aged Vietnamese male brought his 15 year old sister to the base
suffering from small caliber gunshot wounds in her right shoulder
and chest. The boy related that his sister was wounded and his
father killed by the VC in the vicinity of WR 110 170 at approximately
2100H. The girl was given first aid and taken to the civilian
hospital at Ca Mau.

The second such incident occurred on 13 May at approximately
1500H when an adult Vietnamese female was shot in the neck
near her home at WR 106 168. She was treated by USN and VNN
corpsmen at ATSB Ca Mau and driven to Ca Mau Hospital. Allied
personnel were unable to determine who shot the woman or for
what reason.

The guerrillas based along the Song Ong Doc struck once more
on 16 May when they again turned to terror tactics, this time
attacking an unarmed water taxi with B-40 rockets at WR 020 050.
The attack at 1000H did no damage to the water taxi or its occupants.
Units of RPD-63 on routine patrol in the vicinity were called, but the
VNN patrol officer decided not to enter the area.

RAG 26 personnel were the next victims of the guerrillas as
rivercraft of this unit were struck at VR 937 010 while proceeding
to a PF troop insertion point. The attack occurred at 0914H and was
carried out with small arms and automatic weapons. One VNN and two PF soldiers were wounded and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Later the same day, at 1530H, units of RAG 26 received B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the south bank at VR 933 007. Units returned and suppressed the fire and continued on patrol. There was no damage, and no casualties incurred by friendly forces; enemy casualties were unknown.

A resupply convoy consisting of one LCM, two LCUs and various units of RAG 26 and RPD 63 was attacked on 19 May at VR 878 003, at 1245H. The enemy attacked with B-40 rockets, automatic weapons and small arms. The LCM-6 was hit with one B-40 rocket, as was the LCU HQ 1571, both suffering minor damage but fortunately no casualties. The units returned and suppressed the fire and probably killed one VC.

The third incident in which civilians bore the brunt of violence happened at 2130H on 23 May when a 13 year old girl was hit by a stray round from an RF/PF unit operating in the vicinity of VR 045 070. She was brought into ATSB Ca Mau by sampan, treated by the duty corpsman and rushed to the civilian hospital where she died.
On 27 May at 1455H, VNN LCM-8 HQ 920 came under B-40 rocket attack as she made her way up the Song Ong Doc after receiving supplies from USS WHITFIELD COUNTY. The firing came from the south bank at VR 915 010 and was immediately answered by the LCM and her five escorts from RAG 26. They completely suppressed the fire; however, one rocket hit the conex box containing an acetylene bottle and a fire broke out. The fire was controlled and the convoy continued to ATSB Song Ong Doc. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Excitement was generated at ATSB Song Ong Doc on 29 May at 0237H and again at 0315H as the VC tried unsuccessfully to sneak mines past the alert sentries. The sentries destroyed both mines with concussion grenades; the explosions causing waterspouts 70 feet high. No friendly troops were injured, and enemy casualties were not determined.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon engaged in one operation in May; the purpose being to capture VC infrastructure. The Seal team, accompanied by an interpreter and eight National Policemen, inserted from a National Police Boat at 1545H on 12 May at WR 199 017. They patrolled toward
the tax collector's hootch but enroute spotted eight males with weapons and opened fire. The enemy evaded and since the patrol was compromised due to the firing, the Seals decided to patrol to the extraction point via the tax collector's hootch. As they approached the tax collector's hootch, he was seen evading 500 meters east into a treeline. The Seals extracted by boat at 1915H and returned to the base empty handed.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was moderate during the month of May. Units of CTF 210 engaged the enemy on 14 occasions, killing 45 VC and capturing five. Twenty-one structures and eight sampans were destroyed and five weapons, one watermine and miscellaneous supplies were captured. Five craft were mined, two of which were disabled and one sunk. The other two suffered slight damage but were able to carry out their operational commitments. Two Americans, 12 Vietnamese, and four civilians were wounded; five Vietnamese sailors were killed, and one ARVN was declared missing. CTG 116.8 and 116.7.3 accounted for 26 VC killed and six wounded; 59 structures, 27 bunkers, 64 sampans, and miscellaneous supplies were destroyed in flying 86 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XVII Operations.

The majority of enemy activity occurred on the Can Gio Canal in an area about 25 to 29 kilometers southwest of Kien An. A study of the terrain in this area reveals small fields bordered by thick forest on either side of the canal. Because of the open rice fields lying behind the forest along the canal, these areas are much more conducive to minings than to ambushes. Since the first of the year there have been ten minings on the Can Gio Canal, four on the Tram Tram, and ten on the Can Tau (three of which were recorded this month). Ambushes on the other hand, would be vulnerable.
to air strikes, and the terrain would not facilitate a guerrilla team's concealment or retreat.

On the Trem Trem River, enemy activity was concentrated in an area from 14 to 21 kilometers northwest of Thoi Binh (WR 102 328). The banks of the river here are covered with thick foliage which extends a considerable distance back from both banks. This cover permits much easier retreat from the ambush site and affords good protection from air strikes.

Activity along the Cai Tan River was centered around hamlets 3 and 4 of An Khanh Village (WR 030 350). This area is heavily vegetated with interspaced rice fields and is thus conducive to both ambush and mining attacks.

During the past month, intelligence reports were received of enemy units resupplying along the U Minh coastline via small coastal type craft. Air assets, when utilized, proved effective in partially interdicting this enemy resupply operation. A review of the many different insertion points indicated that the enemy was not establishing a pattern by over-using any one canal or stream. Speculation as to possible points of origin included the Me So MT area (VS 610 250) and the Three Sisters area (VS 870 180). It was also possible that the enemy was shuttling supplies down the coast, relaying them from one craft to another, until the final destination was reached.
The Camp Sentinel Radar System located at Op Base Kien An reported heavy enemy movement on five different occasions during the month. At approximately 0310H on 6 May, the operator of the radar system reported heavy enemy movement from 200 meters to the 800 meter range that indicated enemy troop deployment for a possible attack on the Op Base. With clearance from the Kien An District, an 81 mm mortar barrage was laid on the area by a U.S. advisor mortar crew with concurrent 30 caliber machine gun fire from the south tower. Shortly after the initial mortar barrage, the CSR showed two groups retreating to the south and southwest. One group embarked in sampans and the other group reentered the area to recover their stricken numbers. A second mortar barrage was laid down along with 105 mm artillery to prevent withdrawing units from recovering the bodies. The mortar fire was lifted at 0730H when civilian traffic in the area prevented safe firing. A thorough sweep of the area by RF and PF forces plus USN advisors revealed considerable grass trails and fresh sandal prints but no bodies. The radar estimates of the enemy force placed the strength at approximately 100 men.

On 11 May, a group of approximately 10-15 suspected enemy were observed at WR 125 880. At 0220H, with clearance from the Kien An Sector, 81 mm mortar fire was unleashed upon the target. No sweep of the area was made by the RF/PF forces and the movement of the target...
indicated a possible reconnaissance patrol from an NVA unit supposedly located at WR 125 795.

On 18 May, a gate tower guard observed two muzzle flashes from a position located at WR 125 902. Immediately thereafter mortar rounds, evaluated as 60 mm, were received in the Can Gio Canal adjacent to the base. No additional fire was received and none was returned. Approximately 60 VC were detected at WR 080 904 and 60 VC at WR 133 873.

On 19 May, the CSR registered heavy movement between 200 and 800 meters in a southerly direction. A bombardment of 60 and 81 millimeter mortar fire plus 50 caliber and M-60 machine gun fire was directed at the target. An estimate of approximately 100 enemy personnel were reported at the target position. A sweep of the area by RF troops recovered no bodies. Again on 19 May, an estimated 30 enemy personnel were reported in the same vicinity and once again, mortars were fired. The enemy withdrew and the extent of enemy casualties could not be determined.

Firebombs by waterborne units were comparatively light during the month and the number of minkings and recovered mines seemed to ease.

On 10 May, a 110 boat convoy experienced a watermine detonation near the bank at WR 009 387 on the Cai Tau River in An Kuyen Province. The trigger force of the mine detonation
was described as very small, about equal to one or two concussion
grenades or possibly a low order detonation of a larger mine. The crew
checked the sweep gear immediately after the incident and recovered
about 20 feet of nylon line. No casualties or damage occurred in the
incident.

On 18 May, a 13 boat convoy from the 32nd Regimental CP
enroute to Ca Mau with three lead boats minesweeping was delayed
when the fifth boat, an ARVN LCM-8, was mined at WR 012 352 on the
Cai Tau River in An Xuyen Province. The LCM-8 was heavily damaged
by a large watermine that badly warped the hull. As a result, the boat
was beached on the east bank in shallow water. A Seawolf strike was
placed in the area and SEALORD 05 which was transitting the area
responded immediately to the medevac request. One ARVN was killed,
one wounded, and one was declared missing in the encounter.

The next day two ASPBs of RAID 75 were transitting south from
the 32nd Regimental CP to the area of the LCM-8 sinking when the lead
boat, HQ 5126, was struck and disabled by a watermine blast under the
stern. No other fire was received and the boat was towed to the 32nd CP.
Three Vietnamese sailors were wounded (all seriously). The enemy was
not finished with the incident as one of the four boats (HQ 9171 of RAID 75),
providing security around the wreck of the ARVN LCM-8, was the object
of a sapper placed mine. Fortunately the discovery was made prior to
detonation. The mine was placed near the bar armor below the waterline
and removed by RAID 75 personnel. A VNN EOD team assigned to the TRAN
HUNG DAO XVII salvage operations disarmed the mine, which was
contained in a wooden box and weighed approximately 40 kilos.

On 21 May at 1350H, HQ 5122 and HQ 5123 of RAID 74 were each
struck by B-40/41 rocket fire at WR 077 388 on the Song Trem Trem
as they were proceeding in a 12 boat convoy north to the 32nd CP.
The other craft returned fire to both banks and a Black Pony strike was
requested. Both ASPBs, although slightly damaged, proceeded on their
own power. One American, SFl Donald F. Antonacci, received minor
shrapnel wounds to the right thigh. Five Vietnamese sailors were also
wounded (two serious and three minor).

On 22 May, a 12 boat convoy under operational control of CTG 210.2,
while proceeding south from the 32nd CP (WR 04 47) to Ca Mau, was attacked
on two occasions by B-40 rocket fire. HQ 1234 received an B-40 rocket
and small arms fire on the port side from the east bank at WR 079 394 at
1110H. All the boats beached and returned the fire. At 1115H, as the convoy
resumed transit, HQ 1239 was struck by one B-40 rocket and again the
boats were beached and returned the fire. Seawolves were called in to
rake the west bank; while one company of ARVN were inserted to patrol
the east bank. At 1130H, another B-40 was fired but missed its target,
HQ 1234. Immediately, the ARVN took under fire six VC running from their bunkers. In the ensuing fight, three ARVN were wounded by a VC grenade tossed by the retreating enemy personnel. The ARVN soldiers were withdrawn and the Seawolves placed strikes on the other bank. At 1415H, contact was terminated and the convoy resumed transit to Ca Mau without further incident.

On 24 May PBRs of RPD 61 were ambushed with B-40 rocket fire at WR 215 755, nine kilometers west of Kien Hung. The boats returned the fire and with the assistance of Black Ponies and Seawolves, suppressed the enemy fire. No casualties were reported from the incident.

On 25 May, HQ 1234 of RAID 75, in transit to a WBGP, experienced a mine detonation near its position at WR 008 363 on the Rach Soi Toi. The suspected mine was thought to be command detonated. No damage resulted as only mud was thrown on board the craft.

During May, accidents on two rivercraft effectively denied their use to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII. On 8 May, a fire was detected aboard a U.S. Army LCM-8 moored in a nest alongside the repair ammi at Op Base Kien An. The boat was loaded with approximately 9,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel in bladders. Response to the fire by all hands was immediate and professional, but the fire could not be contained, and the boat was set adrift to the north bank of the river. The fire was finally brought under control with a layer
of foam and the bladders cooled. The boat was later towed back across the river and beached a safe distance from the Kien An piers. Both COMNAVFORV and DEFCOMTHD congratulated the personnel of Op Base Kien An for their actions in controlling the blaze. One U.S. Army soldier received slight burns in fighting the blaze.

The other incident occurred on 31 May when a USN LCM-3 sank alongside the pier in approximately 20 feet of water. The boat was last pumped at 1900H on 30 May. The OIC TRAN HUNG DAO XVII Salvage Operations was directed to survey the craft at the first available opportunity. On 31 May, SENADV CTF 210 directed the Senior Advisor CTG 210.1 to appoint an officer to investigate the sinking in accordance with the directives prescribed in the JAG Manual. By month's end, the investigation of the sinking was still pending.

HCU-1 salvage personnel kept up the relentless struggle of clearing sunken craft from waterways in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO with the salvage of HQ 8001 on 30 April, RID 48 ATCs HQ 1293 and 1294 on 13 May, and Zippo 6533 on 26 May. On 28 April, HQ 8001 was found in the Can Gio Canal facing the western bank and making a 45 degree angle to that bank at VR 995 699. The boat was sitting upright on the bottom of the canal in four feet of mud. The bow was in approximately eight feet of water and the stern in approximately ten feet of water. The boat had
extensive damage in the well deck and initial thoughts suggested that the forward voids could not be made watertight. The stern and engine room were damaged on the deck area probably due to counter mining. There was a split in the bottom from the bow ramp to a spot approximately two feet aft of the forward lifting pad. The whole part of the well deck was blown up and all the bulkheads and walls forward were buckled. On 29 April work progressed on the salvage and by the end of the day the LCMS-1 started pulling HQ 8001 onto the beach. On 30 April, the LCMS-2 was pressed into service for the final assault and by a constant effort dragged HQ 8001 partially onto the beach. The craft was left approximately 40 feet on the beach with the engine room completely out of the water and 30 feet in the water, secured from sliding back by a one inch wire. As a result of the salvage operation, LCMS-1 was declared to be of no further use due to the deficiencies in the electrical system and the attendant hazard to the personnel who could not start it at any given time.

On 11 May, the two USN salvage boats were escorted by two Fourth Coastal Zone units and completed the transit from Kien An to the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP 838). In the morning hours of the next day, the salvage boats continued to ATSB Song Ong Doc with escort by TRAN HUNG DAO X units to commence salvage operations in the southern U Minh. On 12 May, at 0630H, LCMSs 1 and 2 were positioned on each side
of the sunken HQ 1293 and proceeded to raise the craft without incident.

After completing the salvage on HQ 1293, the boats shifted to the sink site of HQ 1294 and, using the same technique, salvaged that craft on 13 May.

Both boats were turned over to the commanding officer of RID 48 at ATSB Song Ong Doc.

After conducting repairs on LCMSs 1 and 2, at Ca Mau, the salvage teams again set out on 17 May for the sink site of Zippo HQ 6533. Combat Group 332 and An Xuyen Sector were detailed to provide security for the operation planned for the waterway on 20 May. On 20 May, as per schedule, LCMS-1 and 2 arrived at the sink site (VR 00 38) at 1430H and positioned the craft for a lift at 1500H. After considerable effort by the crewmembers, operations were secured at 1830H for the day. The next day met with little success, and after resurveying the wreck, a hole eight feet by four and a half feet was discovered along with tears along the bottom. On the 23rd and 24th, all effort was expanded in patching the hulk before proceeding to lift it. Finally, on the next day, the Zippo was raised and placed on the beach where more extensive patching was accomplished before attempting to refloat it. On 27 May, after much patching and refurbishing, the salvage crew pulled HQ 6533 off the beach and, with a skeleton crew aboard, attempted to tow it to Ca Mau. Before they could ascertain the problem, a 'T'-shaped split, a heretofore non-existing damage along the deck centerline

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which deteriorated rapidly, gave way, and in 45 seconds the boat sank again at WR 016 323. The extremely steep bank gradient precluded further salvage attempts and fortunately the craft was not blocking the channel. Due to the position and condition of the craft, the salvage personnel recommended that salvage efforts be abandoned and the hulk be blown in place. COMNAVFORV, however, refrained from granting approval due to the position of the craft which was causing no problem and due to other considerations which were not given. It was suggested that CTF 210 request approval for demolition from CNO VNN. At month’s end, salvage efforts on HQ 6533 were abandoned in favor of continuing with more important salvage projects and the crew continued to the sink site of HQ 6002.

On 3 May, COMNAVFORV requested that a mobile diving team from TRAN HUNG DAO XVII conduct a survey on an ARVN LCM-8 (8545) which was supposed to have been sunk by B-40 rockets in October 1970 at WR 275 755. The Senior Advisor CTF 210 replied that no information existed on any boat sunk at those coordinates, however, an ARVN LCM-8 (8543) was sunk in the Nga Boi Cai Tau River (WR 266 734) on 2 October 1970 as it was transiting with bridging material. CTF 210 further stated that a survey was compatible with the present schedules and that a salvage survey would be attempted on 8 May. On 9 May, the survey was completed on HQ 8543 at WR 226 734. The sunken craft was beached.
stern first at a slope gradient of five degrees with considerable mud accumulation throughout and two B-40 rocket holes amidships. The hulk was in good condition and a recommendation was made for salvage. As of the end of the month, the salvage of HQ 8543 was still pending.

Another problem that surfaced during the month was posed by COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon and Senior Advisor VNN LOGSUPP COM on 24 May over the disposition of beached boats. SENADV CTF 210 responded that no action was being taken by VNN operations at this time to recover the boats. The list of beached boats, locations, and CTF 210 comments were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ 1256</td>
<td>VR 950 688</td>
<td>Beyond economical repair; strike from records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 8001</td>
<td>VR 955 696</td>
<td>Beyond economical repair; recommend survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 5134</td>
<td>Op Base Kien An</td>
<td>Beyond repair; recommend survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 6001</td>
<td>VR 973 750</td>
<td>Beyond economical repair; recommend survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CTF 210 further stated that in view of the condition of the beached boats and questionable prospects of repair, as well as current demands on operational assets and salvage capabilities, renovation priority would be given to boats with high repair potential. All others would be beached for removal or survey, as appropriate, contingent on operational requirements and availability of salvage assets.
The much heralded RADRAG system, which was slated to provide the electronic sweeping for TRAN HUNG DAO XVII units, met with failure as both units were declared inoperative. On 1 May, COMNAVFORV recommended that all critical electronic components of the RADRAG system be replaced. In addition, the NAVFORV Swimmer Defense Officer and an NRDU-V representative were ordered to Kien An to lend additional assistance to the personnel working with the RADRAG system.

What brought forth this decision was the message issued by the SENADV CTF 210 in which he stated that in a pre-mission test on 30 April, neither unit generated an audio signal. Efforts to correct the problem on the 30th of April met with no success and further testing revealed one unit was inoperative due to component failure and the other had a broken wire in the unit. However, both units were reported to have been repaired on the scene. He further stated that equipment tests and crew training included practice sweeps in the Cai Lon River and Can Gao Canal. The primary purpose of the training was to mark locations of mine wire detected by RADRAG so that mines could be destroyed by EOD personnel. This training was necessary in reducing the probability of false alarms due to operator error.

On 4 May, the RADRAG system was scheduled for a mine detection mission prior to employment on 5 May with a JP-4 convoy. After concluding the test, the mission was cancelled due to continuing electronic
problems with the system. The NRDU-V representative at Kien An returned to Saigon for test equipment and schematics necessary for RADRAG repair. As a result of the breakdown, an Army LCM-8 minesweeper was pressed into service to accompany the convoy.

By mid-month after an exhausting study by the research personnel, COMNAVFORV requested that the Senior Advisor Op Base Kien An assemble all the components of the RADRAG devices for transport and repair to NRDU-V. For the present, TRAN HUNG DAO XVII units would have to rely on the minesweeping of the units assigned and the expertise of the personnel that have provided this service in the past.

The Dustoff operation which has been the subject of a series of messages came again to the fore as Senior Advisor CTG 210.4 responded to NAVLE DMAC's terse statements about generalized allegations unsupported by facts. (See CNFV Monthly Summary March, April 1971). Besides disputing DMAC's facts, CTG 210.4 again pointed out the Dustoff response time and also specified that discriminations did exist since six levels of priority were listed. He further stated that he recognized the limitations of Dustoff assets but felt that the time lag was due to inadequate planning. He stated:

"Significantly in a war for the hearts and minds of the people, it is the Vietnamese civilian that has been put on low priority. This seems
One of the serious problems plaguing efforts to turnover completely the assets to the Vietnamese Navy was the subject of a message sent by Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD to the Senior Advisor CTF 210. In it he stated:

It is clear that one of the basic problems inhibiting operational performance in the TRAN HUNG DAO Campaigns is the poor material condition of assigned units. The Vietnamese Navy is operating at full strength and there is no prospect of obtaining new or replacement units in the near future. The only way to put more boats on the line is to reduce the need for major repairs.

A high state of readiness depends primarily on effective maintenance at the operational level. The basic equipment was designed and built to operate for several thousand hours with normal attention to daily, weekly, and monthly routine planned maintenance. It is imperative that the Vietnamese Navy be impressed with the need for such practices and concentrate on preventative maintenance.

You are urged to devote maximum attention in your advisory efforts to achieving the following immediate goals:

A. Perform corrective maintenance on all machinery not presently in service. If it is within the capability of the boat force or advisory team embarked to initiate action to effect repairs. If the only thing keeping a boat from being repaired is technical advice, request it. The SA DEPCOMTHD staff will help you obtain assistance if you desire.

B. Keep equipment running via planned maintenance or PM. Use and study the material which has been distributed on this subject. If you need material, SA DEPCOMTHD staff will assist in obtaining it. During visits to your unit, SA DEPCOMTHD will expect a brief report on what you are doing to keep operational readiness high.

1. SA CTF 210, 4 msg 041000Z May 71.
Long range goals are:

A. Simple but an effective damage control program. Ensure that every craft has at least one DC Log and the minimum DC gear. Again originator will assist with this program.

B. Provide recognition and incentives for those craft commanders, engineers, and advisors that have consistently kept their equipment at or near full operational readiness. Upon notification, originator will urge his counterpart to personally recognize any noteworthy performance.

C. Promote friendly competition between your boats for superior standard of excellence. Establish a suitable incentive for the most improved RAD, best overall, or other category of your own choosing. Again, SA DEPCOMTHD will assist with any worthwhile scheme you devise.

D. U.S. repair ships are leaving before the ISBs and LSBs are completed, therefore, it is mandatory that each crewmember of every boat understands that and appreciates fully the importance of increasing the life of equipment between upkeeps. Part of your job is to help them develop an awareness of the value of routine maintenance practices.

Procedures and written material in this area, promulgated by the USN are often too complex and lengthy for VNN personnel to comprehend or use on the rivers. SA DEPCOMTHD welcomes suggestions from the field as to ways of making preventive maintenance procedures, damage control guides, and documentation simpler and more realistic.

SA DEPCOMTHD is fully aware of the difficulties of selling these concepts in the field and the ticklishness of the advisor's position. Hopefully, by working together, SA DEPCOMTHD can supplement your efforts by making the Vietnamese high command more aware of the problems and encouraging it to become more deeply involved. Your recommendations as to how DEPCOMTHD can help you achieve the above goals would be appreciated.

In response to Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD message, Senior Advisor RPD 61 stated:

It is concurred that locally performed PMS is an important aspect of the problem, however, an equally critical element is major preventive and corrective maintenance and logistic support from LSBs.

2. SA DEPCOMTHD mag 2008 56Z May 71.
and ISBs. Machinery designed to operate for several thousand hours will eventually fail and require major repairs. When this point is exceeded regardless of locally performed minor PMS actions such as checking oil and water levels, PBR PMS requires engine overhaul each two thousand hours. At this point U.S. RIVDIVs also gave the entire boat an overhaul. Almost all RPD 61 engines are in excess of two thousand hours since last overhaul. When an engine has a casualty, it is usually pulled and corrective maintenance performed, but not overhauled. The quality of this corrective maintenance frequently leads to further engine casualties. In practice a corrective maintenance system has replaced PMS in the VNN. It should be pointed out that ISB Rach Sol personnel are trying to do a good job but are severely hampered due to lack of spare parts and rotatable spares as well as lack of capable VNN PBR engineers. Although two RPDs have been based at Rach Sol since October 1970, the base has only had a spare parts allowance for one RPD. The situation will probably deteriorate further because of the "cluster" concept which will require RPD 61 to obtain repairs at Long Xuyen even though operating from Rach Sol, and even though Long Xuyen is not ready to operate yet. It has been noted with concern the gradual material condition deterioration since turnover regardless of local performance of PMS. RPD 58 craft show the same deterioration. It is felt that only a thorough overhaul can be obtained from either ISB Rach Sol or LSC Binh Thuy in reasonable amount of time based on past performance. RPD 61 now stages two PBRs to LSC Binh Thuy in time for routine repairs. Ninety percent or more of the time at Binh Thuy is spent waiting. Quality of work is usually poor and excessive time required is unbelievable. One RPD has had boats at Binh Thuy for seven months that are still awaiting repairs. Whereas Rach Sol tries, it is hard to give Binh Thuy much credit.

Performance of PMS at RPD level is a function of commendation and desires of the boat captain. Unfortunately the RPD 61 repair officer does not feel strongly about PMS and the other junior officers do not become involved. Some conscientious boat captains do an acceptable job on PMS despite lack of spare parts and tools. Others do zero. There are no check sheets turned in for documentation or supervision purposes because the unit cannot afford to buy paper or make its own. This problem was addressed to COMNAVFORV which offered assistance. Information on VNN consumable supplies is difficult to obtain. The Naval Supply Advisor's Handbook simply states consumables are underfunded. Information from LSC, ISB, and counterpart indicates each RPD received the thousand plasters per quarter for all administrative consumables. On the open market this would purchase about one room of paper, insufficient for one month's worth of check sheets. All units queried indicated at least some consumable support on the side from advisors.
Some advisors hesitate to look closely at where their counterpart might be getting some of his supplies.

My counterpart is making some effort in this area, but effectiveness is difficult to judge. Competition between boats culminates each month with stand by for penalty inspection. Leading boats receive monetary prizes. The worst boats must stand by for penalty inspections. The problem is lack of suitable prizes.

The senior VNN command attention to promote PMS, and to distribute and make available adequate base support for major maintenance, is vital. This advisory unit has shifted prime emphasis from operations to logistics and maintenance.  

In a change of command, Captain Paul C. Gibbons, Jr., USN, relieved CDR Wyatt P. Watson, USN, as SENADV CATF 211 and SENADV CTF 210 on 22 May. On 8 May, LT C. Thompson, HCU-1 representative located at Vung Tau, was relieved by LTJG Borckowski.

3. SA RPD 61 mag 231045Z May 71.

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The Mekong Convoy operation was originated as a short term operation to keep POL and general supplies coming into the Khmer capital city when Route 4 from the port of Kompong Som was closed due to enemy activity. It had been officially extended for two more months as of the first of May. As a normal Mekong convoy consistently carried ten times as much POL as a regular 30 truck convoy, and as Route 4 remained only marginally open during the month while the Mekong convoys had always been getting through, and as the POL shortage in Phnom Penh remained critical in May, the decision to extend the river convoy was altogether logical. Security of shipping on the Mekong improved significantly in the past two months, with only minor harassing incidents occurring.

The attack on convoy TP-17 at the end of April was the first attack on a convoy since 17 March, and the 21st attack since the convoys began. The area bounded by WT 22 24 and WT 28 37 was the scene of eight previous attacks this year. Of the other 12 attacks, all but one were between WT 25 65 and WT 12 72.

Convoy TP-18, consisting of two merchant ships, two tankers with 1400 tons of POL, three tugs towing two barges of ammo,
two barges of general cargo, and one barge of POL, and a Leapdal
towboat with a POL barge, departed Tan Chau at 0300H on 8 May.
The escorting force had a standard composition: a mine sweeping
force of six PBRs and four mine sweepers, an interdiction force
of six PBRs, a blocking force of four ASPBs and two ATCs and
one Monitor, a scouting force of two Cambodian PBRs, a convoy
escort of three PCFs and 16 Vietnamese PBRs and five Cambodian
PBRs, a reaction force of six ASPBs and four ATCs and one CCB,
and finally a flagship of one LSSL. The USAF FACs gave continuous
airborne cover, as did USAF fixed wing gunships, while USN
Seawolf gunships of Detachment 5 and 9 stood by on ready alert. The
Navy helicopters were only able to give support strikes when up to
one half the distance to Neak Luong, as their staying time did not
allow them to proceed further. As the entire route from Tan Chau
to Phnom Penh was considered a "no-fire zone", a clearance was
needed for each response to the enemy, somewhat slowing the
reaction time. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1600H on the
same day.

Convoy PT-18, composed of ten vessels with escorts was
underway at 1010H on 9 May. Ten kilometers outside of Phnom
Penh the tug VIKING was ordered to turn back by the convoy
commander, since she was making less than four knots while five
knots was the required minimal speed for escorting POL and ammo carrying craft. The tug VIKING was consistently one of the slowest main body units, and since she was a general cargo barge she was 'expendable'. The convoy arrived at Tan Chau without incident at 1945H on the same day.

At 0230H on 17 May, convoy TP-19 left the Tan Chau staging area, with a composition of four merchant ships with general cargo, four tankers with POL, a tug with two ammo barges, and a Leapdol towboat with a POL barge. The convoy was attacked at WT 298 380 at 0700H with 75mm recoilless rifle and B-40 rocket fire. The tanker VIRA received one hit, sustaining slight damage, as did the merchant ship ALLY. At 0710H the escort force returned fire and a reaction force landed to support bank security forces. The fire fight resulted in three casualties (one killed and two wounded). The convoy meanwhile had been split with six ships holding at Neak Laong and four ships south of the point of contact. All ships rejoined the convoy at 0945H and continued past the contact area, arriving at Phnom Penh at 1600H.

Convoy PT-19 was composed of three merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs, and a towboat. The convoy split into two segments, with the slow segment consisting of the two slow tugs, making 4.5 knots,
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departing at 0800H on 18 May. The fast element departed at 0930H, two hours later, and the entire convoy arrived at Tan Chau without incident at 1930H.

Convoy TN-19, heading for Neak Luong with three LCUs with tanks and ammunition, escorted by two PBRs, six ASPBs, and five ATCs, departed Tan Chau at 1000H on 18 May. Aircover was provided as necessary. During the month a 26 tank convoy of trucks left Tan Chau and transited Route 1 without incident to Phnom Penh.

Mekong Convoy TP-20 departed the Tan Chau staging area at 0100H on 27 May, arriving at 1515H the same day without incident. The convoy was composed of two merchantmen with general cargo, a tanker, three tugs, and a Leapdal towboat. The convoy brought a total of 450,000 gallons of critically needed POL to the capital city.

The return convoy, PT-20, departed Phnom Penh at 0900H the following day, arriving at 1300H without incident. The convoy was composed of four merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs, and a Leapdal towboat. Besides general cargo the convoy carried 3000 tons of rice for the erstwhile "ricebowl of Asia", Vietnam.

The Mekong Convoy designation procedures in use were a modification of the system used for merchant ship convoys during

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66
World Wars I and II. There have been three different types of convoys: commercial convoys between Tan Chau and Phnom Penh (designated TP-__); military resupply convoys for ARVN troops between Tan Chau and Neak Luong (designated TN-__); and special interest, high priority, military or civilian convoys between Tan Chau and Phnom Penh. Return convoys have been simply designated with the letters reversed. (e.g. PT__). Planning of the commercial convoys started usually at least seven days ahead of the anticipated movement of the convoy. The military convoys between Tan Chau and Neak Luong have been more rapidly organized, with generally one day advanced warning. The air and surface escorts have been lighter and bank security troops have not been a prerequisite.

A 15 May message from Phnom Penh noted that industrial diesel oil was in very short supply. TP-18 had not carried any and oil company officials stated that several private industries were forced to temporarily shut down until the next convoy arrived with POL. TP-19 proved a disappointment to the oil companies, and industrial diesel reached extremely low levels, while mogas and auto diesel were almost exhausted. TP-20 brought almost 450,000 gallons of POL, which was, nonetheless, insufficient for the need. For at month's end, fuel oil in Phnom Penh was reported by Texakom to be still at a critically low state, so much so that
special escort for the tanker KHMER TRADER, with 569,400 gallons of POL, was requested in order to get the POL as soon as possible.

The tanker finally left with convoy TP-21 on 2 June.
TRANG HUNG DAO XIX

TRANG HUNG DAO XIX, the area of operation encompassing Kien Hoa Province and the area that was once termed as the least pacified region in South Vietnam, was unusually quiet during the month of May as activity came almost to a standstill. The apparent reasons for the lull were not attributed to the lack of VC in the area, but, rather to the persistent efforts of the GVN in thwarting the enemy intentions, and to the enemy's refitting in order to prepare for a giant onslaught at some future date. To support this, a Hoi Chanh debriefed on 6 May stated that the D-100 Transportation Company was a rear service company operating in the Binh Dai Secret Zone of Kien Hoa Province, and was responsible for the receipt, storage, and reissuance of weapons and ammunition in caches located in Binh Dai. As of February 1971, the D-100 was not responsible for actual transshipment, and supplies were received from the Thanh Phu Secret Zone via junks of another group and were reissued from caches (XS 91 19) in Binh Dai to operating forces of Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces. The operational forces were responsible for transport [to their respective areas] of supplies drawn in Binh Dai. He further reported that the coastal transshipment unit moving supplies from Thanh Phu to Binh Dai was staged out of an area along the Rach Con Minh and the Rach Ho Co (both XR 79 88).
On 10 May, an intelligence report indicated that during the early parts of May, a Communist ocean-going ship stopped offshore of the Thanh Phu Secret Zone and unloaded an unknown amount of weapons and ammunition onto motorized sampans which delivered the material to the area of the Bang Cung Canal (XR 798 980). The ammunition consisted of AK-47, 82 millimeter mortar, RPD/LMG and RPG-2 rounds which were to be distributed to the armed forces in Kien Hoa and Vinh Long Provinces. (CNFV INTSUM 116-71). This is the first report received concerning "ocean going" ships delivering war materials into the Thanh Phu Secret Zone. Such reports have been received however, of shipments into the Binh Dai Secret Zone. Reports have also been received of an unknown enemy transportation unit, probably the D-100 Transportation Company, delivering supplies from Thanh Phu to Binh Dai.

Although the CTG 217.2 units were not challenged by the enemy as frequently as in the past, nevertheless, they continued to patrol the area of operations and resupply the ARVN units. In the most significant action of the month, RAG 23/31 craft acted in direct support of the Second Battalion, Tenth Regiment on 15 May, when they were confronted by an estimated two platoons of VC. While acting as a blocking force for the ARVN, the RAG craft fired 81mm and 40mm mortars, and M-79 rounds in direct fire support. Seven VC were killed in the encounter.
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CTG 116.8 supported TRAN HUNG DAO XIX units with 30 sorties and was credited with the deaths of 30 VC as a result of the intense fire that was placed on suspected enemy positions. In addition, many bunkers and structures were destroyed along with various supplies and ammunition.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was limited to anti-infiltration patrols conducted by PCFs and Yabuta junk assets of the Vietnamese Navy. Although naval units did not participate in any firefights, ARVN troops, supported by U.S. helicopters, accounted for six enemy killed while suffering no friendly casualties.

Intelligence reports indicate that infiltration from Cambodia into the Seven Mountains Area is occurring north of the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO along the Vinh Te Canal toward Chau Doc. This could necessitate expansion of the entire Vinh Te Canal from the vicinity of Ha Tien to Chau Doc.
PLAN HUNG DAO XX, stretching from Ha Tien to VS 61 63 and the apparent enemy infiltration route from the Cambodian border to the Seven Mountains Area.
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Enemy contact was light and infrequent in the Rung Sat Special Zone during the month of May, despite the insertion of units participating in three combined CHUONG DUONG search and destroy operations. The enemy proved elusive or scarce under the pressure of the CHUONG DUONG operations, but the cumulative results were 12 Viet Cong killed, 10 of whom were identified by body count, three of the enemy captured, and two of the enemy rallied as Ho Chi Chans. Four sampans were destroyed as well as 14 bunkers. Numerous supplies including seven weapons and three anti personnel mines were captured from the 14 base camps destroyed during the sweeps. The enemy initiated two fire fights against RF troops during the month. Navy Seawolves accounted for two bunkers destroyed. They flew 20 strikes on intelligence designated targets with no known results, and flew 15 support missions for the CHUONG DUONG sweeps and for ground force patrols.

Three Vietnamese soldiers were medevaced by helo dustoff. Only one mission was aborted due to weather, despite the heavy onslaught of the monsoon. Fire was received from the ground twice, with no adverse effect.

The combined sweep operation CHUONG DUONG 21-71 commenced at 0700H on 5 May. It was organized by the commander

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A U.S. Marine, under the Naval Advisory Group, in the Rung Sat Special Zone with an RF soldier on a CHUONG DUONG search and destroy operation.
of the RSSZ and was composed of several RF companies, a PRU

team, river craft of RAG 27, RPD 57, and the 29th RF Boat

Company, one US LCM, three US UH-1Ds, one US command helo,
two US armed helos, one US OV-10, and one US L-19. The

operation began around coordinates YS 040 797, YS 086 797, YS 105

790... and finally included coordinates XS 880 673, XS 954 760,

and XS 954 730. On the first day a VC equipment warehouse was
damaged, and on 7 May, two VC were killed. This was followed
by several uneventful days, and then on 10 May, at 0950H, a

squad of RF Co. 309, while moving by junk, came under M-79

and AK-47 fire at YS 092 503. The commander of the RSSZ immedi-

ately maneuvered an armed helo and one platoon of RFs for support

and commenced pursuit, with unknown results. The RFs were inserted

by U.S. Army "Slick" helos. CDR Stewart, the 3A RSSZ, who

relieved CDR J.C. Williams on 5 May, rode in a CC helo with the

Marine advisors and the commanders of the RF companies. CDR Stewart

directed each operational sweep from the airborne vantage point.

Operation CHUONG DUONG 22-71 was conducted by the Can

Gio Sub-Sector commander and had similar composition as CHUONG

DUONG 21-71. It commenced at 0600H on 12 May, and had

inconsequential results.
Operation CHUONG DUONG 23-71 was conducted in the Quang Xuyen sub-sector, and began at 0700H on 18 May. Covering the areas around XS 937 772, YS 000 750, and YS 035 556, the operation ended the next day at 1600H, with no significant encounters.

The operations in the RSSZ were not without effect, however, for the minimal enemy losses were consequential due to the VC organization existing in the Rung Sat. Information by a Ho Chi Chanh indicated that the Hong Hoa Chapter of the VC suffered severe setbacks due to heavy losses, including two rammers, one man captured, and two killed in action. (The 20 intelligence strikes of the Seawolves very probably accounted for some of the VC troubles. Captured VC declared a great fear of the Seawolves, and confirmed that the RSSZ intelligence officer, Dai-Uy Dan, had been accurately pinpointing enemy targets for the Seawolves' strikes). The manpower shortages were reported to have severely curtailed the political activities of the Long Thanh Chapter of the NLF.

In addition to the support mission in the CHUONG DUONG operations, the PBRs of the Rung Sat searched junks on the average of 96 per day. The search entailed lifting floorboards and checking 10 cards, and 80% of the searching took place on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, with most of the remaining patrolling taking
place on the Sci Rap. Sixty four boats, junks, and craft were assigned to the RSSZ, while 51 were operational and, on the average, 41 were employed during the month. The primary mission of the PBRs was escort for the merchant ships moving up the Long Tau Shipping Channel. The Long Tau has been described as the most valuable piece of real estate in the Republic of Vietnam. The PBRs did not escort the ships alone, for the primary mission of the Seawolves was also escort of shipping, and a Seawolf was always in the air when shipping was on the Long Tau. Historically, there has yet to be an attack on the Long Tau while a helo was overhead. The secondary mission of the American helos was observing the reliability of the PBRs and submitting a daily report to the VNN RPD commander that indicated when a particular PBR had failed to escort a ship up his leg of the channel. The reports, begun in April, produced marked results in increased escort reliability in the beginning, but overall they have resulted in only slight improvement by the PBRs. Since there had been no attack on the Long Tau in seven months, the Vietnamese possibly did not view a PBR absence from a merchant ship as a great risk.

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LONG TAU SHIPPING CHANNEL

As in the past six months, activity by the enemy on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, the life line of Saigon, was absent. The minesweepers of MID 93 continued their regular sweeps of the mine-free channel, but not without difficulties. On 6 May at 0400H, a MSR collided with a Philippine tug on the Long Tau, at YS 928 655, while conducting regular minesweeping operations. Two MSRs were on patrol, with minesweeping lights showing when the second MSR in the line was struck. Fortunately the damage was marginal and the craft continued on to the berthing pier.

On the last day of May, at 0745H, MSR HQ 1905 of MID 93 sank alongside the pier at LSB Nha Be. After a routine night sweep, the MSR returned at 0530H and the entire crew went to sleep. At 0715H the crew was awakened by a member who noticed the list on the boat and the heavy inflow of water as the craft was sinking rapidly. Efforts to control the flooding with a bilge pump were unsuccessful and by 0830H the boat was sunk. The weapons had been removed prior to the sinking. By 2 June the craft was raised by a VNN salvage team. The subsequent report indicated that the exhaust of the port engine, which had been out of commission, had been poorly plugged, and as they worked loose, the flooding of the bilges ensued.
An MSR (Mine Sweeper Remote) on the Long Tau Shipping Channel
The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>CTU 218.1.3</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>CTU 218.1.3</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTF 210</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>CTF 210</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of May.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RPD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>216.1, 228</td>
<td>Phu Guong, Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Keo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau, Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>212.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>213.1</td>
<td>Hoi An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>210.4</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>212.6</td>
<td>Phuoc Xuyen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>212.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Moc Hoa, Tuyen Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Linh Thuy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.
The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Tra Cu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
### RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Long Xuyen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Coastal Zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/33</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>CTG 217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.
Special Warfare

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Officer-in-Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf November Platoon</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LT Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf Papa Platoon</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>LT Antrim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf Quebec Platoon</td>
<td>116.12</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LTJG Taylor LTJG Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf Oscar Platoon</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>LT Ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf Romeo Platoon</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td>LTJG Boyhan LTJG Dundas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seal units are reviewed in the operation in which they operate.

On 1 May, Whiskey Platoon left country and was relieved by Oscar Platoon at Nam Can. On 25 May, Victor Platoon was replaced by November Platoon at Dong Tam. That same day Ten Platoon left Vi Thanh for "stateside" with no relief; the last of Seal Team Two to leave Vietnam.
The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det.</th>
<th>Task Org.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.7.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>116.7.2</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>116.7.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>116.7.4</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>116.7.5</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>116.7.6</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>116.7.7</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>116.7.8</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>116.7.9</td>
<td>YRBM 21 (Tan Chau)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments; major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In May the Seawolves flew 989 missions of which 135 missions were in contact with the enemy, 25 enemy were killed, 118 structures, 162 bunkers, and 133 sampans were destroyed.
The Black Pony Squadron located at Binh Thuy uses the OV-10 counter insurgency aircraft to give air support to the complete Delta region of South Vietnam. In May the "Ponies" flew 565 missions of which 74 missions were in contact with the enemy. 193 enemy were killed; 110 structures, 80 bunkers, and 34 sampans were destroyed.

Black Ponies are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

MARKET TIME patrol units of the U.S. Navy and TRAN HUNG DAO XV units of the Vietnamese Navy continued to patrol against the seaborne infiltration throughout May. The Commander, Coastal Surveillance Forces, reported several incidents of suspicious activity by foreign merchant vessels. COMNAVFORV completed a study on MARKET TIME effectiveness and recommended a reorganization in the existing MARKET TIME patrol structure to increase its effectiveness. MARKET TIME outer barrier unit, USCGC RUSH, fired over 300 rounds of five inch ammunition in naval gunfire support, destroying two enemy structures and damaging nine others.

MARKET TIME VP aircraft sighted a possible SL-6 infiltration trawler at 0757Z on 1 May. The trawler's position was 13-56N 114-08E and was maintaining course 040 at a speed of 6 knots. The contact maintained this course throughout the night. The next day, FJCPAC identified the ship as not an infiltration trawler and further surveillance was discontinued.

In another incident, MARKET TIME forces sighted a suspicious merchant off of An Xuyen Province. The incident began at 1212H on 24 May, when USCGC RUSH routinely reported the sighting of the Polish merchant HANKA SAWICKA at VQ 58 31, on course 310, speed 15 knots. At 1530H CTF 213 advised Coastal Surveillance Center.

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An Thoi (US 935 065) of the 1212H sighting of the Polish ship. At 1615H, CSC An Thoi directed PGM616, which had been in the immediate vicinity of Poulo Obi Island (VQ 820 320), to proceed and investigate. The coordinates as received by PGM 616, however, were VQ 58 01 vice VQ 58 31. This position was approximately 17 miles south of the 1212H reported position of HANKA SAWICKA.

At about 1900H, the PGM arrived in the vicinity of VQ 58 01 and detected a suspicious merchant at a position approximately 21 miles from Poulo Obi and 27 miles from the Nam Can Peninsula. While approaching the merchant, the PGM sighted four junks nearby. Three of the junks were anchored about one mile away from the merchant while the fourth was about one half mile away and appeared to be approaching the merchant. The Commanding Officer, PGM 616, reported the merchant was DIW when initially observed, but then got underway as the PGM approached. The merchant did not respond to a flashing light challenge from the PGM. The PGM gave chase for 20 minutes without being able to close, and then returned to apprehend the four junks.

No contraband was found on the junks, which were normally configured fishing junks from Rach Gia (WS 099 060). The junk crews reported that the merchant did not go DIW but had instead passed through their nets as it transited the area. The junks were
towed to An Thoi, and a further search of the junks, and interrogation of their crews by a combined U.S. and VN team, revealed nothing suspicious.

The PGM Commanding Officer’s description did not match that of the Polish ship HANKA SAWICKA. While the incident did not yield any conclusive results, it did suggest a possible enemy tactic of transferring supplies from trawlers to junks well outside the RVN contiguous zone.

On 7 May, an unfortunate incident occurred in which a Thailand fishing trawler was challenged by VNN PGM 603 five miles west of Hon Khoai (first Poulo Obi Island). The trawler did not stop and the PGM fired warning shots. At this time the trawler returned the fire with what appeared to be a gun shot. The PGM then commenced destructive fire, killing two Thai fishermen and wounding two others. The trawler was boarded, searched, and towed to An Thoi where the wounded were treated.

Salvage and recovery operations of the SL-8 trawler sunk in April were concluded on 19 May. No additional significant debris was recovered.