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CNO (CP-39B9) (3)  
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CNO (CP-34)  
CNO (CP-92)  
CNO (Ops Eval. Group)  
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COMMANDER
U. S. NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
June 1970

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FOREWORD

Enemy activity within the Republic of Vietnam was characterized during the month of June by being moderate to low level in all Military Regions.

Operations continued to be conducted within Cambodia during the month. By mid-month, U. S. Navy support of the operations in Cambodia was conducted from within the borders of the Republic of Vietnam with only relatively few advisory personnel physically located in Cambodia. All U. S. Navy personnel were withdrawn from Cambodia by the afternoon of 29 June.

The Honorable John H. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy, visited Vietnam from 21 - 25 June to personally review the progress of the war and the transfer of combat responsibility to the Vietnamese Navy. During the intensive four day schedule, the former Rhode Island governor toured American Naval installations at Nha Be, Dong Tam, Ben Luc, Sea Float, An Thoi, and Tay Ninh, in addition to Vietnamese operations at Ben Keo and Nha Trang. At several points, the Secretary took the podium at open meetings with naval personnel to respond to their questions, complaints, and comments. SECNAV was accompanied by Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and Rear Admiral Ray Peet, Director, Office of Program Appraisal.
A highlight of Secretary Chafee's visit was his participation in the ceremony transferring 273 riverine combat craft to the Vietnamese Navy at the VNN Shipyard on 23 June (see pg. 85).

The Secretary commented that "the Vietnamese Navy takes over today the major combat role in its own waters. And, with the turnover next December of the final 123 combat boats, the U. S. Navy will relinquish all surface combatant responsibilities in the country." With the June transfer, Secretary Chafee added, the Navy's Vietnamization Program was "on or ahead of schedule."
## CURRENT OPERATIONS
(As of 30 June 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VNN Designation</th>
<th>USN Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Tran Hung Dao I | (Did not have USN codeword designation)  
Originally part of Border Interdiction |
| Tran Hung Dao II | Giant Slingshot |
| Tran Hung Dao III | Sea Float |
| Tran Hung Dao IV | Solid Anchor |
| Tran Hung Dao V | Ready Deck |
| Tran Hung Dao VI | Search Turn |
| Tran Hung Dao VII | Sea Tiger |
| Tran Hung Dao VIII | (No operations) |
| Tran Hung Dao IX | Barrier Reef |
| Tran Hung Dao X | Breezy Cove |
| Tran Hung Dao XI | (No USN codeword designation)  
Cambodian operations |
VNN REORGANIZATION

(The following information is excerpted).

From COMNAVFORV msg 301100Z JUN 70:

A major step in ACTOVOPS will occur on 1 July 1970 when RADM H. S. MATTHEWS, Jr., USN, DEPCOMNAVFORV, will report for additional duty as Deputy for SEA LORDS Operations to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy. At this time he will become Operational Commander under CNO, VNN, of Task Fleet 21.

Task Fleet 21 will fulfill the operational mission of SEA LORDS, and COMTASKFLT 21 will be First SEA LORDS. To establish an effective organization for the fulfillment of the Naval Mission in RVN, certain basic changes in the existing organization have been deemed necessary by CNO, VNN, and concurred in by COMNAVFORV.

The following operational Task Organization will become effective on 1 July 1970:

A. Task Fleet Twenty-One (21) (First SEA LORDS)

(1) Task Force Two One Zero (210) - Vacant, reserved for Special Operations.

(2) Task Force Two One One (211) - Amphibious Operations at such times as the OPCON of the RAIDS is given to CNO, VNN, by JGS.

(3) Task Force Two One Two (212) - Interdiction Operations to include Tran Hung Dao, and eventually Barrier Reef, Search Turn, and Breezy Cove.
(4) Task Force Two One Three (213) - Reserved for those Market Time Operations under SEA LORDS, such as Blue Shark.

(5) Task Force Two One Four (214) - Giant Slingshot and eventually Sea Float/Solid Anchor.

(6) Task Force Two One Five (215) - Reserved for Fleet Command operations that are under SEA LORDS.

(7) Task Force Two One Six (216) - Reserved for Third Riverine Zone operations that are under SEA LORDS, such as Ready Deck.

(8) Task Force Two One Seven (217) - Reserved for Fourth Riverine Zone operations that are under SEA LORDS.

(9) Task Force Two One Eight (218) and Two One Nine (219) Vacant

B. Task Fleet Twenty-Two (22)

(1) Task Force Two Two One (221) - First Coastal Zone Operations and Sea Tiger.

(2) Task Force Two Two Two (222) - Second Coastal Zone Operations.

(3) Task Force Two Two Three (223) - Third Coastal Zone Operations.

(4) Task Force Two Two Four (224) - Fourth Coastal Zone Operations.

(5) Task Force Two Two Five (225) - Third Riverine Zone Operations.

(6) Task Force Two Two Six (226) - Fourth Riverine Zone Operations.

(7) Task Force Two Two Seven (227) - Capital Military District Operations.

(8) Task Force Two Two Eight (228) - RSSZ Operations.

(9) Task Force Two Two Nine (229) - Vacant.

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All operations with USN commanders will remain in the U. S. Chain of Command under COMNAVFORV, with USN Task Designators, until their operational turnover. As VNN officers take command of the various operations, the operations will be removed from the USN Task Force structure and assigned VNN Task Designators in accordance with the above. The following actions involving the USN Command structure will be accomplished on 1 July 1970:

A. Task Force 194 will be deactivated and placed in reserve for COMNAVFORV contingency use. Operational commanders under CTF 194 will CHOP to the commander specified in subpara delta, below.

B. CTF 115 will remain as presently constituted except that it is a combined command and CTG 115.7 will CHOP to CTF 116.

C. HAL-3 and VAL-4 will report to CTF 116 for Operational Control.

D. The current USN Commanded Operations will assume the following CTF 116 designators until turned over to VNN:

(1) Sea Float (Tran Hung Dao III) and Solid Anchor (Tran Hung Dao IV): CTG 116.1

(2) Breezy Cove (Tran Hung Dao X): CTG 116.2

(3) Search Turn (Tran Hung Dao VI): CTG 116.3

(4) Barrier Reef (Tran Hung Dao IX): CTG 116.4

(5) Blue Shark: CTG 116.5

(6) Duffel Bag: CTG 116.6

Other USN residual forces and assets will be organized as specified by CTF 116.
USN REORGANIZATION

On 1 July 1970, Task Force 116 will be reconstituted. The following information is provided as an alerting measure. (Reference COMNAVFORV 291356Z JUN 1970)

Reorganization will be as follows: (Based upon existing TG 194.0 units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Designator</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>CTF 116</td>
<td>COMRIVPATFOR/COMRIVPAT- FLOT Five</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
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<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
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<td>CTG 116.2</td>
<td>Breezy Cove Group Cdr</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTG 116.2.1</td>
<td>CO RPG 59</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
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<td>CTG 116.2.2</td>
<td>CO USS HARNETT COUNTY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.2.3</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team Det ALPHA 6th Platoon</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.2.3.1</td>
<td>MST 2 Det FOXTROT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.3</td>
<td>Search Turn Group Cdr</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.3.1</td>
<td>CO RPG 58</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.3.2</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF D Platoon</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.3.2.1</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF DELTA Platoon, ALPHA Squad</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.3.2.2</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF DELTA Platoon, BRAVO Squad</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CTE 116.3.2.3  OIC MST 2 Det ECHO
CTG 116.4  Barrier Interdiction Group Cdr  YRBM-21
CTG 116.4.1  Barrier Reef West Cdr  YRBM-21
CTE 116.4.1.1  CO RPG 56  YRBM-21
CTU 116.4.2  Barrier Reef Central Cdr  Phuoc Xuyen
CTE 116.4.2.1  COMSTABRON 20  YRBM-21
CTE 116.4.2.2  COMRIVDIV 532  Phuoc Xuyen
CTU 116.4.3  Barrier Reef East Cdr  Tuyen Nhon
CTE 116.4.3.1  CO RPG 59  Tuyen Nhon
CTU 116.4.4  OIC EODMUPAC Team 39  YRBM-21
CTU 116.5  Delta Major River Incursion Group Cdr (Blue Shark)  Cam Ranh Bay
CTU 116.5.0  Delta Major River Incursion Unit / Vung Tau Cdr (COMCOSRON One)
CTU 116.5.1  Upper Bassac-Mekong River Cambodia Border Patrol Unit Cdr  YRBM-16
CTE 116.5.1.1  Upper Mekong River Patrol Element Cdr  YRBM-16
CTE 116.5.1.2  Upper Bassac River Patrol Element Cdr  YRBM-16
CTE 116.5.1.3  Cambodian Border River Patrol Element Cdr  YRBM-16
CTE 116.5.1.5  Special Warfare Element Cdr  YRBM-16
CTE 116.5.1.6  Mobile Support Element Cdr  YRBM-16
CTU 116.5.2  Football Island Incursion and Sa Dec Maritime Surveillance Unit (COMCOSDIV 13) Cdr  Sa Dec

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTE 116.5.2.1</td>
<td>PCF Raider Element Cdr</td>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
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<td>CTE 116.5.2.3</td>
<td>OIC SEAL Team One, Det GOLF HOTEL Platoon</td>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.5.2.6</td>
<td>OIC MST 2 Det ALPHA</td>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.5.3</td>
<td>Cdr Lower Cua Dai, Ham Co Chien / Cat Lo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.6</td>
<td>Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.0</td>
<td>Deputy Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
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<td>CTU 116.6.2</td>
<td>Breezy Cove Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Song Ong Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.3</td>
<td>Barrier Reef Central Crusades Cdr / Kinh Quan Hai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 116.6.3.1</td>
<td>Moc Hoa Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Moc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.4</td>
<td>Barrier Reef West Crusades Cdr YRBM-21</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.6</td>
<td>Vinh Te Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>YRBM-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.7</td>
<td>Sea Float Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Sea Float</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.8</td>
<td>Barrier Reef East Crusades Cdr Tuyen Nhon</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.6.9</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot Crusades Cdr</td>
<td>Tra Cu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.7</td>
<td>CO HAL-3</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 116.7.0</td>
<td>Cdr Helo Support Unit</td>
<td>Einh Thuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.7.1</td>
<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 1</td>
<td>USS TERRELL CTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 116.7.2</td>
<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 2</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
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<td>CTU 116.7.3</td>
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<td>USS GARRETT CTY</td>
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<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 4</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
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<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 5</td>
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<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 6</td>
<td>USS HARNETT CTY</td>
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<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 7</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.7.8</td>
<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 8</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<td>CTU 116.7.9</td>
<td>OIC HAL-3 Det 9</td>
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<td>CTU 116.8</td>
<td>CO VAL-4</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU 116.8.1</td>
<td>OIC VAL-4 Det B</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NOTE: CTG 116.9 organization remains unchanged).
OPERATION TRAN HUNG DAO XI

United States Navy assets and advisors continued to take part in Operation Tran Hung Dao XI during the month of June. A heavy portion of the burden of the operation was borne by the Vietnamese Navy and at the end of the month, with the withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Cambodia, the operation became entirely Vietnamese.

At the beginning of the month the task organization of the operation was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TG 194.0</td>
<td>Tran Hung Dao XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.1</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Unit: RAIDs 71-75, LÉIL 329, 5 VNN PCFs, 10 USN ATCs of RAS 13/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.3</td>
<td>Air Support Unit One: HAL-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.4</td>
<td>Air Support Unit Two: VAL-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.6</td>
<td>River Security Unit: 11 PBRs of RIVDIV 593, 5 PCFs of TU 194.5.1, 3 STABs of STABRON 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.7</td>
<td>Flag Support Unit: USS BENEWAH, ASKARI SATYR, USS HUNTERDON COUNTY, YRBM-16, YRBM-21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU 194.0.8</td>
<td>LSM(H) 400, LSSLs 225 and 226, 10 VNN PCFs, 9 VNN PBRs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At 0200H on 1 June, US ATC 50, while on routine night patrol about nine kilometers south of the Neak Luong Ferry (coordinates WT 265 335), was taken under fire by small arms and B-40 rockets. ATC 50 and ATC 47 returned the fire and cleared the area. One USN was wounded as a result of the action.
On 4 June ASKARI departed the area of operations, towing the ferries which had been salvaged in May to Dong Tam. She chopped to NSA Saigon upon her arrival at Dong Tam.

At 0700H on 6 June, Seawolves of HAL-3 Det 9 on patrol received heavy automatic weapons fire from a point about 15 kilometers north of the border (coordinates WT 270 250). They returned the fire and called in Black Ponies for assistance. They made two hot turn arounds off the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) and continued to place strikes until the Black Ponies arrived. The Seawolves made one last strike after the Black Ponies had finished making their air strikes. Initial results were reported as three structures destroyed and two damaged. At 1830H on the same day Seawolves again took fire from the same area. Black Ponies were again called in, but they were unable to suppress the fire. The next day, June 7, the 520th Tactical Air Squadron placed heavy air strikes in the area.

At 1000H on 8 June, the HUNTERDON COUNTY moved from its position in Cambodia to a point just south of the border. One US ATC was left in Cambodia for communication purposes.

On 14 June a major reorganization took place due to the dwindling U.S. role in the operation. River Division 593 was chopped to CTC 194.8 (THD I) and the STABs were chopped to CTG 194.4 (Barrier
Reef). The USN PCFs returned to the operational control of CTF 115 but CTG 194.5 was tasked to provide five PCFs as a contingency for Cambodian operations until 25 June.

About 1220H on 16 June, four VNN sailors from the monitor HQ 6512 of RAG 26 went ashore against orders about ten kilometers south of Neak Luong (WT 268 308) to visit a coffee house. While drinking coffee, one of the other customers, apparently a VC, started a brawl. Two of the sailors managed to escape, one wounded in the head, but the other two were captured and presumed dead. There were no U. S. advisors present during this incident.

SEALs carried out operations during the month in the Tran Hung Dao XI area of operations. On the night of 16 June LDNN Group A, consisting of nine VNN SEALs and two U. S. advisors, acting on NILO intelligence, was inserted by STABs at a point about 10 kilometers north of the border. They set up an ambush at a small road (WT 243 251). At 2320H two men on bicycles sped past the alert and watchful SEALs too quickly to be taken under fire. The SEALs then extracted. The next night, 17 June, the SEALs returned with a ploy to outdo the wily bicycle riders. A wire was rigged across the road. At 2110H a man came along the road on a bicycle and ran into the wire. He was captured but released when it was found that he had no documents or weapons. The SEALs, their ambush site compromised, then extracted.
At 1330H on 20 June a VNN sailor against orders took a sampan into the beach about 20 kilometers north of the border (WT 298380). He was taken under fire which he returned until he was subdued by an unknown number of VC. Three other VNN sailors heard the fire and went to his assistance. They were taken under fire by about 30 VC and two were wounded, losing an M-16 rifle and an M-79 grenade launcher. The sailors returned to HQ 1201 of RAID 70. The RAID commander led a 16-man landing party which searched up to 800 meters inland. They came under B-40 and small arms fire before withdrawing. Then the RAID units launched a two hour assault, destroying a village and numerous bunkers.

At 1325H on 21 June, VNN ATC HQ 1233 received a sniper round which killed one VNN sailor. At 1520H units of RAIDs 74 and 75 and RAGs 23/31 proceeded to the area and took 20 VC in houses and bunkers under fire. Seawolves scrambled and placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes at the direction of USN advisors aboard RAID 74/75 boats. Nine houses and one sampan were destroyed and one VC was killed by air.

At the end of the month the withdrawal of all U.S. personnel and assets from Cambodian territory was carried out. At 1055H on 29 June, USN PCF 74, while on its way out of Cambodia, received B-40 rocket and sniper fire about 12 kilometers south of Neak Luong
The PCF did not return the fire but cleared the area. One USN sailor was slightly wounded. All USN/USMC personnel had withdrawn from Cambodia by 291427H June.

The evacuation of refugees from Phnom Penh by ships of the Vietnamese Fleet Command, which had been interrupted briefly around the beginning of the month, continued during the month. By 30 June the total number of refugees brought out of Cambodia was 37,720.
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During June Rear Admiral H. S. Matthews, Deputy COMNAVFORV and First SEA LORDS (CTG 174.0) continued to concern himself primarily with the Cambodian operation as naval action in Vietnam itself continued along the same sporadic course of the past several months. The only organizational change of note in TU 194.0 was the disestablishment of River Assault Squadron 13 and River Assault Divisions 131 and 132 on 19 June. The remaining assets and personnel from these units were assigned to River Assault Squadron 15.

First SEA LORDS expressed concern for the growing number of sniper attacks in June. In addition, he pointed to evidence that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were reorganizing and infiltrating with the civilians into villages along the Mekong and her tributaries in an effort to regain dominance in that area. RADM Matthews warned against a tendency for U. S. boat crews, relaxed after the initial lull in Cambodian operations, to anchor too close to shore without proper lookouts, to wander ashore in unauthorized groups, and to swim within sniper range. The battle against boredom is one of the greatest struggles in which a river sailor must engage. The long hours, emotional strain, and oppressive heat normally work with the communists in weakening the Americans' guard.
With the withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Cambodia on 30 June, COMNAVFORV reiterated the necessity of practicing navigational exactitude to prevent the diplomatic embarrassment of a patrol boat inadvertently straying across the border. He pointed out that in the past boredom and routine have contributed to carelessness and inefficiency of patrols along the border regions.
Breezy Cove

Throughout June Operation Breezy Cove continued to be the most active operation in the entire SEA LORDS area. There were 15 friendly-initiated firefights, 11 enemy-initiated actions, and 30 unilateral firings by allied forces. USN/VNN forces killed 63 of the enemy and captured eight, while suffering only six wounded themselves.

Seawolves accounted for the largest number of enemy killed in a single June action in the Breezy Cove AO. Before dawn on 11 June, Seawolves 62 and 63 scrambled to assist ARVN and U. S. troops in contact with a battalion-size enemy element 12 kilometers north of Thoi Binh (WR 09 44). They placed two air strikes in the area during a 90-minute period and received sporadic AK-47 fire. The allied ground elements counted the bodies of 15 dead Viet Cong.

Unit commanders in Vietnam's two southernmost AOs, Breezy Cove and Sea Float, experienced difficulty in making necessary repairs on their heavily committed river craft. The services provided by the USS KRISHNA (ARL-38), although of excellent quality, have been only barely adequate because of the large number of boats needing repair. It often took a week or more before the ARL could accept a boat for repair, and repair time averaged one to ten days. The small craft in these AOs are expected to receive even less maintenance as the number of River Assault Craft (RAC) will be increased from 21 to 45 in the coming weeks.
Breezy Cove units experienced the first sapper swimmer attack on USN river assets since the operation began in September 1969. Early on the morning of 11 June, boats of RIVDIV 554 had just shifted their WBGP toward the mouth of a canal six miles east of Song Ong Doc (VQ 890 975) when a crew member spotted a man swimming south along the canal, approximately 10 meters from one of the PBRs. The swimmer was going against the current and carrying a rectangular object. The swimmer dove under the water and reappeared 10 feet from the boat. The units attacked the man with concussion grenades, apparently killing him. They sank the small rectangular floating object rather than risk bringing it aboard. Intelligence analysts believed this assailant to be a member of the sapper element of the 95th North Vietnamese Regiment known to be operating in the area. Day rocket attacks on the PBRs had generally been ineffective, and an increase in night sapper activity against the vulnerable WBGP was expected.

The United States' most effective counter-guerrilla forces, the Navy SEALs, were quite successful during June operations at Breezy Cove.

At 1445H on the afternoon of 9 June, a nine member SEAL platoon of Detachment ALPHA inserted by air at VQ 902 728 along the Song Dong Dung with a Viet Cong Hoi Chanh as guide. They fired at
two males running into a treeline and then discovered a VC rice cache pointed out by the Hoi Chanh. The 3600 kilos of rice were in huge bins and could not be salvaged, so the SEALs destroyed them. The SEALs entered the hooch of the VC village chief 50 meters away, captured a one kilo pile of documents, and then retreated to the proposed pickup area. While waiting for the helicopter, the SEALs saw a woman pointing them out to a man with a K-54 pistol. The man spotted the Vietnamese guide and fired at him, wounding him in the forearm. The patrol took the area under fire and called in air strikes. Another Vietnamese was wounded by VC automatic weapons fire when he ran into the open to recover the K-54 pistol. When enemy fire was suppressed, the SEALs and the two wounded Vietnamese were extracted by an Army Slick.

On 17 June, LT Boink led a squad of SEALs from Detachment ALPHA to VQ 902 900. They were operating along with Vietnamese counterparts and inserted in sampans. The SEALs established a guardpost along a trail and at 1020H encountered two men. The men began to run, and the SEALs killed one and captured the other. These men were later identified as the VC province chairman of finance and economy and his assistant. An estimated eight Viet Cong then attacked the SEALs who called in Seawolves to cover their escape. One Vietnamese agent was wounded as they boarded the sampan and
a Seawolf hovered to evacuate him in the midst of the firefight. The
Seawolves continued air strikes until the SEALs successfully extracted.

LT Boink's platoon successfully captured three other members
of the Ca Mau Viet Cong infra-structure on the morning of 22 June.
Acting on Hoi Chanh intelligence, the SEALs departed Ca Mau by
MSSC and landed 13 kilometers NE of Ca Mau (WR 289 223) on the
Quan Lo River 0245H. Two men crawled into a nearby hootch
pointed out by the Hoi Chanh and encountered two male and one
female VC. The female struggled briefly with one SEAL, and one of
the men tried to stab LT Boink with a bayonet. The SEALs quickly
withdrew with their prisoners and returned to Ca Mau. The captives
were identified as the village propaganda chairman, a bodyguard of
the Ca Mau City committee chairman, and a member of the VC
female proselytizing cadre.
Search Turn

Enemy activity in the Operation Search Turn AO (CTG 194.3) during June declined rapidly from the previous month's level. During May, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese had aggressively operated from their sanctuaries in the U Minh Forest, but during June, initiated only two firefights, and did not kill or wound any USN/VNN sailors. The enemy lost ten KIA.

On 17 June Commander M. A. Brisbois relieved LCDR S. T. Hock as CTG 194.3 in Rach Gia City. The following day Lieutenant Le Hue Nhi, VNN, the commanding officer of RPG 58, was appointed Deputy Commander of Operation Search Turn.

The Navy's ubiquitous SEALs accounted for the only significant action in the Search Turn AO during June. SEALs from Detachment GOLF, DELTA Platoon destroyed a small Viet Cong ammo cache three kilometers north of Soc Son on 18 June. Acting on intelligence received from a U. S. Army informant at Rach Gia, they departed Rach Soi along the Rach Gia - Ha Tien Canal. The SEALs inserted at VS 993 162 and quickly discovered the cache which was not booby trapped. The stockpile included a handful of AK-47s and B-40 rocket launchers, 60 grenades, 21 pounds of powder, 85 pounds of C-4 explosives, and several hundred pounds of sugar, salt, and rice.
all of which were destroyed with demolitions. The SEALs, covered by Seawolves, withdrew to Rach Soi.

Another SEAL effort to locate a Viet Cong supply station on 23 June was not as successful. LT Short led a six man platoon two kilometers north from Rach Soi to an area at WS 121 082, pointed out by a Vietnamese informer. The unit patrolled 150 meters crossing the Rach Vay Canal, and entered a suspected hootch. The SEALs detained the five occupants and fired at one man who escaped from an adjacent hootch. The Americans' security guard reported suspected enemy activity and signaling in the jungle surrounding the hooches, and the SEALs quickly retreated to the extraction point. They held one man who admitted to frequently supplying the local Viet Cong with rice and food. He was turned over to the Rach Gia Naval Liaison Intelligence Officer.
Barrier Reef

The Area of Operations of Barrier Reef was one of the most active for the Brown Water Navy during June. In eight firefights, allied forces accounted for 27 enemy KIA and one captured. No Americans or Vietnamese were killed in the month's operations, but 11 allies (8 USN, 3 VNN) were wounded.

The only major personnel change in CTG 194.4 came on 15 June when Lieutenant Commander Richard E. Barbour relieved LCDR Paul T. Souval as COMRIVRON 55.

The Vietnamese peasant who occasionally cooperates with allied forces is by far the best source of information on Viet Cong activities. Guerrillas who travel by night in small groups are often visible only to the indigenous population and must depend on them for supplies and geographical information. On 31 May a local farmer at Thanh Loi (WS 7977785) informed ARVN forces that five Viet Cong planned to cross the canal adjoining his land within two days. Units of STABRON 20 and an Army Hunter Killer Team set a WBGP at the designated point on the evening of 1 June. At 2200H STAB 7015 and 708 sighted two persons fording the canal and opened fire with M-60 machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers. After the assailants lost sight of their prey, four persons (3 USN, 1 VNN) from STAB 7015
The landing party discovered two men hiding in a ditch, one of whom tossed a grenade at the group, wounding the Vietnamese. The landing party and STAB 708 saturated the area with bullets while STAB 7015 evacuated the wounded man to ATSB Phuoc Xuyen. Seawolves from Detachment SEVEN, aided by an Army Cobra Team, placed air strikes along the bank of the canal. The allies reported that two VC were killed in the action.

A USN investigation of the area the following morning resulted in the capture of one of these "dead" Viet Cong. During interrogation by the national police at Phuoc Xuyen, the 31-year-old suspect admitted to being a communist from Hanoi who had lived in the village for six years. He had two other VC working for him and reported to a Viet Cong captain on the hull numbers and types of boats on the canal each night. The VC captain had been the other man who was wounded in the previous night's conflict. The Phuoc Xuyen police reported the rather incredible fact that the man's wife and child were unaware that he was a VC.

The Viet Cong apparently carefully monitor all U. S. traffic along the canals - at least in the Barrier Reef AO. The national police from Hoa discovered two VC located in hootches on the south bank of the Grand Canal near WS 801 785 whose job was to relay...
information by radio to their cohorts waiting for a safe moment to cross the canal. The Barrier Reef commander instituted a twofold scheme to thwart VC canal crossings. Strike assault boats began random day patrols, and troops covered by assault boats were occasionally inserted in between areas covered by nightly WBGPs.

Viet Cong intimidation continued at a high pace along the border areas despite these efforts. A mid-June intelligence report indicated that the guerrillas had ordered inhabitants in the Phuoc Xuyen vicinity to do away with their dogs as they often barked and compromised Viet Cong positions. An old man living at VS 903 771 on the Grand Canal reported that VC had ordered him not to stray more than 50 meters from his hootch as the entire area was booby trapped. The national police also reported that the VC has forced the local population to inform on the location of U. S. craft and in one case had murdered a VN male for giving GVN officers information about communist troop movements. In times of war, the civilian population has always suffered from the destruction surrounding them. In Vietnam this suffering often results from methodical terrorism against a people caught in the middle.

The treacherous currents of South Vietnam's small rivers and streams claimed the lives of several U. S. Naval personnel in June, one of whom was EN3 Warnick, an advisor with RPG 59 under
CTG 194.4. PBR 708 was at a WBGP 16 kilometers SE of Moc Hoa (XS 119 791) on 7 June when it sighted two Viet Cong on the east bank of the Kin Moi Hai. It broke its guardpost to make a firing run on the area. Petty Officer Warnick, who had been lying on the canopy of the PBR, fell into the canal and was never seen again. PBRs 742, 773, and 774 joined in the search, and Black Pony/helicopters provided illumination. The PBRs dragged the canal bottom without success and Regional Force personnel conducted an abortive search of the surrounding area.

Seven U. S. Navy personnel were wounded on the evening of 20 June when a satchel charge was tossed into ATC 50 while it was in a WBGP near WS 935 766. Air support was not immediately available so a nearby STAB made a firing run along the canal bank. All the wounds were fortunately of a slight nature and were quickly cared for by an embarked Navy corpsman.

PBR 145 of RIVDIV 532 in a WBGP 16 kilometers south of Moc Hoa on 25 June sighted a moving light on the north bank at WS 995 755. The PBR fired a short burst at the light and moved to a new guardpost. Thirty minutes later, the boat stopped a lighted sampan moving west along the canal with a young girl aboard who was in serious condition from a bullet wound in the hip, probably as a result of fire from the PBR. The boat crew took the girl to
Military Advisory Team 61 for treatment, from where she was medevaced to Tan An. The girl was subsequently identified as a Viet Cong whose job was to signal the position of U. S. river boats to VC units in the area.
Riverine Strike Group

Midway through June, the commander of Riverine Strike Group (CTG 194.7) sent the following message to COMNAVFORV:

"Riverine Strike Group will disestablish without ceremony 30 June 1970."

All remaining river assault craft were reassigned on that date to COMRIVRON 15 under the administrative and operational control of COMRIVPBFLOT Five.

For the past seven months CTG 194.7 had been a skeleton force. During November 1969, as U. S. Naval forces began a buildup of interdiction forces along the Cambodian border, most Riverine Strike Group units were out-chopped to other SEA LORDS components. Since that time CTG 194.7 had controlled only those boats which were returned for alterations and repairs.
Market Time Raider Campaign / Operation Blue Shark

During the month of June units of TG 194.5 conducted numerous incursions and sweep operations and encountered a generally moderate level of enemy activity. In Blue Shark operations during the month there were 13 friendly- and nine enemy-initiated firefights. The enemy suffered 24 killed (12 body count and 12 probable), 6 wounded, 27 captured, and one detained as a result of June Blue Shark operations. Two USN personnel were wounded during the same period.

WPBs, PCFs, Regional Forces, Kit Carson Scouts, CG 36, and SEALs of SEAL Team One, Detachment GOLF participated in Blue Shark operations during the month.

A typical operation was carried out on the evening of 19 June about seven kilometers northeast of Sa Dec. Twelve SEALs and one scout were inserted by Medium SEAL Support Craft to conduct a target operation on a VC firing position discovered on an earlier SEAL patrol. While approaching the firing positions two VC warning signs were seen and then three males were sighted fleeing into the treeline. A few minutes later the point element spotted two males walking along a dike line carrying AK-47s, a B-40 rocket and a launcher. They took the men under fire and the men dropped the rocket and launcher and ran. The rocket and launcher were captured.
As the team approached the firing position which had been the mission's objective, a SEAL stepped on a booby trap and suffered multiple fragment wounds in his legs and feet. The MSSC was called in for extraction as members of the team placed charges in and blew up the bunker in which the VC firing position had been. When the bunker had been destroyed the team extracted and returned to Sa Dec.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

Operation Market Time

Market Time and Stable Door forces continued their normal operations during the month of June. U. S. Navy Market Time units detected 8,435 watercraft, inspected 5,618 and boarded 1,123 during the month of operations. Ninety-three junks and 537 persons were detained for further interrogation as a result of the inspections conducted.

Stable Door units detected an additional 12,027 watercraft and boarded 1,118 of these. As a result, 61 junks were detained along with 61 persons.

The Vietnamese Navy units assigned to Market Time Operations accounted for an additional 87,344 watercraft being searched. The VNN units searched 268,174 persons and detained 346 persons for further interrogation. Forty-nine junks were detained by the VNN units.

Market Time and Blue Shark forces accounted for 47 enemy killed, 58 captured, and nine enemy wounded. These operations also accounted for 73 junks/sampans destroyed, four junks/sampans damaged, 298 structures/bunkers destroyed, and 96 structures/bunkers damaged.
On 10 June, the USCGC SHERMAN (WHEC-20) detected an SL-4 type infiltration trawler at position 08-15N 105-40E. The contact, when detected, was dead in the water, but then got underway and proceeded away from the Vietnamese coastline. The SHERMAN continued to follow the trawler until such time that the trawler entered CHICOM waters at position 18-56N 110-49E at 140002H June 1970.
Stable Door

Unit One - Vung Tau

The June activities of Unit One at Vung Tau were highlighted by two incidents involving Seventh Fleet LSTs. The attempted mining of the USS MEEKER COUNTY (LST 980) on 28 June is discussed in the Naval Support Activity Saigon section of the summary.

At 1650H on 19 June, USS HAMPSHIRE COUNTY (LST 819) collided with and sank a Vietnamese fishing craft in the vicinity of channel buoy two in Vung Tau Harbor. There were no casualties. Two people were picked up by another Vietnamese fishing boat and one man was rescued by the ship's boat.

Unit Two - Cam Ranh Bay

June was quite an active month for Unit Two at Cam Ranh Bay. In the early morning hours of 12 June, VC sappers carried out an attack on the base at Cam Ranh. Skimmers 10 and 30 were dispatched to vicinity of CP 050 280, about 13 kilometers north of the air field at Cam Ranh. When they arrived on station at 0200H they observed a swimmer in the water. They captured the swimmer by wrestling him aboard the boat. During the struggle he attempted to foil the attempt to capture him by knocking the throttle of the skimmer.
open all the way. The swimmer had been towing behind him an
AK-47 and two satchel charges. He was turned over to the police
for interrogation by the NILO and was subsequently found to be a
member of the K-92 NVA Sapper Company.

On the evening of 14 June, skimmers 26 and 10 foiled an
apparent attempted sapper attack near the 22nd Replacement Battalion
(CP 030 320). Arriving at the scene at 1825H several Vietnamese were
sighted on the beach and taken under fire. One of the men was seen
to fall and was presumed dead. Later in the evening a sweep of the
area was conducted and an abandoned sampan was sighted. It was
wisely assumed to be booby-trapped. When one of the IUWG personnel
tossed a grenade near it, a large secondary explosion completely
destroyed the sampan. A short time later the skimmers began
receiving fire and they immediately returned it. Then the Harbor
Entry Clearance Point ordered them to clear the area. As Skimmer
26 turned to leave the area a mine was detonated near her stern.
She received some shrapnel damage to her engine but was still able
to clear the area. Two sampans were seen leaving the area of the
mining but escaped.

On 18 June Skimmers 26 and 27 foiled another attempt to
infiltrate the Cam Ranh Peninsula while patrolling about 2000 yards
north of Dong Da Tin (CP 018 327). Three unidentified junks attempted
to evade when approached and beached on the mainland side. The occupants disembarked and fled north on foot. Despite warning shots the men continued to flee. Then the skimmers opened fire on the men, one of whom appeared to dive into the water. Skimmer personnel got out of their boat and waded over to the man who was found to be dead. The other man got away.

**Unit Three - Qui Nhon**

Two men were injured on the afternoon of 11 June at the Qui Nhon base while conducting a training mission. Explosives Ordnance Disposal personnel were explaining the construction of an M-60 rocket fuze when the device exploded, hurling fragments into the group. CW02 H. W. Russeno and Phu A Cam received surface lacerations on various parts of the body and were taken to the 67th Evacuation Hospital.

The Qui Nhon Stable Door Unit was turned over to Vietnamese Harbor Defense control on 15 June 1970.

**Unit Four - Nha Trang**

LCPL 43 and Skimmers 28 and 74, under the control of CTU 213.2, conducted a large operation on the night of 31 May/1 June in the Nha Trang Harbor and around outlying islands. In addition to boarding
and searching all craft in the area, the Vietnamese crews, accompanied by Vietnamese National Police and Military Police, handed out psyops literature to all civilians they encountered. The operation netted 26 detainees who were turned over to the National Police.

While on routine patrol early on the morning of 12 July, Skimmer 28's crew captured a swimmer 200 meters east of the merchant ship SS HOOSIER STATE. All available Unit Four patrol craft made a surface search and dropped concussion grenades around the ship. The Stable Door EOD team made hull checks on all harbor shipping with negative results. The 40-year-old suspect carried neither explosives nor identification. After interrogation, the Second Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer reported that the detainee was a smuggler and not a swimmer sapper.

A Navy EOD swimmer made a dramatic attempt to capture a communist swimmer sapper in the Nha Trang Harbor on the night of 25 June. EOD team members making a hull check of the TRUONG-SON, a Vietnamese coastal freighter, discovered a swimmer floating near the ship's starboard anchor chain. EOD personnel signaled to Skimmer 28 to provide illumination. When the man realized that he was detected, he swam under-water to the port side of the ship, but was spotted with a search light as soon as he surfaced. He quickly resubmerged and swam back to the other side of the ship.
An EOD swimmer swam to within 12 feet of the suspect and called, "Lai day" (come here). The man did not respond and the Navy swimmer closed to four feet in an attempt to capture him. The sapper then pulled a grenade from his belt and tried unsuccessfully to pull the pin. The EOD swimmer logically abandoned his intention to capture the sapper, and a crew member of Skimmer 28 shot the man with an M-16. The water filled with blood, and the body sank before it could be recovered. Navy personnel dropped concussion grenades into the water to insure a kill and possibly detonate any explosives the sapper had carried. The swimmer searched the area for additional swimmers, and the EOD team members checked the hull of the TRUONG-SON and all the other ships in the harbor, all with negative results. The alertness of the Stable Door EOD team was solely responsible for averting a possible disaster as the TRUONG-SON had poor waterline lighting and no sentries on deck.

The next day the Vietnamese National Police found the sapper’s body washed up on the beach near Chut Village (CP 062 504). The corpse was still clutching a U. S. handgrenade spoon in his right hand.
During the month of June, Sea Float celebrated its first anniversary. When the big Jay arrived on 27 June, it appeared, however, that the personnel of Sea Float had other things to do rather than celebrating the anniversary as the Sea Float Daily Operations Summary makes no mention of any change of routine.

It is understandable that a birthday celebration during the month might have been overlooked, or at least celebrated quietly, as the enemy was still very much in evidence in the Sea Float Area of Operations. On the day before the day recognized as Sea Float's first anniversary, the enemy had ambushed two formidable Sea Float assets, an LSSL and a PG, and carried out a total of five ambushes on that single day. Besides the presence of the enemy, the personnel of Sea Float had another cause for not being in a celebrating mood for seven Sea Float personnel had perished in a logistic helicopter crash on 24 June.

In making his presence felt in the Sea Float AO during June, the enemy carried out ten ambush operations against the Sea Float forces. On two occasions, sharp-eyed pilots detected the enemy making preparations for an ambush and the Sea Float forces foiled the attempted ambush.
SEAL operations in the Sea Float AO accounted for the majority of casualties inflicted on the enemy during the month. Four platoons of SEALs conducted 60 distinct operations to search out the enemy forces. Biet Hai troops (VNN Rangers) conducted another 26 operations of their own.

The enemy lost 25 killed and 24 captured. Friendly casualties were seven Sea Float personnel killed in the helicopter crash and seven USN, two US civilians, and 12 VNN wounded.

During the month, the names of the two hamlets in the Sea Float area were changed in accordance with the desires of the inhabitants. The people living in the hamlets desired to maintain the traditional name of Ham Rong. The hamlets are now called Ham Rong One and Ham Rong Two. The village made up of the two hamlets will now be known as Tran Hung Dao Village.

On 17 June, 15 units of RID 45 arrived at Sea Float. The increase in forces for Sea Float was appreciated, however, these new forces further added to logistics problems at Sea Float.

The 86 Seabees at Sea Float have worked continuously throughout the month of June to complete the facilities ashore (Solid Anchor). Since the facilities ashore are not yet completed, the arrival of RID 45 units, although appreciated, compounded the personnel berthing and