RSSZ Shipping Incidents

Harassment on the Long Tau Shipping Channel continued when at 011330H, the U.S. civilian tug SANTIAM, with a barge in tow transiting north, came under fire from three B-40 rockets shot from the south bank at YS 066 623. There was no damage or casualty to the SANTIAM.

A USN Light Helicopter Fire Team (LHFT), a USAF Forward Air Controller, and RF Company 908 responded to the incident. The RF company swept the area with negative results.
September was an important month for Operation MARKET TIME for at 0001H on 1 September, CAPT Nguyen Huu Chi, VNN, CTF 213 assumed command of the MARKET TIME Inner Barrier from CDR Thomas F. Mullane, USN, CTF 115. This ended the operational control of Inner Barrier forces by USN commanders which began when Operation MARKET TIME was formally established on 24 March 1965 and was a significant indicator of the progress of the ACTOV Program. CDR Mullane reported as Deputy Commander and Senior Advisor to CTF 213 and was relieved by CAPT Carl R. Quanstrom USN, on 2 September. The MARKET TIME Outer Barrier remained under the control of CTF 115 with the task group designator 115.6. The name MARKET TIME in reference to the Inner Barrier was dropped, and the surveillance operations there were redesignated TRAN HUNG DAO XV.

Shortly after the turnover, a new concept in surveillance operations was put into effect in which all units operating in a patrol area where the threat of enemy infiltration was particularly acute would be put under the command of a senior officer afloat rather than allowed to operate independently. The senior officer, embarked in a large unit having better communications than the majority of the patrol units, would, on receipt of reliable intelligence, assume direction
of all patrol units and direct their movements to the area where a threat of enemy infiltration existed. By coordinating the movements of all units, the junks and sampans near the threat area would be corralled; then the patrol units acting together, could board and inspect in force rather than in piecemeal fashion. It was hoped that the new technique would result in better coordinated searches of the suspicious craft, faster and more effective exploitation of intelligence, reduction of stereotyped patrol procedures, and, generally, increased flexibility overall. In early September, CTF 213 directed the formation of three task element commanders who would be in command of TRAN HUNG DAO XV craft in areas 4, 5, and 8 and who would attempt to implement the foregoing tactics.

Trawlers

Shortly after noon on 4 September, a VP aircraft flying a MARKET TIME patrol sighted a possible SL-6 infiltration trawler at 08-25N, 109-20E, 265 nautical miles east of the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Air surveillance was undertaken on this trawler, designated 04S-01. The following day the USCG Cutter YAKUTAT (WHEC 380) was directed to proceed to the scene and take the SL-6 under overt surveillance. YAKUTAT arrived at the trawler's position on 7 September and maintained surveillance until the SL-6 entered CHICOM waters off Hainan Island on 9 September.
In another reported trawler incident, a Hoi Chanh being interrogated in Bac Lieu stated that a North Vietnamese infiltration trawler had come ashore near the mouth of the Ganh Hao River (vicinity WQ 462 960) on 27 or 28 August. He described the vessel as being approximately 35 meters long with a beam of approximately 10 meters. According to the report, the crew members of the vessel told villagers in the area that they had been able to outrun U.S. and South Vietnamese Naval units because their vessel was nuclear powered. The Hoi Chanh's report was being closely examined by Intelligence personnel at month's end. COMNAVFORV ordered five PCFs chopped from CTG 116.5 to CTG 115.6 and assigned to patrol Inner Barrier areas 7E and 8C, near the Ganh Hao River entrance to augment the regular TG 213.3 and TG 213.4 units.

First Coastal Zone

September in the First Coastal Zone was characterized by an upswing in activity, especially in the area around Cua Viet as the enemy mining campaign there reached a level unknown in more than two years.

At 1110H on 7 September, an underwater explosion occurred in the vicinity of a passing sampan on the Cua Viet River three kilometers east of the Coastal Group 11 base (YD 358 307). The detonation

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produced a 70-foot waterspout from what was believed to be an NVA pressure influence bottom mine. There were no casualties or damage as a result of the explosion and the five civilians aboard the sampan were released following questioning. It was thought that the explosion might have been triggered by variations in tides and currents near the river mouth.

At 1410H on 13 September, a mine detonated without causing damage to friendly water craft at the mouth of the Cua Viet River (YD 345 702), not far from the location of the mine which exploded on 7 September. The explosion produced a 150-200 foot waterspout, and the mine was believed to be a large pressure influence bottom mine which was probably detonated by surging currents.

Great concern had been caused by the discovery in August of the presence of enemy mines to seaward of the mouth of the Cua Viet River. Although it seemed likely that the mines had broken loose from moorings in the river and drifted out to sea, there was nevertheless some fear that the enemy was making an attempt to mine naval gunfire support and MARKET TIME ships in the open sea. Thus there was an immediate response when at 1840H on 18 September, the USS BUCHANAN (DDG 14), while lying to 5,500 yards east of the Cua Viet River mouth (YD 390 700), picked up a small contact
with a strong metallic echo quality on its AN/SQS-23D sonar.

USS DYNAMIC (MSO 432), at the time patrolling MARKET TIME Outer Barrier Station 1B, was immediately ordered to the contact area to investigate. The First Coastal Zone Advisor sent an EOD team to assist in the search. DYNAMIC reported her sonar inoperable and she was ordered to exchange stations with USS IMPLICIT (MSO 455) which was patrolling area 7B. IMPLICIT arrived in the Cua Viet area on 22 September and commenced mine-hunting operations. The EOD team was picked up at first light on 23 September, and they commenced diving, using non-magnetic equipment. They had no success in locating mines but they did find a case of pineapple juice, a bundle of angle iron, a metal locker, and other debris.

At 0800H on 23 September a craft of MID 92 discovered an enemy watermine on the Cua Viet River 3.5 kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 270 640). EOD personnel recovered the pressure influence detonating device and attached charge.

Mine hunting operations conducted by the MSOs were terminated on 26 September in order that the MSOs could be on their Outer Barrier stations during the period of highest infiltration threat, the dark of the moon, which was anticipated about 30 September. CTF 115 assigned the MSOs to areas 1B and 2B, where maximum use could be made of
their capability for detecting infiltration trawlers and where they would be close to the Cua Viet River and could return rapidly to resume their mine hunting once the trawler threat period was over.

An 18 man group from the 126th NVA Naval Sapper Regiment was reported to have infiltrated across the DMZ on 19 September with the intention of mining the Cua Viet. On 27 September an incredible series of seven mining incidents occurred, a possible indication of their presence.

At 0300H on 27 September, a large explosion resulted in the destruction of two sampans located approximately 20 meters from the north bank of the Cua Viet River near the mouth (YD 335 699).

At 0830H a similar explosion destroyed another sampan at the same location. Although no personnel were aboard either civilian craft, the owners were taken into custody for interrogation when an investigation revealed that the water mines involved appeared to have been attached to two of the sampans by a nylon line.

At 1005H a mine sweep craft of MID 92 discovered an NVA pressure influence water mine partially exposed in two feet of water about four miles southwest of CG 11 (YD 305 675). At 1020H a second water mine of the same type was recovered in a fisherman's net near the first major bend in the Cua Viet River from the mouth (YD 297 688).
CUA VIET MINING INCIDENTS
SEPTEMBER
1970

STATUTE MILES

KILOMETERS

1/2 1 2 3 4 5

1005 27 SEP
1020 27 SEP
1500 27 SEP
1605 27 SEP
27 SEP 1612
23 SEP
13 SEP
7 SEP
0300
0830 27 SEP
COASTAL GROUP ELEVEN
DONG HCA
Both mines were in excellent condition and appeared to have been in the water no more than six hours. Each mine had two chemical-delay arming pencils and of the four, three had not been activated. The two mines including pressure influence detonator and attached charge were identical except that the first mine had four, 20 pound blocks of plastic explosive hanging from the detonator and the second mine had five blocks.

At 1500H another mine was discovered but exploded as it was being dragged along in a fishnet about 2 1/2 miles northeast of Dong Ha (YD 270 638). The owner of the sampan who discovered the mine was questioned and released.

At 1605H a craft of MID 92 detonated a watermine during a routine scare charge run about two miles northeast of Dong Ha (YD 268 632). A 100-foot waterspout was observed but there were no casualties. At 1612H a mine was detonated in the sweep gear astern of a MID 92 craft not far from the scene of the explosion which had occurred seven minutes earlier (YD 267 636). Another 100-foot waterspout was observed and again there were no casualties.

At 1300H on 29 September an NVA pressure influence mine was recovered in a fishnet and turned over intact to personnel of CG 11. At 1330H a basket of explosives similar to the type encountered with pressure influence mines was turned over to EOD personnel of MID 92 following a sweep of the river.
As the month ended preparations were underway for a renewal of mine counter-measure operations at the mouth of the Cua Viet River to counter the enemy mining threat.

Although activity in the Chi Lang I and SEA TIGER area of operations was at a fairly low level there were a number of sharp encounters.

Duffle Bag personnel began experimenting with a new technique using sensors and associated claymore mines detonated by remote firing devices and achieved some measure of success on enemy-infested Cam Thanh Island. On 31 August the Duffle Bag team set up an ambush three kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 177 578). At 1450H on 1 September, movement was noted near the sensor string, and the claymores were detonated. At 1800H Duffle Bag personnel and the CG 14 sweep team entered the area by PBR. They found three VC killed and captured one M-79, one AK-47, and six M-26 grenades.

On 4 September a similar remote ambush was conducted 3.2 kilometers east-northeast of Hoi An (BT 179 581). Again Duffle Bag personnel and the CG 14 sweep team were inserted by PBRs of RPG 60. Two VC were discovered who had been killed by the mines and an additional arm and leg were also discovered, indicating the demise of other enemy personnel. One AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, one M-26 grenade, and one hand flare were captured.
Allied commanders were delighted with the success of this new tactic. The Duffle Bag commander announced his intention to continue using this demoralizing technique in the hopes of depriving the enemy of his feeling of security in his Cam Thanh Island sanctuary.

At approximately 2100H on 7 September, USMC CAP Team 2-4 made contact with the enemy about 2.5 kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 178 579). One PBR of RPG 60 broke WBGP nearby (BT 181 583) in order to go to the CAP Team’s assistance. As it broke WBGP, other units of RPG 60 in the area began receiving heavy small arms fire. All RPG units went to the original WBGP position to take the enemy under fire. They came under heavy small arms fire and were narrowly missed by two B-40 rocket rounds. Finally all units cleared the area and artillery strikes were called in. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

Tragedy struck on 18 September. At 1030H personnel of UDT 13 Det HOTEL and an RF company were inserted for a bunker destruction mission about four kilometers east of Hoi An (BT 181 584). At 1135H a member of the UDT team detonated a booby trap believed to have been made of an 81 or 82 mm mortar shell. SN L. W. Palma and HM3 L. C. Williams were killed and LTJG E. L. Jahncke, SM3 T. A. Nichols, and MR3 R. C. Banfield were wounded and medevaced. Three bunkers were destroyed as a result of the mission.
Activity in the Second Coastal Zone was at a low level during September but the enemy scored a signal success by mining and sinking PCF 3863 on 7 September near Qui Nhon.

Around 2400H on 6 September, the swift boat anchored, contrary to patrol instructions, about 600 yards off the beach from Hung Luong Village (CR 150 374) 12 miles northeast of Qui Nhon. It was later revealed that this was a popular spot for anchoring by boats supposedly on patrol, a phenomenon which the enemy had evidently observed. Around 0230H on 7 September, while the crew members and the American advisor slept, there was a large explosion. The advisor, who had been asleep on the 81 mm mortar ammunition box aft, awoke and ran forward to the pilot house where he encountered the boat's officer in charge. They attempted to use the radios but were forced to abandon ship. The swift boat sank in about two minutes. The advisor and four VNN personnel were wounded. A VNN ACTOV trainee who had been asleep in the cabin was killed.

Salvage units immediately went into action. EOD and HCU-1 divers recovered weapons, cryptographic material, and the body of the Vietnamese who had been killed on 8 September. They also found a parachute shroud attached to the anchor line and fairlead aft and
tied off on the port outboard exhaust flapper, confirmation that the
explosion had been caused by a sapper-placed negative buoyancy mine.

A 60-ton crane was brought to the scene and with the help of Army and Navy EOD divers, the craft was salvaged by 12 September.

At 2000H on 5 September, CG 23 at Phu My received three rounds of 82 mm mortar fire. One round landed in the CG 23 compound, one round hit the district compound and one round landed outside the compound. The enemy fire was returned with unknown results. Two VNN sailors, two ARVN personnel, and two Philippino civilians were wounded as a result of the attack.

At 2225H on 25 September, the Qui Nhon Support Command came under a mortar attack consisting of 22 rounds of mixed 60 mm and 82 mm mortar fire. Eleven U.S. Army personnel were wounded and six buildings were damaged.

Third Coastal Zone

Activity in the Third Coastal Zone was light and scattered during September and there were no significant actions reported. However there was some concern caused by the report from a Hoi Chanh that a North Vietnamese trawler had entered the Ganh Hao River (WQ 462 960) and offloaded a large quantity of arms. Although
the report was unconfirmed, COMNAVFORV ordered five USN PCFs
chopped from CTG 116.5 to CTG 115.6 and assigned to assist regular
213.3 and 213.4 units in patrolling Inner Barrier areas 7E and 8C
which are adjacent to the mouth of the Ganh Hao River.

Fourth Coastal Zone

At 1655H on 31 August, approximately 40 VC and NVA prisoners
escaped while being transported by truck from the Phu Quoc Naval Base,
where they had been on a working party, to the Phu Quoc POW Camp.
During the escape two VNN guards were wounded and subsequently died.

At 1710H the sector advisor provided USA gunships which
placed a strike in the area between the base and the POW camp.
At 1815H two RF platoons swept the area and flushed several escapees
and recovered a missing M-16. At day's end, 11 POWs had been
killed, three had been recaptured, and 25 were still missing. On 6
September one POW was killed and another was recaptured by an RF
patrol. It was assumed that the remaining 24 escapees had succeeded
in joining local VC units, thus increasing enemy strength on Phu Quoc
Island by seven percent. Authorities concluded that the escape had
been spontaneous rather than preplanned and was carried out without
the help of outside assistance.
Units of the Fourth Coastal Zone continued to carry out normal surveillance patrols in Vietnamese and adjacent Cambodian coastal waters during the month without any major incidents.
Operation STABLE DOOR

Unit TWO - Cam Ranh Bay

Due to operational commitments it was decided to retain the original turnover date of 1 December 1970 for the STABLE DOOR unit at Cam Ranh Bay vice 1 November as had been proposed.

Unit TWO personnel had their hands full at Cam Ranh Bay on 22-23 September. At approximately 2144H on 22 September, LCPL 66 reported small arms fire in the vicinity of Pier Five (Ammo, Pier) and investigated. The pier sentry had fired upon a swimmer alongside the pier. EOD divers were called to the scene and discovered a charge consisting of 120 pounds of C-4 explosive, blasting caps, detonating cord, and a pull friction release type detonator attached to the hull of the OVERSEAS ROSE at Pier Five. The charge was towed out of the area and disarmed by the cool EOD team members. All other ships in the area were checked for charges with negative results.

The following morning at 1036H the SS AMERIGO, also moored at Pier Five suffered a detonation which was located on the starboard side, aft of the starboard boiler in the engine room. The ship lost all power and began flooding in the engine room. She was towed
to the opposite side of the turning basin and allowed to settle in 18 feet of water on the sandy bottom. The ship was later dewatered, temporarily patched, and returned to Pier Five where more permanent repairs were effected.

In a footnote to this action, the body of a swimmer was found in the harbor on 24 September. The body had a bullet hole through the right wrist and damaged facial bones thought to be caused by close proximity to an underwater concussion grenade. It was believed that this was the swimmer sighted by the sentry two nights before. Evidently, two or more swimmers were involved in the attack which damaged the AMERIGO and unsuccessfully attempted to mine the OVERSEAS ROSE.
RAIDS

RAIDS 70-73 operated in Cambodia under the opcon of CTF 210 for the month, RAID 75 continued operations in the Third Riverine Area under the opcon of CTF 217, and RAID 74 performed troop lifts and patrols out of Ca Mau for most of September. From 3-5 September RAID 74 units were enroute from Can Tho to Thoi Binh, having received orders to support the 21st ARVN Division, 4th Battalion, 31st Regiment, and they established a patrol along the Song Trem Trem from WR 065 406 to WR 043 470, about 10-15 kilometers north of Thoi Binh. In the early morning hours of 6 September while on a routine sampan check, RAID boats encountered many women and children evacuating the area because of B-52 strikes the day before.

Patrolling the same general area, RAID 74 came under attack at 0010H, 11 September, when a B-41 round demolished a sampan next to HQ 1233 seven kilometers north of Thoi Binh. There had been a report from NILO, Ca Mau, that local VC in the area 10 kilometers north of Thoi Binh were planning to destroy RAID 74 craft.

The action became more intense at 1845H, 11 September, when RAID sailors received eight rocket rounds and automatic weapons fire 11 kilometers north of Thoi Binh (WR 180 404). Five of the enemy
rockets found their marks: both engines of HQ 5119 were rendered inoperable, and two USN advisors, BMI Pat Stauber and EN3 Alan Yozura, received minor shrapnel wounds. The boats returned to an RF outpost at WR 167 390 with HQ 5119 in tow after the ambush to resum; at 1130H, 13 September, that outpost received 10 mortar rounds, causing no friendly casualties.

RAID 74 stayed on the Song Trem Trem and adjacent canals until at 1800H, 17 September, they received orders from the 21st ARVN Division to sail all boats to Ca Mau, and upon arriving there received an assignment to establish a patrol from VQ 960 765 to WQ 110 870 on the Song Bay Hap in support of the 32nd Regiment. The commanding officer of RAID 74, LCDR Khan, objected to these orders, knowing that the water level in that particular area was too shallow for his craft. Nevertheless, his units commenced patrol in the new AO on 18 September, and LCDR Khan's predictions came true. HQ 5119 reported a steering casualty at 1930H but was able to be towed to an outpost by two other units; all three of the boats were aground at 2130H at the outpost (WQ 105 856). The next morning at high tide HQ 5119 was towed to Ca Mau for repairs. RAID 74 boats continued patrolling the Song Bay Hap for the remainder of the month by remaining in the vicinity of the outpost for support during low tide periods.
On 24 September, Senior Advisor, RAID 74, flew to Ca Mau to discuss the shallow water problem with Senior Advisor, 21st ARVN Division. The results of that discussion were unknown at the end of the month.
USN Psyops teams in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and the SEA FLOAT AO conducted MEDCAP/DENTCAPs, taped broadcasts from boats and helicopters and leaflet drops throughout September.

In the RSSZ, the Vietnamese medical team with USN medical and dental advisors conducted nine MEDCAP/DENTCAPs in Quang Xuyen and Can Gio Districts south and east of the Nha Be Navy Base. A total of 811 people were treated for various medical and dental ailments and two taken to the Nha Be Navy Base Dispensary for further treatment. The MEDCAP/Psypops teams visited five villages and four Regional Forces company compounds by helicopter (USA Slicks). Sixty-three Health Kits were distributed. On September 2, the MEDCAP/DENTCAP was held aboard Vietnamese LCVP and RF company boats while BJU-1 (Beach Jumper Unit ONE) personnel played tapes urging support of the GVN.

The RSSZ Psyops team conducted airborne broadcasts in Slicks seven times during the month, playing tapes of 30 to 45 minutes length urging people to "Chieu Hoi." There were also three leaflet drops conducted in the two districts Can Gio and Quang Xuyen; areas covered were saturated with a total of 151,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets, 37,500 Weapons Reward leaflets, and 30,000 Safe Conduct passes.
In the SEA FLOAT area of operations, the Psyops/Civic Action team reported seven Hoi Chanhs, 125 people who were medically treated, 281 detainees, and 17 hours of air and surface Psyops broadcasts during September. On 3 September at 1520H, 10 refugees, two men, two women, and six children, rallied to VNN Alpha boats at VQ 905 603. The ralliers reported they had heard Psyops broadcasts but that they were weak and incomprehensible; they rallied due to fear of air strikes. On 15 September at 1315H, 58 refugees rallied to VN junks in Vien An Village (VQ 93 61) in response to the Psyops broadcasts and due to fear of air strikes. Cumulatively, since 10 July 1970, there have been seven Hoi Chanhs and 624 refugees who have rallied to the allied forces at SEA FLOAT.

Civic Action projects, the building of a 25-bed hospital at Ham Rong II Hamlet and the civilian agricultural project, were reported as making slow progress due to the move to SOLID ANCHOR, and a lack of lumber. CTF 116.1 reported receiving axes, saws, and other materials which were needed for Civic Action work.

It was also reported that in the refugee hamlets Ham Rong I and II, "Terrorism has reached the point where woodcutters are leaving the rich authorized cutting zones and are cutting in free fire zones within the SOLID ANCHOR 5,000 meter defensive perimeter."
The tragic possibility, particularly at night, of mistaking woodcutters for VC is becoming greater daily." VNN PolWar and Psyops/Civic Action teams (five men each), with the assistance of the Yabuta junk forces, are engaged in daily Civic Action operations in Ham Rong I and II. Six Vietnamese educational films have been shown there since the inception of the plan last month. A census taken of Ham Rong I and II on 26 September showed a total stable population of 5,852 (4,058 children) and a transient population of 2,270. There are in the two hamlets: 836 homes, 396 sampans, 20 charcoal kilns, and 35 fish processing shops.
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The MARKET TIME Inner Barrier was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 September at Cam Ranh Bay. The Inner Barrier force was designated Task Force 213 under the command of Captain Nguyen Hou Chi, VNN, with former CTF 115, CDR Thomas F. Mullane acting as his deputy for one day, until he was relieved by CAPT Carl R. Quanstrom on 2 September. In addition to the Inner Barrier, the VNN also has control of Coastal Surveillance Centers at An Thoi, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and Danang, with a Combined Operations Center (COC) at Cam Ranh Bay. CTF 115 continues to control the Outer Barrier of Operation MARKET TIME, under the Task Designator of II5.6. The Inner Barrier turnover marked the second transfer of a major USN operation in Vietnam (the first one being SEA LORDS in July, 1970), and the assumption of responsibility for Inshore MARKET TIME by the VNN also resulted in the implementation of some new patrol procedures which are explained in the "Coastal Surveillance Force" section of this summary. The task organization and key personnel for the operation are as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title &amp; Location</th>
<th>CDR &amp; Deputy CDR</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTG 213.1</td>
<td>Northern Surveillance</td>
<td>CAPT Ho Van Dy Thoai</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CDR, Danang</td>
<td>LCDR Ton That Ky</td>
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<td>CTG 213.2</td>
<td>Central Surveillance</td>
<td>CDR Pham Manh Khue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CDR, Nha Trang</td>
<td>CDR Nguyen Nhoc Rac</td>
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CTU 213.2.1 North Central Surveillance
CDR, Qui Nhon

CTG 213.3 Southern Surveillance CDR
Vung Tau

CTG 213.4 Gulf of Thailand Surveillance
CDR, An Thai

Advisors and Deputies

SA CTF 213 CAPT C. R. Quanstrom

SA CTG 213.1 CDR R. C. Kuchera
Lcdr T. J. Berger

SA CTG 213.2 CDR J. L. Manzlot
Lcdr C. E. Holcomb

SA CTU 213.3.1 Lcdr C. E. Holcomb

SA CTG 213.3 CDR K. P. Hughes
Lcdr R. E. Dudson

SA CTG 213.4 Lcdr G. W. McKay
Lcdr A. L. Cassott

The new task group commanders will also act as Coastal Zone
commanders, while their deputies assume the role of COSFLOT
commanders.

Six of the craft transferred for the month were concerned, eight

ACTOY-X PCFs were turned over at Cat Lo on 1 September, the first
of a group of 38 PCFs to be turned over by December. Four of the
eight PCFs turned over on 1 September were sailed to COSFLOT 4 at An Thoi; the other four chopped to 116.1 on 4 September for duty at SOLID ANCHOR.

A total of 13 support craft were transferred by NSF Danang during September. On 10 September, three LCM-8s (812, 873, and 678) were presented to the VNN, represented by LCDR Le Ba Thong, VNN, a First Coastal Zone Logistics Officer, by LCDR G. C. Moore, ACTOVLOG Officer, NSF Danang. On 15 September two LCPLs, two 45-foot picket boats, PBs 39 and 41 to be used for harbor defense, and two Boston Whalers were accepted by LCDR Pham Pho, First Coastal Zone Logistics Officer, from LCDR K. W. McCarter.

Finally, on 30 September, LCU 1485 (for Fleet Command), LCM-8 798, LCM-6 628, and PB 44 were signed over to CAPT Ho Van Ky Thoai, First Coastal Zone Commander, by CAPT Maurice A. Horn, Commanding Officer, NSF Danang. September's turnovers brought to 49 the number of boats turned over by NSF Danang in the last 10 months.

As part of the salvage ACTOV program, CSB-2 was transferred to CTF 214 on 17 September at Cat Lo. Thus, by the end of September 49 logistics craft and 575 operational craft had been turned over, with 102 logistics and 225 operational craft remaining to be transferred.
Training proceeded as usual for the month. September outputs were:

138 graduated from basic E/E School at NTC, Nha Trang, 5 September;
24 graduated from EM "A" School, Nha Trang, 5 September;
109 graduated from EN "A" School, Nha Trang, 26 September;
134 graduated from Saigon Maintenance School, 19 September;
59 VNN Officer Candidates graduated from OCS, Newport, R. I., 23 September.

The Food Supplement Program continued its normal cycle of procreation and consumption for the month, with 101 projects operated by 74 VNN units at 42 bases; 44 of these 101 are in the expansion stage. There is a total livestock population of 42,000 chickens, 240 swine, 500 ducks, 149 rabbits, and 3 goats.

As of 14 September 1800 dependent shelters had been completed, and an additional 1100 were under construction. Work was proceeding at a rate of 140 shelters per week, which would come close to the goal of 2500 complete by 30 September 1970. It is anticipated that the great cutback in USN construction personnel over the next few months will have a severe effect on the shelter program. There are 22,000 dependent shelters programmed for the VNN and VNMC, and it is estimated that USN funds and personnel strength are sufficient.
to construct only about 5,000 of these. Thus, VNN participation in the building will be the single most important determinant of its ultimate success, and it remains to be seen just how extensive this participation will be.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

Action involving Naval Support Activity, Saigon, units and detachments was very light in September. The Logistics Support Base at Dong Tam received two 120 mm mortar rounds in the early morning hours of 28 September and one more round that same night. There were no personnel or material casualties. The Advance Tactical Support Base at Moc Hoa was not as fortunate. At almost the same time that the LSB at Dong Tam was going to Red Alert because of the two mortar rounds, the ATSB at Moc Hoa was hit by a B-40 rocket. The rocket detonated in the berthing quarters of the ATSB ammi, wounding SN Wayne Brant and BMC Joseph Zagar. SN Brant was treated and released while BMC Zagar was transferred to the 94th Evacuation Hospital for further treatment.

On 2 September, the Naval Support Activity, Saigon received the Navy Unit Commendation in ceremonies at the Logistics Support Base at Nha Be. Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Jr., COMNAVFORV, presented the award to RADM Robert E. Adamson, Jr., COMNAV-SUPPACT, Saigon, and to ENCS Paul B. Bostic, the senior enlisted man at LSB, Nha Be.
On 26 September, USS SATYR (ARL 23), a venerable veteran of both Vietnam and Cambodian naval action, departed Vietnamese waters for a well earned restricted availability period in Japan. This unit had served as a major asset in various TRAN HUNG DAO campaigns.
HAYING THE WAY - Equipment Operator Third Class, Freddie Gurner (right) at California, Cal. He is assigned to construction battalion, Mattock, 33d Division which is building the homes throughout the country under the Works Progress Administration. Helping Hand.
THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

As in previous months, the most significant tactical incidents involving Seabees took place on Routes LTL-4 and QL-1D in the southern portion of the First Military Region. The Seabees in this area continued to be hindered in their construction efforts by a series of minings which injured six U.S. Navymen during the month.

One major construction highlight of the month was the completion of the Quang Tri highway bridge on Route QL-1. This 901-foot two lane bridge was dedicated, turned over, and opened to traffic on 4 September. Also completed during the month were the upgrade of the Tra Bong airfield, the paving of Route QL-1 South, and the ACTOV base at Thuan An. Nearing completion are the ATSBs at Phuoc Trach and Nam Can, the ACTOV bases at Ha Tien, Chau Doc, and Kien An, and the dependent housing project at Ha Tien.

The usual contingent of visiting dignitaries paid calls on the men of SOLID ANCHOR in late August and September. On 31 August, a star-studded party including LT General Weyand, prospective DEPCOMUSMACV, Maj. General McCown, CG DMAC, Rear Admiral Matthews, DEPCOMNAVFORV, and Maj. General Truong, CG Main Reg. IV Corps visited SOLID ANCHOR. On 7 September, Vice Admiral King, COMNAVFORV, Rear Admiral Chon, VNN CNO, and Rear Admiral Marshall, CEC, CCMTHIRDNCB visited.
Seabee units NMCB TEN and CBMU 361 completed their deployments in Vietnam during the month of September and were redeployed to CONUS.

The remaining Naval Construction forces have a total projected backlog in the First Military Region amounting to seven weeks of horizontal and 18 weeks of vertical work. In the Third and Fourth Military Regions the projected backlog for present Seabee assets is 26 weeks of horizontal and 51 weeks of vertical work.

There were a total of 1,733 Seabees (62 officers, 1,671 enlisted) in the Republic of Vietnam at month's end. Seabees received six Purple Heart Awards during the month.
APPENDIX I

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF: Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON: A multi-purpose barge, standard size is 28' x 90'
AO: Area of operations
ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASPB: Assault Support Patrol Boat
ATC: Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB: Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W: Automatic weapons
BLACK PONY/BRONCO: OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counterinsurgency Aircraft
CCB: Command and Communications Boat
CG: Coastal Group
CHICOM: Chinese Communist
CIDG: Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages
CMD: Capital Military District
CONUS: Continental United States
CRIP
CZ
DUSTOFF
ENIFF
FSB
FWMAF
GDA
GVN
HAFT
H&I
JGS
KIT CARSON SCOUTS

Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
Coastal Zone
Medical evacuation by helo
Enemy-initiated firefight
Fire Support Base
Free World Military Assistance Forces
Gun Damage Assessment
Government of Vietnam
Helicopter Attack Fire Team
Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support
Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units
Light Attack Fire Team
Light Anti-tank Weapon
Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team
Light Helo Fire Team
OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter
Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP  Medical Civic Action Program
MONITOR  Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 mm cannon or 105 mm Howitzer)
MR  Military Region
MRF  Mobile Riverine Force
MSB  Minesweeper, Boat
MSD  Minesweeper, Drone
MSF  Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
NGFS  Naval Gunfire Support
NILO  Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC  Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NOD  Night Observation Device
NVA  North Vietnamese Army
OJT  On-the-job Training
PBR  Patrol Boat, River
PCF  Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)
PRU  Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA  Province Sector Advisor
PSYOPS  Psychological Operations
RAD  River Assault Division
RAG  River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID  River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAS  River Assault Squadron
Regional Forces/Popular Forces

River Patrol Division

Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group

Rung Sat Special Zone

Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)

Search and Rescue

UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated

C-119 aircraft

20-foot fiberglass motorboat

UH-1B Helo, USA operated

C-47 aircraft

Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)

Strike Assault Boat

Tactical Area of Responsibility

United States Army, Vietnam

Vietnamese Marine Corps

Vietnamese Navy

Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor

Rocket Assisted Projectile