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MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
AUGUST 1969
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Charts and Photographs</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation SEA IORDS Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giant Slingshot Campaign</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nang Thit Michelai/Cho Gau Canal</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Interdiction Campaign</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Turn Campaign</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Time Raider Campaign</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation SEA IORDS Statistical Summary By Campaign (By USN and V.F. Forces)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation SEA IORDS Statistical Summary By Campaign (Combined results by all friendly forces involved)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Surveillance Force Summary</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Market Time</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Coastal Zone</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Coastal Zone</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Coastal Zone</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Time Units</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Patrol Force Summary</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game Warden, PBR, UH-1B, and OV-10A Operations</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game Warden SEAL Operations</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Mining/Harassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Aiverine Force Summary</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Kien Hoa Province</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN Statistical Summary</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Advisory Group Summary</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.M./VNC Statistical Summary</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations and Civic Action Summary</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN Civic Action Statistical Summary</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Turnover Program and Training Summary</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Abbreviations</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

1. (P) Operation Giant Slingshot ........................................ 2
2. (P) PBR on the Van Co Dong ........................................ 5
3. (P) Monitor equipped with flame throwers ....................... 9
4. (P) PCF's - River incursion ....................................... 14
5. (C) Giant Slingshot Asset Locator ................................ 16
6. (C) Barrier Interdiction Asset Locator ......................... 27
7. (P) PCF's and Huey Gunship ....................................... 28
8. (P) PCF inspects junk while on Market Time operations .... 38
9. (C) Operations in First Coastal Zone ......................... 45
10. (C) Operations in Second Coastal Zone ....................... 49
11. (C) Operations in Third Coastal Zone ....................... 54
12. (C) SEAORDS Operations in Third Coastal Zone ........... 55
13. (P) SEAL's on operations ....................................... 61
14. (C) Sea Float Operations in Fourth Coastal Zone .......... 68
15. (P) SEAL Team going ashore ................................... 81
16. (P) River Patrol Inspection ..................................... 88
17. (P) "Zippo" on operations .................................... 93
18. (P) Vietnamese sailor training with U. S. Navy .......... 120
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of August, Operation SEA LORDS, combining the efforts of elements of the Coastal Surveillance, River Patrol, and Mobile Riverine Forces (the latter for the last time since it was disestablished on 25 August) in coordination with other U.S. and Vietnamese Forces, placed increased emphasis on interdicting enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia. At the same time these forces continued to pacify vital trans-Delta waterways and to harass the enemy in his base areas.

Several changes were made in the various campaigns during the month, the first of which was on 6 August when CTG 116.1 assumed the designator CTG 194.3 and became commander of the Search Turn (Rach Gia) Campaign. At the same time, COMRIVDIV 513 vacated CTU 116.1.3 and assumed 194.3.2 as did COMRIVDIV 553 when he assumed 194.3.2 from CTU 116.1.0. Hal 3 DET 8 assumed 194.3.3 in another change. The OV-10's previously under the operational control of SEA LORDS reverted back to TF 116 although they continued to support SEA LORDS forces. Finally, TF 117 was disestablished on 25 August with the remaining Navy components being redesignated the Riverine Strike Group under Commander Task Group 194.7 and taking over the responsibility for the Song Van Co patrol on 28 August and for the Cho Gao Canal on the last of the month.

Overall activity for the SEA LORDS campaigns increased significantly in August with 585 enemy killed by all the SEA LORDS forces this month, August ranks higher than any other previous month in terms of enemy casualties inflicted and is significantly greater than July when 354 enemy were killed (excluding Search Turn). The same is true for hostile fire incidents which increased from 217 in July to 253 in August. These increased results were not without cost to USN and VNN forces as their casualties doubled from 6 killed and 43 wounded in July to 13 killed and 90 wounded in August.
U.S. NAVY UNITS

ARMORED TROOP CARRIER

UH-1B GUNSHIP

OPERATION "GIANT SLINGSHOT"

MONITOR

RIVER PATROL BOAT

ASSAULT SUPPORT PATROL BOAT

CAMBODIA
Operation Giant Slingshot was initiated to interdict the enemy's infiltration of men and supplies from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia into Vietnam. It is a combined operation involving the efforts of the three major J. S. Navy Task Forces (until TF 117 was disestablished on 25 August), Vietnamese River Assault Groups, and U. S. and ARVN ground troops. During August, an average of 72 PBR's, 29 RAC's, 3 MSM's, and 149 VN craft (for a total of 153) were committed to Giant Slingshot.

Despite the fact that the number of hostile fire incidents (122 in August versus 118 in July) and the number of two boat patrols conducted (1752 in August versus 1765 in July) were similar for the two months, casualties for both sides were up significantly during August. Enemy killed by USN and VN units increased from 147 in July to 216 in August. Similarly, casualties for the Navy forces increased from four killed and twenty-three wounded to ten killed and sixty-nine wounded.

The TACR's for most 194.9 Task Units were modified at the end of July and were in effect throughout the month of August. The realignment was made taking into consideration district boundaries, Army AO's, and artillery fans in the respective areas in order to provide the optimum in coordination and to eliminate any problems of mutual interference. On 28 August, CTG 194.7 (Riverine Strike Force) assumed the TACR for the Song Vam Co between the confluence Vam Co Dong/Vam Co Tay and the juncture of the Vam Co/Soi Rap formerly patrolled by 1 ASPB's of TE 194.9.4. The new boundaries are delineated on the asset locator that follows the incident narrative and SEA LORDS statistics.
The incident narratives which follow have been chosen to provide an overview of activity/combat operations in the Giant Slingshot area of operations:

On the morning of 3 August, VNN RAID 73 units picked up the Duc Hoa District Chief, the Assistant District Chief, the Duc Hoa RF Company 362, and the Duc Hoa District CRIP Platoon from District Headquarters and inserted them on the west bank of the Van Co Dong River across from Hiep Hoa. The CRIP platoon with the District Chief and the Assistant Chief patrolled south into a recently vacated VC base camp located approximately two miles southeast of Hiep Hoa. With the aid of a metal detector, the CRIP platoon recovered a well preserved cache containing 32 82mm mortar rounds, 12 60mm mortar rounds, 19 B-40 rockets and propellant charges, 8 cases of detonators, 2 cases of Chicom grenades, 1 40 lb anti-tank mine, and 1 Chicom dish type claymore mine.

Just prior to midnight on 5 August, two PBR's of TU 194.9.2 were in waterborne guardpost positions ten miles northwest of Tan An (XS 459 732) on the Van Co Tay River when they observed movement on the beach. The PBR's took the area under fire with unknown results and without receiving return fire. The following day, local intelligence sources reported that four VC/NAV were killed in the action, one of whom was shot in the head and another in the abdomen. This information corresponds to troop reports of intestines and blood trails in the area.

In an operation based on intelligence reports of an enemy commo-liaison station located approximately ten miles southeast of Ben Luc (XS 698 625), U.S. Navy SEAL's accompanied by two VNN LDNII's were inserted on the west bank of the Van Co Dong River about a mile east of their objective by LCPL in the evening on 6 August. Taking up positions around the target area, the SEAL's observed a two man armed roving patrol and 16-20 men conversing.
in hootches. At five minutes after midnight, the SEAL's initiated action and ceased fire after 15 minutes to allow firing runs by Seawolves and Black Pony aircraft that had been called in and were holding in the area. Artillery was called in after the airstrikes for illumination of the site while a search was conducted that revealed four VC/NVA bodies along with numerous blood trails, two AK-47's, two K-51 pistols, and 30 kilos of documents. There were no friendly casualties.

In the early evening on 6 August, an Army observation aircraft spotted VC running along a small canal off the west bank of the Vam Co Dong River two miles south of Hiep Hoa (XT 140 042). Seawolves on patrol nearby were vectored to the area and coordinated with a PBR patrol from RTVDIV 552. A LRRP team in ambush positions nearby and the aircraft fired into the area with automatic weapons. The LRRP monitored a burst of AK-47 fire directed at the gunships from a treeline 200 meters to the south and the PBR patrol that was standing by proceeded to the area and placed M-60 fire and 40mm grenades into the treeline. As the gunships departed to rearm and refuel at Hiep Hoa, the FAC observed three more VC running from the area. Artillery was then called in (reaction time of 6 minutes) resulting in one VC killed and two VC probably killed. At this time, the PBR's received 2 or 3 rounds of small arms fire from the east bank of the river and closing the bank returned fire with 40mm and CS grenades. One man seen running away was taken under fire and was observed as he fell into the canal by the PBR patrol and the FAC. By now, two additional patrols of PBR's had moved in to assist, one of which had a LRRP team embarked which was inserted to search for bodies. After insertion, the team heard movement and voices very near their position and initiated contact with claymores and automatic weapons. The
team marked its flanks for extraction and immediately thereafter experienced a large explosion - possibly a booby trap or mine set off when the team shifted positions. One of the PBR patrols placed fire on the team's flanks and moved in for extraction. Due to personnel casualties among the LRRP's, they could not be immediately extracted. Another patrol of boats moved in and PBR sailors jumped ashore to establish a landing zone for the dust off helo while other crewmen administered first aid. Air evacuation of seriously wounded personnel was accomplished with the now returned LHFT providing overhead cover and later placing an additional strike on the contact area. Upon completion of the strike, additional LRRP's returned to the contact area and retrieved the field gear of the wounded in action. Friendly casualties amounted to two U. S. Army troops killed and four wounded (two serious). Enemy casualties were one VC killed and three VC probably killed.

On 10 August, U. S. Navy SEAL's led by a Hoi Chan attempted recovery of two reported intelligence caches. After insertion by LSSC and PBR six miles northeast of Ben Luc on the east bank of the Vam Co Dong River (XS 556 622), the SEAL's patrolled 300 meters to the south where they found 70 88mm mortar rounds in a bomb crater. After extraction, the SEAL's were reinserted 3½ miles down river and found the second reported cache site, however, it had been emptied within the past 72 hours.

In the morning on 12 August, two Seawolves of TU 194.9.8 were placing a strike for U. S. Army Special Forces at Duc Hoa when they were called to support TU 194.9.3 units in contact two miles north of Hiep Hoa on the Vam Co Dong River (XT 415 105). The LHFT expended remaining ammunition, returned to base and refueled, and sortied to the contact area to cover troop
insertion, receiving and suppressing small arms fire in the process. Upon release by CTG 194.9.3, the Seawolves proceeded to assist U.S. Army units four miles southwest of Duc Hoa, placing a strike on a bunker complex with assistance from a USAF FAC. While rearming, the Seawolves were again scrambled, this time to support TU 194.9.1 units who had spotted 8-10 VC on the riverbank of the Van Go Tay five miles west northwest of Tuyen Khoan where they placed a strike. The two Seawolves, during the morning's operations, expended 27,000 rounds of 7.62mm and 70 2.75" rockets. Later in the day, OV-10's from TU 116.4.9 placed an airstrike in a wooded area 8 miles west of Duc Hoa (L3 910 915). Ground units broke contact to allow the airstrike, and heliborne units observed the strike devastate the main enemy position which resulted in 75 VC probably killed.

Just after midnight on the 14th of August, TE 194.9.5.1 units consisting of a VN CCB and two USN ATC's were on routine patrol of the Van Go Dong 6 miles southwest of Tay Ninh with one platoon of ARVN Airborne Ready Reaction Troops when they were called to respond to an enemy attack on an ARVN Airborne base camp. The units made approximately ten firing runs and provided constant illumination for the base camp. Receiving return fire on all runs, it was quickly suppressed. The USA advisor at the base camp coordinated TACAIR, gunship, and artillery strikes in the area where an estimated three enemy battalions were assaulting the base. The Navy was credited with 20 out of the 73 VC killed by body count while suffering no casualties. The ARVN lost 14 killed and had 43 personnel wounded. In addition, the ARVN captured two VC and 42 enemy weapons.

Four PBR's of RIVDIV 592, on routine patrol of the Van Go Dong River ten miles southeast of Tay Ninh, were ambushed just before midnight on 13
August receiving heavy recoilless rifle fire. The units took several hits, suffered personnel casualties, and attempted to clear to the south. Due to communications difficulties, the patrol officer transferred to the cover boat which soon began sinking. The wounded personnel were taken off the cover boat, but the patrol officer was not recovered. Listed as missing in action, he was subsequently declared killed in action. Bronco aircraft were called in and received heavy automatic weapons fire over the target. TACAIR was then requested and placed strikes. An additional PBR patrol was dispatched to assist, and when they arrived on the scene, they received heavy enemy fire which resulted in one of the boats having to beach due to excessive flooding. Weapons and personnel were removed from the beached craft without sustaining casualties. Artillery was called in and RF troops were lifted to the area to provide security. Salvage operations began at first light and by that afternoon, both boats had been recovered and one was helo-lifted to Tra Cu, and the other was towed to Go Dau Ha. Friendly casualties were one USN killed and eight USN and three VNN wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Two PBR's of RIW DIV 534 were on routine patrol of the Vam Co Dong River eight miles south southwest of Tay Ninh (XT 288 377) when they received four B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire at 2025 on 14 August. One of the boats took a B-40 hit which ruptured a fuel tank followed by another hit which ignited the fuel. Crew members managed to extinguish the blaze, but in spite of their efforts, the boat sank in about five minutes. Both boats were able to clear the kill zone prior to the sinking. Seawolves, Broncos, and artillery were called in on the area and alternated strikes. Additional PBR's with RF troops embarked were sent
to the scene to secure the area around the sunken craft, which was later salvaged and sent to Ben Luc. In the action, one USN (one serious) and one VN were wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

While in transit on the Van Co Dong River 16 miles southwest of Saigon, one of the two VN ATC's with ARVN and USA troops embarked took a direct hit in the roll deck just after midnight on the fifteenth of August. The boats beached, and the army units secured the area for dust-off helos. Later analysis of the shell fragments identified the round as a 75mm recoilless rifle round. Friendly casualties amounted to six ARVN killed and 11 ARVN and three USA wounded. There were no enemy casualties.

The following morning at 0222, two VNN RAC and a U.S. Zippo on patrol with TF troops embarked received several hits from enemy rocket and automatic weapons fire 13 miles south of Tay Ninh on the Van Co Dong River (Xt 342 270). The units returned fire and cleared with the exception of the Zippo which flamed down the contact area while the other units returned to Go Dau Ha to medevac their casualties. Seawolves and Broncos were called in and placed airstrikes in the area followed by artillery. TACAIR was requested but was unable to put in a strike due to the low ceiling. Friendly casualties in the action were 2 VNN killed, two USN wounded (one serious), 6 VNN wounded (two serious), and four RF wounded (serious). Enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 17 August, PBR's and VNN RAC provided support for a troop sweep along the Van Co Dong River eight miles southeast of Tay Ninh City, the site of a previous ambush. During the sweep, the troops found one B-40 launcher, five B-40 rockets, two B-40 boosters, one backpack and the burned and mangled remains of three VC. Heavy blood trails in the area indicated that at least three more bodies had been dragged off. There was no enemy contact.
Two TE 194.9.5.1 VAC were in waterborne guardpost positions on the Van Cu Dong River west-southwest of Tay Ninh when an ARVN airborne base camp nearby (KS 114 433) reported that they were under mortar, automatic weapons, and rifle grenade fire at 0205 on 17 August. The units immediately commenced flanking fire north of the camp and a nearby PBR patrol moved into position south of the camp and began flanking fire while two additional PBR patrols were scrambled to ensure against an enemy river crossing attempt. U. S. Army advisors at the camp coordinated fire from afloat units, artillery, and Bronco aircraft. At 0410, the enemy broke contact and retreated to the west, however, the afloat units continued to provide illumination until daylight. A sweep of the battlefield at first light turned up 85 NVA bodies. Two VNS were killed and three wounded in the action along with one USN slightly wounded. General Henderson visited Ben Keo after the battle and expressed his "well done" to TE 194.9.5.1 and OV-10's for assisting the ARVN airborne in repelling the attack.

A debrief by Airborne Advisors revealed that the OV-10's were responsible for repulsing a counter attack by the VC at about 0400.

Four VAC of RAID 71 acted as a blocking force for a sweep by the J. S. Army 5/60th Infantry Battalion troops of the 9th Division along the Van Cu Dong River 15 miles southwest of Saigon (XS 630 709). While in position at 1730 on 18 August, the boats observed 6 VC/NVA at the water's edge pretending to be dead and who attempted to evade as the boats approached to investigate. The units beached and took the enemy under fire killing three and wounding one but were unable to fire on two of the evaders due to the close proximity of friendly troops. However, they were later killed by Army personnel. Upon completion of the sweep, troops ashore had accounted
for 26 VC killed by body count, 6 VC prisoners, and one Hoi Chan. Friendly

 casualties were one USA killed and 6 USA wounded. Ground units also cap-
 tured 17 AK-47's, one B-40 launcher, two X-54 pistols, and six mortar rounds.

 Beginning at 0500 on the 20th of August, VNN RAC of RAID 70 inserted,
supported, and extracted 300 troops from the 25th ARVN Division 18 miles
 southest of Saigon on the Vam Co Tay River (XS 635 624). The troops had
 light contact which resulted in 7 VC killed by body count and one ARVN
 wounded (minor). Five AK-47's were also captured in the action.

 In the evening on 21 August, two PBR's of 194.9.2 inserted a seven man
 Ranger team from the 9th Division, 19 miles south southwest of Saigon on the
 Vam Co Tay River (XS 700 580). A little over an hour later, the team made
 contact with approximately two squads of VC, and Seawolves were requested
 on a standby basis. The team had come across a large complex which was later
 found to be a VC hospital containing 15 beds, a mess hall, and other accommodations.
 Shortly afterward, the troops came under heavy enemy fire, and Seawolves put
 in airstrikes along with Broncos that had been scrambled. A second seven
 man Ranger team was inserted by two more PBR's and still two more PBR's
 moved in to provide a blocking force. Three additional squads of Rangers
 were inserted by helo followed by airstrikes when one of the squads heard
 movements on three sides of their position. There was no further action
during the night, and at first light, a sweep proved enemy casualties to be
four VC killed by body count. Two were credited to the Army and two to
Seawolves. There were no friendly casualties.

 Late in the morning on 26 August, PBR's were approached by children
who showed them the location of one B-40 rocket on the bank of the Vam Co
Dong River 12 miles southeast of Tay Ninh (XT 346 315). Later in the
PCF's conduct high speed river incursion during SEA LCRDS operations.
afternoon, the units discovered three more B-40's and a number of spider holes in the same area, which is directly across the river from a location which Co Dau Ha units use to medevac casualties. Apparently, the enemy was setting up to attack the boats during a dust-off.

Acting on intelligence reports and led by a Hoi Chan, SEAL's were inserted on the Vam Co Dong 16 miles southwest of Saigon (XS 574 776) on 28 August in search of an enemy cache. Among the articles recovered were: 25 boxes of fuze ignitors and detonators, 21 grenades, 20 batteries, 50 electric blasting caps, 100 ordinary blasting caps, 18 cans of 60mm propellant, 12 mines, five satchel charges, 1,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition. It is believed that the area was used extensively as a rear service supply depot for local water sapper units and that the supplies were possibly targeted against the boats that patrol this section of river and for use against Ben Luc Bridge. Also on 28 August, two FBR's of TU 194.9.3 inserted, supported, and extracted LRRP Team 21 on the Vam Co Dong River approximately 2 miles north of Tra Cu. The LRRP's initiated contact with eight VC who were evading an Army troop sweep to the northwest. Three VC were killed by body count, and there were no friendly casualties.

On the 31st of August, FBR's of RIVDIV 573 were conducting a routine canal incursion when they sighted a 55 gallon oil drum at the water's edge seven miles east of Tuyen Nhon just off the Vam Co Tay River (XS 388 774). The barrel contained 227 Chicom "Potato Masher" grenades.
Giant SlingShot Asset Locator

TE 194.9.5.1 (RIVDIV 531)
Tay Ninh Patrol Element
10 PBR's
12 RAC's

TU 194.9.5 (RIVDIV 592)
Upper Vam Co Dong Patrol Unit
(TE 194.9.7.3 - RAID 73)
10 PBR's
1 RAC
17 VNN (until 28 August)

TU 194.9.3 (RIVDIV 552)
Middle Vam Co Dong Patrol Unit
10 PBR's
2 VNN

TU 194.9.6 (RIVDIV 511)
Upper Vam Co Tay Patrol Element
10 PBR's

TU 194.9.4 (RIVDIV 153)
Middle Vam Co Tay Patrol Unit
4 ASPB
4 PBR's
3 RAC's

TU 194.9.1 (RIVDIV 534)
Lower Vam Co Dong Patrol Unit
10 PBR's
3 MSM's

TU 194.9.8 (RIVDIV 53)
HAL 3 DET 4

TU 194.9.7.1 (RAID 71)
3 VNN

Mobile Base II

USS Benefactor (APB-35)
Hang Thit-Nicholai/Cho Gao Canal

Although 194.6.1 (RIVDIV 535) and TU 194.6.2 (RIVDIV 572) were committed to it, activity in the Hang Thit-Nicholai/Cho Gao Canal area of operations (AO) was relatively light throughout the month with only four hostile fire fights recorded. U. S. Navy activity was aimed primarily at establishing a CBP presence on this vital north-south waterway through the use of routine patrols for traffic checks, night waterborne guardposts, psyops, and medcaps in order to bring about firmer GVN control of the area. Support of U. S. Army and Vietnamese forces in the way of transport and blocking forces was also provided. Navy SEAL's participated in a series of operations in response to intelligence on suspected VC POW camps in the area but achieved no success in locating them. There were no US casualties during the period and enemy casualties were 19 killed (two probable), one wounded, and four captured. Specific incident narratives for this campaign will be found in the River Patrol Force section of this summary.

Border Interdiction Campaign
Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef West

Redeployment of two U. S. 9th Infantry Brigades, activation of new VN RAID's, and restructuring of TF 117 to become TG 194.7 prompted a review of Navy assets in III and IV Corps to enhance the interdiction of infiltration from Cambodia at a time when the enemy is possibly attempting to fortify his logistics base capability and to rebuild his personnel structure throughout the Delta. As a result, the Border Interdiction Campaign, an inclusive term for the Tran Hung Dao and Barrier
Reef Vest Campaign was increased in magnitude during August until it approached the Giant Slingshot Campaign in terms of assets committed and tempo of operations. During the month there were an average of 123 river craft assigned to border interdiction operations as opposed to 89 in July. In addition to the 3RD RIVER SOUTH (LST 836) and RIVDIV 591 which chopped to 1042 at the end of July, four additional FCF's from CTJ 115.7.7 arrived at the beginning of August for employment on the western portion of Vinh Te Canal. Four M131 units sailed from Sa Dec for operations with 10M2H arriving on the 13th of August followed two days later by four additional M131 craft and eventually by two ATC's from Dong Tam. On the 21st of August, RIVDIV 575 was detached from YREH 20 located on the Upper Mekong River 11 miles east of Chou Doc (XS 401 855) and assigned to the 3RD RIVER SOUTH which was located near Tan Chou where it could provide optimum support for both border patrol units and Barrier Reef units. At the same time, YREH 20 was moved to the Chou Doc area to facilitate FBR transits of Tran Hung Dao. On the 28th of August, the USS SATYR (ARL 23) moved from the Chou Doc area to the Long Xuyen canal in order to service WAD RAID's 78 and 75 as well as RAB 131 craft.

Despite the build up of friendly forces, the statistics for the month of August indicate that the enemy chose to avoid increased contact. Enemy casualties actually decreased from the 55 killed and eight wounded in July to 32 killed and one wounded in August. USN & VNN casualties changed from 3 killed in July to one killed and six wounded in August. A daily incident narrative for Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef West follows:

The first night in August, four FBR's from CTJ 194.4.4 and 20 Special Forces troops in a waterborne guardpost on the Vinh Te Canal 16 miles north-
east of Ha Tien (VC 630 635) spotted seven VC 100 meters north of their position. Fire was initiated by the USN sniper and followed by fire from the FBR's and SF troops prior to a sweep of the area. During the sweep, a wounded VC threw a grenade which injured the USN sniper and two SF troops, and while trying to assist the injured, a VNN was killed and a USN wounded by a second enemy grenade. After all enemy fire was suppressed, Seawolves out of Vinh Gia medevaced all wounded personnel to Chau Doc. Army gunships and Navy Seawolves placed rocket and machine gun strikes into the contact area, and a sweep at first light revealed two VC bodies bringing the total enemy casualties to four VC killed and three VC probably killed. In addition, two AK-47's were captured in the action.

At just after midnight on 5 August, four VNN junks in waterborne guardpost nine miles northeast of Ha Tien (VC 530 597) reported receiving B-40 and automatic weapons fire from the south bank of the Rach Giang Thanh. The VNN Officer in Charge ordered the junks to open fire, and this return fire landed in close proximity to another waterborne guardpost manned by two VNN PCF's and 20 PF troops who were one mile to the south around a bend in the river. The PCF's returned fire and cleared to the south. The situation was quickly resolved without friendly casualties. A reaction team swept the area of initial enemy contact with negative results.

Late at night on the 15th of August, five Coastal Group 12 junks and 20 SF troops sighted 30 VC moving toward their position on the north bank of the Vinh Te Canal 19 miles northeast of Ha Tien (VC 710 620). The SF troops took the enemy under fire and were supported by the VNN junks. Negative return fire was received, and there were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties are unknown.

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On 21 August, two FBR's in waterborne guardpost positions nine miles northeast-of Ha Tien on the Rach Giang Thanh (VS 532 503) observed one individual approaching from the east late at night. The units commenced fire at a range of 25 feet killing the enemy. A few minutes later a white light and cigarette glow were seen on the west bank of the river which extinguished as the units approached. A firing run was made on the area, and two enemy were probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

The following morning, just prior to dawn, VNIN units in waterborne guardpost 16 miles northwest of Ha Tien (VS 600 710) on the Vinh Te Canal received B-60 and A-1-H7 fire from an estimated 12 VC. As fire was returned, four of the VC were spotted on the north bank. A sweep at first light revealed two blood trails on the north bank and numerous footprints on the south bank. Enemy casualties were three VC probably wounded while there were no friendly casualties.

At 0115 on the 26th of August, a CIDG advisor reported the presence of an estimated battalion size VC force adjacent to the Rach Giang Thanh eight miles northeast of Ha Tien. Two FBR's and one PFC from TE 194.4.1.1 moved into the area to act as a blocking force while Army gunships placed strikes in the area. There was no return fire from the area, and a sweep produced negative results. One CIDG trooper was wounded slightly by helo fire.

At 0645 on 31 August, two FBR's from the Vinh Te Canal Patrol Unit "A" were proceeding east on the canal when they observed two persons waving and heading toward them. One was carrying two AK-47's and the other an ax. The two stated that they desired to Chieu Hoi and that there were nine more in Cambodia who wished to do the same. One of the Hoi Chans asked to fire into the air to signal the other nine, who came to the boats after the signal was
given. All eleven Ho Chans were disarmed, searched, and embarked for Chau Doc where they were turned over to HILC for disposition.

On the morning of 6 August, at the request of the An Phu District Senior Advisor, two PBR's of TU 194.4.6 inserted ten PF troops and a U.S. Army advisor ten miles north of Chau Doc where the Rach Co Lau branches off the Upper Bassac (LT 100 020). The operation was an immediate response to intelligence reports that three VC had just moved into a small village at the location. As a result, two VC (one male, one female) were captured, and one VC suspect was detained. There were no friendly casualties.

Late at night on 9 August, two TE 194.4.8.1 Seawolves using night observation devices sighted two enemy sampans on the Rach So Ha just east of the Upper Mekong, 18 miles northeast of Chau Doc (US 400 958). The five VC spotted on this known enemy infiltration route were probably killed when taken under fire by the helos.

Just after midnight on the 17th of August, PBR's reacting to intelligence provided by Vietnamese authorities were in waterborne guardpost positions nine and one half miles east of An Long (US 566 803). Observing the approach of two enemy sampans, the PBR's called in Seawolves and together they opened fire on the enemy craft killing four VC. The following day during a sweep of the area by PF troops, two VC were captured. There were no friendly casualties.
After a considerable period of relative inactivity, the area around the city of Rach Gia and the group of mountains to the north known as the "Three Sisters" has been the site of continued and recently increased enemy infiltration. To counter this buildup and to interdict the enemy's movement into the Delta, CTU 194.3, consisting of two RVN divisions, a Seawolf team, and an Air Force detachment, was formed and tasked to dedicate 50% of its assets to offshore day and night patrols since intelligence reports indicated seaward infiltration into the shoreline between the "Three Sisters" and the shoreline south of the north of the Song Cal Ion. The remaining 50% were available to respond to Provence and ARVN requests for support and operated in the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Tri Ton, Ba The, Van Ray, and various other adjoining waterways. To reduce travel time to the northern part of the AO, a new ATSB was established at Tri Ton 16 miles northwest of Rach Gia at the intersection of the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Tri Ton Cannals. During July, Search Turn came under the operational control of CTU 116, but since it has once again become an interdiction barrier, the task designator was changed in August to 194.3 as Search Turn returned to operation TRA 1040.

The first significant action of the month occurred on 4 August when two Seawolves from CTU 194.3.3 accounted for five VC killed and one armed VC tank destroyed as they took the tank under fire one mile off the beach 17 miles west northwest of Rach Gia (VS 550 160). At the termination of the flight, two small arms hits were discovered in one of the aircraft.

Just after dark on the following evening, three CTU 194.3.2 PBR's were in guardpost positions on the Vam Ray Canal which leads from the Gulf of Thailand to the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal, 27 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 796 327), when two sampans were sighted. When hailed, the two sampans
opened fire which was then suppressed by PBR's. As they broke their guard-posts to inspect the sampans, the PBR's received and suppressed fire from the south bank and then cleared to the north. After airstrikes by Broncos, Shadow and Spooky aircraft, and a troop sweep, the results of the action were five LVA/VC killed, two A-1's, one rifle grenade, one mine, and 2,000 rounds of A-1 ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties.

In the same general area on the Sot Mot Canal (VS 797 355) during the early morning hours on 8 August, three sampans were sighted and taken under fire by CTU 194.3 PBR's. Under continuous illumination provided by Shadow aircraft, the PBR crewmen inspected the sunken sampans that had gone down in shallow water. Twelve 107mm rockets and fuzes were recovered along with four grenades and a large medical kit. In all, three VC were killed, and three more were probably killed while friendly forces suffered no casualties. One female was detained who was suspected of being a scout for a large enemy unit. She was turned over to the Fourth Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer for interrogation.

Back on the Van Bay Canal (VS 773296) at just after midnight the following day, two PBR's of CTU 194.3 observed a sampan with three personnel approaching their position. Two of the occupants were holding weapons while the third was paddling. At a range of twenty feet, the PBR's took the enemy under fire, and all of the enemy personnel were observed to fall into the water where their bodies were swept away by the fast current. The bodies were not recovered, but it is highly probable that all three VC were killed.

During the night on 12 August, the ATSB and the RF compound nearby at Xien Son received a total of nine rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire.
After the initial four rounds, all units, including the CCB which acts as the operation center, dispersed along the canals in the area. IHFT's were scrambled and were overhead in eight minutes for strikes on Hui Soc Son, a mountain to the southwest believed to be the origin of the hostile fire (VS 23 260). Results of the enemy shelling were one RF trooper killed and three civilians wounded.

The ATSB at Kien Son was hit again by enemy fire along with the RF compound just after midnight on the 16th of August. In addition to 107mm rounds, they also received two B-40 rockets and small arms fire from northeast of the base. Seawolves and Black Tony aircraft were scrambled and placed strikes in the area from which the enemy fire was emanating. Some of the underway FFR's received automatic weapons fire from both banks of the Tri Ton Canal (VS 23 260) which they returned and suppressed while other FFR's reconnoitered by fire along the northeast bank of the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal (vic VS 938 261). Enemy casualties as a result of the action were two VC killed while friendly casualties amounted to two RF killed and two wounded and one civilian killed. Later in the morning at 0620, the ATSB was hit again with two 107mm rounds followed that night by six B-40 rockets and small arms fire at 2330. Seawolves and Broncos were called in to place strikes in the area from which the attack had originated. The only casualty was one J. 3. advisor wounded by small arms fire.

Four FFR's of CTU 194.3.2 were conducting BUSHWACK (combination land and waterborne guardposts) operations with 35 Kien Son RF troops on the night of 18 August when they sighted two sampans on the Luynh Quynh Canal, 15 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 862 240). The sampans, with three passengers each, were taken under fire killing three VC while the others
evaded upstream. Seawolves were scrambled and placed a strike in the area and departed. Several hours later, the units started receiving incoming mortar fire and support was again requested. Seawolves, Spooky, and Delta Hawk aircraft placed strikes into the suspected enemy positions. A troop sweep was conducted at first light with negative results. Items recovered from the captured sampan included 25 homemade grenades, two rifles, a metal container of explosives, three back packs, and some documents.

In the early evening on the 23rd of August, during a single ship visual recon by a Seawolf from CTU 194.3.3, several sampans were sighted beneath a tree, and 15 blue-uniformed men were seen running from the area located 20 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 875 293). A second Seawolf was scrambled, clearance was obtained to place a strike in the area, and the results were two VC killed, nine probably killed, two sampans sunk, and three sampans damaged. A short while later, while providing overhead cover for PBR’s four miles to the southeast, the Seawolves spotted some bunkers, a lean-to area, and several enemy scurrying for cover. A second strike was placed which resulted in five probable kills.

Late at night on the 29th of August, two PBR’s of TU 194.3.2 were in guardpost positions on the Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal 13 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 973 226) when they observed 12 VC approaching from the northeast. When they had closed to 150 meters, they were taken under fire by the PBR’s who received return fire not only from the approaching element but also from a security element located 150 meters to the southeast. Suppressing the enemy fire, the PBR’s called in Seawolves, and the patrol officer directed the strike into the target area. At this time, the CCB from Kien Son arrived on the scene and reconed the area by fire. A troop sweep of the area revealed
four VC killed and provided the capture of one rifle and assorted personal documents. Two U. S. Navy sailors were wounded in the action from a double load explosion of an M-60 machine gun, and one was wounded as a result of a '6-17 grenade launcher jam. All the wounded were treated on board and returned to duty.
Vinh Te Canal Patrol Units
TU 19h.4.3 (RIVDIV 51h), 10 PBR's (YCHS 16)
TU 19h.4.6 (RIVDIV 551), 10 PBR's (YCHS 16)
TU 19h.4.2 (RAID 72) 16 PAC (Chau Doc)
TU 19h.4.6 (HAI 3, DET 5 - 211 (YCHS 16)

Upper Mekong Barrier Patrol Unit
TU 19h.4.7 (RIVDIV 512) - 10 PBR's
Upper Mekong Support Unit
TU 19h.4.8 USS Hunterdon County (LST
TU 19h.4.8 HAL 3, DET 3 - 2H - 636

Barrier Reef West Patrol Unit
TU 19h.4.5 (RIVDIV 515) - 10 PBR's

Binh Thuy Patroil Unit
TU 19h.3.2 (RIVDIV 513) - 10 PBR's
HCM's backed up by Huey gunships set out on a SEA LORDS mission.
MARKET TIME Raider operations consisting of two or more PCF's and supported by helicopters, OV-10, and OV-6A aircraft and U.S. Coast Guard WPB's continued to strike heavily at enemy base areas along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Corp areas during August. The Third and Fourth Coastal Zone Raiders conducted almost 90 separate missions in support of Operations SEA LORD3 and SEA FLOTAT. The Swift boats in addition to conducting H and I fire, and responding to requests for urgent gunfire support and manning of waterborne guardposts, inserted, extracted, and supported ground forces consisting of Underwater Demolition Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, SEALs, PRU's, RF/PP troops and ARVN soldiers.

Enemy initiated hostile fire incidents increased again over July with 43 incidents reported. There were eight USN and one VNN Swift boats and three aircraft damaged in the firefights. Friendly casualties were one U.S. sailor and one Vietnamese sailor killed and eleven U.S. and four Vietnamese sailors wounded.

Enemy personnel losses by combined allied forces increased over July with 93 Viet Cong killed (70 body count and 23 probable), seven wounded, and eleven captured. Enemy material losses also increased over the previous month with 214 watercraft and 445 structures destroyed, 17 craft and 261 structures heavily damaged and two craft captured.

Although these operations continued to achieve maximum damage in secret zones and enemy base areas, the primary emphasis continued to center on the pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula under Operation SEA FLOTAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III.
MARKET TIME Raiders, consisting of PCF's 32, 98, and 100 on the morning of 6 August took targets of opportunity under fire along the banks of the Rach Sau (XS 733028), Rach Bang Cung (XR 760962) and Rach Eoloi (XR 729880) in the area about 17 miles east of Phu Vinh in Vinh Binh Province. The targets had sector clearance and visual recon was provided by the IV Grp Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO). The Swift boats scored heavily as they destroyed 41 structures and 14 watercraft while heavily damaging 20 structures and 28 bunkers. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 8 August, five PCF's and four PBR's conducted area prep fire on Hon Lio Lio Island about 11 miles south-east of Go Cong (XS 9630) prior to the insertion of airborne troops. During the prep fire several secondary explosions were observed. The PRU troops were inserted at 0930 and immediately came in contact with the enemy. Throughout the day and night the Swift boats provided H and I fire and blocking force and received intermittent A/W fire. At 2230 OV-10 aircraft arrived in the op area and the PCF's provided targets and illumination. The Swift boats and PBR's were detached the morning of 9 August following a prep of the area for another troop insertion. PCF 103 received S/A fire hits causing only minor damage and slightly wounding a U.S. sailor. The LHFT and PRU troops killed 55 Viet Cong and captured numerous weapons, ammunition, and documents.
On the morning of 7 August PCF's 32, 59, and 102 entered the Song Lang Nuoc, Rach Sau, Song Ba Dong and Rach Can Ban in Vinh Binh Province taking targets of opportunity under fire about 25 miles southeast of Phu Vinh (XR 7372). The probe of the canals was unopposed and targets consisted of sampans, bunkers, trench lines and small villages. The operation netted 15 water craft, and two structures destroyed, ten bunkers, two structures damaged and 70 ft of trench line caved in.

In the early morning hours of 15 August, PCF's 37 and 100 with 20 PRU's from Huong My moved in for insertion about six miles north of Phu Vinh (XS 470082). While the PRU's swept their objective area the Swift boats provided cover. Although there was no gun damage assessment reported for the PCF's the PRU's killed 10 Viet Cong and captured one VC with several documents. There were no friendly casualties.

The PT MARONE (USCG WPB) and PT PARTRIDGE (USCG WPB) supported by OV-10 aircraft, took targets of opportunity under fire along the Song Ganh Hao about 35 miles northeast of the SEA FLOAT MASTB (WQ 464960) on the morning of 29 August. Firing at a range of 10-1500 yards, the WPB's and OV-10's achieved maximum results. The Bronco airstrikes resulted in four structures and eight sampans destroyed, three structures damaged and one large secondary explosion. The WPB's destroyed 61 sampans, five structures and heavily damaged 60 structures. One Coast Guardsman was slightly wounded by a weapon malfunction while enemy casualties are unknown.
## OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SUMMARY BY CAMPAIGN (By USN & VNN Forces)

### AUGUST 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GIA 7 CLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIER REEF</th>
<th>TRAN HONG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>MANG THIT/NICOLAI/CHO GAO</th>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL (then filled in)
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SUMMARY BY CAMPAIGN
(Combined results by all friendly forces involved)
AUGUST 1969

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<tr>
<th>Enemy casualties:</th>
<th>GIA T SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIER REEF</th>
<th>TRAN HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET TIME RAIDERS</th>
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<td>43 BC 31 EST</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Damaged</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Aircraft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents:</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57 4</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Routine operations continued for Market Time and Stable Door forces during August. The weather was generally good and did not affect surveillance operations during the month. Market Time units retained patrol responsibility in the Game Warden area of operation for the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers during the entire month, detecting over 5,000 watercraft, inspecting 2,322 and boarding another 2,233. There were four craft detained and 15 persons detained while seven craft evaded. Task Force 115 surveillance units detected 142,484 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 47,936 were inspected and another 24,381 were boarded. As a result of these checks, 280 craft and 1,734 persons were detained for violation of restricted areas, possession of contraband, improper personal or craft papers, and other suspicious activities. There were also 59 Viet Cong suspects detained.

Enemy initiated activity remained at a relatively low level during August, the same as the previous month. Although there were intelligence reports citing several significant dates for possible enemy offensive action there were no major engagements. There was a marked improvement in enemy weaponry and marksmanship as 75mm recoilless rifles were used against Sea Tiger forces in the First Coastal Zone and heavy concentrations of claymores and RPG were used against the NSP and "Swift" boats in the Sea Float area of operations. The enemy was hard to find and his general tactics were to cause as much damage as possible.
with the least expenditure of personnel. The general indications at month's end were that the VC/NVA are moving out of the III Corps Tactical Zone and into the IV Corps Tactical Zone. There were no known infiltration attempts of men or supplies by sea during the month.

Task Force 115 units continued to provide naval gunfire and blocking patrols in support of friendly ground operations along the coast and in the rivers and canals. During August one Navyman, two USCG men and one VNN were killed and 14 U.S. sailors, three USCG's, two VNN's, 11 KCF's and one U.S. soldier wounded in combined operations. Enemy losses were 107 confirmed killed, the highest total to date, 42 probably killed, 21 wounded and nine captured.

On 5 August, CDR Paul A. Yost, USCG, relieved CDR Paul P Connolly, USN, as Third Coastal Zone Advisor and CTG 115.3.
OPERATION MARKET TIME

During August there were 614 naval gunfire support, SEA LORDS, SEA FLOAT and SEA TIGER missions conducted, approximately 100 less than in July. Gun damage assessment on these missions was 38.3 percent, up from 31.5 percent for July and comparable to the high of 42.3 percent in May 1969, with the following results being attained:

149 Viet Cong killed (107 body count, 42 probable).
21 Viet Cong wounded.
9 Viet Cong captured.
228 Junks/Sampans destroyed.
732 Structures/bunkers destroyed.
20 Junks/Sampans damaged.
423 Structures/bunkers damaged.

There were 15 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported and taken under fire resulting in 18 watercraft destroyed and 13 VC killed (9 body count, 4 probable), one VC wounded and two VC captured.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 76,265 watercraft. Of these 40,254 were inspected and another 17,974 were boarded. Detection of steel hulled vessels in Market Time areas totalled 669 with 511 being inspected and another 28 boarded and determined to be non-suspicious.
Swift boats conducting Operations SEA FLOAT and SEA LORDS river and canal incursions (Market Time Raiders) in the III and IV CTZ continued to score heavily against the enemy with 88 multi-craft missions being conducted during August. In addition, when the Swift boats in the IV CTZ were not engaged in SEA LORDS missions they were involved in the SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III FYOSOPS campaign in the lower Ca Mau peninsula. These operations are discussed under Market Time Raiders in the Operation SEA LORDS summary and Operation SEA FLOAT summary.

SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 continued routine operation during August, primarily in the IV CTZ in support of Operation SEA FLOAT.

Surfliner operations continued in August in Areas 1, 4 and 6. There were no significant events reported.
FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Weather remained excellent in areas 1 and 2 of the First Coastal Zone during the entire month of August. There were 21,306 detections of watercraft by patrol units, not including detections by Vietnamese Navy units assigned to the First Coastal Zone. Of these craft, 3,148 were inspected and another 6,710 were boarded. There were 42 craft detained and 294 persons detained for violation of restricted areas, improper personal or craft papers and curfew violations.

First Coastal Zone patrols carried out more than 170 naval gunfire missions during August. Of these, 90 were SEA TIGER missions or patrols with 48 reporting no gun damage assessment due to darkness, heavy foliage or no troops available to sweep the area.

A SEA TIGER mission was conducted near the mouth of the Truong Giang River (BT 158536) on the morning of 2 August with UDT 13, Det H, EOD Team 70 and Duffel Bag Team (CTE 115.1.5.1) embarked in PCF's 15 and 39 while the security force, RAG-32 were embarked in Coastal Group 14junks. The operation commenced with helo gunships prepping the area and was followed by the insertion of the security force and the EOD, UDT and Duffel Bag Teams. The ground forces swept to the south destroying major bunker complexes as spotted by an O-1 observation aircraft. One bunker was destroyed with two VC inside after they could not be convinced to come out. A small amount of fresh food and cooking utensils were found and destroyed. The Duffel Bag Team implanted a sensor field along a known VC infiltration
point. Also destroyed were 20 major bunker complexes, one claymore mine and two fishing nets. There were no friendly casualties while two VC were probably killed.

On the night of 6 August PCF 75 and PCF 79, while on normal SEA TIGER patrol established a night observation/waterborne guardpost on the Truong Giang River about 15 miles southeast of Danang (BT 168544). Shortly after the post was established four VC trying to sneak up on PCF 75 were taken under fire and probably killed. Heavy A/W fire was then received and suppressed as the Swift boats exited to the northeast. After reversing course, the PCF's sighted six VC in uniform and took them under fire while heavy enemy A/W and S/A fire was again received and quickly suppressed. The PCF's then cleared the area safely with only minor material damage. There were no friendly casualties while seven VC were killed (2 body count, 5 probable).

PCF's 75 and 79, EOD Team 70, UDT 13 Det H, CG-14, RAG 32 and helo gunships participated in a SEA TIGER mission on 7 August to conduct a sweep of the eastern tip of Lang Dong Island and a smaller island to east about 14 miles south-southeast of Danang (BT 170539/ BT 159537). The EOD and UDT Teams were inserted on the small island and they destroyed several bunkers without any enemy opposition. They were then extracted and reinserted along with the CG-14 security force on the eastern tip of Lang Dong Island. The security force swept to the west and provided a blocking line while the EOD and UDT Teams destroyed bunkers and various fishing equipment. The ground
forces were extracted at 1500H without incident. There were no friendly casualties while two VC were probably killed. The day operation netted 54 bunkers, two structures and numerous fishing weirs, traps and nets destroyed.

Early on the morning of 20 August PCF 61 responded to a request from an AC-119 aircraft for a SAR operation for a reported downed aircraft about 33 miles southeast of Danang (BT 5848). A systematic search of the area and questioning of Vietnamese civilians fishing in the area failed to reveal any trace of the aircraft and the mission was terminated.

A SEA TIGER mission commenced at noon on 22 August when PCF's 39 and 65 inserted an EOD, UDT and VNN Landing Teams about 16 miles southeast of Danang on Lang Dong Island (BT 168542). The VNN landing team swept the area while the EOD and UDT Teams conducted beach reconnaissance and fired at targets spotted by a helicopter gunship. The UDT and EOD Teams were extracted while the VNN Team established a night observation post. One VC walked into the observation post at 1800 and was killed. The team then withdrew to the north and were extracted. The afternoon operation resulted in 18 bunkers, 14 structures, two sampans and a fishing trap destroyed, and one M-16 rifle and 50 pounds of rice captured. Two large fires were ignited and there were no friendly casualties.

While on normal SEA TIGER patrol of the Truong Giang River on 23 August, PCF 39 and PCF 65 took targets of opportunity under fire
about 18 miles southeast of Danang (BT 161518). The "Swift" boats accounted for 20 watercraft and two structures destroyed and three bunkers damaged. There were no friendly casualties while enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 27 August a SEA TIGER mission was conducted utilizing POF's 15 and 101, UDT 12, Det H, an EOD and a Duffel Bag Team and a VNN Landing Team with helo gunships providing air cover. The VNN Landing Team was inserted on Lang Dong Island about 16 miles south-southeast east of Danang (BT 143531) to establish a security perimeter. The EOD, UDT and Duffel Bag Teams were then inserted and destroyed bunker complexes along the shoreline while the Duffel Bag Team implanted sensors. The troops were then extracted and reinserted about one mile to the southeast to allow Duffel Bag personnel to perform maintenance on a sensor string implanted on a previous operation. The troops were then extracted without incident while the helo gunships returned to the first location and took uniformed VC under fire killing nine (7 body count, 2 probable). The return of close support aircraft to an AO shortly after the departure of friendly forces proved to be a lucrative tactic and will be used in the future. The morning operation resulted in the destruction of 61 bunkers, four structures, four fishing weirs, four fishing traps, one 250-pound bomb and numerous food supplies and utensils. In addition, there were two large secondary explosions. There were no friendly casualties.