former intensive care unit into an operating room.

MCB 62, working from Camp Haskins at Danang, continued its support of Force Logistic Command (FLC), the Marine's 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion (LAAM) and ASP 2. At FLC, phase II of the permanent electrical distribution was placed on the line; a mezzanine was added to the 7th Motor Transport Battalion supply warehouse; and two more rigid frame buildings were added to their covered storage area. At the 1st LAAM Battalion site, five buildings were completed except for wiring. At ASP 2, one guard tower was erected, the steel roofs for two ammunition pads were placed and the pads compacted.

MCB 128, working from Camp Faulkner at Danang, East, completed 16 projects during the month of February. Major completions included a 1,000 square foot administration building, 5 two-story barracks, and 1 BOQ for the 212th Aviation Battalion. At the Marble Mountain Air Facility, 194,000 square feet of runway was resurfaced and five 40- by 100-foot rigid frame metal buildings were erected. A water treatment plant and supporting buildings were also completed at Camp Tien Sha by the Seabees of MCB 128.

At Hoi An five 16- by 32-foot hoochies were erected by MCB 58 for the Republic of Korea Marines.

The aggressive determination and responsiveness of MCB 121 kept Route #1 open in the Phu Bai/Phu Loc region during the entire Viet Cong Tet Offensive despite deadlined equipment from road mine
damage and enemy harassment.

The majority of MCB 121's vertical effort was directed to the high priority new construction needed to support several newly arrived U. S. Army units. Among the completed projects were a 40- by 80-foot operations bunker which was built to withstand a direct 122-mm rocket hit, 1000 feet of revetments, and 4 additional bunkers. Other projects completed by Phu Bai-based MCB 121 included a bakery, two administration buildings, and one Butler building.
An increased buildup of American Forces in Vietnam brought these MCB FOUR Seabees to the Republic of Vietnam a month and a half earlier. They are unloading baggage and cargo after being airlifted to Camp Haskins, Danang.

The versatility, mobility, and "Can Do" spirit that have become synonymous with the name Seabee were demonstrated during February by MCB 4. The Seabees of MCB 4 had been undergoing technical and military training at Port Hueneme, California for the past four months, with a planned return to Vietnam on 1 April 1968. On 5 February the Battalion was alerted for probable early deployment to Vietnam and within hours after notification, the first part of the battalion was en route; a few days later the entire battalion...
was in Vietnam. The battalion was temporarily segmented to support MCBs 9 and 56 in the Danang area, MCBs 6 and 40 in Chu Lai, and MCBs 8 and 121 in the Phu Bai area.

In addition to the many projects completed during February, numerous significant projects were begun or continued by the THIRD MCB battalions.

At Phu Bai MCB 8 began construction of the 1st MARDIV hospital and continued work on four Butler buildings for Marine Air Group (MAG) 36.

Working from Camp Carroll at Phu Bai in support of newly arrived Army units, MCB 121 was continuing work on three Butler buildings, a data processing facility and a chapel.

During the month MCB 40 spent considerable time repairing small but widespread mortar, rocket, and blast damage caused by enemy offensive actions. These efforts did not disrupt the continuing work on the Chu Lai ASP, which required 750,000 yards of sand for the creation of 24 large berms. MCB 40 was also continuing work on the Quang Ngai hospital.

MCB 53, working from Camp Adenir, Danang, East, was primarily concerned with the construction of the NAVSUPPACT Danang hospital complex. At month's end, the operating rooms, intensive care unit, and wards for the 200-bed expansion project were nearing completion. Other miscellaneous projects under construction at the hospital.
included a urology clinic, a two-story barracks and two storage buildings. MCB 53 was also working on the 1st Logistic Command's 500-man galley and theater, plus 7 quonset huts for the Army's 5th Special Forces.

During the month, MCB 58 was relocated from Camp Haskins to Hoi An to develop critical ROK Marine facilities. Despite enemy harassment and delays caused by the closing of Route #1 from Danang to Hoi An, work progressed at a rapid pace on the 8,000-man cantonment.

The continuing offensive action by the Viet Cong during the month of February resulted in 4 Seabees being killed and 38 wounded.

During the period 1 to 5 February, Gia Le and Phu Bai Combat Bases came under enemy rocket attacks. As a result of one of these attacks the engineering office of MCB 8 was completely destroyed. Both MCB 8 and MCB 121 manned their perimeters during the hours of darkness of this period.

On the morning of 19 February the LCU ramp at Dong Ha received incoming enemy artillery rounds which resulted in three members of MCB 5 being wounded.

The continual harassment of the Dong Ha Combat Base was climaxd on 26 February when 300 rounds of rocket, mortar and artillery impacted on the base. Twenty rounds landed within MCB 5's camp.
and caused extensive damage to buildings and equipment, and resulted in six Seabees being wounded in action.

During an enemy attack on Tam Ky City on 31 January, a 55-man detail of MCB 6 participated in the successful defense of the province headquarters. The MCB 6 detail was credited with 6 enemy killed while only 1 Seabee was injured.

MCB 9's effort during February was considerably hampered by enemy activity and harassment. On 1 February the MCB 9 checkpoint on Route #3 came under small-arms fire. Two Seabees were wounded in a subsequent investigation patrol during which six Viet Cong suspects were captured. On 6 February the lead 5-ton tractor-trailer in an MCB 9 convoy was damaged by a land mine, and on 23 February a 31,000 board-foot stockpile for the Liberty Bridge was destroyed by enemy action.

MCB 128 suffered two men killed in action on 4 February when their jeep struck a land mine near a Marine encampment northwest of Danang.

MCB 62 details were involved in seven incidents of sniper fire or land mines during February; for the most part, damage was light. However, on 17 February one man was killed and four were wounded when a MCB 62 convoy was ambushed and mined on Route #1, approximately two miles south of Hai Van Pass.

On January 30th, during the early stages of the Viet Cong
CONFIDENTIAL

Tet Offensive, MCB 53's Camp Adenir at Danang, East, was mortared and resulted in 17 Seabees being wounded.

*****
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CIVIC ACTION OPERATIONS

The extensive plans and preparations for psychological operations scheduled for the Vietnamese Lunar New Year (Tet) holiday period and thereafter were nullified by the Viet Cong's simultaneous attacks against cities and military installations throughout the Republic on the closing day of January. The vicious attacks were launched in violation of the agreed truce and during the most revered holiday season. Immediate action was instituted to bring to the people of South Vietnam and to the enemy forces the true story of these actions. Some of the major themes stressed were:

1. The enemy's shameful violation of the spirit of Tet after deceiving everyone by their truce announcements.

2. The NVA/Viet Cong leadership misled and betrayed their soldiers.

3. The call for a general uprising was emphatically rejected by the population of South Vietnam which rallied around the Government of Vietnam.

4. The United States was giving full support to the Government of Vietnam in the restoration of public services and the reconstruction of installations destroyed by the barbaric enemy attacks.

During the month there were 94 hours of aerial broadcasts, 384 hours of surface broadcasts and 293,334 leaflets
CONFIDENTIAL

distributed.

The enemy's Tet Offensive presented a fertile psychological opportunity to discredit the enemy and thereby gain and reinforce adherents to the Government of Vietnam. However, the first priority was to strengthen the confidence of the civilian population in the ability of the elected officials to restore security and the orderly functioning of the government.

The President of Vietnam issued a decree establishing a high level committee, headed by the Vice President, to direct and coordinate the activities of all GVN agencies, both civilian and military, in expediting civil recovery from the enemy's treacherous Tet Offensive. U. S. naval forces quickly responded and provided the following support to the GVN's "Project Recovery":

1. Dollar value military supplies: $51,560.00
2. Manpower: 4,735 man-days
3. Transportation services rendered: 20,372 ton-miles

Assistance rendered to the Vietnamese civilian population by the Vietnamese Navy and the U. S. Naval Advisory Group in the form of food, clothing, medical supplies, building materials and other miscellaneous items amounted to $54,663.00. Operations were conducted in 27 locations in the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh area and 6 locations in the Fourth Riverine Area—The Civic Action Team consisted of doctors, dentists, psychological operations and intelligence personnel, photographers and reporters,
as well as security forces. The doctors and dentists conducted sick call, performed minor surgery and dental work, distributed medicine and disinfectants and administered inoculations. The psychological operations personnel distributed food to refugees and other needy people, broadcasted information in response to psychological operations guidance, issued elementary sanitation instructions, passed on information as to how members of the Viet Cong could defect and attempted to help the people solve minor problems. Intelligence personnel mingled with the refugees and collected intelligence information throughout the operations. Approximately 1,500 tons of fresh water was also furnished to seven hamlets visited. In the Mekong Delta the Vietnamese Naval Hospital Ships HQ 400 and HQ 401 performed 23,106 medical treatments and distributed food to 84,650 people during the month.

Individual naval units continued to display the humanistic spirit of the Navyman as they rendered support wherever possible to help the Vietnamese recover; however, the military tactical situation somewhat hindered the progress of Civic Action in many cases. Nevertheless, concerted efforts were made to provide medical assistance to the refugees and materials were furnished to allow them to rebuild their destroyed and damaged homes.

In I Corps Tactical Zone, naval mobile construction battalions reported an increase in intelligence collection among the refugees.
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Although the Seabees were primarily engaged in military construction projects, their contribution was significant in the rebuilding of destroyed homes and roads and in drilling wells.

A Navy Seabee bulldozer clears away wreckage in Vinh Long City following the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive in early February.

On 22 February, Hospital Corpsman Second Class Gene WHEAT, USN, Naval Support Activity, Danang, departed on another of his frequent visits to the Hoa Vang District south of Danang to bring medical assistance to the many villagers. When Corpsman WHEAT did not return, a search was instituted for WHEAT and his assistant travelling with him. Residents of Tau Hanh Hamlet, the site of the
intended MEDCAP, advised the search party that the Viet Cong had ambushed the jeep and killed the two riders. Corpsman WHEAT had lost his life bringing help to those in need.

In their efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in recovering from the effects of the Tet Offensive, GAME WARDEN (TF 116) units contributed $2,120 worth of military supplies and 524 man-days of labor. The units conducted 217 medical evacuations, helped restore several damaged homes, and supplied food, clothing, water, fuel and other necessities to refugees, outposts and towns.

USN Civic Action Statistical Summary
February 1968

PROGRAMS:

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<th>Expenditures (VNS)</th>
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VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS:

527,351

INSTITUTES ASSISTED:

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<td>Others</td>
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PERCENT OF U. S. CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:

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<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other FMAF</td>
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</table>
RVNAF
U. S. civilian voluntary agencies
Average percent of self-help by VN civilians

Percent
32
10
19.2
SALVAGE OPERATIONS

On 3 February a demolition team from Harbor Clearance Unit ONE embarked in IDB-2 arrived at P culo Obi Island off the southern tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and commenced clearing the narrow channel and the LCU beach landing area of obstructions. After two days of extensive demolition work using several shaped charges, 400 pounds of C-4 explosive, and 1,000 feet of primer cord, the demolition team cleared a 90-foot wide channel and the beach landing area of coral and rock obstructions. The team arrived back at Vung Tau on 7 February.

On 5 February fragmentary reports were received by CTF 117 that ASPB-92-3 had sunk in 20 feet of water near the mouth of the My Tho River. The unit, one of two loaned to CTF 116 for a 30-day evaluation with PBR's, suffered an exhaust boot failure, causing the boat to flood and sink. The next morning, YLLC-3, with HCU ONE, Team Four embarked, got underway from Vung Tau and arrived at the salvage site at 1230. The efficient salvage team had the boat completely buoyant within six hours and towed the ASPB back to Dong Tam, arriving at 2355 that evening.

On 6 February YLLC-4, with Team Three embarked at Dong Tam, was temporarily released from the operational control of CTF 117 to sail to Thong Thoi, four miles east of Tan Chau in Chau Doc Province, to recover a sunken PBR for CTF 116. PBR 727, which had received a direct B-40 rocket hit, sank in 40 feet of water.
while moored at a U. S. Special Forces Camp. The PBR was successfully recovered on 7 February.

On 15 February YLLC-4, with Team Three embarked, sailed deep into the area of operations southwest of Can Tho to salvage ASPB-92-1. The ASPB had attempted to beach due to flooding through the bilge system, but it partially submerged to the coxswain's flat. YLLC-4 raised the assault craft later that evening, and the riverine minesweeper was towed to USS ASKARI (ARL 30) at the MRB for repairs.

Efforts to locate ASPB-112-4, which was junk by enemy B-40 rockets on 27 February on the Can Tho River approximately six miles southwest of Can Tho, were severely hampered by swift currents and not knowing exactly where the boat had been sunk. Search efforts by units of TG 117.2, UDT-12 with Aquadarts, EOD team with the AN/PQS 1 sonar set and YLLC-4 were finally successful on the afternoon of 26 February. The sunken ASPB was located approximately 1,000 yards from where it was ambushed. Due to the hotly contested area in which the boat was lost, salvage operations were delayed until the morning of 29 February. About 1800 that evening the lifting straps of YLLC-4 parted, making it necessary to buoy the sunken craft until salvage operations could be resumed on 1 March.

*****
COMMUNICATIONS

Project CLARINET SEAWARD (formerly SEARCHLIGHT—upgrading communications facilities at COMNAVFORV, the Coastal Surveillance Centers and GAME WARDEN bases) showed very little progress during the month of February except for the Vinh Long site. After the destruction of the fixed facilities at the start of the Tet Offensive, replacement communications facilities were installed on the YR-9. The decision was made to install the permanent (CLARINET SEAWARD) equipment in a structure to be erected on the top deck of the mobile GAME WARDEN barge. Construction was started on the Cat Lo site with a firm beneficial occupancy date (BOD) of 15 March.

Task Force CLEARWATER was established in I Corps during the later part of February. COMNAVFORV provided one Lieutenant and one Chief Petty Officer to assist CTF CLEARWATER in establishing communications/operations centers at Tan My and Cua Viet and on the Mobile PEAR Base ONE. The additional communications equipment required for CLEARWATER was obtained by utilizing uninstalled or shelf equipment from COMNAVFORV/COMNAVSUPPACT Danang/III MAF. Programming for the permanent equipment was initiated by COMNAVSUPPACT Danang.

In CLARINET TACK (formerly STARBOARD TACK—the use of communication vans transportable by helicopters) the VHF frequency modifications were delayed due to problems involving frequency
clearances. These problems were expected to be rectified in March.

Project CLARINET RAMROD (formerly BOWLINE--NAVCOMMSTA Cam Rahn Bay) made considerable progress during the month when permanent power facilities, less a no-break capability at the communications center, were accepted by the U.S. Navy on 22 February. The receiver site shifted to a power source provided by the Vinnel Corporation on 24 February. Vinnel power to the transmitter site was 95 percent completed with the exception of the sub-station, which was awaiting the delivery of transformers.

A total of 94,399 messages were handled by the COMNAVFORV Message Center during the month of February. This was a decrease of 1,759 messages from the January totals.

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Rear Admiral James B. OSBORN (right) and Rear Admiral Paul L. LACY, Jr., salute the colors during change-of-command ceremony held at the Naval Support Activity in Danang. Rear Admiral OSBORN assumed command of the Danang naval installation on 5 February.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that in view of the operational situation in South Vietnam, all visits by military and civilian personnel be held to a strictly controlled minimum until further notice. As a result of this directive, several scheduled visits by U. S. Navy officials and other dignitaries were subsequently cancelled.

On the morning of 5 February Rear Admiral James B. OSBORN, USN, relieved Rear Admiral Paul L. LACY, Jr., USN, as Commander, U. S. Naval Support Activity, Danang. Rear Admiral OSBORN assumed his new duties after completing a thorough orientation and indoctrination tour which covered the four Corps Tactical Zones of Vietnam. Rear Admiral OSBORN reported from Washington, D. C., where he served as Ad Hoc Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Study Group.

* * * * *
The personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) on 29 February was 16,386 officers and enlisted men; of this number 1,303 were officers, 3,209 were NCOs and 11,874 were enlisted men. The number of unauthorized absentees stood at 786; this large number was attributed to the inability of personnel to return to their parent commands during the Tet Offensive. There were no VNN personnel discharged as deserters during February.

Military operations associated with the Tet Offensive minimized formal training accomplished during February. An increased use of Fleet Command and logistic lifts units in defensive operations resulted in non-availability of ships for underway training. The VNN Underway Training Unit was scheduled to resume its program in March. Courses at the Vietnamese Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon, were cancelled throughout February while the Naval Training Center, Nha Trang, lost three weeks of training. In their vital sector operations, augmenting Khanh Hoa Province forces, naval training center personnel performed nightly patrols, conducted sweeps, manned listening posts and maintained an excellent defense posture. At the Naval Recruit Training Center, Cam Ranh Bay, one week of training was lost while the personnel were on alert and
maintained a ready-reaction force. Joint operations were conducted with U. S. Army Military Police and U. S. Navy Harbor Defense Units.

**Fleet Command**

During February the Fleet Command had 27.8 ships available daily, maintaining 13 ships on station in MARKET TIME operations, 9 ships on river patrol and 5 ships for static defense and naval gunfire support duty. Fleet Command ships fired 187 naval gunfire support missions, searched 405 junks and 1,838 persons and detained 2 junks and 7 persons.

Fleet Command units continued to distribute "psywar" materials to junks and craft investigated and carried on an extensive civic action program in Saigon. (See page 122). The Fleet Command also assumed responsibility for a refugee camp in the village of Binh Thai, 10 miles north of Qui Nhon, providing security and sanitation facilities while augmenting the food supply and quarters available.

Patrol craft (PCs and PCEs) were utilized in the First, Second and Fourth Naval Zones while Patrol Gunboats (PGMs) were used in all four naval zones and the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). These ships fired 75 naval gunfire support missions during February. In gunfire support missions on 13 and 14 February, PC 06 killed six Viet Cong and wounded or killed seven others who were
carried away. These missions were in defense of the Cau Can Defense Post on the western shore of Phu Quoc Island. On 19 and 20 February, PCE 11 supported Phu Yen Province forces and Coastal Group 23 units four miles west of the coastal group base at Song Cau. Answering the request for naval gunfire, PCE 11 accounted for 9 Viet Cong killed and 11 reported wounded or killed and carried away.

Landing Support Ships (LSSIs and LSIs) fired 25 naval gunfire support missions and provided patrol services in the Third Naval Zone, the Capital Military District, the RSSZ and the Fourth Riverine Area, concentrating their efforts in defense of Delta cities besieged by the enemy during the Tet Offensive. On the night of 5-6 February, LSIL 327 supported Coastal Group 36 and Ba Xuyen Province units on Dung Island in the lower Bassac River. The ships gunfire accounted for 33 Viet Cong killed and numerous others killed or wounded and apparently carried away.

On 9 February, five miles northeast of Can Tho, LSIL 328's gunfire produced a secondary explosion, while killing 15 Viet Cong and wounding 8 others. On 18 February LSSL 226 provided gunfire support to Vinh Long Province units, eight miles northeast of Can Tho, resulting in 15 Viet Cong killed, 7 wounded and 7 individual weapons captured.

While Motor-Launched Minesweepers (MLMs) continued daily sweep operations in the Saigon, Long Tau, Nha Be and Dong Nai rivers,
the Coastal Minesweepers (MSCs) provided much needed gunfire support in the Fourth Naval Zone. MSC 114 fired 14 naval gunfire support missions during February. On 12 February, MSC 114 gunfire killed 18 Viet Cong and wounded or killed 25 others in support of Cau Can outpost on Phu Quoc Island.

LDNN (VNN UDT) were restricted in their operations with U. S. Navy SEALs during February by the Tet Offensive. The LDNN personnel were assigned missions in the Capital Military District, including defense of VNN Headquarters and counter-ambush and patrol duties. On 13 February, three Viet Cong were captured by LDNN who were providing security for a civic action mission being conducted by VNN Headquarters personnel in Gia Dinh Province near Saigon.

Coastal Force

In February, with an average of 194 junks available, approximately 172 were employed daily. Coastal Force units searched 22,333 junks and 72,738 persons; they detained 55 junks and 368 persons.

Coastal group junks from all naval zones were used during the first of the month in defensive, "medevac" and logistic operations to relieve besieged towns and villages after the massive Tet Offensive. The six VNN River Assault Group (RAG) craft, assigned to the First Naval Zone, operated with Coastal Groups 11 and 12 to secure the Cua Viet and Perfume rivers for friendly river traffic and patrol boats. During February heavy contact was made with the
enemy; one LCVP was sunk and one moderately damaged; one Yabuta junk was sunk and another heavily damaged and an LCM was damaged but was repairable.

Coastal Group 12 and RAG boats provided troop and logistic lifts for Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) troops and acted as a blocking force for search and destroy/ambush operations. On 2 February three Coastal Group 12 sailors were wounded at Hue when their junk was attacked during troop-lift operations and a RAG officer was also wounded later that day. The enemy was well-entrenched in the area and intelligence indicated attacks were imminent. On 4 February a RAG LCM, carrying ammunition for resupply of ARVN units in the vicinity of Hue, was attacked by 81-mm mortars and .50 caliber machine gun fire on the Perfume River. One VNN sailor was killed and four others were wounded in this ambush. The LCM, though damaged, returned to the coastal group base under its own power.

Meanwhile, Coastal Group 16, further south, engaged the enemy at two defense posts on 2 and 4 February.

Three Viet Cong were killed and numerous weapons were seized on the 2nd as the coastal group naval gunfire supported the Son Hoi Defense Post, three miles northeast of Quang Ngai City. One and one-half miles to the south, four more of the enemy were killed and three wounded on 4 February when a PF outpost was defended by Coastal Group 16 gunfire. On 6 February Coastal
Group 14 engaged the enemy in a fire fight near Hoi An which wounded three VNN sailors and killed one Viet Cong. Later that day, Operation HONG BANG 2 combined one platoon and four junks of Coastal Group 14 with one PF squad in an area sweep two miles east of the coastal group base. Three VNN sailors were wounded and one Viet Cong suspect was captured along with numerous weapons and ammunition. It was reported that several more Viet Cong were killed or wounded and carried away after the skirmish.

The U. S. advisor to Coastal Group 11 was wounded by small-arms fire on 16 February when the junk he was on was participating in a blocking mission in support of a U. S. Marine Corps operation on the Cua Viet River. The advisor was "medevaced" to Danang and treated for a deep chest wound and later returned to limited duty. Coastal Group 13 that same day was involved in a search and destroy operation in Thua Thien Province, 32 miles northwest of Danang. A Coastal Group 13 party and 30 PF troops launched an attack against an estimated two Viet Cong platoons. A TF 115 PCF provided 81-mm mortar fire in support of the operation. One PF soldier was wounded during the fire fight; numerous blood trails indicated the enemy took dead or wounded from the battlefield. Later intelligence indicated three Viet Cong were wounded and two were killed as a result of this confrontation.

On 17 February two junks of Coastal Group 16 were ambushed while patrolling the Tra Khuc River near Quang Ngai City. One junk was
sunk and one radio, a .30 caliber machine gun, two automatic rifles, one carbine and one M1 rifle were lost. The coastal group commanding officer and three VNN sailors were wounded and two sailors were reported missing in action. On 20 February a river convoy, consisting of four Coastal Group 12 junks, two LCMs and one LCVP, came under recoilless-rifle fire on the Perfume River, three miles north of Hue. One LCVP was sunk but the weapons aboard were recovered. One junk and two LCMs received minor damage and two VNN sailors were wounded in the action.

The combined VNN/USN/USMC complex at Cua Viet received 140-mm rocket and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) artillery fire on 21 February. No rounds landed in the coastal group compound; the USMC 1st AMTRAC Battalion compound received approximately 60 rounds. Secondary explosions occurred in the ammunition dump and one round landed in a village to the south. Coastal Group 11 units assisted in the movement of the civilian casualties; three Vietnamese civilians were killed and six were wounded.

Operation LAM SON 168 was conducted by Coastal Group 12 units, two Ranger groups and Tua Thien Province bakeries on 27 and 28 February, north of Hue. This two-day operation netted four Viet Cong and several documents captured.

Coastal Force units of the Second Naval Zone carried out numerous "mopping up" missions after the initial onslaught by the enemy during the Tet holiday period. Junka ran resupply missions
for the civilian population, the military and civilian police forces of the provinces. Once these forces regained their composure and strength, they began to conduct search and destroy/ambush operations within their areas, seeking, pursuing, yet rarely encountering the enemy.

Yabuta junk landing PF troops during a sweep operation along the South China Sea coastline.

On 17 February Coastal Group 23 units and Phu Yen Province units landed on a peninsula, 15 miles south of Qui Nhon, where a PF platoon had been reported overrun. Fire support from PCE 11,
a TF 115 PCF, and USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409), as well as artillery, provided the landing party with security and support against the Viet Cong. A search of the entire peninsula failed to raise the enemy. A village chief, his wife, a hamlet chief and two PF soldiers were found murdered and their bodies mutilated. One sampan and various amounts of ammunition and weapons were seized although the Viet Cong escaped; 11 PF soldiers were reported missing. On the night of 19-20 February, PCE 11 provided gunfire for a Coastal Group 23 unit making a sweep in Phu Yen Province, 20 miles south of Qui Nhon. Nine Viet Cong were killed and another 11 were wounded or killed but carried away during the operation. Once again on the night of 27-28 February, PCE 11 and Coastal Group 23 teamed up in Phu Yen Province, 10 miles south of Qui Nhon, to capture 28 Viet Cong; 1 VNN sailor was wounded.

Two Viet Cong, a First Lieutenant and an NCO, defected to the Coastal Group 35 "psywar" team in the Third Naval Zone on 3 February. The officer revealed that he had 21 years of service, including three years of officers' school in Hanoi. The Hoi Chans were taken to the Coastal Surveillance Center at Vung Tau for further interrogation.

On 5 February a 40-man landing party from Coastal Group 35 encountered heavy small-arms fire from Viet Cong attacking a village outpost in Phu Vinh Province, two and one-half miles
northwest of the coastal group base. The sailors drove off the Viet Cong, who had assassinated the village chief, killing three of the enemy and wounding one. A coastal group security force remained in the village until sunset to ward off possible recurrent attacks.

That same day a Coastal Group 36 ambush team was inserted near their base to aid a RF company as it pursued an estimated Viet Cong company three miles to the south. The RF company gained contact.
but the Viet Cong quickly dispersed and the RF troops quit the area. The VNN ambush team remained to seek out the enemy. After three hours the team reboarded their craft and were returning to their base when they were ambushed. Supported by TF 116 light helicopter fire team and LSIL 327, the sailors landed again and attacked the enemy. Later reports indicated three Viet Cong were killed and eight wounded.

On 10 February Coastal Group 32/33 units and two vedettes assigned to Vung Tau Naval Base were ambushed eight miles northeast of the city of Vung Tau. The force had been conducting a blocking operation on all waterways east and west of the Vung Tau Peninsula to prevent Viet Cong infiltration. The lead vedette was struck by B-40 rocket fire and automatic-weapons fire; three VNN sailors were wounded. Vietnamese Marine Corps artillery and U.S. Air Force air strikes augmented the junk's return fire. An estimated 25 of the enemy were reported killed by the combined forces. For the next two days junks of Coastal Group 32/33 patrolled the waterways, conducting interdiction fire into the general area of the earlier attack. At 2000 on 12 February, two Coastal Group 33 junks were ambushed; the lead junk took a direct hit by a B-40 rocket in the pilot house. Although damage was limited, a VNN sailor was killed and another was wounded.

During the night of 10-11 February, 49 Viet Cong were captured
by two platoons of Coastal Group 34/37. Sweeping near their base in Kien Hoa Province, the VNN sailors also destroyed numerous bunkers. On 12 February a Coastal Group 34/37 six-man team was attacked, two miles south of their base on the Ham Luong River, while en route to a patrol area to conduct a "psywar" broadcast. Immediately reinforced by two squads of PF troops in coastal group junks, the force returned fire for an hour, evacuating a mortally wounded PF soldier amidst the fray. A TF 116 light helicopter fire team arrived and provided additional gunfire support. One Viet Cong was captured and intelligence reports revealed that 4 Viet Cong were killed and 14 were wounded. Despite the incident the "psywar" team carried out its broadcasting mission in an area south of the action.

With intelligence gained from a Hoi Chanh an operation was conducted by Coastal Group 36 and a 50-man Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) team on the night of 13-14 February. Two coastal group junks landed the PRU team eight miles northwest of the Coastal Group 36 base on the Bassac River. During a one and one-half hour sweep the PRUs were credited with 5 Viet Cong killed and 11 of the enemy with numerous weapons and documents captured. None of the friendly forces were injured.

Again, in the early morning of 20 February, Coastal Group 36 and PRUs combined forces to conduct another successful attack.
on Viet Cong entrenched on Dung Island in the Bassac River. Captured Viet Cong revealed more of the enemy were to arrive at 1000 that morning. A 15-man PRU team remained in ambush while the coastal group units stood by off the island's shore. At 1030 all personnel boarded the junks; one Viet Cong had been killed and nine others, including two Viet Cong infrastructure cadre, were captured.

That same day Coastal Group 34/37 operated with ARVN forces in Kien Hoa Province, two miles north of the coastal group base in an effective search and destroy operation which netted 45 Viet Cong killed. There were indications of numerous others killed or wounded and carried away. The combined forces suffered no casualties; 25 of the enemy and various weapons were captured and 30 bunkers were destroyed.

February 21 proved to be a day fraught with skirmishes. Coastal Group 34/37 conducted sweep operations with district troops seven miles north of their base in Kien Hoa Province, killing 1 Viet Cong and capturing 10 others and their weapons. Coastal Group 35 units in Phu Vinh Province, two miles northwest of their base, came to the relief of province forces under attack. Silencing the enemy, coastal group personnel found one Viet Cong killed while friendly losses were two killed and three wounded. Several weapons and ammunition were seized. On the northern tip of Dung Island, Coastal Group 35 craft and a PRU team conducted sweep operations that yielded nine Viet Cong captured including
a female district commissar. The remainder of the month consisted of light contact with the enemy for the coastal groups.

Junks of the Fourth Naval Zone were utilized to relieve cities and villages in their operational area from the ravages of the Tet Offensive. Sporadic mortar and rifle fire in the cities and in the countryside continually reminded the people of the presence of the enemy. Civilian river traffic was negligible and Fourth Naval Zone junks resupplied the cities as well as transported wounded or ill civilian and military personnel. Offensive operations were limited during the month but psychological operations were carried out with no disruptions.

The Kien An-based junks of Coastal Group 43/44/45 stepped up patrols in the Cai Lon River and Rach Gia Bay. During the month Rach Gia City came under a series of attacks that caused only slight damage but posed ever-present dangers to the people. Housing areas of VNN dependents were damaged to some extent; two dependents were killed and three were wounded on 13 February during one mortar attack.

Riverine Area Naval Commands

At the end of February the RAGs and the River Transport and Escort Group (RTEG) had 225 craft assigned. A daily average of 138 craft were available for operations and 126 were employed. The Viet Cong threat present in the Third and Fourth Riverine Areas
and the RSSZ resulted in increased use of river assault craft for static defense. River Assault Group 22 provided two and sometimes three boats in support of the VNN headquarters' operations. Regional Force river patrol boat companies and RAGs 22 and 28 conducted river patrols and provided support for search and destroy operations in the RSSZ. Operations conducted by the U. S. Army 1st Division in Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa provinces received 200 boat-days of support from RAG 30. River Assault Group 27 provided 223 boat-days of support to operations conducted by the ARVN 50th Infantry Regiment. In Saigon, RAG 24 craft, which were being overhauled at the Eastern Repair Facility, were employed for defense of the Capital Military District. A three-boat detachment from RAG 24 remained at Tan An and was instrumental in the successful defense of that city on 10 February. As a result of the Tet Offensive, RAGs expanded civic action operations to include relocation of refugees and logistic lifts of food and supplies while civilian river traffic was at a standstill.

In Binh Duong Province RAG 28, supporting Binh Duong Province forces during the early stages of the Tet Offensive, contributed strongly to the defense of the provincial capital, Phu Cuong, 10 miles north of Saigon, during Viet Cong attacks on 1 February and on the night of 5-6 February. River Assault Group 28 craft provided fire support, flank security, blocking forces and later,
indirect fire support and illumination. At 2300 on 5 February, a RAG monitor took a B-40 rocket hit that killed two VNN sailors but caused slight damage. The monitor was beached while repairs were made and two days later the craft was returned to duty. On 6 February RAG 28 craft supported the 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron in Operation CHANH NGHIA 121, west of Bien Hoa on the Dong Nai River. Twenty Viet Cong were killed while five others and numerous weapons were captured by the combined forces.

On 10 February three craft from RAG 24 were credited with the successful defense of the national highway bridge at Tan An in Long An Province. The craft joined with U. S. and ARVN forces to defend Tan An City and accounted for 30 Viet Cong killed. On 15 February, elements of RAG 28, one RF company, one ARVN infantry company, one national police company and elements of the RF river patrol company, combined forces west of Bien Hoa for Operation CHANH NGHIA 123. Seven Viet Cong were killed and three were captured along with weapons and documents in their possession.

Meanwhile, RAG 30 craft were operating with the U. S. 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 10 miles east of Saigon along the Dong Nai River. The RAG units conducted search and destroy missions, established waterborne check points, provided fire support reconnaissance for ground troops and established floating night ambushes with embarked Army elements. On 22 February an Army barge convoy,
An Army ammunition barge sunk on the Dong Nai River resulting from enemy attack 10 miles east of Saigon on 22 February.

consisting of eight ammunition barges and two tugs, was attacked on the Dong Nai River, 10 miles east of Saigon. RAG 30 craft proceeded to the scene and found five barges still afloat, two of these burning. Two craft were dispatched to render assistance while the remaining units fired on the ambush area and subsequently put embarked troops and a VNN landing party ashore. Two additional barges sank and one other exploded. As the force conducted a search, RAG 30 coordinated a "medevac" for 13 personnel wounded during the attack. Six Viet Cong were killed. one B-41 rocket
and one AK-47 were captured and a quantity of electric wire and nylon line, suspected to be part of a mine device, was recovered.

Operating throughout the month with the ARVN 50th Infantry Regiment, RAG 27 and RF units made slight but continuous contact with the enemy. On 26 February, Operation AN DAN 55/68, conducted north of Ben Luc, 14 miles southeast of Saigon on the Vam Co Dong River, resulted in four Viet Cong killed and one captured. Several weapons, a quantity of ammunition, a sampan motor, medical supplies and documents were seized.

The RAGs of the Fourth Riverine Area illustrated their effectiveness and versatility during February as they were committed to the defense of the Delta cities. The cities of Vinh Long, My Tho and Can Tho, in particular, were struck by the enemy and the RAGs based near those cities shared in the responsibility for the cities' defense and the ultimate victory over the Viet Cong and NVA. The price paid for repulsing the enemy was impressively slight. Although the number of U.S. and ARVN casualties were unknown, RAG units suffered 2 killed and 11 wounded, with 3 VNN sailors reported missing. The Viet Cong had over 300 killed in the battle of Vinh Long alone.

At Vinh Long the enemy infiltrated the city and, after a mortar barrage at 0250 on 31 January, attacked all government installations. By dawn the city, except for the areas immediately

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surrounding the RAG base and the airfield, was under enemy control. Leaving 40 men to defend the base, the craft of the RAGs 23/31 got underway and were joined by LSSLs 226 and 229, forming one large task force to support the base and friendly ground units in the city and along the nearby canals. During the following week the task force evacuated over 2,500 refugees from the city and surrounding villages to a mid-river island, resupplied the island and the troop units in and near the city, and provided almost continuous gunfire support in the battle for the city.

Vietnamese youngsters and an American advisor view the remainder of one section of Vinh Long after the Tet Offensive.
When the insurgents began fortifying the waterfront area of Vinh Long the heavily-gunned LSSIs and monitors destroyed every building within 300 yards of the river's edge; similarly, the base defense force was forced to destroy the dependent housing area when the Viet Cong attempted to overrun the base by massing troops in the sailors' homes. On 4 February two divisions of the Riverine Assault Force, with two battalions of the U. S. Army's 9th Infantry Division embarked, supplemented the weary defenders; by the 8th the combined force had secured the city and the Vietnamese units turned to the major task of rebuilding.

In the defense of My Tho, RAG 21/33 carried out amphibious assaults with an ARVN 7th Infantry Division battalion and the 7th Reconnaissance Company, conducted gunfire support missions, made ammunition lifts and acted as a blocking force for the ground troops. From the initial attack at 0400 on 31 January until 3 February the Viet Cong continued to pound the city; however, withdrawing that day at 1000, the enemy left over 400 of their dead in the city. My Tho was regained at the cost of 2 VNN sailors wounded, 25 ARVN soldiers killed and an unreported number wounded. Meanwhile, at Can Tho, the craft of RAGs 25/29 patrolled the Bassac River and the Can Tho River, south and west of the city, preventing additional enemy infiltration and supporting defending units of the ARVN 21st Division on the north bank of the river.
On 1 February the monitors of the task force laid down a 100-round barrage of 81-mm mortar fire, killing 40 Viet Cong and repulsing an attack on the ARVN compound. Recalled a few hours later, the craft killed 25 more of the enemy and repulsed a second attack. That same day another river patrol attacked an enemy cargo junk, killing 40 Viet Cong troops attempting to transit the Can Tho River, two miles west of the city. On the 2nd the river patrol team was ambushed by an enemy force, three miles southwest of the city; the patrol team escaped without casualties while killing 25 of the enemy.

At Chau Doc RAG 32 was conducting similar operations for the defense of that city. Ammunition runs from Long Xuyen, troop lifts, blocking force operations and normal patrol duties were carried by this RAG during the first few weeks of February.

Normal RAG operations were not resumed until the second half February; the first half being filled with special logistic lift missions of ammunition, POL, food and personnel. As the cities regained composure, the RAGs turned again to normal patrols, offensive operations and civic action missions. On 16 February RAG 21 units landed at ARVN 7th Infantry battalion and one RF company on two small islands in the My Tho River near the northern edge of Loi Quan Island. As the troops ashore conducted sweeps of the islands, the RAG craft surrounded each island as a blocking force.
RAG commandament symbolizing strength and courage to the people of Republic of Vietnam as it travels a river in the Delta.

The sweep netted 37 Viet Cong suspects. That same day, RAG 31 units resupplied outposts on the Ham Luong River and RAG 25 units lifted supplies to Ca Mau from Can Tho for the first time since the Tet Offensive. Each mission was conducted without incident and the RAG advisors noted the opportunity of immediate exploitation of the "psywar" and civic action programs as the people urgently needed, and wholeheartedly accepted, the aid of the Government of Vietnam.

On 16 February the enemy renewed his attacks on Vinh Long.
and My Tho with little success. At 0200 a mortar attack on Vinh Long was followed by approximately 100 Viet Cong infiltrators. RAG 23/33 personnel accounted for 21 Viet Cong killed as they ambushed the enemy at 0230. At 0730 this same RAG raider team attacked a Viet Cong platoon and six more of the enemy were killed. ARVN units battled the enemy most of the day as fixed-wing and helicopter air strikes were called in on Viet Cong positions. The enemy was finally forced to withdraw, sneaking out of the city under the cover of darkness.

At the same time, My Tho received 100 rounds of 82-mm mortars. No further attempts were made by the enemy to infiltrate and little damage was recorded.

On 20 and 23 February RAG 26/32 units conducted Operation DAN THANG 9 and 11 in Chau Doc Province near Chau Phu City. The combined forces of provincial and ARVN units and RAG craft resulted in 17 Viet Cong killed and numerous weapons captured while friendly casualties were 5 ARVN wounded. Also on 23 February, Operation CUU LONG 71/10 was conducted by RAG 23/31 units and ARVN forces in Kien Hoa Province, 13 miles south-southwest of My Tho. Thirty-three Viet Cong were captured, ARVN troops suffered two killed and four wounded.

**Logistics**

In February the VN: conducted 50 logistical support missions
SEARCHES AND DETentions
BY VIETNAMESE NAVY SEA, COASTAL AND RIVERINE FORCES

SEARCHES

DETentions

CONFIDENTIAL

160
which accounted for the lifting of 4,523 tons of cargo and 11,370 personnel. Tank Landing Ships (LSTs) lifted 1,398 tons of cargo and 5,266 personnel; Medium Landing ships (LSMs) lifted 1,506 tons of cargo and 1,875 personnel; and Utility LANDING Craft (LCUs) lifted 1,619 tons of cargo and 4,229 personnel. The USN Supply Center had a gross effectiveness of 71 percent on a total of 4,397 requests for items and a net effectiveness of 82.9 percent on 3,717 requests for items normally carried in the supply system.

Vietnamese Navy Statistical Summary
February 1968

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During the month of February the six infantry battalions of the VNMC operated in I and II Corps Tactical Zones and Capital Military District. The infantry battalions and the artillery battalion were committed to operations 100 percent of the time. During February the operational control of the six battalions was characterized by constant change. (See page 167).

Until 2 February Task Force A, composed of the 5th and 6th Battalions and Battery C, VNMC Artillery Battalion, conducted operations in II Corps Tactical Zone under the operational control of ARVN forces. That day the 6th Battalion was returned to Saigon and assigned to the Capital Military District. By 6 February ARVN forces had relieved the remainder of Task Force A, the 5th Battalion and Battery C, which also returned to Saigon. On 9 February the task force headquarters and 1st Battalion deployed to Phu Bai in the I Corps Tactical Zone under the operational control of ARVN forces. The 5th Battalion arrived at Phu Bai on 12 February and on 14 February the 4th Battalion and Battery B, VNMC Artillery Battalion arrived at Phu Bai. Thus Task Force A was in force and became actively engaged in the battle of Hue.

Throughout the month these battalions pursued their objectives, gaining ground one day, only to be checked the next. Heavy friendly losses were taken each day while inflicting still heavier losses.
On the enemy. On 24 February the west wall of the city of Hue was secured by the 5th Battalion, while the south wall was being taken by the 4th Battalion. The toll of many lives was paid those days as Task Force A remained, patrolling and sweeping to hold the Citadel, Hue Island and the area to the south of the Perfume River.

On 27 February mopping-up operations were conducted by small-unit patrols of each element of the task force. Weapons and ammunition of such vast quantity were uncovered that the material was either destroyed in place or buried with the Viet Cong bodies. The following statistics illustrate the magnitude and results of the battle operations as conducted by Task Force A at Hue.

**VC/NVA** 622 KIA 29 VC CAPTURED 278 VC SUSPECTS DETAINED

**VNMC** 80 KIA 365 WIA 1 KIA

**US** 1 WIA

**Weapons Captured:**

- 12 Rocket Launcher, Soviet, RPG-2 (B-40)
- 1 Rocket Launcher, Soviet, RPG-7 (B-41)
- 2 Mortar, 60-mm
- 5 Heavy machine gun, ChiCom, 12.7-mm, type 56
- 3 Light machine gun, U.S., .30 caliber
- 1 Light machine gun, U.S., 7.62-mm, M-60
- 18 Light machine gun, ChiCom, 7.62-mm, type 56
- 72 Rifle, assault, Soviet, 7.62-mm, AK-47
- 5 Rifle, U.S., 5.56-mm, M-16
- 18 Rifle, U.S., .30 caliber, M1
- 1 Rifle, Browning automatic, U.S., .30 caliber
- 1 Submachine gun, Danish, M-51
- 2 Submachine gun, U.S., .45 caliber, M-3
- 6 Submachine gun, Soviet, 7.62-mm, K-50
- 50 Carbine, Soviet, 7.62-mm, SKS
- 1 Carbine, ChiCom, 7.62-mm, type 56
- 35 Carbine, U.S., .30 caliber, M1