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COMMANDER
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VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
OCTOBER 1969

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Assistant Historian..............................LTJG Wesley R. Dixon
Field Historians...............................LCDR William Isenburg Jr.
                                      LT Jerald L. Parsoneault
                                      LTJG Donald J. Scott
Historical Yeoman.............................YN1 Antonio T. Armas
Historical Journalist..........................JO2 Ralph P. Goldman
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of October, Operation SEA LORDS completed its first year of operations and continued to increase its effectiveness in accomplishing its major objectives which are: (1) the interdiction of enemy infiltration into the Mekong Delta region from Cambodia; (2) the pacification of vital trans-Delta waterways for domestic commerce in order to extend the influence of the government of Vietnam; (3) the harassment of the enemy in his base areas, disrupting his plans, and keeping him off balance.

The first of these objectives, to interdict enemy infiltration from Cambodia, came as a result of logical thinking after the 1968 Tet Offensive in IV Corps when the VC continued to enjoy ample quantities of arms and ammunition despite the fact that Market Time operations had effectively stopped infiltration from the sea. The following statistics are provided for the first year as a partial measure of the effectiveness of the ongoing border interdiction operations which provided a continuous barrier adjacent to the Cambodian border from north of Tay Ninh City to Ha Tien on the Gulf of Thailand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAN HUNG DAO</th>
<th>GIANT SLINGSHOT</th>
<th>BARRIER REEF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>START OF OPS</td>
<td>21 NOV 68</td>
<td>6 DEC 68</td>
<td>2 JAN 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURATION</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIREIGHTS</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINING INCIDENTS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNITIONS CACHES</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIGHT (TONS)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACHES (OTHERS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIGHT (TONS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>376.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Totals include 6.3 tons munitions and 5.3 tons other material captured during engagements with barrier operations forces. Intelligence reports indicating enemy plans to attack patrol craft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>123</th>
<th>163</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>305</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Combat losses as of 18 October:

| ENEMY KIA | 345 | 17bl | 159 | 22h8 |
| CAPTURED  | 26  | 22b  | 46  | 29b  |
| U.S./GVN KIA | 22  | 1bl  | 20  | 186  |
| U.S./GVN WIA | 191 | 1130 | 130 | 1451 |

In addition to the statistics, the effects of the SEA LORDS effort must be considered as instrumental in lessening the frequency and shortening the duration of the enemy "high points." As more and more waterways are closed to him, enemy supplies are backing up resulting in well documented reports (intelligence) of enemy units in the Delta being improperly equipped. Their plight becomes more apparent as continued intelligence reports indicate that the enemy is short of rice during the harvest season when rice is easiest to obtain.

Just as important are the intangible results of all the SEA LORDS campaigns which allow inhabitants along the waterways greater safety and freedom to move about in areas formerly controlled by the VC, thus enhancing economic development and the image of the government of Vietnam.

The means to accomplishing these objectives can be seen in the discussion of the individual SEA LORDS campaigns and operations which follows and which includes several new operations. SEA LORDS statistics for October are included in this section while a Task Organization Table is located at the end of the summary.
Navymen of RivDiv 593 have won 131 medals for their heroic actions during combat patrols such as this one. The "Iron Butterfly" has patrolled the operation Giant Slingshot rivers northwest of Saigon, the Rung Sat Special Zone and the upper Saigon River. (OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH)
Giant Slingshot Campaign

The month of October saw increased participation by Vietnamese forces in Operation Giant Slingshot with the assignment of the 2nd Battalion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and RPG-53, consisting of 20 VNN PBR's, to Giant Slingshot in a continuing refinement of an already highly effective interdiction operation. The VNMC Battalion became a part of CTG 194.9 on 3 October and conducted amphibious and various defensive operations along the Vam Co Dong River in conjunction with naval units (see VNMC section of the summary for details). The VNN PBR's of RPG-53 commenced interdiction operations on the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers on 26 October with ten PBR's working out of Ben Luc (CTE 194.9.0.1) and ten PBR's working out of Tan An (CTE 194.9.4.1). After conducting the turnover and indoctrination of RPG-53 units assigned to Tan An, RIVDIV 573 was shifted to Tuyen Nhon and assumed responsibility for Barrier Reef East.

In close proximity to Tuyen Nhon, a new operation was carried out in October. Called the Kinh Gay Canal Extension Operation (short title: Deep Channel), its purpose was the evaluation of demolition methods for clearing, extending, and connecting the Kinh Gay and Kinh Lagrange in the vicinity of XS 370 902 where the two canals approach within two miles of each other. Ultimately, this would provide a patrol route for river craft and establish a cordon to enemy infiltration from the tip of the "Parrot's Beak" southwest along the Bo Bo Canal. The feasibility of accomplishing this goal was proved by Deep Channel forces on 18 October when EOD and RAD units, using military explosives (MK8 MOD 2 Hose), extended the Kinh Lagrange 200 feet in length and 30 feet in width at a depth of five feet (vic XS 358 876); and again on 22 October when EOD and RIVDIV 552 units extended the Kinh Gay 100 feet by 28 feet by six feet (vic XS 377 906) and widened to 35 feet the canal along a 300 ft.
stretch (vic 147934). Upon completion of the evaluation, the Kinh Gay Canal Special Operations Group was dissolved with all units reverting to their parent commands (for task organization, see task organization section of the summary).

In addition to the new activity above, the overall activity level increased in the Giant Slingshot area of operations during October. The hostile fire incidents encountered by friendly forces, which averaged 120 per month during the previous six months, increased from 56 in September to 67 in October while the number of enemy killed by friendly forces increased more significantly from 146 last month to 279 this month. Even with the increased number of enemy killed, USN/VNN casualties remained the same at 13 wounded, however, friendly casualties increased substantially during the period primarily as a result of the first of the Giant Slingshot incidents recorded below.

While participating in a joint/combined USN/VNN/MSF operation with RIV-DIV 511 and RAID 70 units, two MSF companies were pinned down by heavy automatic weapons fire at 0825 on 2 October 21 miles north northwest of Moc Hoa (WT 825 187). An Army Hunter/Killer team arrived on the scene at 0900 to assist, and while putting in air strikes, one of the helos was shot down. Troops of a third MSF company, who had been retained aboard the boats, were quickly inserted to provide a security perimeter around the downed aircraft. At 0910, TAC AIR was called in arriving at 1010 about the same time that the enemy automatic weapons fire began to be augmented by B-40 and mortar fire. The ground troops were unable to withdraw until 1400 when they began pulling
back under the cover of continuing TAC AIR strikes, and support was received from a company of special forces troops who had been moved into the vicinity by helo along with 105mm howitzers. By 1700, all the troops had moved out of the contact area and by 1930 had been extracted by USN/VNN units and were on their way to a site for regrouping, determining casualties, and setting up night defense positions. Aircraft and artillery continued to fire into the area during the night receiving sporadic return fire while RIVDIV 511 PBR's and USA helos attempted to locate numerous troops missing in action. The final outcome of the engagement was: 25 VC/NVA killed and 17 wounded with friendly casualties amounting to 24 MSF troops killed and 21 wounded, one USA troop wounded, and one MSF troop missing. Airstrikes during the
action destroyed numerous heavily fortified enemy bunkers and trenches. As a result of this engagement, the desireability of having a 105mm equipped Monitor assigned to joint operations in areas not covered by permanent artillery was pointed out.

Also on the night of 2 October, while the previous action was taking place, a Tango and Zippo boat of TU 194.9.5 received B-40 and recoilless rifle fire as they operated on a small canal off the Van Co Dong River four miles up river from Go Dau Ha (X1335 276). The Zippo made a flame run on the contact site, and artillery and additional afloat units (PBR's) were requested. The artillery reaction time taking four minutes. Army LHIT and Bronco aircraft placed airstrikes, and PBR's made firing runs in the area. The following morning a sweep was conducted by district RF/PF troops who discovered 12 blood trails, three B-40 rockets, 1 RPG-7 launcher, and some propaganda leaflets. Friendly casualties were three USN slightly wounded.

The next significant incident to occur took place six miles down river from Go Dau Ha (X1410 155) on the evening of 3 October when two TU 194.9.5 PBR's on normal patrol spotted a man on the bank running toward a clump of plowed up earth. The units turned, made a firing run, and shortly thereafter observed a green cluster flare and two or three more men running. At this time, the PBR's, receiving automatic weapons fire, requested and obtained artillery illumination, in addition, Seawolves and Black Ponies were scrambled. When a man was seen waving his arms on the beach, a cease fire was ordered, and U.S. troops began standing up. The scramble was cancelled. It was determined that the man originally seen on the bank was the Army unit's
Kit Carson Scout who ran when he heard the boats approaching. The USA troops taken under fire were from "C" Company 2/27 Infantry, and unfortunately, one of the three soldiers wounded in the mishap died. The daily operations schedule for the 2/27 Infantry did not list any night Army positions closer than 700 meters to the position of the troops when the shooting began.

Crossing back to the "left river" of Giant Slingshot, the Vam Co Tay, a curious event occurred on the night of 6 October. Two ASPB's of TU 1944.4 set a WBGP four miles northwest of Tuyen Nhon and placed a four PSID (Passive Seismic Intrusion Detector) perimeter around the boats on the north bank. Later, upon receiving activations on PSID No. 3 backed up a visual sighting of these personnel, the area was taken under fire, and the activations ceased. About 30 minutes later, the activations began again on PSID No. 3, and the area was taken under fire again, however, this time the activations continued. It was suspected at the time that the continued activation was the result of damage to the device caused by friendly fire. The next morning when Duffel Bag units returned to the area to retrieve the PSID's, it was discovered that PSID No. 3 had been removed and that there was a trail leading away from the area where it had been planted.

Vietnamese Navy RAID 71 units set a joint/combined WBGP on 8 October which resulted in 6 VC killed. Two ASPB's, a Boston whaler, and one platoon of U. S. Army Raiders opened fire on the VC when their presence was detected along the banks of the Doc Ma Canal seven miles southeast of Ben Luck just off the Vam Co Dong River (XS 663 683). All the units received return small arms fire, but there were no friendly casualties. After suppressing the enemy
fire, the area was cleared while Black Ponies (overhead in two minutes) placed a strike.

Further up the Vam Co Dong River, six miles to the west of Tay Ninh City (AT 162 422), four TU 194.9.5 craft were in night WBGP on 11 October on the north bank of the river when they heard movement on the beach. When the two to three VC approached within 15 feet, the boats broke WBGP and made two firing runs. At 0237, artillery was requested, and in the ten minutes that ensued prior to the "first round on deck" the heavies, Monitor and ATC, moved in and put 81mm mortars into the area. Also, during the lulls between artillery volleys, the heavies put mortar and MK-19 fire into the area. While the patrol officer was spotting artillery, a PBR crewman using an NOD (night observation device) observed persons running along the south bank. The heavies immediately commenced mortar, MK-19, and 40mm cannon fire while artillery was being readjusted to the south bank. This action in which three VC were probably killed represents a good example of the use of heavies to react in support of PBR WBGP's and to provide immediate heavy firepower during lulls in artillery fire.

Three days having elapsed since their last significant enemy contact, RAID 71 units were back at it on the night of 11 October. Two ASPB's, a Boston Whaler, and a platoon of U. S. Army Raiders were involved in the action which took place four miles northwest of Ben Luc on the Vam Co Dong River (XS 590 789) and accounted for nine VC killed. The VN Navy units, while in WBGP, sighted and opened fire on eight of the VC while they were approaching the boats. As the boats pulled away, they received small arms automatic weapons fire from both banks of the river which was suppressed, and an additional VC was killed in the exchange. After a Black Pony airstrike
a sweep of the area revealed numerous blood trails and drag marks. There were two friendly casualties in the action: one USA raider and one USN advisor, ENS William M. Dewey, slightly wounded.

A scramble of TU 194.9.8 Seavolves on the night of 13 October was conducted in support of U. S. Army troops in contact six miles northeast of Tan An (XS 615 715). The LHFT placed multiple rocket and machine gun attacks on the estimated squad size unit. U. S. Army troops in a subsequent sweep discovered four VC killed by the airstrike.

Five days later, a triangular arrangement of enemy caches was discovered by 25th ARVN Division troops who had been inserted by VNN ATC's. The caches were located in a pineapple field at XS 539 832, XS 542 832, and XS 542 836 and contained the following items: 145 82mm rounds; 150 82mm booster kits; 38 B-40 rockets; 38 B-40 boosters; and 50 75mm recoiless rifle rounds. There was no enemy contact, and all the material recovered was retained by the ARVN units.

Four miles to the southeast of the triangular cache, U. S. Navy SEAL's uncovered a large cache in the Bo Bo Canal on 22 October at a point where a dike crosses the waterway in a heavily wooded area (XS 493 792). The find was in conjunction with an underground search and area reconnaissance operation conducted by U. S. Army and Navy units along the Bo Bo Canal (a waterway which bisects the angle formed by the Giant Slingshot Rivers). The total ordnance recovered during the 72 hour operation was 204 82mm mortar rounds; 14 107mm rockets; 13 75mm recoiless rifle rounds; 4 AK-47's; 1 case of AK-47 ammunition; 3 U. S. Claymore mines; 5 grenades; 1 gas mask; and 1 55 gallon drum of TNT (badly deteriorated). All of the heavy ordnance was in excellent condition and was sealed in metal containers. There was no enemy contact.
On the night of 25 October, enemy contact was made by a USN and VNN ASPB established in WBG with 25 U.S. Army Raiders two miles north of the confluence of the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers in the vicinity of the Xom Bo Canal (XS 722 652). Shortly after moving into position, the patrol officer aboard the VNN ASPB detected movement on the west bank of the Vam Co Dong whereupon the two U.S. ATC's acting as a blocking force on that river beached, their embarked USA snipers taking under fire and killing three VC. As the ATC's pulled away from the bank, they began receiving fire from both banks; all four crafts made firing runs. Two large groups of enemy troops (20-30 men) were spotted along the west bank, and the boat cleared to the north as Seawolves put in a strike which was followed by OV-10 strikes and a TAC AIR strike. Three VC were killed in the action, and there were no friendly casualties with the exception of a helo that was hit by enemy fire forcing it to return to Ben Luc.
Two boats of RivDiv 593 churn along a riverbank, hoping to spot signs of enemy activity. The division's 54 sailors man nine river patrol boats (PBRs). (OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH)
Operation Ready Deck

Soon after the initial exploration of the upper Saigon River in July by River Division 554, which traveled as far up the river as the village of Tri Tam, 35 miles northwest of Saigon (XT 483 470), regular combat operations by TF 116 PBR's in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division, USA, were instituted on the Saigon River. On 11 August, RIVDIV 571 traveled from Nha Be to Phu Cuong, thereby doubling the number of PBR divisions fighting the VC in the upper Saigon area. Other combat forces, including the Vietnamese RAG 24, the 5th ARVN Division, local RF/PF forces, and the 82nd Airborne Division, USA, further expanded the successful operation.

On 10 October, the nickname "Ready Deck" was officially proclaimed as the combined USN/VNN operation on the upper Saigon River assigned to interdict enemy lines of communication. Five days later on 15 October "Ready Deck" was designated as a SEA LORDS operation. The USN commander, CTU 116.9.1, assumed the task force designation CTU 194.6 and the title Interdiction Commander, Upper Saigon River. River Division 531 became TU 194.6.1 and RIVDIV 571 became TU 194.6.2.

Working from their base at Phu Cuong (XT 803 140), nine miles north of Saigon, the two PBR divisions conducted river patrols and troop lifts, and established waterborne guardposts from Phu Cuong upstream 35 miles to Tri Tam (XT 803 140 to XT 834 470). Operations were also carried out on the Thi Tinh River that channels into the Saigon River five miles upstream from Phu Cuong (XT 755 205).
Although the statistics for Ready Deck only reflect the results in the area after it was established as a SEA LORDS operation, they are indicative of the strong enemy resistance and the definite success of the USN, VNN, USA, ARVN, and RF/PF forces in the area. Since 15 October USN and VNN units have accounted for 69 VC killed (including 23 probable). In the same time frame they reported six hostile fire incidents.

Intelligence information and captured documents were particularly gratifying in that they pointed to the extreme difficulty that the enemy was having in moving food, men, and supplies on the upper Saigon River. To counteract the US/GVN operations, the enemy have been forced to try and locate new and safer crossing points.

The more successful operations for the navy units have been in the night WBGP's. Eight miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XJ.682 22h) on the evening of 22-23 October, LTJG Roahen, the patrol officer, and two PBR's of TU 196.6.2 were disguised along the bank in WBGP. Several hours after midnight, the PBR crews visually detected an estimated 15 VC crossing the river, south to north, using inner tubes and one 15 foot sampan as the means of conveyance. When the VC were approximately ten meters from the north bank, the PBR's broke the guardpost and charged the enemy with weapons blazing. After two more firing runs, the PBR's returned to the contact area to ascertain the extent of damage. Five dead VC were strewn among the floating debris. Five more VC were probably killed. The PBR crews were able to recover two AK-47's, one Czech rifle, a small quantity of ammunition, some food stuffs, and miscellaneous personal gear. After the PBR cleared the position, artillery was placed in the area.
A similar action took place on the evening of 23 October. LTJG Young, in charge of two PBR's in a waterborne guard post upstream from the morning action in the previous paragraph (XT 61 319), spotted seven swimmers attempting to cross the Saigon River from north to south. Employing a slightly different tactic, the young officer called in artillery illumination and then directed the PBR weapons on the swimmers. Closing the location of the swimmers, the PBR's sighted five dead VC bodies and collected seven packs, one AK-47, two AK-47 magazines, two U. S. hand grenades, some documents, clothing, and rice. After the PBR's had cleared to the south, artillery was called into the suspected location of the two swimmers who had escaped.
Border Interdiction Campaign

At the end of October, the Border Interdiction Campaign had 141 USN and VNN River craft assigned along with six USN helicopters. The continued build up of friendly forces and waterborne guardposts in the Border Interdiction Campaign had a significant effect on enemy operations during the month as enemy casualties soared from 85 killed and two wounded in September to 306 killed, 13 wounded, and two captured in October. An indication of the difficulty caused the enemy by the numerous WBGP's is the fact that during the month there were several instances in which large enemy forces tried to fight their way across the Vinh Te Canal while directing mortar fire at the boats in a seldom used tactic. The enemy seems to prefer attempting to breach the Tran Hung Dao barrier rather than effect the extensive commo-liaison reorganization that would be required if he were forced to make end runs through the coastal waters of northwest Kien Giang Province or down the Bassac/Mekong River Corridor.

As in the Giant Slingshot Campaign, Vietnamese forces took on increased responsibility in the Border Interdiction Campaign during October. On the 23rd ten of the 20 boats of RPG-54 arrived at YRBM-20 (WS 183 825) for patrols in the Tran Hung Dao area of operations assuming task designator CTE 194.4.3.3, after which, River Division 551 was relocated to YRBM-21 (WS 390 899) and commenced patrolling Barrier Reef West. In addition, at month's end, VNN's were on their way to Chou Doc to man Kenner ski barges that are to be added to the Vinh Te Canal interdiction effort. In an earlier change, the USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) relieved the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) and chopped to CTG 194.4 on 16 October assuming duties as Commander Ha Tien LST (CTU 194.4.4). The same day, HAL 3, DET 3 embarked for operations.
On the first day of the month, a RAD 132 ATC was in night WBGP on the Vinh Te Canal 16 miles northeast of Ha Tien (VS 640 634) when two sampans carrying five people were sighted crossing the canal from south to north. Taken under M-16 and M-79 fire, the enemy personnel disappeared into the water. A Bronco aircraft in the air that had diverted to assist sighted three additional sampans from which light small arms fire was received. A ready reaction force was then requested from Vinh Gia, and L5 troops were provided who conducted a sweep under illumination provided by a Vietnamese outpost. The troops captured some documents revealing names of communalliaison women in the area and the amount of ammunition and location of a cache. In addition to the troop sweep, an airboat/LHFT sweep was conducted prior to daylight and was followed after daybreak by a two hour sweep by 19 USN personnel in assorted craft, 2 U. S. Army troops, and 50 CIDG. Total results of the incidents were three VC killed, five VC probably killed, two prisoners captured, eleven sampans destroyed and two damaged, and a large amount of VN women's clothing captured. Later in the day, in conjunction with the same incident, an army L/H and airboats conducted an additional sweep to the east (vic VS 662 515) killing five VC, destroying eight huts, and capturing 16 sampans, 2,500 pounds of rice, and 50 rounds of AK-47 ammunition.

Three days later on 4 October, two PBR's of RIVDIV 514 were in night WBGP on the Vinh Te Canal when one of the boats located two miles south of Chou Doc (WS 099 827) received small arms fire from a tree line north of the canal as three sampans were sighted approximately 200 meters to the north having been observed coming out of Cambodia. As the PBR returned fire, the sampans evaded into the tree line, which was then marked with traces of fire enabling
a Black Pony aircraft to put in multiple rocket strikes. About thirty minutes later, personnel on the second PBR, which was under RMC Cruel and located 1 miles down the canal, heard movement and voices from four locations. After continuing to monitor the area for over one half hour, three VC were sighted in front of the boat, and the area was taken under fire and illuminated. A sweep at daybreak turned up the following: 2 VC killed, three sampans destroyed, one sampan damaged, and miscellaneous uniforms and ponchos captured along with 35 assorted Chicom and NVA hand grenades and some sapper material. There were no friendly casualties.

On the same day, another PBR of RIVDIV 514, while moored alongside YREM-16, was subjected to what appeared to be a possible sabotage. CMGSN Herring discovered a concussion grenade, with pin removed, under a 60mm white phosphorous mortar round in a box which contained ten assorted rounds of WP and high explosive 60mm mortar ammunition. The pin was found lying beside the ammo box and was carefully reinserted in the grenade. The grenade was thrown overboard. An immediate inspection of all other boats at YREM-16 was conducted with negative results.

Two Tango boats and a PBR from RAD 132 and RIVDIV 535 were in night WBGP 19 miles east northeast of Ha Tien (VS 726 613) on the Vinh Te Canal an hour and a half before midnight on 8 October when Tango Boat 24 detected a sampan with three VC crossing the canal from north to south. T-24 initiated fire as the sampan pulled into a rice paddy at about 50 meters range. PBR 27 provided 60mm illumination and HE mortar fire on both banks as T-23 provided a cross fire. Several minutes later, T-23 personnel observed lights moving north from the contact area and took them under fire with T-24 providing supporting fire. A USN LHPT arrived shortly thereafter and detected three additional sampans.
which were destroyed by machine gun and rocket attacks. During this time, T-24 destroyed another sampan. A sweep conducted later by airboats and CIDG troops turned up one NVA killed and many pieces of sampans in the area. Since the water depth in the area is approximately ten feet, a complete sweep was precluded, however, 11 enemy were considered as probable kills. There were negative friendly casualties.

Less than two hours later, six miles to the east (VS 833 61h) three additional RAD 132 and RIVDIV 535 craft in night WBGP sighted two sampans with approximately eight persons embarked about 100 meters from PBR 722. As the PBR opened fire, the sampans evaded northward, one of them sinking in the process. The second sampan was caught in a crossfire as T-19 opened up on it. A USN LHFT in the contact area placed a strike and Monitor 3 illuminated the area until a sweep was conducted at daylight. CIDG troops found one NVA killed, two rifles, some grenades, and various additional gear and documents. It is also estimated that seven enemy were probably killed.

Two Seawolves were on routine patrol 3½ miles east of Chou Doc and six miles north of the Kinh Ong Lon on 14 October when they sighted eight sampans at WS 670 880. After obtaining clearance from DSA Dong Tien and CTG 194.4, Seawolves 309 and 318, piloted by LT McCallum and LTJG Ross, placed rocket and machine gun strikes in the area. All the sampans were destroyed, and a post attack search for movement/survivors produced negative results. It is estimated that 18 enemy were killed and five wounded in the attack.

Back in the Tran Hung Dao area of operations on the evening of the 20th of October, intelligence reports began coming in from Vietnamese Special
Forces at Vinh Gia that 150 to 200 VC/NVA were positioned near the Cambodian border 16 miles northeast of Rach Gia (VS 680 640) and that they would attempt to cross the Vinh Te Canal which was 1200 yards to the south. At 1901, an ATC in WBGP in the crossing area observed a flare burning on the ground directly north of its position (VS 675 630). At 2130 another flare was sighted, and shortly thereafter an ASPB in WBGP 1,000 yards to the west of the ATC opened fire on nine enemy personnel in three sampans. Twenty minutes later, VN Special Forces reported 150 enemy moving southeast, and the area in that direction was taken under artillery and mortar fire (vic N/S grid line VS 670). Meanwhile, the VN Special Forces had assembled about 150 troops at Vinh Gia and transported them by sampan and whaler into the contact area where they commenced a sweep from the west (VS 640 63h). During the sweep, the troops were supported by a Monitor which fires 105mm Beehive rounds ahead of the advancing troops and by other WBGP units which illuminated the area as the troops made contact with the enemy at four separate locations. One of the guardpost units, while illuminating with a searchlight, received three 82mm mortar rounds close aboard. Earlier in the action, another unit had observed three explosions near its stern which were believed to be caused by mortars. As a result of the sweep, seven VC bodies were found along with four SKS and three AK-47 rifles. At 2230, a general harassment of VN outposts in the area began apparently in support of the attempted crossing. Four afloat units provided supporting fire for the outposts, and Seawolves put in rocket and machine gun strikes which drew automatic weapons fire from the ground. When the Seawolves reached a low fuel state, Black Ponies were requested and continued the strikes. At 2213, three additional 82mm mortar rounds were fired at WBGP units, and the Black Ponies shifted their strikes to the enemy.
mortar location. All firing ceased at 0015, and later intelligence reports indicated that a battalion sized unit estimated at 270 VC had massed between N/S gridlines 66 and 68 with the intention of crossing between N/S 690 and 695. Total results for the action were 11 VC killed and 20 VC probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

Just before dawn on 21 October, an ATC involved in the previous action was sitting in WBGP after a long night when what appeared to be a coconut drifted downstream and stopped alongside the boat. Considering this a rather unusual phenomena, a closer observation was made proving the "curious" coconut to be the head of a man who was clinging to the craft's bar armor. Three concussion grenades were dropped, and the swimmer submerged and did not surface. A check was made of the hull for mines with negative results.

The following morning at 0201, PCF-35 under LTJG Zumwalt was in WBGP five miles northeast of Ha Tien when noises were heard on the west bank of the Rach Giang Thanh followed by the sighting of a number of sampans in a small canal (VS 478 522); PCF-35 initiated fire. No return fire was received as the enemy personnel evaded into a nearby treeline. Right after it was light, a company of troops swept the area and found three NVA bodies, two destroyed sampans, six AK-47's one U. S. carbine, one Chicom carbine, 7,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, nine AK-47 magazines, 16 60mm mortar rounds, eight 57mm mortar rounds, 20 B-40 rockets and 80 boosters, two Russian anti-tank grenades, and five pounds of miscellaneous canned food, clothing, and papers. In addition, three sampans were captured. Sweeping troops determined that PCF-35 had intercepted five sampans that were attempting a crossing from west to east.
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PBR's of RIVDIV 515 were in WBNP position 19 miles due east of Chau Doc on the Dong Tien Canal (WS 245 821) during the night of 22-23 October when they observed three sampans approximately 400 meters away on the north bank of the canal. After the sampans were observed proceeding south for approximately ten minutes and with clearance from DSA Dong Tien, they were taken under fire. Black Pony aircraft were diverted from patrol to assist and were overhead in ten minutes and placed a strike in the area. A Black Pony sighted another group of sampans nearby and received small arms fire from the passengers in the sampans while conducting visual reconnaissance. The aircraft retaliated by placing multiple rocket strikes in the area which suppressed the ground fire. They then departed because of a low fuel state and were relieved by Seawolves five minutes later which placed strikes on the sampans resulting in eight sampans destroyed and three VC killed (BC). After the strike, two personnel were sighted emerging from the contact area. They were detained by PBR's in the area and were later turned over to U. S. Army advisors at Tram Chin. A few minutes after the action ended, three more sampans were sighted crossing the canal at WS 440 821. When they attempted to evade, the PBR's initiated fire and destroyed them. Black Pony aircraft arrived on the scene five minutes later and provided illumination for the Seawolves. They also delivered a strike on a partially camouflaged barge and several sampans. They drew no return fire. The enemy lost 17 sampans and one barge in this action, and seven VC were killed (BC) and 12 VC were probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

Vinh Gia LIDB (Vietnamese Special Forces) were in listening post about 20 miles northwest of Ha Tien (VS 735 622) on the night of 23-24 October when they observed approximately 80 sampans carrying over 100 persons cross
the Cambodian border and proceed south. Friendly troops initiated fire
sinking three sampans. A few minutes later, heavy mortar fire was received
by boats on the Vinh Te Canal from a launch site about one mile from the
previous fire site (VS 731 625). Mortar rounds landed within 100 meters
of Tango Boat 20 which was in WBGP at VS 730 612 and were then walked in
an arc terminating at VS 760 611 where CCB-3 was located. Heavy A/W fire

The VC seldom pay attention to these waterborne
road signs.

fire was directed at CCB-3 from the north bank. The units returned fire
and Black Ponies O4 and O6 on Barrier Reef Patrol were diverted to assist.
Also, a night hunter/killer team was scrambled from Chi Lang and a relief
Black Pony was scrambled from Binh Thuy. A Vinh Gia LLDB 105mm howitzer
commenced firing into a suspected mortar launch site. While Black Ponies provided illumination, the night hunter/killer team commenced air strikes in the vicinity of VS 730 613. At 2250, a VC support element located at VS 730 600 opened fire on the boats. Air illumination and visual recon were conducted throughout the night, and 5th Special Forces air boats and troops from Vinh Gia commenced contact area sweep at first light. Enemy casualties included 4 VC killed (BC) and ten VC probably killed. There were no friendly casualties, and although numerous A/W hits were detected on the T-20 and CCB, there was only minor damage. There are preliminary indications that the engaged unit was the 195th VC transportation company.
Search Turn Campaign

Task Group 19L.3 with 29 PBR's, two helos, and one CCB assigned continued interdiction operations in Kien Giang Province and the Gulf of Thailand in addition to supporting the 21st ARVN Division in the "Three Sisters" area. During the month, in reaction to local intelligence, the PBR river divisions successfully conducted mine counter measure operations on the Song Cai Lon and Song Cai Be utilizing MSD's (minesweeper drone) thus demonstrating that the MSD can be effectively controlled from a PBR on a winding river.

Although there were many intelligence reports of enemy build up in the Search Turn area of operations, the number of hostile fire incidents recorded in October dropped slightly from 28 last month to 26 this month. The number of enemy killed also decreased more significantly from 76 killed in September to 38 in October. The following incident narratives are typical of activity in the Search Turn AO.

On the 15th of October, two PBR's of RIVDIV 553 under Patrol Officer RDC Kelly were in night WBGP with ten RF troops 19 miles north northwest of Rach Gia (VS 990 360) when two sampans with eight occupants were sighted to the west of the guardpost. The sampans were taken under fire and a troop sweep in the morning yielded the following results: one sampan captured along with 1020 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, three AK-47 clips, one Chicom grenade, one field medical kit, 21 rounds of 7.62 Chicom pistol ammunition, and assorted clothing and food. It is estimated that four VC were killed in the action. There were no friendly casualties.

Two RIVDIV 553 PBR's were in WBGP under Patrol Officer BM1 Edwards the following night when five VC were observed approaching their position at
When the enemy was within 100 meters of the WBGP and 20 meters of the perimeter, three of them were taken under fire by a sniper and the other two were unfortunate enough to have approached via a claymore mine which was detonated as they neared it. Moderate small arms fire was received in return, but it was surpressed by the sniper. A morning sweep revealed blood trails and body parts in the vicinity of the claymore detonation. Enemy casualties were three killed and two wounded. There were no friendly casualties.

RIVDIV 513 PBR's, under Patrol Officer LT Graham, embarked 70 VN troops and two U. S. Army advisors on 18 October for a sweep in an area where a small VC commo-liaison unit had recently been sighted. After insertion at WR 374 723, 26 miles southeast of Rach Gia, the VN commander requested that the PBR's follow behind the sweeping troops who, within 50 yards of insertion, made heavy contact with VC armed with B-40's, machine guns, and light automatic weapons. At this point, the Patrol Officer suggested the troops break contact to permit a firing run by the PBR's; the VN commander requested that the PBR's move up to a specified point and commence firing. As the PBR's reached that point, they came under heavy automatic weapons fire. As the PBR's placed return fire, they received word from the VN Army advisor that the friendly forward element was in the same area attempting to maintain contact. The VC then chose to break contact. The PBR's extracted the troops and returned them to Kien Binh for medevac of two wounded VN's (one by PBR). PBR's also coordinated Seawolf and Black Pony strikes in the vicinity of the contact area and along the VC withdrawal route. Four VC were killed in the action.
Riverine Strike Group

During the month of October, an average of 36 RAC remained under the opcon of Commander Riverine Strike Group. The Riverine Strike Base, consisting of USS BENEWAH, USS SPHINX, AND RAD 152 remained on the Vam Co while units of RAD 131 based in Dong Tam provided security for salvage of the dredge "Sandpumper" which sank in the My Tho River and conducted joint operations in conjunction with the Vietnamese Joint Amphibious Task Force 211 in the vicinity of Old Song Ong Doc (VR 980 025) and continued interdiction patrols of the Cho Gao Canal. Units of RAD 152 provided water mobile support for 6/31 BN 3rd Bte 9th Infantry Division and one platoon of the 16th Rgt. 25th ARVN Division in the vicinity of Old Song Ong Doc. In addition, they conducted heavy interdiction operations on the Rach Cao, Rach Cat, and Nha Be Rivers.

Under the opcon of other commanders, 77 RAC were outchopped as follows:

| CTG 194.2 | - | 6 RAC |
| CTU 194.3.2 | - | 1 RAC |
| CTG 194.4 | - | 23 RAC |
| CTG 194.9 | - | 30 RAC |
| CTG 116.9 | - | 9 RAC |
| CTG 115.7 | - | 8 RAC |

The 36 RAC under Riverine Strike Group opcon lifted 5,707 troops, inspected 3,268 sampans, checked 7,001 people, and detained 39 of them. The Riverine Strike Group and embarked Army troops killed 36 VC during the month.

On the morning of 18 October, a U.S. Army Hawk Team and an ARVN recon element previously inserted by RAD 152 units near French Fort (XS 882 632) engaged two enemy sampans and six VC. When the troops began receiving small arms fire from the river bank, Broncos were called into action and placed
multiple strikes suppressing enemy fire and killing one VC. There were no friendly casualties in the engagement which cost the enemy seven VC killed and two sampans destroyed.

The following day, in the evening, a U. S. Army Hawk Team and a recon platoon of ARVN troops came under heavy fire near the Vam Co Dong River two miles north of its confluence with the Vam Co Tay (XS 712 642) while participating in an operation with RAD 152 units. Seawolf and Bronco strikes were placed in the area, following which, the contact was broken. Again, there were no friendly casualties, and the VC lost five killed and three AK-47's captured.

The enemy did inflict some damage, however, on 22 October when two RAC assigned to a joint operation at Old Song Ong Doc were mined while beached at the base camp (VR 971 023). An estimated 100 pound bomb detonated between boats CCB-1 and ATC-5 resulting in 15 wounded (none critically). T-5 sank and C-1 was beached sustaining flooding in the engine room. Three other craft in the vicinity were damaged. The incident points out the advisability of greater separation between beached RAC in order to minimize damage from mining attempts.
Song Ong Doc Operation

At the end of September PCF's operating in the lower Ca Mau Peninsula were replaced by PBK's and PAC operating on the Song Ong Doc in a new operation called Breezy Cove. The operation is designed to prevent enemy infiltration, movement, and resupply along the inland waterways in the Song Ong Doc area in order to enhance the government of Vietnam's pacification program.

At the beginning of October the following assets were assigned to Breezy Cove: USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786), RIVDIV 572, Seawolf Detachment SIX, 3 ATC's and 2 ASPB's, and an advanced tactical support base (ATSB) composed of seven Amni pontoons positioned on the river in the vicinity of the town of Song Ong Doc. On 5 October, a 105mm monitor sailed from the USS BONEWHAH to Song Ong Doc to provide an artillery reaction force for the new operation. In conjunction with this move, the RSSZ Duffel Bag assets were also to be moved to Breezy Cove. On 20 October, CTU 194.1.3 RSSZ Crusade Commander (Oinc TF 116 Nha Be Monitor Team 2) became CTU 194.1.2 Breezy Cove Crusade Commander (Oinc TF 116 Monitor Team 2 - USS GARRETT COUNTY). In another asset change, SEAL Team, Det Alpha, Third Platoon arrived at Song Ong Doc on 20 October and assumed CTU 194.2.6.

It was not long after commencement of Breezy Cove until the enemy was engaged. On the 2nd of October, RIVDIV 572 PBK's and a RAD 131 ASPB were in night WSGP 18 miles southwest of Ca Mau (VR 940 O11) under Patrol Officer LTJG Tuholski when two sampans were sighted crossing the Song Ong Doc from north to south. Upon being hailed by voice, the sampans responded.
with small arms fire which was supplemented by fire from the bank. The patrol took the sampans and the bank under fire killing four VC, destroying two sampans, and suppressing the fire from the bank.

Late that night a sampan with two occupants was observed crossing from south to north. After being hailed by voice, the sampan attempted to evade and was taken under fire killing both passengers. The sampan was captured and was found to contain numerous documents. A half hour later a fourth sampan was sighted traveling from west to east. After hailing the sampan with no results, it was illuminated and taken under fire. The engine of the sampan exploded probably killing both occupants. In all three contacts there were no friendly casualties.

On 4 October, five PBR's of RIVDIV 572 under Patrol Officer LT Berry were participating in the first combined operation with local VN forces in the Breezy Cove AO acting as a blocking force for RF troops. While proceeding north on a small unnamed canal which leads off the Song Ong Doc 24 miles southwest of Ca Mau (VR 852 033), the PBR's began receiving 75mm recoilless rifle and heavy automatic weapons fire. One of the PBR's was knocked out of action in the kill zone and its crew was transferred to another boat which then cleared the area. All units returned fire and then Broncos, and Seawolves placed strikes. One hundred troops were put ashore south of the contact area and swept northward. Friendly casualties in the action were one USN killed and 11 wounded (2 seriously). Enemy casualties were 7 VC killed by PBR's and 7 VC killed by Seawolves and Broncos. The damaged PBR was later recovered and towed out of the canal.
Later, a debrief of the OTC and patrol officers and an examination of the damaged PBR produced speculation that the operation had been compromised and the VC had known the Navy units were coming. The VC had been set up as a heavy weapons company and had initiated contact by detonating an oversized claymore mine that had been filled with half inch pieces of steel construction rod. During the firefight, the units noticed a large weapon on wheel that resembled a 7mm Pack Howitzer. At least two .51 cal. weapons were used by the enemy along with several AK-47's.

In a non-hostile incident occurring on the 15th of October, two PBR's on patrol stopped a sampan with one VN male aboard who presented a Chieu Hoi pass and expressed a desire to rally. The returnee was Trung Uy Le Xuan Thu, the former VC surgeon for An Xuyen Province. He was turned over to VN authorities for disposition.
Market Time Raider Campaign

During October, Market Time Raiders conducted 62 Sea Lords missions along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Coastal Zones. Ships and aircraft supporting these missions consisted of two to seven PCF's, U.S. Coast Guard WPB's and one WHC, River Assault Craft, helicopters, OV-10's and OV-6A's and Vietnamese Navy assets. The Market Time Raiders, in addition to firing at targets of opportunity, conducting H and I fire, and responding to requests for urgent gunfire support, and manning of waterborne guardposts, inserted, extracted and supported ground forces consisting of Underwater Demolition Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, SEAL's, PRU's, RP/PP troops, VNN Rangers and ARVN soldiers. There were only 15 incidents of enemy initiated hostile fire reported during October. This was 10 less than the September total. One PCF and one skimmer were damaged in these firefights. Friendly casualties were two U.S. sailors killed and four U.S. sailors and one VN sailor wounded.

Enemy personnel losses, which were lower in October than in September, were 49 Viet Cong killed (21 body count, 27 probable), two VC wounded and five VC captured. Enemy material losses; however, increased over the previous month with 167 junks or sampans and 130 structures destroyed, 66 craft and 240 structures heavily damaged and six craft captured in October.

The primary operational emphasis continued to center on the pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula under Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III while still achieving maximum damage in secret zones and enemy base areas.
PCF's 103, 54, 17 and 46, with two OV-10A (Broncos) aircraft from VAL-4 providing air cover, conducted a Sea Lords mission on the morning of 7 October along the Rach Bo Lon about eight miles southeast of Thanh Phu (XR 728 880). The "Swift" boats entered the canal in pairs and took targets of opportunity under fire as they proceeded up the canal. The Broncos placed a strike on two large sampans. At noon the PCF's exited the canal without making contact with the enemy. The OV-10A's then placed a strike on offensive bunkers at the north end of the canal. The morning operation resulted in five bunkers, 12 structures, two sampans and one fish trap destroyed, and six bunkers and 13 structures heavily damaged. There were no friendly casualties.

On the afternoon of 10 October, PCF's 25 and 28 entered the Bassac River (XR 340 545) on a Sea Lords mission taking targets of opportunity under fire. Proceeding up the river numerous structures and sampans on the east bank were taken under fire and destroyed. The "Swift" boats probed the river for about 10 miles when restricted water forced them to turn around. The PCF's destroyed 17 sampans, 12 structures and eight large bunkers and damaged five structures. There were two Viet Cong probably killed and no friendly casualties.

A Sea Lords mission was conducted in the Thanh Phu Secret Zone on 10 and 11 October. Prior to commencement of the operation, the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO) at Ben Tre leaked information through the province that an airborne assault would take place in the next few days. At 0645H the PT COMFORT (USCG WPB) and PT GRACE (USCG WPB) conducted
a probe of the Rach Khau Bang and Rach Con Menh taking targets of opportunity under fire. In the afternoon the WPB's were joined by the USCGC SEBAGO (WHEC 42) and conducted on H and I mission. A representative of the U.S. Army Beach Jumper Unit ONE, Team 13 made a tactical voice deception transmission indicating an airborne insertion of troops in Thanh Phu. Shortly thereafter, two UH-1B helicopters arrived on the scene and made a firing run and dropped four para dummies to simulate an airborne landing. PCF's 102, 103 and 54 proceeded up the Rach Bo Lon and established a waterborne guardpost at 1945H. While entering the river two warning shots were heard along the north bank. During the early morning hours of 11 October, PCF 102 took three evading sampans under fire. The two lead PCF's suppressed the enemy fire with .50 caliber, M-79 and M-60 fire, while PCF 102 steamed slowly through the area losing both banks with .50 caliber fire. The PT GRACE detained four males from a sampan and turned them over to the NILU at Ben Tre for classification. The total results of the operation in Thanh Phu from 0600H 10 October to 0400H 11 October follow: 3 Viet Cong killed (2 body count, 1 probable); 6 structures destroyed; 4 structures damaged; 3 sampans destroyed; 2 sampans damaged; 6 bunkers damaged; 1 large sustained fire and 2 large secondary explosions.

The PT CYPRESS (USCG WPB) and PT MARONE (USCG WPB) inflicted heavy material losses against the enemy in a Sea Lords mission on the morning of 21 October. The WPB's proceeded up the Khem Bang Co (IR 366 615 to IR 249 728) playing PSYOPS tapes, titled "President Thieu Speaks"
and "Open Arms Program." On the return trip the WPB's took all targets of opportunity under fire. Four secondary additional explosions were sighted and 14 sustained fires were started. Results of the operation included 62 sampans, 14 motorized junk, 12 structures and 2,000 pounds of rice destroyed and 22 sampans and 40 structures heavily damaged. Three large junk, one small sampan and 1,000 pounds of rice were captured. No friendly or enemy casualties were reported.

On the afternoon of 27 October the PT COMFORT (USCG WPB) and PT ELLIS (USCG WPB) with OV-10A Broncos, providing air cover, proceeded up the Song Ganh Heo (WQ 464 960 to WQ 463 983) taking targets of opportunity under fire along the entire route. The Broncos placed air strikes adjacent to the river. During the probe of the river the WPB's sighted four B-40 rockets mounted on a floating platform on a small man-made elevation along the river bank. The three hour Sea Lords mission scored heavily with the following results: 4 Viet Cong probably killed; 22 structures destroyed; 53 structures damaged; 24 sampans destroyed; 32 sampans damaged; 14 bunkers damaged and 4 B-40 rockets destroyed.
MARKET TIME RAIDER - SEA LORDS
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

A. SEA LORDS 665 - 7 OCT
B. SEA LORDS 673 - 10 OCT
C. SEA LORDS 675 - 10-11 OCT
D. SEA LORDS 709 - 21 OCT
E. SEA LORDS 733 - 27 OCT

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## Operation Sea Lords Statistical Summary by Campaign

**October 1969**

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### Enemy Casualties:

- **Killed**
  - 50BC & 16BC
  - 95BC & 117EST 25BC & 65EST 156EST 15EST 21BC & 27EST
  - 1BC & 25BC & 27EST 16BC & 23EST

- **Wounded**
  - 9USN & 4VNN 1USN 8USN & 9VNN 4USN & 1VNN 0USN & 6VNN 0USN & 6VNN

- **Captured**
  - 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN

### USN & VNN Casualties:

- **Killed**
  - 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN

- **Wounded**
  - 9USN & 4VNN 1USN 8USN & 9VNN 4USN & 1VNN 0USN & 6VNN

- **Captured**
  - 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN

- **Missing**
  - 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN 0USN

### Enemy Material Losses:

- **Destroyed**
  - 1 Junks & sampans
  - 16 Structures

- **Captured**
  - 3 Junks & sampans
  - 16 Weapons
  - 140 Ammunition (rounds)
  - 1 Rice (tons)

- **Damaged**
  - 1 Junks & sampans
  - 2 Structures

### USN Material Losses:

- **Destroyed**
  - 0 Surface craft
  - 0 Aircraft

- **Damaged**
  - 2 USN Surface craft
  - 0 Aircraft

### Hostile Fire Incidents:

- 57
  - 35
  - 21
  - 15
  - 6
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

During October, Market Time and Stable Door forces continued routine operations. The weather was generally good in the First and Third Coastal Zones; however, choppy seas is the Second Coastal Zone prevailed during most of the month. Task Force 115 units detected a total of 102,802 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 34,705 craft were inspected and 19,069 were boarded. As a result of these checks, 189 craft and 538 persons were detained for possession of contraband, faulty or no identification, violation of restricted zones or other suspicious activity. There were also 28 Viet Cong suspects detained. In the Game Warden area of operations in the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers, Market Time units detected 6,919 watercraft, inspecting 2,470 and boarding 3,256. There were 92 craft and 17 persons detained.

Enemy initiated activity remained at a relatively low level during October as it has in the previous three months. Intelligence reports of expected enemy offensive actions that were to commence in October did not materialize. There were no known large scale infiltration of men or supplies attempted during the month. Task Force 115 forces continued to provide Naval gunfire and blocking patrols in support of friendly ground operations along the coasts and in the rivers and canals. There were five U.S. Navymen killed and 13 wounded while enemy losses to the naval gunfire of Market Time units came to 75 confirmed killed plus 39 probably killed and 11 wounded.
Operation Market Time

The tempo of naval gunfire, Sea Lords, Sea Float and Sea Tiger missions increased slightly during October with 603 missions conducted. Gun damage assessment on these missions was 40.6 percent, and comparable to the high of 42.3 percent recorded in May 1969. Results of these missions were: 112 Viet Cong killed (75 body count, 37 probable; 11 Viet Cong wounded; 4 Viet Cong captured; 423 junks/sampans destroyed; 86 junks/sampans damaged; 687 structures/bunkers destroyed and 417 structures/bunkers damaged. There were 10 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported during the month. These were taken under fire resulting in eight sampans destroyed and 13 Viet Cong killed (12 body count, 1 probable) and one VC wounded.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 42,581 junks and sampans. A total of 17,760 inspections and 13,680 boardings were carried out. Detections of steel hulled vessels in Market Time areas totaled 714. Of these 413 were inspected and another 34 were boarded and determined to be non-suspicious.

There were more than 80 multi-craft missions conducted during October in support of Operations Sea Float and Sea Lords in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. These river and canal incursions (Market Time Raiders) continued to score heavily against the enemy, although the primary emphasis in the IV CTZ continued on pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula. The "Swift" boats assigned to Sea Float continued to support Sea Lords missions in areas adjacent to the Sea Float AO (see discussion
During October, SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 conducted almost daily operations in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in support of Sea Float operations.

In ceremonies on 31 October at the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard in Saigon, 13 PCF's were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. The PCF's, 11, 23, 42, 44, 47, 49, 57, 58, 66, 67, 68, 91 and 100 departed that afternoon for Qui Nhon and will commence Market Time patrols in the Second Coastal Zone during November. The Coastal Surveillance Center, Qui Nhon is also scheduled for turnover to the Vietnamese Navy in early November.