middle of the river. A PBR patrol unit, under Patrol Officer, EM1 Frame, diverted to the scene. PBR's 129, 12, and 24 towed the sinking LCM to the north bank. Once beached, the LCM was pumped out and temporary patches were applied to stop the flooding. When the battle damage was brought under control, the PBR's towed the stricken craft to the south bank near the Dong Ha ramp. All logistic traffic was stopped. Emergency sweeping of the river commenced employing top and bottom catenary. Scare charges were employed.

When the explosion occurred, the 6X6 truck and trailer carrying two 10KW generators and one TRC-24 receiver were blown clear off the LCM into the water. Of the personnel aboard the LCM, five were blown into the water. Four men were picked up by the tug RACCON, and one man swam ashore. NSAD divers commenced a search for possible missing personnel.

Questioning of the LCM coxswain revealed the mine detonated when the LCM hit a broomstick in the water. The mine was believed to be an NVA pressure mine with a long delay fuze. Divers located the truck and trailer blown into the water and recovered two bodies. At 1640H, the casualties known were two USA killed, two USN wounded, three USA wounded and one USA missing. The wounded were treated and released from the 18th Surgical Hospital in Quang Tri.

Before opening the river to logistic traffic, the Commander, Dong Ha River Security Group, reported the entire river swept twice with chain drags, top and bottom catenary, random scare charges, and
the EOD set charges in the turning basin. Three MSM's were sent on
night river patrol, and two pusher boats were kept on alert in the
turning basin.

On the 7th of February, CTF Clearwater met with FCZ10, NAD,
NILC Quang Tri, the Quang Tri Phoenix Program Senior Advisor, and
the Coastal Group 11 advisors. Arrangements were made for operations
to be conducted to neutralize or capture VC sapper units operating in
the Cua Viet area. On the 8th of February, the diving barge LCMB-
912 arrived at Cua Viet for salvage operations of the signal truck
and trailer.

The following morning, at about 1124H, on the 8th of February,
EMI Frame, patrol officer, with SN Center and SN Brooks, completed
a double sweep of the river in LCM-17. On recovering the sweep gear,
parts of a mine were found fouled in the top catenary. The parts
included a punctured inner tube, two blasting caps, and a small
section of a basket. They are typical parts of an NVA pressure mine.
Later the same day, LCM-38 was approaching check point W-13, 8 kilo-
meters southwest of Cua Viet, when the crew observed a 75-foot waterspout approximately 25 feet astern. The mine was believed to be an NVA
pressure mine with a delay fuze. The LCM-38 was on a logistic run
from Cua Viet to Dong Ha. LT M. W. Andrews, NSAD Qua Viet, immediately
closed the river preparatory to making scare and bottom catenary
sweeps. All logistic craft movement on the Cua Viet River halted
until the sweep was completed. Two sweep boats with bottom catenary
escorted the remaining logistic craft to NSAD Cua Viet in convoy fashion. It was decided to operate logistic runs as convoys for the remainder of the high threat period.

Patrol Officer, BMC Nelson and Boat Captain, EN2 Reed were patrolling on the river five kilometers west of Cua Viet at about 2045H when five personnel were observed 100 meters inland on the north bank of the river. Obtaining fire clearance, the patrol unit took the group under fire with an MK-40 Honeywell grenade launcher and reported two enemy KIA. After the patrol cleared the area, artillery fire was called in on possible escape routes.

Patrol Officer, ENS H. C. Hampton, with Boat Captain, EM1 Dombrowski in PBR 118, set a waterborne guardpost six kilometers west of Cua Viet on the night of the 15th. At about 2251H, three people were observed 100 meters to the west carrying objects toward the river bank. The group was taken under fire, and the contact disappeared. The patrol shifted the guardpost and kept the area under surveillance. No further action occurred.

A waterspout startled the crew of an NSAD Cua Viet skimmer early on the morning of the 18th. BM3 Sudduth and SN Ouendag were on a morning Scare charge run six kilometers southwest of Cua Viet when a secondary explosion produced a column of water 40 feet high approximately 1,000 feet ahead of the skimmer. There were no personnel or material casualties.
On the 21st of February, an agent report received by CTF Clearwater stated that sappers with two oxygen tanks and three water mines had crossed the Cua Viet River. There were no confirmed reports involving the use of advanced breathing equipment by sappers in the Cua Viet. The use of more sophisticated equipment would not greatly increase the mining threat as the sapper is forced to surface for orientation.

CTF Clearwater reported enemy activity remained at a moderate level during the month of February. Infiltration of supplies from the west continued. There were indications of forces being reinforced and moving closer to the plain areas of Thua Thieu Province. Agent reports continued to state the enemy's intention to launch an offensive in the near future.

**Operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone**

Irregular and scattered contact with the enemy continued during the month of February. The RSSZ forces increased the tempo of operations, supporting the Provincial Forces, conducting psychological operations, SEAL team inserts, EOD operations, mine countermeasures, and reacted to enemy contact when gained. Special Support Units A and D, and Helicopter Unit A supported overall operations. One USA Hunter/Killer Team (COBRA) from D Company 229th AVN Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division, Dua Tieng, operated in the RSSZ in conjunction with USA and VNN forces throughout the month.
One USN LHFT, TU 116.9.8, with LCDR Kizer supported two squads of Regional Forces Company 782 early in the evening on the 3rd of February. The RF Company was proceeding to a trail guardpost position when movement was noted in the vicinity of XS 940 590. Responding to the RF Company's request for overhead cover, LCDR Kizer placed strikes in the area of suspected enemy movement at 1942H. With the Seawolves standing by overhead, the RF Company continued the patrol without further incident.

The first extended composite operation including all the forces in the RSSZ began on the morning of the 3rd of February. At 0600H, LTJG Holst and LTJG Curelop in RSSZ PBR's accompanied by BMG Olivarez with two ASPB's took blocking positions in the Rach Ba Giang at XS 985 630. By 0750H, the Regional Forces Company 999, with 1st LT Gross Hans, USMC, as advisor, had inserted by USA Slick helicopter on the north bank of the Song Dong Tranh (YS 083 760). The troops began a sweep southwest in the general direction of the PBR's and ASPB's. No enemy contact was gained and the company extracted by Slick at 1430H. In coordinated action, at 0816H, RF Company 782, with advisor CAPT Burch, USMC, inserted by USA Slick one kilometer east of the blocking force and began a sweep to the southeast. By 1040H, the company reached XS 981 638 where they found a 500 pound dud bomb. An USA Slick inserted the RSSZ EOD team at 1130H. The EOD team blew the bomb in place as the troops continued their sweep to the east. As the squads fanned out through the brush and mangrove swamps, one group found and destroyed 300 pounds of three quarter
inch by 12 feet steel bars. From XS 981 638, the company moved south-west to find and destroy one booby trap grenade. The blocking PBR's extracted the company from XS 983 633 and reinserted the troops at YS 004 620. The area was swept with negative results and the troops extracted by Slick at 1400H in the vicinity of YS 004 620.

At 0845H, the Regional Forces Company 361 with GY SGT Leith, USMC, as advisor inserted by Slick at YS 030 493 and moved out to the southwest. After one hour and twenty-five minutes of moving through foot slogging mud, waist deep mud holes, and tangling mangrove roots, the troops found and destroyed a newly constructed bunker and two structures. The sweep continued without further results until the company extracted by Slick at YS 079 491.

An USA Hunter/Killer Team began to search the area around YS 0875 at 0800H. Fifty-five minutes after the search began, the H/K team found and destroyed three bunkers at YS 086 755. At 0910H, the H/K team destroyed two more bunkers at YS 089 757. After destroying the two bunkers, the H/K team diverted to cover the various company troop insertions. At 1300H, the H/K team returned to search the area around YS 990 621. There one structure and a ten bunker complex was destroyed. Two other bunkers and two structures were located and destroyed at 1400H in the vicinity of YS 007 594.

Throughout the day's operations, CAPT Kinslaw, USMC, aboard an L-19 from the 184th AVN Company, Phu Dii, provided overhead coordination for the troop sweeps and insertions. One USA LHFT and one USN LHFT provided on call air cover for the day's operations.
At 1545H, reacting to informant intelligence, the HSSZ PBR's proceeded to provide location security near XS 980 593. One USA LHPT provided overhead cover while one USA LOH landed the USSSZ advisors. The informant lead the advisors to a cache site. As a result, two B-40 rockets, five B-40 rocket boosters, one case of 24 Chinese Communist grenades were captured. All units returned to Nha Be on terminating operations.

The above is an example of the coordinated composite type operation necessary for successful operations in the HSSZ. USN EOD, PBR's, ASPB's, LHPT's, LAFT's, USA L-19's, LHPT's, H/K team; VNN patrol boats, and four H/F Companies were employed during the days operations.

The net results included one 500 pound dead bomb destroyed, one booby trap grenade destroyed, 300 pounds steel construction rods destroyed, 18 bunkers destroyed, three structures burned, two B-40 rockets captured, five B-40 rocket boosters captured, and one case (24) grenades captured.

The coordinated action discovers enemy caches, disrupts his supplies, and keeps him on the move.

On morning patrol the 9th of February, LCDR Wolniewicz and LTJG Cook patrolling the HSSZ in Seawolves reported an U.S. Army barge, No. BC6527, beached on the west bank of the Long Tau shipping channel at XS 141 531. The U.S. Army reported the barge had been moored to buoy number one in Vung Tau harbor the previous evening.
At 0900H, BM1 Hepstall took R5SZ PBR's 5 and 6 to the area to provide security. By 1030H, the Regional Force Company 875, with CAPT Cowan, USMC as advisor, had inserted by Slick helicopter at YS 141 531. Prior to the insertion, the USN LHFT overhead placed preparatory strikes in the area destroying one bunker and one sampan. Negative enemy contact was made by the ground troops. An USA Tug took the barge under tow for Vung Tau and by 1515H the troops extracted. There were no friendly casualties.

At 2045H on the evening of the 10th, four VC firing automatic weapons conducted a probe of the Than Thoi RF outpost on the banks of the Song Ong Tien at YS 109 503. Regional Forces Company 361 troops returned the fire suppressing the initial attack. One RF trooper was seriously wounded. LTJG Cook immediately scrambled the USN LHFT and reported overhead to provide air cover. However, air strike clearance was denied due to friendly unit advance posts. The LHFT continued to provide cover while CAPT Cowan, USMC, coordinated the dustoff of the wounded RF trooper by USA helicopter from Bario.

Another coordinated action of the R5SZ forces got underway 0500H the morning of the 12th. CPO Allred and CPO Hutchason took aboard RF Companies 908 and 362, with USMC advisors, CAPT Cowan and 3/SGT Bradshaw, in PBR's and ASPB's for transporton to the operations area. From 0730H until 0800H, two USN LHFT's, CDR Wolneiwicz and LTJG Cook, and one USA LHFT placed air strikes in an area of maximum sniffer readings. At 0810H, RF Company 999, with 1st LT Grosshams,
inserted by USA Slicks at YS 056 783, one kilometer north of the Song Dong Tranh. The troops swept west with negative results, extracted by USA Slicks, and returned to base camp. At 0815H, an USA LHFT placed air strikes on an enemy base camp at YS 075 783 and received one secondary explosion. RF Company 875, GY SGT Bledsoe, USMC advisor, inserted by Slicks at YS 096 953 and swept the area with negative results. At 1230H the company extracted by air and reinserted at YS 030 795 to sweep east. The USA LHFT covering the troop movement received sporadic semi-automatic weapons fire at YS 034 704. Two USN LHFT's lifted at 1240H and placed air strikes in the enemy firing positions. The USN air strikes destroyed three bunkers and eight structures. RF Company 875 swept this area at 1400H and captured 1,000 - 7.62 linked belt rounds, 100 kilo rice, five kilo tobacco, thirteen 4.5 volt batteries, 100 meters of electric wire, and two water containers. The troops returned to base camp at 1436H. An APSB, EMC Olivarez, lifted RF Company 783, 1st LT James, USMC advisor, to YS 124 777 to provide security for the base camp.

At 1100H RF Company 908 with their advisor inserted by ASPB at YS 056 795, swept southeast with negative results, extracted at 1442H, and returned to base camp. RF Company 362 left the base camp with their advisor by Slick and swept the area of YS 089 789. The troops gained no contact by 1450H and returned to base camp by Slick.

At 0800H one USA Hunter/Killer team began a search of area YS 0678. Two bunkers were discovered and destroyed at YS 068789. Later at 0920H, the team destroyed another bunker and one structure at
YS 075 789. At 1230H the Hunter/Killer team diverted to provide overhead cover for the troop movements. At 1500H the team destroyed two more bunkers at YS 046 719. ASA RSSZ Major Hunter, USMC, RSSZ NGLO 1st LT Phipps, USMC, and three USAF SNAP FACS provided overhead coordination for the troop insertion and sweeps. The RSSZ PBR's and ASFB's provided waterborne transportation and set up blocking action under the direction of waterborne OTC, LCDR Thames.

Continuing coordinated operations in the RSSZ, one USA Hunter/Killer team commenced a search of area YS 1777 at 0700H on the morning of the 9th. At 1030H, the team sighted a bunker complex at YS 174 776. Two civilians were reported captured by the VC and at 1300H the team diverted to search the area of YS 965 779 but failed to find the kidnappers. At 1400H, the team returned to YS 174 776 to reach the area. Twenty kilo of documents were removed from the bunkers before artillery was called in at 1500H, with RSSZ NGLO CAPT Garwick, USMC spotting, to destroy the complex. Fire Support Base Dakota fired artillery into the complex until 1530H. In the next hour and a half, the team completed the destruction of five bunkers, two structures, two sampans, seven 75mm rocket rounds, and three B-40 rocket rounds. At 1700H, the team departed the area for Nha Be Naval Base. En route Nha Be the USA LOH reconed the area where another LOH had been shot down the day before by enemy ground fire. At 1715H the H/K LOH reported receiving heavy automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire in the vicinity of YS 153 805. By 1720H the LOH was down and burning at YS 173805. At 1725H, Cobra aircraft placed air strikes on the
enemy position killing six VC. One USN LHFT, LCDR Kizer and LCDR Walniewicz, scrambled to provide overhead cover. At 1730H, the Cobra aircraft was down at YS 173 805 due to mechanical difficulty. LCDR Kizer directed the Seawolves over the downed Cobra to provide cover for the dustoff crew of Long Binh. RF Company 105, Nhon Trach, inserted by USA Slick to secure the area in the vicinity of the downed aircraft. One LHFT scrambled out of Vung Tau to assist in air cover while an Army Chinook aircraft extracted the downed Cobra to return it to Phu Loi. At 1900H, the troops extracted by Slick helicopter. Friendly casualties were one USA KIA, one USA WIA. Enemy casualties were six VC killed by air.

On the night of the 17th, CPO Allred in RSSZ PBR, answered a call from RF Company 999, 1st LT Grossham, USMC advisor, who was in a firefight at YS 068 789 about one kilometer north of the Song Ong Tranh. The RF troops, in a night guardpost had taken seven VC under fire at 1705H, killing three. Receiving automatic weapons fire, the troops withdrew to the north bank. The PBR's reconed the area by fire and extracted the troops without further incident.

Early in the morning of the 18th, at 0600H, LTJG Curelop and RD1 Fisher took RSSZ PBR's and ASPB's through the winding canals to set up blocking positions to support a coordinated RSSZ operation. At 0837H, the USAF facility at Tan San Nhut AFB directed tactical air strikes on an enemy base camp at YS 038 792 destroying one bunker and scoring one secondary explosion. RF Company 908, 1st LT Grossham,
USMC advisor, inserted by USA Slick helicopter at YS 114 744 and began to sweep the area to the west at 0923H. At 0936H, the troops found and destroyed one enemy booby trap at YS 107 745. Moving out to the southwest at 1135H the company captured ten pounds of rice, a small quantity of documents, and one ordnance sighting device. While searching the area, six to eight VC were seen evading to the northeast and northwest. One USA Hunter/Killer team, one USA LHFT, and one USN LHFT, LCDR Wolniówicz and LTJG Denigro, placed air strikes in the vicinity of the enemy. The troops then swept through the area with negative results and extracted by Slick at 1435H from YS 102 745. WO Hoferkamp, USMC, advisor to RF Company 362, inserted with the company by Slick at YS 106 784 and swept the area to the west. At 1045H in the vicinity of YS 102 784, the troops captured 100 rounds of 7.62 caliber ammunition and four M-79 grenades. The sweep continued without further results and at 1440H a Slick helicopter extracted the company from YS 108 784. RF Company 999, CAPT Cowan, USMC advisor, inserted by Slick at YS 086 788. At 0945H, they examined the action on the 17th of February and found drag marks where bodies had been dragged away. The company departed by Slick at 1450H. At 0956H, RF Company 875, 1st LT James, USMC advisor, swept from YS 042 797 to YS 050 795 and departed by Slick. The troops reinserted at YS 047 784 and searched southwest. At 1435H, the company captured two old CHICOM type 53 rifles, assorted semi-automatic ammunition, and found five shallow graves which they attributed to the air strike action on the 13th of February. The troops continued their sweep with no
further results and extracted from YS 047 784 by Slick at 1510H.

At 1120H, one USA LHFT sighted movement at YS 107 783. The aircraft placed air strikes on the suspected enemy positions and received sporadic semi-automatic rifle fire. The USN LHFT, LCDR Wolniewicz and LTJG Denigro, joined the USA LHFT and the Hunter/Killer team in placing strikes at YS 092 764. At 1245H, the ASPB's sighted movement on the bank of the Song Thi Vai (YS 124 760). The ASPB reconed the bank by fire. Results were unknown. From 1645H to 1730H, the Hunter/Killer team destroyed four bunkers at YS 046 789.

The RSSZ NGLU, CAPT Kinslow, USMC, SA RSSZ CDR Wages, and ASA RSSZ Major Hunter, USMC in L-19 from 184th AVN CO, Phu Loi, provided overhead coordination for the troop insertions. The RSSZ NGLU, 1st LT Phipps coordinated gunfire from an OV-10 from Vung Tau. This operation concluded at 1730H.

At 1800H on the 23rd of February, CPU Quoi, advisor to RPG 52, inserted 14 RSSZ PRU troops from VNN PBR's at YS 173 627 in a streamlet off the Rach Tchen. At 0130H the next morning the PRU's sighted four VC in a sampan and took them under fire. The sampan returned the fire with automatic weapons. Four VC were killed. One sampan, two M-16 rifles, two kilo rice and fish, and a small amount of documents were captured. At 0145H, the PRU's extracted the troops.

The last combined operation of the month took place between 0500H and 1730H on the 25th of the month.
Commencing the operation, CMD Price and LTG Demigro conducted a people sniffer search in the Wolf Pack AO by USN LHFT from 0700H to 0730H. At 0745H the USAF Tac Air placed strikes at YS 074 788 and YS 075 789. At 0820H the control aircraft received sporadic semi-automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of YS 074 793. RF Company 362, CAPT Hickman, USMC advisor, inserted by Slick aircraft at YS 051 797. At 0845H the company began a sweep to the east. The troops called in the USN LHFT at 1045H to place strikes at YS 075 788. Two bunkers were destroyed in the strikes. Further patrolling netted no further results and the company extracted by Slick from YS 051 797 about 1450H. At 0857H the RF Company 999, with CAPT Cowan, USMC advisor, inserted by Slick at YS 078 793. The troops swept east and at 0905H received automatic weapons fire at YS 080 793. The RF troops returned the fire and then moved southwest. At 1321H one VC was killed in a short fire exchange with the troops. Two AK-47's with magazines, two radio transmitters, and a small amount of documents were captured before the company called in air strikes on the supported enemy positions at YS 074 782 killing four VC. At 1340H one USN LHFT placed additional strikes in the same area killing one more of the enemy. The company continued to sweep south and at 1355H took a small party under fire killing one VC at YS 073 780. The troops called in one USA LHFT to place air strikes on the enemy positions. The aircraft received automatic weapons return fire. In sweeping the area, the company found two VC killed by the air stroke, destroyed four sampans, five bunkers, four...
structures, 130 kilo of rice, and two CHICOM grenades. At 1717H, after a long day, the troops extracted by Slick at YS 073 791.

RF Company 908, S/SGT Bradshaw, USMC advisor, inserted by Slick in the area of YS 109 753 at 0920H. The company moved out to the southeast. They had reached YS 103 750 with no results when they were lifted by Slick to YS 073 788 to support the action occurring with RF Company 999. An USA Slick reported automatic weapons fire southeast of the RF position. The company moved out in that direction. At 1515H, four VC were engaged in a brief firefight killing one. After the firefight, the troops captured one claymore mine, eight M-16 magazines, eleven grenades, and 20 75mm rounds. The company withdrew from the position and called in air strikes resulting in one secondary explosion. At 1703H, three new graves were found at YS 073 791, a result of action with the VC by RF Company 999 on the 24th. At 1730H the company extracted by Slick.

WO Haferkamp, USMC, inserted with RF Company by air at YS 017 798. At 0935H, the troops began a sweep to the southeast. They discovered a VC base camp at YS 022 797 showing signs of recent activity. An USN LHFT was called in at 1225H. The air strike destroyed the camp. The troops continued their sweep with an USA LHFT placing strikes in their path of advance. With no further positive results the company called for extraction and were lifted out of YS 016 799 by Slick at 1503H.
The RSSZ EOD team proceeded to YS 147 745 by Army Slick and destroyed three bunkers at 1240H, returning to base camp at 1400H.

The RSSZ NGLO 1st LT Phipps, USMC provided overhead coordination from an OV-10 from Yung Tau throughout the day.

**Enemy Harassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping**

The SS Trans Globe reported enemy rocket and semi-automatic fire from the west bank of the **Long Tau** shipping channel at 0912H on the morning of 3 February. The harassing attack originated about 600 meters south of Tan Tanh (YS 118 575). Three B-40 rocket rounds exploded in mid-air, and three other rounds passed over the Trans Globe. Two minutes after the attack, a USN LHPT arrived over the enemy firing position. One USN PBR on Long Tau patrol proceeded to assist in the search of the banks. At 0945H, the LHPT seized one detainee, and ten minutes later, an USA Hunter/Killer team in the area seized another detainee. Both detainees were brought to Tan Tanh (YS 115 586) for transfer to Nha Be. At 1015H, the Regional Forces Company 875 were inserted by helicopter at YS 117 575. The troops swept the area with negative results. The Trans Globe suffered no casualties. The two civilian detainees were released from Nha Be after identification and interrogation.

At 1134H, on the morning of 3 February, the Senior Naval Advisor, Rung Sat Special Zone, received word through VNN channels the SS **VENUS VICTORY** was attacked in the Long Tau shipping channel at YS 093 627, 22 kilometer southeast of Nha Be. The Regional Forces
Company 783 inserted in the attack area at 1205H. On their sweep, the company found firing stakes in the vicinity of YS 096 627. The company completed the search and extracted from the area with no enemy contact. The VENUS VICTORY received one B-40 rocket hit on the mast with no personnel and slight material damage.

On the morning of the 24th, the SS WASHINGTON BEAR transited north on the Long Tau shipping channel. At about 0745H, the WASHINGTON BEAR reported receiving seven rockets from the west bank in the vicinity of YS 090 627. At that time, negative hits or casualties were reported. The USNS FENTRESS, also transiting north, trailing the WASHINGTON BEAR by approximately one half mile reported sighting rocket trails near the leading ship. Later investigation revealed one small puncture and several small indentations in the WASHINGTON BEAR's hull above the water line near hold five.

At the time of the attack, Regional Forces Company 783 was conducting a security sweep on the bank of the Long Tau channel near the area. Within minutes of the attack, the RF company took three to four VC under fire in the vicinity of YS 090 625, receiving automatic weapons fire in return. BM1 Baker in ASPB No. 5 and CPO Hutchason with PHN's No. 9 and 10, on Long Tau patrol, diverted their boats to the area of enemy activity. As the RF company swept to the south, LCDR Kizer and LTJG Cook, in two Seawolves, vectored overhead to provide air fire support.
At the direction of the RF company, the USN LHFT's placed strikes in the vicinity of YS 095 618 at about 0810H. At 0850H, the Regional Forces Company 875 inserted to the south at YS 093 605 by VNN boats taking up a blocking position. The troops then swept to the north. Again on call, the USN LHFT's placed air support strikes at YS 082 577 about 1025H. There were no friendly casualties, enemy casualties were unknown. The RF companies extracted without incident.
Three members of a U. S. Navy SEAL team descend from a hovering helicopter by rappelling down ropes to set their position in the jungle below.
Throughout the month, SEAL Team (Detachment ALFA) operated in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The SEAL's set waterborne guardpost, made night patrols, and operated in conjunction with other friendly forces assigned to the RSSZ. Although the SEAL team positioned elements in the RSSZ almost daily, only sporadic and infrequent contact was made with the enemy. The decreasing number of enemy contacts month by month is indicative of the effectiveness of the combined forces operating in the zone.

LT Gardner with a six man SEAL patrol set a waterborne guardpost by LSSC about seven kilometers southeast of Nha Be Naval Base. ENS Marsh escorted the team and the LSSC to the night position at 1315H on the first day of the month. No enemy presence was detected at the WBG site. At 2230H, the SEAL's departed that position, and en route to Nha Be, encountered one sampan on the bank of the Long Tau shipping channel at X5 935 778. One Vietnamese suspect was detained and delivered to Nha Be for questioning.

On the 9th of February, seven SEAL's with LT Gardner departed the Seabee base camp by USA Slick helicopter at 0900H. Inserting at X5 128 509 they patrolled east to the vicinity of X5 133 512 and searched an abandoned VC base camp with no results. The team again patrolled east to the vicinity of X5 139 514 and set a guardpost at 1130H. Having no contact by 1400H, the team broke the guardpost and moved to the north. As the team moved, LCDR Wolniecz provided
overhead cover with an USN LHFT. The moving patrol found a dud fired
CHICOM grenade booby trap at YS 140 514 and rendered it safe. The
SEAL's moved out to the east again and at 1530H set up a guardpost
at YS 144 515. The guardpost was held until 1730H when the USA Slick
extracted the patrol returning them to the Seabee base camp at 1745H.

On the 22nd of February, eight SEAL's with LT Jukoski departed
Nha Be by two USA Slicks and inserted at XS 969 759. By 1800H, the
team was patrolling south with LCDR Kizer providing overhead cover
in a Seawolf LHFT. The patrol set a guardpost on the bank of the
Rach Bong Gieng Lon at 1915'. There, five kilometers south of Nha
Be, four VC attempted to swim the canal north to south at 1950H. The
team took the swimmers under fire killing two of the VC. Four minutes
later ENS Scott placed air strikes in the vicinity of the crossing with
an USN LHFT. After directing the air strike, the SEAL's extracted by
LSSC, covered by LTJG Bryson with the MST 2, and returned to Nha Be.
The team destroyed two CHICOM grenades, one M-26 grenade, and 40
rounds of AK-47 ammunition carried by the transiting VC.

LTJG Norris and seven SEAL's departed Nha Be at 1500H on the
23rd by MST-3 piloted by ENS Scott. Covered by two USN PBR's under
M1 Hepstall, they proceeded up the Dong Tranh River. Where the
Rach La emptied into the Dong Tranh River they turned left and went
up the canal to set a waterborne guardpost at YS 066 788. At 2200H,
the patrol broke guardpost and while proceeding to the LSSC less
than a hundred yards away, they came under B-40 and automatic weapons
attack. The SEAL's returned fire and held their positions while LTJG Denigro placed air strikes on the enemy position with one Sea-wolf USN LHFT. At 2230, the patrol departed the area for Nha Be in the LSSC. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown.

On the same day, LT Gardner with 13 SEAL's and one LDNN departed Nha Be at 1400H in an LCM with ENS Marsh. The LCM took five hours and forty five minutes in the circuitous route down the Nha Be River to the Song Rach Cat, then up that river to the town of Can Giouc. From Can Giouc the SEAL's went by LSSC winding up the Cai Tram Canal to insert at XS 806 742 deep in the Can Giouc District of the Long An Province. Once inserted, the patrol moved out along the canal bank and set a waterborne guardpost at XS 807 744 by 2100H. Less than 45 minutes later four VC passed the guardpost headed southeast on the canal. The patrol took the sampan under fire killing three of the VC and wounding one. With LTJG Denigro overhead in an LHFT providing air cover, the team spread out to search the area. During the search, the captured wounded VC shot the Vietnamese Navy SEAL in the right hand and forearm with a concealed pistol. In the resulting fight, the VC was killed. LTJG Denigro, on call, brought down the LHFT to place an air strike in the area. The team patrolled to XS 806 742, still on the banks of the Cai Tram Canal, where the LDNN could be evacuated by helicopter. At this point, a local Provincial Force platoon joined the SEAL team for a sweep and re-search of the combat area. Destroying the sampan, the group captured
a small amount of documents. The enemy weapons were lost in the water during the initial fight. Discontinuing the search, the SEAL team and the LSSC rejoined the LCM and departed for Nha Be at 0330H. There were no additional friendly casualties.
## USN Statistical Summary

### Market Time

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<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>6,691</td>
<td>1,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boardings</td>
<td>5,368</td>
<td>2,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft detained</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons detained</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong suspects</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy casualties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>112 (72 BC, 40 Est)</td>
<td>22 (16 BC, 6 Prob)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN casualties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy material losses:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Captured:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Weapons</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Ammunition (rounds)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Rice (tons)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Damaged:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Structures</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN material losses:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Damaged:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR missions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**

*Information not available or not applicable*
NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY

Vietnamese Navy

Fleet Command and Central Task Force

The PCF's, WPB's, patrol craft, and support ships of the Fleet Command performed river and Market Time patrols, Sea Float operations, NGFS, logistic lifts, Psyops, and Civic Action missions in February. The 55 NGFS missions fired by the Fleet Command units in February was comparable to the previous month when 57 NGFS missions were completed.

Satisfactory weather conditions along the coast was apparent for the second straight month as Fleet Command surveillance figures recorded slight increases in comparison to the January figures. In February a total of 26,172 people and 7,628 junks were searched by the Fleet Command. Seven junks and 86 people were detained for further questioning and identification.

The routine operation reports of the Fleet Command units reflected the low level of enemy activity. The majority of their NGFS missions were fired with unknown results and the regular resupply runs were uneventful with the exception of an enemy initiated action in the Sea Float AO on 25 February. In the afternoon, LSSL 228 was transiting toward the mouth of the Bo De River (WQ 163 677) when the ship came under B-40 and automatic weapons fire. The enemy fire
was immediately returned and within two minutes, two Black Pony
aircraft were overhead, followed shortly thereafter by USN Seawolves.
After the OV-10's and helos had placed strikes into the area and
the LCM had ceased her direct fire, a Kit Carson Scout reaction
team was inserted by USN PCF's 17 and 36. Sweeping the ambush site
from west to east the Kit Carson Scouts uncovered five B-40 rockets,
three E-50 rounds, 11 rocket launch tubes, 11 propellant charges,
and three wiring assemblies. No confirmed enemy casualties were
reported for the action.

On 28 February in Danang, 11 USN PCF's were shifted adminis-
tratively from the USA COSDIV 12 to the VNN COSFLOT 1 at the same
time the Danang Coastal Surveillance Center was placed under VNN
control. With the additional VNN assets in the 1st Coastal Zone
including the three LCM's turned over on 14 February, all of the
inshore stations in Market Time areas one and two became exclusive
VNN patrol responsibilities.

The Central Task Force carried out its mission with no signifi-
cant interruptions. At the end of one minesweeping patrol on the
Long Tau River the VNA minesweeper H21801 recovered 20 feet of two
conductor electrical cable.

Coastal Junk Forces

The force strength of the Coastal Junk Groups remained stabil-
ilized at 223 junks which reflected the most recent survey of two
junks that took place in January. At Hue, seventeen craft were assigned to FAC 32.

The continued favorable weather conditions along the coast were reflected for the second straight month of larger surveillance figures. In February there were 185,900 people and 52,021 junks searched, and 208 people and 26 junks detained.

First Coastal Zone

A moderate high point in enemy activity at the beginning of the month was followed by a generally low level that was characteristic of the rest of the month. Major enemy interest appeared to be on his anti-pacification efforts, sapper, and guerrilla attacks. In the Cua Viet area, five mine incidents occurred which served to acknowledge the presence of water sappers along the Cua Viet River.

On the afternoon of 12 February USN PCF's and CG 14 forces were called upon to carry out a blocking force mission on the Truong Giang River south of Hoi An as part of a ground sweep by ARVN units, (vicinity BT 175 502, 172 502, 165 510, 168 370, 164 504). The USN PCF 79 intercepted three sampans attempting to cross the river and killed one VC (BT 168 510). Three CG 14 personnel were inserted along the river bank where they destroyed one sampan, two bunkers, 500 yards of fish net, and confiscated another 500 yards of fish net.
Another CG 14 unit (BT 175 502)sighted seven VC females attempting to escape during a prep fire on bunkers. All seven were captured without incident. While returning to their base, CG 14 units again put VNN personnel ashore to destroy bunkers. Proceeding to a second bunker complex, the VNN detected movement in the nearby mangrove. Four to six VC were then spotted and after chieu hoi attempts failed they were taken under fire. Three male VC were overtaken and another was wounded before he escaped in the dense mangrove. One additional bunker was destroyed by the VNN before they returned to their base.

First Coastal Zone Junk Employment as of 28 February 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coastal Group/Homeport</th>
<th># of Junks</th>
<th>Type/Location of Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG 11/Cua Viet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patrols/Cua Viet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 12/Thuan An</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Patrols/Thuy Tu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 13/Tu Hien</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patrols/Cau Hai Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 14/Hoi An</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patrol; Base Defense/Hoi An; Cua Dai; Cua Lau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 15/An Hoa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Coastal and river patrol/coast; Truong River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 16/Co Luy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patrol;base defense/Tra Phuc; Pho Tho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second Coastal Zone

The level of enemy activity was relatively heavy at the beginning of the month particularly in the coastal provinces on the night of 31 January - 1 February. In Binh Dinh Province, nearly every major U.S. installation came under attack by fire. This high point
was followed by a low level that characterized the action of the enemy for the remainder of the month. While avoiding major contact with allied units, the enemy concentrated on low scale attacks against bases and allied pacification efforts.

There were no significant combat incidents reported by the 2nd Coastal Zone Junk Groups. However, in their psyops and civic action campaign, CG's reported the dedication of a one room addition to the Song Cau High School that was built through the efforts of material and labor provided by CG 23.

2nd Coastal Zone Junk Employment As Of 1 March 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG/Homeport</th>
<th># of Junks</th>
<th>Type/Location of Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG 21/Degi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>patrol; base defense/ Nuoc Nguc Lagoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 23/Song Cau</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>patrol; base defense/ Ong Dien Cape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 25/Dong Hai</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>patrol; base defense/ Hon Khia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 26/Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>patrol; base defense/ Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 27/Phan Rang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>patrol; base defense/ Dong Nai Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 28/Phan Thiet</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>special ops; base defense/ coastal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Third Coastal Zone

A relatively quiet situation prevailed in the 3rd Coastal Zone until the end of the month when 20 attacks by fire were recorded on the evening of 26-27 February throughout the III CTZ. For the Coastal Groups the Dung Island complex continued to be the scene of the majority of the contact with the enemy in February.

On the afternoon of 2 February four CG 36 units and two USN advisers, ENS Champion and RD3 Korber were conducting a PSYOPS mission at the northwestern end of the Dung Island complex (XN 220 768) when the VNN spotted a sampan evading toward the island. Three of the CG 36 units took the sampan and its occupants under fire as the sampan reached the beach. After the VNN ceased fire they searched the abandoned sampan which contained two dead VC, 13 SKS rifles, three RPG launchers, three B-41 launchers, one M-60 machine gun, two AK-47's, one 30 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun with mount, twenty five 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, eight 82mm mortar rounds, 2,500 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition, five Chinese Communist land mines, 75 blasting caps, 100 meters of detonating cord and twenty 82mm detonators.

A CG 36 small boat with USN advisers, LT King and HM2 Sannicolas departed the base on the morning of 20 February in order to carry out a waterborne reconnaissance mission while circling the Dung Island Complex. Half way down the northern side of the island (XR 280 705) the VNN spotted seven VC ashore. As the VC scattered into the dense undergrowth, they were taken under fire. One VC was confirmed dead and a second was
seen crawling into the jungle with wounds. Before continuing on the patrol the VNN destroyed the enemy sampan.

The last day of the month CG 34 units, USN PCF's 55 and 87, helos and VNAF fixed winged aircraft were in search of a downed VNAF aircraft that had crashed near the mouth of the Ham Luong River (vicinity XS 800 010). An oil slick was located in the morning and later PCF 87 had two grappling hooks attached to the submerged aircraft awaiting salvage assistance that would arrive in March.

Third Coastal Zone Junk employment as of 28 February.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG/Homeport</th>
<th># of Junks</th>
<th>Type/Location of Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG 33/Vung Tau</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Patrol; base defense/Sea Float; Rach Ong Ben and Cua Lap; local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 34/Tien Ton</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Patrol; base defense/Ham Luong River; local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 35/Hung My</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Patrol; base defense/Sea Float; Co Chien River; local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 36/Dai An</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Patrol; base defense/Sea Float; Hau Giang River; base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourth Coastal Zone

Consistent with the level of action throughout the Republic of South Vietnam the 4th Coastal Zone experienced a general lack of enemy activity for most of the month. The one high point of the month took place on the 25-26 February when 49 incidents were reported in the delta including 21 attacks by fire.

The special patrols in the Gulf of Thailand were gradually phased down and disestablished effective 200001H February. During the two
month period, the stations were patrolled and 5,496 junks and sampans were detected and 5,359 of these were inspected or boarded and searched.

The following is a breakdown of the totals by areas as computed by CTU 115.4.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8D1</th>
<th>9E1</th>
<th>9F1</th>
<th>9G1</th>
<th>9H1</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detected Day</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>4,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspected Day</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;S Day</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>3,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detected Night</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspected Night</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;S Night</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junks Detained</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistics indicate that the traffic was most dense in areas 9E1 and 9F1 and that the largest percentage of cargo and detainees were apprehended in areas 9D1 and 9E1. Over 500 bags of rice were confiscated and 90 VN personnel, the majority who were restricted zone violators, were detained and turned over to the proper authorities. No weapons, munitions, or movement of troops was detected and while the movement of junks through the restricted zones was never halted, the flow of unmanifested cargo was stopped.

Evaluating the lessons learned from the operation CTU 115.4.1 reported that heavy traffic through restricted zone does not necessarily indicate that coastal infiltration is taking place. Most restricted zone violators in this area were either innocent fishermen or were in the area because they were taking the shortest route on a coastal transit. Many of these were unaware of the restrictions and during
rough weather the junks have a tendency to hug the coast more closely because of the reduced sea state experience there.

The PCF's are able to operate on coastal patrols from LST's for extended periods of time. However, base level maintenance should be available elsewhere since major repairs cannot be performed by the LST's.
The most significant incident that RFG 55 reported took place on the morning of 5 February while the VNN's with their USN advisor, LT Carty, embarked were patrolling the Cho Goa Canal (vicinity XS 625 461). As if in sole defiance of the government presence in the area, a lonely VC flag was flapping in the breeze about 25 feet from the bank. Sighting the flag the VNN called local AR/PF forces who swept the area with negative results. In addition to the flag, one VV banner, one VC painted metal sign, and nine typewritten sheets of VC propaganda were recovered from the scene.

The twenty PBR's assigned to RFG 51 divided their operating time between interdiction operations on the Saigon River from Phu Cuong up stream and routine river patrols on the lower Saigon. Although the lower river patrols had no significant contact, they assisted in the recovery of personnel from a U.S. Army helo that went down approximately 13 miles northeast of Saigon (YT 032 992) on 19 February. Three of the four men that were aboard the helo were quickly fished from the water. The two VNN PBR's remained in the area, dragging for the helo and helping EOD and U.S. Army troops search for the missing fourth man.

RFG 52 units continued special operations in the HSSZ with USN and local ground forces and conducted routine day and night river patrols of the Long Tao and Sci Rap Rivers. In the Tran Hung Dao and Giant Slingshot AO's, PRG's 54 and 53, respectively, interdicted enemy troop and logistic movements through the employment of patrols waterborne guardpost, and special operations.
TF 212 employment as of 28 February 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RG/Location</th>
<th># of PBR's</th>
<th>Type of Ops</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51/Cat Lai, Phu Cuong</td>
<td>12, 8</td>
<td>River patrols, Interdiction Ops, River Patrols</td>
<td>CTF 212, CTF 194.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52/Nha Be</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>River patrols, Special Ops</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52/Ben Luc, Go Dau Ha</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>River patrols</td>
<td>CTF 194.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54/Chau Doc</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>River patrols, Interdiction</td>
<td>CTF 194.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55/My Tho</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>River patrols, Security</td>
<td>CTF 212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third and Fourth Riverine River Assault Groups

The eleven RAG's operating in the 3rd and 4th riverine areas completed 685 river patrols and 2,587 amphibious operations in February. These figures were slightly lower than the previous month but generally comparable to the operating level over the past six months. In addition to the river patrols and amphibious operations which occupy a major portion of their time, the RAG's carried out Psyops and Civic Action missions, logistic and troop lifts, and base defense operations.

In the 3rd Riverine Area, RAG's 22 and 24 operating in the Giant Slingshot and Ready Deck AO's, respectively, experienced the more numerous enemy contacts. In an unusual combination of forces that took place on 11 February, the commanding officer of RAG 30 assumed command of an integrated river force consisting of four RAG 30 units, six RPG 51 PBR's, one RAG 28 unit, and two RF Boat Company 24 units.
At approximately 0900 the river force embarked four companies of the 31st Ranger Battalion, Third Ranger Group and established a combined ranger/ naval command post on the RAG 30 command boat. The amphibious force put under way and proceeded to VC Island located approximately nine miles east of Saigon (YS 030 950) where three companies were inserted for a sweep. Meanwhile, the afloat units commenced coordinated patrol and blocking force operations on the Tac and Dong Nai Rivers which surround the island on the east and west, respectively. The VNN and ranger commanders cooperated in setting up night defense and waterborne guardposts on the evenings of 11 and 12 February. The sweeps of the island and the area to the east of the island were carried out for three days with no significant results. However, the operation is expected to serve as a basis for future multi VNN/ ARVN operations in the 3rd Riverine area.

In the 4th Riverine area, a minor shift of USN PBR's in the Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef AO left a vacancy in the river patrols in the vicinity of Chau Doc (from WS 140 340 to WS 113 883, and from WS 110 840 to WS 150 900). In order to fill the patrol requirements, RAG 23/31 based at Vinh Long extended their responsibility to include the Chau Doc and Bassac Rivers northwest of Chau Doc until 9 February.

In addition to the routine support of the 7th ARVN Division, RAG 21/33, during the period of 1-9 February, initiated nightly patrols on the My Tho River (from XS 370 410 to XS 450 428) and on the Kenh Xang Canal (from XS 413 425 to XS 390 475). Two LCVP's were used.
on the Kenh Xang Canal patrols unless troops were going to be inserted in which case one FOM and one LCM-6 were used. On 1 February, six other HAG 21/33 proceeded to Ham Luong Ferry (\.S 484 297) in order to provide services to Kien Hoa Sector. While supporting RF operations in the sector on 9-11 February, the HAG 21/33 units used the canal connecting the My Tho and Ben Tre Rivers for the first time in over 18 months (from AS 590 380 to AS 555 306). Fourth Riverine area HAG activity for the remainder of the month was centered around troop and logistic lifts and routine patrols; neither encountered any significant contact that directly involved the RAG's.

3rd and 4th Riverine Area HAG Employment As of 28 February 1970

Third Riverine Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAG/Admin Location</th>
<th>No. of HAG</th>
<th>Type/Location Ops</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAG 22/Nha Be</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Troop Support</td>
<td>Long An Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics/Vam Co Dong River</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAG 24/Cuu Long</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Interdiction, riverine patrol troops support/upper Saigon River</td>
<td>3rd Riverine Area Commander/CTG 194.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAG 28/Nha Be</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Troop support, logistics/Can Giioc Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAG 30/Cuu Long</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>River Patrol, troop support/lower Saigon River</td>
<td>3rd ARVN Ranger Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourth Riverine Area

| HAG 21-33/Dong Tam | 17-18 | Troop support, logistics/My Tho River | 7th ARVN |

131
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG 23-31/Vinh Long</th>
<th>20-10</th>
<th>River patrols, troop support/Co Chien Mang Thit Rivers</th>
<th>4th Riverine Area Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAG 25-29/Cam Tho</td>
<td>17-12</td>
<td>Troop support, logistics/Ca Mau</td>
<td>An Xuyen Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG 26/Long Xuyen</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Troop support, logistics/Ca Mau</td>
<td>Kien Giang Sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**River Assault and Interdiction Divisions**

The six RALD's of ATF 211, 70 through 75, conducted river patrols, amphibious assaults, routine troop and logistic lifts, Psyops, and Civic Action missions while employed in SEA LO HUS operations and in joint VNN/VNNC ATF 211 operations in the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province and in northern An Xuyen Province. The entire ATF 211 completed 332 river patrol and 1,491 amphibious assaults in February.

RALD's 70 and 71 which have operated independently of the ATF since their commissioning continued to successfully carry out interdiction operations in the Giant Slingshot AO. At the end of January, the majority of the RALD 70 and 71 units were relocated to Moc Hoa and Ben Luc, respectively, as part of the Giant Slingshot redeployment of forces that was based on intelligence information of a possible attack on Tay Ninh. On 7 February in order to more equitably share the load at Moc Hoa, RALD 71 sailed eight units to Moc Hoa and relieved RALD 70. Two U.S. RAC A-13 and A-14 remained at Moc Hoa and were placed under the OPCON of RALD 71 upon their arrival. In turn, the RALD 70 units sailed from Moc Hoa to Tan An where they assumed the RAC requirement at that location. Upon their departure from Moc
Hoa, CTG 194.9 commended RAID 70 for the valuable assistance they had rendered by placing experienced VNN boats with inexperienced U.S. ATC's in combined waterborne guardposts under the command of VNN patrol officers.

In order to maintain three RAID's in support of VNMC operations in the Twin Rivers AO of Chuong Thien Province (vicinity Wd 370 700), ATF 211 scheduled regular stand-down and maintenance period alongside the USS ASKARI (ARL 30) for each of the RAID's 72 through 75. This procedure was utilized until 23 February when the ATF 211 operations in the Twin Rivers area were terminated. Since the beginning of this operation on 12 December 1969, the RAID's have accumulated the following results:

VC/NVA: KIA 11, suspects detained 19, Hoi Chanh 6
VNN: KIA 1, WIA 13
Searched: Sampans 13,649, People 38,271
Troops lifted: 19,614
VNN Boats Damaged: HQ 1239 50%
HQ 1327 20%
HQ 5126 20%
HQ 5128 20%

For the same operation the Vietnamese Marine Corps accumulated the following results:

VC/NVA: KIA 179, captured 39, suspects detained 21
VNMC: KIA 53, WIA 220

133
Weapons captured: 11 crewserved; 63 individual

Material captured: One 1.5 KW generator

Enemy sites destroyed: 3 company size base camps; one 50 bed hospital/dispensary

VNMC weapons; equipment lost: 4 M-16; one .45 cal. pistol; 1 mine detector; 2 PRC/25 radios

During the period 1-21 February, RAID 72 patrolled the Cai Lon River (from WR 330 720 to WR 390 730) and the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau (from Cai Lon to WR 280 700). After relieving RAID 75 on 21 February, RAID 72's patrol area was changed to the Rach Nga Ba Dinh (from WR 330 650 to WR 345 580). On 23 February when the operation was terminated, RAID 72 proceeded to Can Tho for maintenance and resupply via Vi Thanh and the Xa No Canal. In order to provide support for the VNMC Brigade "A" operations in An Xuyen Province at the end of the month, RAID 72 transited to Ca Mau on 26 February. The following morning they moved to Thoi Binh where the Brigade "B" command post was established and began patrolling the Trem Trem River (WR 100 330 to WR 997 561) and supporting the 2nd Battalion, VNMC.

RAID 73 provided troop lift service in the AO and patrolled the Cai Lon River and the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau (from WR 170 790 to WR 280 750 and to WR 300 700) from 1-12 February. After being relieved by RAID 75 on 13 February, RAID 73 proceeded to Long Xuyen and the USS ASKARI (ARL 30) for 12 days of stand-down and maintenance. At the end of the month RAID 73 was en route to Ca Mau in order to relieve RAID 72 at the beginning of March.
From 1-11 February, RAID 74 lifted troops and conducted patrols on the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau and the Rach Nga Ba Dinh (from WR 320 680 to WR 340 560 and to WR 320 630). While en route to an insertion point on the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau (vicinity WR 344 617) with 1st Battalion Marines on 9 February, HQ-1239 was hit by B-40 rounds in the well deck. The VNN ATC returned the fire with unknown results and cleared the area with 11 wounded Marines and slight material damage. The RAID 74 patrol area was modified on 12 and 13 February to the Cai Lon River, extending both east and west from Thoi Binh (from WR 265 746 to WR 390 730). On the afternoon of 19 February, units of the 3rd Battalion, 31st Regiment, 21st ARVN Division, were preparing to board RAID 74 units (WR 700 380) when, what was thought to have been, a command detonated mine, exploded six feet from a boat ramp resulting in 13 ARVN and one USA Lieutenant killed and 25 ARVN wounded. A dustoff and assistance was immediately requested. A Chinook helicopter "Inn Keeper 16" operating in support of ATF 211 monitored the dustoff request and proceeded to the scene. The helo determined that he could land but was advised that the area was not secure nor was a perimeter established. The pilot flew to Vi Thanh, obtained a Cobra fire team, and returned. Before the Chinook had landed the Cobras were diverted to another action. In spite of no air coverage, "Inn Keeper 16" safely landed, remained on the ground for approximately 45 minutes while the wounded were transferred, and then delivered the Marines to Vi Thanh were ambulances and medical personnel were available.
With the operation terminating on 23 February, RAID 74 with ATF 211 personnel embarked, traveled to Rach Soi and Long Xuyen. RAID 74 stood down alongside the USS ASKARI (ARL 30) for the remainder of the month.

The RAID 75 units were receiving upkeep and maintenance alongside the USS ASKARI until 13 February when the boats traveled to the AO and relieved RAID 73. Patrols (from WR 330 650 to 348 575) and troop lifts were conducted by RAID 75 until 21 February when RAID 72 assumed the responsibility. RAID 75 proceeded to Rach Gia and was assigned to Operation Search Turn (TG 194.3) as of 23 February. With the arrival of VNN units the operation was renamed Search Turn/Tran Hung Dao VI. The USN Commander, CTU 194.3 was designated Commander, Operation Search Turn/Tran Hung Dao VI and the Commanding Officer, RAID 75 was designated the Executive Officer of the operation.

ATF 211 employment as of 28 February 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID/Location</th>
<th># of HAC</th>
<th>Type of Ops</th>
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<tr>
<td>RAID 70/Tan An</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>River patrols</td>
<td>CTG 194.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID 71/Moc Hoa</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>CTG 194.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID 72/An Xuyen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>River patrols</td>
<td>ATF 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID 73/en route An</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Transit in prepa</td>
<td>ATF 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID 74/Long Xuyen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Stand-down maintenance</td>
<td>ATF 211</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAID 75/Rach Gia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>River patrols</td>
<td>CTG 194.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vietnamese Marine Corps

Brigade "A"

Brigade "A" has been absorbed into the joint staff of ATF 211. The Brigade Commander has been designated as the Deputy Commander of ATF 211. Further information of ATF 211 operations is found in the individual discussions of the infantry battalions.

Brigade "B"

Brigade "B" which included the 4th, 5th, and 6th Infantry Battalions and the 2nd Artillery Battalion conducted reconnaissance in force operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces in February under the OPCON of the 7th ARVN Division. Specializing in airmobile and Eagle Flight operations, Brigade and Artillery CP security missions, and company and small unit patrols, the Brigade had one significant engagement with the enemy before Operation Song Than 807 was terminated on 16 February, and the Brigade had moved their operation to central Kien Hoa Province. A coordinated VC mortar attack on the Brigade and Artillery CP and a simultaneous ground assault against one company of the 4th Battalion on 15 February ended with two VNMC and seven VC dead and another seven VNMC wounded. Two separate VC Battalion size contacts with elements of the 6th Battalion on 23 and 25 February resulting in 14 VNMC and 40 VC killed and five AK-47's captured were the major actions for Brigade "B" during the remaining days of February.
1st Infantry Battalion

The 1st Infantry Battalion under the OPCON of ATF 211 was supporting a reconnaissance in force operation in Chuong Thien Province (vicinity WR 364 697) in February. Concomitant with providing security for the ATF 211 command post, the 1st Battalion performed small unit patrols and Eagle Flight operations. After the 2nd Battalion assumed the ATF 211 CP security missions on 9 February, the 1st Battalion concentrated on Eagle Float and small unit infantry tactics. That same afternoon eleven VNMC were wounded by enemy rocket fire when 1st Battalion units were ambushed during Eagle Float operations 27 miles southeast of Rach Gia on the Rach Nga Ba Cai Thanh (WR 340 618).

At the end of the week on 14 February, 1st Battalion forces, supported by six RAID 75 boats acting as a blocking force, established intermittent enemy contact approximately two and one half miles to the east of the VC ambush site of 9 February (vicinity WR 384 592). No assessment was made of enemy casualties, and the Marines counted five of their own killed and another seven wounded at the conclusion of the action.

After the newly formed 7th Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on 20 February, the 1st Battalion returned to the Thu Duc Base camp (XT 895 035). The move was completed on 21 February, and two days later, the 1st Battalion was relocated to Camp Nguyen Van Nho (XS 878 929) and was assigned as the JCS reserve for the CMD. On the last day of the month, the 1st Battalion was relieved of the CMD
alert status and reverted to their Thu Duc Base Camp under JGS control.

2nd Infantry Battalion

Under the OPCON of ATF 211, the 2nd Infantry Battalion supported a reconnaissance in force mission in the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Province (vicinity WR 289 508) in February. Initially assigned to airmobile operations in conjunction with ground sweeps along the major ca'als leading into Kien Long District and to a security mission at the ATF 211 forward CP, the 2nd Battalion experienced negligible activity. On 9 February, the 2nd Battalion moved to the ATF 211 CP and relieved the 1st Battalion of the CP security mission including perimeter defense responsibilities and local screening operations. A relatively quiet enemy situation prevailed until 19 February when the Marines gained contact with enemy units 27 miles southeast of Rach Gia near a small stream that emplies into the Rach Nga Ba Dinh (vicinity WR 307 608). One of the four VC that was killed in the action was identified as the squad leader of the 307 VC recon platoon. In his possession there was a citation commending the squad leader for his part in the attack on Brigade "B" on 6 November. In addition to the VC that were killed, the Marines suffered two killed and another six wounded.

Having been relieved of the ATF CP security missions by the 3rd Battalion on 22 February, the 2nd Battalion conducted Air Cavalry Eagle Flight operations and infantry sweeps in the area (vicinity WR 266 683) with negligible results.
On 27 February, the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Infantry Battalions and the 1st Artillery Battalion minus, the task elements of Brigade "A", were lifted into a new A0 north of Ca Mau (vicinity WR 103 329) in order to commence reconnaissance in force operations under the OPFOR of the 21st ARVN Division. An airmobile assault and subsequent infantry sweeps by the 2nd Battalion on 28 February produced negative results.

3rd Infantry Battalion

The 3rd Battalion has continued to support the reconnaissance in force operation in the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province (vicinity WR 456 745) under the OPFOR of ATF 211. Eagle Float operations with HAID 74, airmobile combat assaults, and company size infantry sweeps were employed with negligible results. The 3rd Battalion displaced to the ATF 211 CP area (WR 364 697) on 22 February and relieved the 2nd Battalion of the ATF CP security mission. Two VC were captured (vicinity WR 240 688) on 23 February by the Marines and another three VC were taken into custody (vicinity WR 255 734) on 26 February.

The following day, the 3rd Battalion, as a unit of Brigade "A," conducted an airmobile assault into a new A0 north of Ca Mau in An Xuyen Province and assumed the Brigade A forward CP security and responsibility for local screening patrols (WR 090 459). There was no significant action through the end of the month.
**4th Infantry Battalion**

While supporting a reconnaissance in force mission in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces (vicinity XS 235 507 and XS 738 198), the 4th Infantry Battalion was initially assigned the Brigade "B" CF security missions. Screening operations and small unit tactics established no contact until the early morning of 14 February when there was a small VC attack against the 4th Battalion positions, located 11 miles north of Vinh Long (XS 099 528). One Marine was killed and another seven wounded in the initial attack. A daybreak battlefield search by the VNMC found nine dead VC and four personal weapons. Early the next morning, 4th Battalion Marines in the same location again came under an enemy mortar attack. Later that morning and throughout the day, they had scattered VC contacts in the area that accounted for seven VC and two VNMC killed and seven VNMC wounded. After moving to a new location, 16 miles southeast of My Tho (vicinity XS 714 264), the 4th Battalion encountered VC mines and scattered enemy resistance on 18 and 19 February that produced nine VC killed along with seven VNMC wounded. Additional company size patrols, airmobile assaults, and artillery security missions were uneventful through 28 February.

**5th Infantry Battalion**

From 1–28 February, the 5th Infantry Battalion conducted reconnaissance in force operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces (vicinity XS 225 554 and XS 551 317). Company size combat patrols, Eagle Flight operations, and Battery D security missions were the primary responsibilities assigned to the Battalion at the beginning.
of the month. Light to no action prevailed throughout the month with mining incidents inflicting the Marine casualties. Two companies of the Battalion were inserted into a landing zone north of the 6th Battalion contact on 25 February in an attempt to block enemy withdrawal routes. However, no contact was established.

**6th Infantry Battalion**

The 6th Infantry Battalion remained under the OPCON of Brigade B the entire month and supported the reconnaissance in force mission in Dinh Tuong and Kinh Hoa Provinces (vicinity XS 304 487 and XS 600 289) along with the 4th and 5th Battalions. Carrying out operations similar to those of the 4th and 5th Battalions, the 6th Battalion had negligible action until the end of the month.

Early on the morning of 23 February, a VNMC squad surprised a squad size VC security element approximately 15 miles south southeast of My Tho (vicinity XS 610 190). One VC was killed and one AK-47 was captured. About two hours later, the parent VNMC platoon established contact with the main body of the VC unit, later identified as part of the 516B VC Battalion. Effectively employing supporting arms that included artillery, USN OV-10's, VNAF AC-47's, and helo gunships, the Marine platoon killed 22 VC while sustaining one VNMC killed and another four wounded.

Two days later on 25 February, three companies of the 6th Battalion were conducting small unit operations from independent company patrol bases (CPB's) approximately 2,000 meters apart. Midmorning one of the
platoons established enemy contact approximately one mile to the west (X5 592 192) of the successful engagement of 23 February. The Marine Company Commander reinforced the contact by ordering a second platoon to the area. Shortly after the second VNMC platoon had been dispatched, the company patrol base was hit by heavy indirect fire. The VC Battalion then launched a three directional attack against the CPB utilizing the combined fire power of 57mm recoilless rifle, B-40's, 82mm and 60mm mortars, and machine guns. The VNMC maneuvers were temporarily halted. However, they consolidated their position, commenced a successful counterattack, and forced the VC to initiate their withdrawal plans. Meanwhile, the VNMC Brigade Commander combat assaulted two companies of the 4th Battalion and two companies of the 5th Battalion into blocking positions to the north and northeast of the contact. Two 6th Battalion companies were also maneuvered into the contact area to place additional pressure on the withdrawing VC. With the enemy retreating, the Brigade Commander called in VNAF fixed wing air strikes along the VC withdrawal routes. The total results of the engagement were 18 VC and 14 VNMC killed and 22 VNMC wounded. The remainder of the month was uneventful as the 6th Battalion pursued the enemy through the use of small unit patrols, artillery security missions, and air-mobile operations.

7th Infantry Battalion

On 3 February, the 7th Infantry Battalion concluded its initial unit training with the completion of an amphibious landing exercise at Vung Tau. The 7th Battalion was formally activated on 11 February.