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JULY 1970

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VIETNAM
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List II (A&B)
List III (Less E)
List IV (Less D&E)
List V (A)
List VI (Al&2, Dl E&HI4)
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT OPERATIONS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sea Float / Tran Hung Dao III</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breezy Cove</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Turn</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Reef</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Shark</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Fleet 21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VN OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao I</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao II</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao V</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao XI</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao XII (Special Operation)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rung Sát Special Zone</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Market Time</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Door</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Command</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Patrol Groups</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAIDS</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Assault Groups</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I - Glossary of Abbreviations</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

Enemy activity within the Republic of Vietnam was characterized during the month of July by being moderate to low level in all Military Regions.

Enemy mining activities appeared to be on the upswing during the month and the enemy gained some success by mining activity in the Sea Float Area of Operations by heavily damaging the USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) and by sinking the Vietnamese Navy LSSL 225. A mine incident in the Cua Viet River area sunk a civilian water taxi with the resultant loss of life of over 50 Vietnamese civilians. The enemy may have lost more than he gained by sinking the water taxi, as the civilian populace was highly aroused against the enemy as a result of this mine incident.
### Current Operations
(As of 31 July 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VNN Designation</th>
<th>USN Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao I (TG 214.2)</td>
<td>(Did not have USN Codeword designation), originally part of Border Interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao II (TG 214.1)</td>
<td>Giant Slingshot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao III</td>
<td>Sea Float (TG 116.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao IV</td>
<td>Solid Anchor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao V (TG 216.1)</td>
<td>Ready Deck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao VI</td>
<td>Search Turn (TG 116.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao VII (TG 221.1)</td>
<td>Sea Tiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao VIII (TG 217.1)</td>
<td>No USN Codeword designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao IX (TG 212.3)</td>
<td>Barrier Reef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao X</td>
<td>Breezy Cove (TG 116.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao XI (TG 210.1)</td>
<td>(No USN Codeword designation) Cambodian operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao XII</td>
<td>(No USN Codeword designation) POW Repatriation during July 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tran Hung Dao XIII will not be used.

**Tran Hung Dao XIV (TG 217.2) (No USN Codeword designation)**

**Operation is to conduct Riverine and Interdiction operations in IV MR in support of the 7th ARVN Division for pacification of the AO. Individual units began assembling in late July for operations to commence in early August.**

**Operation will be an Interdiction and Destruction operation along the Mo Cay River to support rural development and pacification in IV MR in Kien Hoa Province. Scheduled to commence in mid-August.**
USN OPERATIONS

Operation Sea Float / Tran Hung Dao III

Enemy activity in the Sea Float area of operations remained relatively high for the month which were listed as 52 killed (43 B.C., 9 probable), 12 wounded, and 17 captured. These high figures cost the U.S. Navy men of Sea Float dearly, however, as one U.S. sailor was killed and six others wounded during the same period. Material casualties to allied forces were even more serious as the VNN LSSL 225 and ASPB 5162 were both sunk with a great loss of life to VNN personnel, and the USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) was severely damaged due to enemy action during the month. A number of other craft assigned to Sea Float received minor damage in the same period. Also, a U.S. Army Slick helicopter operating in support of SEAL operations in the Sea Float area of operations was shot down by enemy fire. The aircraft was later successfully recovered. In all, the enemy carried out two successful mining attacks and 12 rocket and launch bomb ambushes on Sea Float units in the month of July.

These attacks have been carried out despite the conducting of numerous SEAL missions, Biet Hai and C.D.G sweeps, and stringent security measures. It is pertinent to note that the joint U.S.-ARVN Cambodian incursion does not seem to have depleted the enemy's source of supply in the Sea Float area.
The presence of RID 45 units at Sea Float continued to cause serious logistic and repair problems in July. In the RID 45 material condition report of 21 July, CTG 116.1 (Commander Sea Float) pointed out that all five of the ASPBs and five of the seven ATCs assigned to RID 45 at Sea Float were in a C-4 material status (unable to conduct assigned operations). The remaining assets of RID 45 (two ATCs, one CCB, and one Monitor) were listed in a C-3 status.

In a country-wide command reorganization on 1 July, Operation Sea Float was transferred to the operational control of CTF 116. The new task designator for Sea Float operations is TG 116.1.

The 94 Seabees at Sea Float worked continuously throughout the month of July in their efforts to complete the ashore facilities of the Solid Anchor site. By month's end the project was 38% complete.

RADM H. S. Matthews, Deputy COMNAVFORV, visited the Sea Float complex on both 2 and 27 July. Other distinguished visitors to Sea Float during the month included Dr. R. G. Gibson, Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC with a party of five on 10 July and a seven-man team composed of representatives from JGS, VNN, and MACV on 31 July.
Three units of RID 45 transiting the Rach Bien Nhan on the morning of 4 July were ambushed by RPG 7, launch bomb, automatic weapons, and claymore fire from the east bank in the vicinity of VQ 940 556. All three boats were hit, but the rear boat of the column, ASPB 5162, which received one launch bomb on the port side forward and another amidships plus one claymore and automatic weapons fire, sank within a minute. Seawolves and other supporting units were scrambled and placed covering fire as wounded were medevaced and diving operations on the sunken ASPB were commenced. All units returned to Sea Float upon completion of the diving operations. Salvage operations were terminated the following day when it was determined that the ASPB was damaged beyond repair. Seven Vietnamese and one U.S. sailor were wounded in the action. Another four VNN personnel were listed as missing in action.

The USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) was struck by a water mine while anchored in the vicinity of the Sea Float complex (VQ 982 668) on the night of 6 July. The explosion ripped a 20 foot by 17 foot hole in the area of the port side engineroom and accommodation ladder. Fourteen feet of the opening was below the waterline. QM2 Lanny Howard Buroff on PCF 40 which was nested next to the KRISHNA was killed instantly by fragments from the explosion.
There were no personnel casualties on the KRISHNA. The flooding was brought under control within 40 minutes by listing to starboard. The KRISHNA made emergency repairs and departed the Sea Float area for Vung Tau the following afternoon. Following a further study of the damage, the KRISHNA entered the VNN Shipyard Dry Dock for repairs on 11 July. Repairs were continuing at month's end.

On 9 July, 15 KCS with SEAL advisor ETN2 Frisk were inserted into an area 19 kilometers southwest of Sea Float (VQ 853 495) in search of a VC base camp. The camp was found and 200 kilos of rice, 250 kilos of medical supplies, 800 kilos of foodstuffs/general supplies, and other miscellaneous supplies were captured. Thirty sampans and three generators were destroyed. Also captured were five VC. One other was killed and another wounded. Five other persons were detained for further interrogation.

The USS CANON (PG 90) was hit in the port engine room by an RPG 7 rocket while escorting the USS BRUJ E (AKL 28) in the vicinity of WQ 213 694 on the morning of 14 July. The PG, with its port engine inoperable, beached and returned suppression fire as did the US PCF 96 and the VNN PCF 3816, which were also on escort duty. PCF 3816 was hit by two rockets and other "Swifts" and Black Ponies joined the fray. Upon completion of air strikes,
suppression fires, and a ground sweep, the PG was pulled free and
the units returned to Sea Float. Six enemy were killed (5 B.C.,
1 probable) and another wounded in the encounter. Two U.S. sailors
and six VNN personnel were also wounded.

In the early morning hours of 30 July, the VNN LSSL 225,
moored to the far eastern buoy of Sea Float (WQ 001 677), was
rocked by a large explosion aft on her starboard side. The LSSL
commenced taking water rapidly, capsized, and sank by the stern
within minutes. Seventeen VNN personnel were listed as missing
as a result of this attack. A length of nylon cord found attached to
the LSSL's mooring buoy confirmed that the ship, one of the
largest in the South Vietnamese Navy, was sunk by an enemy mine.
The sunken ship, with approximately ten feet of her bow above
water, remained attached to the mooring buoy at the end of the
month as salvage experts surveyed the possibilities of raising her.
These possibilities appear limited due to the high security risk of the
area, the strong river current, and the need for specialized equipment.
Breezy Cove

CTG 116.2 forces at Song Ong Doc continued to experience a high level of hostile activity during July. One VNN sailor was killed and another wounded as Breezy Cove units participated in 17 fire-fights (11 initiated by friendly forces and six initiated by the enemy). There were no USN casualties in July.

A collision on the Song Ong Doc River accounted for the death of one Vietnamese sailor on 2 July. Monitor 1 and Zippo 3 were proceeding east as PBRs 44 and 101 were traveling west in a heavy rainstorm. The boat crews did not see each other until they were less than ten meters apart, and their efforts to avoid collision were futile. Zippo 3 struck PBR 44 on the port side, knocking one VNN crewman, Chinh Vo Van, into the river at VR 890 003. The boat crews cut their engines when they heard cries for help, but the sailor was never seen after he fell into the seven knot current wearing rain gear and a flak jacket. The four craft illuminated and searched the river banks but found no signs of the missing man, reportedly a non-swimmer.

The USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 821) left the Breezy Cove AO after spending three and one-half years in Vietnam when the USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) relieved her of her support.
functions on 8 July. The GARRETT COUNTY now proceeds to Guam, after a brief visit to Bangkok, for decommissioning. She will eventually be turned over to the Vietnamese Navy.

The ATSB at Song Ong Doc went to general quarters at 2134H on the evening of 9 July when it was learned that several Viet Cong had infiltrated the city of Song Ong Doc. A VNN landing party was organized to investigate. Within an hour the Vietnamese force returned to report that two VC had entered the village, distributed propaganda leaflets, and departed immediately. The base secured from GQ without firing a shot.

The Viet Cong introduced a new weapon to the allies in the Song Ong Doc area when they attacked a PBR with an RPG 7 rocket. VNN PBRs 38 and 39 of River Patrol Group 62 were attacked with five rockets and small arms fire while on patrol 14 miles east of Song Ong Doc (VR 920 012). One VN sailor was wounded seriously by a rocket which exploded close aboard the lead boat and a bullet which struck him in the cheek. The PBRs suppressed the enemy fire and rushed the wounded man to Song Ong Doc for evacuation. A portion of the rocket fragments which hit the PBR were recovered and evaluated as portions of an RPG 7, a highly accurate, short range communist rocket which had heretofore not been encountered in the Breezy Cove AO. In addition, a bullet fragment in the boat was
believed to have come from an American M-16 and not an AK-47.
A troop sweep into the area failed to recover a launcher, but intelligence indicated that a platoon size enemy force had spent two days in bunkers near the ambush site waiting for a river boat to pass.
The Song Ong Doc NILO, LTJG J. W. Tapscott, reported that the enemy combination of small arms fire and rocket attacks was highly effective against river craft, especially if the VC continued to use the RPG 7.

PBRs 62 and 78 of RPG 62 initiated a major firefight from their WBGP one and a half miles east of Vam Song Ong Doc (VR 835 994) on the evening of 21 July. When the PBRs commenced firing at a movement along the north bank, they received heavy small arms return fire. Monitor 1 and Zippo 3 came to the area to assist, and saturated the contact area with flames and 105 mm shells. The VNN PBRs then illuminated the area and searched along the banks with negative results. About 15 minutes later (at 2205H), there was a Duffle Bag sensor activation two kilometers northwest of the original contact area, and NGFS ship fired 25 rounds of 5 inch shells into the area, believed to be the hiding area of the ambush team. A Popular Force platoon made a ground sweep and reported ten Viet Cong killed (probable) on the basis of numerous blood trails.
Six SEALs of Detachment ALPHA, 6th Platoon made a rather unique discovery 16 kilometers southwest of Ca Mau (WR 017 080) on the afternoon of 24 July. LT Boink's squad entered a hootch suspected of being a Viet Cong supply point, but found nothing. About 150 meters eastward, however, they found a heavily camouflaged mound which hid a very large and operationally sound French tractor with a wheel diameter of 4.5 feet. The SEALs marked the vehicle with smoke so that aircraft could destroy it after extraction. Two men then successfully escaped a nearby hootch, despite SEAL efforts to stop them. The hootch itself was a VC workshop complete with tools and metal from a wrecked aircraft being used to make rocket motors and parts. The SEALs marked this site also and extracted by air. Intelligence sources indicated that this area was along the communist supply route from the U Minh Forest sanctuaries to the Song Ong Doc River, and the VC probably used the tractor for nocturnal transportation of heavy equipment. Sea-wolves 63 and 68 and an Army Forward Air Control plane quickly deprived the VC of their vehicle and hobby shop.
Search Turn

The river craft and SEALs of CTG 116.3 (formerly CTG 194.3) continued to experience a moderate level of hostile activity throughout July. One Operation Search Turn advisor suggested that the pressure exerted by the VNN and ARVN against the insurgents in Cambodia was continuing to weaken enemy aggressiveness in his AO. Of the 18 firefights in the Search Turn AO during the month, the enemy initiated only three. Two wounded SEALs and one wounded VNN sailor were the only casualties incurred by the allies during July.

At 2100H on 1 July, the crews of PBRs 52, 53, 54, and 55 stopped three people near their WBGP at WS 059 230 and detained them for lack of identification cards. The three captives tried unsuccessfully to bribe the patrol officer to release them for 10,000 piastres, indicating perhaps that they were not innocent fishermen out tending their nets. The detainees confessed that they were trying to rendezvous with another group in a hootch on the opposite side of the canal. The naval units kept the hootch under careful surveillance, and within two hours, five armed men entered the structure. The PBRs opened fire with mortar and machine gun fire when the men departed the hootch at 0105H the next morning. The Vietnamese crews killed one of the Viet Cong and wounded another who was medevaced to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. Four civilians received
minor wounds from the cross fire and were taken to Rach Gia for treatment.

The stealthy Viet Cong occasionally betray their position by their use of signal lamps at night. PBRs 52, 53, and 55 of River Patrol Group 56 sighted three flashing lights on the night of 10 July. 300 meters downstream from their WBCP located eight kilometers northeast of Rach Gia (WS 178 100). Two boats remained in position and the third cast off and drifted quietly toward the lights, only to find an empty hootch with a light shining from it. The crews of PBRs 52 and 55 then saw four men along the east bank and took them under fire with unknown results. Two hours later, at 110230H, the crew of PBR 53 saw a Viet Cong along the bank using a signal lamp which was then answered from the opposite side. The Vietnamese patrol officer interpreted these lights as signals not to cross at this point because of the presence of PBRs. The FBRs opened fire at both lights and reported killing one of the Viet Cong. Black Ponies and Seawolves placed heavy strikes on both sides of the canal, hoping to trap a communist platoon waiting to cross, but the ensuing ground sweep revealed the body of only one dead Viet Cong.

Navy SEALs of Detachment GOLF, KILO Platoon ran into a devastating ambush on the Hien Canal the night of 20 July while enroute from the Rach Soi ATSB to a landing site five kilometers
southeast of Rach Gia (WS 148 021). Just before reaching their
destination, the SEAL's MSSC was hit by a communist rocket and
heavy automatic weapons fire which crippled the boat's steering
mechanism. The crew quickly shifted to the emergency steering
system and escaped the kill zone, but not before two SEALs and
their Cambodian guide were slightly wounded. The platoon returned
fire briefly but soon proceeded to Rach Gia where the wounded were
medevaced to Binh Thuy.
Barrier Reef

The continuing presence of South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia has made the border policing chores of CTG 116.4 (formerly 194.4) of less consequence than they were prior to May. During July there were a total of ten firefights which cost the enemy six dead. The allies suffered one Vietnamese sailor killed, another wounded, and four American personnel wounded.

PBRs 123 and 144 of RIVDIV 532 were ambushed with B-40 rockets and scattered small arms fire 17 kilometers southwest of Moc Hoa (WS 925 707) while proceeding to a WBGP on the evening of 17 July. One communist rocket fired from the south bank of the canal struck the M-60 machine gun shield of the lead boat, killed one Vietnamese sailor and wounded four Americans. The wounded personnel were able to return fire while clearing the kill zone, and, the cover boat placed a heavy volume of fire at the ambush site. The units proceeded to a Vietnamese outpost at WS 975 758 to get medical assistance from a corpsman and the four wounded USN sailors were dusted off by Seawolves scrambled from YRBMs 20 and 21.

The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese unfortunately did not account for all of the allied casualties in the Barrier Reef operations area during July. Vietnamese Seaman Thanh Van, while drinking at
a bar in Tuyen Nhon Village on the afternoon of 19 July, entered into an altercation with several Regional Force and Popular Force soldiers. The VN sailor, displaying an impressive amount of bravado, returned to the Tuyen Nhon ATSB and had his crew man PBR 7677, of which he was boat captain. As he returned to Tuyen Nhon Village, the RF/PF soldiers opened fire on the boat, and the PBR responded with .50 calibre and M-60 machine gun fire. Most of the rounds fired penetrated the three district administration buildings, but Seaman Le Cong Duong, one of the PBR’s gunners, was seriously wounded in the exchange. Van returned his river craft to Tuyen Nhon, went into emotional shock, and was medevaced along with SN Duong.

A group of eight to ten Viet Cong attacked PBR 7664 of River Patrol Group 59 as it waited in a WBGP along the Kinh Moi Hai Canal (XS 134 761) on the night of 30 July. At 2300H a crew member spotted two VC along the east bank of the canal, and four minutes later, he opened fire on a group of eight to ten communists approaching his position. Army artillery responded with a heavy bombardment of the area within seven minutes of the initial call for assistance. An Army airborne hunter killer team arrived to place heavy air strikes on what was suspected to be mortar muzzle blasts. At 18 minutes past midnight, Navy Seawolves 90 and 95
began placing rocket strikes into the original contact area; and were
followed up by OV-10 aircraft which prepared the area for a ground
sweep. The 858th Regional Force Company began a ground sweep
at 0100H and reported finding two heavy blood trails and evidence
of extensive movement in the contact area. No allies were wounded
in this rather one-sided demonstration of fire power.
Blue Shark

Operation Blue Shark was transferred to the operational control of CTF 116 as of 1 July 1970. The new task designator for Blue Shark operations became CTG 116.5 with this transfer. Enemy activity remained light to moderate in July as Blue Shark units conducted numerous incursions and sweep operations. The enemy lost seven killed (6 BC, 1 probable), three wounded, and three captured during the month. Three USN personnel were wounded during the same period.

One of the highlights of the Blue Shark operations in July was a bold attempt by SEALs from JULIETTE Platoon of SEAL Team One Detachment GOLF to free two U.S. and a group of ARVN POWs. The SEALs were inserted into the target area (VIC SR 306 379) in the early morning hours of 15 July while the USCG WPB POINT CYPRESS, PCF 93, and one MSSC stood by to provide support.

As the SEALs approached the target hooches they tripped a grenade booby trap which wounded the SEAL interpreter slightly. The explosion alerted the VC who were able to move the prisoners before the SEALs could arrive at the target. Three VC were killed during the encounter (2 BC, 1 probable) while three SEALs were slightly wounded.
The month of July witnessed an acceleration in the turnover of U.S. Navy assets to the Vietnamese Navy. The culmination of the decline of direct USN participation came on 1 July when DEPCOM-NAVFORV RADM H. S. Matthews reported to CNO, Vietnamese Navy for additional duty as Deputy for the Tran Hung Dao campaign with VNN designation of Commander Task Fleet Twenty-One. This new combined organization now controls all the riverine and interdiction operations in the III and IV Military Regions.

RADM Matthews, with the additional title of Second Tran Hung Dao, will continue to direct, through CTF 116 (CAPT J. R. Faulk, USN), the SEA LORDS operations still commanded by USN officers - (Sea Float, Solid Anchor, Search Turn, Barrier Reef, Breezy Cove, and Blue Shark). As the ACTOV Program grows, RADM Matthews's SEA LORDS role will decrease as his VNN Tran Hung Dao role increases. The Task Fleet 21 components now under VNN command include Tran Hung Dao I, II (formerly Giant Slingshot), V (formerly Ready Deck), VIII (in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces), and XI (Cambodian operations). In addition, all combined advanced tactical support bases began on 1 July to operate under a VNN commander with a USN deputy where such an arrangement was feasible. The USS BENEWAH (APB 35) departed the Mekong Delta on 25 July for
well-earned tender availability at Vung Tau. The BENEWAH has been in Vietnam since 1966 and has served as First SEA LORDS's flagship since May 1970 and sailed into Cambodia with the Tran Hung Dao XI thrust. After repairs, the BENEWAH will return to the Mekong Delta for resumption of flagship duties and eventual turn-over to the Vietnamese Navy.
VNN OPERATIONS

Tran Hung Dao I

Operation Tran Hung Dao I (formally U.S. designator CTG 194.8) became CTG 212.4 on 1 July. As "operations in Cambodia have taken on a more permanent structure," according to COMTASK-SLT 21, Vietnamese PBRs and support craft continued to operate extensively across the border. A mobile naval operations center was established on a RAC near the Cambodian border on the Chau Doc River with a U.S. Naval advisor embarked with the understanding that he would not cross the border.

Despite this involvement in Cambodia, actual contact with the Viet Cong was quite limited during July. There were only seven firefights reported, of which the enemy initiated one. The Tran Hung Dao I sailors reported killing one Viet Cong during the month, and did not suffer any casualties as the result of contact with the enemy.

The greatest tragedy of the month in the Tran Hung Dao I area resulted from the miscalculations or carelessness of Cambodian pilots. On 12 July, three Cambodian T-28 aircraft attacked six Vietnamese PBRs and several civilian sampans on the Chau Doc River just south of the Cambodian border. The PBRs, assets of River Patrol Group 61, were all beached near a GVN outpost on the
river bank, and there were approximately half a dozen fishing sampans in the middle of the river. The three fixed wing propeller aircraft approached the area at 1030H and made two low level runs, firing rockets. The first group of rockets hit in the midst of the fishing vessels, completely destroying two, and a second volley exploded harmlessly 200 meters inland. The aircraft made a second pass, but departed to the north when the PBRs and the government outpost initiated fire. U.S. Navy Seawolf 56 was launched from YRBM in a futile attempt to establish communication with the attacking planes. One Vietnamese man and two children were missing, and two other fishermen were wounded. Nine VNN sailors were slightly wounded by rocket shrapnel, but damage to the PBRs was negligible.

After some discussion and much confusion, Lon Nol's Cambodian government admitted that the planes were, in fact, Cambodian, but that the attack was aimed at the sampans and not the VNN PBRs. The official statement claimed that aerial reconnaissance and civilian reports had indicated heavy Viet Cong movement from the border of South Vietnam north along the Song Chau Doc. The three planes in question had been making straffing runs along canals and trails north of Angkor Brei (VT 97 10). A Cambodian reconnaissance pilot flying along the border reported the movement of numerous
sampans heading into Cambodia past a nest of PBRs which were not flying flags. At this point, according to the official statement, the pilot radioed the Vietnamese Liaison Officer in the area to ascertain if there were any friendly forces in the area. When he received a negative reply, he gave the T-28 pilots permission to attack the sampans (but not the PBRs) on the assumption that they carried Viet Cong. Lon Nol personally expressed regret for the incident and hoped that it would not jeopardize Cambodian-Vietnamese relations.

On 17 July the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) relieved the USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786) as the Ha Tien support tender.
Tran Hung Dao II

Participants in the Tran Hung Dao II Operation experienced five enemy and 47 friendly-initiated firefights in July, resulting in six enemy killed (BC), 14 enemy dead (PROB); there were no friendly casualties. There were 13 enemy prisoners taken and 12 Hoi Chanhs. Engagements producing the most tangible results are summarized below.

RID 43 units, with Chief Loi as patrol officer, sighted a sampan with six occupants crossing the Vam Co Tay 12 kilometers downstream from Tan An (XS 651 592) and took them under fire. Four persons were observed falling from the boat, and two retreated along the beach. Concussion grenades were dropped and one ammo box containing U.S. antibiotics and vitamins was captured.

Boats 141 and 136 from RIVDIV 571, with BMC Thorton the patrol officer, inserted a squad from the Kien Tuong Province National Police at a point 20 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa (WT 920 073) on the morning of 8 July. Led by a Hoi Chanh who had rallied on 7 July, the squad captured six members of the VCI.

On 8 July at 2007H, boats 8116 and 8122 of RIVDIV 594 were in WBGP six kilometers from Tuyen Nhon (XS 332 788) when they observed one VC ten feet from the boat. With LTJG Stephens in
charge, the boats took the man under fire and received small arms return fire. At 2013H a Black Pony placed a strike. Result of the encounter was one VC killed (BC).

On 13 July at 2100H, boats HQ 5114 and 5133 of RID 44, with CPO Manh in charge, were patrolling 10 kilometers above Tra Cu (XT 431 055) when they sighted one man on the beach 50 meters ahead of the boat. A sniper on board equipped with a starlight scope took him under fire and killed him.

An ambush team in a Boston Whaler with SFl Gillis and EM2 Lamoine in charge inserted an ambush party 20 kilometers above Tra Cu (XT 395 139) on the night of 14 July. The ambushers observed four enemy personnel to their left rear and took them under fire and observed two of them fall. Then the whaler opened up and the ambush party detonated three claymores previously placed in front of their position, suppressing enemy fire to their front. The whaler withdrew to avoid mutual interference and began to receive intense fire from the bank. The whaler then proceeded north directly into enemy fire while the ambush party worked on the group firing at the boats. The enemy fire was suppressed at 2147H. A sweep later revealed three VC dead, and it was estimated that three more were killed. There were no friendly casualties.
At 2330H on 18 July boats HQ 5113 and 5115 of RID 44 were
in WBGP 12 kilometers from Tra Cu (XT 422 098) when they
received two hand grenades and automatic weapons fire. The boats,
with POI Dong as patrol officer, broke position, called in air strikes
and artillery, and then made three firing runs on the area, the
first time receiving a B-40 rocket, which missed, and suppressed
enemy fire on the third run. At 2357H Black Ponies put in a strike.
Artillery fired into the area from 0011H until 0031H. Later intel-
ligence from residents of Hiep Hoa (XT 440 055) indicated that
three VC were killed in this engagement.

On 20 July at 1920H, HQ 5146 of RID 40 in WBGP 10 kilometers
from Go Dau Ha, spotted a sampan crossing the river at XT 409 150,
the two occupants of which jumped into the water upon sighting the
RID boat. One man was hit by friendly fire on his way over the side
and sank; the other submerged and was assailed with concussion
grenades from the ASPB. The sampan was recovered and yielded
one AK-47 with three magazines, a hand grenade, and a bag of rice.

RID 44 boats 5109 and 5110 in WBGP six kilometers from
Tra Cu (XS 511 967) at 2001H on 21 July sighted four personnel on
the beach 250 meters ahead and kept them under surveillance. They
lost sight of the men at 2030H and at 2101H detected a swimmer
approaching the boat and threw concussion grenades. The swimmer
surfaced and was taken under fire, after which he disappeared.
On 25 July at 0700H, three PBRs from RIVDIV 571 (8129, 8121, and 8120), with LT Clymer in charge, inserted 60 RF troops at a point 10 kilometers southeast of Tuyen Nhon (XS 433 746); where they captured two NVA. Initial interrogation revealed that the NVA were from a group of six operating in the area.

A significant non-combatant event for the month was the relief of LT T. W. Frenzinger as COMRIVDIV 594/CTU 214.1.6 and Tuyen Nhon Base Commander by LT H. J. Price. The organization of 214.1 forces at the end of the month is as follows:

214.1.1 RPG 53 - Ben Luc
RIVDIV 571 (3 boats)

214.1.2 RID 44 (10) - Tra Cu

214.1.3 RID 40 (9) - Go Dau lia

214.1.4 RPG 53 - Ben Keo

214.1.5 RPG 54 - Tan An
RIVDIV 571 (6)

214.1.6 RIVDIV 594 - Tuyen Nhon
RIVDIV 571 (2)
RIVDIV 43 (1)

214.1.7 USS SPHINX RID 40 (14) - Moc Hoa
(overhaul)

214.1.8 RID 40 (14) - Dong Tam

Tran Hung Dao V

The Vietnamese Navy's assumption of control of U. S. Naval river assets continued at a high pace in July as Operation Ready Deck (CTG 194.6) became a completely VNN project with the title Tran Hung Dao V on the first day of the month. Americans will continue to assist the crews operating from the Phu Cuong base in an advisory capacity. The Upper Saigon River Task Group (designated CTG 216.1), comprised of RAG 24 and RPG 52 and under the control of Commander Third Riverine Area (CTF 216), is organized with a U. S. Naval representative as deputy commander. LCDR W. W. Aerndli relieved LCDR R. M. Dunbar of this position on 16 July.

As in previous months communist aggressiveness in the Upper Saigon River area was exceptionally restrained during July. Although allied units constantly searched for the Viet Cong (an impressive 86% of available units were deployed to WBGPs nightly), they engaged in only five firefight with the elusive enemy. This limited action resulted in two VNN sailors wounded and no enemy soldiers either killed or captured.

A major disaster occurred on 10 July when a U. S. Army helicopter helping to resupply PBRs crashed 31 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong on the Upper Saigon River (XT 565 356). The helicopter
crashed and burned when it was attacked by an unknown size enemy force with two B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire while attempting to hook up a fuel bladder. Three bodies were found in the wreckage, and another 16 wounded personnel were medevaced. None of the PBRs were damaged and all personnel casualties were in the Army.

A VNN PBR sank for some unknown reason while moored to the ATSB pier at Phu Cuong on the last day of the month. It was raised without difficulty the following morning.
Operation Tran Hung Dao XI

The units involved in Operation Tran Hung Dao XI continued during July to carry out their mission of evacuating Vietnamese refugees from Phnom Penh and insuring the security of the Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the Cambodian/Vietnamese border although all U.S. forces had been withdrawn from participation in the operation at the end of June. LSMs 404 and 405, LSTs 501 and 503, and LCU 533 participated in the evacuation.

A total of 15,710 refugees were evacuated during the month to Dong Tam, Vung Tau, Vinh Long, Rach Dua, and Can Tho. Some 1800 refugees were taken to Neak Luong and trucked overland via Route One to Tay Ninh. The evacuations were carried out with only one serious incident involving enemy activity which occurred on 27 July. On that date, LSM 404, underway from Phnom Penh to Dong Tam with 800 refugees, received one B-40 rocket hit about 17 kilometers north of Neak Luong. Three Vietnamese Navy personnel received serious wounds and six civilians, minor wounds. Units of RAIDs 72 and 73 reacted and suppressed the fire. Besides refugees, on 3 July, LST 501 transported 1200 to 1500 Cambodian troops from Phnom Penh to Can Tho where they were to receive military training.
On 2 July an ATC of RAID 71 received two B-40 rockets just north of the Cambodian border (WT 214 100). One engine was disabled, one VNN sailor was killed, and three wounded.

At 1000H on 24 July in ceremonies aboard USS SATYR (ARL 23), the two Neak Luong ferries which had been salvaged and repaired by the U.S. were transferred to the Cambodian Navy by the Vietnamese Navy.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Tran Hung Dao XII

Tran Hung Dao XII was a Prisoner of War (POW) Repatriation conducted primarily by the Vietnamese Navy during the early part of July. Planning started late in June and the repatriation was completed on 11 July 1970.

VNN LST 503 anchored near the DMZ at 110745H July and commenced transferring 24 North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 sick and wounded POWs into two junks. The junks departed the LST bound for the North Vietnamese coast at 1325H. Two NVN patrol boats met the junks and escorted them into the beach at 1449H. VNN LST 503 shortly thereafter got underway having completed her mission. VNN PGMs also took part as escort vessels enroute.

U. S. Navy advisors accompanied the various VNN units in order to provide a communications link among USN and VNN units. U. S. Navy ships, USS GUIDE (MSO 447) conducted minesweeping operations ahead of LST 503, while the USS JOSEPH STRAUSS (DDG 16), with COMDESRON II embarked, and the USS EDSON (DD 946) stood by to provide gunfire support if required. CTG 77.0 exercised operational control of these SEVENTH Fleet units assigned.
Other units participating in this operation but not in the immediate vicinity were ARVN artillery units and SEVENTH Air Force units.
Rung Sat Special Zone

Combined operations were continued in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) during the month of July. Five such operations were conducted and were named Chuong Duong 27-70 through Chuong Duong 31-70.

Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) were also active during the month within the confines of the RSSZ. A typical PRU operation was conducted on 11 July in the Thanh Duc District of Long An Province, approximately seven kilometers south of Nha Be Navy Base. Thirty PRUs, with advisors, inserted by LCM and conducted a sweep. Results of the sweep were two VC killed and three captured. They also captured a small amount of documents, three AK-47 rifles, one K-54 pistol, one 61 mm mortar, and 4,000 rounds of 7.62 machine gun ammunition. The PRUs destroyed five bunkers, a small amount of rice, and a small amount of clothing.

The Chuong Duong operations were all very similar in concept with Chuong Duong 29-70 forces encountering the majority of enemy contacts. Forces participating in the operation were USA Slicks, a USA LHFT, USN Black Ponies, USN ASPBs, USN PBRs, RSSZ RF Companies 121, 362, 601, 908, and 999 with advisors, VNN LCMs, VNN RPGs, RAG 27 units, USAF Forward Air Controllers,
the RSSZ EOD Team and the RSSZ Psyops Team. The operation was conducted in Nhon Trach District in Bien Hoa Province, approximately 12 kilometers east of the Nha Be Navy Base and in Quang Xuyen District, approximately 22 kilometers south of the Nha Be Navy Base. The operation was characterized by multiple troop insertions, sweeps, and extractions. Extensive use was made of psyops material and broadcasting facilities during the operation. Psyops personnel conducted both live and taped broadcasts from helicopters and dropped a total of 280,500 leaflets. The leaflet drops included Safe Conduct, Return to GVN, Rally to GVN, Chieu Hoi, Hoi Chanh, and Weapons Reward leaflets.

Results of the Chuong Duong 29-70 operation were one RF trooper slightly wounded, 15 VC killed and four probably killed. Friendly forces captured one U.S. .45 calibre submachine gun with four magazines, two CKC rifles, one M-1 carbine, one AK-47, assorted small arms and automatic weapons ammunition, one transistor radio, approximately six pounds of documents, assorted clothing and cooking utensils, food, and VN $1,500. The forces destroyed seven sampans, 22 bunkers, 11 structures, three cooking hooches, and one 105 mm round.
The only other Chuong Duong operation which had significant contact with enemy forces was Chuong Duong 31-70. The most significant feature of one such contact with the enemy during this operation was that the enemy forces attempted to use tear gas (CS) against the friendly forces.

PRU and Chuong Duong operations during the month accounted for 34 enemy killed and 11 probably killed. Eleven VC were captured. Two crew-served weapons and 34 individual weapons were captured. Friendly casualties during the month were one RF trooper killed and 13 wounded.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

Operation Market Time

Market Time and Stable Door forces continued their normal operations during the month of July. U. S. Navy Market Time units detected 9,053 watercraft during the month. Of these, 5,077 were inspected, and another 937 boarded. Eighteen junks and 67 persons were detained for further interrogation as a result of these inspections and boardings.

U. S. Stable Door units in Vung Tau and Cam Ranh Bay detected an additional 9,931 watercraft, inspected 1911, and boarded 1087 of these. As a result, 142 junks and 148 persons were detained.

Market Time forces accounted for five enemy killed during the month. They also destroyed 12 structures/bunkers while damaging another 16.

On 1 July, the operational control of Operations Sea Float and Blue Shark were transferred to CTF 116.

On 6 July, Market Time air units detected an SL-4 infiltration trawler approximately 300 nautical miles east-southeast of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Surveillance continued with USS EDSON (DD 946) and USS ERNEST S. SMALL (DDR 838) taking part until 9 July when the trawler entered CHICOM waters between Chanchiang and Hong Kong.
First Coastal Zone

Activity in the First Coastal Zone remained at a generally low level, but the lull was punctuated by an upswing in mining incidents on the Cua Viet River, the responsibility for the security of which was turned over to the Vietnamese at the beginning of the month, and a number of sharp encounters with the enemy in the Sea Tiger area of operations.

On 1 July CTF Clearwater closed out its operation and turned over the responsibility for the security of the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers to the Vietnamese. Task Group 221.2 (formerly TG 217.2) located at Hue and Tan My, assumed responsibility for the Perfume River and Mine Interdiction Division 92 assumed responsibility for the Cua Viet River.

In an apparent attempt to test the defensive measures of the newly turned-over forces, there was a sharp increase in the number of mining incidents on the Cua Viet River. On the afternoon of 1 July an LCM-8 of the 101st ARVN Transportation Battalion struck an enemy water mine on the Cua Viet about four kilometers north of Dong Ha (YD 267 637). Units of CG II searched the area, brought the damaged LCM-8 to the CG II base, and medevaced the wounded, of which there were two, with one person missing.
At 1000H on 3 July a unit of MID 92 detonated an enemy pressure mine in its trawl net three kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 264 624) while conducting a sweep operation. A half hour later at the same location a water taxi traveling outside the swept channel detonated another mine and was completely destroyed. A CG 11 unit went to the scene, investigated the area and conducted a medevac of the wounded. There were four wounded, 40 killed, and 13 reported still missing. It is believed that the VC suffered a good deal of adverse publicity as a result of this incident.

MID 92 units detonated mines during sweep operations on 27 and 29 July and captured NVA pressure mines on 15 and 29 July.

At the beginning of the month Operation Chi Lang 1 (Sea Tiger) was established as Task Group 221.1 (formerly 217.1) with headquarters at Hoi An and secondary headquarters at the CG 14 base. In the Sea Tiger area of operations there were four friendly and eight enemy-initiated firefights. There were 27 enemy KIA (18 BC and 9 probable) and three captured with two USN WIA and one VNN sailor KIA and five WIA.

A number of fairly large units of VC were spotted and engaged during the month. A good example is an action that occurred on the afternoon of 24 July. At 1715H a CG 14 ambush team was inserted
about 6.5 kilometers southwest of Hoi An 'BT 150 528) and proceeded south under Forward Air Controller guidance. The FAC reported spotting nine VC at BT 146 518 and the ambush team proceeded to that point. They spotted 18 VC and took them under fire. The CG 14 ambush team received heavy automatic weapons fire and six B-40 rockets in return and were forced to retreat. They were extracted at the insertion point.

At 0405H on 28 June two junks of CG 15, patrolling a known VC infiltration area 8.5 kilometers northeast of Chu Lai, spotted three sampans moving along close to the beach. When the junks approached to investigate, the sampans tried to evade and were taken under fire. There were estimated to be nine persons in the sampans. After the junks ceased fire two small boats were dispatched to investigate. Three bodies were found in two sunken sampans along with two AK-47s, one AK-50, three VC grenades, and one small block of plastic explosive.

Second Coastal Zone

Enemy activity remained at a low level throughout the month of July. Allied offensive operations, also, were on a low to moderate level. The PCFs and WPBs of the Coastal Surveillance Forces of the Second Coastal Zone conducted numerous harassment and interdiction firings with unknown results.
At 1600H on 21 July WPB 713 came under small arms and B-40 rocket fire about 32 kilometers northeast of Phan Thiet (BN 140 200). The fire was returned and suppressed. On 23 July CG 28 conducted a ground sweep of the area and spotted two VC who were not pursued.

Beginning at 1930H on 29 July approximately seven rounds of 82 mm mortar fire were received in the vicinity of the CG 23 base. The firing position was located by muzzle flashes and CG 23 and the Song Cau army subsector returned the fire with mortars and artillery. Regional Forces Company 310 was dispatched to sweep the area from which the mortars had been fired. CG 23 provided illumination and USS J. C. OWENS (DD 776) provided illumination and high explosive support. Results of the sweep were unreported. Three civilians who had been wounded as a result of the attack were medevaced.

Third Coastal Zone

Activity in the Third Coastal Zone was at a very low level throughout the month. The PCFs, WPBs, and coastal group junks of the Third Coastal Zone conducted routine coastal patrols and supported numerous ground sweeps but there was little contact with the enemy. Part of the junks assigned to Coastal Groups 33, 35 and 36 remained temporarily assigned to Sea Float.
On the afternoon of 23 July junks of CG 35 and the POINT CYPRESS conducted a patrol at the mouth of the Co Chien River (XR 692 790 to 720 774) with advisors LT. Fritz and HM2 Destalek present. Four to six VC with weapons were sighted at XR 717 772. The VC took the patrolling units under fire and their fire was returned and suppressed with M-60 and M-79 fire. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

Fourth Coastal Zone

Enemy activity remained at a very low level throughout the month in the Fourth Coastal Zone. Units assigned to Market Time operations carried out normal patrols but there were no significant contacts with the enemy reported.

Extended Market Time

Vietnamese naval units continued to patrol the Cambodian coast between Ha Tien and Kompong Som during July although all US advisors had been withdrawn from units patrolling Cambodian waters at the end of June. A heightening spirit of cooperation between the Vietnamese and Cambodian navies was apparent during the month, although the level of activity in extended Market Time areas was very low.
On 9 July Vietnamese naval units evacuated 915 refugees from Kompong Som and Ream to Hon Tre Island. This evolution was carried out with the full cooperation of the Cambodians.

At 1530H on 11 July, PCE 12 entered extended Market Time areas 9 N/O and assumed the surveillance patrol from the Cambodian PCE 311. This was done by agreement between the Cambodian and Vietnamese navies so that repairs could be effected on the Cambodian vessel. At month’s end the Vietnamese Navy was still patrolling these areas. There were no US advisors embarked.

On 16 July the Cambodian LCT 916 made a call at An Thoi. It was supplied with concertina wire, barbed wire, three drums of avgas, ten drums of mogas, 50 claymore mines, 20,000 rounds of M-2 carbine ammunition, 5,000 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition, and 500 grenades.

On 25 July the Cambodian coastal zone commander paid a visit to An Thoi aboard the LCT 916 in order to discuss plans for combined operations with the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander.

Coastal Surveillance Forces

As of 11 July the Vietnamese Naval units participating in Market Time patrols in the four coastal zones were as follows: