their check points along the river to collect money from us and we were forced to support the so-called South Vietnam Liberation Front with rice and medicine, especially antibiotics, and sometimes with motors for sampans. Under the Viet Cong pressure we had to obey them and were forced to help them. We had to increase the price of goods to cover the losses and we endured their illegal taxes.

Since the day that there have been PBR activities on the Ham Luong River, the Viet Cong's heartless actions have been put to an end and we have had peace of mind in our daily work. We are no longer threatened by their pressure and their retaliation (for example, the owner of HUNO-PHAT Motorized Sampans was captured and liquidated... (and)... a number of citizens were forced to witness the execution). Especially now the Viet Cong cannot collect taxes from us.

We feel no resentment when we are searched by PBR forces because we realize that their actions and their purposes are to cut off Viet Cong supplies and to annihilate them. We are very satisfied with PBR forces and pledge to stand by them. We will point out Viet Cong (economic and financial cadres) and camouflaged commo- liaison Viet Cong cadres living among villagers. We will especially provide information on Viet Cong concentration anywhere along the river side.

We have high respect for Vietnamese policemen and PBR
sailors because they have good manners and are very polite when they search our taxis and they do not take bribes.

We wish the above activities to be continued and increased to protect us villagers, honest people living in lovely coconut tree areas of the South, from Viet Cong sabotage. We would like to convey our warm wishes and gratitude to policemen working on PBRs and...(to the)... PBR sailors..."

On 27 August, in the My Tho area, the commander of River Assault Group 21 received a note—signed, "a citizen"—informing him that the Viet Cong were attempting to mine the entrance to the Cho Gao Canal. The report proved reliable and the mining attempt was disrupted. On a number of occasions throughout the month, Viet Cong defectors (Hoi Chanh) seeking assistance under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program provided Fourth Riverine Area units with dependable intelligence data. As a result, Delta-based River Assault Groups conducted several successful operations in which three Viet Cong were killed and seven were captured. In addition, the missions resulted in the destruction of numerous enemy structures and the seizure of enemy weapons, ammunition, medicines, documents, a prison camp and a hospital.

In the First Coastal Zone, naval units conducted over 100 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts during August, more than one-half of this total was carried out on board craft of the Vietnamese Navy. At least one Hoi Chanh rallied at Hue as a direct result of the taped Chieu Hoi appeals beamed by members of Coastal Group 12. The rallier subsequently gave interrogators the coordinates of a Viet Cong
battalion command post, and the information led to a successful air strike.

In Danang the local Polytechnical School--which has been receiving assistance from members of the Naval Support Activity's Civic Action Team on a continuing basis--graduated 143 Vietnamese students in August. The school's vocational courses range from carpentry and electricity to sewing and tailoring, and the instruction is conducted by Vietnamese faculty members with voluntary assistance from naval personnel. At the graduation ceremony the school's director publicly thanked the Navymen for their long hours and hard work in teaching and advising the various classes.

During the month the soldiers and sailors of the Mobile Riverine Force presented 118,000 piasters to the widows of the Vietnamese Marines who were killed while participating in Operation CORONADO II. The casualties occurred on 29-30 July, in Dinh Tuong province, when the Marines' 3rd Battalion steadfastly refused to break contact with an enemy force in favor of air and artillery strikes. The Marines' professionalism and gallantry proved to be a major factor in the very substantial success achieved during the operation.

The following is a tabulation of certain civic action projects conducted during August by U.S. and Vietnamese naval forces. Construction projects involving renovation or repair are so indicated with an R.
1. Construction:
a. Bridges
b. Churches/temples/pagodas
c. Dispensaries
d. Dwellings/number of families
e. Hospitals
f. Levelings-grading projects
g. Libraries
h. Playgrounds
i. Roads
j. Schools/classrooms
k. Toilets, public
l. Wells
m. Water pumps
n. Barbed-wire fencing (feet)
o. School desks (number)
p. Warehouses

2. Medical treatment:
a. General
b. Dental
c. Surgery
d. Emergency evacuations
e. Blood tests

3. Health and sanitation:
a. Classes on personal hygiene/attendance
b. Medical aides or nurses trained
c. Spray insecticide operations
d. Swamp areas drained
e. MEXCAPs

4. Distribution of commodities (pounds unless otherwise specified):
a. Cement
b. Clothing
c. Food
d. Lumber (board feet)
e. Medical, non-prescription (cases)
f. School kits (number)
g. Soap
h. Tin sheets (number)
i. Woodworker kits (number)
j. Midwife kits (number)
k. Paint (gallons)
l. Sand (cubic yards)
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m. Sewing machines (number)  1
n. C-rations (cases)  15
o. Paper blankets (number)  1,500
p. Plastic envelopes (number)  500
q. Toys (number)  250
r. Textile kits (number)  100

. Educational efforts:
a. English classes/attendance  80/2,360
b. Text books (number donated)  1,400

c. Voluntary piaster contributions in support of:
a. Hospitals  50,000
b. Orphanages  6,850
c. Religious activities  4,720

d. Schools  11,200
e. Scholarships  11,500
f. Surgical needs  15,000
g. Widows  118,000
The new communications station at Cam Ranh Bay.
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COMMUNICATIONS

On 1 August the Naval Communications Station at Cam Ranh Bay was formally commissioned by Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. Under construction since August 1966, the station's complex includes a communications center, receiver and transmitter sites, and message centers at the nearby headquarters of the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) and the Naval Air Facility.

The new station is designed to serve as a principal relay point for the message traffic of all major Navy commands in South Vietnam, and provide multi-channel termination and Fleet Broadcast services for ships in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin area. In addition, the station also has a direct communications link with the master area station located in the Philippines.

Although the Cam Ranh Bay station was operational, certain defects existed in the power distribution system and the air-conditioning system. The starting currents of the air-conditioner compressors were considerably higher than those experienced during the factory tests of the system, and were causing widespread voltage fluctuations; the power surges, in turn, were affecting the reliability of the station's transmissions.

At Danang, the work designed to improve NAVSUPFAC'T's communications capability (Project SEA ANCHOR) continued to progress and, by month's end, the project was approximately 97 percent complete.
MONTHLY MESSAGE TRAFFIC

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PERCENT OF TOTAL

TOTAL
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OUTGOING

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150,000
140,000
130,000
120,000
110,000
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0

W  QTR  2ND QTR  3RD QTR  4TH QTR  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec

CY 1966 CY 1967
Utilization of the new equipment was scheduled to commence in early September. In Project STARBOARD TACK (the use of communications vans transportable by helicopters), three HF vans and six microwave vans arrived in Danang during the month. The UHF and VHF vans were now expected to arrive in October.

Meanwhile, construction and installation work continued on Project SEARCHLIGHT at COMNAVFORV's headquarters in Saigon. The construction phase has been somewhat behind schedule because of delays in obtaining certain electrical material. By month's end most of the needed material had arrived. In the Delta, the transfer of circuits from the Air Transportable Communications Unit (ATCU LOC A) at Can Tho to the SEARCHLIGHT site at Binh Thuy commenced on 26 August. Progress at the other SEARCHLIGHT sites continued to lag because of delays in the arrival of equipment and construction materials.

The number of messages handled by the COMNAVFORV Communications Center during August was 78,640, a decrease of 14,123 under July's figure. The decrease was due primarily to the relocation of CTF 115 from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay during July and the subsequent transfer of associated communications circuits to the Naval Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay.
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ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND


During the latter part of the month, General of the Army Omar N. BRADLEY visited various activities throughout South Vietnam, including the Mobile Riverine Force and river Patrol Force facilities in the Delta and, on the 29th, COMNAVFORV's headquarters in Saigon.

PCF Hull Corrosion

In recent months, interior hull corrosion has begun to develop among some of the Swift boats assigned to Operation MARKET TIME. The deterioration has been particularly noticeable in bilge areas and other recessed sections susceptible to salt-spray accumulations. Despite the increased efforts of boat crews to detect and combat the corrosion during its early stages by means of wire brushing, scraping and painting, the hull-life of certain PCFs has been reduced by
as much as one-half of the original thickness.

The problem has been the subject of close study and increasing concern since May. At the same time, as the in-country PCF overhaul program has become progressively overtaxed, it has become evident that out-of-country overhauls would be necessary to perform the extensive PCF hull work required. During August, in a detailed message to Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, COMNAVFORV summarized the problem's status and recommended that preliminary arrangements for an out-of-country overhaul program be initiated. At month's end a planning conference was earmarked for early September in Cam Ranh Bay to establish the schedule for such a program.
The personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) on 31 August was 15,985 officers and enlisted men; of this number 1,227 were officers, 2,592 were non-commissioned officers and 11,766 were enlisted men. The number of personnel discharged as deserters decreased from July's total of 69 to 50 in August, and the number of unauthorized absentees declined from 507 in July to 235 in August.

On 10 August, 132 midshipmen of the Vietnamese Naval Academy's Class 16 were commissioned during a ceremony at the Academy's site in Nha Trang. General Nguyen Van THIEU, South Vietnam's Chief of State, was the guest of honor and principal speaker. Other dignitaries attending the commencement exercises included Rear Admiral Kenneth L. VETH, USN, Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, Captain Tran Van CHON, the Vietnamese Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, and Captain Allan P. Slayff, USN, Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Navy Headquarters.

Fleet Command

In August the Fleet Command had 23 ships available daily and maintained 13 ships on station off the coast of South Vietnam, five ships on river patrols and one ship on convoy escort duty.
The month's operations included MARKET TIME and other anti-infiltration activities, psychological warfare and civic action visits, escort patrols and gunfire support missions. The ships fired a total of 81 gunfire missions during the month, almost three times the number conducted in July.

The Fleet Command's patrol craft, consisting of PCs, PCEs, gunboats (POMs) and minesweepers (MSCs) patrolled the coasts of the four naval zones; the POMs also patrolled the Soirap and Long Tau Rivers in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The PCs and PCEs fired 20 gunfire missions during August and the gunboats 34; most of the missions involved harassment-and-interdiction fire or nighttime support of Vietnamese outposts.

Meanwhile the Fleet Command's landing support ships (LSSs and LSSLs) provided coastal patrols, river patrols, convoy escort and gunfire support services in the Third and Fourth Naval Zones, the Fourth Riverine Area and the RSSZ. The ships conducted 27 gunfire missions in August. On the night of 22 August LSSL 229 came to the assistance of an outpost situated along the Mekong River, 13 miles upstream from Sa Dec. The outpost commander, upon learning that a Viet Cong company was marshalling for an attempt to overrun the base, requested help and subsequently provided continuous spotting corrections for the LSSL's gunfire. The fire successfully suppressed the imminent attack and killed or wounded
approximately one-third of the enemy force.

On 20 August, 10 miles east of Saigon, an MMS conducting a routine mine-sweeping patrol along the Dong Nai River uncovered 20 cases of U.S.-manufactured 81-mm. mortar ammunition in a Viet Cong cache on the river bank. The minesweeper subsequently delivered the ammunition to River Assault Group 27's base at Cat Lai for further transfer to U.S. Army authorities.

Throughout the month a detachment of the VNN's Underwater Demolition Team (LDNN) continued to conduct nightly hull inspections of ships berthed in the Port of Saigon. Two other detachments operated with U.S. Navy SEAL units based at Nha Be and Binh Thuy. On the morning of 7 August a combined LDNN-SEAL ambush team, of the Nha Be contingent, attacked two Viet Cong sampans in the western portion of the RSSZ, 19 miles south of Saigon. One of the sampans was sunk and its five occupants were killed; the second sampan evaded successfully.

Coastal Force

In August the Coastal Force searched 27,805 junks and sampans and 105,077 persons, detaining 28 junks and 376 suspects. On a daily average, 71 percent of the Force's 184 available junks was on patrol.

From 1 to 4 August, Coastal Group 14 junks supported units of the U.S. FIRST Marine Division conducting Operation PIKE along the
south bank of the Thu Bon River, 17 miles south of Danang. The amphibious sweeps resulted in the death of 99 Viet Cong, the capture of 56 others and the detention of 27 suspects. Eight Marines were killed during the missions and 60 were wounded; there were no Vietnamese Navy casualties. From 7 to 10 August, in the Cua Dai River, Coastal Group units provided exfiltration patrols for Marines conducting Operation BEACON GATE.

On 11 August, in response to an intelligence report that about 120 Viet Cong were planning to attack the Coastal Group 13 base (25 miles northwest of "Hue"), the base commander, Lieutenant Junior Grade Nguyen VAN, VN, activated a base defense plan which included: sending all dependents to a nearby village by nightfall; positioning a 30-man ambush party along likely Viet Cong escape routes; embarking all but seven personnel in junks to provide mobile base-support; assigning the remaining seven men to normal nighttime patrols, generator watches and "claymore" mine detonation positions. In effect, the plan was designed to accept Viet Cong infiltration in return for maximum enemy casualties. The attack never materialized. One week later, on the night of the 18th, the crews of two junks in base defense moorings killed one Viet Cong underwater swimmer and recovered over 80 pounds of explosives from the body of a second swimmer. The swimmers' equipment included rudimentary straight-tube snorkels and sheath knives.
VIETNAMESE NAVY COASTAL OPERATIONS
AND
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS GROUND OPERATIONS
August 1967

LEGEND:
□ - Coastal Surveillance Center
● - Coastal Group Base
X - Vietnamese Navy Incident
# - Vietnamese Marine Corps Incident

SCALE:
0 100
Nautical Miles

CONTRIBUTION - KOREAN

CONTRIBUTION - KOREAN
On the morning of the 16th, in the Second Coastal Zone, a Coastal Group 23 contingent staged an ambush along a known enemy crossing route in Giao Bay, 20 miles south of Qui Nhon. Shortly after noon the team intercepted a group of Viet Cong, killing four and capturing one, and detaining five Viet Cong suspects. In addition, three individual weapons, two grenades, one sampan and a quantity of documents were seized. There were no VNN casualties.

On 13 August, in the Third Coastal Zone, members of Coastal Group 33, together with two companies of Hoa Binh District Special Forces and the 4th Battalion of the ARVN 12th Regiment, conducted a coordinated search and destroy and civic action mission in the village of Xom Cua Tien, 20 miles west of Vung Tau. The village lies near the mouth of the My Tho River, and reportedly has been a major liaison point for Viet Cong units transiting the Delta toward Go Cong Province. The government ground forces swept ashore at 0200 and soon made contact with two Viet Cong companies. During the ensuing engagement three Viet Cong were killed, a fourth was captured and a quantity of weapons was seized. One Special Forces soldier was killed and three others were wounded. A medical civic action team was landed at 0900 and proceeded to treat needy villagers while simultaneously distributing literature espousing the Government's cause.

On the 23rd, a Coastal Group 26 ambush team detained three
Viet Cong suspects as they were attempting to infiltrate a village adjacent to the Coastal Group base, 47 miles southwest of Vung Tau. Nine additional suspects were detained the following evening as a result of information provided by the first three; subsequent interrogation revealed that all 12 were Viet Cong and that they had been sent to the village in an effort to persuade residents to boycott the September National elections.

The Attack on Coastal Group 16's Base

On the morning of 7 August, in the darkness of the pre-dawn hours, an enemy force of one to two battalions assaulted the Coastal Group 16 base, 70 miles southeast of Danang.

The base, which lies adjacent to the village of Co Luy near the mouth of the Tra Khuc River, was initially struck by an intensive mortar barrage that began just before 0300. The Coastal Group's U. S. advisors--Lieutenant William C. FITZGERALD, USN; Lieutenant Junior Grade Anthony C. WILLIAMS, USN; Chief Engineman Harold H. GUINN, USN; and Boatswain's Mate First Class Leo E. PEARMAN, USN--immediately radioed for help and provided direct assistance as base personnel tried to check the enemy's movements amid a heavy exchange of small-arms fire.

A U. S. Navy craft on patrol nearby--PCF 20--intercepted the distress call, relayed the message to other MARKET TIME units in the area and headed toward the base, arriving about 0315. Soon
arrival, at Lieutenant FITZGERALD's request, the Swift boat began firing on enemy mortar and automatic-weapons sites emplaced on the other side of the river, directly across from the beleaguered base.

By 0330 the overwhelming enemy force had penetrated the base's northern mine field defenses and numerous Vietnamese Navy personnel were already dead, including the Coastal Group commander, Lieutenant Junior Grade Nguyen N. THOM, VNN. Then, as an advance contingent (approximately 300 in number) of the invaders broke through and began overrunning the central sections of the base, Lieutenant FITZGERALD and his assistants moved to their bunker and continued to fire on the enemy troops.

At 0340 PCF 75 reached the scene to lend additional fire support and, five minutes later, the Vietnamese Navy's FCE 10 arrived and began firing on the Viet Cong positions with spotting assistance from Coastal Group personnel embarked in junks along the river. By 0345, however, the base was in virtual enemy possession and communications with the base had deteriorated. At this time, realizing that the advisors' bunker was probably the sole remaining source of resistance within the base complex, Lieutenant FITZGERALD requested an artillery strike on his position and ordered his men to escape to the river. As the men left the bunker Lieutenant FITZGERALD remained behind, providing covering fire for their movements. When Lieutenant FITZGERALD reached the bunker's exit, he
was fatally struck in the back of the head by a round of small-arms fire.

The remaining advisors subsequently reached the river successfully but not before LTJG WILLIAMS was hit in the face and chest by shrapnel; about an hour later he was picked up by a fisherman, transferred to a Swift boat and eventually evacuated to the U. S. Army hospital at Qui Nhon. Meanwhile, the other two advisors were rescued by a Coastal Group junk and, after treatment for minor wounds, returned to the base and made their way back to the bunker where, about 0430, they found the body of LT FITZGERALD.

By this time a number of other units were in the area, including USS CAMP (DER 251), PCFs 15 and 54, and a U. S. Air Force C-47 "Dragon Ship." With CAMP acting as on-scene commander, the units provided counter-fire support, exfiltration patrols and evacuation assistance. The Swift boats evacuated approximately 40 Vietnamese to CAMP, fifteen of whom were subsequently flown by helicopter to the Vietnamese hospital at Quang Ngai.

At 0700 two infantry companies of the ARVN SECOND Division and a company of U. S. troops from Task Force OREGON reached the battered Coastal Group base and launched a counterattack against the Viet Cong units, forcing the enemy to retreat. By 0730 the Allied contingent had regained control of the base.

Besides the Coastal Group commander, 13 Vietnamese sailors
The Trench 19 case following the Viet Cong attack of 7 August.
were killed during the attack and 35 were wounded. In addition, 20 civilians, most of them military dependents, were killed or wounded. At the same time 11 Viet Cong invaders were killed, and 35 Viet Cong suspects who had been in a detention status escaped; three other detainees were killed. All but one of the buildings comprising the base complex were destroyed or damaged.

By mid-morning the base was re-manned by the remaining Coastal Group 16 personnel, augmented by 30 men from Coastal Group 15 and a company-size security unit of Regional Force troops.

Riverine Area Naval Commands

In August the River Assault Groups (RAGs) conducted five operations in the First Naval Zone, 10 in the Third Riverine Area and 19 in the Fourth Riverine Area. The RAG units also performed escort duty, and conducted river patrol, base defense and psychological warfare missions. With a daily average employment of 77 percent of the 166 available craft, the RAG units searched 3,530 junks and 9,940 persons.

During the month, the First Naval Zone's RAG detachment supported various ARVN units in a series of one-day operations conducted along inland waterway areas in Thua Thien province. Although contact with the enemy was generally light, in a two-day sweep which started on the 16th, 12 miles northwest of Hue, ARVN sector forces landed from boats of the detachment captured 17 Viet Cong, killed
10 others, and seized a quantity of weapons and documents.

Throughout the month in the Rung Sat Special Zone, a daily average of 11 craft from RAG 22 and six craft from Regional Force boat companies supported ambush operations conducted by Regional Force and Popular Force elements. In addition, between the 12th and the 31st, the craft supported the VNMC's 3rd Battalion and conducted regular patrols along the Long Tau River and its tributaries.

On 3 August the RAG 22 base adjacent to Nha Be's U.S. Navy facility came under fire during a mortar and recoilless-rifle attack directed primarily at the U.S. base. Although damage to the VNM facility was light, 10 military personnel and five dependents were wounded, five seriously.

In an amphibious assault conducted on 7 August, Long An sector troops, supported by RAG 27 units, landed along the Vam Co Dong River, 14 miles southwest of Saigon. The operation resulted in the capture of two Viet Cong, the detention of four Viet Cong suspects, and the seizure of a quantity of enemy equipment and documents. One ARVN soldier wounded during the operation died later from the wounds.

On the morning of the 10th, seven miles north of Saigon, nine RAG 30 craft on patrol in the Saigon River encountered a Viet Cong troop movement. The RAG commander ordered his craft to beach and