water and attempted to make the bank. The skimmer took the VC under fire and called in 81mm mortar support. The skimmer then captured a grenade and documents from the abandoned sampan. Both skimmers were extracted and picked up by PT CYPRRESS and PT WELCOME. The three VC were killed with no casualties to the U.S. personnel. The two WPBs, continuing their patrol, destroyed eight sampans and three long shaft motors.

The USCG WPBs, PT BANKS, under the command of LT Lashley, and PT LOMAS, under the command of LTJG Foskey, entered a canal approximately 21 miles southeast of Ben Tre (XS 73° 028) on the afternoon of 10 April and proceeded to destroy enemy offensive bunkers, camouflaged sampans, and reinforced structures along the canal bank. In the vicinity of XR 733 983, an apparent VC staging area for a VC intelligence office was found with a VC rice paper flag and numerous revolutionary slogans glued to numerous tree trunks. The staging area was destroyed and the PT BANKS and PT LOMAS extracted with no contact with enemy forces. Gun damage assessment for PT BANKS included two non-motorized sampans, 13 bunkers, five structures, and one haystack destroyed. The PT LOMAS captured a sampan and turned it over to CG 34.

Also on 10 April, PCF 65, with Officer in Charge LTJG Wallace, detected a sampan exiting from a canal some 22 miles east of Soc Trang (KR 34° 0673). When PCF 65 closed and illuminated the sampan, the single occupant leaped into the water and attempted to evade. He was immediately taken under fire and probably wounded. The sampan was searched and
destroyed. Two handgrenades, one M-2 carbine magazine, two bags of rice, one bundle of documents, and one bundle of confirmed VC mail were captured.

PT BANKS, LT Lashley commanding, and the VNN PCF 3825 were inserted into an area 12 miles south of Soc Trang (XR 155 442) on the afternoon of 23 April in order to fire on the suspected positions of two VC companies. After 25 minutes of firing 15 to 20 VC, all young men, were observed fleeing from a structure. They attempted to hide in vegetation and irrigation canals and the PT BANKS saturated the area with intense 81 mm, .50 cal., and 7.62 mm fire which restricted the enemy's movement. Meanwhile, VAL 4 OV-10s arrived on the scene and put an air strike into the area. However, the smoke from burning structures limited their identification of individual targets. The PT BANKS killed three VC and wounded four more. The Coast Guard unit also destroyed 12 structures and three sampans while damaging two structures and two bunkers and capturing one 18 foot sampan. VNN PCF 3825 destroyed one structure and damaged several others.

The PT BANKS continued her high tempo of operations on the afternoon of 29 April when she fired a Naval gunfire support mission 20 miles southeast of Se Tra Vinh (VIC XR 70 77 to 72 76) with a unit from the 199th FAC spotting. Gun damage assessment for this mission was four structures, three bunkers, and one sampan destroyed while one bunker and two structures were damaged.
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE

A. PT CYPRESS, PT WELCOME 2 April
B. PT BANKS, PT LOMAS 10 April
C. PCF 65 10 April
D. PT BANKS 23 April
E. PT BANKS 29 April

SCALE:

0 30
Nautical Miles

[Map showing locations such as Saigon, HCMC, Mekong River, Vung Sat Special Zone, etc.]
Fourth Coastal Zone

Market Time units continued to man special patrol areas in area Nine in the Fourth Coastal Zone during the first seven days of April. These special Gulf of Thailand patrols were discontinued on 8 April after it was determined that the results did not substantiate intelligence reports of large scale enemy infiltration in this area. The four PBRs of this special patrol were returned to the operational control of CTG 194.3 while the four PCFs remained to continue Market-Time patrols in areas 9E1 and 9D1.

The Market Time units involved in the special Gulf of Thailand patrols detected 2,802 craft during the month. Of these, 964 were inspected and another 570 boarded.

Special Gulf of Thailand Patrols

On 3 April, PCF 72 detected a motorized sampan in a restricted zone 19 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 84 86). A search of the sampan revealed 1600 pounds of unmanifested rice. The rice, and the two occupants of the sampan, were turned over to the Fourth Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer at Rach Gia.

USS ASHEVILLE (PG84) detected and detained a sampan 26 miles north of Sang Ong Doc (VR 78 45) on 7 April. The sampan was carrying a large quantity of medicine, shovel heads, foodstuffs, soap, candles, candy, wire, mosquito nets, writing paper, and, in the words of the message reporting the incident, "enough supplies to stock a small general store." The cargo was confiscated due to the lack of a proper manifest.
OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

A. PCF 72 3 April
B. USS ASHEVILLE 7 April
C. USCGC DALLAS 10 April
D. USCGC HAMILTON 21 April
E. USCGC DALLAS 30 April

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES 30
Gulf of Thailand Offshore Patrol
Unit Area 979 (WHEC Assigned) CTG 115.6

On 10 April, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) fired a gunfire support mission in Market Time area Nine about four miles east of Duong Dong (VIC VS 95 31). The mission was requested by the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO) at An Thoi and consisted of VC staging areas, base camps, liaison routes, and shelter areas. The five inch gun of the cutter accounted for five bunkers and four structures destroyed as well as interdicting several hundred meters of trails and wooded areas.

The USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) fired a gunfire support mission arranged by CTG 194.2 on 21 April approximately nine and one half miles north of new Song Ong Doc (VIC VR 837 144, 827 176). The HAMILTON destroyed four structures, damaged six others, and also damaged one sampan. There were two VC probably killed during this mission.

On the afternoon of 30 April, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) was requested to standby in support of a sweep being made by a company of the 21st ARVN Division, approximately six and one half miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 825 104). Gunfire support was called for by the ground troops, and the cutter quickly responded. Shortly after the DALLAS opened fire, a Dustoff helicopter with six ARVN casualties landed on board for emergency medical attention by the ship's doctor. After an hour of steady firing, the cutter had expanded all her HC and CVT projectiles and repositioned the vessel to seaward in order to take the targets under fire with rocket assisted projectiles (RAP).
During a brief lull, the Dustoff helicopter lifted the wounded ARVN to Ca Mau. The DALLAS remained on station into the evening hours and continued to provide gunfire support for the troops ashore. The cutter's gunfire killed 14 VC (4 BC, 10 PROB) and destroyed six structures during the operation.
Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III

There were over 223 gunfire support missions, including Sea Float and SEAL missions, conducted in the Sea Float AO during the month of April. These missions were part of a continuing attempt to keep the enemy off balance by destroying his base camps, extortion stations, and secret areas while interdicting his known and suspected routes of travel.

Although the random sweeps by U.S. and VN SEALs, Kit Carson Scouts, and Mobile Strike Force and Regional Force troops has continued to disrupt enemy operations and has prevented him from reasserting his control over a once secure haven, the VC presence is still evident in the area. This presence was acutely felt by Sea Float personnel on the night of 21 April when Sea Float was attacked by four enemy swimmers who were carrying enough explosives to completely destroy the MASTB. Alert sentries and immediate reaction by Sea Float personnel thwarted this attack, the first since Sea Float was established in June, 1969, and all four swimmers were killed.

One of the continuing problems at Sea Float has been that of adequate resupply of diesel fuel, fresh water, and food. A cloudiness of the water at the Solid Anchor site (probably aqua-gel) has precluded its use as a source of potable water to date. Part of the shortages were alleviated during the last days of April when VNN LSM HQ-404 made back to back resupply runs from Nha Be to Sea Float, but a permanent solution to the problem has not yet been found.
Solid Anchor construction continued throughout the month. The Seabees, plagued by an absence of sand at various times, had finished a water tower and taken great strides in land clearance by the end of April. Work continued on showers, the sewer system, and the perimeter fence.

The following U.S. and VNN craft and units operated in the Sea-Float AO during part or all of the month: PCFs 3, 9, 16, 17, 18, 22, 35, 37, 38, 50, 52, 56, 64, 82, 89, 93, 96, 691, 693, and 695; USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST-1151), USS TREDRELL COUNTY (LST-839), USS ASHEVILLE (PG 84), USS ANTELOPE (PG 86), USS READY (PG 87); LCPL; Sea Float River Assault Craft Detachment consisting of ATCs 4, 9, and 13, ASPBs 2 and 3, Zippo 2, Monitor 3, and Utility Boat 2; SEAL Team 1, Detachment GOLF; Underwater Demolition Team 11, Detachment GOLF; Duffle Bag Team CTE 19,1.5.2; Seawolves; Slicks; OV-10s; LSMs HQ-401, HQ-402, and HQ-404; LSSL HQ-231; LSSL HQ-331; VNN PCFs 00, 05, 07, 12, 13 and 14; Coastal Groups 33, 35, and 36 craft and personnel; VNN POLWAR Team; VNN Reaction Team; VNN Rangers; Mobile Strike Force troops; Mobile Strike Team Two, Detachments CHARLIE, FOXTROT, and GOLF. Regional Force troops; Kit Carson Scouts; EODMUPAC Team 70, Elements FOUR, FIVE, and SIX; and EODMUPAC Team VNN 03. These forces conducted psyops missions and escort services for logistics craft along the rivers and canals. Air assets provided psyops missions in those areas inaccessible to water craft. The afloat units and the Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base conducted nightly H and I fire into known and suspected VC base camps and extortion stations.
On 6 April, LT F. G. Vinant, OIC of SEAL Team One, Detachment GCLF, FOXTROT Platoon, relieved LT R. J. Flanagan, OIC of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF, GOLF Platoon, as CTE 115.7.6.2.

Also on 6 April, CDR Paul F. Treagy, Jr., USN, was relieved as Commander Task Group 115.7 by CDR Robert W. Curran, USN.

RADM Douglas H. Plate, USN, and a party of five visited Sea Float on the afternoon of 22 April and were briefed on current operations, intelligence, and psyops. The party then toured the Solid Anchor site prior to departing for Binh Thuy.

RADM Hoefer, USNR-R, and NBC-TV newsman Jim Bennet along with a Chicago Tribune representative visited Sea Float and Solid Anchor on 23 April. The group also visited the Sea Float Annex area where they observed refugees being resettled in the hamlet.

On 24 April, Captain Packer, MACMA, CAPT Robertson, Staff COMNAVPHIL, and party visited the Sea Float complex. After a C-ration lunch and a briefing, the group toured the Sea Float Annex and the Solid Anchor site.

On 25 April ENS Willie L. Holt, USNR, was relieved as CINC MST Two, Detachment Two, Detachment CHARLIE, (CTE 115.7.6.3) by LTJG John B. Barnes, USN.

Sea Float Missions

On the evening of 21 April, the VC attempted their first swimmer attack on the Sea Float complex. At 2050H, bubbles were sighted in the vicinity of Sea Float, indicating the possible presence of a scuba-
equipped swimmer. The area was immediately brought under fire with grenades and the bubbles ceased. Some five hours later loin cloth garbed swimmers using snorkels were sighted coming in from two directions. The first swimmer sighted had actually reached the ammo-storage ammi before being seen. Sea Float personnel immediately went to General Quarters and saturated the area with small arms fire and concussion grenades. H and I illumination was also provided. The swimmers, believed to be four in number, submerged and were not seen again. Approximately one hour later, firing was secured in order that UDT personnel could inspect the MATSB. However, nothing was found. By 1130H on 21 April, four bodies had been found and three recovered. Three of the four swimmers were equipped with Soviet defensive grenades, time fuse pencils, blasting caps, nylon line, snorkel breathing tubes, plus other assorted mining and swimming paraphernalia. In addition, one of the three swimmers carried 250 one quarter pound TNT blocks in a case interspersed with ten pounds of plastic explosive. The explosives were recovered and subsequently destroyed by EOD team members. Of the four swimmers, two were killed by gunfire and one probably by concussion grenade. The other body was not recovered. The alert sentries and aggressive and immediate reaction by all hands to the swimmer attack saved Sea Float from almost certain destruction.

MSF elements and Seawolves from Sea Float were also kept busy on the night of 21 April. While on patrol in the vicinity of WQ 12h 757, the MSF patrol came into contact with seven VC and took them under fire. Two fell while the others ran into a treeline. The MSF unit then began to receive S/A fire from an estimated 10 to 15 VC from various sides.
Seawolves were scrambled and placed strikes into the VC positions. Four of the enemy were caught by the Seawolves' strobe light possibly attempting to set up a mortar. The VC fled into the treeline, and after a further strike, contact ceased. Six VC are estimated to have been killed in this encounter.

While providing cover for a Dustoff helo on a MSF Medevac on the afternoon of 22 April, Seawolves spotted a sampan with the occupants fleeing in the vicinity of WQ 134 773. The enemy was taken under fire by the Seawolves, and one was killed (BC). Receiving S/A fire from a nearby position, the Seawolves put in another strike which resulted in the death of another VC (BC). Black Ponies called in to cover the Seawolves assisted in making further strikes which killed a third VC (BC). Fifteen sampans were also destroyed during the mission.

SEAL Operations

On the morning of 1 April, Echo platoon of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF, under the command of LTJG Ward, was inserted by Army Slick into an area approximately 20 kilometers northeast of Sea Float (VIC WQ 065 857). The target for this mission was a VC village office, communication section, and grenade factory. Heavy A/W fire was received during the insertion, and minutes later, the SEALs received word that the Slick had gone down in the vicinity of WQ 060 877. Seawolf strikes were called in, and the SEALs proceeded to the downed helo and set up a security perimeter. Shortly after the perimeter was set, a swing-ship Slick from Ca Mau arrived and extracted the crew of the downed Slick. The covering Seawolves began to receive A/W fire at this time.
and, after putting in strikes of their own, called in Black Ponies. While SEALS, Seawolves, and Black Ponies continued to provide security, the downed chopper was rigged for extraction, and at 1200H, three hours after it went down, the Slick was lifted out by a Chinook. The SEALS were then extracted by Slick and Seawolves while the Black Ponies of VAL-4, Detachment Six, remained on the scene and put in further strikes on VC positions. The outstanding coordination between the SEAL unit and air assets resulted in the successful extraction of both the Slick and the SEALS without incurring any personnel casualties while the enemy lost one VC killed (BC) and two wounded by the SEAL’s fire, and four others killed (BC) by the Seawolves and Black Ponies.

The SEALS of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF, along with a KCS platoon, were inserted by Slick into an area 14 kilometers northwest of Sea Float (VQ 878 712) on the morning of 6 April to seek out a VC cache containing 40 tons of rice. The cache was quickly found and 35 tons of rice were destroyed while 1500 pounds were airlifted by Slick for use by Sea Float and Sea Float Annex personnel. Also captured were two kilos of documents and a VC flag.

On 16 April, Foxtrot Platoon of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF, under LT Vinant, was inserted by Army Slick into an area 15 kilometers northeast of new Nam Can (VQ 195 883). Three VC were captured by the point element shortly after insertion while the security element discovered a bunker with three persons inside. After four unsuccessful attempts to call them out, a concussion grenade was thrown at the base.
of the entrance but deflected into the bunker and wounded the three persons who were later found to be civilians. Following the medevac of the civilians, the security element captured two more VC in a bunker. In less than one hour, the SEALs had captured five of the enemy. Seawolves flying cover for the mission killed one VC (BC) after receiving A/V fire from a hooch one kilometer southwest of the objective area.

Echo Platoon also encountered action on the evening of 16 April. The SEALs were inserted by Army Slick about 16 kilometers southeast of old Jam Can (WQ 134 615) on a mission to interdict traffic on a suspected VC supply route. About four and a half hours later two groups of sampans were observed moving toward the SEAL's position. Two of the sampans were approaching from the south with approximately eight persons embarked while the other three sampans, with approximately six occupants, were approaching from the north. The SEALs hailed the occupants of the sampans who then attempted to evade and were taken under fire. Six of the evading VC were killed (4 BC, 2 prob) and one, a wounded female with a small child, was captured. All five of the sampans were destroyed as were ten kilos of tobacco and 40 kilos of rice. Three sampan motors, two VC grenades, a U.S. smoke grenade, a VC flag, and five kilos of documents were also captured. The SEALs were then extracted by an MSSC from MST Detachment GOLF under LT JG Henderickson. As the MSSC was returning to Sea Float, it was hit by B-40 rocket and AK-47 fire which ruptured a fuel tank and did a great deal of damage to the hydraulic system, electrical wiring, and cooling system, causing a loss of steering. The fire was suppressed and Seawolf strikes called into

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Meanwhile PCFs 18 and 89, with Patrol Officer LTJG Swift, rendezvoused with the crippled HSSC and towed her back to Sea Float. One U.S. sailor was slightly wounded during the attack.

LTJG Yard and Echo Platoon were inserted by Slick into an area 16 kilometers north of Sea Float (VQ Oluj 447) on a mission to destroy a VC rice cache on 26 April. Supporting Seawolves led by LTJG McCamy spotted a VC attempting to flee the area and pinned him in a bunker until the SEALs arrived and captured him. The platoon then continued its patrol and captured another VC hiding in a fighting hole and found the rice cache. The two prisoners were extracted and an L/P set at the cache site. 30 minutes later seven armed VC were observed approaching the cache site from the east and southeast. However, a female in a nearby hooch detected the SEALs and shouted a warning to the VC who evaded and were taken under fire. Seawolves were called and took one VC under fire while receiving heavy S/A and A/W fire. The rice cache was destroyed, and the SEALs were extracted by Slick and returned to Sea Float. There were four VC killed (2 BC, 2 PROB), one wounded, and seven tons of rice destroyed. The two prisoners were identified as a village VC Farmers Association Chief and a VC Farmers Association member.
OPERATION SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III
SOLID ANCHOR

OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

LEGEND:
□ - Coastal Surveillance Center
X - Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
# - SAR/MEDEVAC Incident

A. SEALS 1 April
B. SEALS 6 April
C. SEALS 16 April
D. SEALS 16 April
E. Sea Float 21 April
F. Sea Float 21 April
G. Sea Float 22 April
H. SEALS 26 April

SCALE:
0 NAUTICAL MILES 30

CONFIDENTIAL
Stable Door

Stable Door forces detected a total of 35,633 watercraft in the harbors of the Second and Third Coastal Zones during the month of April. 5,654 of these craft were inspected, and another 4,116 were boarded. These checks resulted in the detention of 183 craft and 169 persons for various reasons. Included in these reasons were faulty or missing identification papers, possession of contraband, and restricted zone violations.

Unit ONE - Vung Tau

Crew members of the SS KEYSTONE STATE uncovered a large surprise late in the evening of 16 April when a 750 pound bomb, not on the ship's cargo manifest, was discovered under the general cargo in hold number three. The bomb, crated and unfused, was examined by Unit ONE EOD personnel and offloaded without incident.

On 25 April, the tug M/T KAMEHAMEHA notified the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) that they had five injured men aboard and requested assistance. Picket 27 was dispatched to the ship and transported the injured men to the MST piers where an ambulance met them and took them to the 345th Medical Dispensary for treatment.

Unit TWO - Cam Ranh Bay

The silence of the late evening hours of 31 March was shattered by the sounds of an explosion in the vicinity of the Army POL farm. Navy EOD personnel were alerted and proceeded to the ammo piers to
conduct an inspection of the piers, and the ships and barges in the harbor for possible satchel charges. At about 0112H on 1 April, four rocket rounds impacted some four hundred meters northwest of the NECP. Moments later Picket 51 observed five more rockets being fired from the vicinity of CP 020 089 along the free fire zone and was given permission to open fire. Artillery fire was also called into the area. At 0109H, six more rounds impacted near the ammo piers, and EOD personnel commenced another check of ships and barges in the harbor with negative results. One RPG 107 round was found by Skimmer 31 following these attacks.

In the afternoon of 19 April, LCPL 43 reported that an Army diving barge had found two mines in the water at BP 006 110. The mines were attached to a hand detonator at the end of forty feet of wire. EOD personnel arrived on the scene within minutes and received S/A fire from the beach. EOD personnel were ordered to depart the area while LCPL 43 commenced a firing run. However, the LCPL's .50 cal machine guns jammed, and receiving S/A fire from the beach, she was forced to depart the area. Twenty minutes later, two explosions were observed on the beach. LCPL 66 then arrived on the scene and commenced firing runs on the beach. No S/A fire was received, so the EOD team was sent back to recover the suspected mines. They found the hand detonator, the wires, and the blasting caps, but the charges had been removed. The EOD team also found a partially disassembled claymore mine and a half pound block of TNT buried in the sand. Army gunships were called into the area and put in strikes for
approximately 20 minutes. Some S/A fire was observed by LCPL 66 which directed the gunships to concentrate fire in that area. Enemy casualties were unknown.

Unit THREE - Qui Nhon

On 27 April, Skimmer 89, with SM3 James Jernigan and two VN crew members, was on a routine harbor patrol when a piece of styrofoam some 70 inches by 18 inches by 6 inches was observed floating in the water. SM3 Jernigan retrieved the styrofoam and placed it in the skimmer. The skimmer then proceeded to a mooring buoy, and SM3 Jernigan started to put the styrofoam on top of it. As he did so he noticed a grenade on the buoy and immediately had the boat start backing. However, the grenade exploded wounding all three crew members. A later investigation revealed that the grenade had been placed on the buoy with the pin pulled so that it would explode at the slightest movement, which it did when SM3 Jernigan put the styrofoam on the buoy. The two VN crewmen were treated and returned to duty while SM3 Jernigan, who lost the tips of two fingers of his right hand and suffered injuries to his right leg, arms, and face as well, was medevaced to VNTH, Yokosuka, Japan, on 29 April.

Unit FOUR - Nha Trang

A special services craft containing two U.S. Army personnel and one U.S. civilian developed engine trouble and beached at CP 047 150 in the afternoon of 1 April. Upon completing repairs, the U.S.
personnel sighted ARVN troops emerging from the undergrowth nearby. As the craft began to move away from the beach, the ARVN troops opened fire, wounding one Army man. Assistance was requested, and the HECF dispatched Skimmer 25 to the scene. The special services craft was directed to the harbor defense boat for landing, and the wounded man was taken to the 8th Field Hospital by a Unit FOUR truck.
Seventh Fleet Units

The following Seventh Fleet units operated in Market Time during the month of April, 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USCGC KLAMATH (WHEC 66)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC PONTCHARTRAIN (WHEC 70)</td>
<td>17-25, 27-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC MELLON (WHEC 717)</td>
<td>7-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718)</td>
<td>15-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716)</td>
<td>1-2, 9-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715)</td>
<td>3-8, 17-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS PRIME (MSO 466)</td>
<td>1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS LUCID (MSO 458)</td>
<td>14-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS PEACOCK (MSC 198)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS WIDGEON (MSC 203)</td>
<td>1-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS WOODPECKER (MSC 209)</td>
<td>7-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS ADVANCE (MSO 510)</td>
<td>12-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS ORLECK (DD 886)</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST 1157)</td>
<td>1-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS O’CALLAHAN (DE 1051)</td>
<td>5-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS PIVOT (MSO 463)</td>
<td>12-30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Navy river patrol boat (PBR) speeds through a river in the Mekong Delta while patrolling to interdict movement of Viet Cong personnel and materials. The heavily armed craft are the backbone of the River Patrol Force in the Republic of Vietnam.
RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY

Reduction of the River Patrol Force continued in the month of April. The Bassac River Patrol Group was reduced to one river division, River Division 535. The two operational forces remaining included TF 116.8, Clearwater, at Tan My, and TF 116.9 in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Task Units 116.9.2, COMDIV 112; 116.9.5, SEAL Detachment ALPHA; 116.9.6, SEAL Detachment BRAVO; and 116.9.8, HAL 3, Detachment Two, operated from Nha Be Naval Base. Mobile Support Team Two, Detachments ALPHA and BRAVO, and the EOD Team remained at Nha Be.
There was a slight decrease in enemy activity during April. However, enemy efforts remained high around the Cua Viet River. Intelligence reported a Viet Cong/NVA meeting was held on the 17th concerning increased mining operations on the Cua Viet. Representatives from a Combined Assault Company, the Gio Linh Armed Company (an artillery unit), and local guerrilla units planned attacks on Allied units near Gio Hai. The attacks were to increase in intensity after the 20th. This plan conformed to a Corps-wide high point effort during the same time frame. The enemy's concern with the resettlement of the north bank of the Cua Viet and the turnover of assets to the VVN indicates a strong local government and an effective Vietnamese armed force so close to North Vietnam is a long term military/political impediment. Reestablishment of South Vietnamese influence near the DMZ constitutes a distasteful loss of face for the enemy. Consequently, enemy efforts increased toward the end of the month during the phase of decreased lunar illumination.

Sapper team activity was reported as early as 5 April. Sapper teams of up to six people were operating north of the Cua Viet River. One team, four men and two women, carried individual weapons and sapper equipment. The mission of the unit was to observe activities of U.S. and V.C. forces, plant mines in the Cua Viet River, and to harass U.S. Army units on the north bank with artillery fire. Their activity concentrated around the villages of Xuan Khanh and Kuan Ngang. There was a continued high level of mining in the river but no artillery
attacks materialized. There has been no artillery attack on the Cua Viet River since the 7 December 1969 rocket attack on the NSAD Cua Viet. However, such an artillery attack by the enemy is within his capability and could be launched if so desired.

Resettlement of Vietnamese civilians along the north bank of the Cua Viet River caused violations of restricted areas. Approximately 3 persons and over 500 persons were reported in the restricted areas during the month. The heavier settlements concentrated in Quang Tri province about four kilometers southwest of the Clearwater ATSB. While pacification and resettlement of these areas is one of the goals of military operations, the early surge of eager settlers in these areas hampered military operations, masked Viet Cong infiltration, and otherwise made the task of securing the LOC more difficult.

Patrol units conducted weekly medcaps in the province throughout the month. Weekly revisits were made to the Hay Tay, An Gia, Gai Do, Tron Ioa Duan, and An Soi Phong villages. The treatment most frequently required was for colds and skin infections, particularly about the eyes. In some cases, whole families were infected. The medcap teams distributed soap and psyops literature. The medcap missions were well received.

The FTA units, LCPL units, and the MCM units, conducted patrols, daily swept the river with chain drags, and set waterborne guardposts. Mine detonations occurred almost daily. The mines were detonated by scare charges, dredged up by chain drags, and caught up in fish nets by local fishermen.
An example of one day's routine operations for the combined forces in the VC occurred on 4 April. Patrol units operating as a blocking force with the Thu Vang 5/5 and 2/501 BN 101st ABN Division detained 3 draft dodgers, nine deserters, 14 AWOL, and one Viet Cong infiltrator, believed to be the VC Commissioner of the area. From the 260 persons checked, five M-1 rifles and six 12 gauge shotguns were collected.

At 1200H on the 4th of April, an ARVN LCM-8 carrying ten Vietnamese civilians detonated a mine on the Cua Viet River wounding eight of the civilians. The craft was beached. The mine was a pressure mine of the type generally used by 126th Naval Sapper Regiment. A complete mine of this type was recovered the previous day. This mine was equipped with an arming delay device, which, if properly set, hinders collective minesweeping. It is possible that the morning scare charge sweep of the Cua Viet did not detonate this mine because of the arming delay. In addition to the scare charge sweep, the river had been swept twice with two chain drag sweeps. The LCM-8 was traveling west at an undetermined speed on the south side of the river outside of the swept channel when the explosion occurred.

In the 5th of April, PBR Mobile Base One shifted the site of the base to Tan My Cove. During the move, the base remained fully operational.

At 2330H on the 2nd, LCPL 13 on waterborne guardpost observed three persons moving along the riverbank and took them under fire. At the same time, three kilometers to the northeast, the 2nd Platoon A/4/12 Cavalry Troop in night defensive position made contact with an estimated 15 to 20 NVA. 35 minutes later, RF/PF forces engaged a
squad sized enemy element in Xuan Khanh village. At 0107H an MSH in waterborne guardpost saw people moving along the river bank and took them under fire.

A ground sweep of the contact areas by the A/1-12 Cavalry Troop platoon yielded eight NVA XTA, one RPG-7, two packs each containing a pressure mine, nine back packs containing C-3 plastic explosives, five M-67s, 17 pineapple grenades, ten potato masher grenades, two litters, and assorted swimmer equipment. Another Viet Cong was killed and one AK-47 captured in the Xuan Khanh village.

The following morning a scare charge run in the river produced one secondary explosion, probably from an NVA pressure mine planned the previous evening by the NVA group before they were intercepted.

This brought to nine the total of watermines detonated in the Cua Viet River from the 4th through the 9th of April. The increased enemy mining activity was believed to be related to the resettlement of the north bank of the Cua Viet.

Out of the estimated 200 to 300 people resettling in the old Cua Viet area, many were seen leaving their new homes and returning to Xuan Khanh village several hours before enemy contact was made on the evening of the 8th. This movement had not been noticed on other evenings, indicating the local people knew the enemy had come into the area.

The 11th and last mining attempt of the month was discovered at 1740H on the 9th. LCPL 24 was on patrol about four kilometers south-
west of the Clearwater ATSB when they observed a waterspout about 35 feet astern of a sampan. Fishermen in the sampan were recovering their net when the explosion occurred producing a waterspout of about 50 feet. An NVA pressure mine was caught up in the net and detonated when the men began to haul in the net. There were no casualties to the sampan or its occupants.
SEAL Operations in the Mang Sat Special Zone

SEAL Detachment ALPHA, 5th Platoon, Squads ALPHA and BRAVO, CTU 116-95, operated throughout the RSSZ during the month of April. Although insertions, patrols, and guardposts were set almost nightly, contact with the enemy remained relatively light.

One contact with the enemy occurred on the night of the 3rd; all SEALS including LT Jaroski and LTJG Norris departed Nha Be at 1800H and proceeded by LSSC to Cat Lai for a briefing on the patrol's patrol. EM Scott and one VNAH IDN accompanied the SEAL team. At Cat Lai, the patrol transferred to VNAH IDNs and proceeded to the insertion point. The SEALS proceeded up the Dong Nai River to YS Ol42 955 where Squad ALPHA went ashore at 1945H to set a trail guardpost. Squad BRAVO continued up the Song Nai River turning left into the Giang Canal to set a guardpost at YS Ol48 955, about 15 kilometers northeast of Nha Be. The squads remained at their guardposts through the long dark night, and at 0300H, ALPHA Squad heard an unknown number of Viet Cong on both sides of the canal south of their position. The sound called in a night hawk aircraft which reconnoitered the area with night light and mini-gun fire. At 0425H, the squad observed three Viet Cong swimming across the canal toward Squad ALPHA. The SEALS broke guardpost and took the swimmers under fire killing three Viet Cong. The patrol then directed an LEP strike on the left bank of the Dong Nai River. The strike resulted in a secondary explosion. One SEAL was wounded in the initial fire fight. There were no other friendly casualties.
Eight SEALs from SEAL Detachment ALPHA, with LT Sarick in charge, proceeded to An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island for a special mission. Intelligence reports indicated infiltration efforts on the part of the NVA had increased. At 2100H on the 26th, the SEAL team departed An Thoi in a VNN HQ, accompanied by two PCTs and a Ski Barge. The group arrived at the selected point of insertion at 0530H the following day. On arrival at 13 960 520, the Ski Barge commenced ferrying RF troops ashore to the landing area, US 939 512. At 0730H, the operation was aborted and the RF troops extracted. A support craft casualty resulting in possible compromise of the mission during daylight hours led to the abort decision, and the group returned to An Thoi at 1400H on the 26th.
At 0945h on the morning of the 3rd, the SS LOHA VICTORY reported observing three rounds of rocket fire from the west bank of the Long Tau shipping channel. The LOHA VICTORY was in transit north in the channel when the attack occurred. The rounds came from the junction of the Don Canal and the Long Tau channel. Regional Forces Company 601 conducting a daily sweep on the left bank heard the B-40 rocket explosions. Two more RF companies were inserted for a sweep of the firing area. No enemy were sighted. There was no damage to the LOHA VICTORY from the rocket attack.

The second attack of the month occurred on the 11th as the SS ARCA was transiting the shipping channel north at 1030H. Three B-40 rocket rounds exploded off the port side of the ARCA causing no damage. The rounds were fired from the west bank from the junction of the Dan Xay River and the shipping channel. One round exploded in the air short of the ship and small parts of the rocket booster landed on the ship's deck.
CONFIDENTIAL (when filled in)

USN STATISTICAL SUMMARY

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<td>(4) Rice (tons)</td>
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Remarks:

- Information not available or not applicable
NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY

Fleet Command and Coastal Surveillance Forces

During the month, the forces of the Coastal Surveillance Forces were augmented by the turnover of seven PCFs at Nha Trang on 1 April and two WPBs at Cat Lo on 29 April. Ships of the Fleet Command involved in Market Time operations and the Coastal Surveillance Forces searched 10,259 junks and 35,252 people. These figures were comparable to those for March. The number of gunfire support missions fired by ships of the Fleet Command was 86, 20% above that for March. However, the results of almost all missions fired were unknown. In the SEA FLOAT AO, the demand for naval gunfire support was especially heavy. As a result, almost nightly H and I missions were fired by LSSL 231 and LSIL 331. The operational patrols of the Fleet Command units were almost uniformly without incident. In ICTZ, PCFs of the Coastal Surveillance Forces engaged in numerous sweep operations which resulted in light and scattered contact with the enemy.
Coastal Junk Force

During the month of April the strength of the Coastal Junk Groups remained at 225 junks, of which an average of 159 were employed daily. The weather was generally quite favorable for junk operations, and the surveillance figures for the month were only slightly less than those for March. During the course of the month, 62,553 junks and 223,120 people were searched, and 40 junks and 277 people were detained by the coastal junk forces.

First Coastal Zone

Enemy activity in the First Coastal Zone was at a moderately low level throughout the month of April. An attack on CG 14 at Hoi An was indicated by intelligence but never materialized. On the Cua Viet River, however, there was a strong resurgence of the enemy's mining campaign. A total of 15 mining incidents occurred during the month, three times the number in March.

On the morning of 4 April, an LCM-8 of the 101 ARVN Transportation Battalion detonated a probable pressure mine at YD 272 645, about half way between Cua Viet and Dong Ha on the Cua Viet River. The boat was heavily damaged and beached. A CG 11 patrol unit in the vicinity rendered immediate assistance and medevaced the nine ARVN personnel who had been wounded.

During the month, there were two attempts by swimmer-sappers to sabotage the CG 14 base at Hoi An. In the first incident, during the night of 2/3 April, the sapper was seen and chased away before he...
could plant a charge. In the second incident, on the evening of 8 April, a heavy charge was detonated in the vicinity of the base pier. Although little damage was done, the force of the explosion was sufficient for the coastal group's generator, located at the far end of the base, to be tripped off the line.

CG 14 conducted several sweep operations during the month, but there was little contact with the enemy. An operation on Cam Thanh Island was conducted on 16 and 17 April in conjunction with USN PBRs and UDTs. Thirty bunkers and four structures were destroyed, and three VC were killed.

Second Coastal Zone

With the exception of a high point at the beginning of the month, enemy activity in the Second Coastal Zone was light and scattered during April. The Coastal Groups conducted routine patrols, base defense operations, and several sweeps.

On 2 April and again on 14 April, CG 23, in conjunction with national and military police, conducted sweep operations of Lao Chua Island (CQ 175 570), which had little contact with the enemy but netted a number of suspected deserters.

On the evening of 8 April, a junk of CG 21 on a routine patrol was fired on by an unknown unit. The junk withdrew rapidly and further investigation proved the unknown unit to be a company of the U.S. 173rd Airborne. The Army unit had not known that Navy units were patrolling the area and had thought the junk's behavior suspicious.
2nd Coastal Zone Junk Employment as of 27 April 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG/Homeport</th>
<th>No. of Junks</th>
<th>Type Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG21/DEGI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Patrol/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG33/ Song Cau</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Patrol/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG25/Dong Hai</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patrol/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG26/CRB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patrol/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG27/Phan Rang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patrol/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG28/Phan Thiet</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Special Ops/Base Defense</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Third Coastal Zone

Enemy activity in the Third Coastal Zone during the month of April was light. Numerous sweep operations were conducted by the coastal groups with RF and PF forces, but there were only scattered contacts with the enemy.

On 5 April an ingenious and highly praised operation was carried out by CG 35. Six members of the coastal group, wearing civilian clothes and carrying weapons, boarded a water taxi. On the Song Co Chien (XS 470 Ch7), a VC tax team fired shots in the air to call the water taxi. As the taxi closed the beach, two men in a sampan approached to extract money from the passengers. Much to their surprise (we must suppose) they were met by a hail of gunfire from the CG 35 personnel in the taxi. The two men in the sampan were killed and one other was wounded.
VADM Zumwalt, COMNAVFORV, sent the following message commending CG 35's action:

The CG 35 Trojan Horse Ops ... will create a fear of uncertainty that can be significant in reducing enemy extortionist activities. Well done for your ingenuity and success.

Third Coastal Zone Junk Employment as of 24 April 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG/Homeport</th>
<th>No. of Junks</th>
<th>Type/Location Ops</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG 33/Vung Tau</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Base defense; River patrol (Rach Cua Lap); Coastal patrol (Rach Ong Ben); 1-TAD SeaFloat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 34/Tien Ton</td>
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<td>Base defense; River and Coastal patrol (Song Ham Luong)</td>
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<td>CG 35/Hung Ly</td>
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<td>Base defense; River and Coastal patrol (Song Co Chien); 3-TAD SeaFloat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 36/Dai An</td>
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<td>Base defense; River and Coastal patrol (Song Hau Giang); 3-TAD SeaFloat</td>
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</table>

Fourth Coastal Zone

After the initial high point at the beginning of the month, enemy activity in the Fourth Coastal Zone remained at a fairly low level. Both the number of junks searched and the number of people searched showed a 24% decline from the figures for March.

At the end of the month the forces of CTG 115.4 VNN/213.4 were augmented by two PBRs which were transferred from CTG 194.2 in order to conduct close-in night surveillance in patrol areas 9D1 and 9E1.
There were no significant combat actions in the Fourth Coastal Zone during April.

**Fourth Coastal Zone Junk Employment as of 25 April 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG/Homeport</th>
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<tr>
<td>CG 41/Poulo Obi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 42/An Thoi</td>
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<td>River patrols (Ha Tien) Patrols (Poulo Panjang) 9L</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 43/Hon Tre</td>
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<td>River patrols (Ha Tien) Logistics (Rach Soi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 44/Hon Tre</td>
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<td>River patrols (Ha Tien) Logistics (Kien Giang) Security (An Thoi)</td>
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River Patrol Groups

The strength of VNN T1 211 was increased from 88 to 140 PBKs
in the turnover at the beginning of the month of 12 boats to augment
46 and 47 boats to form RPGs 56 and 57. With these added assets,
a ever increasing number of operations were carried out to deny the
enemy the use of the 3rd and 4th Riverine Areas to the enemy. An average
of 117 boats were engaged in river patrols and 79.7 were engaged in
publie assaults daily.

Contact with the enemy was light and scattered during the
month. No significant combat actions were reported by the RPG advisors.

The RPGs were deployed to the following homeports during April:

- 51 Cha Be (RSC)
- 57 Thu Duong (THD 5)
- 52 Ben Doc and Ben Xeo (Giant Slingshot)
- 15 Phu Cho (THH 8) and Tan An (Giant Slingshot)
- 55 Thua Dac (THD 1)
- 59 Vinh Long (121.4)
- 57 Cha Be (RSC)
River Assault and Interdiction Divisions

Rally all significant action for RAID units this month was
with efforts to salvage HQ 1536, the ATC sunk by a mine
in the Ben Tre River. On 1 April, units of RAID's 72 and
operating VNMC Brigade BRAVO in Kien Hoa Province: RAID 72
near the salvage site (X5 615 245) while RAID 74 kept five
abotence, and the remainder patrolled the Song Ham Luong
river to XX 59 11. Salvage personnel had arrived on the scene
and pulled the sunken boat to shore, and immediately began
the salvage attempt. At this time, security for the
site was provided by two companies of the VNMC Fourth Battalion
which patrolled during the day and assumed a guardpost
right near the capsized craft. However, this seemingly
security did not prevent a sapper from successfully planting
a mine, a RAID 72 monitor, on the morning of 2 April,
located at 0315, it took her approximately five minutes
with all crew aboard. Daylight found the monitor capsized
immediately. The only two reported casualties were minor:

three received superficial shrapnel wounds in the right
arm, Larry D. Sweeney's right eardrum was perforated when
the mine capsized toppled over on him.

Later points for the rest of the month all revolved around
the two damaged and unwieldy RAC to a safe position in the
area of constant harassment from both banks of the Ben Tre. RAID 73,
which had been supporting the 32nd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division, along
the Song Trem Trem south of the U Minh Forest for the first week of
April, relieved RAID 74 on 10 April and commenced a patrol of the
Song Ham Luong from XS 51 25 to XS 60 13, with two companies of the
5th Battalion embarked. On 10 April at 0420, RAID 72 units took two
B-40 rounds causing minor flooding and damage to one TANGO Boat and
one CCB; there were no friendly casualties. On 13 April, a 31 kilo
mine was discovered in the early morning between two RAID 72 units
tooled together; earlier that night, a swimmer had been taken under
fire and killed in the same vicinity. The mine had not detonated
because of a faulty connection. At 1100 on the same day, RAID 72 boats
incurred B-40 and A/W fire at XS 577 276 killing four VN Marines,
wounding 23 of them, and wounding six VNN. Aircraft fired rockets into
the area killing three VC.

These skirmishes continued in spite of the fact that 5th Bat-
talions troops were inserted on both sides of the river at the salvops
site. On 14 April at 1800, a 72 TANGO Boat on patrol received B-40
rounds downstream from the site at XS 582 270. The port engine was
knocked out of commission and the boat towed to a safer location;
seven VNN were wounded, four seriously, and one American, GK12 J. R.
Eckert, was dusted off after receiving serious frag wounds to the face,
left arm, and legs. His prognosis was later reported as good. A monitor
and ALPHA Boat also received B-40 rounds on the same occasion with no
major damage.
Meanwhile, the salvage team was encountering extreme difficulty floating the sunken craft. On 15 April at about noon, the Army advisor to the 7th ARVN Division recommended to Commanding General, DMAC, that both boats be blown in place, in view of the fact that the craft could only be raised with heavy flotation equipment and that the security requirements for the operation were diverting VN Marines from a previously planned Army operation. The salvage team took some of the fire from this request by successfully floating HQ 1236 the next day; COMNAVFORV's recommendation to CG, DMAC, was thus to forestall blowing the monitor until another salvage attempt was made, and this recommendation carried the day. While headquarters was asking for more time, however, additional difficulties developed at the scene of the action. HQ 1236 had been floated, but that was literally, only half the battle. The tenacious enemy had stretched a cable across the Ben Tre at IS 585 285, and once the RAID 72 units towing HQ 1236 were successfully impeded, the air began to sizzle with B-40's and A/W fire. The damaged ATC was stuck in the mud, the TANGO Boat towing her was hit, and while an air strike was successfully subduing the ambushers, the friendly forces cut the towing cables and regrouped at the mouth of the Ben Tre for the night, preparing to continue the melee the following day. The attack produced three VNN KIA and two U. S. sailors wounded -- one minor, the other, SF1 J. D. O'Connell of HCT-5, seriously.

On 18 April, units of RAID 73, CSB 1, LCM 8192, and EOD personnel returned to the HQ 1236 position at 1040, raised her, and took
her in tow, once again receiving a rocket attack, this time with only minor damage thanks to air support, during her transit downriver.
The embattled units finally emerged from the Ben Tre, towed by two ASPBs from RAID 72, on 20 April, and prepared the boat for towing to Dong Tam.

It remained necessary to relive the entire event, however, as HQ 6527 had to be brought out of the same area. On April 23 at 0652, RAID 73 units, CSB1 and LCM 8192, arrived at the site, 7th ARVN units supplying security. The enemy was equally determined this time around, however, and on 23 April at 1815, six 60 mm mortar rounds landed in the immediate area of the salvops, bracketing CSB1 within 25 meters; again, on the night of 24 April as the salvage and RAID 73 units were leaving the salvage area, they received a B-40 attack which produced only one minor U.S. casualty. This time, headquarters was convinced, due in part to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient ground support for the operation. On 23 April at 2012, CNO VNN and COMNAVFORV agreed that the salvage ops could be temporarily discontinued upon ARVN recommendation, with the stipulation that the sunken monitor not be destroyed, and on 24 April, HCU-1 received instructions to discontinue the operations, which were scheduled to recommence on 15 June. RAID 73 units and the salvage party arrived in Dong Tam with HQ 1236 at 1130 on 27 April. Nine boats of RAID 73 were then sent to a new AO in Kien Hoa Province in support of the 10th Regiment, 7th ARVN Division. RAID 72 operated independently for the remainder of the month, also in support of 7th ARVN along the Song Ham Luong.
RAID 74 had a relatively easy time of it, although it too saw its share of action for the month. Upon being relieved by RAID 73 on the 10th, 74 transited to Dong Tam for refueling and rest, and then got underway on 12 April for Ca Mau. On 17 April, they picked up 250 2nd Battalion VNMC troops at Ca Mau and carried them to the Sea Float AO, arriving at Nam Can at 1800. She continued troop lifts and an occasional Medcap for the remainder of the month, operating according to the positions of the VNMC units. On 23 April at 1505, RAID 74 units took two 6-40 rounds near WQ 26 77 with minor damage and three VNMC seriously wounded. The end of the month found 74 back in Can Tho for fuel preparing to go to Chuong Thien Province for further VNMC support operations.

RAIDs 70 and 71 remained attached to Operation Giant Slingshot for the entire month. The latter reported on 13 April that he was having serious maintenance problems and that only six of his 21 boats were fully operational, the others either being in an overhaul status or operating on one engine and inadequate electrical systems. Seeing no relief in sight for these chronic upkeep difficulties, he requested three additional ENs and one EM: he was informed that additional advisors were currently unavailable. And of course, it should be mentioned that once again, in view of her superior performance, RAID 75 was ordered to extend her operations on Search Turn for one month as of 23 April.
Of administrative importance, CDR J. E. Quick, USN, relieved CAPT C. H. Blair, USN, as Senior Advisor, ATF 211 and CTG 19.7, at 1000, 1 April.

River Assault Groups

During the month of April, the 15 River Assault Groups of the Vietnamese Navy engaged in numerous river patrols, amphibious assaults each day.

Homported at Dong Tam during the month of April, RAGs 21/33 conducted almost daily amphibious and troop support operations with elements of the 7th ARVN division. At 1515 on 12 April, units of RAG 21/33 were proceeding north on the Ham Luong River carrying the 3/10 Battalion of the 10th Regiment, 7th ARVN Division. They were ambushed by an unknown size enemy force using automatic weapons and 75 mm recoiless rifles between XS 510 219 and XS 494 244. All units returned fire with 40 mm and 20 mm cannons, 81 mm mortars, and 50 and 30 caliber machine guns. Two helo gunships already on station providing cover for the RAG boats also took the enemy under fire. Two additional helo gunships requested by the embarked RAG advisor, GMG1 A. G. Jones, arrived from Ben Tre in 10 minutes.

One LCM-6 received two direct hits amidships from a 75 mm recoiless rifle which killed four ARVN, wounded 13 ARVN, and killed one VC prisoner. The boat sustained extensive hull damage, much of it below the waterline, which caused flooding, resulting in a sharp port list. While the other RAG units continued to return the enemy's
fire, the damaged LCM-6 beached on the southern end of Cu Lao Lan Island (XS 504 253). All killed and wounded were loaded on two FCMs and taken to the Ham Luong Ferry Landing from where they were medevaced.

By 1550, enemy fire had been suppressed. Enemy casualties in the action were put at 22 killed and two captured. The RAG commandant and Monitor tied up to the damaged LCM-6 and towed it to the Ham Luong Ferry Landing where it was beached. The VNN officer in charge decided that although the boat was heavily damaged, it could still be floated and towed. Two other LCM-6's were brought alongside the beached boat and made fast, whereupon they proceeded to Dong Tam.

RAG 25/29 operated out of Ca Mau during the month of April under the opcn. of the 21st ARVN Division. LT T. A. Fitzgibbons, the RAG advisor, had a rather unhappy experience with his unit on the night of 9/10 April. A night amphibious operation was conducted in the vicinity of WH 017 055 with the 367th and 967th RF companies. There was little contact with the enemy and the RAG advisor stated in a message to the 4th Riverine Area advisor that he thought the operation had been of doubtful value for the following reasons: the insertions had been made one and a half hours late due to unscheduled stops and firing enroute; the operation had been announced by 35 minutes of heavy fire prior to insertion; no patrol or blocking effort had been maintained during the operation; and finally, numerous sightseers aboard the command craft had created crowded and unsafe conditions. The commander of the 4th Riverine Area was very unhappy with the results of this operation. The commander of the 4th Riverine Area and the 4th
Riverine Area advisor visited the Ca Mau sector, and the CO of RAG 29 was relieved by the CO of RAG 25.

RAG 27 and special RAGs 81 (escort) and 91 (minesweeping), homeported at Cat Lai, were attached to CTF 214. They engaged in numerous operations to insure the security of the Long Tau shipping channel. Units of RAG 27 conducted nightly troop lifts and river security patrols. On 15 April, a unit of RAG 91 recovered 20 feet of single conductor electrical wire at the end of a minesweep patrol on the Long Tau.

RAG 32 continued its operations on the Perfume River in ICTZ.
Hlung Sat Special Zone

In 7 April, the Senior Advisor, Rung Sat Special Zone, reported the following billets/incumbents in advisory capacity for the RSSZ:

- Senior Advisor RSSZ, CDR C. J. Wages, Jr., USN
- Assistant Advisor RSSZ, CDR L. H. Thames, USN
- Logistics Advisor, ENS N. A. Baker, USN
- Tactical Operations Center Officers, LTJG W. R. Kerivan, USNR, and LTJG J. P. Albanese, USNR
- District Intelligence Operations Coordinators, LTJG J. A. Spears, USNR, and LTJG W. G. Applegate, USN.

Combined operations continued in the RSSZ throughout the month with Naval Advisors, USMC Advisors, EOD Teams, and SEAL Teams participating in the operations. The cumulative result of operations in the RSSZ for the month of April included 48 Viet Cong killed, two VC captured, and 17 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly casualties included three killed and eight wounded.

At 1500H on the first day of the month, 18 Provincial Troops inserted in the vicinity of XS 925 722, about eight kilometers southeast of Nha Be. The troops set a trail guardpost on the north bank of the Rach Giong Chon. At 1700H, six of the troopers extracted by Slick helicopter while the remaining troopers waited in their position, three kilometers east of the Nha Be River. Fifty minutes later, the quietly waiting troopers sighted four Viet Cong on the trail and took them under fire, killing three. The fourth VC, wounded, was extracted by helicopter. The troopers then swept east to the Kinh So Canal where they were met by two USN ASPBs. BM1 Baker returned the troops to Nha Be.
in the ASPBs at 1900H. On departure of the troops, CDR Price and LCDR Kizer in the RSSZ Seawolves placed air strikes in the area.

Action again occurred on the 9th in the same area when BM1 Nelson inserted a Provincial unit on the west bank of the Nha Be River in two ASPBs at 1545H. Four Viet Cong were killed, one sampan destroyed, and one AK-47 captured in the ensuing action. On extraction of the troops, LCDR Kizer, with the Assistant Senior Advisor of the RSSZ aboard, placed air strikes in the area. The PRUs returned to the area the next morning at 1030H, finding five Viet Cong killed by the air strikes the previous day.

USN and USMC advisors participated in a large combined operation (Chuong Duong) on the 16th involving all units in the RSSZ. Six RF companies operated in the area where the Van Sat River, extending from the interior of the RSSZ, flows into the Nha Be River about 15 kilometers south of Nha Be. The action began early in the morning at 0400H when USMC advisors Captain Cowan, CAPT Hickman, CAPT Burch, 1stLT Grosshans, 1stLT James, GY/SGT Bledsoe, and GY/SGT Leith inserted with the PR companies. BM1 Baker provided blocking action with two USN ASPBs. The companies operated in the area through the day until 2230H. As the troops changed positions, the RSSZ NGLO, 1stLT Phipps, USMC, provided airborne coordination aboard an OV-10 from Vung Tau. LT McGinley, USN, embarked in RPO 57, provided naval support. Two U. S. advisors were slightly wounded in action that afternoon as four members of RF Co. 875 in a Boston Whaler WEGP made contact with a VC unit of unknown size on the west bank of the Nha Be River (XG 944 614). LCDR Walniewicz provided overhead Seawolf cover as the wounded were extracted to Nha Be. The day's operations
resulted in two USN wounded, one VC killed, one sampan captured, three sampan motors and one .45 cal. automatic weapon captured. Nine bunkers, four structures, one grenade booby trap, and one sampan were destroyed.

The RSSZ USN LHFTs, with LCDR Wolniewicz and LTJG Yates, TU 116.9.8, again supported the PRUs on the 23rd. A PRU unit had engaged an unknown number of Viet Cong at XS 911 696 on the west bank of the Nha Be River about 11 kilometers southwest of Nha Be. Under overhead cover of the LHFTs, the PRUs killed nine VC and captured two. Five AK-47's, one K-45 CHICOM pistol, 20 kilograms of documents, 20 kilograms of uniforms, ten CHICOM mines, and two VC flags were captured. Fourteen bunkers were destroyed. Frequent contact in this area of the Nha Be River during the month indicated the VC had used this point as an operating base for some time.

The RSSZ advisors were engaged in the Chuong Duong operation on the 23rd. At 2125H, the previous evening, LCDR Wolniewicz with one LHFT placed strikes on suspected enemy positions in the vicinity of XS 066 766, 21 kilometers east of Nha Be. The position was two kilometers north of the Dong Tranh River and one kilometer south of the Xam Quot Thanh village. At 0700H the next morning, the USN LHFT conducted sniffer operations in the same area. At 0830H, the USN LHFT and A-10 placed strikes in the vicinity of maximum readings, destroying two bunkers. Shortly after, the LHFT conducted a PSYOPS leaflet drop in the same area prior to the insertion of RF Company 782 with LT Grossham, USNC, as advisor. The troops swept northwest, capturing three SKS rifles and a 75 mm recoiless rifle with tripod.