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Historical
Summary

JUN 1971

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U.S. NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
June 1971

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The enemy in the Delta appeared to be returning to an earlier stage of guerrilla warfare, emphasizing resupply, regrouping, and political warfare, as naval activity continued at a low level in June. Three AOs were essentially dormant, and six AOs made only minor contact with the enemy. The lull in Kien Hoa Province, under TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, was ended in June. The status in the Delta brought about a significant restructuring of operations, as TRAN HUNG DAO X was disestablished and the AO added to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, while the support bases at Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc were disestablished in a concomitant gesture. Four Mekong convoys reached the beleaguered Cambodian capital during the month, restoring the exhausted POL stocks on each trip.

The mobile US Navy Seawolf helos, along with their Black Pony cohorts, dominated the combat action in the Delta again during June. Seawolves were credited with most enemy casualties and enemy assets destroyed in each naval AO. For example, in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO, Seawolves accounted for 80 enemy killed to four killed by ground forces, while the enemy casualties were 10 to one in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO. Tallies in the other Delta areas also indicated that the helos had an edge over ground and water forces. Campaigns were almost exclusively helo targets.
and over 200 were destroyed. Black Ponies, ranging over the entire Delta region, accounted for 215 enemy killed during the same period.

While booby traps perpetually plagued ground troops, enemy sappers also took their toll in June. In the Cua Viet area, there were 12 sapper attempts; and, with 83 mining attempts occurring there since the first of the year, the Cua Viet is clearly a sapper focal point, with one half of all the mineings in Vietnam occurring there. Elsewhere, the harbor security was again revealed to be unsatisfactory at Qui Nhon when the SS AMERICAN HAWK was mined and an ARVN ammo dump was dramatically blown up. Sappers also struck once in Cam Ranh Bay and once on the Cal Nhap in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO.

Amid diplomatic and press flurries, 13 NVA POWs were sent north on the USNS UPSHUR for repatriation. The special operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII, was aborted on 4 June when North Vietnam rescinded their agreement to take them.

In the crucial logistics area of ACTOV, advances were made with the recovery of Intermediate Support Base Rach Sol and nine support craft in June. The Blue Water Vietnamese Navy received the Coast
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Guard Cutter BERING STRAIT; the Brown Water Navy received four Army PBRs for harbor security. Task Fleet 21 began an ambitious program in the last week of June to overhaul all river craft in the Delta by December.

The U.S. Navy in-country strength continued to decline in June. As of 24 June there were 10,983 naval personnel in South Vietnam, a reduction of just less than one thousand men in the course of the month.
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* No task group designator.
Repair and maintenance were again the key words in the plans of TF 21, as an ambitious program to overhaul all rivercraft in the delta by December of this year was initiated during the last week in June. This promised to be a job of tremendous magnitude and predictions were that LSBs and ISBs would be taxed to the limit of their endurance and resources to accomplish this task.

June saw a great restructuring of the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO as a result of the disestablishment of the bases at Song On, Doc and Ca Mau. With this action, the TRAN HUNG DAO X AO was disestablished and the area added to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, making it the largest AO in the delta.

Four POL convoys were able to reach the beleaguered Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh during the month, encountering only very light opposition on the river.

During June, there were two bright developments in the air warfare portion of ACTOV. First, VNAF pilots and aircrewmembers began integration into Seawolf Detachments in the initial steps of what is to be a gradual turnover of assets to the GVN. Secondly, June saw the first successful use of the Di Mau Brevity Code in many areas.
of the delta; it was especially effective in the TRA. "HUNG DAO" AO
and has also been used in TRAN HUNG DAO V and VIII AOs.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO was light, contrasting with the heavy enemy infiltration reported by intelligence sources. There was a general inability for TRAN HUNG DAO II assets to confront the infiltrators, and the mobile Seawolf helos dominated the action for the month. The Seawolves of Detachment Four, based at Ben Luc, flew roughly 105 intelligence and opportunity missions, and scrambled approximately 16 times. In only five runs they accounted for all of the 42 sampans destroyed in the AO for the month, and altogether struck 64 bunkers. The Seawolf tally of 16 enemy killed by air rather outshone the figure of one VC killed in action recorded for the river craft. Other effective assets in the area were the DUFFELBAG teams located at Tra Cu and Tuyen Nhon. While the results were generally unknown, the system provided pinpoint coordinates for the 105mm and 155mm howitzers to shoot at, which they did on approximately 77 different occasions.

On 4 June, at 1735H, USN Seals commenced a mission to capture a VC weapons cache located five miles northwest of Ben Luc at XS 576 795. Acting on intelligence from a Hoi Chanh, the Seals inserted by MSSC and patrolled to the cache, which contained 53 B-40 rockets. They removed 40 of the rockets and destroyed the rest after a snake was
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discovered in the bunker. There was no contact with the enemy and hence no casualties.

On 7 June, at 1035H, three Seawolf missions placed multiple strikes on a suspected VC/NVA camp area located 10 miles west of Tra Cu, around XT 315 025, and accounted for a formidable tally. Nineteen sampans were destroyed and 11 damaged, while nine bunkers were struck. On the same morning, and close to the first strike, at XS 334 964, Seawolves sighted a suspicious sampan and placed machine gun fire after obtaining proper clearance, sinking the craft. The Seawolves, later in the day, at 1720H, inserted Seals to search the sampan and provided air cover during the search. The Seals recovered five 60mm mortars, five rifle grenades, and 18 B-40 rocket boosters, but were forced to leave a sizable cache behind with the approach of nightfall. They had expended all their explosives on a mission earlier that morning, and could not explode with small arms fire the numerous rockets remaining. Visual reconnaissance flown the next day discovered that all the equipment in the sampan had been unloaded by the enemy during the night. The above Seal contact indicated that the enemy brazenly used daylight as well as nighttime to move supplies across the Plain of Reeds into South Vietnam, facilitated by the monsoon inundations. Intelligence reports noted that sensor activations from Tra Cu and Hiep Hoa had increased since the end of May, with
the highest number of activations occurring in the early morning hours.

On 7 June, at 1505H, Seawolves placed strikes on numerous bunkers and sampans located ten miles northwest of Tra Cu at XT 315 555. With no return of fire, 12 sampans and three bunkers were neatly dispatched, adding sizeably to the tally for this most eventful day for the Seawolves.

On 8 June at 1755H, two PBRs of RPD 64, while returning to ATSB Tuyen Nhon from MoBase II, were ambushed, receiving B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the Vam Co Tay at XS 410 775, seven miles east of Tuyen Nhon. The Seawolves were scrambled at 1805H while the PBRs returned fire. Fifteen minutes later the Seawolves arrived to place a strike, and orbited for 20 minutes until an additional PBR arrived. One PBR was hit by a B-40 rocket at the onset of the firefight, resulting in the death of a Vietnamese sailor, the wounding of another, while the PBR was only slightly damaged. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

During an aerial reconnaissance mission, the Long An Province Senior Advisor on 10 June sighted six sampans beached at XS 485 801 on the Bo Bo Canal. Two additional sampans were sighted approximately 15 kilometers northwest of the first sighting at
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XS 353 905. The reconnaissance aircraft received 25 rounds of small arms fire in the area, and a strike was requested. After two strikes, a USN Seal team was inserted, revealing three sampans destroyed in the strikes. There was no equipment of military interest found in the sampans, though a rest area was discovered nearby, with well used trails leading to the area. Marshy reeds were waist high, and in some places they were over six feet tall. The destroyed sampans were out in the open marshy plains and not on one of the small channels in the area. The level of water in the area was deep enough to push a loaded sampan across the open terrain, revealing the ease with which the enemy was able to move men and supplies across the Plain of Reeds from the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia into South Vietnam.

On 13 June, at 1330H, an LCM-8, enroute to Tra Cu on a fuel and resupply mission from Ben Luc, was attacked, two miles southeast of Tra Cu in the vicinity of XS 567 964, receiving one B-40 rocket out of five fired. Two USN advisors were slightly wounded (SK2 King and ET1 Leman), the LCM suffered minor damage and continued to operate. Two ASPBs of RID 44 arrived to assist, and Seawolves moved strikes at 1330H, with unknown results. The attack coincided with the end of a GVN sweep nearby.

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On 21 June, at 0825H, Seal Team One, Quebec Platoon, and Luong 66's, acting on aerial photo intelligence, conducted a mission 12 miles southeast of Ben Luc near XS 716 587, against a VC meeting area. The Seals were inserted by an MSSC and patrolled to the suspected hootch, which was found to be vacant. They then searched the area, detecting a campfire, patrolled to the site and opened fire on six evading persons, who returned the fire with heavy automatic weapons. The Seals then called in Seawolves, with the final result being five VC killed, and no friendly casualties incurred.

On 27 June, at 2300H, crewmembers on two RID 44 craft in waterborne ambush heard movement on the west bank of the Vam Co Dong, and opened fire. The enemy returned fire with small arms, and the resulting firefight lasted five minutes, with no damages inflicted to the VNN, and none known to the VC.

On 28 June, at 0040H, Detachment Four Seawolves scrambled for VNN Seals surrounded at XS 870 799, six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc. They provided overhead cover for the MST 6 Detachment Alpha unit which extracted the Seals. CTG 214. I commended the judgement and skill of the MST detachment in the night combat situation.

A message on 25 June from the Senior Advisor of CTG 214, I detailed the problems and possible solutions to the problems confronting him in the AO.

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The message requested a troop airlift capability for TRAN HUNG DAO II, since the ARVN air assets for quick reaction were nonexistent. Highly trained reconnaissance personnel could be available on 10 minutes notice, with clearances obtained for the target area in 10 - 30 minutes. Air support was available, and the intelligence sources were excellent. The only factor lacking was the means by which to transport the assets to the target area. As it was, the enemy was moving supplies and troops with relative impunity. The Senior Advisor stated that "River patrol craft are unable to effectively cope with this infiltration due to enemy dispersal short of and quick transit over river boundaries of the target area." In an effort to increase the utilization of RPD 54, boats were shifted such that there were six boats each at Tan An, Ben Keo, and Ben Luc; with two employed on random patrol during the day and two employed in W3GP's each night at intelligence selected locations. Still, four large arms tunnels discovered near Ben Luc during the month evinced aggressive enemy infiltration, and numerous agents' reports also mentioned heavy infiltration of troops into the area. Nevertheless, the upcoming "Big offensive" predicted in numerous intelligence reports throughout the month again failed to materialize, despite these movements.
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TRAN HUNG DAO IV

In late May and early June, various intelligence sources predicted a sharp upsurge of enemy activity in southern An Xuyen Province.

The terrorist activity was to occur from 18-24 June during minimum lunar illumination, and was to feature attacks on the town of Nam Can, on the National Police at Nam Can, and on various outposts in the area.

These attacks did not materialize and, in fact, combat activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO diminished for the fourth straight month.

There were 11 firefights resulting in five friendly troops wounded and eight enemy killed. There was one apparent mining on the Cai Nhap Canal, but when the ASPB of RID 46 was salvaged, evidence was uncovered that pointed to sabotage.

Seawolf helicopters attached to H-111, Detachment One, patrolled An Xuyen Province and engaged the enemy on 24 occasions. The "Wolves" killed one enemy soldier and probably accounted for six more; thirty sampans and junks, 26 structures, and nine bunkers were destroyed while six bunkers and 24 structures were damaged.

The waterborne elements of TRAN HUNG DAO IV, including RID 46, RID 47, and COSDIV 511, engaged in sporadic firefights, only one resulting in casualties or damage.

Two companies of ARVN Rangers were inserted by helicopter.
at WQ 045 542 on 3 June to conduct search and clear operations. Starting at the insertion point, the companies swept in an easterly direction and netted three VC, two sampan motors, and five pounds of documents captured; 20 bunkers, 12 mines, and six sampans were destroyed. One ARVN soldier was wounded by a mine. A blocking force of PCFs on the Rach Duong Keo in support of the operation engaged in a brief firefight with the fleeing enemy troops. There were no casualties incurred by the PCFs and no known enemy casualties.

On 14 June at 0800H the VC attacked watercraft of RID 46 with launch bombs on the Cai Nharp Canal at WQ 087 781. No hits were scored by the enemy, and the boats quickly landed two platoons of ARVN soldiers to sweep the area. Results of the sweep were four launch bombs and six launchers captured. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown.

On 17 June, at 1430H, the monitor attached to RID 47, HQ 6543, hit a previously sunken Alpha boat, and beached at WQ 081 747 to preclude sinking. Water continued to enter faster than the pumps could dewater, necessitating the prompt dispatch of a portable pump from Nam Can to avert a disaster. The craft was repaired and returned to Nam Can under its own power.

Also, on 17 June, the second attack of the month occurred at
1520H, this time from the east bank of the Rach Cai Nhap, long a favorite ambush site of the enemy. Two of the three B-40 rockets launched from WQ 081 750 heavily damaged ASPB HQ 5111, causing it to beach. Three VNN sailors were seriously wounded, and PCFs were called to medevac the wounded crewmen and to lift VNN EOD and Seal personnel to the sink site to provide security.

The Cai Nhap Canal was also the scene of the next battle between RID 46 and the VC when, on 23 June, at 1023H, a romeo boat, HQ 9174, was hit by one B-40 rocket causing minor damage and slightly wounding one VNN sailor. The attack occurred at WQ 077 775, and a reaction force of Biet Hai were swiftly landed. As a result of this tactic, two VC were killed and one AK-47 captured. Seawolves scrambled, and even with no U.S. advisors present with the ground forces, placed successful strikes and coordinated a medevac flight for the wounded crewmen, using the new Di Mau Brevity Code.

The determined An Xuyen guerrillas struck again on 23 June at 1830H when they attacked two PCFs on routine Cau Lon patrol at WQ 220 685. The VC struck using AK-47 rifles, but their fire was quickly suppressed. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. The "Swifts" continued to ISB Nam Can.
Following the now familiar scenario, the VC ambushed a convoy of RID 47 craft from the east bank of the Cai Nhap Canal, at WQ 083 750. The attack occurred at 2130H and was carried out with B-40 rockets. There were no hits and the boats quickly returned and suppressed the enemy fire.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Oscar Platoon, conducted an operation on 6 June at 0430H. In conjunction with Seawolf air assets, the Seals and Australian Air Service personnel inserted at WQ 248 779 by Sealord helicopters to destroy an enemy supply cache. They patrolled to the target area, directed air strikes onto the supplies and, shortly thereafter, were extracted by Sealord aircraft and returned to Nam Can. The air/ground team destroyed 20,000 pounds of unfinished rice, 1,000 pounds of finished rice, eight structures, two sampans, two sewing machines and four kilos of soft goods.

On 18 June at 0630H, an ASPB of RID 46, HQ 5174, reported that it had hit a mine and was sinking at WQ 081 750, six miles northeast of Nam Can, on the Cai Nhap Canal. Four wounded Vietnamese were evacuated by Seawolf helicopters. On 27 June Harbor Clearance Unit One salvaged the craft and could determine no battle damage. The sea sumpers were broken, however, and sea valves were wide open.

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The 20mm bow mounted gun had been removed and no evidence could be found of battle damage in this area. The Senior Advisor of CTG 214.2 recommended that the VNN investigate the matter.

In salvage operations conducted on the Rach Cai Nhap on 20 June, the unsung salvors of HCU-1, assisted by RID 47 units and USN UDT personnel, raised HQ 5111 at WQ 085 730. The damaged craft was towed back to ISB Nam Can without incident and arrived at 1830H.

"Iron Bottom Canal", or the Rach Cai Nhap, as it is more familiarly known was the scene of another successful salvage operation on 28 and 29 June. Using two LCMs, the salvage team first lifted the craft, HQ 5142, sunk on 15 April 1971, and then had to completely demud the vessel before patching it and returning it to ISB Nam Can on 28 June.

The VC also made their presence felt by harassing local wood cutters using booby traps. They caused two minor casualties, one each on 15 and 16 June; and in another booby trap incident, one of the cleverly concealed devices wounded a man, woman, and child near the ISB. A Sealord helicopter medevaced the trio to Ca Mau but unfortunately, the man died enroute.

Commander Martin F. Corcoran, USN, was relieved as CTG 116.1 and Lieutenant Commander Donald Ayre, USN, was relieved as Senior
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Advisor CTG 214.2, by Commander Howard V. Shores, USN, on
11 June at 1900H.

The 42nd ARVN Rangers were relieved by the 32nd ARVN Rangers
on 17 June.
TRAN HUNG DAO V

Activity declined to a low level in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO during June. CTG 216.1 reported that his forces engaged in four firefights resulting in no casualties on either side. The Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3, Detachment Six, flying from Phu Loi, struck the enemy 34 times during the month, destroying 20 sleeping platforms, four sampans, one bunker and two bridges; one of the enemy was probably killed by air attack.

The river units of TRAN HUNG DAO V reported very little activity this month in sharp contrast to May, when a FOM was sunk; two VNN crewmembers were killed, and several other craft were damaged. In one of two reported incidents of the month, nine RAC of RAG 22 on daytime patrol received small amounts of AK-47 fire from the west bank of the Lower Saigon River (XT 703210) on 1 June. The boats returned the fire; no friendly material damage or personnel casualties resulted from the engagement, and enemy casualties were undetermined.

The second incident occurred on 29 June. In midafternoon, eight RAC of RAG 30, providing support for an RF company, sighted an unmarked VC bunker. One of the RAC personnel fired an M-79 grenade into the bunker at what must have been point blank range, for he was struck in the chest by shrapnel from his own round. The man was subsequently medevaced to Long Binh.

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During the month there were a number of proposed changes to the TRAN HUNG DAO V assets. There was a plan under consideration to move RPD 52 north from Phu Cuong to Dau Tieng. Another plan under discussion was the relocation of a SEAL team to the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO.

A new command structure of Task Group 216.1 was promulgated on 23 June:

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Effective 5 June, LT James R. Reckner relieved LT James R. Jones as Senior Advisor RPD 52.
**TRAN HUNG DAO VI**

Enemy activity dropped to a low level in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO. During June, Commander CTG 212.5 reported that his forces engaged the enemy in six firefights, a significant decrease from the 26 of last month, suffering two VNN wounded, while 95 of the enemy were slain. Three VC suspects were captured. Seawolves of HAL-3, Detachment Eight, staging from Rach Gia, struck at the enemy 24 times, destroying 38 sampans and three structures, and accounting for most of the 95 enemy dead in the AO. Black Ponies from VAL-4 flew six missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO destroying three enemy military structures and damaging ten others.

The significant decrease in enemy activity this month was mainly due to two reasons. First, several asset transfers took place during June. RPD 58 transferred from ISB Rach Soi to OP Base Soi Den on 7 June, leaving the OPCON of CTG 212.5; also on 7 June, RPD 63 arrived at ISB Rach Soi from ATSBs Song Ong Doc and Ca May, coming under the OPCON of CTG 212.5. In addition, RPD 41 shifted OPCON from CTF 310 to CTG 212.5 when it moved from OP Base Kien An to ISB Rach Soi on 26 May. These transfers greatly cut down the number of patrols in this AO, and the fact that now units were operating in an unfamiliar AO also probably reduced the effectiveness of the patrols. Second, the enemy suffered...
heavy losses last month in several melees with RPD 58 and Seawolf units, and consequently, the VC/NVA were probably lying low to regroup and resupply.

On 2 June, two males in a sampan approached two PBRs of RPD 61 19 kilometers southeast of Rach Gia (WR 150 870). One man stated his desire to "Chieu Hoi", while the other said he was an ARVN soldier captured by the VC on 30 Oct 70 and had been held until 20 May 1971. The PBRs took the men to the Rach Gia Chieu Hoi Center and to the Province Chief respectively.

The Kien Giang Province VC made their presence felt during a boat ambush on 8 June, 22 kilometers south of Rach Gia (WR 158 862). The VC fired one B-40 rocket at PBRs 7711 and 7715 of RPD 61. The boats returned the fire with all weapons while the VC fired four more rockets but without effect. Meanwhile, two other boats joined the melee while Seawolf helicopters scrambled and placed strikes in the area. Three females ashore in the vicinity of the ambush surrendered to the PBRs and were turned over to an outpost nearby. The Seawolves sighted one sampan and two other persons in the target area. They sank the sampan, probably killing two of the enemy. There were no friendly casualties or damage in the scrap. No US advisors participated in the operation, however, the Vietnamese patrol officers used the air brevity code to direct a Seawolf strike for the first time under combat conditions.

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The Kien Giang guerrillas struck again on 18 June, attacking PBRs 7700 and 7718, attacking from both sides of the Cai Lon River (WR 208 768) with heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket fire. One rocket hit PBR 7700's M-60 machine gun, seriously wounding two crewmembers. The PBRs medevaced the wounded to Cai Nung outpost (WR 160 805), where Seawolves evacuated the men directly to Binh Thuy. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

The Camp Sentinel Radar System at OP Base Kien An was instrumental in breaking up a possible ground attack during the evening of 24 June.

At 2030H, the operator of CSR Three reported the approach of three distinct groups of people, approximately 25 persons per group. Two groups approached from a small canal south of WR 126 893. The third group approached the bank of the Cai Lon River from WR 130 894. All three groups converged bearing 175 degrees true, 300 meters from the base. At 2105H, one group approached along a bearing 180 degrees true to within 200 meters of the base. The base responded with drum mortar and machine gun fire. This fire seemed to drive off the majority of the people; however, radar continued to detect movement in the vicinity of the southern end of the canal (WR 126 893) until 2400H. There were no friendly casualties; enemy casualties were undetermined.

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TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

During the month of June, activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO increased over that of the previous month but was still considered light in comparison to the past. CTG 217.1 units participated in 48 troop movements or support missions for the Seventh ARVN Division and the RF and PF forces, while 17 convoy escort and political warfare missions were conducted. TU 217.1 supported the Dinh Tuong and Kien Phong joint operations. TUONG PHUONG centered around the Wagonwheel area (WS 990 550) for the last 17 days of the month. Waterborne units engaged the enemy on eight occasions, resulting in undetermined damage to enemy assets. Two Vietnamese sailors were killed and six wounded.

CTG 116.8 and 116.7.7 air units flew 19 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO VIII assets resulting in 23 enemy killed and in the destruction of 18 bunkers and four sampans. In addition, various supplies were captured in the ensuing troop sweeps.

The important naval repair center at LSB Dong Tam was mortared on 13 June by one round of undetermined size, while on 17 June the base was hit by a number of rounds on two separate occasions a few hours apart. Fortunately, no casualties or damage resulted from the barrage on either occasion.
The attacks occurring during the month on LSB Dong Tam were predicted by intelligence sources in a series of reports. On 10 June, an intelligence report indicated that the section chief of the 273rd Artillery Battalion of VC MR-2 had completed the reconnaissance for the placement of mortars to be used in the shelling of the Dong Tam Base. The report further stated that the shelling would be in support of VC main and local forces which would accompany the attack. The 273rd Artillery Battalion had been reported previously as targeted against the Dong Tam Base and My Tho City. Although accompanying attacks failed to materialize, the report proved to be rather accurate in its predictions and information.

The source of enemy weapons and especially the long range mortar used was the subject of another report issued in the latter part of the month. MILO My Tho reported that, on 22 June, the VC in Cai Loy District, Dinh Tuong Province received an arms shipment of approximately 57 81 mm mortar rounds, 160 82mm rounds, 83 75mm rounds, 70 anti-personnel mines, 47 cases of grenades, 67 B-40 rounds, and 70 blocks of TNT. The shipment was reportedly received at the terminus of the Khung Ong Canai (XS 137 565) by a 37 man rear services unit of VC My Tho.
Waterborne units engaged the enemy on eight separate occasions; five were enemy initiated resulting in five craft being struck by B-40 rockets. In every incident, the craft responded with devastating suppressive fire and continued to operate. On 11 June at 1745H, two PBRs of RPD 53 on routine patrol of the Kinh Xang (XS 357 541), 11 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam, received an unknown number of B-40 rockets. One rocket struck the after section of HQ 7543 causing minor fiberglass damage. Other rockets fired by the VC missed their mark as the PBRs responded with devastating fire. Seawolf aircraft were scrambled to assist, and with the use of the brevity code, the VNN officers were able to direct the attack. However, prior to arrival on scene, the enemy broke off the engagement and control passed to the NOC. The PBRs proceeded to an ARVN outpost and picked up reactionary troops for a sweep of the area. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the encounter and the damage to PBR 7543 was considered minor.

On 13 June at 0015H, two RID 42 craft, while in ambush position on the Kinh Dong Doc Loc (XS 365 585), 18 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam, were attacked by an unknown number of VC with B-40 rockets and AK-47 fire. Alfa boat 5156 was struck by two B-40 rockets but returned the fire for the five minutes that the attack continued before contact was broken. Three VNN sailors were wounded and evacuated by a Dustoff helo arriving.

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on scene at 0150H with a Night Hawk gunship. While the operation was taking place, the gunship silenced the remaining sniper fire and at 0225H, the medevac was completed and Alfa 5156 resumed operations.

On 15 June at 0630H, PBR 7545 returned to My Tho with minor hull damage after being struck with B-40 rockets on the Kinh Xang. The rocket causing the major damage struck the canopy and then exploded. A troop sweep was immediately conducted with no contact being established, however, one B-40 rocket was found on the ground in the vicinity.

On the same day at 1800H, two PBRs of RPD 53 on routine patrol of the Kinh Xang, two miles northwest of Dong Tam, were attacked with B-40 rockets fired from the west bank in the vicinity of XS 388 41. One of the PBRs received one hit resulting in minor damage and one Vietnamese sailor was killed and two were wounded. The two PBRs, assisted by two additional PBRs and two boats of RAG 21/32, returned the enemy fire, and reactionary forces from a nearby outpost were too to sweep the area. The troops reported no contact but recovered one expended B-40 rocket.

As of the same day at 2355H, two boats of RID 43 in a night attack position, were attacked with an unknown number of B-40 rockets 4 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 365 584). An ASPB received three rockets resulting in one Vietnamese sailor being killed and slight

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damage to the boat. After the third rocket was fired, contact was immediately broken by the enemy. A reactionary force inserted at first light, with no significant results recorded.

The Dong Tam Naval Base was mortared on two occasions during the month causing no casualties or damage. On 13 June, one rocket round impacted, probably a zeroing round for the attacks to follow. At 2135H on 17 June, 20 rounds of harassing fire impacted at XS 411 431. Two hours later, five rounds impacted at XS 412 432. Investigation of the attack by Sector S-2 revealed that the 2135H fire was due to the Sam Giang Artillery Base responding to a contact. The 2335H fire was due to enemy activity, possibly the 273rd and 303 F Artillery Battalions operating in the area.

TUONG PHUONG, a joint operation from Dinh Tuong and Kien Phuong Provinces, was launched on 15 June when 12 boats of RAG 21/33 inserted a platoon of infantry and afterwards patrolled the canals in the operating area. Twelve boats of RAG 21/33 conducted psychological warfare operations on the Kinh Hai and Muoi Tarn by distributing literature, medical supplies, and clothing, and talking to the inhabitants. The operation was launched to try to blunt the VC activity in the area estimated by Seventh ARVN Intelligence to have 6,000 VC. Eight VC battalions operate in the AO with the 261A and 514C of major concern since they
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They have operated principally around the Kinh Xang and Kinh Tong Doc Loc.

The manning level of a VC battalion is estimated at 250 men of which 40% are North Vietnamese infiltrators.

To counter this force, RAG 21/33 has been employed on the western waterways, Kinh Hai Muoi Tam from XS 100 465 to Wagonwheel (WS 990 56), north on Kinh Tong Doc Loc to XS 025 585 and northwest on Kinh Tai Muoi to WS 983 565. This area was expanded with the advent of the rainy season and was expected to cover the majority of Kinh Tong Doc Loc. Four RAG 21/33 boats and four RPD 53 PBRs were on the My Tho River from XS 390 415 to XS 910 350. Six PBRs were on the Kinh Xang from Dong Tam (XS 412 427) to XS 312 577. Nine RID 42 boats were on the Tong Doc Loc from XS 303 600 to Kinh Xang at XS 358 533.

An overlapping area between the PBRs and "Heavys" was required as the area is an east to west location for VC traffic, and a majority of contacts in the AO occur at this point. Nightly ambushes were set on all possible waterways and were coordinated with ARVN outposts in joint PF/VN participation. Two U.S. Army helicopter squadrons were employed for troop insertions and extractions from the Seventh ARVN Division. By the end of the month, the operation was proceeding on this with undetermined results.

In a change of command, LT Charles F. Tichets, USN, relieved LT Fleming Mazer, USN as the Senior Advisor of RID 45 on 16 June.

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TRAN HUNG DAO IX

Action on the waterways of the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was again dormant. No firefights occurred and the ten boat unit of RPD 62, based at Phuoc Xuyen, did not engage the enemy. Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Nine, based on YRBM 21 at Tan Chau, continued their support of outlying army and RF/PF outposts, engaging the enemy on 22 occasions. The Seawolves suffered no casualties and enemy losses could not be determined. Although the Seawolf actions did not occur within the AO, since the outposts are all in adjacent infiltration areas, the airstrikes certainly have major importance to the area.

DUFFLEBAG sensors helped PF troops score a victory on 26 June when sensor activations pinpointed a party of VC marauders. The PF troops set an ambush at 2105H at WS 239 990. Results of this ambush and subsequent artillery fire directed by activations were four enemy killed; one 60mm mortar, one M-16, and one AK-47 were captured.
TRAN HUNG DAO X/XVII

During the month of June, the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was
highlighted by wholesale changes in its boundaries and the disestablish-
ment of two bases, ATSB Song Ong Doc and ATSB Ca Mau. The TRAN
HUNG DAO XVII AO was restructured to include the TRAN HUNG DAO
X AO, upon its dismantling on 5 June at 0800H, thus becoming the
largest AO in the Delta. CTG 212.6 was relieved of responsibility
for the area by CTF 216.

Operation TRAN HUNG DAO X was initiated on 28 September 1969
and ended on 5 June 1971. During the almost two years of its existence,
units attached to the operation killed 457 enemy troops and captured
142, while destroying 728 sampans. There were 53 friendly sailors
killed and 373 wounded.

ATSB Song Ong Doc was formally disestablished on 4 June at
1300H. This base had been a bulwark in the defenses on the western
side of the Delta and had the distinction of being overrun once, on
October 1968, at its old location near the mouth of the Song Ong Doc.
Undeterred by this temporary setback, the base was re-established in
September 1968, further into enemy territory, about halfway between the
mouth of Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau, where it stood until the decision was made to
abandon it, a decision made because of the reduction of U.S. Navy
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Support LSTs and the indefensible disposition of the base itself.

The only other naval base in the area, ATSB Ca Mau, was disestablished on 17 June, due to pressure from the Senior Province Advisor and a hostile civil populace, who did not like the base, an obvious target, to be near their homes. As a result of these base disestablishments, the only U.S. Naval personnel left in the Ca Mau area were the Seabees who are constructing ISB Ca Mau, personnel attached to CTF 210 at the MACV Compound, Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon, and Seawolf Helicopter Detachment Three at Ca Mau Long Strip.

Combat activity diminished in the area during June as the total number of waterborne firefights dropped to five; one VC was killed while friendly casualties were one PF soldier killed, seven Vietnamese and American sailors, and six PF soldiers were wounded. There were no minings, a considerable improvement over previous months, and no watercraft were lost. There was one terrorist incident in Ca Mau to remind the GVN that there were still VC lurking almost everywhere.

Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Three at Ca Mau and Detachment Eight at Rach Gia were active in virtually all parts of the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII OP area. 116.7.3 flew 26 missions killing two VC and

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probably killing two more, while destroying two bunkers, 25 sampans
and eight structures. 116.7, 8 flew only six missions in TRAN HUNG
DAO XVII but they were highly successful; 18 enemy soldiers were killed,
another 10 were probably killed; two bunkers, and 12 sampans were
destroyed while eight bunkers and 18 structures were damaged.

On 8 June at 0900, a LCM-8 was hit with one B-40 rocket at
VR 370-303 on the Song Ong Doc. The escorting boats of RAG 26
returned and suppressed all enemy fire and the convoy continued to
Ca Mon. One USN officer, LT J. D. Pickett, received slight wounds and
the vessel suffered a six inch hole in the port side forward. Enemy
casualties were undetermined.

The Kinh Can Gao was the setting for another attack on 5 June; this
time the audacious VC ambushed a convoy of TG 219.1 less than one
mile from CP Base Kien An. The lead boat, an ASPB, was nearly
totally destroyed by two B-40 rockets, but no casualties were inflicted by the
enemy rockets and the convoy was able to proceed to the 33rd
Regimental CP without further incident.

On 8 June at 0830H, a four boat convoy of RAG 26, proceeding
towards the Song Ong Doc with one RF company embarked, was
ambushed by the VC with 10-12 rounds of B-40 rockets and AW fire.
The boats returned and suppressed the enemy fire, and the troops

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were inserted for a sweep at WR 020 055. One VC was killed, and friendly units suffered one killed, eight wounded, and minor damage to two FOMs.

The persistent VC of Song Ong Doc District struck again on 28 June at 0945H when a five boat convoy of RAID 74 was fired upon at WR 008 047 by an unknown number of the insurgents using B-40 rockets. There were no hits, fire was suppressed by the combat air patrol, consisting of Black Pony Aircraft, and the rivercraft continued to Ca Mau without further incident. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 29 June, at 1900H, in the northern U Minh, two Americans and five Vietnamese were wounded when their LCP, a RAID 72 craft, was struck with two B-40 rockets. The attack occurred at VR 965 730 on the Kinh Can Gao. Both boats returned the fire and ARVN artillery support was called in. The rivercraft proceeded to the 33rd Regimental CP where the wounded were medevaced. The boat suffered no damage in the attack; Communist casualties could not be determined.

Terrorists of the Ca Mau City cell struck on 5 June, at 2115H, when two males, one clad in black, the other in white, astride a Honda, threw a grenade into a group of Vietnamese, outside a restaurant, near the main market place. Results of the attack were one civilian killed, seven VNN wounded (four serious), two National Police and two civilians injured.
Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon, engaged in two operations in June. In the first operation conducted on 5 June between 1715H and 1745H, Seals, assisted by Luc Luong 66s, inserted from two SEALORD Slicks at VR 848 159. Seawolf helicopters suppressed all ground fire and the commandos patrolled to the target area. They observed two armed men fleeing and opened fire with small arms, but were not able to locate any casualties. While in the area, one structure, two bunkers, two grenades, one stove, and 300 kilos of rice were destroyed; Seawolves accounted for two enemy killed while none of the friendly forces reported casualties.

On 26 June at 1710H, Seals, a KCS guide, and an interpreter, inserted at VR 828 169 by SEALORD Slicks to interdict VC infrastructure. They patrolled 25 meters to the target hootch, set security, and searched with negative results. The Seals then patrolled back to the LZ and called for a normal extraction. Results of the operation were two enemy probably killed by Seawolf helicopters; one hootch, and one bunker destroyed.

Salvage teams were not as active during June as in previous months; however, they did salvage two rivercraft, one at Ca Mau on 1 June and one on 18 June in the U Minh near the 32nd Regimental CP. After these two operations the much praised salvors of HCU-1 and their VNN

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counterparts changed operational control to TRAN HUNG DAO IV.

In early June, units of TRAN HUNG DAO XVII played a major part in one of the most impressive political coups of the Vietnam war. On 1 June, the 21st ARVN Division, currently engaged in very successful search and clear operations in the U Minh Forest, celebrated its 12th anniversary amid visits from such dignitaries as President Thieu, General Abrams, and Ambassador Bunker. Also on hand for the festivities at the 33rd Regimental CP were approximately 3,000 civilians, who, in order to travel to the location, had to transit the notorious Song Trem Trem and Kinh Can Gao in sampans; both waterways are very susceptible to terrorist attack, but units of CTF 210 secured them and prevented any incidents. The ceremonies were held in the heart of a formerly impregnable enemy stronghold without a single terrorist incident to mar the day, a great accomplishment for GVN forces. Units of CTF 210 were commended by DEPCOMTHD for this significant achievement.

A crisis developed during June, when, with the imminent closing of ATSB Cà Mau on 17 June, it was realized that the Navy would no longer have a teletype communication circuit. With assistance from all parties concerned, namely COMNAVFORV, U.S. Army 52nd Signal Battalion, CTG 212.6, and TF 210 Staff, CTF 210 made a great effort and succeeded in moving the teletype facilities from
the ATSB to the ARVN 21st Light CP in Ca Mau, thus ensuring the stability and continuance of Naval communication to the Ca Mau area of the Delta.

On 30 June at Kien An OP Base, SP5 G. C. Hinsdale, USA, was killed while heroically maneuvering a burning, JP-4 filled LCM away from the pier where two other petroleum filled craft were moored. He steered the craft toward the opposite shore and when he was sure of its direction, jumped from the stern of the vessel. His body was recovered and death was due to drowning. His actions undoubtedly saved other lives and tremendous material damage.
During the month of June four convoys carried 5,325,500 gallons of critically needed POL stocks to the Cambodian capital city of Phnom Penh. Two of the minesweepers leading the convoys were attacked in the forward naval element, but no serious damages were incurred, and otherwise the convoys had few problems in reaching Phnom Penh.

Mekong Convoy TP-21, composed of two merchant ships, the old standby KHMERE TRADER with 569,400 gallons of POL, and two tugs, departed Tan Chau assembly area at 0500H on 2 June. The convoy had been delayed three hours from the original departure time because of a two-company size enemy force with heavy weapons reported by intelligence sources to be moving towards the river to points WT 237 370 and WT 215 357. At 0900H, the merchant ship FELICITY went aground six miles south of Neak Luong at WT 260 350. The tug VIKING assisted the merchant ship and she rejoined the convoy at 1040H, and the convoy arrived unscathed at Phnom Penh at 1550H. The return convoy, PT-21, departed Phnom Penh at 1000H the next day with two merchantmen, two tankers, and a tug, and arrived at Tan Chau at 1645H without incident.

During the first week in June, industrialists and private citizens alike in Phnom Penh continued to wait anxiously for the next arrival of a Mekong POL convoy, and the pattern repeated itself each week.
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Indicating, as the convoys managed to satisfy only the most pressing needs of the city. Residential and commercial districts went up to 8 hours per day without electricity. Before the 10 June convoy arrived, stocks of auto and industrial diesel and fuel oil were completely exhausted, and MOGAS was critically low. Convoy TP-22 considerably relieved the problem, and each successive convoy restored the capital city anew. The situation fundamentally improved at the end of June when new contracts for additional shipping took effect.

Convoy TP-22, consisting of two merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs and a Leapdal towboat, and carrying a total of 1,772,100 gallons of POL, departed Tan Chau at 0300H, on 10 June, and arrived at 1500H the same day. The return convoy, PT-22, composed of two merchantmen, two tankers, four tugs, and a Leapdal towboat, arrived one barge with 1000 tons of rice, and left Phnom Penh at 1700H on 16 June, arriving at Tan Chau at 1930H without incident.

Making convoy TP-23, left Tan Chau at 0200H on 17 June consisting of four merchantmen, four tankers, and a Leapdal towboat, carrying a total of 1,314,000 gallons of POL. At 0500H, the minesweepers of the convoy were attacked with five B-40 rockets at WT 27 57, 2000 miles north of Neak Luong. No hits or damage was reported. While the convoy returned the enemy fire, FANK units, responding, in 20 minutes, swept the area with unknown results. This was the first

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incident where the enemy attacked the lead naval element of a convoy
since TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII began in January of this year.

The convoy arrived in Phnom Penh at 1630H with no further incident.
The last previous ambush occurred a month earlier on 17 May. The
return convoy, PT-23, composed of a merchantman, two tankers,
and a Leapdal towboat, departed Phnom Penh at 1045H and arrived
at Tan Chau seven hours later; carried by the monsoon current on the
Mekong, the convoy made the trip from Phnom Penh to Tan Chau in
half the time that the upriver trip takes.

Mekong convoy TP-24 left Tan Chau at 2100H on 24 June, with a
composition of one merchantman, three tankers, three tugs, and two
Cambodian ferry boats, carrying a total of 1,770,000 gallons of POL.
At 2325H the convoy was attacked approximately two miles north of the
border with 14 B-40 rockets. The tanker VIRA II received one hit
in the engine room, resulting in one crewman being wounded and a
momentary steering casualty. The attack was broken by the quick
reaction of the escorting PBRs, and by air strikes from USN Seawolves,
Black Ponies, and USAF Shadows, all under the control of USAF
Rustic. This was the southernmost attack on the convoys since
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII began, and the second attack of the month.
There had been frequent previous reports of enemy units operating in
the area of the attack. Two attacks on nearby outposts, at WT 203
038 and WT 204 055, took place approximately six hours prior to
The convoy attack. The extensive movement and activity in the area just north of the border indicated that the enemy intentions were to secure the territory for themselves. As convoy TP-24 continued up the river, the advance element of MSRs came under attack for the second time in the month. At 0620H in the vicinity of WT 195 670, the enemy fired five B-40 rockets, missing the boats and hence inflicting no casualties.

On 30 June, a special convoy, consisting of an LSSL, two LCUs, two LCM-8s, two PCFs, one ATC, one ASPB, and a Zippo, enroute from Neak Luong to Tan Chau, was attacked at 2105H at grid line 29. The LSSL received three 57mm recoilless rocket hits resulting in two personnel slightly wounded, and minor damage. The wounded were transported later to YRBM 21 by PCF.

The seemingly taken support of the Mekong convoy operations by the Khmer Navy was a subject of concern by COMNAVFORV, as detailed in a message on 2 June to COMUSMACV. The first part of the message read: "The MNK has reduced their craft contribution for Mekong convoy operations to four PBRs. While it is recognized that with the other commitments, preservation of the Mekong LOC must be given their highest priority. At the present time, their contribution is below their capability. Mekong convoy operations require their dedicated support."

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effort about two days each week. By careful scheduling it should be possible to accommodate other requirements. On 29 June the American Ambassador to Cambodia, Ambassador Swank, went to Tan Chau to review the convoy operations in response to the message.

American air assets provided invaluable assistance to the convoys during the month in an escort capacity. On the morning before the 24 June convoy, Seawolves struck ten structures where 13 VC were believed to be hiding in an ambush posture, at an area just south of the border on the west bank of the Mekong. Results of the strike could not be determined. Later that day, at 1820H, two outposts on the west bank just south of the border, in the vicinity of WT 204 055 and WT 203 058, came under attack twice, and on the second attack, a USN heavy fire team immediately responded. Artillery strikes were lifted for the Seawolves as they made passes, and the enemy fired at the helos each time, but no casualties were incurred and damage to the enemy was unknown.