### NAVAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY (AS OF 2 FEB 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tran Hung Dao</th>
<th>Giant Slingshot</th>
<th>Barrier Reef</th>
<th>Breezy Cove</th>
<th>Search Turn</th>
<th>Ready Deck</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy KIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By USN</td>
<td>242 (270)</td>
<td>1,041 (36)</td>
<td>73 (4)</td>
<td>74 (24)</td>
<td>209 (25)</td>
<td>320 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By VNN</td>
<td>57 (7)</td>
<td>139 (13)</td>
<td>31 (2)</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>74 (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Other</td>
<td>288 (7)</td>
<td>1,043 (133)</td>
<td>109 (5)</td>
<td>22 (5)</td>
<td>43 (0)</td>
<td>245 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy CIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By USN</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>24 (0)</td>
<td>15 (0)</td>
<td>43 (4)</td>
<td>4 (2)</td>
<td>14 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By VNN</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>9 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>8 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Other</td>
<td>16 (0)</td>
<td>205 (0)</td>
<td>34 (3)</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>30 (3)</td>
<td>112 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Friendly KIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>11 (0)</td>
<td>34 (4)</td>
<td>5 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>14 (0)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>9 (0)</td>
<td>17 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19 (0)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>17 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>19 (0)</td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friendly WIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>107 (20)</td>
<td>478 (12)</td>
<td>48 (7)</td>
<td>57 (20)</td>
<td>65 (2)</td>
<td>30 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>73 (13)</td>
<td>143 (24)</td>
<td>11 (0)</td>
<td>9 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td>17 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>138 (0)</td>
<td>646 (36)</td>
<td>88 (1)</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>92 (0)</td>
<td>84 (2)</td>
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</table>

**Kill Ratio**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>VNN</th>
<th>Other</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>6:8:1 (7:0)</td>
<td>8:2:1 (6:5:1)</td>
<td>31:0 (2:0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15:1:1 (7:0)</td>
<td>8:4:1 (11:1:1)</td>
<td>6:4:1 (2:5:1)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

() - Monthly totals
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

During January, Market Time and Stable Door forces continued routine operations. The weather forced the "Swift" boats to vacate their patrol areas during most of the month in the First and Second Coastal Zones; however, in the Third Coastal Zone the weather was good the entire month. Task Force 115 units detected a total of 58,149 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 12,761 craft were inspected and 12,561 were boarded. As a result of these checks, 104 craft and 513 persons were detained for lack of or faulty identification, violation of restricted zones, possession of contraband, incorrect or faulty manifests, or other suspicious activity. There were also 48 Viet Cong suspects detained. In the Game Warden area of operations in the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers, Market Time units detected 6,895 watercraft, inspecting 3,027 and boarding another 2,822. There were three craft and 21 persons detained.

Enemy initiated activity remained at the relatively low level of the preceding month. There were no known large scale infiltration of men or supplies attempted during January. Task Force 115 units continued to provide Naval gunfire and blocking patrols in support of friendly ground operations along the coasts and in the rivers and canals. There were 12 U.S. Navymen wounded during these missions while enemy losses to the naval gunfire of Market Time units came to 93 confirmed killed, 60 probably killed, seven wounded, and 30 captured.
Operation Market Time

The tempo of naval gunfire, SEA LORDS, Sea Float and Sea Tiger missions decreased during January with 434 missions conducted. Gun damage assessment on these missions was 36 percent as compared to the 43.4 percent recorded in December. Results of these missions were:

153 Viet Cong killed (93 body count, 60 probable).
7 Viet Cong wounded.
30 Viet Cong captured.
140 Junks/sampans destroyed.
12 Junks/sampans damaged.
422 Structures/bunkers destroyed.
99 Structures/bunkers damaged.

There were 12 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported during the month. These were taken under fire and resulted in 28 craft destroyed, 43 Viet Cong killed (37 body count, 6 probable), one wounded, and nine captured.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 24,240 watercraft. A total of 9,091 inspections and 10,065 boardings were carried out. There were 434 steel hulled vessels detected in Market Time areas and 324 of these were inspected and 11 boarded. All were determined to be non-suspicious.

During January, SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 continued to conduct almost daily operations in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in support of Sea Float operations.

During the New Year's cease fire period from 311800 December to 011800 January there was only one truce violation reported involving the PT BANKS (USCG WPB) and is discussed under the Third Coastal Zone operations.
On 1 January, four VNN PCF's were chopped from CTU 115.2.1 to
CTG 115.2 and assumed patrol responsibilities for areas 4E and 4H.

On 30 December, the trawler designated 23FL ceased loitering
approximately 100 miles north of the Malacca Straits and commenced
a northerly course toward the general vicinity of the Paracel Islands.
The USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) maintained surveillance until relieved by
the USS McMORRIS (DE 1036) on 4 January. The USS CAMP (DER 251)
relieved the USS McMORRIS on 12 January. The trawler crossed the
12 nautical mile territorial waters of Hainan at 1042H on 19 January
on course 310, speed 8.5 knots. Radar contact was lost at 1437H on
19 January at posit 18-40.5N; 110-36.7E, on course 030, speed 8 knots,
and surveillance operations were discontinued.

On 1 September 1969, two U.S. Navy hydrofoil patrol gun boats,
the USS FLAGSTAFF (PGH 1) and USS TUCUMCARI (PGH 2) were assigned to
Commander Task Group 115.1 for an extended combat test and evaluation.
Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam confidential message 270803Z Jan 1970
to Command in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet was the evaluation report and
is quoted below.¹

"PGH EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. YOUR 170331Z JAN 70

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED IAW REF A:

A. SUITABILITY OF SUBJ CRAFT IN PERFORMANCE OF ASSIGNED
MISSION:

(1) THE MISSION OF THE PGH WAS TO CONDUCT AN OPERA-
TIONAL EVALUATION IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. SERVE AS A RAPID REACTION

¹ COMNAVFORV 270803Z JAN 1970 45
UNIT AND AUGMENT MARKET TIME FORCES BY CONDUCTING RANDOM, HIGH SPEED PRE-PLANNED PATROLS.

(2) BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH SPEED AND ABILITY TO GET UNDERWAY ON SHORT NOTICE, THESE CRAFT WERE IDEALLY SUITED FOR A COASTAL SURVEILLANCE MISSION AND RAPID, SURFACE CONTACT INTERCEPTION.

(3) RADAR PERFORMANCE WAS GENERALLY GOOD WITH AVERAGE RADAR DETECTION ON TRAWLER SIZE CONTACTS AT 10-12 MILES.

(4) HOWEVER, THE PGH IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT UPON SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PATROL AND THESE FACTORS, EXCEPTIONALLY ADVERSE IN THE DANANG AREA DURING THE NE MONSOON PREVALENT DURING THE DEPLOYMENT, SEVERELY UNDERMINED PGH EFFECTIVENESS.

B. EVALUATION OF MATERIAL READINESS CONDITION WHILE DEPLOYED.

(1) TUCUMCARI DEMONSTRATED A HIGHER DEGREE OF MATERIAL READINESS THAN FLAGSTAFF THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. IN GENERAL, MATERIAL READINESS WAS SATISFACTORY DUE TO THE VAST SUPPORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN DANANG, AND TECH REPS AND PECULIAR SPARE PARTS WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE CRAFT. TUCUMCARI SUFFERED THREE MAJOR CASUALTIES, TWO OF WHICH WERE REPAIRED BY SCRF DNG AND THE THIRD WITH SRP SUBIC ASSISTANCE.
(2) Flagstaff suffered major casualties to her turbine and was rarely available for patrol or operational. During the period 15 Oct to 25 Dec, Tucumcari conducted 40 days of operational and was unavailable on 7 days due to material casualties while Flagstaff conducted 9 days of operational and was unavailable for 14 days due to material casualties.

(3) 20 days were scheduled for upkeep. Tucumcari required 24 and Flagstaff required 49 days.

(4) High humidity and rough seas, greater than state four, accounted for many mechanical and electrical failures, and limited dock space and crowded working conditions caused and extended down time.

C. ESTIMATE OF RELIABILITY FACTOR.

(1) The sophisticated and still unproven systems associated with the FGH demand special facilities and expertise not usually available at conventional surface craft repair facilities. By virtue of the facilities available at SCRF DaNang, aircraft facilities also available in DaNang, preplanned peculiar spare parts support and the presence of technical representatives, one FGH was able to perform in a satisfactory manner while the other suffered prolonged down time.

(2) Crew fatigue was an ever recurring factor in FGH deployment. The high tempo of ops imposed upon these
CRAFT CONTRIBUTED TO MANY MECHANICAL FAILURES WHICH IN
TURN LED TO UNUSUAL DEMANDS ON THE CREW.

(3) ONLY THE HIGH LEVEL OF MATERIAL SUPPORT AND
DEDICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL KEPT THESE CRAFT OPERATIONAL.

D. MATERIAL AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR
DEPLOYED PGH'S.

(1) ALTHOUGH SPARE PART AUGMENTATION WAS INITIATED
PRIOR TO THE AUGUST DEPLOYMENT, VARIOUS CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS
RESULTED IN THE CANCELLATION OF A MAJORITY OF PGH-1 SPARES
AND LONG DELAYS FOR PGH-2 SPARES.

(2) DANANG WAS CHOSEN AS A BASE OF OPS DUE TO SCRIP
AND AIRCRAFT REPAIR FACILITIES. HOWEVER, THERE WERE
INSTANCES WHERE EITHER SPECIAL MATERIAL OR UNUSUALLY
DEMANDING SPECIFICATIONS PRECLUDED PART MANUFACTURE AT
SCRIP. A NUMBER OF JOBS HAD TO BE REDONE DUE TO INEXPERI-
ENCED PERSONNEL AND LOCAL LABOR. DETAILED SUPERVISION BY
PGH CREW MEMBERS WAS OFTEN REQUIRED. GENERALLY, JOBS
UNDERTAKEN BY SCRIP PROVED SATISFACTORY.

(3) ORIGINAL OUTFITTING AND PROVISIONING HAD TO BE
BASED ON CONTRACTOR'S AND CREW'S ESTIMATES OF REQUIREMENTS.
IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A MUCH GREATER RANGE AND DEPTH OF
SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS ARE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN TOP
MATERIAL CONDITION OVER A LONG TERM DEPLOYMENT. CURRENT
DATA WILL PROVIDE A MORE ADQUATE SUPPORT PACKAGE FOR
FUTURE EMPLOYMENTS.
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MATERIAL CONDITION OVER A LONG TERM DEPLOYMENT. CURRENT
DATA WILL PROVIDE A MORE ADQUATE SUPPORT PACKAGE FOR
FUTURE EMPLOYMENTS.
2. (C) WHILE THE PCH CONCEPT IS HIGHLY SUITED TO A COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND RAPID SURFACE CONTACT INTERCEPTION EFFORT, THE HIGH LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THEIR SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS AND THE SEVERE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY MONSOON WEATHER MAKE THEM HIGHLY DEPENDENT UPON LARGE SUPPORT FACILITIES IN AO'S OF MODERATE WEATHER AND SEA CONDITIONS. WITHOUT THESE FACILITIES AND AT THIS STAGE IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, THEY CURRENTLY ARE TOO UNRELIABLE FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS."

First Coastal Zone

The northeast monsoon season continued to force Market Time surveillance units off their patrol areas during much of January. Even with the adverse weather, there were 6,970 craft detected, almost double the number detected in December. There were 2,027 craft inspected and another 3,187 craft boarded. Surveillance results remained high as over 74 percent of those craft detected were either inspected or boarded leading to the detention of 41 craft and 203 persons for lack of or faulty identification papers, violation of restricted zones, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession of contraband and curfew violations.

There were approximately 100 naval gunfire support and Sea Tiger missions conducted in the First Coastal Zone. The PBR's of Commander River Division 543 continued to operate in the Sea Tiger area of operations in those rivers and canals inaccessible to the "Swift" boats.
PBR's 67 and 114, with BMC Turnbull as Patrol Officer, were en route to a waterborne guardpost on the evening of 1 January when they sighted one man along the Ba Ren River, eight kilometers south of Hoi An (BT 110 505). When the PBR's closed, the man ran and was taken under fire. The PBR's then withdrew and returned 30 minutes later and sighted a sampan with two persons aboard crossing from north to south. As the PBR's approached, they attempted to evade and were taken under fire destroying the sampan and probably killing the two occupants. PBR's 59 and 95 with QMC(SS) Williams as Patrol Officer, joined up with PBR's 57 and 114 and established the WBGP on the Cam Ha River about four kilometers west of Hoi An (BT 104 578). Personnel on the opposite bank appeared to be watching the PBR's and were taken under fire. VC psyops broadcasts were heard from the opposite bank but stopped when the PBR's made their firing runs. There were two enemy killed and no friendly casualties. The substance of the Psyops broadcasts was for Vietnamese and U.S. personnel to give up; if not, the Viet Cong would kill them. The broadcasts further urged U.S. fighting men to go home.

In the afternoon of 11 January the USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) conducted a gunfire support mission on a confirmed NVA position about 15 miles southeast of Quang Ngai (BS 784 507). The mission was requested and cleared by the Duc Pho Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO). The five inch guns of the cutter destroyed 15 structures and four fighting positions. Further enemy casualties were unknown.
On the night of 12 January, PBR's 59, 95, 114, and 131, with LT JONES and QMC(SS) Williams as Patrol Officers, established a waterborne guardpost on the Vinh Dien River about six miles northwest of Hoi An (BT 058 615). The WBGAP was set with the assistance of two helo gunships making dry runs to mask the PBR's. Approximately an hour later, 20-25 Viet Cong with back packs and individual weapons were sighted on the west bank. The PBR's initiated contact and then cleared the area but not before killing seven VC. One sortie of gunships was called in to work the area over with negative results being reported.

While on normal Market Time patrol in area 2, 32 miles south of Cua Lao Re Island, on 14 January, the USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) received a visual distress signal from a 40-foot sampan. Upon boarding the craft it was discovered there were four Vietnamese fishermen embarked from the village of Sa Quynh, and they had lost their propeller and had been adrift for six days. The Coast Guard cutter passed food and water to the crew and then took the craft in tow. The PT ARDEN (USCG WPB) relieved the CHASE and continued towing the craft to shore without incident.

Early in the morning of 25 January, PBR's 91 and 43 were on night stand-down about two miles west of Hoi An (BT 107 577), when a large explosion occurred under the stern of PBR 91. The boat was tossed on the bank upside down after traveling approximately 10 feet through the air. Parts of pumps and engines were found up to 100 meters.
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE

A. Sea Tiger (PBR's) 1 JAN
B. USCGC HAMILTON - 11 JAN
C. Seatiger (PBR's) - 12 JAN
D. USCGC PT ARDEN 14 JAN
USCGC CHASE CHASE
E. SEA TIGER (PBR's) 25 JAN
away. PBR 43 received only minor damage while there was extensive
damage to the hull, internal damage to mechanical parts, and complete
demolition of the stern of PBR 91. Initial estimates was that PBR 91
was a total loss. There were two U.S. sailors and two Vietnamese
sailors wounded.

Second Coastal Zone

Weather conditions improved somewhat during January as Market
Time units detected 6,957 craft, more than double the December
detections. Surveillance results remained high as over 75 percent
of those detected were either inspected or boarded. There were
3,258 inspections and 1,997 boardings reported during the month
resulting in the detention of 29 craft and 192 persons. Reasons
given for detentions were lack of or faulty identification papers,
suspected draft dodgers, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession
of contraband, and restricted zone violators.

There were only 25 naval gunfire support missions conducted
during the month, and only a minimum of gun damage assessment was
reported.

At midnight on 16 January eight 82mm mortar rounds landed in
the vicinity of the Camp McDermott BOQ area at Nha Trang. LCDR D.
D. Crabbe, Commander Task Group 115.2.2, received minor shrapnel
wounds while en route to a bunker. He was treated at the 8th Field
Hospital and released.
Third Coastal Zone

Indigenous coastal traffic increased in the Third Coastal Zone during January to almost three times the number of December detections. Surveillance results were not as impressive as in previous months as only 44 percent of the 20,187 craft detected were either boarded or inspected. There were 4,140 craft inspected and another 4,927 craft boarded resulting in the detention of 77 persons for lack of or faulty identification papers, incorrect or faulty manifests, and possession of contraband. There were 25 Viet Cong suspects and four confirmed Viet Cong detained by Market Time units. The "Swift" boats continued their patrols of the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers, detecting 6,895 watercraft and inspecting 3,027 and boarding 2,822. There were three craft and 21 persons detained and no incidents of evading craft reported.

During January, Market Time units of the Third Coastal Zone conducted approximately 140 naval gunfire support missions in response to requests for urgent naval gunfire support, H and I, targets of opportunity, or in pre-planned river and canal incursions.

The PT BANKS (USCG WPB), LTJG Chiswell commanding, established a pre-planned waterborne guardpost early on the morning of 1 January about 15 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 735 027). The PT BANKS' skimmer proceeded about one mile to the north and conducted covert surveillance and heard a sampan with an outboard motor transiting the Rach Bang Cung. About 15 minutes later two heavily laden sampans...
with armed guards approached from a large canal to the west. When hailed to stop, small arms fire was received by the skimmer and suppressive automatic weapons fire was returned. While attempting to close the sampans, small arms fire was received from the northwest bank and suppressed prior to the skimmer being extracted. There were no friendly casualties while five VC were killed, and two 20-foot sampans with long shaft motors were destroyed.

On the morning of 10 January, the PT CYPRESS, LTJG Godfrey commanding, while on normal Market Time patrol, 19 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 740 030), spotted a large sampan exiting a canal. The sampan ignored the PT CYPRESS' flashing light, siren, and shots across the bow and turned to head back into the canal; however, strong current would not permit it. The sampan headed down stream away from the WPB. A skimmer was put in the water and overtook the sampan, capturing the four occupants. The occupants were turned over to Coastal Group 34, and initial interrogation indicated they were all Viet Cong.

While an normal Market Time patrol on the afternoon of 19 January, the PT GRACE (USCG WPB) detected and boarded a disabled junk BX 46 about 15 miles southeast of Soc Trang (XR 390 630). The junk was missing a rudder and was unable to make any headway against the wind and flooding currents. There were only women and children aboard the junk and it was towed to (XR 100 600) and released.
On the afternoon of 26 January, the PT CYPRESS (USCG WPB), while on normal Market Time patrol 17 miles southeast of Tra Vinh (X5 706 045), was ambushed with B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons fire. The WPB responded immediately with 50 caliber fire and suppressed the enemy fire; 81mm mortars were then fired into the area. Air strikes were called in; however, due to lack of continuous contact, air assets were not scrambled. The WPB received one rocket hit at frame 37 about eight feet above the water line causing light damage to the bulkhead. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown.

The Province Sector Advisor from Binh Dai requested emergency naval gunfire support from the PT GRACE (USCG WPB) on the evening of 28 January. An outpost, 18 miles southeast of Ben Tre (X5 845 165) was under heavy enemy mortar attack. Friendly troops were in contact with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong, and the WPB was requested to act as a blocking force in an adjacent river. Upon securing from the blocking action, H and I fire was placed on an extortion station. When exiting the river, a sampan was detected and attempted to evade. It was taken under fire and the three occupants tried to swim ashore. There was one VC killed and two VC captured. The sampan sank before it could be searched for arms. There were no personnel casualties aboard the PT GRACE. Results of the ground action were unknown.

A friendly outpost 12 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 342 540) came under attack by an estimated 70 Viet Cong early on the morning.
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

A. PT BANKS - 1 JAN
B. PT CYPRESS - 10 JAN
C. PT GRACE - 19 JAN
D. PT CYPRESS - 26 JAN
E. PT GRACE - 28 JAN
F. PT FARTRIDGE - 31 JAN

SCALE:

CONSON

0 30 Nautical Miles
of 31 January. The PT PARTRIDGE (USCG WPB), on normal Market Time patrol was advised of the attack and proceeded to the area and fired 81mm mortars on the VC positions. A U.S. Army halo gunship and 221st R4C Unit 36 arrived on the scene a few minutes later and fired on the enemy positions. Upon departing the area, the WPB fired 50 caliber H and I along the shore line as requested by the sector advisor. There were no friendly casualties to the supporting units, and casualties to the outpost were unknown. There were 10 Viet Cong known killed and probably more. Numerous automatic weapons captured by the outpost.

Gulf of Thailand Surveillance Group CTG 115.4

While on normal Market Time patrol in area 9F on the morning of 3 January, PCF 17 boarded and searched a sampan about 22 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 840 750). There were two women and three children in the sampan, and they were in a restricted area. The women had identification but no papers for twelve 100 pound bags of rice. The rice was confiscated and turned over to the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer at Song Ong Doc for disposition.

On 10 January, PCF 17 again stopped, boarded, and searched a sampan about three miles from the above location (VR 840 750) and detained one Vietnamese male who had thirty five 100 pound bags for which he had no papers. The 3,500 pounds of rice and the detainee were turned over to NLI0 Song Ong Doc for disposition.
The next day, PCF 37 detained one Vietnamese male in the same area for having no identification and fifteen 100 pound bags of rice without papers. The detainee and 1,500 pounds of rice were turned over to NILO Rach Gia for disposition.

On 12 January, PCF 37 stopped another sampan in the same area with 900 pounds of unmanifested rice. One male detainee and the rice were turned over to NILO Rach Gia for disposition.

Gulf of Thailand Offshore Patrol Unit Area 8/9
(WHEC Assigned) CTG 115.6

The USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) scored heavily against the enemy on the afternoon of 7 January, 6 and one half miles southeast of Song Ong Doc (VQ 890 930). The cutter provided destructive Naval gunfire support (NGFS) on Viet Cong structures and troops. There were three structures, and one large food cache destroyed and one bunker heavily damaged. A later report also credited the DALLAS with three NVA and three VC killed.

In response to a request from CTG 194.2 the USCGC TANAY (WHEC 37) fired a destructive NGFS mission ten miles north of the Song Ong Doc (VR 827 184) on the afternoon of 14 January. The targets were enemy troops and supplies, and the five-inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure and heavily damaged three others. There were eight enemy killed and no friendly casualties.
Four targets were taken under destruction fire by the five-inch gun of the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) on 25 January, 17 miles northwest of Thu Binh (VR 830 475). Expending over 240 rounds, the cutter destroyed three structures and three bunkers and heavily damaged six structures and two sampans. The cutter was also credited with killing an estimated eight Viet Cong.

On the morning of 26 January, the USCGC DALLAS fired a destructive mission at a range of 17,000 yards, about 12 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 828 170). The targets were heavy automatic weapons positions. The five inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure and three fish nets and heavily damaged three structures. There were three enemy troops killed.

Again on 27 January, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) was called upon to fire a destructive mission against VC bunkers and structures about ten miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (VR 285 170 and VR 880 133). This mission resulted in four structures destroyed and 11 damaged, four bunkers destroyed and two damaged, two sampans destroyed and six damaged, one large food cache, and 10 fish drying mats destroyed. There were two enemy troops probably killed.

The USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) destroyed four structures, one bunker, and two sampans, while heavily damaging 19 structures, three bunkers, and six sampans in a NGFS mission on the evening of 30 January. The mission was requested and cleared by the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer from Ca Mau and the targets consisted of structures,
CONFIDENTIAL

GULF OF THAILAND SURVEILLANCE GROUP - CTG 115.4
GULF OF THAILAND OFFSHORE PATROL UNIT AREA 8/9 - CTG 115.9

LEGEND:
- Coastal Surveillance Center
X - Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# - SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

A. PCF 17 - 3 JAN
B. PCF 17 - 10 JAN
C. PCF 37 - 11 JAN
D. PCF 37 - 12 JAN
E. USCGC DALLAS - 7 JAN
F. USCGC TANEY - 14 JAN
G. USCGC DALLAS - 25 JAN
H. USCGC DALLAS - 26 JAN
I. USCGC DALLAS - 27 JAN
J. USCGC HAMILTON - 30 JAN

SCALE:
0 - 30 NAUTICAL MILES
bunkers, and rice paddies located about ten miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 846 145). In addition, one Viet Cong was probably killed.

Again on 31 January, the USCGC HAMILTON provided destructive fire on bunkers, structures and sampans 11 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 833 142). This mission was also requested and cleared by NILO Ca Mau. The five inch guns, firing at a range of 12,000 yards, destroyed two structures, four sampans, one heavily loaded, and eight bunkers and damaged 10 structures and five sampans. There were also one large secondary explosion and one secondary fire. The cutter was credited with killing 10 enemy troops.

Market Time Units

Patrol aircraft detachments from five Navy patrol squadrons manned the Market Time air barrier patrols during January. Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO (VP 22) operated out of U-Tapao, Thailand. Detachments from VP-17, VP-46, VP-47 and VP-50 operated from Cam Ranh Bay.

The following SEVENTH Fleet ships operated in Market Time during the month of January:

- USS PRIME (MSS 466) 1 - 5
- USS EMBATTLE (MSS 434) 6 - 31
- USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) 1, 12 -31
- USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) 2 - 12, 15 - 25
- USCGC TANEY (WHEC 37) 13 - 23

62
USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) 1 - 14, 24 - 31
USS VIREO (MSC 205) 1 - 11
USS GANNET (MSC 290) 12 - 31
USS ACME (MSO 508) 1 - 5
USS REAPER (MSO 467) 6 - 31
USCGC KLAMATH (WHEC 66) 1 - 11, 26 - 31
USS VERNON COUNTY (LST 1161) 1 - 18
USS TIGCA COUNTY (LST 1158) 15 - 31

PCF's assigned to Coastal Divisions as of 11 February:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEVEN</th>
<th>TWELVE</th>
<th>THIRTEEN</th>
<th>FOURTEEN</th>
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<tr>
<td>An Thoi</td>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6 63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 56</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(03)</td>
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Total Assigned PCF (69)

PCF's in Overhaul

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<th>PCF Location</th>
<th>Commenced</th>
<th>ETC</th>
<th>EST Length</th>
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<tr>
<td>55 Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>3 Jan 70</td>
<td>18 Feb 70</td>
<td>45 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1 Feb 70</td>
<td>12 Mar 70</td>
<td>40 Days</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>Days</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2 Mar 70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>7 Jan 70</td>
<td>21 Feb 70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>1 Feb 70</td>
<td>17 Mar 70</td>
<td>45</td>
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</table>

Total Non-assigned PCF (05)
Grand Total (74)
Average No. U.S. ships/craft on patrol during month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSO</th>
<th>MSC</th>
<th>WPB</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>LST</th>
<th>PG</th>
<th>WHEC</th>
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<tr>
<td>AVG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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Average No. VNN ships/junks employed during month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sea Force</th>
<th>River Force</th>
<th>Coastal Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>303</td>
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U.S. Activity

Total Detected
- Wood - Day 20,431 Night 3,609
- Steel - Day 198 Night 236

Total Inspected
- Wood - Day 7,308 Night 1,583
- Steel - Day 141 Night 183

Total Boarded
- Wood - Day 9,528 Night 537
- Steel - Day 7 Night 4

VNN Activity

- Junks Searched 80,611
- Junks Detained 99
- Persons Searched 255,136
- Persons Detained 359

U.S. Activity

- Junks Detained 104
- Persons Detained 513

Stable Door
- Det 34,175
- Ins 3,546
- Brd 2,485
Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III

There were over 300 gunfire support missions conducted during January, including over 60 Sea Float and SEAL missions. These missions continued to maximize damage to known or suspected VC base camps, extortion stations, and secret zones although the primary emphasis continued to be pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula. The following U.S. and VNN craft and units operated at Sea Float during part or all of the month: PCF's 3, 5, 9, 12, 18, 22, 27, 35, 40, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54, 56, 72, 73, 88, 94 and 96; USS VERNON COUNTY (LST 1161), USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST 1165); USS GALLUP (PG 85), USS ANTELOPE (PG 86), USS CROCKETT (PG 88); Sea Float River Assault Craft Detachment consisting of ATC's 4, 7, and 13, A2PB's 2 and 3, Zippo 2, Monitor 2, and Utility Boat 2; an LSSC; SEAL Team ONE; UDT 12; OV-10's; Seawolves, Slicks; LSSL's HQ229 and HQ321; LSM's 401, 403 and 405; Coastal Group 33, 35 and 36 craft and personnel; VNN PCF's 00, 01, 03, 09, 10, 11, 12; VNN POLWAR Team; VNN Reaction Team; VNN Rangers; EOD MUPAC Team VNN 06; Kit Carson Scouts; MST TWO Detachments F and G; Regional Force Troops; Revolutionary Development Team, and Mobile Strike Force. These forces conducted day and night blocking forces, strikes, patrols, waterborne guardposts, listening and observation post, psyops missions, and escort services for logistic craft along the rivers and canals of the Sea Float operating area. Air assets continued to provide psyops missions in those areas inaccessible to the craft. All afloat units and the Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base continued to conduct nightly H and I fire into known and suspected VC base camps and extortion areas.
On 8 January, CDR T. R. M. Emery, USN, returned to Sea Float after approximately three months at Cam Ranh Bay as Commander Task Force 115's Chief Staff Officer and assumed command of Sea Float. CDR J. C. Patrick, USN, who had been the Commander of Sea Float since 17 September returned to Cam Ranh Bay as Chief Staff Officer of CTF 115.

On 9 January, CDR Thinh, VNN arrived at Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III and assumed duty as second in command.

On 10 January, 180 Mobile Strike Force troops arrived Sea Float to augment existing forces.

Senator Dominick, VADM E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, and party visited Sea Float on 11 January and were briefed on current Sea Float operations and accomplishment. Following the briefings, they were given a tour of Solid Anchor and the Tran Hung Dao Villages.

Rear Admiral D. M. Ruble, USN, COMPHIBTRAPAC, Captain L. S. Curtin, USN, and party visited Sea Float on 17 January and were briefed on operations, accomplishments, intelligence and psyops followed by a tour of Solid Anchor and Tran Hung Dao II.

Mr. J. Grimes, SECNAV's Special Assistant for Vietnamization, visited Sea Float and was briefed and given a tour of Solid Anchor and Tran Hung Dao I on 20 January.

The Honorable R. C. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, and VADM Zumwalt visited Sea Float on 28 January and were briefed on Sea Float, Solid Anchor, accomplishments at the Tran Hung Dao Villages and the tactical use of Sea Float assets.

**SEAL Operations**

On a reconnaissance patrol on 4 January south of the Rach Cai Chon, 16 kilometers southeast of Old Nam Cam (W2 144 645), SEAL's were inserted by a U.S. Army Slick with Seawolves overhead. Camouflaged sampans were sighted during the patrol and taken under fire. A six hootch complex containing one elderly male and 30 women and children was searched with negative results. They were told they would be better off if they relocated to the Sea Float Annex which they agreed to do in three days. During the patrol, one VC was killed. There were four hoothches, four sampans with motors and 2,500 pounds of shrimp destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.
A SEAL mission was conducted on 6 January about 10 kilometers northeast of Old Nam Can (Kê 048 763) to capture people and gain intelligence about the area. SEAL Team ONE, Detachment GOLF, departed Sea Float aboard a Slick, and during the insertion, heavy automatic weapons fire was received. The SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float. Seawolves placed two strikes in the area, and two OV-10 Black Ponies placed a strike in the area 20 minutes later. One U.S. sailor received minor wounds, and one U.S. Army Slick helo received extensive damage. There was one Viet Cong killed, and one sampan destroyed.

Early on the morning of 8 January, SEAL's departed Sea Float via PCF's 45 and 50 and later transferred to an LSSC for insertion about 35 kilometers west of Sea Float (Kê 310 754), in a mission to capture six VC known to be living in the area. After patrolling 300 meters toward the objectives, a sampan with two VC was hailed and a short conversation with the VNN interpreter ensued. The patrol then continued and observed two lighted hootches with several people moving in the area. Another sampan with two VC was engaged in conversation, and they stated "We saw PCF's on the way in, they have brought a special force to attack us." Other sampans were taken under fire as they exited the canal. The SEAL's then patrolled to the hootches and destroyed them after a thorough search. During the extraction, automatic weapons fire was received, and Black Ponies from Binh Thuy were called in to suppress the enemy fire. The SEAL's killed eight VC (4 TC, 4 probable), destroyed two hootches, three sampans and captured two rockets and two rocket launchers. There were no friendly casualties.
SEAL Team ONE departed Sea Float late on the night of 11 January on a mission to capture four Viet Cong infrastructure about 16 kilometers northeast of Sea Float (VQ 084 822). The SEAL's were inserted via an ISSC and patrolled two kilometers to the north where a hootch was searched and one VC captured. During the search of other hooches small arms fire was received, and when the SEAL's were unable to suppress it, Seawolves and Black Ponies were scrambled to put strikes in the area. The air assets succeeded in suppressing the enemy fire, and the SEAL's were extracted via a U.S. Army Slick and returned to Sea Float. There were no friendly casualties while five VC were killed and one VC captured.

Seven Viet Cong were killed by the SEAL's in a mission to interdict commo-liaison and resupply routes along the Rach Ong Trang about 17 kilometers southwest of Sea Float (VQ 850 576) on the morning of 15 January. The SEAL's were inserted by ISSC at 0300H and set a listening post where shortly three sampans traveling south were hailed, and when they attempted to evade, they were taken under fire. They were unable to search a fourth sampan on the bank due to the area being heavily booby trapped. The SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float without further incident. There were two sampans destroyed and one sampan captured. There were no friendly casualties.
While in waterborne interdiction site on the night of 21 January about 20 kilometers northeast of Old Nam Can (WQ 212 759), SEAL Team ONE sighted two sampans with six persons embarked. When the craft were hailed, they attempted to evade and were taken under fire, killing all six. The sampans were searched, and one German Mauser rifle, three grenades, and several rounds of small arms ammunition were captured along with seven kilos of documents containing 25 maps. The two sampans were then destroyed, and the SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float without incident. There were no friendly casualties.

**Sea Float Missions**

On the morning of 13 January, a Mobile Strike Force platoon of 42 men were inserted by PCF's 94, 22 and 35 and VNN PCF on the east bank of the Kinh Ngang Canal (WQ 010 732) and commenced a sweep to the southeast. An unoccupied Viet Cong Base Camp was located, and the structures, along with a sampan and two bunkers, were destroyed. The troops continued their sweep to the southeast without further incident and were extracted by LSSC. During the extraction, several rounds of harassing small arms fire were received; however, it was not returned since it could not be determined from what direction it originated. There were no friendly casualties. The troops destroyed 15 structures, one sampan, and two bunkers during the operation.

A VNN Reaction Team, a UDT team, and an EOD team embarked on PCF's 22, 35, 69 and 94 transited the Song Bo De and South China Sea to the Rach Nang (WQ 162 780), where the troops were inserted at the canals' mouth on both banks. The units swept down the canal encountering numerous booby traps on both banks and offensive bunkers on the south bank. An unknown type ordnance exploded on the port side of
PCF 94, causing numerous holes in the engineroom, flooding and knocking the port engine out of commission. There were two U.S. sailors slightly wounded. The troops swept down to the explosion site but were unable to uncover any evidence as to the type of explosion. The troops were extracted, and all units exited the canal without further incident. There were five bunkers, one structure, one sampan, and 35 booby traps destroyed. Enemy casualties were unknown.

A thirty man VNN Reaction Force, a UDT team, and an EOD team were inserted by PCF's 12, 18, and 27 on the Rach Cai Ngay (WQ 115 729) to conduct sweeps east along the banks on 16 January. Various booby trapped grenades, land mines, fish traps, hoochies, and bunkers were destroyed. The "Swift" boats placed 81mm mortar prep fire in front of the sweeping troops. While sweeping the north bank an electrical wire was discovered leading from the river bank to an offensive bunker complex ten meters inland. Further investigation revealed that 3-4 personnel had been waiting in ambush with their primary weapon being an anti-boat mine located at the bottom of the canal. A battery firing assembly was recovered in the vicinity of the bunkers, and the electrical leads were cut. A line was secured around the object, and, utilizing a tow line, a PCF pulled the object onto the bank. It was then determined that it was a U.S. made 750 pound bomb converted into an electrically, command detonated water mine. The EOD team destroyed the mine, and all units returned to Sea Float without incident. There were seven booby trapped grenades, four bunkers, six hoochies, 35 booby traps destroyed.
two fish trap, and one land mine destroyed in addition to the 750 pound mine. There were no friendly casualties during the operation.

On the morning of 19 January, PCF's 72, 94 and VNN 12 embarked a UDT, BUD, and 20 man VNN reaction Team and proceeded up a canal running north of the Song Cua Lon (WQ 171 605). About 600 meters up the canal, a wire was found across the canal. The troops were inserted on both banks. After it was discovered that the wire was not booby trapped, it was pulled down by the PCF's. The troops then moved north and east up the canal with Seawolves providing cover. The USS CROCKETT (PG 88) was prep firing the area 1,000 meters in front of the troops. Five VC, camouflaging three sampans, were surprised on the east bank, and after small arms fire was exchanged, they made a hasty departure with friendly forces in pursuit; however, the VC quickly disappeared into the thick brush. The ground elements then encountered several structures, bunkers, a food cache, and a large fish trap. Continuing the sweep north along the canal, more structures, bunkers, punji stakes, and sampans were discovered. The troops then swept west, destroying bunkers en route, and were extracted for return to Sea Float without further incidents. The day operation resulted in the destruction of 19 bunkers, 12 sampans, 12 structures, and five canal obstructions. The ground forces also captured two mortars, 200 pounds of shrimp, 30 pounds of salt, 50 pounds dried fish, 75 pounds of rice, six large fishnets, and one pound of documents. There were no friendly casualties, and one VC was wounded.
On 24 January, 16 reaction force personnel were inserted by Slicks in two elements about 25 kilometers southwest of Sea Float (VN 74L 498) for a reconnaissance patrol. The patrol encountered enemy fire several times, and it was suppressed. Five VC were countered and taken under fire prior to setting an interdiction post. While on the interdiction post, several VC approached at various times by sampan and were either killed or captured. During interrogation of one of the VC, it was learned that there were 30 VC in the area looking for the patrol. During the operation, Seawolves placed strikes in the area, and on one strike received heavy automatic weapons fire. Black Ponies were called to place a strike in the same area, and the enemy fire was silenced. The patrol was extracted by Slicks at 2300H without further incident. There was one friendly seriously wounded (non-U.S.). Ten VC were killed and five VC captured. There were eight sampans, 30 uniforms, and 250 kilos of supplies destroyed and four small arms captured.
LEGEND:

- Coastal Surveillance Center
- Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
- SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

A. SEALS - 4 JAN
B. SEALS - 6 JAN
C. SEALS - 8 JAN
D. SEALS - 11 JAN
E. SEALS - 15 JAN
F. SEALS - 21 JAN
G. Sea Float - 13 JAN
H. Sea Float - 14 JAN
I. Sea Float - 16 JAN
J. Sea Float - 19 JAN
K. IVV/Covers - 24 JAN

SCALE:

0 - 30 NAUTICAL MILES

CONFIDENTIAL
Operation Stable Door

Adverse weather in the Second Coastal Zone harbors during most of January resulted in the detection of only 34,175 craft by Stable Door Forces approximately 7,000 less than during December. Of these 3,546 were inspected and another 2,485 were boarded. There were 30 craft and 88 persons detained primarily for restricted zone violations and or altered identification papers.

On 23 January, the Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese (ACTOV) program began for Stable Door Units THREE and FOUR located in Qui Nhon and Nha Trang respectively. This turnover was expected to include all units in time and was expected to be completed for Units THREE and FOUR by June 1977 when these units are officially turned over. There are currently fourteen Vietnamese Navy Enlisted and one Vietnamese Navy Officer at each unit.

Unit ONE - Vung Tau

On 3 January the USS CHOWANO (ATF 100) notified the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) of a possible swimmer sighted near the ship. LCPL/33 and Picket 26 proceeded to the anchorage and commenced a search using a spot light and expending 25 grenades and 20 flares. LCPL 33 resumed normal patrol and Picket 26 continued the search until EOD personnel arrived on the scene. After a thorough search of the anchor chain and hull failed to produce any positive results, the search was terminated.
On 19 January the SS RUTGERS VICTORY notified the HECP that a body had been sighted floating off her starboard bow. PL35 proceeded to the scene and recovered the body. The body was taken to the De Long pier and turned over to the National Police and a CID Representative. The body was a Vietnamese male about 14 years old without any identification papers.

PL33 witnessed the collision of two Vietnamese junks on 28 January resulting in one of them sinking. Two persons, one seriously injured were taken aboard the PL 33. They were both taken to the MSTS pier where an awaiting ambulance took them to the Le Loi Hospital. The owner of one junk, Nguyen Van Dinh, died shortly after arrival at the hospital.

The USNS COMET, entering the Vung Tau harbor on 28 January reported a body floating down her port side in the vicinity of buoy two. Picket 26 proceeded to the area and recovered the body of a caucasian male wearing civilian clothes and about 23 years old. The only identification found on the body was military identification tag indicating his name as Thomas J. Kordosky and social security number 468-60-1955. The cause of death was undetermined. The body was taken to the De Long Pier and turned over to the 345th Medical Detachment.

The USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY reported a body floating down her post side on 29 January. Picket 33 recovered the body and transferred it to Picket 26, who proceeded the DeLong Pier and turned the body over to the 345th Medical Detachment. The body was that of a Negro wearing civilian clothes and containing no identification.
On the evening of 2 January, Skimmer 27 sighted several men entering Cam Ranh Village from the south along the beach. They were carrying either a 30 caliber or M-60 barrel and tripod and a box of 50 caliber ammunition. Warning shots were fired in an attempt to stop them, but to no avail as they all ran for the village.

On the night of 9 January, LCPL 37 reported a fire deep in the south bay. Picket 51 proceeded to investigate and reported that it appeared personnel were fishing in the area. Due to the shallow water Skimmer 26 was dispatched to assist LCPL 37, proceeded to 150 yards off the beach and reported that the fires were lanterns on fish nets strung out just off the beach.

While on routine patrol on 18 January, PL 39 sighted the Maritime Police Boat 143 coming out of Cam Ranh Village and headed straight toward them. PL 39 took evasive action but could not avoid the collision as the Maritime Boat was running too fast and was showing no lights. PL 39 received a three inch crack in her hull above the water line and damage to the beading around the port cleat. The Maritime Boat received damage to the forward section of her bow.

On 26 January the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) received a call from Commander Operational Control Center (COCC) reporting a junk with one man on board landing at the RMK tower. Skimmers 26 and 30 were sent to investigate and received small arms fire about six minutes later. The Skimmers cleared the area, but it could not be
determined who was doing the firing. Later the HECP was informed that the man who beached at the RMK tower had worked for them and lived on the peninsula.

**Unit THREE - Qui Nhon**

During a RECON flight by the 1st platoon, 203rd Reconnaissance Company on 6 January, one person was spotted going into a bunker. Sea Cobras were inserted and skimmers set up a waterborne guardpost. The Sea Cobras made a sweep of the area with negative results. Three separate caves, all empty, were discovered and destroyed. Approximately 200 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition were found in a stream and destroyed with grenades.

On 7 January, Sea Cobras with Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel embarked were dispatched to look for a reported Viet Cong who desired to surrender. Picket 39 with Sea Cobras aboard discovered a cave containing papers with writing, a flashlight, two pair of short pants, two harnesses, 50 AK-47 rounds, a camouflage shirt and a camouflage parachute. There was no enemy contact and all items were turned over to the PRU forces.

On 11 January, tower number one reported a junk proceeding from Hai Minh Village to the Qui Nhon docking area. LCPL 38 was called to intercept it, but the junk had entered shallow water and shots across her bow failed to stop the junk. The HECP reported that there were six men aboard the junk and that they unloaded several boxes at the Cam Docks area.
On 20 January a five ton truck loaded with ten tons of rice sunk in water just off the Mike Boat Landing at the LST Beach. The truck was backing off a Mike Boat and when the rear wheels got on the beach the tractor pushed the Mike Boat away from the beach. Salvage operations were conducted by Unit THREE's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team and the truck and trailer were recovered along with ten tons of ruined rice.

On 11 January, Skimmers 17, 32 and 89 inserted Sea Cobras for an area sweep on the east side of the bay (CR 122 307), while the Skimmers and Picket 19 provided offshore support. As the Recondo team swept inland, the point man mot and took under fire one VC at a distance of five feet. The Recondo team then withdrew and two more VC were encountered by the rear security element and taken under fire. The team was then extracted and B Battery, 41st Artillery responded with area saturation fire. There were two VC killed, one VC wounded and one sampan destroyed.

Also on 20 January, the boat captain of Skimmer 32 accidentally dropped a grenade in the skimmer while conducting grenade drops. Both crew members dove into the water and were later picked up by Skimmer 29 uninjured. Skimmer 29 then went alongside and extinguished the fire and towed the damaged skimmer to the LCPL Pier. Skimmer 32 had the starboard side transom blown out, engine wiring burned out and steering cables ruined.
On 5 January, the Liberian Cargo Ship KADMILOS requested medical assistance from Unit FOUR. Skimmer 25 proceeded to the ship and found two seriously wounded personnel, one with a possible skull fracture, fractured jaw and a compound fracture of the right hip. The second man had a skull fracture and several contusions. The injuries were the result of falling into a cargo hold. The injured personnel were taken to the Cau Da pier where an ambulance met the skimmer and took the injured men to the Eight Field Hospital for treatment.

While on routine patrol on 11 January, LCPL-43 stopped a water taxi (DJOINTDC) and discovered 35 - 100 pound sacks of rice and 18 sand bags of corn. All of this cargo was not manifested and one male was detained for having an incorrect boat registration number, along with the unmanifested cargo.

The 228th Signal Company located on Hon Tre Island requested assistance on 15 January to search for a missing CATAMARAN sailing craft with two U.S. Army personnel on board after the craft had been missing for about five hours. PL43 was dispatched to search the coastline of Hon Tre, Hon Mieu, Hon Tam and the eastern coastline of the Dong Bo area. After four hours the search was terminated with negative results. On 16 January Skimmer 25 resumed search of the coastline. It was later reported by local Vietnamese fisherman that the missing personnel were located on Hon Tam Island. The craft was then towed to the LCU landing on Hon Tre Island.
The cargo ship SUNSHINE STATE requested medical assistance on 23 January, stating they had an injured man on board. PL48 was sent to the ship with an 8th Field Hospital Corpsman to determine the extent of the injuries. It was determined that the man had a skull concussion caused by a fall as the result of an epileptic fit. The injured man was transported to Unit FOUR's pier and further transferred to the 8th Field Hospital for treatment.
LESSONS LEARNED

The following Lessons Learned information was submitted by Commander Task Force 115, message 311340Z.

a. Organization and Administration

1. Centralized maintenance of personnel records, pay, health, service, and dental, by the various support activities and detachments is of inestimable value as it not only relieves the afloat staffs of this responsibility but gives the operational commander complete freedom with his assets when reacting to intelligence, contingency plans, or special operations.

2. Problems continually arise within the area of mutual support/liaison which invariably have to be resolved by personal contact between higher echelons. These problems become even more complex when third country nationals are involved. The majority of the third country national liaison problems are usually immediately solvable through the liaison establishment. However, conflicts do arise when the liaison officer is not of an equal or higher level than those in command who are being advised. In essence, a well-established liaison network at command levels, province levels, sector levels, and even political levels can contribute much to the generation of mutual support, the minimization of mutual interference, and the elimination of safety corridors and havens for the enemy along the existing political and military boundaries.

2. Operation Sea Float, a Combined Command

(a) Organization and Administration: The initial organizational structure consisted of a staff comprised of USN and VNN officers, with a USN commander in charge and a VNN commander as
second in command. Waterborne assets, from which operations were
conducted and logistic support was provided, also came from both
the U.S. Navy and Vietnamese Navy. This organizational structure
has remained the same and has proven to be a workable situation.
One position in this structure that has proved marginally workable
is that of second in command. It is currently held by the IV CZ
commander, as a collateral duty. Because of his other responsi-

(b) Upon the assignment of ground forces for Sea Float/
Solid Anchor base defense, other organizational problems arose.
Two separate units were assigned. The VNN Rangers arrived with
an American advisor and reported to COMMANDER SEA FLOAT. Accordingly
they were an integral part of the chain of command and liaison could
be easily established through the advisor. The other base defense
unit assigned was a regional force company that arrived without an
American advisor. Their chain of command initially went from the
company commander straight to the district chief. Consequently,
all orders had to come straight from the district chief. Also the
lack of an advisor precluded any easy liaison between Sea Float and
the company. This problem area was resolved when the district chief
insisted the company commander that he would take orders from COMMANDER SJA FLOAT. This problem was further alleviated with the assignment of a military assistance team. One base defense organizational problem area that still remains is the lack of cooperation between these two units. The RF company and the VNN Rangers each consider themselves superior to the other. An obvious solution to the problem is the assignment of one large unit with sufficient troops to defend the perimeter. This would provide for only one ground commander, with control of all the forces that comprise the base defense.

4. One of the most evident lessons learned from the organizational point of view is that programs similar to SCATTER AND START should be an integral part of any campaign undertaken by Free World Military Assistance Forces. The benefits of such a program are two fold.

(a) One: The purpose of the FWMAF is to do just that, assist, not do the job instead. The enforcement of J.G.S. promulgated law by the U. S. Navy and U. S. Coast Guard gets the tasks done but it does not necessarily enhance the image of the GVN. Conversely, combined USN/VNN or USCG/VNN crews with vessels flying dual ensigns not only signify the enforcement of the GVN law by the VNN but also shows the GVN flag.

(b) Two: The immediate formation of combined crews would enable the nation receiving the assistance to generate a well-informed, well-trained cadre of varying experience levels which
would enhance the formation of an in-country training program as the armed forces expands. Since the training cadre would exist, the following on turnover programs would not be hindered by the requirement to train the training cadre.

b. Personnel:

1. Operation Sea Float:

   (a) Personnel: There are approximately 700 personnel assigned to Operation Sea Float, of which 193 are U. S. Additional personnel could be effectively utilized in all areas of operations. However, the physical size of the Sea Float MATS precludes any further personnel expansion. U. S. personnel assigned are highly motivated and professionally qualified. As is the case at most advanced bases, morale is high. The Vietnamese personnel assigned have progressed satisfactorily in taking over the operation. They are currently conducting all Psyops at the annex, participating in combined operations, taking an active part in the planning of operations, and conducting totally VNN operations other than Psyops. It is considered that by the time the Solid Anchor base is completed, the Vietnamese will be ready to assume full responsibility for the base and be adequately proficient in river operations to maintain a GVN presence in the area.

2. Personnel Assignment:

   (a) In screening volunteers or nominees for duty in Vietnam, a close look should be given to suitability in living with others and sobriety. Personnel who are considered "poor neighbors"
in stateside conditions are certainly not going to do better in the
close quarters and heavy interdependence required of in-country
sailors. The one year tour is a great morale factor. It also pro-
vides a good chance of choosing more desirable duty stations upon
return. The incidence of extensions, especially among enlisted,
is very high, providing a nucleus of highly-motivated, experienced
CO's.

(b) The VN personnel lack motivation and discipline
when compared to USN personnel. This is because of the rapid ex-
pansion of the navy. It will be necessary to build their motivation
and discipline considerably if they are to have an effective navy
upon turn over. This can be done through the Personal Response
program and by setting high standards of performance for VNN turned
over assets by senior VNN officers. More often than not, senior
VNN officers expect far less from their forces than do U. S. commanders.

However, the important thing to remember above assessing VNN effec-
tiveness or progress is that it must be viewed in terms of a six
month or year basis, using this method of evaluation, the VNN pro-
gress has been excellent. Quantifying this on a 4.0 basis, the
VNN would receive a 3.4 in progress and a 3.0 in performance.

3. PCF Manning:

(a) Manning ratio: Maintaining a 1.5 to 1 crew to boat
ration on PCF's is a necessity. This ratio allows adequate relax-
ation periods between patrols, as well as ensuring more effective
preventive maintenance on the in-port PCF's. Failure to maintain