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MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
SEPTEMBER, 1969

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COMMANDER
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VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
SEPTEMBER 1969

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Charts and Photographs</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giant Slingshot Campaign</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Interdiction Campaign</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Turn Campaign</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverine Strike Group</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Time Raider Campaign</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary (USN &amp; VNN Forces)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary (Combined results by all friendly forces involved)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Coastal Zone</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Coastal Zone</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Coastal Zone</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Market Time</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Stable Door</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game Warden SEAL Operations</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Harassment/Attack on Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Clearwater</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN Statistical Summary</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Naval Shipyard</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN Civic Action Statistical Summary</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### LIST OF CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>(P) CV-10 Aircraft</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>(P) Mobile Base II</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>(P) &quot;Swift&quot; Boats</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>(C) Operations in the First Coastal Zone</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>(C) Operations in the Second Coastal Zone</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>(C) Operations in the Third Coastal Zone</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>(C) Market Time Raider - SEA LORDS Operations in the Third Coastal Zone</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>(C) Market Time Raider - SEA LORDS Operations in the Fourth Coastal Zone</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>(C) Sea Float Operations in the Fourth Coastal Zone</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>(P) &quot;Rocket Boat&quot;</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>(P) Ferro-cement Junk</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>(P) ACTOV Trainee</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>(P) Coast Guard WPB</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Navy AV-8B "Bronco" aircraft provide fast and powerful air support for Operation SEA LORDS throughout the Mekong Delta.
Operation Sea Lords Summary

Operation Sea Lords, which began on 18 October 1968, is a continuous overall effort which has several principal operational parts: Giant Slingshot/Barrier Reef East (CTG 194.9), Tran Hung Dao/Barrier Reef West (CTG 194.4), Search Trun (CTG 194.3), Market Time Raiders (CTG 194.5), Riverine Strike Group (CTG 194.7), and Breezy Cove (CTG 194.2). Sea Lords main objectives have been: (1) to interdict infiltration from Cambodia by placing naval units along infiltration routes; (2) to clear and open Delta waterways; and (3) to penetrate long held enemy areas with reiver operations.

Now, after nearly a year of Sea Lords operations, naval forces have succeeded, along with the Army and Air Force, in contributing to the interdiction of supplies coming into Vietnam from Cambodia and to the return to government control of the rivers in the lower Delta and various VC strongholds. To date, more than 3070 VC have been killed and 500 tons of munitions and supplies in caches found and destroyed.

Perhaps even more important than these statistics are the intangible results such as inhabitants along the waterways being able to move about with greater freedom and safety and the fact that areas once controlled by the VC are now open to economic development. Waterways, once used with impunity by the enemy, are now closed to him, backing up his supplies which now take him longer to get through. This, in turn, has lessened the frequency and duration of enemy "high points."

The Mang Thit Campaign (CTG 194.6), which began on 18 July 1969, had as its basic objective the pacification of the area adjacent to the canal in order to stimulate the resettlement of this area and the promotion of the government image. This campaign terminated 20 September the initial objectives having
been achieved. During the tenure of naval units, traffic on the Mang Thit/Nicolai Canal doubled from approximately 1,000 units to 2,000 units per month. There also was a noticeable pacification improvement as evidenced by numerous hooches being built in previously uninhabited areas, the enthusiastic response of people along the canal bank to the PBR presence, and the increased response to medical aid missions. During the first twenty days of the month, PBR's of RIVDIV 535 made no significant contact with the enemy and were chopped to CTU 194.4 and relocated to YRBH 20 in the vicinity of Chau Doc.

As an extension of Sea Lords and in support of the Fourth CTZ pacification program, Operation Breezy Cove was activated on 25 September. The mission is to implement USN Game Warden type PBR Operations on the Song Ong Doc in An Xuyen Province in order to prevent enemy infiltration, movement, and resupply along the inland waterways in the Song Ong Doc area in order to enhance the government of Vietnam's pacification program. Active Vietnamese Navy participation will begin during late October or November pending future PBR turnovers.

On 24 September, the USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 785) arrived in the vicinity of the Song Ong Doc from Rach Gia with HAL 3, DET 6 embarked to provide support for the off loading, positioning, and outfitting of the amm pontoons that were consolidated into an Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB). RIVDIV 572 arrived from Binh Thuy on 26 September and assumed designator CTU 194.2.1 commencing operations on 28 September. They were joined on the 30th by 2 ASPD's, 3 ATC's, and a Monitor which became CTU 194.2.3.

On 28 September, the District Chief, Song Ong Doc, who had been in WBGF position for several nights in order to observe two young ladies who had recently moved into town to set up shop, was forced to send them back to Saigon.
Apparently, these young ladies had heard in Saigon that the Navy was moving in (to Song Ong Doc) and wanted to be there firstest with the mostest. There were no casualties reported on either side. Xinh Loi!
A Navy Seawolf helicopter lands on the flight deck of Mobile Base II anchored at Tan An. The base serves units engaged in Operation Giant Slingshot.
**Giant Slingshot Campaign**

With over 118 USN and VNN craft committed to the Giant Slingshot Campaign along with U.S. and ARVN ground troops, this campaign continues to be the most active and effective of the SEA LORDS interdiction barriers. Conducted on the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers, Giant Slingshot forms a natural barrier around the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia which protrudes into Vietnam and is an enemy sanctuary only 35 miles west of Saigon.

Intelligence reports continue to come in describing the difficulty caused to the enemy by the constantly patrolling units not only in terms of physically preventing his freedom of movement, but also denying him adequate weapons, foodstuffs, and medical supplies.

During the month, increased river bank activity and river crossing attempts in the daylight hours suggests that certain areas of the Vam Co Dong are so difficult to cross at night due to the constant pressure of KLV Div units that the Viet Cong prefer to attempt crossing during the hours of peak sampan traffic.

Compared to the previous months, Giant Slingshot in September was extremely quiet. Hostile fire incidents which had been averaging 130 per month for the past six months, dropped to 56 in September. Enemy KIA's (BC and EST) correspondingly decreased from 363 in August to 146 this month while friendly casualties decreased from 36 killed and 204 wounded in August to 33 wounded in September.

At 2215 on 3 September, two PBR's of TU 194.9.1 inserted a company of U.S. Army troops nine miles southwest of Ben Luc (XS 722 662).
FBR's was backing off the beach, small arms fire was received from the northwest and a sampan with five occupants was detected pulling into the bank 20 meters away. As the friendly units opened fire, they received grenades and small arms fire in return wounding two Army troops. Enemy casualties were considerably greater since their losses were: five killed; one sampan destroyed; and two AK-47's, a K-59 pistol, and a large amount of medical supplies captured.

About mid-day on 5 September, while on a routine patrol on the Vam Co Tay River 5 1/2 miles northwest of Tan An (XS 480 700), two PBR's of TU 1%4.9.2 were hailed by a water taxi because two men on the taxi desire to rally. Surrendering an M-1 carbine and a 30 round magazine, they stated that there were other VC in the area who might also want to rally. The PBR's returned to base for loudspeakers, and one of the Hoi Chans made a live broadcast in the VC base area with negative results. Before taking the Hoi Chans to Tan An Chieu Hoi Center, the PBR's pulled into the Hoi Chans' village so they could talk to their families and friends. The PBR's received an enthusiastic welcome from the villagers.

That afternoon, on the Vam Co Dong River, PBR's of CTU 1%4.9.3 on routine patrol two miles northwest of Tra Cu received from three to four rockets and light automatic weapons fire from the east bank. The bulk of the fire was directed at the cover boat which took a rocket hit on the port side of the coxswain flat below the armor plating resulting in three USN and one VNN wounded (boat captain seriously). The PBR went out of control and beached on the west bank as the other PBR's returned fire and remained in the area to support the beached boats. Four to six VC were seen evading the area and were taken under fire with unknown results. A Seawolf and FAC both arrived
on station and proceeded to place strikes in the contact area which were followed by artillery. Thirty-seven minutes after the initial engagement, a PBR patrol and VNN ATC that had been scrambled arrived with a platoon of army troops for insertion. The troops swept the contact area and found fresh trails, ambush positions on the bank, and two bunkers which they destroyed. After a strike by an OV-10 that had arrived on the scene, plus an additional strike by a second Seawolf, the VNN ATC pulled the beached PBR clear. Enemy casualties for the engagement were 1 VC killed and 1 VC probably killed.

Two PBR's of the Upper Vam Co Tay Patrol Unit, acting on local intelligence, inserted, supported, and extracted 36 PRU troops on the Rach Bach Chan 4 miles southwest of Moc Hoa (WS 975 890) on the morning of 6 September. The troops located two arms caches containing 500 Chicom grenades, 40 B-40 rockets and assorted small arms ammunition.

Acting on intelligence that VC sappers were operating in the area, VNN RAC of RAC 22 embarked a battalion of ARVN troops and inserted them on the Vam Co Dong River 14 miles southwest of Saigon (XS 592 795) on the morning of 9 September. During the sweep, the troops located a cache buried in tin boxes which consisted of: 6 boxes of TNT; 1,000 pounds of C-4; 224 60mm mortar rounds; 216 82mm mortar fuzes; 150 B-40 rockets; 100 B-40 boosters; 31 mines of various types; 16 hand grenades; 10 AK-47's; and 31 boxes of AK-47 ammunition.

All the material in the cache was in very good condition, and it is estimated that the cache had been in place less than seven days. There was no enemy contact.
Operating on SEAL intelligence, SEAL Team, DET GOLF, Golf platoon, squad BRAVO conducted interdiction of a reported special supply convoy on 14 September 3½ miles south southeast of Ben Luc (XS 629 710). While in waterborne guardpost position, the SEAL's observed a large sampan containing approximately 12 men exit the canal. They allowed the craft to reach mid-stream before initiating contact. The sampan was sunk by direct M-79 hits, and 25 kilos of personnel effects and one kilo of documents were recovered from the water. Enemy casualties were 6 VC killed while three SEAL's were wounded. PBR support and artillery illumination was called for, and the PBR's made firing runs along the river bank and then cleared to the opposite bank. A SEAL platoon from Alpha squad was inserted at 2245 and patrolled inland observing numerous blood trails and fresh footprints on both sides of the canal, but they failed to gain contact.

During the afternoon of 16 September, two RAID 71 units attached to TU 194.9.3 extracted a U.S. Army platoon directly across from Tra Cu (XS 479 986) and reinserted them a mile downriver (XS 487 974) at the request of 3rd Brigade units. Once ashore, the troops swept inland toward an area where a USA scout team had made recent contact with 3 VC during which one Army man was seriously wounded. The sweeping troops discovered 3 VC bodies, 3 NVA ponchos, assorted clothing, cooking utensils, and 50 wooden planks.

On 17 September, while in night waterborne guardpost three miles west of Ben Luc (XS 575 752), four PBR's of TU 194.9.1 observed three VC in a sampan exit a nearby canal. The sampan was taken under fire killing four VC and capturing four AK-47's. One USA trooper was wounded seriously when he was hit in the left shoulder by automatic weapons fire. He was dusted off to the 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon.
Three days later, four different PBR's from TU 194.9.1 were in night waterborne guardpost positions four miles northwest of Ben Luc (XS 554 810) with a U.S. Army company. Eight to twelve VC were spotted and taken under fire by the troops after which they were extracted to allow the PBR's to take the area under fire and a Black Pony air strike. The troops were then reinserted for a sweep which discovered 4 VC bodies.

Two Upper Vam Co Dong Patrol Unit PBR's inserted U.S. Army troops eight miles south of Tay Ninh (XT 244 353) prior to daylight on 22 September. After only a few minutes ashore, the troops reported seeing five lights and 15-20 persons moving 200 yards to the northwest of their location (XT 242 355). Seawolves were scrambled and were overhead in five minutes making M-60 and 40mm firing runs. Afloat units remained in the area as a reaction force, and as they patrolled along the bank, they discovered a small cache containing an AK-47, four B-40 rockets, and a small amount of AK-47 ammunition. Results of the action were three VC killed and three probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

On the 28th of September, combined units of RAID 70, 71, and RAD 151, while in night waterborne guardpost position with a U.S. Army platoon, observed three VC on the riverbank opposite their position on the Vam Co Dong River seven miles southwest of Ben Luc (XS 723 660). The three VNN craft opened fire and caught the VC in a crossfire while receiving negative return fire. Artillery was then called in after which the units returned to the area and spotted three bodies near the water line. There were no friendly casualties.

In a turnabout is fair play routine, ASPB units of 194.9 "psyopsed" one of the Viet Cong's newest psyops devices. These units were in waterborne...
guardpost position 8 miles northwest of Tuyen Nhon on the Vam Co Tay River (X5 187 843) on 29 September when they observed movement on the river banks. They broke position and found 2' by 2' floats with VC leaflets attached.

After close examination, the floats were picked up, and the area was reconed by fire with negative results. The floats were returned to Tuyen Nhon where the leaflets were removed and turned over to NILO. The favor was then returned as US/VN leaflets were attached to the same floats which were then returned to the original position and released on the following night.

Two units from RAID 71 and RIVDIV 151 in support of a U.S. Army platoon on 29 September discovered 225 pounds of TNT in \( \frac{1}{2} \) pound blocks packaged in six crates. The condition of the crates and explosives indicated that they had been cached for a considerable length of time. The Army units were led to the cache site 100 meters from the bank of the Ben Luc River 2½ miles north of Ben Luc (X5 638 798) by a Kit Carson scout who had recently Chieu Hoid. The cache was located in the bottom of a bomb or artillery crater.
Border Interdiction Campaign

Task Group 194.4 had an average of nearly 120 USN and VNN craft assigned during September. Interdiction operations were conducted in the Tran Hung Dao area of operations which included approximately 22 WBGP's with 300 RF/PF troops placed nightly increasing to 35 WBGP's at month's end, the locations of the sites being determined by current intelligence, by recommendations of local commanders, and by analysis of historical intelligence to determine previously used infiltration routes or areas. Ten PBR's and four to five RAC's were employed during the month to carry out interdiction operations on Barrier Reef West.

In an effort to tighten the interdiction barrier and because of the seasonal flooding with its resultant water table that has inundated large areas compounding interdiction problems, a new tactic for this particular area came into use during September. Sampans were utilized by friendly troops to extend the WBGP front and thus challenge the enemy at his own game. Under the present rules a squad size, three sampan, independent WBGP is positioned 300 meters from the PBR's thus permitting a much wider dispersion of waterborne interdiction forces. At the end of the month, conventional WBGP tactics were further altered by the use of single boat WBGP's throughout the Tran Hung Dao/Barrier Reef TAOR. PCF's, VNN Junks, PBR's and RAC were assigned geographical sectors in which they changed station randomly. These assigned craft were complemented by troops, sampans, air boats, and Kenner Ski Barges in order to achieve maximum probability of detection and countering enemy infiltration.

In additional changes, on 13 September, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) arrived off Ha Tien to support RIVDIV 532 and provide other assistance as feasible for operations in Ha Tien TAOR and assumed designator TU 194.4.9 with TU 194.4.8.1, DET 3, embarked to provide air support in western Tran Hung Dao.
On 15 September, RAD 132 relieved RAD 131 in Operation Tran Hung Dao and chopped to CTG 194.4 as RAD 131 returned to Dong Tam. On 27 September, HAL 3, DET 9, consisting of two UH-1B gunships arrived at YREM 21 (WS 392 895) and assumed CTE 194.4.5.1 and will operate primarily in support of Barrier Reef West.

Two PBR's of TU 194.4.4 were in WBGP on the Vinh Te Canal six miles southwest of Chou Doc (WS 049 796) on 4 September when they observed 50 or more enemy troops in a column of 20 to 25 sampans approaching from the east moving west. The PBR's opened fire and requested artillery illumination. After forty-five minutes, artillery illumination had still not been received, and Black Pony aircraft in the area made illumination runs with negative sightings, however, visibility was very poor due to rain. Enemy troops were believed to have retreated across the Cambodian border one mile to the northwest.

Three days later, a mile down the canal (WS 035 787), two additional TU 194.4.4 PBR's were in WBGP when they observed one sampan crossing from south to north. The PBR initiated fire and destroyed the sampan. Three enemy were killed and two grenades, an NVA uniform, four ponchos, a first aid kit, and some articles of clothing were found in the sampan.

Still another mile farther to the west on the Vinh Te Canal (WS 020 788), TU 194.4.4 PBR's in WBGP observed two VC in a sampan with two VC swimming alongside crossing the canal towards the north on 19 September. When the VC saw the PBR's, they attempted to evade and were taken under fire and were killed. At this time, the PBR's received scattered small arms fire from unknown positions to the south resulting in very slight damage to one PBR. Enemy casualties were 4 VC killed. There were no friendly casualties.
VNN junks and a Coastal Group 44 reaction team in WBGP the following night 13 miles northeast of Ha Tien on the Vinh Te Canal (VS 600 634) sighted approximately 20 persons to the north of their position proceeding south. When the reaction force opened fire, they received return automatic weapons fire as the enemy evaded north into Cambodia. A sweep conducted later by the reaction force with Black Pony aircraft orbiting to the south of the canal produced negative results. Enemy casualties were estimated as three VC killed while friendly casualties were one VNN killed and one VNN slightly wounded.

While on Cambodian border patrol, units of MINDIV 113 on 11 September sighted a funeral float drifting down the Mekong River 13½ miles northeast of Chou Doc (WT 210 030). One unit followed the float until it was 17 miles east northeast of Chou Doc (VS 380 930) where it ran aground and was partially destroyed. The remains of the float were towed into the river and destroyed by M-79 fire.

Two ATC’s of RAD 132 were in waterborne guardpost position 15½ miles northeast of Ha Tien on the Vinh Te Canal (VS 645 635) on 19 September when two persons were observed in the vicinity of an abandoned hootch near their position. A sniper opened fire and shot one man through the head and is believed to have hit the other one. A sweep at first light revealed large amounts of blood on the ground near the hootch. There were no friendly casualties.

PBR’s of RIVDIV 512 were in WBGP positions in the early morning of 24 September on a small canal off the Vinh Te Canal 21 miles southeast of Chou Doc (VS 870 560) when they spotted two groups of VC/NVA approximately 200 yards apart. The first group, which was 200 yards from the PBR’s, evidently
sighted the 512 units as they were observed setting up mortars. The PBR's initiated fire on the first group and received sporadic AK-47 fire in return. A USN OV-10 was diverted and was overhead in five minutes. Placing multiple strikes in the contact area, it obtained one secondary explosion. The OV-10 was relieved by an LHFT which also placed a strike in the area. A morning sweep by CIDG troops produced negative results with only miscellaneous equipment located. Enemy casualties were 10 KIA/KBA (Proo). There were no friendly casualties.

In the early morning on 26 September, a VN outpost in the Tien Binh district 5½ miles southwest of Chou Doc (WS 049 798) was reported under attack by 50 VC. An LHFT of HAL 3, DET 3, was scrambled and sent to the scene where it searched the area with negative results. Meanwhile, personnel manning an NOD approximately two miles away (WS 088 799) reported moving lights were seen about 1½ miles southwest of their position (WS 075 782). The LHFT then made a low level reconnaissance using its landing lights and observed four or five sampans with 10-15 people aboard. With clearance from the province and concurrence from CTG 194.4, the LHFT placed multiple machine gun and rocket strikes in the area. Enemy losses were 5 VC killed (Prob) and 2 to 5 sampans sunk or damaged (Prob) while there were no friendly casualties.

Junks of Coastal Group 42, while proceeding to WBGP on 27 September on the Vinh Te Canal about 13 miles northeast of Ha Tien (VS 572 640 to VS 585 635), received two B-40 rounds at an estimated range of 10 meters. The units returned fire for 20 minutes, then one unit cleared the area to evacuate two wounded VNN. At that time, the remaining unit received A/W fire. A few minutes later, an LHFT arrived on the scene to provide close support. The LHFT made five firing runs and received A/W fire on all runs.
The LHFT cleared the area as an LAFT arrived to provide support and illumination for a ground sweep, which showed that an estimated five men has been in ambush position approximately 200 meters to the north and an estimated company sized unit had beaten down the undergrowth. It is believed that the ambush was planned as a diversion for an enemy crossing which had been prevented in the intended area. Enemy casualties are unknown while friendly casualties were two VNN wounded (one serious).

On the evening of 28 September, PBR's of RIVDIV 514 sighted three sampans each carrying two persons 150 feet from their WECG position 6 miles west southwest of Chou Doc on the Vinh Te Canal (WS 037 790). The PBR's initiated fire with illumination provided by an LHFT with unknown results. Several minutes later, fire was once more initiated. A sweep discovered 2 VC bodies and one sampan. The two enemy bodies appeared to be under sixteen.
Two "Swift" boats tow a third damaged by enemy fire during the incursion as gunners watch for enemy ambush positions.
Search Turn Campaign

Task Group 194.3 with an average of 30 PBR's and four Seawolves assigned continued routine sorties, waterborne guardposts, and interdiction patrols in Kien Giang Province and the Gulf of Thailand, in addition to supporting the 21st ARVN Division in the "Three Sisters" area. Commencing on 12 September, the Search Turn AO was broken down into the following areas of responsibility: (1) RIVDIV 554, TU 194.3.5, to patrol Kien Tan, Kien Tinh, and Kinh Binh Districts out of Rach Soi; (2) RIVDIV 513, TU 194.3.1, to patrol the Song Cai Lon, Kien An District, and the lower Gulf out of Rach Soi; and (3) RIVDIV 553, TU 194.3.2 to patrol Kien Son and Kien Phung District including the upper Gulf out of Kien Son.

During September the enemy suffered 76 killed by Search Turn units which is two more than the previous month. However, this was accomplished while reducing friendly casualties from 4 killed and 10 wounded in August to 2 killed and four wounded in September. The following incident narrative are typical of activity in the Search Turn AO.

On 6 September, two PBR's of RIVDIV 553 supporting 21st ARVN Division operations sighted and took under fire three swimmers crossing from east to west on the Luynh Quynh Canal 18 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 861 238). Seawolves were diverted from their patrol and placed air strikes while the PBR's provided illumination. The PBR's and Seawolves both received return fire from the banks and returned and suppressed same. As the Seawolves departed station, Black Ponies arrived and placed additional air strikes. A troop sweep at daylight turned up four VC bodies, a small amount of clothing, and some freshly used medical dressings. There were no friendly casualties.
On 11 September, two PBR's of RIVDIV 513 in WBGP on the Song Caï Be 11 miles southeast of Rach gia (VR 178 888) observed two sampans approaching their position after curfew. The number of occupants could not be determined due to the extreme darkness. The sampans were taken under fire and a subsequent search of the area resulted in the capture of one VC suspect and one sampan. In addition, one VC was probably killed and a sampan destroyed while there were no friendly casualties. Also on the 11th in a typical Seawolf mission, two Seawolves on southern coastal patrol were cleared by CTG 194.3 to strike targets of opportunity in a designated target area 18 miles southwest of Rach gia (VR 940 810). The results were seven structures destroyed and eight damaged, seven sampans destroyed and led damaged, and four VC probably killed.

Two RIVDIV 553 PBR's were in WBGP positions on 14 September when they sighted six unoccupied sampans floating toward their position on the Vam Ray Canal 24 miles northwest of Rach Gia. Taking the sampans under fire resulted in several secondary explosions. At the same time, small arms fire was received from the west bank, which was returned and suppressed. Seawolves were scrambled and arrived on the scene after the PBR's had engaged in a second firefight. The Seawolves placed a strike which was followed at daybreak by a troop sweep. A search of the area and the sampan wreckage produced one VC body and indications that six more were probably killed. In addition, three AK-47's, two cases of AK-47 ammunition, two B-40 rockets, one M-16 rifle, ten M-16 magazines, and four pieces of web. There were no friendly casualties.

An unfortunate accident occurred on 15 September when Seawolf 302 of TU 194.3 crashed into the Gulf of Thailand during a scramble takeoff in a rain squall. The two pilots were wounded (one seriously) and the two crewmen were killed.
PER's 677 and 679 of RIVDIV 513 were in WBGP on the Cai Lon River 20 miles south southeast of Rach Gia (MR 200 772) on 20 September when the after gunner on one of the boats was hit in the chest by an enemy grenade which then fell on the boat's pump covers. The quick thinking gunner quickly retrieved the grenade hurling it back into the rippa plam bush from which it eminated. The grenade exploded probably killing one VC.
Riverine Strike Group
(Task Group 194.7)

The remnants of the now defunct (as of 25 August 1969) Mobile Riverine Force consist of River Assault Divisions 13 and 75 and continue operational commitments as the Riverine Strike Group (RSG) within the Operation SEA LORDES organizational structure as depicted in the following chart:

**OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION**

```
+-----------------------+
| TF 194                |
| "SEA LORDS"           |
| VADM ZUMWALT          |
+-----------------------+
| TG 194.0              |
| FIRST SEA LORDS       |
| RADM FLANAGAN         |
+-----------------------+
| TG 194.7              |
| RIVERINE STRIKE GROUP |
| CAPT BLAIR            |
+-----------------------+
| RIVRON 13             |
| CDR MURPHY            |
| RIVDIV 131            |
| LT KAHN               |
| RIVDIV 132            |
| LT CONNOLLY           |
| RIVDIV 151            |
| LT BARTLETT           |
| RIVDIV 152            |
| LT SCARBROUGH         |
| RIVDIV 153            |
| LT LOPEZ              |
+-----------------------+
| USS BENFOLD (APF 35)  |
| LCDR SOLOMON          |
| EOD TEAM              |
| LTJG WELLS            |
```

Captain Carvell Blair, formerly Commander Task Force 177 and River Flotilla ONE, assumed primary duties as the Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Navy Amphibious Task Force 217, with additional duties as Commander Task Group 194.7 and on the staff of Commander River Patrol Flotilla FIVE, in charge of River Assault Craft matters.
Limited operations by the Riverine Strike Group, as compared with the large scale, extensive, and relentless offensive activity of the Mobile Riverine Force, continued during September. Riverine Assault Operations in support of various PRU, ARVN, and RF troops were conducted in areas in Kien Hoa, Go Cong, and Dinh Tuong Provinces. These troop insertion and extraction operations were conducted on request of the respective unit U.S. advisor and usually developed on short lead time. Reconnaissance in force operations in support of the 6/31 Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, U.S. Ninth Infantry Division in the Can Gio District of Long An Province were carried out. As began last month, RSG units continued patrol and interdiction operations on the Song Vam Co, Rach Cat, Bach Cac, and Song Nha Be. The Cho Gao Canal became a CTG 194.7 operating area on 1 September, and an average of six assault craft were on patrol there. Emphasis in all areas was given to inspection as 8448 persons and 25,565 persons were checked.

Operations were in general routine, and contact with the enemy was very light or non-existent in all operating areas except on the Cho Gao Canal. Five enemy ambushes were sprung on RAC along this waterway during September whereas none are recorded for the other areas. Casualties were light again this month—enemy casualties were listed as 9 Viet Cong killed; friendly casualties were one USN killed, and six USN and 4 VNN were wounded.

Disposition of RAC in the Giant Slingshot and other campaign areas continued as in previous months as shown in the accompanying table which depicts the situation on the last day of September.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation/Location</th>
<th>Assault Division</th>
<th>ATC</th>
<th>ASPF</th>
<th>M80</th>
<th>CCH</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Refueling</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>117</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(1) F – flame thrower
(2) Utility craft are HMS

RAC were ambushed on the Cho Gao Canal on two successive nights.

At 2050 on the 4th, RAD 132 craft on patrol came across several sampans.

As soon as the area was illuminated the patrol received 5 B-40 rockets and A/W fire from both banks at a position 5½ miles east of My Tho (MW 595 438).

Fire was returned and suppressed with unknown enemy casualties. ATC-9 took 3 rocket hits and 3 Navy men were wounded in the action. Again, the next night, RAC received rocket fire from both banks of the canal 4 miles south-east of My Tho (vicinity NS 569 432) as ATC 23 took 3 hits and ZIPPO 2 took one hit. The patrol suppressed the fire and the ZIPPO flamed the area. Later investigation revealed that 3 VC were killed; one Vietnamese sailor was slightly wounded.

A U.S. Navyman was killed at 0525 on 5 September when a single enemy mortar round made a direct hit on the flight deck of ATC 22 (RAD 132) as it was tied up to Pier Charlie at Dong Tam. The security watch was mortally wounded and three other sailors received wounds.
At 2130 on the 17th, RAC were again ambushed on the Cho Gao Canal. One B-40 rocket struck ZIPPO-1 resulting in minor damage and no personnel casualties. Just after midnight on the 24th, RAC on the Cho Gao interdiction patrol received 10 B-40's and A/W fire from a 300 meter long ambush position on the south bank in the vicinity of KS 565 432. Two RAC received hits resulting in light material damage and 3 U.S. and 3 Vietnamese sailors wounded. Subsequent reports indicated that 8 Vietnamese civilians were asphyxiated as the ZIPPO flamed the ambush area to suppress enemy fire. Another ambush erupted at 2300 on 26 September as RAC on the Cho Gao Canal received B-40 and A/W fire 8 miles northeast of My Tho (KS 637 472). Fire was returned and suppressed and an embarked reaction team inserted. Three USN were wounded while enemy casualties were unknown.

RAC of RAD 152 inserted 6/31 Infantry Battalion troops along a canal in Long An Province. During late morning of the 27th, the troops, with the aid of a Hoi Chanh 3 miles east of Can Giooc (KS 879 720) discovered a 450 pound cache of explosives. EOD personnel destroyed the rusted and deteriorated rockets and primers in place.
Market Time Raider Campaign

Enemy base areas and fortifications along the navigable waterways of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones were hit frequently by the combined sea, ground, and air punch of the "Swift" boat river incursion operations. Employing two or more PCF's and supported by helicopter, OV-10, and OV-6A aircraft and USCG WPB's, the III and IV Coastal Zone Raiders conducted 78 missions in support of operations SEA LORDS and Sea Float during September. The "Swift" boats, in addition to conducting H and I fire and responding to requests for urgent naval gunfire support and manning of waterborne guardposts, inserted, extracted, and supported ground forces consisting of Underwater Demolition Teams, Explosive Ordnance Teams, SEAL's, PRU's, RF/PF troops, MSF and ARVN soldiers. Enemy initiated hostile fire incidents decreased from 43 in August to 25 during the month of September. These were suppressed on all occasions except when nearness of friendly forces prevented return fire in the area. There were no U.S. or VNN "Swift" boats damaged in the missions while one Seawolf supporting the operations received minor damage, and seven U.S. sailors were wounded during the month.

Enemy personnel losses by combined allied forces increased over August with 109 Viet Cong killed (80 body count, 29 probable), 10 wounded, and 22 captured. There was a decrease in enemy material losses over the previous month with over 100 watercraft and 254 structures damaged and six craft captured.

Although these operations continued to produce maximum damage in secret zones and enemy base areas, the primary emphasis continued to center on the pacification of the Ca Mau peninsula under operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III.
A new tactic utilized by Market Time Raiders include a drifting waterborne guardpost wherein two PCF's drift downriver with the current to intercept VC traffic. Another tactic is the utilization of the lead PCF of three or more PCF's as a decoy. When transiting the river, the lead PCF proceeds out ahead at maximum speed steering a zig zag course. The remaining boats stay in a column formation at a speed approximately 500 RPM's less than the lead boat. Upon reaching a distance of approximately 2,000 yards ahead of the others, the lead PCF returns and then commences his run again. The rationale is to lure the enemy into thinking only one "Swift" boat is on patrol. If shot at, all PCF's converge at a point on the opposite bank and saturate the area with 81mm mortar fire.

On 3 September, PCF's 54, 24, 28, and 59 and the PT GREY (USCG WPB) embarked two companies of RF/FF troops (vicinity XR 521 643) about 50 miles southeast of Can Tho. The units then proceeded to a small canal (XR 476 622) just south of the Kinh Quan Chanh Bón and after prepping the beach with .50 caliber machine gun fire, inserted the troops. The troops made light contact with the enemy; however, the close proximity of friendlies preclude the "Swift" boats from providing gunfire support. Shortly thereafter, the RF/FF troops were extracted and disembarked at XR 485 636. The units then exited the canal without further incident. The Sea Lords mission resulted in eight sampans, four structures, and two bunkers destroyed. There were no friendly casualties while four VC were killed and seven VC captured.

The PT GREY (USCG WPB) and PT CAUTION (USCG WPB) conducted a Sea Lords mission on the afternoon of 4 September about six miles southeast of Thanh Phu (XR 76 95). The WPB's entered the Kinh Bo Loi taking targets of opportunity under fire and firing at a VC machine shop. During the engagement, small arms fire was received and suppressed. The afternoon operation resulted
in four bunkers, 21 structures, and eight sampans destroyed and 13 structures heavily damaged. In addition, several small fires were ignited. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties are unknown.

On the night of 4 and 5 September, PCF's 63 and 64 inserted a Kien Hoa Province Kit Carson Scout platoon (KCS) on the Co Chien River in Base Area 49C about six miles north of Phu Vinh (XR 461 082). Following the insertion, the "Swift" boats stood by to provide support as necessary. The scouts were extracted at 0200, 5 September and returned to Ben Tre. The "Swift" boats made no contact with the enemy, but the KCS captured four VC suspects and destroyed 200 feet of trip wire and 200 gallons of gasoline. There were no friendly casualties.

At 0615 on the morning of 14 September, six PCF's and the USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) got underway and proceeded to the Song Ong Doc (VQ 805 985) where 60 RF were embarked on the "Swift" boats. The troops were inserted on the south bank of the Song Ong Doc (VR 910 007) and swept east and then south (to VQ 918 998) where contact was made with a two squad size enemy force. In the ensuing firefight, seven VC were killed and two VC were captured along with numerous weapons, ammunition, and field gear. Continuing the sweep, one large rice mill and 200 kilos of rice were destroyed. Three PCF's provided mortar support for the troops while the other three "Swift" boats with UDT embarked destroyed river barricades in the vicinity in preparation for future PBR operations. During the operation, the IST provided H and I fire while Seawolves providing air cover took targets of opportunity under fire. The troops were extracted at 1530, and all units exited the river without further incident. There were no friendly casualties while enemy losses were 12 VC killed and three captured. There were three structures destroyed.
and four heavily damaged. One 30 foot sampan loaded with cardboard boxes was destroyed. One of the detainees indicated that the VC were holding a meeting, and the RF troops had surprised them, and two of the VC killed were hamlet level cadre.

On the night of 22 September, three PCF's proceeded up the Song Ong Doc to the northeast corner of the Kinh Ba Kheo (VR 889 002) where PCF 17 dropped out of the formation and inserted an RF company, UDT, and PF personnel to establish a night guardpost. PCF's 103 and 25 continued up the river about 2,000 meters to simulate a night patrol, then reversed course and along with PCF 17 returned to the Song Long Doc to standby. The troops took a sampan under fire when it did not respond to a call to stop for a search and wounded two civilians. The "Swift" boats returned up the river, embarked the wounded, and returned them to Song Ong Doc for treatment. One man was identified by another detainee as a VC. The river traffic increased after the second trip by the PCF's; apparently, the operators thought the troops had been extracted. One sampan was called over for a search and at first slowly approached the troops then attempted to evade to the opposite canal bank. It was taken under fire and destroyed, and the four occupants were killed. During the night, 15 other persons and their motorized sampan were detained. The troops were extracted at 230315H, and all units exited the river without further incident. There were four VC killed and one VC captured while sixteen civilians were detained as curfew violators. One sampan was destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

On the night of 25 September, PCF's 63 and 54 inserted Kien Hoa Province PRU's off the Hau Luong River about 12 miles northeast of Phu Vinh (XS 540 170). The "Swift" boats then waited to render support as necessary. A short time later an emergency call for fire was received from the Kien Hoa PRU Advisor
whose forces were receiving heavy enemy A/W fire. The "Swifts" reacted quickly, and the enemy attack was suppressed. The troops were extracted at 0300 the next morning by PCF 63 while PCF 54 fired H and I in the area evacuated by the troops. There were no friendly casualties while four VC were killed and two VC captured. One field hospital was destroyed and documents were captured.
## USN & VNN

### OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SUMMARY BY CAMPAIGN

#### SEPTEMBER 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GIANT</th>
<th>BARRIER</th>
<th>HANG SEARCH</th>
<th>TURN TIME</th>
<th>RIVERINE STRIKE GROUP</th>
<th>MANG THIT CAMPAIGN (Tora. 20 Sep)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLINGSHOT</td>
<td>RETF</td>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>TANT</td>
<td>29 BC &amp; 41 BC &amp; 46 BC &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54 EST 35 EST 28 EST 3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Enemy casualties:

- **Killed**
  - 56 BC & 63 PRGB
  - 0
  - 3 BC
  - 41 BC
  - 48 BC

- **Wounded**
  - 2
  - 1
  - 1
  - 10
  - 0

- **Captured**
  - 3
  - 0
  - 12
  - 0

**USN & VNN casualties:**

- **Killed**
  - 0
  - 0
  - 1
  - 0
  - 1

- **Wounded**
  - 11 USN & 2 VNN
  - 2 USN & 3 VNN
  - 3 USN
  - 7 USN
  - 6 USN & 4 VNN
  - 1 USN

- **Captured**
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0

- **Missing**
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0

### Enemy material losses:

- **Destroyed**
  - **(1)**: 8 Junks & sampans
  - 0
  - 0
  - 31
  - 82
  - 90
  - 2
  - 0
  - **(2)**: 91 Structures
  - 0
  - 13
  - 109
  - 219
  - 3

- **Captured**
  - **(1)**: 1 Junks and sampans
  - 0
  - 2
  - 2
  - 1
  - 0
  - **(2)**: 10 Weapons
  - 0
  - 6
  - 11
  - 0
  - **(3)**: 50 Ammunition (rounds)
  - 0
  - 100
  - 100
  - 60
  - 5
  - **(4)**: 1 Rice (tons)
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0

- **Damaged**
  - **(1)**: 6 Junks & sampans
  - 0
  - 7
  - 107
  - 5
  - 0
  - **(2)**: 30 Structures
  - 0
  - 17
  - 110
  - 88
  - 0

### USN material losses:

- **Destroyed**
  - **(1)**: 1 Surface craft
  - 1 USN
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - **(2)**: 0 Aircraft
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0

- **Damaged**
  - **(1)**: 4 Surface craft
  - 1 USN
  - 0
  - 0
  - 0
  - 5 USN
  - 0
  - **(2)**: 0 Aircraft
  - 0
  - 0
  - 1
  - 0

### Hostile fire incidents:

- 49
  - 1
  - 13
  - 28
  - 25
  - 4
  - 1
### COMBINED

**OPERATION SEA LORDS statistical summary by campaign**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GIANT SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIER REEF</th>
<th>HUNG DAO</th>
<th>SEARCH TURN</th>
<th>MARKET RAIDERS 29 EST</th>
<th>RIVERINE STRIKE</th>
<th>MANG THIT CAMPAIGN (Term. 20 Sep)</th>
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<td>31 BC &amp; 41 BC &amp; 9 BC</td>
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<td>b. Wounded</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>(1) Junks &amp; sampans</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>4 USN</td>
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<td>(2) Aircraft</td>
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<td><strong>Hostile fire incidents:</strong></td>
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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

Market Time had Stable Deor forces continue routine operations during September. Market Time units retained patrol responsibility in the Game Warden area of operations on the lower Bassac and Co Chion rivers during the entire month, detecting 5,388 watercraft, inspecting 1,920 and boarding another 2,474. There were seven craft and 20 persons detained with no reported incidents of evading craft in the rivers. Task Force 115 surveillance units detected 119,167 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. This is more than 20,000 fewer detections than in August; adverse weather conditions in the First and Second Coastal Zones caused the decrease. There were a total of 33,180 inspections and 18,693 boardings during September. As a result of these checks 236 craft and 1364 persons were detained for possession of contraband, violation of restricted areas, improper personnel or craft papers and other suspicious activities. There were 32 Viet Cong suspects detained in addition to the above.

Enemy activity during the entire month of September remained at a generally low level as during the previous two months. Increases in enemy activity predicted for the latter part of September failed to materialize.

On 1 September, Market Time Barrier Aircraft reported a modified SK-6 Cau Nu class trawler in the Gulf of Thailand at position 09-25N, 103-37E about 100 miles west of Song Ong Doc on course 320 degrees true at a speed of 8 knots. On initial sighting the trawler
was observed to have a green hull, white deckhouse and white canvas cover astern and appeared to be heavily loaded. The aircraft commenced covert surveillance and ready alert aircraft were launched to maintain the barrier integrity. The contact was designated 1F1 by the Commander Coastal Surveillance Force. Shortly after the initial detection the trawler changed course to a southerly heading, approximately 100 miles off the coast until past Ca Mau Peninsula when it changed course to a northerly heading toward the Paracel Islands.

The USS WILKES (DD 441), USS GEORGE H. MACKENZIE (DD 836) and USCGC SPENCER (WHEC 36) took station on the trawler and maintained a continuous covert surveillance. At 031400 SEVENTH Fleet Units assumed surveillance responsibility and all Market Time units returned to normal patrol duties. On the evening of 6 September the Seventh Units lost contact with the trawler when she entered the Paracel Islands in the vicinity of Lincoln Island. A possible infiltration attempt was aborted.

Task Force 115 units continued to provide naval gunfire and blocking forces in support of friendly ground operations along the coast and in the rivers and canals. During September one U.S. Navyman and one U.S. Coast Guard man were killed and 11 U.S. sailors were wounded. Enemy losses were 79 confirmed kills and 39 probably killed, 27 wounded and 18 captured.

At 1150 on 31 August while enroute from An Thoi to Ka Thin, PCF 62 on a heading of 035 degrees magnetic crossed into Cambodian
waters (VS 220 440). At coordinate VS 260 530 small arms fire was received but was not returned. As soon as the officer in charge realized he was in Cambodian waters he altered course to 140 degrees magnetic to clear the area as soon as possible and entered South Vietnamese waters (VS 330 480). The PCF penetrated approximately six miles inside Cambodian territory.
FIRST COASTAL ZONE

The first half of September found several of the patrol stations in area 1 and 2 vacant due to heavy weather and as a result there were 13,475 detections of watercraft which was nearly 8,000 less than during August. Of these craft, 4,991 were inspected and another 3,725 were boarded. There were 32 craft detained and 270 persons detained for curfew violations, improper personal or craft papers and violation of restricted areas.

First Coastal Zone patrols participated in more than 160 naval gunfire support missions during September. Of these, 57 were SEA TIGER missions or patrols with about half reporting no gunfire damage assessment due to heavy rain, darkness, heavy foliage or no troops available to sweep the area.

On the morning of 1 September PCF's 65 and 79 while on a normal SEA TIGER patrol inserted a Vietnamese Navy landing team about 15 miles southeast of Danang and provided security while the team made a sweep to the east. After destroying bunkers and an ammo/medicace cache the team was extracted and reinserted in two groups about three miles to the southeast where they swept toward each other and then to the east. The team detained three Vietnamese females and destroyed bunkers in the area prior to extraction and the PCF 65 took several structures under destructive fire. The morning operation resulted in the destruction of 10 bunkers, four structures and three sampans. There were no friendly casualties while three Vietnamese females were detained and turned over to Coastal Group 14 (CG-14).
On the morning of 5 September, PCF's 13 and 15 inserted an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) and PCF's 39 and 75 inserted RF troops off the Song Thu Bon for a combined sweep through coordinates BT 143 535 and BT 153 535 about 15 miles southeast of Da Nang. While the "Swift" boats provided security the ground forces destroyed bunkers in the sweep area and observed four large secondary explosions. The troops were extracted at 1400 without incident. There were no friendly casualties while one VC was probably killed. The sweep resulted in 45 bunkers, three structures, two 105mm rounds and four 81mm rounds being destroyed.

A SEA TIGER mission was conducted on 11 September to implant Duffel Bag sensors on Thuan Tinh Island in the Song Cua Dai (BT 187 553) about 16 miles southeast of Da Nang. The operation commenced with helo gunships prepping the area with rockets and miniguns. PCF's 39 and 78 then inserted the EOD, UDT and Duffel Bag personnel, while the helo gunships and "Swift" boats stoodby to provide security. Completing a beach and underwater recon the UDT commenced implanting two sensor strings in the water while the Duffel Bag team implanted two sensor strings on Thuan Tinh Island. During the operation some AK-47 fire was received, but it was immediately suppressed by the PCF's and helo gunships. The sensor string was laid by 1130 and all personnel were extracted without further incident. There were seven structures, two bunkers and one 155mm dual round destroyed and one AK-47 rifle captured. There were no friendly casualties while four VC were killed.

35 CONFIDENTIAL
At 2120 on 16 September, PCF 61 on a SEA TIGER patrol observed a large explosion on the Song Cua Dai (BT 207 568) about 17 miles southeast of Danang. Subsequent investigation revealed two Coastal Group 14 junks were completely destroyed, probably by a floating mine. PCF's 61 and 78 provided illumination and assisted in a search for survivors. A MEDEVAC halo was called in to evacuate four wounded VNN while artillery fire was placed on the west bank of the river.

On 22 September, the PT LOMAS (USCG WPB) while on normal Market Time patrol detected 11 sampans underway without running lights (vicinity of YD 772 375/YD 700 420) about 60 miles northwest of Danang. Eight of the sampans were boarded and 9 Vietnamese without identification were detained. Three sampans evaded and after they ignored warning shots were taken under fire with M-16's by sailors in the small boats. There were no friendly casualties while eight VC were killed. The nine detainees were turned over to CG-12 for further transfer to the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO) at Hue for disposition.

On the night of 22 September PCF's 13 and 69 in a night water-borne guardpost sighted a sampan with two occupants on board about 14 miles south of Danang (BT 170 545). With clearance from the Quang Nam Sector the sampan was taken under fire, resulting in two VC killed and one sampan destroyed. One belt of VC grenades and one bag of medicine was recovered from the wreckage. There were no friendly casualties.
Intelligence sources reported underwater caves about 75 south-east of Danang (vicinity BS 792 858) as being used by the Viet Cong. A Seawolf conducted visual reconnaissance of the area on 23 September to determine the feasibility of a joint Army/Navy operation to detect and destroy the underwater caves. Five VC were sighted emerging from the underwater caves and when they attempted to return were taken under fire and killed. Further reconnaissance of the area indicated a high density of mines and booby traps and based on this information further operations in this area were recommended.

On the afternoon of 26 September a helo gunship escorting two PBR's during a probe of the Truong Giang River received automatic weapons fire from the vicinity of BT 168 437 about 18 miles southeast of Danang. The helo's gas tank was hit and it was forced to land. PCF's 61 and 65 along with the two PBR's returned the fire immediately and effectively suppressed it. As the units were closing the area PCF 61 received one incoming M-79 round which caused no damage. There were no friendly casualties while one bunker, three structures, one sampan and two fish traps were destroyed. Two structures were damaged and one sampan captured. Enemy casualties are unknown.

At 0830 on 30 September on a SEA TIGER mission, Coastal Group 14 and River Assault Group 32 units in sortied three VNH sweep/security teams followed by a PCF insertion of EOD and UDT personnel (vicinity of BT 154 532) about 16 miles southeast of Danang. CG-14, RAG-32, two helo gunships and an O-10 (light observation aircraft bird dog)
providing waterborne and air cover the VNN team conducted a sweep to the east of Lang Dong Island while the OD and UDT teams conducted beach recon and bunker destruction along the south bank. All personnel were extracted at 1330 without incident. One VC was sighted in the area and taken under fire by the helo gunships. The operation was terminated at 1430 with no friendly casualties and one VC killed.

The ground forces destroyed 77 large bunkers, five structures, one sampen, one 1,000 lbs. bomb, one 105mm round, one 155mm round and various quantities of fresh food. The average size of the bunkers were 10x15 feet with the largest being 20x30 feet.
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE

LEGEND:
[ ] = Coastal Surveillance Center
X = Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# = SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

A. Sea Tiger - 1 SEP
B. Sea Tiger - 5 SEP
C. Sea Tiger - 11 SEP
D. Sea Tiger - 16 SEP
E. PT LOMAS - 22 SEP
F. Sea Tiger - 22 SEP
G. Seawolf - 23 SEP
H. PCF's 61 & 65 - 26 SEP
I. Sea Tiger - 30 SEP

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES 10
Second Coastal Zone

Weather throughout the Second Coastal Zone was generally good during the month of September although the number of detections was approximately 10,000 less than in August. There were 998 detections of watercraft with 16,511 of the craft inspected and 5,847 boarded. There were 42 craft and 281 persons detained for curfew or restricted zone violations, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession of contraband, lack of or faulty identification papers or as suspected draft dodgers.

There were 109 naval gunfire support missions reported in the Second Coastal Zone during the month of September with a minimum amount of gun damage assessment reported.

On the afternoon of 24 September, the USCGC SPENCER (WHEC 36) conducted a NGFS mission as requested and cleared by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) of the ARVN 68 miles north of Tuy Hoa (CR 027 526). The SPENCER neutralized three VC base camps, well covered 1,200 meters of infiltration and supply routes, and destroyed three structures. In addition, six structures were destroyed, one masonry structure was heavily damaged, and four large secondary fires were ignited. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties are unknown.

On the morning of 25 September, the USCGC SPENCER was again requested by the ARVN Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer for a support mission about 70 miles north of Tuy Hoa (CR 026 548). The target was a VC base camp, and it was neutralized by the Cutter's five inch guns. One masonry structure was destroyed and two masonry structures and a cave heavily damaged and 3,000 meters of infiltration and supply routes well covered. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties are unknown.
At 0200 on the morning of 27 September, two suspicious Nationalist Chinese fishing vessels were spotted within the restricted zone by PCF 57 about 25 miles south of Phan Rang (BN 88 39). The two vessels were closed; however, heavy seas prevented boarding. The vessels then retrieved their nets and departed the area escorted by PCF 57.

On the afternoon of 28 September, the USCGC TANEY (WHEC 37) conducted a gunfire support mission in support of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division about 70 miles north of Tuy Hoa (CR 013 490). The mission was requested and spotted by the ROK Infantry Division NGLO. The NGLO reported the target area well covered with 300 meters of assembly area and 400 meters of infiltration route well covered, one cave partially closed, and one secondary fire. There were no friendly casualties while one VC was killed and three VC were wounded.

On the morning of 29 September, the TANEY was called on again for a gunfire support mission two miles to the east of the previous day's mission (CR 032 505). The Cutter's five inch guns destroyed five bunkers and damaged five more. On the morning of 29 September, PCF 49 patrolling in Market Time area 3G was informed of a possible search and rescue mission about 14 miles southeast of Qui Nhon (CR 205 035). An emergency beeper signal had been picked up by an aircraft on patrol. Investigation by the "Swift" boat revealed the emergency beeper to be aboard a small Vietnamese fishing vessel. The fishing vessel was then brought alongside the USCG TANEY (WHEC 37) for questioning of personnel by the VNN liaison officer aboard the cutter. Interrogation revealed that the fishing boat had been in the area since 281800H and approximately 290530H discovered the radio in the water and brought it aboard. They further stated they had seen no aircraft crash or any indication that one had crashed. Two Vietnamese were detained and transferred to PCF 49 for transportation to Qui Nhon for further interrogation.