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MONTHLY HISTORICAL
DECEMBER 1969

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2. The Civic Action Statistical Summary includes data which applies to the period 26 October through 25 November.

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NAVPHVR/NAVADVGRP MACV NOTE 05216 of 1 Jan 1970
LIST II (A&B)
LIST III (Less E)
LIST IV (Less D&E)
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LIST VI (A 1&2, D1 E & H14)
List of Charts, Graphs, and Photographs

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FOREWARD

Although there were incidents of enemy contact that were primarily aimed against the government's pacification effort and continued reports of enemy troop and logistic movements, enemy action in the I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones fluctuated between a low and a moderately low level in December. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone, a moderate number of enemy contacts reflected a degree of activity two to three times that reported in previous months, and was characterized by small unit crossings, mining incidents, and attacks against naval units.

To counter the increased level of enemy activity in the IV CTZ and to enhance the effectiveness of friendly forces in that area, several changes were made in December which included the combining of Barrier Reef West and Barrier Reef East under CTG 194.4 to facilitate better command coordination along that long barrier; the committing of an MSF battalion to the Border Interdiction Campaign; and the relocating of numerous assets due to receding water levels on the Vinh Te Canal, reports of infiltration across Barrier Reef, and the designation of Moc Hoa in the Giant Slingshot AO as an area of maximum enemy threat at mid-month. In the III CTZ, additional VNN units were assigned to the Ready Deck Campaign which then became a combined VNN/USN operation under the OPCON of a VNN commander as the Vietnamese Navy continued to assume more of the responsibilities for the naval effort in Vietnam.
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<td>Cement PCF hits the water</td>
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<td>PCF hull</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. (P)</td>
<td>Seabee Santa</td>
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</table>
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of December, combined SEA LORDS forces operating in the Border Interdiction, Giant Slingshot, Search Turn, Ready Deck and Breezy Cove campaigns accounted for a total of 378 enemy killed (by body count) and 47 captured. This is a significant increase over last month's 254 killed and 22 captured. Friendly casualties for these campaigns were down to 12 killed and 84 wounded from last month's 16 killed and 104 wounded. A breakdown of USN and VNN SEA LORDS statistics for December and statistical totals computed since the start of operations are located at the end of this section following the discussions of the various campaigns.
The Giant Slingshot Campaign completed its first year of operations on 6 December. During the year, Brown Water Navy units, in close coordination with ground and air forces, interdicted enemy infiltration and supply lines along the strategically located "Y" shaped rivers, the Vam Co Tay and the Vam Co Dong, causing appreciable enemy attrition as evidenced by the following statistics:

Giant Slingshot Statistics 6 DEC 68 - 6 DEC 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BY USN</th>
<th>BY VNN</th>
<th>BY OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Killed</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Captured</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Ammunition Captured</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>Other Caches</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caches Uncovered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight in Tons</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>Weight in Tons</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIFF's</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>ENIFF's 649</td>
<td>Unilateral Firings 1,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Killed</td>
<td>28 USN</td>
<td>13 VNN</td>
<td>107 Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Wounded</td>
<td>454 USN</td>
<td>103 VNN</td>
<td>603 Other</td>
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Due to the resultant slowdown in the movement of enemy personnel and supplies caused by U. S. Navy forces operating on the "Slingshot" rivers, the threat of enemy attacks on major population centers such as Tay Ninh City and Saigon was greatly reduced. In addition,
these same river forces were instrumental in preventing the enemy from mounting a sustained offensive by helping to deny him the necessary manpower and material to do so.

As for the month of December, casualties inflicted by the 106 river craft and four Seawolves of Giant Slingshot increased from November's 75 killed to December's 112. Friendly casualties were also increased from four killed and 14 wounded last month to nine killed and 37 wounded this month. This increase on both sides occurred even though the number of ENIFF's and FRIFF's (see statistics) remained nearly the same, thus revealing the increased intensity of the fighting.

On the 11th of December, the Moc Hoa AO was evaluated as an area of maximum enemy threat. Accordingly, COMRIVDIV 153, with eight ASPB's, was redeployed to Moc Hoa. RAID 70 was redeployed to Tuyen Nhon and assumed that AO, and RAID 71 was split assuming the old RAID 70 and 71 AO's. Det 7 was staged out of Moc Hoa from 1800 to 0700 daily, while Black Ponies favored the vicinity in their evening patrols. An example of the increased activity in the Moc Hoa AO is included in the following narrative in the incident of 11 December.

Two PBR's were in WBGP on the Vam Co Dong River five miles south of Go Dau Ha (XT 395 183) on 8 December when they sighted a motorized sampan with six VC aboard. The units, under Patrol Officer RD1 Evens and Boat Captains BM1 St Pierre and BM3 Vogler, illuminated the area and attempted to get the enemy to surrender. When the attempt
proved unsuccessful, the sampan was taken under fire killing all six of the enemy and sinking the sampan. There were no friendly casualties.

Three RAC of RAS 15 were supporting the U. S. 6/31st Infantry Battalion in a night operation on 13 December near the Vam Co Dong River, 11 miles southeast of Ben Luc (XS 723 635), when one of the troop ambush positions sighted ten VC, received a mortar round, and began taking automatic weapons fire. During the firefight that followed, four U. S. Army men were killed, and one was wounded. The RAC, under B/LC Franklin, supported the troops along with Army helos. A sweep conducted the following morning turned up 11 VC bodies.

RIVDIV 552 PBR's were in WBG at a known enemy crossing point on the Vam Co Dong River nine miles southeast of Tra Cu (XS 566 886) at 1944H on 14 December when they sighted and took under fire one sampan crossing the river from west to east. When the area was illuminated, an additional three sampans were sighted along with nine VC in the water. As the units opened fire on the sampans and swimmers, they came under B-40 and A/W fire from the west bank and heavy A/W fire from the east bank. Enemy firing positions extended approximately 75 meters along the river. The lead PBR took two or three B-40 rounds which blew the boat captain over the side and wounded three of the crewmen. The damaged boat went out of control, beached, and began burning. Meanwhile, the cover boat continued to receive B-40 and A/W fire with at least 12 rockets being fired. By this time, assistance was on the way in the form of artillery, Seawolves, Black Ponies, troops, and TACAIR. At 1952H, the missing boat captain was
recovered alive, and six enemy troops and three more sampans were sighted and taken under fire. At 2202H, a zippo and a CSB (Combat Salvage Boat) went alongside the beached PBR to extinguish the fire which had burned the boat to the waterline. Troops and river units provided security throughout the night, and during early morning salvage operations discovered two M-60 riddled sampans, one of which contained an AK-47, seven 75mm RR rounds, and traces of fresh blood. Salvage personnel estimated that the destroyed PBR had taken at least four 75mm RR hits. The hulk was sunk in the river. Friendly casualties in the engagement were four USN wounded (one serious) and one PBR destroyed. Enemy casualties were placed at four VC killed and five more probably killed.

SPB's of RAD 153 were nosed in to the beach at the Special Forces Camp at Binh Chau on the Vam Co Dong River six miles northwest of Moc Hoa (VS 928 993) when they received 82mm mortar, B-40, and A/V hits at 0121H on 11 December. Four PBR's, which were in WBGP nearby, were scrambled to the scene along with an Army LHPT and Navy Black Ponies that were diverted to the area. Enroute, PBR's received B-40 and A/V fire from the portion of Binh Chau Village which is west of the fork in the river. The fire was not returned. At 0134H, the damaged ASPB's departed the area for Moc Hoa. Shortly thereafter, with the camp under ground assault, the Army advisor requested emergency extraction and medevac. The extraction was begun by PBR's as the enemy forces entered the camp and forced the defenders to retreat to the south perimeter. At this point, Black Ponies commenced air-
strikes, and two additional PBR's were scrambled from Moc Hoa. At 0156H, the Black Ponies were forced to leave the area due to a low fuel state, and additional Black Ponies were requested. Meanwhile, two PBR's continued direct fire into the enemy force while spotting for strikes by the Army LHX. At 0230H, a Shadow aircraft began strikes and received A/W fire while over the target, and at 0306H, the camp was retaken by the defenders. Friendly casualties in the action were two USN killed, two USN wounded (serious), and two VNN wounded (serious). All Navy casualties were aboard the ASPB's when they were hit. One U. S. Army man was also wounded. The people
of the village nearby reported that the VC killed four civilians and wounded six while destroying 14 houses. Enemy casualties were listed as 21 VC killed and two VC wounded of which 11 of the kills were credited to Black Ponies. A Special Forces agent reported later that 27 VC had been killed and 13 VC wounded in the attack. He also commented that the VC are possibly monitoring U. S. Navy units to limit their support of FOB's in forthcoming attacks. Two days later, on the night of 13 December, Black Pony aircraft killed 30 VC (by body count) in an airstrike a mile and a half to the northeast of the camp.

Beginning at 1000H on 19 December, two ATC's of RAD 151 under SK1 O'Reilly, Patrol Officer, and BM1 Thai and BN2 Hoang, Boat Captains, supported RF/PF elements in a sweep of the west bank of the Van Co Dong River nine miles northwest of Tra Cu (vic XT 413 102). During the sweep of the area, the site of heavy contact two days earlier, the troops discovered a cache which contained a machine gun, 23 B-40 rockets, 70 rifle grenades, 2,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 70 60mm mortar rounds, 20 anti-tank mines, 14 82mm mortar rounds, and 1,000 rounds of 7.62mm long (CKM ammo). The bodies of three VC were also found, presumably the result of a previous PBR action.

VNN ASPB's of RAID 70 were proceeding to pick up troops when they came under rifle, grenade, and A/V fire from the east bank of the Van Co Tay River, 14 miles southeast of Ben Luc (XS 701 570) at 1000H on 29 December. The units returned fire and made firing runs on the area while Seawolves were scrambled. LT Johnson, Flight Commander, and LTJG Parker, Wing Pilot, were overhead in five minutes.
with VNN observer LTJG Hung. After the helos made their firing runs, a sweep of the area produced five VC bodies. The troops conducting the sweep also captured three wounded VC together with one AK-47, one M-16, one M-1 carbine, and seven magazines for the rifles. In addition, 300 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, four gallons of gasoline, ten blasting caps, a box of rice, and numerous documents were captured. The only friendly casualties were two VNN slightly wounded.
In Operation Ready Deck on the upper Saigon River from Phu Cuong upstream to Tri Tam (XT 803 140 to XT 480 470) and on the Thi Tinh River that merges with the Saigon River northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 755 205), the fighting forces of TG 194.6, the 1st Infantry Division, USA, and the 5th ARVN successfully interdicted the enemy forces in December. The Ready Deck campaign which has been a SEA LOUDS operation under USN command since 15 October became a combined USN/VNN operation on 11 December. Commander Dang Trung Hieu, VNN, presently Commander of the Third Riverine Area, assumed command at Phu Cuong and LCDR G. T. Flanagan, the retiring CTG 194.6, assumed duty as the Deputy CTG 194.6. At the same time the operation was renamed Tran Hung Dao V/Ready Deck to reflect the Vietnamese participation.

Concomitant with the change of command, RIVDIV 571 departed Phu Cuong on 9 December and chopper to CTG 194.4. River Division 593 vacated the designator TU 194.6.2 and assumed TU 194.6.1 on 10 December. RAG 24 was brought under the direct control of CTG 194.6. The drawdown of assets that was created by the departure of RIVDIV 571 was filled by eight PBHs of the VNN RGP 51 who completed the transit from Cat Lai to Phu Cuong on 11 December. The units now assigned to CTG 194.6 are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Units Assigned</th>
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<td>TG 194.6 (Whaler)</td>
<td>Whaler</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.6.1 (RIVDIV 593)</td>
<td>PBH</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGP 51</td>
<td>PBH</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG 24</td>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>18/36</td>
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The employment of the night waterborne guard post either with FBK's or FBM's in conjunction with troops of the 5th ARVN Division or 1st Infantry Division, USA, again proved to be the most effective tactic to interdict the enemy movements along the Saigon River. Routine day and night patrols, search and destroy missions, ground sweeps, and UDT-12 bunker blowing operations were also utilized against the enemy force.

The number of enemy casualties, firefights, sightings and unilateral firings were comparable to those recorded in November as the intelligence data continued to reflect the primary emphasis of the enemy to be on logistics. A VC supply chief from the 83rd Rear Service Group who rallied to the friendly forces revealed that the VC were conducting reconnaissance mission along the Saigon River and in the vicinity of the ATSB at Phu Cuong. Other reports indicated that the enemy 2nd Quyet Thang Battalion and the K15 sapper Battalion of the 268 Regiment have been targeted against the allied boats on the Saigon River.

The centers of enemy activity along the Saigon River in December seemed to cluster in three general areas seventeen, eleven and six miles northwest of Phu Cuong (vicinity XS 589 333, XS 670 260, XS 200 735, respectively). In November, the successful interdiction of VC trying to cross the river or operating near the river involved VC in groups of six to ten. At the beginning of December, the VC appeared to be more cautious than in November as friendly forces detected on the
average one to three VC, generally between the hours of 2000 and 0300 the following morning. Towards the end of the month, larger groups were sighted, ten VC on 26 December, ten and 40-45 on 29 December in two separate incidents, and two battalions on 31 December.

During a typical search and destroy and bunker blowing operation, the integrated force of two U.S. and two VNN PBH's, the UDT-12, Det D, and troops of the Reconnaissance Company of the 5th ARVN Division uncovered evidence of recent VC activity on 13 December on the banks of the Thi Tinh River from its junction with the Saigon River to five miles upstream (XT 755 205 to XT 743 254). In the morning, the troops and UDT personnel destroyed one platoon sized bunker. Activity picked up in the afternoon as they found a recently occupied platoon size bunker at approximately 1220. Within minutes, one PBH fired 40mm rounds at two VC who were escaping into a nearby treeline. The troops gave chase but the VC made good their escape. About an hour later the ground units destroyed a 105mm shell that was booby trapped and another bunker. Continuing upstream, they found fresh bedding, ten metal rods and fifteen lengths of freshly cut bamboo. Approximately another fifty meters up river, they recovered two crockery pots, 2,000 NVA piasters, two fresh squash, some nouc mam, 280 rounds of assorted ammunition, one pound of smokeless powder, one pack, two U.S. canteens, two 2.75 rocket propellants, and some miscellaneous clothing.

On the evening of 26 December, two VNN PBH's of RPG 51 were in the process of establishing a waterborne guardpost eight miles north-
west of Phu Cuong (XT 677 229) when they were ambushed from the west
side of the river by an estimated VC squad armed with B-40 rockets
and automatic weapons. The lead boat was hit by a B-40 rocket and
sank within a couple of minutes. The cover boat attempted to suppress
the enemy fire while it maneuvered to recover the VN sailors in the
water. All the personnel were recovered with the exception of one
sailor whose body was found two day later. Two of the VNN that were
picked up had received minor wounds. HAG 24 units that were in the
area conducted search operations the same evening with illumination
artillery being provided by the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. An
LHPT from Phu Loi escorted the remaining PBH most of the way to Phu
Cuong.

Seven HAG of HAG 24 and their U.S. advisor, LT W. K. Blakely,
were in a night waterborne guardpost on the evening of 29 December
while providing security for the salvage operations of the PBH that
had sunk on 26 December. Shortly after dark, they detected ten to
fifteen VC moving from the southeast to the northwest about ten meters
from the river. With illumination overhead, the HAG laid down a
blanket of fire for fifteen minutes. Air strikes were called in and
the following day a sweep of the contact area revealed three VC killed
(two probable).

Two nights later, 12 HAG 24 units and two RPC 51 PBH's were in
defensive position in the same area (XT 675 234) still providing
support and security for the VNN PBH salvage operations. At approxi-
mately 2019 the VNl observed at a distance of 400 meters eight to
ten VC approaching their units from east to west across a field. As
the enemy troops moved close to the boat positions, it was determined
that they were armed with automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons
and satchel charges. When the VC were approximately 100 meters away,
the HAC and PBH's opened fire with their weapons. Immediately, a
LHFT was scrambled from Lam Son on a priority basis. Black Pony 105
on a normal patrol was diverted to the contact area and began air
strikes at 2046. The strikes continued until 2130 when the Black
Pony had expended all its ammunition and departed the area. The
LHFT immediately commenced helo strikes and continued until approxi-
mately 2215. Artillery illumination was requested and the U.S. 25th
Infantry Division responded within 10 minutes. At 2223 two VC were
illuminated by flares 200 meters north and 60 meters inland from the
main HAC element located on the east bank. A minute later at least
30 VC on the west bank opened fire with B-40 rockets and automatic
and semi-automatic weapons fire. At 2258 Black Ponies 04 and 10 were
on station and began air strikes on the enemy positions. The OV-10's
departed the area at 2320 and Nighthawk aircraft from Cu Chi arrived
at 2355 and commenced air strikes. The sounds of men splashing into
the river were heard at 0100, and ten minutes later, at least two VC
were closing the boats from the west side with one person on the bank
nearby. The area continued to be illuminated, and at 0126, the VC
opened fire from the west bank again as four more swimmers slipped
into the water. Three of these were killed and the other one was
most probably killed. From 0235 until 0320 high explosive artillery rounds were spotted into the area by the USN advisor, LT Blakely. At this time, one 3-40 rocket was fired at the NAC by approximately six VC on the west bank. The next few rounds of artillery landed directly on their position as they scurried up the hill on the opposite bank. The northern NAG 24 element was attacked by 18 to 20 VC who charged toward the NAC craft at 0335. At this point many of the friendly units were running low on ammunition as they were putting fire into the VC on both banks.

Black Pony aircraft were scrambled again but developed engine trouble and did not arrive until 0415. In the meantime, the riverine craft and FPR's were still receiving concentrated enemy fire from both banks. Around 0430 both Black Pony and Snooky aircraft were providing continuous strikes and illumination. One VNN FPR and two NAG 24 RPC were en route from the Phu Cuong with more ammunition, and a VN flare ship was on station over Phu Cuong. The FPR arrived in the area at 0520, and the two RPC arrived at 0610. Because of the dense fog and smoke, the fixed wing aircraft departed the area at 0515. Illumination from the flare ship continued until almost day break when the possibility of further attack was considered unlikely. With the fighting over, the friendly forces were able to assess the total results of one of the longest riverine engagement of the war. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were placed at 37 VC killed including 12 by body count.
2019  RAC/PBR sight 12 VC 400 meters to East, opened fire at 100 meters
2046  Black Pony begins strikes
2130  LHPT begin strikes
2225  Two VC illuminated 60 meters inland on East Bank
2234  30 VC on west bank
2252  Black Pony begins strikes
2355  Nighthawk begins strikes
0110  Two VC in water, one VC on bank closing boats from west side
0126  VC open fire from west bank as four VC enter water.
0320  20 VC charge RAC from east bank
0425  Black Pony and Spooky begin strikes
0430  Ammo resupply on way, flare ship on station, last significant attack ceased
0515  F/W air assets depart due to smoke/fog
In a separate incident on 29 December, WIC Kinsey and two U.S. PHN's, numbers 752 and 755, had just settled into a night waterborne patrol post four miles northwest of Phu Cuong (AT 74J 204) when they saw swimmers attempting to cross the river from south to north 25 meters from the boats. When the two PHN's broke the NBOG, released their weapons, and illuminated the area, they counted 40 to 45 VC in the water. When the PHN's began firing at the swimmers, they were greeted by heavy automatic weapons fire from ten to fifteen positions along the bank. Once the PHN sailors had suppressed the fire, they counted 30 dead VC (three probable). In the process of searching the battle grounds, they recovered one wounded VC, eight packs, one pistol, 7,000 piasters, some medical supplies, one U.S. grenade, one small radio, one pound of documents, and some miscellaneous personal gear and clothing. 8 and 1 fire was placed in the area by the 25th Infantry Division Artillery until dawn at which time the area was swept by 5th NDN Division troops. At midnight USN Black Ponies conducted an air strike in the contact zone within unknown results.
Border Interdiction forces continued to increase both in number and effectiveness during the month. The number of river craft assigned to the Border Interdiction Campaign increased from 180 at the end of November to 239 at the end of December. During the same time period, border Interdiction units increased the number of confirmed enemy killed from 57 to 120. As a further measure of effectiveness, the significant increase in enemy kills was accomplished while incurring fewer friendly casualties - those figures dropped from nine killed and 55 wounded in November to three killed and 26 wounded in December. The fact that for two monthly periods the total number of ENIFF's, FRIPP's, and unilateral firings varied by only five (97 in November and 102 in December) is also indicative of increased effectiveness.

Various changes were made during the month in the Border Interdiction Campaign, many as a result of the seasonally decreasing water level in the Vinh Te Canal. Early in the month, RAC operating in the eastern sector of the canal were periodically grounding during transits to WBGP positions. As a result, a 1/4 and 3/4 mile stretch of the Vinh Te Canal from Chou Doc southwestward (WS 065 806 to WS '28 847) was declared a "troops only" operating area. With the RAC restricted to a five mile section of canal southwest of the "troops only" area, all but six Tran Huy Dao RAC were relocated to Barrier Reef West. The remaining RAC maintained a heavy lift capability for the Chou Doc Province forces and will continue operations until they are precluded by low water. In addition to this change, by 10
A CAMOUFLAGED SAMAN RECEIVES AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE FROM A DOOR GUNNER.
December, the water had reached such a low level that it forced curtailment of the extensive single boat WBGPs that have proved so successful in the previous months. The reason being that the resultant high banks make single boat operations of this type hazardous. Also, in another change, a MSF Battalion was assigned on 10 December to operate in the Tran Hung Dao portion of the 44th STZ Border Interdiction Campaign under the command of CTG 194.4. The general area of employment will be in Central Tran Hung Dao, bounded on the east and west by north-south grid lines VS 61 - VS 93, with initial emphasis between VS 61 and VS 76. The purpose of the assignment is to provide troop support for Navy operations in the area in addition to the other forces, CIDG camps, and RF/PF outposts presently supporting CTG 194.4. Upon the withdrawal of Navy boats from the area due to the receding water levels, the MSF units will move to deployment points with other available transportation.

In the Barrier Reef AO's, the entire canal system (Barrier Reef West and Barrier East) from An Long to Tuyen Nhon was placed under the CFCON of CTG 194.4 on 8 December, and Barrier Reef East MAC, formerly under CTG 194.9, were chopped to CTG 194.4 on that date. This was done to facilitate better command coordination in view of the relocation of Tran Hung Dao MAC, the shifting of MAC to Barrier Reef from operations on the Song Ong Doc, and because of numerous intelligence reports of infiltration across Barrier Reef.

For the month of December, Tran Hung Dao forces maintained an average of 62 WBGPs nightly, slightly less than the 68 average for November. The newly combined Barrier Reef East and West forces were
A SEANOLF SEARCHES FOR VC ACTIVITY ALONG ONE OF THE RIVERS IN THE FRIENDLY VIETNAM.
setting over 40 350's nightly during the last part of the month.
The following incident narratives are typical of the type of activi-

ity seen in the Border Interdiction Campaign and include examples show-
ing the effectiveness of the "Hedge"

On 4 December, at the request of the Chau Doc Province Chief,
132 units (T-16, BM2 Hall, Boat Captain, and T-19, BM2 Miller,
Boat Captain) lifted 150 PF troops from Chau Doc and inserted them
12 miles to the north on the Song Hau Giang. The insertion, made
at 1245H, was near a suspected enemy position where five VC had been
killed in a contact with an estimated 50 VC on the previous day.
After the insertion, the two tango boats remained in the vicinity
(WT 097 031) until 1430H when the on-scene commander, the PF Senior
Advisor, requested they provide fire support on enemy positions a
mile to the north. Enroute to the target area, the boats drew light
automatic weapons fire from the east bank (WT 096 042), however, the
fire was not returned due to friendlies in the area. At 1500H,
the two craft commenced fire on designated targets on the east bank
of the Song Hau Giang (WT 095 048 and WT 095 049), and two enemy
were killed by PF troops as they attempted to evacuate the target
area. Shortly thereafter, T-16 was called upon to extract five
wounded PF troops (WT 095 050) and move them to a more secure area
where a dustoff could be conducted. At 1727, the two units, while
moving south for troop extraction, came under heavy automatic and
B-40 rocket fire just to the south of the position from which earlier
fire had been received. During the attack, five B-40's were fired
SITE OF PREVIOUS DAY'S CONTACT WITH VC

T-16 EXTRACTS FIVE WOUNDED PF TROOPS (1520)

TANGO BOATS PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT (1500)

T-16 AND T-19 DRAW LIGHT A/W FIRE WHILE MOVING NORTH FOR FIRE SUPPORT MISSION

ARMY HELO DOWNED—NAVY SEAWOLVES PROVIDE COVER (1530-1630)

T-16 AND T-19 RECEIVE HEAVY A/W AND B-40 FIRE WHILE MOVING SOUTH FOR EXTRACTION (1720)

T-16 AND T-19 INSERT AND EXTRACT PF TROOPS (1245-1807)

CHAU DOC
12 MILES

1 1/2 0 1 MILE
at the boats with T-16 taking the only rocket hit, however, the two
craft sustained approximately 60 AK-47 hits which wounded two
sailors and one USA soldier. Because the enemy position was a twin
two friendly units, strict fire discipline was exercised after re-
turning enemy fire. In addition to the Tango boats, U.S. Navy Seaw-
wolves also participated in this action. Seawolves from Det 3, Det 5
and Det 9, provided air cover for heavy ground contact and a downed
Army helo. The Navy helos received heavy A/W fire from enemy posi-
tions as they placed numerous machine gun and rocket strikes. In all,
the enemy lost 20 NVA killed by air and 17 NVA killed by PF troops in
an action that again demonstrated the versatility of the ATO and the
effectiveness of helo gunships.

The ATO's and Seawolves were not the only Border Interdiction
units to see action on 4 December. Two PBR's of HU211Y 535, under
Patrol Officer MK1 Lee, that were set up in night WBGP 22 miles
southwest of Chau Doc on the Vinh Te Canal (VS 855 612) were also
to see plenty of activity. At 2220H, the PBR's sighted five person-
nel swimming across the canal from north to south (VS 856 612)
a crossing technique being used with increasing frequency as inter-
diction units make it more difficult for the enemy to make unprotected
crossings. When the swimmers reached midstream, they were taken
under fire with 40mm and 60mm fire, and they disappeared. Only
an oil slick and metal can were left floating in the contact area.

Thirty minutes later, three additional swimmers were observed
swimming across the canal in the same vicinity as the previous
attempt. They were also taken under fire and disappeared. The PBR's,
not having broken ambush during the incidents, waited for another hour and were ready when four more swimmers attempted a crossing. During this last abortive attempt, one swimmer reached the opposite bank only to fall back in the canal when he was cut down by machine gun fire. No other persons were observed leaving the canal. Enemy casualties were one NVA killed and 11 NVA probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

Forced Interdiction Forces continued to prove their effectiveness as two sizeable enemy units were thwarted in Vinh Te Canal crossing attempts on the nights of 21 and 24 December. In the first instance, KViLV 515 PBK's teamed up with friendly troops, Hal 3, Bob's 3 and 5 helos, and Val 4, Net A Black Ponies to prevent an estimated 60 enemy who had assembled on the river bank from crossing the canal 21 miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 058 613). Seawolves, with PBK's sotting, placed rocket and machine gun strikes on enemy positions while Black Ponies provided illumination and delivered ordnance. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown. In the crossing attempt on the 24th, PF troops in a defensive perimeter in the vicinity of RAD 132's T-16 and T-19 (mentioned previously in this section in the write up of the 4 December incident) came into contact with an estimated 30 VC and turned them back across the Cambodian border as they tried to cross the Vinh Te Canal 4½ miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 052 798). Small arms fire from three VC was received by T-16 in WBGP on half mile to the south of the crossing site (WS 050 791). The unit returned fire
with unknown results, and contact was broken as VC withdrew into Cambodia. Again, there were no friendly casualties.

All the month's significant activity was not restricted to the Tran Hung Dao AO. On 22 December, six miles east of An Long on Carrier Reel (WS 513 812), a Boston Whaler with LT Roper aboard sighted eight sampans north of the NKP moving toward the canal. Fire was held until the sampans had entered the canal and began to cross, and then, the Boston Whaler broke ambush while initiating fire on the first three sampans. In return, the whaler received A/W fire from the north bank, and, of the three sampans taken under fire, two reached the south bank and one returned to the north bank. At this point, PER's 730 and 731, under boat captains BM2 Bernhardt and EN2 Goodall, made firing runs on the enemy positions drawing return fire from both banks. Black Ponies of Val 4, Det A, were diverted to the scene and placed airstrikes that suppressed the enemy fire. Ten PF troops from an outpost a mile and a half to the west (WS 489 914) were later inserted for a sweep of the area. Among the items captured were 82 locally made hand grenades and material to produce nearly 200 more, 4 boxes of Chicom grenades, 15 rifle grenades, 4 SKS rifles, 1 AK-47 with 8 clips of ammunition, 2 claymore mines, 30 pounds of rice, and 4 sampans. The VC suffered 10 killed during the engagement while they were unable to inflict any friendly casualties.

Following this incident, there were strong indications that the VC would launch an attack against the PER's in retribution for this particular defeat. Intelligence reports were received stating the
VC were spreading propaganda throughout the area to this effect.

However, the antithesis of retribution occurred on the following night when the enemy made contact with another WBGP set by HLVDIV 535 units in the same vicinity. Contact was made with 20-30 VC who were observed on the south bank in a line abreast spaced approximately 500 meters either side of the site of the previous night's crossing attempt. The river craft (one Boston whaler and four PPH's) teamed up with Seawolves and Black Ponies to kill an estimated eleven VC (one body count, ten probables). As on the previous night, there were no friendly casualties.

Vietnamese sailors from Coastal Group 44 scored heavily against the VC on 29 December when a VNN junk, under LT Quang with U.S. advisor BM3 Gone aboard, accounted for 20 VC probable kills, 7 sampans destroyed, 6 AK-47 rifles, one M-2 carbine, and some ammunition and documents captured. The VNN junk was on routine patrol and in the process of challenging 20 sampans when it came under automatic weapons fire from the sampans four miles northeast of Ha Tien (VS 480 523). The fire was returned sinking three sampans and forcing two sampans to beach. It was from the latter sampan that the captured material was taken. A short time later, while still in the contact area, the junk came under automatic weapons fire from both banks which was returned and suppressed. Seawolves were called in and placed a strike at VS 485 520. A troop sweep, later, revealed numerous blood trails. The only friendly casualty in the action was one VNN slightly wounded.
NAVY HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS (SEAWOLFS) AND PCFS (SWIFT BOATS) WORKING TOGETHER MAKE UP A VERY EFFICIENT AIR-RIVER TEAM TO COMBAT ENEMY AGGRESSION.
Search Turn

Intercdiction operations were continued during December by Search Turn units with special emphasis being placed on the Ba The, Tri Ton, and So Not canal areas due to intelligence reports which warned of a possible all-out enemy effort in the Search Turn A.O. To combat this possibility, TG 194.3, with an end of month strength of two Seawolves and 34 water craft, which included 28 PBR's, three Boston Whalers, two MSD's, and one CCB, mounted 391 one, two, and three unit waterborne guardposts which more than doubled November's total of 177.

In spite of these intelligence reports and operational preparations, the forecast enemy activity failed to materialize as hostile fire incidents dropped from 31 in November to 19 in December. The number of enemy kills also dropped from 40 kills and 57 probables recorded last month to 12 kills and 18 probables this month. There were, however, two VC captured in action in December while there were none captured in November. Search Turn operations also resulted in 19 enemy craft destroyed and five damaged. USN losses for this period were three USN wounded and one PBR damaged.

Also participating in the December Search Turn effort was SEAL Team, Det C, which was chopped to CTG 194.3 last month. They conducted interdiction and interrogation operations throughout the month in the Rach Gia and Three Sisters areas. In reaction to SEAL and other intelligence sources, they also joined river craft in WBCP actions. One of the SEAL's most important operations of the
month was an interdiction of a known VC commo-liaison route 28 miles northwest of Rach Gia on the So Mot Canal (VS 836 413). By taking a large VC element under fire on 1 December, the action resulted in eight VC killed and seven VC probably killed as well as dealing a serious blow to an important VC route.

On 11 December, Mobile Support Team (MST) 2, Det 3, began working in the Rach Gia A. O. under task designator 194.3.7. This unit joined with the SEAL's and the other Search Turn waterborne units in the month's interdiction operations as can be seen in the following incident narrative.

Six SEAL's of TU 194.3.6, two Chieu Hoi's, and one LSSC of MST 2, Det 3, set a waterborne interdiction position on the Rach Gia - Ha Tien Canal 22 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 862 301) in the early evening on 20 December. During the first hour only sporadic movement was seen and noises from the bank were heard. Then, at 2040, the WBGP heard a bugle call. The unit initiated fire and continued it for over one half hour when the unit broke guardpost and directed a Black Pony strike at the contact area about one mile down stream from the WBGP position (VS 851 301). The Black Ponies completed the strike at 2215 and reported receiving fire from a heavy tree line north of the previous contact point. A second set of Black Ponies was then called to follow up on the strike. They arrived overhead at 2237 but were diverted to a higher priority target. The LSSC extracted personnel and returned to subsector Kien Son. There were no friendly casualties while the enemy suffered six probable kills,
three sampans destroyed, and miscellaneous web gear and first aid equipment captured.

During the late evening on 29 December, Search Turn units in WBG F on the Ba The Canal 1/4 miles north of Rach Gia (WS 087 264) as part of the Ba The interdiction line sighted two men moving south along the east side of the canal bank and 40 yards inland. The units illuminated the area and took it under fire. One received return fire, which was believed to be 40mm, close aboard and cleared the area. After firing into the area, they observed one man fall and one run away. In response to a scramble, Seawolves arrived on the scene and placed a strike on the east bank about 300 yards inland. The units located one body and discovered a heavy blood trail leading east. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses included one VC killed and one VC probably killed. Clothing, photos, three bags of rice, and numerous documents and papers indicating that the VC may have been a tax collector were recovered. All papers were turned over to NILO Rach Gia for evaluation.
Riverine Strike Group

During December, as in the last half of November, all RAC formerly assigned to CTG 194.7 (Riverine Strike Group) remained outchopped to other operational commanders with the exception of those craft undergoing overhaul.

The following table shows the disposition of the various craft at the end of December.

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<th>ASPR</th>
<th>MCR</th>
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Activity increased significantly in the Breezy Cove AO during December. Enemy KIA's jumped from 16 in November to 40 in December as the total number of ENIFF's, FRIFF's, and unilateral firings increased from 37 to 58, however, this increase in activity did not bring with it an increase in friendly casualties. In fact, they declined slightly from 13 wounded last month to 12 wounded this month.

During the first part of the month, five ATC's and one Monitor departed Song Ong Doc and were chopped from CTG 194.2 to CTG 194.4 on 4 December. This left 26 craft and two Seawolves for operations during the remainder of the month as follows:

- CTU 194.2.1: USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786)
- CTU 194.2.1: 10 PBR's, 2 B'd's
- CTU 194.2.3: 5 ASPB's, 5 ATC's, 1 MON
- CTU 194.2.5: 2 UH-1B's
- CTU 194.2.6: 1 HSSC, 1 LSSC

Two PBR's of TU 194.2.1 were on a routine daytime patrol of the Song Ong Doc on 14 December when they came under attack seven miles from the river mouth (VR 905 007). The PBR's received 6-8 rockets and automatic weapons fire from the south bank, returned fire, and cleared the kill zone. Returning for a second firing run, the units drew an additional two rockets and automatic weapons fire. As the boats cleared to the east, Seawolves on patrol placed strikes in the area. Two additional PBR's then arrived and joined in a third firing
run which was without return fire. Troops were later lifted to the area and in a sweep discovered a half pound of documents, numerous firing positions, and blood trails. In the action, four USN were slightly wounded while enemy casualties are unknown. The size and coordination of this attack was a significant departure from the harassing attacks of the enemy during recent weeks.

In another daylight action, on 24 December, two Seawolves flown by LT Polenski and LTJG Gingrich were returning from a patrol when the pilots sighted 30 VC evading into the brush about 1.5 miles northwest of the base perimeter (WR 823 008). All clearances were quickly obtained and confirmed followed by an airstrike as the VC began breaking up into small groups. The original estimate of enemy casualties was placed at 30 probable kills. Although a sweep of the area produced no bodies or weapons, a sympathizer to the village chief identified the unit as the combined C-8 and C-9 VC companies (approximate strength of 80 men) and reported that there were 28 VC killed and one wounded by the airstrike.

In a night action, on 29 December, SMC Davenport, Patrol Officer, was with two PRR's in WHOP two miles northeast of Song Ong Doc City (WR 003 041) when a sampan with four occupants was sighted crossing the river from south to north approximately 50 meters away. The PRR's hailed the sampan without success and finally took it under fire. The sampan sank, and the four occupants were killed. There were no friendly casualties.
A NAVY HELICOPTER GUNSHIP IS LAUNCHED FROM THE DECK OF AN LST AT SEA, SIGNALLING THE START OF ANOTHER SEANWOOLF OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF BROWN WATER NAVY CRAFT.
Market Time Raider Campaign

There were 66 SEA LORDS missions conducted during December by the Market Time Raiders along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Coastal Zones. There were 17 hostile fire incidents reported during the month; however, only six were against the "Swift" boats and three against WPB's. The other hostile fire incidents were against ground units supporting these missions. Enemy material losses for December were 21 craft and 103 structures destroyed and seven craft and 55 structures damaged. There were 11 Viet Cong killed, one wounded, and five captured. The enemy losses were considerably less than in previous months as the enemy avoided contact whenever possible.

There were three U. S. sailors wounded, two Vietnamese killed and five wounded during the operations. PCF 28 suffered minor material casualties from a B-40 rocket hit for the only craft damaged.

The SEA LORDS missions employed various mixes of craft of up to four PCF's, six USCG WPB's, one USCG WHEC, a monitor, one LSIL, units from Coastal Groups 3h and 36, River Assault Groups 25 and 29, and air cover was provided by OV-10's from VAL-4. Ground forces supported by these craft were Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, RF, PF, PRU, ARVN, National Police Field Forces, Beach Jumper Unit Team 13, and personnel from Coastal Groups 3h and 36.

On the afternoon of 8 December, the PT GRACE (USCG WPB), LT JG J. F. Ebersole, USCG, Commanding, in company with the PT CYPRESS (USCG WPB), entered the Song Ganh Hao on a SEA LORDS mission about
12 miles east of Ca Mau (WR 386 027). The units did not fire upon entering the river hoping to surprise the enemy. Several persons were sighted just after entering the river and were taken under fire by the PT CYPRESS and Broncos (OV-10's) from VAL-4. The Broncos received and suppressed light small arms fire. The WPB's also fired PSYOPS rounds into a large village just to the east. As the units exited the river, targets of opportunity were taken under fire including a 45 foot camouflaged junk which was destroyed. The PT CYPRESS was hit by a suspected rifle grenade causing only minor damage to the superstructure. There were no U. S. casualties in the operation, and the Broncos were credited with three Viet Cong killed. Further enemy casualties were unknown. There were 13 structures and six sampans destroyed and 21 structures heavily damaged.

The Binh Thuy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team embarked in PCF 2, and in company with PCF 32, conducted a SEA LORDS mission on 14 December about 8 miles north of Soc Trang (XR 115 754). The EOD Team was inserted for a bunker destruction mission while the "Swift" boats stood by for security. PCF 64 relieved PCF 32 in mid-afternoon. There was no contact with the enemy during the operation. The EOD Team was extracted at 1720H and returned to Coastal Group 36 headquarters. The Binh Thuy EOD Team destroyed 25 defensive bunkers during the day's mission.

On 17 December, a SEA LORDS mission was conducted approximately 15 miles south of Ca Mau (WR 458 003). The PT MALONE (USCG WPB), LTJG W. C. HOYT, USCG, Commanding, the PT JEFFERSON (USCG WPB), a
monitor, RAG's 25 and 29, and the 221st RAC unit 45 entered the Song Ganh Hao, and the troops were inserted for a ground sweep while the WPB's took targets of opportunity under fire and provided a blocking force. The WPB's received and immediately suppressed small arms and automatic weapons fire at two separate locations along the river. The troops were extracted at 1700H without further incident. The day's action resulted in one Viet Cong killed and 27 sampans, 16 structures, and six bunkers destroyed. There were six sampans and 10 structures damaged. In addition, 2,000 pounds of rice and approximately 100 pounds of dried shrimp were destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

A SEA LORDS mission was conducted on 30 December about 15 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 299 686). PCF 102 with CTF 116 EOD Team embarked and PCF 21 with 35 Popular Force (PF) troops embarked proceeded to Dung Island in the Bassac River where the troops were inserted to destroy bunkers. The troops were extracted and reinserted about two miles to the east where light small arms fire was received and suppressed. Upon completion of the sweep, all troops were extracted without further incident. Gun damage assessment and enemy casualties were unknown. The EOD Team destroyed 30 bunkers. There were no friendly casualties.
MARKET TIME RAIDERS
SEA LORDS

OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

A. SEA LORDS - 14 DEC
B. SEA LORDS - 30 DEC

SCALE:

0 30
Nautical Miles

CONFIDENTIAL
MARKET TIME RAIDERS
SEA LORDS
OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

A. SEA LORDS - 879 - 8 DEC
B. SEA LORDS - 17 DEC

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES 30

CA MAU POINT

CG 41 BASE - POULO
CG 42/46 BASE - PHU QUOC
CG 43/44/45 BASE - RACH GIA

CONFIDENTIAL
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<th>BARRIER REEF</th>
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(*) - Monthly totals