There was no action in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO during July. Planning was started on a new operation to be named TRAN HUNG DAO XXV which would include the same general area and would replace TRAN HUNG DAO IX.
The Mekong convoy operations finally managed, in the month of July, to somewhat satisfy the needs of the Cambodians. New contracts commencing 1 July allowed more ships to participate in the convoys. The second of three convoys for the month ran into enemy resistance, as it did on its return trip, but as ever the enemy was wholly unsuccessful at reaching the convoy.

The first expanded convoy, TP-25, departed Tan Chau assembly area at 2100H on 5 July, harboring an unprecedented two and one half million gallons of POL. The convoy consisted of 17 ships, tugs with barges, and tankers, and was divided into fast and slow elements for better command and control. The fast element anchored at Neak Luong at 0300H and waited for the slow element. At 0700H both elements joined and proceeded towards Phnom Penh. A change in convoy escort procedures was required in order to provide the normal close-in escorts for the increased number of vessels.

The ambush teams were reduced to one per element and the blocking force was absorbed by the main bodies for escort duty. There was no reduction in the capability to react and
disrupt enemy attacks against the merchant ships, but the ability to hurt the enemy after the ambush was lessened. The convoy arrived without incident at Phnom Penh at 1200 H on 6 July. The last tanker, TAN THANH PHU, developed steering problems and arrived later under the tow of two ASPBs. The return convoy, PT-25, with 11 vessels, departed on 7 July at 1000 H, and arrived eight hours later at Tan Chau without incident.

On 13 July convoy TP-26 which was preceded by ARVN sweeps upriver was attacked by an estimated company of VC. A USA LOACH was downed during the operation, with both pilots rescued; an event that would be repeated two days later on 15 July with convoy PT-26. Convoy TP-26 departed Tan Chau at 2100 H, consisting of 13 ships, tankers, tugs with barges, and LCM-8s, and divided into a fast and slow element. Almost two million gallons of POL and almost 4,000 tons of general cargo were transported. At 0017 H the merchant ship ALLY, in the vicinity of WT 211 190, was hit by two rounds of 57 mm rockets resulting in two crewmen being wounded and slight damage to the ship. Enemy fire was received from both banks of the river. For the first time in convoy operations a change in ambush tactics was noted. The enemy used three firing sites in
the same general area to insure better coverage of the longer convoys. Prompt action by the VNN PBR ambush team and air strikes denied the enemy any real success, and the convoy maintained its speed without delays. Detachment Five Seawolves from Chau Doc had scrambled in pairs on two occasions to place strikes on both banks under the convoy commander’s instructions. The convoy arrived at 1545H on 14 July without further incident, though it was discovered that five vehicles on a barge were missing their batteries and spare tires.

On the return trip, PT-26 was delayed an hour due to mooring problems encountered by the tug SHAWNEE. The convoy, consisting of ten vessels and two barges, departed without the SHAWNEE at 1135H of 15 July. At 1617H, in the vicinity of WT 211 090, a U.S. Army Baron Aircraft spotted an enemy recoiless rifle team and rolled in to place strikes. During the air engagement all aircraft received heavy ground fire resulting in one U.S. Army light observation helicopter being shot down near WT 21 90. Both pilots were recovered from the river by PBRs and were taken to YRBM-21 where they were reported to be only slightly injured. The engagement was continued as Cobras, Seawolves, and accompanying boats placed fire on the enemy position until fire was suppressed.

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Approximately one mile down river Seawolves spotted manned enemy bunkers and placed strikes in the area as tactical air support was requested. U.S.A.F. fighters placed strikes in the area of WT 222 072 consisting of four 500 pound bombs, napalm, and rockets. The strikes were followed by a ground sweep that revealed five enemy killed. The ground troops also captured one AK-47 and a recoilless rifle ground mount.

The convoy itself received no damage, and arrived at Tan Chau at 1715H. The next day the tug SHAWNEE finally got underway, leaving Phnom Penh without escort for Neak Luong, demonstrating thusly the secure nature of that area of the Mekong. She met an escort at Neak Luong, as the trip south to Tan Chau was considered more hazardous, and arrived there at 1515H without incident.

Convoy TP-27, composed of four tankers and five tugs towing barges, departed the staging area at 2015H on 22 July. At 2230H, while still south of the border, the tanker LAKANDULA developed engine trouble and turned back with escort. At 0330H on 23 July, at WT 212 247, the tanker BAUAN ran aground.

The convoy continued, and two PCFs stood by for security. At 0535H the tanker was reported free and continuing up river. The lead element of the convoy arrived at Phnom Penh
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at 1500H, with the rest harbored by 2130H. The return convoy, PT-27, composed of eight ships and three tugs, departed at 1145H on 24 July, arriving in Tan Chau without incident six hours later.

The three convoys of the month raised stocks of POL to more comfortable levels, though schedules were still delayed. While Telakhmer finally acquired in July enough vessels under contract to bring as much as 17,000 cubic meters of POL per convoy, the amount was difficult to unload since the convoys turned around for Tan Chau 15 hours after arrival, and since the strong current prevented more than two ships from tying up alongside each other at the unloading site. Telakhmer's persistent requests for additional convoys were rejected, as escort assets were proving hard to obtain.
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

Forces in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO went on the offensive during the month of July with a series of combined VNN/ARVN operations placing great pressure on the enemy in Kien Hoa Province. Although waterborne units rarely encountered the enemy, they nevertheless acted as blocking and supporting forces and deprived the VC of escape by water. In this respect, Rag 23/31 supported the First Battalion, Tenth Regiment on the west Bai Lai River and the Reconnaissance Company, Tenth Regiment, on the east Bai Lai River. LSIL 331 was used for firing runs on different occasions in Thanh Phu District. RID 45 patrolled the Ham Luong River and RPD 58 PBRs were at WBGP on the east Bai Lai River and Lao Lan Island (XS 500 268). Coastal Group 34 and 35 junks also patrolled the Ham Luong River.

During the month, CTG 217.2 units in Kien Hoa Province combined to kill 229 and capture 70 VC. Friendly casualties included 52 killed, 185 wounded, and 6 missing. In addition, eight incidents of OP harassment, five assassinations, and two attempted assassinations were reported throughout the province, while one outpost was overrun in Thanh Phu District.

Waterborne units were involved in three firefights on different occasions. Two VC were killed while friendly units suffered
one casualty. No damage resulted to the craft in any of the incidents.

TU 116.7.9 supported TRAN HUNG DAO XIX operations by flying 35 sorties, resulting in ten VC killed and two captured, while 22 sampans, 11 structures, 18 bunkers and eight hooches were destroyed.

Black Pony and Leatherneck (OV 10-D) aircraft were flown in 14 sorties against an enemy stronghold located approximately 72 kilometers southeast of Dong Tam. Results of the sweeps indicated that 31 VC were killed; 32 sampans, ten structures, and ten bunkers were destroyed. On 23 July, OV 10-D aircraft reported receiving 12.7 millimeter fire from the enemy. This was the first occurrence of this type of enemy action.

The pursuit of the enemy in Kien Hoa Province served to indicate the overwhelming desire by the GVN to pacify this strategic area. The enemy is still firmly entrenched as was noted by the many VC killed, wounded, or captured. Thanh Phu District contains approximately 37,100 people of which 64 percent live under GVN control while 36 percent live in contested villages and hamlets. An intelligence source had recently stated that, since the withdrawal of the US 9th Division in 1970, pacification has declined. He stated
the population of the district was greatly influenced by the VC either because of family ties or terrorism. While the 7th ARVN had pacified about 80 percent of the land area, the source believed only about 10 percent of the population was loyal to the GVN and the other 90 percent was controlled by the VC. (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 168-71).

Some of the enemy units reported as operating throughout the province were: F-105X Boat Hunting Company which was located approximately five kilometers southeast of Ben Tre and which was charged with monitoring VNN radio frequencies to gain information on operations in progress; C-540 Local Force Company which was located six kilometers west of Ben Tre and which was charged with attacking boats moving along the Cai Cam Canal; an unidentified platoon sized unit charged with the shipment of munitions in the Binh Dai Secret Zone; C-270 Underwater Demolition Company charged with the demolition of fixed targets such as anchored ships, ferry landings, and bridges; and two companies of the D-16 Transportation Battalion charged with the building of defensive fortifications in the Binh Dai Secret Zone.

In a captured enemy document, it was emphasized that the VC must attack the GVN at all levels, using sapper, guerrilla, and
secret guerrilla techniques. In the cities and towns, a combination of military activity and proselytizing is to be achieved. In all areas, there was to be contact with families of GVN soldiers.

Although activity by waterborne units was confined to support and logistics, three firefights, plus a special minesweeping mission, were recorded during the month. On 1 July, six RAG 23/31 craft formed with two tugs and two barges along with two LCVP minesweeps to proceed up the Song Co Chien (XS 450 070) while two LOHs and two Cobras provided air cover. The convoy was proceeding to a bridge construction site located at the mouth of the Thu Hue Canal (XS 382 020). No major incidents or problems developed on the journey although fish net wires were strung out across the canal. As the tugs completed positioning the barges and the river craft repositioned for the trip back, the LCVPs strayed downstream (XS 377 009) and received small arms fire from the west bank. The two LCVPs returned the fire, and with aid from the LOHs, suppressed it completely. The boats then returned to the construction site. One Vietnamese sailor was wounded slightly and only minor damage occurred to the LCVPs. With the barge finally positioned, the craft formed up and proceeded out of the canals and river without further incident. COMNAVFORV

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On 9 July, LSSL 230 fired on an intelligence target in Thanh Phu District, Kien Hoa Province which was indicated as the VC headquarters for the district. The LSSL fired 47 three inch rounds, 35 81mm rounds, and 589 40mm rounds. Both air and surface bursts were used during the firing. An intelligence report indicated that the firing destroyed 40 percent of VC Thanh Phu District Headquarters and that the VC were again rebuilding the site.

On 15 July, RID 45 craft preceded by two RAG 23/31 LCVP mine sweepers reentered the Rach Cai Hap and escorted a tug from XS 323 033 to the Co Chien River. Although minor problems were encountered with the engine of one of the LCVPs, the mission was completed without incident. But in the afternoon as two barges were being towed by the tug, one ASPB received small arms fire from the north bank. The Cobras immediately placed a strike in the area and suppressed the fire. Then at XS 423 038 on the Song Lang, an ASPB and one ATC received small arms fire which was again immediately suppressed by both river craft and Cobra gunships. No casualties or damage to river craft resulted from the gunfire.
On 28 July, RPD 58 PBRs which had just relieved RPD-56 the previous day, immediately entered the conflict as they attempted to set an ambush on the east Bai Lai River (XS 588 342). The PBRs detected two sampans moving with three males on board and promptly initiated action with M-16s and M-60 weapons. The males either dove or fell overboard and were then taken under grenade attack. No bodies were recovered and one sampan was sunk. One sampan was captured along with documents and one M-16 magazine.
The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was again among the quietest areas in Vietnam during July. It was apparent, however, from DUFFLEBAG activations and intelligence sources along the Vinh Te Canal, that infiltration was taking place.

Seawolf aircraft attacked infiltration routes in around the Seven Mountains area 15 times during the month. Due to the absence of friendly troops or delays in mounting infantry sweeps, battle damage assessments were not available.

At 2000H on 15 July, junks of CG 44 engaged in a unilateral firing when a sensor was activated at VS 480 540. No casualties were incurred by friendly units and enemy casualties were not known.

On the morning of 20 July, civilians reported seeing a "strange" object in the waters of the Giang Thanh River; the object was a watermine and it was taken to Cu Duc RF/PF outpost. TRAN HUNG DAO XX forces were alerted and EOD personnel were moved into the area. The device was then towed to Ha Tien where it was destroyed. The mine was reported to have been of U.S. origin of a type frequently used by Seals. Due to its corroded condition it was estimated that the mine may
have been in the water for upwards of 12 months.

On 22 July at 2120H heavy sensor activations were received from an area northeast of Ha Tien. A reaction team of ten sampans and five junks was dispatched but no contact was established. Evidence was found, however, suggesting recent use of the area as an infiltration point.

Two more unilateral firings occurred on 24 July at 2005H and at 2105H when sensors located at VS 479 528 and VS 479 537 were activated. Reaction to both activations was made with mortar and machine gun fire by junks of CG 44. Results of the firing were unknown.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXI

The waterways of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI were extremely quiet during July as there were no waterborne firefights and only two mining incidents. Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Three based at Ca Mau ranged over northern An Xuyen and southern Kien Giang Province in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI operations and U.S. Army Military Assistance Teams. They flew 22 missions, killing five VC/NVA and destroying 37 sampans, four structures and four bunkers, while damaging ten sampans, 19 structures and ten bunkers.

Intelligence gathered in July from normal channels and from Hoi Chanhs pointed to two major trends: the first trend was to wrest control of the Song Ong Doc and surrounding territory from the GVN. Both the C-7 Sapper Battalion and the San Tau Mobile Company were reported just south of the Song Ong Doc, the former at VQ 916 694 and the latter at VQ 872 993. Both units were armed with watermines, B-40 rockets, and individual weapons. The second trend was more specific in that an attack was in the planning stages, targeted against Kien An OP Base. The base was probed in the early morning of 25 July at 0400H by an estimated 30 personnel. The Camp Sentinel Radar System detected them and rapid and accurate fire by USN 60mm mortar teams forced
the enemy to retreat. The VNN 81mm mortar team took the fleeing enemy under fire and completed the rout. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. This probe tended to confirm the intelligence reports but at the end of the month, no attack had materialized, perhaps due to the strong defense posture of the base.

On 4 July, nine boats of CTG 210.2 embarked three companies of ARVN Infantry for a sweep in the vicinity of WR 007 365, to clear the area for construction of a new outpost. Shortly after the insertion a 40 kilo insertion a 40 kilo mine was spotted floating on the canal and captured. The mine was probably swept by the chain drag minesweepers preceding the convoy.

The VC lost a large weapons cache on 6 July when a Hoi Chanh led elements of the 1st Battalion, 32nd ARVN Regiment to a spot in the vicinity of VR 943 545 in the heart of the U Minh. The cache included one 60mm mortar, one 75mm recoiless rifle, two 20mm cannon, and various explosives.

On 12 July at 2045H, one unknown type artillery shell impacted about ten feet inside the western perimeter of ISB Ca Mau, presently under construction by Seabees of NMCB - Five, Detachment Mustang. There were no personnel casualties.
attributed to the explosion, however, one man broke his leg while running to the bunker.

The second watermine captured during the month was taken on the Cai Tau Canal at VQ 970 398 near the 52nd Regimental Command Post. HQ 5126 of RAID 75 found the 15 kilo device and later destroyed it at the request of the ARVN.

RAID 72 advisors found two wounded Vietnamese civilians at Toan Thang, on the Song Trem Trem at 1315H on 21 July; they called in a Sealord aircraft to medevac the two personnel to Ca Mau. Officials later discovered that the civilians were wounded by a dud M-79 round.

On 22 July at 2115H, crewmembers of an ASPB of RAID 75, moored at WR 007 365 near an RF/PFoutpost, heard noises and during a check of their immediate surroundings, found nylon cord tied to their craft. This line was immediately cut and the rivercraft moved to a new location. Two hours later the previous position of the boats was the sight of a shattering explosion. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Song Ong Doc district town received between 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from 0500H to 0600H on 25 July. RAG 26 boats immediately got underway and avoided damage.
There were no USN or VNN casualties, but one RF soldier was killed and two were wounded.

On 26 July at 0320H, a small outpost on the south bank of the Song Ong Doc at VQ 805 963, was partially overrun by an estimated reinforced platoon. Five RF/PF soldiers and five civilians were killed and 24 personnel were wounded including four US Army MAT advisors. Moderate quantities of arms were also lost; enemy casualties were undetermined.

Electric power problems at the MACV compound were exacerbated by construction of new naval billeting, and the Army at Ca Mau advised the Navy that it could no longer supply power to support the naval tenant commands. This resulted in the installation of a 60 KW generator in the compound to serve the electrical "needs of the Navy" and the defusing of a possible Army/Navy confrontation.

PMS teams made progress during the month as they delivered manuals, and gave short training lectures at both Ca Mau and Kien An. SA CTF 210 stated "PMS procedures and their related importance for maintenance of CTF 210 RAID/RAG units have been thoroughly emphasized within the Naval Advisory"
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Organization and with VNN counterparts. This program is accorded highest precedence over all evolutions except urgent operational commitments.\(^1\)
During the month of July, the Rung Sat forces conducted seven CHUONG DUONG airmobile/watermobile sweeps, but the enemy evaded consistently under the extreme pressure, and reports indicated that enemy troops were still infiltrating into the area. Results of the Slick/RPC/LCM inserts were often unrewarding, as the enemy found convenient hidden bunkers, to disappear into, but the sweeps effectively kept the enemy away from the Long Tau shipping channel for the ninth month in a row. The results were as follows: 11 enemy killed (two by air) and two captured, a sizeable arms cache discovered, and 70 bunkers destroyed. The abundance of bunkers evince the type of war being fought in the Rung Sat, where the enemy must daily face the awesome rocket and machinegun fire from the Seawolves, and must daily elude reconnaissance planes and patrolling local forces. To survive, he has dug, and he is surviving, though miserably.

The USN Seawolves of Detachment 2 out of Nha Be rode 'shotgun' over the CHUONG DUONG operations during the month, accounting for several of the kills. They also flew upwards of 23 routine intelligence directed missions on suspected enemy locations, with results ascertained on only four occasions.
Tactical boundaries of the Rung Sat Special Zone. The dotted line indicates the Long Tau Shipping Channel.
The Logistics Support Base at Nha Be, 13 kilometers south of Saigon, provides support for PBRs and Seawolves protecting the Long Tau Shipping Channel and prosecuting sweeps in the Rung Sat Special Zone.
The operations in the Rung Sat were generally one-sided. Local forces in strength hunted for an elusive enemy chary of combat, while supporting Seawolves overhead (on short notice) gave the VC good reason to seek bunkers. On 1 July at 1815H, 18 miles southeast of Nha Be, an RF company enroute to a night ambush position came in contact with three to five VC. The RFs initiated the fire and the VC fled. Seawolves placed strikes on the evasion route near XS 030 508, but the enemy casualties were unknown. Searching the area after the strike, the RFs found 400 pounds of rice and assorted quartermaster gear.

In a typical CHUONG DUONG airmobile/watermobile operation, three RF companies were inserted by US Army Slicks, boats of RPD 57, RAG 27, and RF Boat Company 29, on 1-3 July in an area centered 17 miles southeast of Nha Be. They made contact twice during the three day operation, resulting in two VC killed and one wounded, while one RF soldier was wounded. The results of the operations were 25 bunkers, two tunnels, two sampans and assorted supplies destroyed. Still, the enemy appeared to be building bunkers faster than the allies could destroy them.

On 2 July at 1830H, an RF company enroute to a night ambush position came into contact with five to eight VC in the
vicinity of YS 023 502, 17 miles southeast of Nha Be. Seawolves were scrambled and accounted for two kills. One RF was wounded before the action was taken out of the hands of the ground forces.

Though sweeps were conducted daily, most were unproductive, while one stands out as an example of PRU power. On 14 and 15 July, 40 PRUs with Slick support conducted a sweep in an area centered 15 miles east of Nha Be near YS 20 82. On the first day, nine PRUs came into contact with an unknown number of VC, and dispatched seven of them, while one PRU was wounded in return. The reputation of the PRUs is built on hard encounters such as these. On the same day, and in the same vicinity, a USN LHFT placed an air strike which destroyed 45 bunkers. On the second day, the PRUs captured one assistant platoon leader and several guns.

On 17 July at 1300H, while conducting a daytime sweep, an RF company came across a huge arms cache which upstaged arms captured in the entire military region. At a spot 28 kilometers southeast of Nha Be, in the vicinity of YS 204 709, the company uncovered 23 M3A1 sub machine guns, three CKC rifles, one 7.92 German mauser, and destroyed 100 kilos of TNT in quarter pound blocks, as well as 500,000 rounds of CKC ammo.
The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RPD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Keo, Tan An, Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau, Chau Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
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<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>Ben Tre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>CHI LANG I</td>
<td>DaNang/Thuan An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>212.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>212.6</td>
<td>Phuoc Xuyen</td>
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<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>212.5</td>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.
The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>216.1</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>214.2</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>Nam Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CTF 210</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Commander,</td>
<td>Hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Coastal Zone</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/33</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>CTG 217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.
The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Officer-in-Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf</td>
<td>116.6.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LT Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf</td>
<td>116.13.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>LT Antrim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papa Platoon</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf</td>
<td>116.10.2</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LTJG Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Team One Det Golf</td>
<td>116.1.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>LTJG Walsh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oscar Platoon</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.

Romeo Platoon of Seal Team One stood down on 27 July.
The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det.</th>
<th>Task Org.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.7.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>116.7.2</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>116.7.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>116.7.4</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>116.7.5</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>116.7.6</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>116.7.7</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>116.7.8</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>116.7.9</td>
<td>USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST 1167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) From 29 to 31 July located at YS 00 00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments; major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In July the Seawolves flew 1144 missions of which 117
missions were in contact with the enemy; 62 enemy were killed. 123 structures, 101 bunkers and 163 sampans were damaged or destroyed.
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CTG 116.8

During July the "Sonies" flew 270 missions of which 118 were in contact with the enemy. 227 enemy were killed; 130 structures, 248 bunkers, and 122 sampans were damaged or destroyed.

A new combination, Black Pony OV-10 aircraft armed with CBU-55 bombs, the newest ordnance in Vietnam, made their mark in July; they were used on numerous occasions to clear insertion points of mines and booby traps and also against several intelligence targets with devastating results.
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

During July, MARKET TIME patrol units of the U.S. Navy inspected 457 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 55 and detained none. The MARKET TIME forces had an average of two MSOs, one LST, three PGs, two WHECs, and one DE on patrol during the month. The VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Inner Barrier units boarded 13,305 junks and sampans, detaining 85 persons. Coastal Surveillance units engaged in NGFS accounted for 12 structures destroyed, eight damaged; one bunker, and one sampan destroyed.

Cloud operations were implemented in all four coastal zones in July. A common problem seemed to be lack of senior OTCs experienced in unit coordination. Another problem area was communications. Not all units within a cloud were able to communicate effectively among themselves and with their respective zone commander.

MARKET TIME P-3 air barrier units commenced a trial period of advancing patrols between the Republic of Vietnam and high infiltration trawler threat areas on 1 July. The advancing patrol was designed to give intensive coverage to traffic traversing the South China Sea to Military Region Four. Under
MARKET TIME PATROL AREAS

- COASTAL GROUP
- COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CENTER

TU 213.1.1
TU 213.2.1
TU 213.2.2
TU 213.3.1
TU 213.4.1
TU 213.4.2
TU 213.4.3

VIETNAM
SOUTH CHINA SEA

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the advancing patrol concept, one flight daily was to be dedicated
to MARKET TIME operations. However, Seventh Fleet augmented
this coverage with operational flights serving a two-fold
purpose; to satisfy other requirements in the South China Sea
directed by higher authority along with countering sea infiltration
to the RVN coast. This provided adequate coverage of the southern
portion of the RVN coast but left noticeable gaps on occasion
in the northern coastal areas of South Vietnam. VARS (visual
air reconnaissance) flights continued to be flown in all coastal
zones, providing additional coverage of these areas.

USCGC RUSH departed Vietnam waters on 4 July, having
performed yeoman service as a MARKET TIME unit. RUSH
participated in the sinkings of two infiltration trawlers in
FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Typhoons swept through the First Coastal Zone in July, causing minor damage along the coast and reducing the effectiveness of MARKET TIME and TRAN HUNG DAO XV patrols. The "Cloud" Task Unit 213.1.1 encountered coordination difficulties due to inexperienced, junior OTCs. The Cua Viet, closed to water traffic due to the suspected presence of an NVA HAT-2 mine in the river mouth, was opened on 11 July after repeated sweeps failed to locate the mine. Enemy mining activity on the Cua Viet remained moderate, however, as enemy emphasis shifted from the eastern to the western portion of the river. This activity resulted in the sinking of a loaded rock barge on 26 July. Enemy activity in the CHI LANG I AO was light to moderate. An unfortunate NGFS accident in this AO resulted in the wounding of four civilians near the Coastal Group 14 OP Base on the morning of 16 July.

During the month Typhoons Harriet, Ivy, Kim and Jean caused moderate damage throughout the First Coastal Zone, mostly in the DaNang area. The Naval Support Facility DaNang reported one VNN PBR, one LCVP and a skimmer sunk because of the storms. All of the boats were later refloated. One LCM was
reported moderately damaged. One Navy barracks was moderately damaged, and the VNN harbor security causeway was grounded and later freed. The harbor entrance control point reported receiving structural damage to a building, damage to rooftop antennas and one radar dome antenna lost.

Elsewhere throughout the First Coastal Zone, OP Base Hue reported minor structural damage to structures throughout the base and temporary loss of communications. OP Base Cua Viet reported one third of the anti-swimmer fence was washed away and three barges were broken away during the storms. One of the barges sank 500 meters down river, one washed into the LST ramp and the other barge beached near the base. Coastal Group 12 at Tuan An reported one junk sunk which was later refloated, and also reported moderate damage to dependent housing. CG 13 at Cua Tu Hien reported one USN outboard engine lost and heavy damage to dependent housing. CG 14 at Hoi An reported minor damage to dependent housing. CG 15 at An Hoa reported minor damage to some of the structures on the base. Many aids to navigation in the Tan My Harbor were destroyed or dislocated, resulting in the closing of the channel. Elsewhere, damage was light, and the main effect of the typhoons was the curtailment of patrols due to high seas.

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During July, the "Cloud" task unit in the First Coastal Zone, TU 213.1.1, experienced some difficulties. The task unit, composed of PGMs and WPBs, did not have commanding officers with enough experience to effectively coordinate patrols of the various elements. The First Coastal Zone Advisor recommended that more aggressive on-scene leadership, such as can be provided by an 0-4 or above, was needed to make the Cloud Concept viable.¹ The Executive Officer, COSEFLOT ONE, departed DaNang on 26 July to assume the position of OTC until the reassignment of a PCE with its more experienced, and more senior commanding officer, to the task unit.

One of the task unit elements, PGM 612, experienced difficulty of another sort at 2355H on 19 July, approximately 25 kilometers east of Chu Lai (BT 785 070). The PGM spotted USNS LST 1067 about five miles from the coast and instigated challenge procedures, with negative reaction from the LST. While the PGM was dead in the water and still sending the challenge, the LST collided with the PGM's bow causing moderate damage. LST 1067 failed to stop or answer the challenge. Fortunately, there were no personnel casualties.

¹ SA CTG 213.1 msg 230830Z JUL 71
During July on the Cua Viet, enemy activity remained moderate with 15 mining incidents reported. Eleven of these incidents involved mine recoveries, three involved harmless detonations, while one resulted in the sinking of another rock barge. Several of the mine recoveries were aided by civilians, demonstrating the effectiveness of Coastal Group II's PSYOPS campaign. The majority of these incidents occurred in the western part of the river, a shift of enemy emphasis from the eastern portions of the Cua Viet.

The one sinking of the month in the Cua Viet happened on the morning of 26 July. A loaded rock barge, pulled by a tug, detonated a mine at YD 311 682. The tug was following the second set of sweep beats, all passing over the mine without incident, indicating the mine was specially set for the higher pressure gradient of the rock barge. The barge sank without blocking the channel.

Coastal Group II was instrumental in aiding survivors of an overturned sampan on 27 July. The sampan, carrying 32 people, overturned due to wind and choppy seas. Twenty people survived with no injuries, two were medevaced, while ten lost their lives.
The intensive search for the HAT-2 mine supposedly planted by two captured watersappers in June was called off on 11 July, and the Cua Viet waterway was reopened. The decision to reopen the waterway was heavily influenced by the fact that intensive sweep operations failed to locate the mine, and that on 9 July, a dry docking ammi moored at OP Base Cua Viet, broke loose and was carried through the channel and out to sea by the swift current. LCMs located the ammi and returned it to the pier with no damage. The ammi and LCMs had to travel over the suspected location of the missing HAT-2 mine, yet failed to trigger anything.

A number of incidents occurred in the CHI LANG I AO during July. At 2230H on 2 July, a Coastal Group 14 Yabuta junk in a WBGP (BT 194 565) heard VC talking on a loudspeaker. The Yabuta opened fire with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, receiving no return fire. At about the same time, another CG 14 Yabuta, with SA CG 14 embarked, was investigating the report of a half sunk fishing boat in the vicinity of BT 222 555. The U.S. advisor and the VNN patrol officer disembarked from the craft and began searching for the stricken vessel. While they were gone, the Yabuta received several rounds of small arms fire and
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returned the same. The officers found the fishing vessel, empty except for its engine, and so they returned to the Yabuta. While they were gone the Yabuta had run aground, so another Yabuta had to be dispatched to the scene to free the grounded junk.

On the morning of 15 July, a tragedy occurred near the CC 14 OP Base. At 0945H, CG 14 notified CSC DaNang that USS OKLAHOMA (CLG-5) was firing extremely close (50-100 meters) to the OP base. The ship promptly ceased fire, but not before four rounds landed close to the village adjoining the OP base, wounding four civilians, two seriously. An investigation as to responsibility for the accident was being conducted at the month's close.

On 17 July, another incident occurred involving CG 14 personnel when a sensor team, attempting an implant at BT 141 531, received automatic weapons fire from a small enemy force. Regional forces suppressed the fire with M-16, M-79, M-60, and 60mm mortar fire, and then maneuvered to flank the enemy position. The RFs moved to a tree line at BT 142 531, finding one bunker. Further inspection was halted when a friendly mortar round fell short, seriously wounding one
RF. All units then withdrew to the insertion point for medevac.

Enemy casualties were undetermined.
SECOND COASTAL ZONE

The enemy continued to maintain a moderate level of military operations involving sapper probes, ambushes, and standoff ABFs in the Second Coastal Zone during July. "Cloud" operations continued in full swing with a task unit in the North and a task element in the South providing coverage in high infiltration threat areas. Also during the month, several probable sub contacts in the Vung Ro Bay area, coupled with an intelligence report lent credence to the fact that the North Vietnamese may be trying to infiltrate supplies into the Vung Ro Bay area by submarine.

Harbor security was again a primary concern throughout the Second Coastal Zone. Three barges were destroyed in Qui Nhon by water sappers, and two suspected sappers were captured in Cam Ranh Bay. In addition, the USS COHOES (ANL-78) completed salvage operations on the mined SS AMERICAN HAWK, also in Qui Nhon, as the month drew to a close.

Two "Cloud" task units were underway in the Second Coastal Zone during July. A northern unit, designated Task Unit 213.2.3, composed of, on the average, one PGM, two WPB, and three PCF's patrolled areas 3-I and 4-C. The southern unit, designated Task Element 213.2.2.1, composed of a PGM and three PCF's, patrolled area 5-C. Both units continued to improve throughout
the month in patrol procedures, unit coordination, and communications security. The one common problem in "Cloud" operations was the lack of experience in unit coordination by the relatively junior officer OTCs.

With the new "Cloud" units increasing the effectiveness of the Inner Barrier, the North Vietnamese may have found another way to infiltrate supplies to their troops in RVN. At 1800H on 18 July, two VNAF Skyraiders engaged an unidentified submarine at CQ 280 420. The submarine returned fire and dived. At 1830H, at CQ 330 210, PGM 611, on patrol of the Vung Ro Bay area, reported sighting an object ten inches high and 20 inches wide moving through the water on an estimated easterly course at speed ten knots. CTF 115 sent an aircraft to investigate and the aircraft reported a probable diesel submarine at 12-50N 110-16E at 2328H.

Furthermore, a Second Coastal Zone IO source reported that at 1800H on 13 July, a NVN submarine, about 39 meters in length, painted black, infiltrated territorial waters in the vicinity of CQ 316 286. It was sighted for five minutes and then disappeared. This report was rated as to-source; fairly

1. NILO Qui Nhon PERINTREP (14-71) 200700Z JUL 71
Successful enemy sapper activities in Second Coastal Zone harbors during the past few months focused concern in the area of harbor defense. In Cam Ranh Bay, the overall harbor defense posture decreased since the division of harbor responsibility in December 1970, due to the inability or reluctance of the National Maritime Police and Coastal Group 26 to effectively patrol their assigned areas of the harbor. Military areas of responsibility still are patrolled by Harbor Defense Unit, CRB. The Army Ammunition Piers at Cam Ranh, presently protected against swimmer/sapper attacks by Project Short Time, have requested three PADD (Portable Acoustic Doppler Detectors) units for mid September, after Project Short Time stands down. The redeployment of ISDS (Improved Swimmer Defense System) from Tan Chau to Cam Ranh is also being considered as a replacement for Short Time. Spotlighting the issue, on 10 July, USN Neptune patrol boats spotted two suspicious suspects on the shoreline of Upper Cam Ranh Harbor, across the harbor from the NAF. One suspect tried to evade but stopped upon being challenged.

1. 2nd CZ IO msg 241020Z JUL 71
2. SA CTF 213 msg 191245Z JUL 71

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a second time. Neither man had ID papers, and between the
two, were carrying three fragmentation grenades and one rocket
fuze. The suspects were turned over to the National Police.

Nha Trang and Qui Nhon also reported problems in the areas
of harbor security. The problem was more acute at Qui Nhon, where
three merchant ships have been mined within the past 15 months.
Two PADD devices are currently employed (one at the north
end of De Long Pier, the second in a patrol skimmer), and these
were instrumental in night detection of a swimmer on 30 June
and on 3 July. The latter detection was confirmed by visual
sighting, however, the resultant PBR chase proved in vain. Four
additional PADD units are expected in the near future. Each unit
requires four persons for operation and maintenance.

At 2356H on 25 July, another incident occurred at Qui Nhon.
Two explosions sank three ammunition storage barges (vic.
CR 100 244). Fortunately, the barges were empty except for
some scrap lumber. The explosions were probably caused by
satchel charges.

USS COHOES (ANL-78) completed salvage operations on the
SS AMERICAN HAWK at Qui Nhon on 28 July. Much of the
month's work involved construction and welding of an external patch, dewatering of flooded compartments, and the off-loading of NSFO from the stricken vessel. In spite of this busy work schedule, USS COHOES found the time to respond to a distress signal on 2 July from the Liberian tug FERRY. The tug had a barge alongside, taking on water and in danger of sinking. The COHOES immediately went alongside and began pumping out the barge. Repair work was completed the next morning.

In a miscellaneous incident at 1415H on 21 July, a PA&E worker welding a hinge to a metal door frame inside the Naval Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay transmitter site, ignited the styrofoam insulation between the metal outer and inner walls. Local personnel began fighting the fire immediately, however, the remote location, unfamiliarity with the area, and the requirement to bring water to the area hampered their efforts. Army and Air Force water trucks were called for help and the fire was quickly brought under control. Damage was limited because the fire was contained between the inner and outer walls. All circuitry was back on the air at 1724H without any noticeable problems.
THIRD COASTAL ZONE

The major concern during the month in the Third Coastal Zone was the interdiction of coastal activity in the estuaries and open waters off the Long Toan, Thanh Phu, and Binh Dai Secret Zones. These transshipments were believed to be of small quantities shipped in small, shallow draft craft from the Long Toan to the Thanh Phu to the Binh Dai and thence inland into Kien Hoa Province. On 30 June, 1971, the Third Coastal Zone "cloud" operations began with the activation of Task Unit 213.3.1. CTU 213.3.1 was tasked with "the mission of conducting intensive coordinated waterborne sweeps, checks, and searches of all craft plying the coastal waters and estuaries around and between the secret zones". Furthermore, CTU 213.3.1 was tasked to "conduct coastal air reconnaissance of the secret zones and adjacent coastal waters"; to "conduct planned air missions into secret zones"; and, to "develop coordination with ground and VNN forces to insure all waterways connecting and contained within the secret zones are interdicted".

The task unit assets assigned were:

(a) 1 USN LST (USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY LST 1167)
(b) 2 VNN PCF divisions (6 craft)

1. SA 213, 3 msg 011031Z JUL 71
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(c) HAL 3 Detachment 9 (2 UH1-M Seawolf gunships)

(d) 1 SEALORD helicopter available on request for VAR (visual air reconnaissance)

(e) VNN Coastal Groups 33, 34, 35, 36 (36 junks)

The LST, WESTCHESTER COUNTY was employed as the mother ship to the PCF divisions (providing fuel, water, and food to the crews) and as a command and control platform for CTU 213.3.1, and as a NGFS ship mounting 3"/50 caliber guns.

While the task unit was supposedly Vietnamese commanded, US Navy advisors exercised considerable control due to the US assets involved in this operation. A joint staff was formed for CTU 213.3.1, with either the Third Coastal Zone Advisor, Senior Advisor COSFLOT 3 or Senior Advisor COSFLOT 5 assigned to duties afloat with the staff. Operations were going so well by the end of the month that COMNAVFORV directed SA CTF 213 and SA VNN Fleet Command to initiate planning for a VNN ship (HEC/DER) to assume the role as the command and control platform and the support ship to the PCFs.

As an example of the numerous successful operations conducted by the task unit during the month, a combined operation was held on 23 July involving four CG 34 junks,