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MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
JANUARY 1970
The overall barometer of enemy activity in January fluctuated between a low and moderate level with the former accounting for the majority of the action. Attacks by fire, minor probes, and sapper attacks characterized the enemy's apparent intention to avoid large unit confrontation and emphasize anti-pacification operations, to resupply and regroup his forces, and to gather intelligence information of allied tactics and operations. In comparison to the entire month, the significant increases of enemy activity on 3/4 and 5/6 January in I CTZ, on 20/21 January in III CTZ, and on 19/20 January in IV CTZ continued to reiterate the enemy's ability to conduct isolated incidents of concentrated attacks by fire.

In January, Vietnamization continued with the commissioning of Task Force 213 – considered a major milestone in the development of a fully combined USN/VNN surveillance and interdiction effort – and with the VNN successfully taking over the important SEA LORDS, Ready Deck Campaign. Also during January, one of the largest combat demolition jobs in the history of the Navy began and, by the end of the month, neared completion. Known as Deep Channel II, this operation is designed to connect, using military explosives, the Kinh Gay and Kinh Lagrange Extension, which are located in the Giant Slingshot AO. In the Border Interdiction AO, contact with unusually large groups of enemy troops was made during January. Large scale crossing attempts were thwarted and intelligence reports continued to be received indicating that enemy units were delayed for up to weeks at time from crossing the barriers with weapons and supplies needed to the south.
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OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of January, combined SEA LORDS forces operating in the Giant Slingshot, Border Interdiction, Search Turn, Ready Deck, and Breezy Cove campaigns accounted for a total of 384 enemy killed (by body count) and 17 captured. These totals are not too dissimilar when compared with December's 378 enemy killed and 47 captured, and they reflect similar overall activity levels for both months, which ranged from low to moderate. Friendly casualties for this period increased moderately from 12 killed and 84 wounded in December to this month's 22 killed and 122 wounded. In January, Vietnamization continued as Operation Ready Deck was removed from the SEA LORDS Campaign and redesignated as a 3rd Riverine Area VNN operation with both VNN and USN units assigned. A breakdown of complete USN and VNN SEA LORDS statistics for January and statistical totals computed since the start of operations are located at the end of this section following the discussion of the various campaigns.
Giant Slingshot

During January, there were an average of 63 U. S. Navy craft and 55 SVN craft assigned to the Giant Slingshot Campaign, and, in addition to performing escort duty, troop lifts, and blocking and support missions, these craft set a daily average of 22 WBGP's along the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. During the month, enemy activity remained at the low to moderate level with enemy casualties increasing from December's 142 killed to January's 182 killed. However, this increase did not come about without cost to friendly units. Friendly casualties also increased from nine killed and 37 wounded last month to this month's 18 killed and 72 wounded.

In addition to other duties, CTG 194.9 assumed the opcon, on 5 January, of all elements assigned to Operation Deep Channel II, one of the largest combat demolition jobs in the history of the Navy. The purpose of this operation is to connect the Kinh Gay and Kinh Lagrange Extension using military explosives. This will in turn provide a patrolling route for river patrol craft in a formerly inaccessible area and established a cordon to enemy infiltration from the tip of the "Parrot's Beak" southwest along the Kinh Bo Bo - a known enemy infiltration route. The new six mile channel when completed will have the added benefit of providing the civilian population in the area with a short cut between Tuyen Nhon and Tra Cu, thus making it easier for them to transport products to the Market in Saigon, Tay Ninh City, and elsewhere. By the end of January, Detachment Delta of Underwater Demolition Team Twelve (UDT-12) and a detachment of Vietnamese Navy
Frogmen, all under LTJG Walter R. Harvey, were well on their way to completion of the channel blasting. In addition, other units were involved as seen on the following Task Organization Chart.

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The following narrative includes examples of the more significant incidents occurring in the Giant Slingshot AO in January.
On the first day of the month, two VN PBR's of RFG 53 were in WSGP on the Vam Co Dong River, three miles west northwest of Ben Luc (XS 573 777), when they observed a sampan moving north along the west bank. The Vietnamese units, with U. S. Navy advisor EM1 Hererra aboard, waited until the sampan closed within twenty yards and then opened fire killing all four occupants. The sampan was then searched and found to contain an AK-47, two ammo cans containing political progress reports, and medical and supply lists. Black Ponies placed a strike on the west bank, but there was no further contact.

On the night of 2 January, two Seawolves flown by Commander Hamman and Lieutenan Catone were diverted to assist TU 194.9.7 craft in contact with VC six miles northwest of Moc Hoa on the Vam Co Tay River (XT 965 965). The two aircraft received and suppressed light small arms and automatic weapons fire as they placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes on the target. A later sweep by 194.9.7 units revealed that the airstrikes had killed six VC, and subsequent intelligence reports from agents in the area indicated that an additional five VC had been killed and 12 wounded.

Beginning at 1400H on 8 January and continuing into the morning of 10 January, RF troops made contact with an estimated VC/NVA battalion located in a rubber plantation five miles north of Go Dau Ha (XT 360 332). U. S. Navy units from Go Dau Ha provided blocking forces and waterborne guardposts in the Vam Co Dong River while Seawolves and Black Ponies conducted air strikes in support of the operations. At the same time, RAC at Go Dau Ha were standing by to lift additional troops into the
area should a need for them arise. As it turned out, there was no need since the enemy was resoundingly defeated and lost 89 VC/NVA killed while inflicting only light casualties on friendly forces - two RF killed, one RF wounded, and two U. S. Army wounded.

In the meantime, on the afternoon of 9 January, Navy Seawolves scrambled to support ARVN and U. S. troops in heavy contact 11 miles southeast of Ben Keo (XT 370 350). The two Seawolves, flown by Lieutenant Catone and LTJG Pinegar, arrived on the scene and coordinated with a U. S. Army FAC as they placed multiple rocket and machine gun attacks on two sides of the friendly position. After returning to Tay Ninh to rearm and refuel, the HHT arrived back in the contact area as armored vehicles, which had been moved in to suppress the enemy offensive, began taking heavy RPG fire. The aircraft placed strikes in support of retreating friendly forces until their ammunition was expended, and their fuel state required them to return to their home base. By this time, TACAIR was enroute. The Navy helos were credited with ten probable kills, and, despite receiving heavy A/W fire on all passes, suffered no casualties with the exception of two small holes in one of the aircraft.

In the same general area, also on 9 January, four RIVDIV 594 PBR's were enroute to night WBOF positions when they came under heavy B-40 and A/W fire from the south bank of the Vam Co Dong River three miles south of Ben Keo (XT 223 433). A total of nine B-40's were fired, and one of the PBR's took two hits resulting in a three foot hole in the port bow and shattered coaming on the portside forward.
To avoid sinking, the PBR beached on the north bank west of the contact area and twenty minutes later was taken in tow to Ben Keo by an ATC with a Monitor providing cover. An artillery sweep of the contact area was followed by Army LHFT and Navy Black Pony airstrikes. However, enemy casualties were unknown. Friendly casualties were one USN killed and four USN wounded who were medevaced less than 16 minutes after the start of the action.

SEAL's of SEAL Team, Det Golf, were inserted by ISSC three miles northeast of Ben Luc (XS 586 770) on the evening of 13 January. The nine SEAL's, two of which were LDNN's, under LTJG Duggan, patrolled north about 600 meters to an east-west commo-liaison trail discovering five bunkers along the route. Turning east on the trail, the SEAL's had patrolled another 500 meters when they heard numerous voices from a large hootch nearby (YS 590 775). One of the LDNN's stated that the voices were directing preparations for a VC meeting, which he estimated 20 VC were attending. While maneuvering toward the hootch, the SEAL's observed nine VC armed with AK-47's moving east. The SEAL's set up on the hootch, called for Seawolves, and then initiated fire after which they withdrew 50 meters to direct the Seawolf airstrikes. During the subsequent strikes, the Seawolves received light A/W fire, and, as the SEAL's moved south for extraction, they also received fire. The results of the action were 15 VC probably killed (five by air) and no friendly casualties.

One platoon of MSF troops and four PBR's of TU 194.9.7 were operating together on 16 January and were in night WOBOP when they sighted
approximately five VC on the south bank of the Vam Co Tay River, four miles northwest of Moc Hoa (WS 951 974). The PBR's, under Patrol Officers SMC Chambless and BMC Blackwell, made firing runs and received two B-40 rockets and small arms fire in return from an undetermined size force. Seawolves were diverted to the scene and placed two strikes in the contact area followed by an MSF troop sweep which netted two VC bodies, two AK-47's, and one B-41 rocket. The boats reset the BFG, and when it became light, another troop sweep was made recovering a B-40 round and 25 back packs filled with personal gear and khaki colored uniforms. Later in the morning, an informant, relating information obtained from villagers in the area, reported that 11 VC had been killed and 12 wounded in the action. There were no friendly casualties.

The enemy had better success on the 21st day of January in an action against the ATSB at Go Dau Ha on the Vam Co Dong River. At 0117H, an explosion occurred between the galley amni of the ATSB and an ATC (T-36) which completely demolished the galley and caused the ATC to sink within three minutes. General Quarters was set immediately on the ATSB, and fields to the north were straffed with machine gun and mortar fire. In addition, boats dropped concussion grenades into the water in the vicinity. A VC was seen evading to the west along a canal by the north perimeter. Seawolves were scrambled and upon arrival, observed several VC evading to the west, 800 meters south of the base. They were taken under fire by the Seawolves, and artillery was called in and fired blocking rounds to the north and southwest.
Of the six U. S. Navy crewmen onboard the ATC four escaped. Two men, below decks at the time of the explosion, were killed. Of the four that escaped, three were slightly wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

The same day, after having been alerted to enemy movement by portable sensors, CTU 194.9.7 PBR's set up in night WBQP five miles northwest of Moc Hoa (WS 948 978). Sighting approximately 30 VC on the river bank, the four PBR's, under Patrol Officers SMC Chambless and BMC Lewis, took the enemy under fire and received grenade and heavy automatic weapons fire in return. Seawolves and a U. S. Army HHHT conducted numerous strikes in the contact area. Also, a Shadow aircraft arrived on the scene but was unable to fire because of clearance problems. The afloat units discovered four VC bodies in the river after the strikes. There were no friendly casualties.
Border Interdiction

At the end of January, there were 278 river craft and 6 helicopters assigned to the Border Interdiction Campaign. During the month, these units continued to hamper the VC's slowly disintegrating logistics chain despite the seasonally decreasing water level which was detrimental to waterborne interdiction efforts. The number of enemy contacts and sightings in the Border Interdiction AO indicates that the enemy is still trying to move through the Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef interdiction barriers, and this month that effort cost him 41 confirmed killed and 67 more probably killed. On the other hand, friendly Border Interdiction forces suffered no kills during December and at month's end had only 33 wounded.

The degree of effectiveness of Navy forces in the Border Interdiction Campaign was reflected in a statement by a VC who had surrendered to friendly forces. He revealed that a 300 man unit with needed weapons and supplies had been prevented from crossing into the "Seven Mountains" area for several weeks by Navy forces. Major General Wetherill, CG DMAC, had passed to the units concerned, a message which contained a well done for their unsurpassed "Courage, determination, and aggressive action." The following incident narrative includes examples of such action.

At 0205H on 3 January, a VC/NVA element of unknown size launched a coordinated attack on the Vinh Gia Special Forces Camp and waterborne units in guardpost positions nearby. The camp, located 30 miles southwest of Chau Doc, in the central sector of the Vinh Te
Canal, received four recoilless rifle rounds and AK-47 fire; ten minutes later, a RIVDIV 512 PBR in VBGP five miles west of the camp (VS 730 612) began receiving automatic weapons fire. Seawolf support was requested at this time, and even though HAL 3, DET 3 helos were theoretically "pinned down" at Vinh Gia due to the incoming enemy fire, LCDH Thomas and LTJG Watts made emergency takeoffs in order to provide support for the PBR, including Medevac. While the Medevac was being conducted, a RIVDIV 515 PBR came under B-40 and heavy automatic weapons fire one mile east of Vinh Gia (VS 815 612). An Army LHPT in the area observed the attack and diverted to assist, arriving prior to HAL 3, DET 5, Seawolves scrambled from YREM-16. Airstrikes were placed in the ambush area, and a Medevac was conducted. Another RIVDIV 515 PBR, also at VS 815 612, reported that an 82mm mortar round had landed on the boat and fortunately failed to detonate. The crew was evacuated to the cover boat and a security perimeter was set. Later, EOD personnel were lifted to the scene to dispose of the dud mortar round, and they arrived shortly after 40 MSF troops who were lifted in by PBR's and inserted near the westernmost contact area (VS 730 613) for a sweep. Results of the action were three VC killed and seven USN and three VNN wounded. In addition, an AK-47, 100 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, numerous hand grenades, and miscellaneous personal and medical gear were recovered.

That night, just to the east of the previous incident, a fierce battle erupted. Initially, the attack was launched by
an estimated 100 VC/NVA against a RIVDIV 535 PBR, under Patrol Officer RMC Mariner, in VNGP 24 miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 640 612). During the action, heavy automatic weapons fire was received from the north bank and random small arms fire was received from the south bank by the PBR. At one point, the enemy approached the boat closely enough to throw a hand grenade at it. Fighting was so intense that the PBR had to be rearmed. By this time, two Seawolf Det's, three flights of Black Ponies, and Army Hunter-Killer Team, and TACAIR were supporting the action, which was characterized by a series of individual engagements in which the enemy would initiate fire on the PBR, followed by airstrikes suppressing the enemy fire, only to have the enemy open fire again a short time later. The next morning KSF troops were inserted, and they found one NVA body and evidence of five more enemy probably killed. In addition, mortar positions, one 105mm booby trapped projectile, and a small amount of ammunition were found. Remarkably, there were no friendly casualties.

On the same night, still further to the east, a RAD 132 ATC reported receiving A/W fire and B-40 rockets from the north bank of the Vinh Te Canal, five miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 058 803). The ATC (T-2), with GMG2 Jones aboard as Patrol Officer, returned and suppressed the fire. Another ATC (T-19), with GMG1 Johnson as Patrol Officer, also came under fire one half mile to the southwest (WS 053 798) while enroute to assist T-2. Seawolves of HAL 3, DET 9, placed two strikes in the vicinity of WS 049 798
where six people were sighted on the north bank. There was no
further contact or any friendly casualties. PF troops were inserted
into the area after the action and captured a VC who was suffering
from a serious face wound. Rapid interrogation of the prisoner
while awaiting Medevac revealed that he was part of a 14-man team
assigned to attack boats on the Vinh Te Canal. The PF troops also
recovered a small amount of ammunition including two F-40 rockets
wired for command detonation.

Not all the significant action occurred in the Vinh Te Canal
Section of the Border Interdiction AO. In the Barrier Reef AO,
on the night of 10 January, an RF guard post on the Grand Canal
seven miles west of Ap Bac (X5 047 744) was attacked by an unknown-
sized enemy force. RIVDIV 551 PBR's, under Patrol officer PR1
Davidson, picked up 20 troops at a Vietnamese outpost located two
miles to the east and inserted them at the contact site. The
PBR's provided fire support for one and a half hours until extraction.
The following morning a troop sweep revealed three VC bodies, 1000
rounds of AK-47 ammunition, six rifle grenades, and some miscellaneous
supplies and documents (boobytrapped). Friendly casualties
in the engagement were two RF troops killed and one wounded.

Moving back to the Vinh Te Canal, on the night of 17-18 Jan-
uary, an enemy crossing attempt by approximately 100 VC was thwarted
by RCG 54 PBR's, MINDIV 113 MSR's, RAD 132 RAC's, and Hal 3, Det's
3 and 5, Seawolves. The first crossing attempt of the night was
Soil shell 22304 when, in response to NCO and radar sightings, 
Seawolves and Black Ponies placed rocket and machine gun strikes 
in the contact area, 12 miles southwest of Chau Doc (VS 972 752). 
Fifty minutes later, four VNN PBR's of RCG 54 in WEGP a half mile 
to the northeast (VS 979 755 and VS 989 760) spotted an estimated 
100 VC approaching their position. When the enemy was within 40 
50 meters, the PBR's opened fire and called in Seawolves, who again 
placed machine gun and rocket strikes. Both the Seawolves and 
the PBR's received return fire. Later, daylight sweeps of both 
areas produced five VC bodies and numerous blood trails leading 
toward Cambodia. Aircraft, as a result were credited with 25 probable 
kills. In addition, a small amount of enemy ammunition was captured 
in the actions that yielded no friendly casualties. In a smaller 
encounter at VS 990 763 that occurred later still, KSB personnel 
accounted for four additional VC killed (two probables) as the VC 
were observed crawling toward a nearby PBR.

Several nights later, on the Grand Canal (Barrier Reef), a 
Monitor (M-3) of RAD 132, while in WEGP 14 miles west of Ap Bac 
(VS 920 769), received seven E-40 rockets and heavy automatic wea-
pons fire from both banks. The Monitor returned fire even though 
she had sustained six rocket hits. An ASPB and a Zippo nearby 
broke their guard post position to assist, and arriving on the 
scene suppressed the hostile fire. The Monitor, escorted by the 
ASPB, cleared to the west to Medevac four wounded USN, while the 
Zippo remained behind destroying enemy positions. Seawolves, in 
addition to Medevac services, placed strikes on the enemy positions.
A troop sweep the following morning revealed eight civilian hooches destroyed, five civilians killed, and seven civilians wounded (all Medevaced). Enemy casualties are unknown.

On the night of 25-26 January, RIVDIV 573 PBR's in WBGP eight miles northeast of Vinh Gia, on the Vinh Te Canal, sighted two VC 150 meters north of their guard post. CIDG troops, attached as boat security, pursued the VC north until contact was lost. Seawolves were overhead at 2046H, 20 minutes after the initial sighting, and illuminated the area. While placing airstrikes, the Seawolves, flown by LTJG Watts and LTJG Leach, received return fire. At 2228H, PBR's initiated fire on at least 12 VC observed south of the boats, this time Black Ponies were on hand and raked the area with fire until they were relieved by Seawolves. At 2305H, PBR's of RIVDIV 571, in the contact area, observed two VC running from the scene and took them under fire with unknown results. Seawolves, providing support, were seen taking automatic weapons fire from the eastern end of Xui Gia Mountain. At 0330H, 20 MSF troops swept the area while under Black Pony cover with the following results: eight VC killed (one by air); six AK-47's; numerous hand grenades, and two pistols captured; and numerous documents confiscated. There were no friendly casualties.
Search Turn

With an end of month asset strength of two Seawolves and 36 watercraft, which included 29 PBR's, three Boston Whalers, two MSD's, one CCB, and one LSSC, Search Turn units (TG 194.3) continued their interdiction operations in January with patrols in the Gulf of Thailand and the Three Sisters area and with waterborne guardposts on the Ba The and Rach Gia-Ha Tien Canals and along the Kien An coast, an area indicated in intelligence reports as the site of a major enemy resupply effort.

January also saw Search Turn personnel aid the victims of a VC terrorist attack in Rach Gia. At 1955H on 7 January, CTG 194.3 NCC was notified that a terrorist had thrown a grenade into the Chau Van Theatre in downtown Rach Gia. Five civilians were killed and 25 were hospitalized, eight of which required emergency surgery. The VN TCC initiated a request for blood and a medical evacuation to be sent from Can Tho. U. S. personnel in Rach Gia and at the Naval Base at Rach Soi responded with immediate blood donations.

On the 15th of the month, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) arrived on station in the vicinity of Rach Gia to relieve the USS HARNETT COUNTY (LST 821) and assumed task designator CTU 194.3.4.

Hostile fire incidents in the Search Turn A. O. dropped again in January with only 14 recorded as compared to 19 in December. Enemy losses, however, rose during the month from 12 kills and 18 probables in December to 24 kills and 20 probables. Search Turn units
also increased the number of VC captured from two in December to five in January and accounted for 19 enemy craft destroyed and six damaged. USN losses for the month dropped from three wounded and one PBR damaged in December to two wounded and no lost craft in January.

While on routine patrol in the Gulf of Thailand 16 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 898 870) on the evening of 2 January, units of RIVDIV 513, under Patrol Officer LT Graham and Boat Captains BM1 Furman and GMO1 Combs, sighted a sampan with six occupants towing another sampan toward the coast. The sampan in tow was loaded with 600 pounds of rice for which there was no manifest or reasonable explanation although all six occupants had I.D. cards. The two men, three women, and one infant were detained and turned over to NILO Rach Gia who discovered that two of the detainees were village level VC cadre and classified them as prisoners of war.

An LHFT which was on coastal patrol on the night of 8 January 13 miles west southwest of Rach Gia (VS 913 15h) spotted a sampan in a curfew zone. Once sighted, the sampan began to evade and headed into a canal in the direction of the Three Sisters area. When warning shots were placed, small weapons fire was received in return. The LHFT then placed a strike upon the sampan, which was of a large type and which was carrying two smaller sampans. The LHFT departed the area and returned 45 minutes later to discover that a previously sighted body and the smaller sampans had been removed from the larger craft. Although the aircraft took one hit during the action, there
were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses included one VC killed (BC), one VC probably killed, two sampans destroyed, and one sampan damaged.

In response to intelligence reports of enemy resupply efforts along the Kien An coast, LCDR Hock, CTG 194.3, attempted to insert a Boston Whaler, under the cover of noise created by patrolling PBR’s, into a non-restricted zone along the coast 13 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 950 910) during the late evening of 14 January, but it grounded approximately 800 meters off the beach. Twenty minutes after the PBR’s cleared the area, four lights appeared along the coast. One of these began flashing and was answered by a junk which started toward the shore. The whaler could not intercept the craft due to an engine problem; so it notified the PBR’s which then returned to the scene but not before the junk had entered the tree line along the coast and had extinguished its lights. With the permission of the district chief, the area was reconnoitered by fire. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties are unknown. Since this area and the coast south of Three Sisters are inaccessible to PCF’s, three or four Kenner ski barges were requested in order to perform continuous operations in this area if the infiltration route is confirmed. Meanwhile, presently available assets will be used to continue this type of operations.

PBR’s of RIVDIV 554 were in WBGP on the Ba The Canal 13 miles north of Rach Gia (WS 102 282) on the evening of 17 January when they sighted a swimmer in the water moving east to west. At the same time, approximately nine VC were sighted 100 meters inland on the west bank
and were taken under fire by the units, which were under Patrol Officer SM1 Shoemaker and Boat Captains EN3 Collins and RD1 Stogner. An immediate retaliation of small arms fire was directed at the boats from the east bank where five more VC were sighted and also taken under fire. At 2330H, Seawolves put in a strike in the contact area. The river units reassumed their guardpost positions and kept the barrier under surveillance for the rest of the night.

An early morning sweep revealed many tracks, one NVA hat, one VC pamphlet, and blood trails. The action produced no friendly casualties while the enemy probably lost one VC.

PBR's of RIVDIV 553, under Boat Captains BM1 Kovi and GM32 Goodwin, were on a routine Gulf patrol in the Three Sisters area (VS 872 156) in the early evening of 21 January when a sampan with four occupants was observed close to the beach in a 24 hour curfew area. Upon illumination, the occupants jumped from the sampan and were then taken under fire. Two VC were killed, and two were seen running for the beach. Twelve to 15 more were observed to come out of the tree line in an apparent attempt to retrieve the bodies and the sampan. They were taken under fire by the PBR's; there was no return fire. At this time, nine bodies were clearly sighted in the contact area. Seawolves then put in a strike and provided cover while an attempt to recover the sampan was made. This try, however, was thwarted by shallow water and enemy IAW fire from the tree line on the beach. Black Ponies also arrived on station and put a strike into the contact area, and PBR's, while firing into the area, observed
one large secondary explosion. With the assistance of Sector ar-
tillery illumination, the contact area was kept under surveillance
throughout the night. Another attempt to retrieve the sampan during
the early morning using a borrowed Army Boston Whaler with Seawolves
overhead was prevented by shallow water and deep mud. The sampan was
then destroyed. Enemy losses also included nine VC killed. There
were no friendly casualties.

While in routine WSGP on the following evening, FBR's of TU
194.3.2 observed five VC crossing a field south of the Rach Gia-
Ha Tien Canal and took them under fire at 500 meters; there was
no return fire. Thirteen minutes later, artillery illumination was
requested, and the first round went out 35 minutes later. Five minutes
after, the units investigated the contact area and found one VC body
and one heavy drag trail. Air assistance was not requested because
of the scene's proximity to a populated area. The enemy suffered
one VC killed and one VC probably killed while friendly casualties
were held down to one USN slightly wounded.

During the early morning hours of 24 January, units of RIVDIV
553, while in WSGP under Patrol Officer LTJG Nickerson, received
sensor activation and observed four VC approaching their position
14 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 957 238). These four were taken
under fire, but no return fire was received. Seawolves were requested
on Scramble III. They arrived on station and put in a strike 15
minutes later. There was no further activity, and the units reestab-
lished their guardpost position. About four hours later, the units
again received sensor activation and observed VC moving in the contact area. Once again, the enemy were taken under fire with no return fire being received. Illumination was requested, and a sweep by the units produced one heavy blood trail. The enemy suffered one VC probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.
During January, as last month, all RAC formerly assigned to CTG 194.7 (Riverine Strike Group) remained out-chopped to other operational commanders with the exception of those craft undergoing overhaul.
Market Time Raiders Campaign

There were 52 SEA LORDS missions conducted during January by the Market Time Raiders along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Coastal Zones. There were 17 hostile fire incidents reported, seven friendly initiated, three enemy initiated and seven unilateral firefights. Enemy material losses for January were 41 craft and 186 structures destroyed, 81 structures damaged and two craft captured. There were 13 enemy troops killed (6 body count, 7 probable), one wounded and eight captured.

There were no U.S. casualties in any of these operations; however, there were four RF/PF troops killed and four RF/PF troops wounded. There was one USCG WPB damaged and required repairs are being performed at the shipyard in Singapore.

A SEA LORDS mission was conducted on 30 December along canals about 15 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 263 675). PCF's 21, 32 and 102, the PT GRACE (USCG WPB), two Coastal Group 36 skimmers and personnel, and CTF 116 EOD Team entered the canals taking targets of opportunity under fire. Eight sampans were sighted and when their occupants evaded they were taken under fire. Coastal Group 36 personnel searched the structures that had been rapidly vacated. The "Swift" boats played psyops tapes throughout the mission. Initial reports indicated that one VC was probably killed and one VC captured along with several training documents and miscellaneous gear. Follow-up intelligence the first of January credited the Market Time Raiders with an additional GDA of four Hoi Chans and 12 VC killed by body count.
PCF's 60 and 103 picked up Popular Force (PF) troops from Dai Ngai on the morning of 10 January at the Coastal Group 36 base and inserted them on Dung Island about 20 miles southwest of Tra Vinh (XR 247 686) while PCF 98 acted as a blocking force. The PF troops and an EOD team swept southeast along the canals destroying bunkers and structures. Four females in a sampan exiting a canal were detained by PCF 98 and later turned over to Coastal Group 36 for disposition. The troops and EOD team were extracted having made no contact with the enemy. The ground forces destroyed 67 bunkers, 33 structures and two sampans with engines. There was one large secondary explosion believed to be mortar ammunition. There were no friendly casualties in the operation.

On the morning of 11 January, PCF's 53 and 102 picked up a 40-man Regional Force (RF) security force and an EOD team for a bunker and structure destruction mission along the canals off the Bassac River about 20 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 027 906). PCF 102 detained one sampan and a woman and child prior to the insertion of the troops. Light enemy contact was made as soon as the troops were inserted and the "Swift" boats reconnoitred the area by fire. Following the sweep the troops were extracted and all units exited the canal without further incident. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown. The EOD team destroyed 22 bunkers, 13 structures and 9 sampans.

In a SEA LORDS mission on the night of 14 January, PCF 59, LTJG Gorne commanding, picked up 30 Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) and a U.S.
Advisor and inserted them along the Co Chien River about 12 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 370 180). The KCS made contact with an unknown number of VC carrying grenades. The "Swift" boat provided mortar fire to cover the troop extraction and exited the area without further incident. There were no friendly casualties while six enemy were killed.

Ten Viet Cong were captured in a SEA LORDS mission on 21 January about 10 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 225 753). PCF's 60, 95 and 97 and two Coastal Group 36 units embarked 90 Long Phu Popular Force troops and 80 Ba Xuyen Regional Force troops and inserted them on Dong Island for ground sweeps to the site for a new outpost. The new outpost was established by the Regional Force troops. The "Swift" boats stood by for support and then extracted the Popular Force troops without incident. There were no friendly casualties, and further enemy casualties were unknown.

The USCG WPB's PT GREY and PT GRACE conducted a SEA LORDS mission on the afternoon of 22 January about 20 miles south of Tra Vinh (XR 690 704). The WPB's entered a large canal and investigated small side canals en route taking targets of opportunity under fire. During the canal transit only occasional sniper fire was received. The WPB's exited the canal without suffering any casualties, while 11 enemy were killed (1 body count, 10 probable). There were 15 structures, two bunkers and six sampans destroyed, and five structures and five bunkers heavily damaged. In addition, 10 acres of rice field and four large rice piles were burned.
On the afternoon of 28 January, the PT JEFFERSON (USCG WPB), PT MARONE (USCG WPB) and 199th RAC Unit 21 conducted a SEA LORDS mission about 22 miles south of Tra Vinh (XR 410 620). All units entered the canal taking targets of opportunity under fire. Small arms fire was received and suppressed with 50 caliber fire and defensive fortifications were taken under fire with 81mm mortars. All units then exited the canal with no further enemy contact. There were four structures, two bunkers and nine sampans destroyed, and 28 structures and 21 bunkers heavily damaged. There were also several large secondary explosions. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

The USCG WPB PT GRACE was hit by a B-40 rocket while involved in a SEA LORDS mission on 30 January sustaining the following damage: one hole 10" X 6"; one hole 2" X 2" four feet above the water line at frame 17 starboard side; considerable damage interior forward berthing; watertight bulkhead 20 penetrated by many small holes; hull port side penetrated at frame 20 two feet above water line by 1/4 inch hole; bulkhead forward of frame 11 buckled, four inch protrusion. Repairs to the PT GRACE were not within the ship's capabilities. The PT GRACE and PT CYPRESS had entered a canal off the Ham Luong River about 10 miles east of Tra Vinh (4S 729 081) to conduct maximum boarding of craft and a psyops mission. There were 52 craft boarded and various psyops material distributed, all without incident. While exiting the canal the PT GRACE came under heavy rocket and automatic weapons fire sustaining one rocket.
hit. The fire was suppressed by 50 caliber and small arms fire while the WPB cleared the area. The WPB's destroyed 10 bunkers, eight structures and two sampans and damaged five structures. There were four enemy killed, and no friendly casualties. The mid-watch on the PT GRACE had just proceeded topside prior to receiving the rocket hit otherwise there would probably have been three Coast Guardsmen killed. One Coast Guardsman had all his clothing except what he was wearing, destroyed. The PT GRACE was ordered to the shipyard at Singapore for repairs.
MARKET TIME: RAIDER CAMPAIGN
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

A. Sea Lords - 30 DEC 69
B. Sea Lords - 10 JAN
C. PCF's 53 & 102 11 JAN
D. Sea Lords - 14 JAN
E. Sea Lords - 21 JAN
F. Sea Lords - 22 JAN
G. Sea Lords - 23 JAN
H. Sea Lords (PT GRACE/PT CYRESS) - 30 JAN

SCALE:
0 30
Nautical Miles
Operation Ready Deck

In January, Tran Hung Dao V/Operation Ready Deck became a Vietnamese Navy operation as the combined forces of TG 194.6, the 1st Infantry Division, USA, and the 5th ARVN Division continued to interdict the enemy in the areas adjacent to the upper Saigon River north and northwest of Saigon. The units of TG 194.6, which operated on the Saigon River from Phu Cuong upstream to Tri Tam (XT 803 140 to XT 480 470) and on the Saigon River northwest of Phu Cuong, were primarily employed in the very successful waterborne guard posts. They also conducted regular day and night river patrols, ACTOV training, troops and logistics movements, Psyops missions, and bunker destruction operations.

The intensity of enemy activity was comparable to previous months as it fluctuated between a low and moderate level. On 6 January there were two separate instances where allied operations recovered large enemy caches. At one location (XT 532 338), there were 18 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 87 81mm mortars and 36 107mm rockets, and in the other (XT 648 425), there were 150 60mm mortars. The type of weapons uncovered in these caches suggested the enemy possible had plans for stand off attacks in the area. The 58 enemy attacks by fire that were recorded during the high point of the month in the 30TZ on the evening of 20-21 January agreed with this line of thought.

While on a search and destroy operation on 9 January, RAG 24 units discovered and destroyed a new enemy bunker tunnel complex.
northwest of Thu Suong (XT 710 216) which contained a small, 10 kilogram conical shaped command detonated water mine. This was the second water mine of this type found recently in the area. A large, 25 kilogram conical command detonated mine was found on the river bank (XT 719 210) on 2 January. The area was also within three to four kilometers of where three contacts involving RAG 24 units had occurred in the previous three weeks. There were possible swimmer sapper attacks on 29 December (XT 674 234), sporadic contact throughout the night of 31 December at the same location, and heavy contact with land sappers and possible swimmer sappers on 9 January (XT 675 234). Also on 9 January two groups of swimmers and 20 VC were sighted in the tree line (XT 680 235). This reoccurrence of water mine incidents confirmed document readouts which stated that several enemy units had the mission of attacking the boats during the winter-spring campaign. Later in the month there was a noticeable increase in the number of enemy initiated firefight involving TG 194.6 units. The enemy's activity targeted against the boats not only added credence to the recent intelligence reports but pointed out the successfulness of the interdiction operations.

The casualty figures are somewhat misleading in January. In November and December the USN units were credited with the majority of the enemy KIA's. However, in January, this was completely reversed. In reality, the VNN enemy KIA figures for January include some of the late entries of December when the VNN had several large actions. Taking the combined totals of USN versus VNN enemy KIA's for December
and January, 57 versus 71, respectively, it can be deduced that when
the VNN were put in command of Operation Ready Deck on 11 December
they did effectively assume the responsibility.

The following narrative includes examples of the more signifi-
cant incidents occurring in the Ready Deck AO in January.

On the evening of 9 January, seven units of RAG 24 and their
senior USN advisor, LT W. R. Blakely, were positioned in a waterborne
guardpost nine miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 680 235) four to six
swimmers were sighted in the water about 100 meters north of the RAG
location. They were immediately taken under devastating fire. Twenty
minutes later, the VNN spotted 20 VC in the tree line 300 meters inland,
took them under fire, and received return fire. A USA LNFT reported
on station after another twenty minutes passed and placed strikes
into the tree line with unknown results. RAG 24 units cleared the area
to the south and reset the WBGP when FAC aircraft arrived on station
to place additional strikes in the suspected enemy positions.

Two RPG 51 PBR's with their advisor, GM3 Morris, had established
a night WBGP eight miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 684 223) on 13
January. Shortly before midnight, the sailors, poised for action,
spotted three swimmers in the water crossing from south to north
approximately 1000 meters north of the WBGP. Twenty minutes passed,
and another ten to twelve VC were on the bank and in the water. With
deadly accuracy the PBR's opened fire killing 8 VC (2 prob). Illumi-
nation was requested from the 25th Infantry Division, and the first
round was on deck in six minutes. The illumination was cancelled at this time as Nighthawk aircraft with infrared and white light was on station. Before departing the area, the Nighthawk had killed three VC (1 prob). Resetting the ambush in the same general area, the PBR's had no further contact that evening.

On 19 January, 14 miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 632 321), 12 RAG 24 units in a night WBG with seven companies of the 5th ARVN Division embarked, sighted and took under fire three VC in the water five meters from the north bank (XT 629 321). Within approximately 20 minutes, a USA LHFT arrived on station and spotted two VC which they killed in the original contact area. The LHFT was vectored to the south bank where they detected another seven VC 200 meters to the east. Four of these were killed by air before the LHFT had to depart the area because of a low fuel state. Two hours later, five VC were seen by the RAG as they crossed the river from south to north in the vicinity of the original contact. The RAG's killed one of them, and the LHFT, which by this time was back on station, killed four more. Continuing the search along the river bank, the RAG units sighted an unknown number of VC in a canal immediately across from their positions. The LHFT placed a strike in this area resulting in two VC killed. After all the aircraft departed, H and I artillery from Fire Support Base Tennessee was placed in the area. There was no further contact that night, and a ground sweep by the embarked ARVN troops was planned to commence at daybreak that morning. The overall results of the contact were 13 VC killed (4 prob).
Breezy Cove

The level of activity in the Breezy Cove AO decreased slightly during January. Enemy KIA's dropped from 40 killed last month to this month's 30 killed, and there was a corresponding decrease in friendly casualties which dropped from 12 wounded to four wounded. The total number of ENIFF's, FRIFF's, and unilateral firings did increase slightly, however, from 56 to 59.

At the end of January, 26 craft and two Seawolves were assigned for operations as follows:

CTU 194.2.4 USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786)
CTU 194.2.1 10 PBR's, 2 Boston Whalers
CTU 194.2.3 5 ASPB's, 5 ATC's, 1 Monitor
CTU 194.2.5 2 UH-1B's
CTU 194.2.6 1 HSSC, 1 LSSC, 1 Boston Whaler

On 7 January, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) provided Breezy Cove with its first naval gunfire support in reaction to a PBR contact. Additional support by DALLAS is included in the following narrative which contains the more significant incidents occurring in the Breezy Cove AO during January.

Four SEAL's and two LDNN's, under Platoon Leader LTJG Mihalic, were inserted by sampan three miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (WR 007 052) on the afternoon of 2 January. Shortly after setting up a guardpost, male voices were heard to the west. A Seawolf was
scrambled, and when it was overhead, the SEAL's moved into some huts west of the guardpost and captured three VC.

On the afternoon of 6 January, Pham Van Trang rallied to a PBR patrol under the Chieu Hoi program. Upon his initial interrogation by NILO Song Ong Doc, the Hoi Chanh revealed the location of 100 VC five miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (WR 052 046 to WR 063 052). That night an airstrike was placed on the target with unknown results; the pilots reported receiving ground fire. On 9 January, a NILO Ca Mau agent reported that 32 VC had been killed as a result of the airstrike.

On 8 January, Pham Van Trang was shot and killed by a petty officer of the Vietnamese Navy.

After he had turned himself in, the Hoi Chanh was quartered ashore under 24 hour surveillance. During this time, he passed intelligence information to NILO Song Ong Doc, helped plan a SEAL operation, and made a psyops tape urging his friends to rally to the side of the government. SEAL's and LDNN's, however, considered the Hoi Chanh's suggested operation as a possible trap. The suspicion clouding Trang's true feelings were further heightened when he requested a weapon from the NILO's interpreter. Thus, arrangements were made to turn the Hoi Chanh over to local authorities as quickly as possible.

On the 8th of the month, at 0830H, Trang was placed in the custody of a sentry on the ASTB to be turned over to local authorities about an hour and a half later. At 0835H, PO2 Vu Ba Hung of the
Vietnamese Navy took Thang to Vam Song Cng Doc for a requested cup of coffee. While in a restaurant, the ral1ior insisted upon seeing a sister in town and persuaded Hung to let him go and see his sister alone. Petty Officer Hung had noticed that Trang was acting strangely, so he followed him from a distance. When Thang realized that he was being followed, he told Hung that he had changed his mind and would return to the ASPB by himself. Hung, however, again followed Thang closely.

At approximately 0900H, the Hoi Chanh looked back and saw the trailing Hung. The petty officer then observed Thang reach into his shirt where he detected a large bulge. Hung drew a .45 cal pistol and shot the Hoi Chanh twice. This shooting was witnessed by CPO Lee Anh Hoang also of the Vietnamese Navy who was on his way to the village market at the time. Hung and Hoang examined the body of Thang and found a fragmentation grenade clipped to his waistline.

The village doctor, Dang Van Kim, pronounced the false ral1ior dead, and village officials accepted custody of the remains.

The village chief commended Hung's sharp observation and quick reaction which saved the lives of both civilians and allied sailors.

Petty Officer Hung has been recommended for the U. S. Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V" for meritorious service while serving in a joint Vietnamese and United States Navy Task Group.
In another action involving aircraft, two Seawolves sighted three evading sampans 11 miles north of Song Org Doc (VR 827 18h) on the afternoon of 14 January. As the helos arrived in the vicinity of the sampans, they received automatic weapons fire from both banks of the canal. The aircraft returned fire on the enemy positions, and, after successive strikes, the A/W fire still continued. At this point, CTG 194.2 requested and received clearance for naval gunfire support from the PSA An Kuyen. The USCGC DALLAS arrived in the area and commenced fire until Seawolves and Black Ponies arrived back in the area to place additional airstrikes. After the airstrikes (which still received return fire), the USCGC DALLAS opened fire again, pausing briefly for TACAIR strikes. When all fire finally ceased, enemy casualties were 13 VC killed and six more probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.
### Naval Statistical Summary (As Of 2 Feb 70)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tran Hung Dao</th>
<th>Giant Slingshot</th>
<th>Barrier Reef</th>
<th>Breezy Cove</th>
<th>Search Turn</th>
<th>Ready Deck</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start of Operation</strong></td>
<td>21 Nov 68</td>
<td>6 Dec 68</td>
<td>2 Jan 69</td>
<td>28 Sep 69</td>
<td>1 Nov 68</td>
<td>3 Jun 69</td>
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<td><strong>FRIFF</strong></td>
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<td>1455 (34)</td>
<td>58 (16)</td>
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<td><strong>Unilateral Firings</strong></td>
<td>367 (38)</td>
<td>1309 (58)</td>
<td>174 (41)</td>
<td>107 (31)</td>
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<td>17.5 (.01)</td>
<td>1424.9 (3.0)</td>
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<td><strong>Other Cache &amp; Cache Wt. (Tons)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Reports of Enemy Plans to Attack Patrol Craft</strong></td>
<td>144 (4)</td>
<td>194 (5)</td>
<td>24 (5)</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
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<td><strong>Sampans Destroyed</strong></td>
<td>250 (7)</td>
<td>314 (11)</td>
<td>147 (19)</td>
<td>158 (51)</td>
<td>301 (19)</td>
<td>140 (5)</td>
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</table>

- 9.8 tons munitions and 5.5 tons of other materials were captured during engagements with barrier units.

- Monthly totals

- Statistics not available

- Confidential