troops from the 233rd RF Company, and the two Seawolf helicopters
of HAL-3 Detachment 9. The troops were inserted by junk
at coordinates XS 724 990 at 0700H. At 0705H, Seawolves
spotted a cache of 55 gallon gasoline drums at XS 725 993,
and put a strike on them, destroying four of the six drums.
The remaining drums were destroyed by the RF troops. The
troops continued their sweep, contacting an unknown number
of VC at XS 722 995, killing three and destroying one CKC
rifle. At 1010H, the junks extracted the troops at XS 715 009,
completing the operation. Three U.S. Navy advisors participated.
There were no friendly casualties.
FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

Cloud operations were the main focus of attention in the Fourth Coastal Zone during July. The cloud units have been operating more or less independently, waiting for intelligence upon which to act in order to form clouds. This was difficult to do for accurate intelligence could not be obtained soon enough, and problems with communications hampered coordination efforts. It was decided that the greatest threat areas of infiltration were the lower Ca Mau Peninsula, the Rach Gia Bay area, and the Ha Tien area. This led to the formation of three cloud groups in these areas.

The first group, designated Task Unit 213.4.1 was formed with the Commanding Officer, CG 43, Hon Tre Island, as the task unit commander. Three PCFs were removed from the Phu Quoc patrol (areas 91, 9K, and 9K1) in order to bring total assets up to six PCFs and six junks, and were placed under the control of CTU 213.4.1. Operations envisioned three PCFs and three junks continuously on station. The junks were to be placed at 300 yard intervals from VS 845 195 to VS 840 190, while the PCFs were to be stationed at 2000 yard intervals from VS 840 190 to VS 840 130. The remaining three junks and three PCFs were to stage out of Hon Tre to provide on
station reliefs.

On 8 July, at the request of Commanding General 21st ARVN Division and VNN CNO, one PCF and one junk were detached from TU 213.4.1, and one PGM from patrol area 9D in order to patrol a transshipment infiltration area at the southern shore of Rach Gia Bay, VR 920 920 to VR 860 820. This force was essentially a free moving cloud patrolling a landing area vice a traffic control point, as was done in the northern unit. This was done because the VC had less flexibility in diverting around the patrol area.

Thus the formation of this southern group left two PCF's and two junks continuously on station in the northern Three Sisters area in a barrier line oriented about VS 845 195, VS 840 190 and VS 840 130. The junks manned the inshore leg of the barrier at 500 meter intervals, and the PCFs the seaward leg at intervals of 1000 meters. The general north/south orientation of the barrier line was designed to screen traffic considered by the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander to move from west to east around the Three Sisters shoreline to get further into the bay before taking departure from the shoreline.

The second cloud group, formed on 12 July, and designated CONFIDENTIAL
Task Unit 213.4.2, had as its OTC the Commanding Officer of CG 44 at Ha Tien. The cloud unit's assets included six PCFs and two coastal raiders. Three PCFs and one coastal raider were to remain on station continuously. The coastal raider was to be stationed at a traffic control point determined by the on-scene commander, to observe all traffic. The PCFs were to operate in a moving cloud downstream from the raider, checking traffic and responding to information from the raider.

The third cloud group had, perhaps, the most difficult job. The group, designated Task Unit 213.4.3, was tasked with patrolling the high infiltration threat area off the southern Ca Mau Peninsula. This cloud utilized assets formerly assigned to areas 8C, D, E, and 9C. The unit commander was to be an outer barrier HEC/PCE skipper. However, these outer barrier assets were available for only short periods of time. For example, on 17 July, the HEC/PCE unit chopped back to CTF 213, leaving a relatively junior WPB commanding officer as OTC with the attendant coordination problems discussed in the First and Second Coastal Zone sections. Also, the departure of the outer barrier unit seriously degraded task unit communications. On 22 July, the VNN CNO agreed to
the retention of HEC/PCE commanding officers as CTU.

However, the unit would remain in the outer barrier, while the senior WPB/PCF skipper was designated as CTE and on-scene commander. Both CTU and CTE were to have continual communications with CTG 214.2 at Nam Can in order to receive intelligence.

Task Unit 213.4.3 was further subdivided into two groups. One group was to operate as a mobile patrol in the area between the Bo De and Ganh Hao Rivers, while the second group would form a mobile patrol in the Mue Ya Quan area. Each group was to consist of two WPB/PGMs and was to remain on station four days at a time.

There was some discussion at month's end about embarking CTU 213.4.1 and CTU 213.4.2 with their respective clouds. However, a strong argument against this was the lack of reliable communications between the afloat units and the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander. The CTUs, shore based, could better pass information between the clouds and the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander with their more reliable communications facilities.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

The primary objective of the U.S. Navy PSYOPS effort in Vietnam is to assist the Vietnamese in acquiring the capability of conducting their own PSYOPS. To further this aim, Beach Jumper Unit 1 Team 13 will stand down in early August. During July, much of the BJU equipment was being turned into N-9 COMNAVFORV for routine maintenance. After this maintenance, N-9 will sub-custody this equipment to the senior POLWAR advisors attached to the various commands throughout Vietnam for use by the VNN in conducting PSYOPS throughout their respective AOs. At a later date to be announced, this equipment will be turned over to the VNN POLWAR bloc. The following is a listing of BJU-1 Team 13 detachments and a resume of their activities during July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Assigned to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ team</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>2off/4enl</td>
<td>CTF 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyops Det</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>1enl</td>
<td>Nilo, Vinh Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyops Det</td>
<td>Ben Tre</td>
<td>1enl</td>
<td>Nilo, Ben Tre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psyops Det</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
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<tr>
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<td>My Tho</td>
<td>1enl</td>
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<td>Rach Gia</td>
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<td>SA, CTG 212.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>2enl</td>
<td>SA, CTG 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equipment loan</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>POLWAR Adv, RSSZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At Binh Thuy, BJU personnel were mainly involved in planning
and maintenance. A BJU representative, along with the NAVLE
CORDS PSYOPS officer visited all the BJU detachments and inspected
the progress of training the Vietnamese on operation and maintenance
of PSYOPS equipment. While VNN interest in PSYOPS was still
hesitant and tentative, other agency interest was high (vis. National
Police, Phung Hoang, Sector FOLWAR); the purpose of the visit
was to connect these active groups with personnel on the US/VNN
side who will receive the BJU loudspeaker equipment, and to form a
basis for future cooperation so use of PSYOPS gear can be expanded.

The detachment at Vinh Long conducted operations totaling 21 1/4
broadcast hours during July. The team conducted four helo broad-
cast missions targeting six districts with general Chieu Hoi themes.
The team also conducted five vehicle broadcast missions targeting
five districts with Chieu Hoi themes, and one waterborne
broadcast mission targeting three districts with a general Chieu
Hoi theme, and themes concerning refusal to pay VC taxes. All
equipment was set up and operated by VNN personnel on all the

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operations. The BJU operator accompanied the team in a purely advisory capacity. These PSYOPS missions resulted in 19 Hoi Chanhs for the month; four others rallied from Sa Dec as a result of a BJU PSYOPS broadcast using a new high ranging Hoi Chanh tape.

The Chau Doc team operated for 144 hours with PBR and PCF craft in districts and canals on both sides of the Mekong River below the Cambodian border. These operations involved a total of 21 broadcast hours utilizing tapes with general Chieu Hoi, specific NVA Chieu Hoi, PSDF, blacklists, land titular, and harassment themes. One quick reaction mission using a 250 watt backpack set in support of the Olam City Public Health Service was run. This mission utilized programs with themes of mosquito control, noncontaminated water usage, blacklist, pro-GVN, PSDF, and land titular. Nine Hoi Chanhs were received at Chau Doc during the month, seven of them directly attributable to PSYOPS.

The My Tho Detachment reported nine broadcast hours for the month, six of those involving preplanned tape and live broadcasts with a 1400 watt system around Ben Tre and My Tho, utilized in conjunction with Marine Police boats. At the My Tho Detachment, over 20 Vietnamese were trained in use of BJU PSYOPS gear.
The Rach Gia Detachment was extremely active throughout the month. The team carried out 22 1/2 hours of broadcasting by boat and vehicle utilizing general VCI themes. Three missions with a 250 watt system mounted on a jeep were conducted targeting villages with Phung Hoang and Chieu Hoi inducement themes, and also targeting district level VC finance and economy cadre. One mission was conducted using a 1400 watt system mounted on a Marine Police boat along the Cai Lon for purposes of Phung Hoang exposure (Phung Hoang is called "Phoenix" by the Americans and is an intelligence program directed at VCI) and Chieu Hoi rallying. Two hundred posters were also put up, and 20,000 leaflets and 1250 pamphlets distributed. Two preplanned missions with the Marine Police in Kien Thang District were carried out, involving broadcasts with Chieu Hoi inducement themes, and with a theme targeting ten known VCI in the area. In the period 4-10 July alone, the Rach Gia Detachment reported 44 Hoi Chanhs, five directly attributable to PSYOPS.

The Ca Mau Detachment also had highly successful results during July. The team conducted 11 hours of broadcasts with voluntary informant and narcotics penalties themes. The team also conducted five interesting night harassment missions over suspected VC camps around the Little Square Bay area near Solid Anchor. These missions utilized tapes with themes such as a crying baby, wandering soul,
laughter, and U.S. acid rock and country and western music. A recent Hoi Chanh interview with Tran Van Be, guerrilla member, who rallied on 5 July, indicated that, in addition to not believing VC propaganda any more, PSYOPS played a large part in his decision to rally. The Hoi Chanh stated that just prior to rallying he heard three PSYOPS programs from a helo on general Chieu Hoi themes. This Hoi Chanh later led the 21st ARVN Division on a successful operation capturing one 85mm mortar, seven 60mm mortars, two .50 caliber machine guns, one rocket launcher, one LMG, two SMG (K-50), two SMG (M), 16 Mausers, nine K44 rifles, eight MAS 36 rifles, and one ton of explosives.

PSYOPS was not confined to the Delta in July. In a message on 20 July, SA CTG 213 requested a report of current and planned PSYOPS programs from his coastal zone advisors. In general, the coastal zone programs consisted of face to face leaflet/pamphlet/poster distribution by coastal group patrol and MEDCAP teams. Some broadcasting was being done; also, air leaflet drops were planned.

The program in the First Coastal Zone was, by far, the most advanced, utilizing broadcast equipment on loan from BJU-1. For example, a PSYOPS team conducted a broadcast on the Cua Viet on 24 July covering anti-mine, Chieu Hoi, and associated themes. This
broadcast bore immediate results, for on 26 July, a VN boy reported two anti-tank mines, one CHICOM grenade, and one case of pull friction fuses to a CG 11 junk. ALSO, on 28 July, a boy brought one anti-tank mine to the CG 11 OP Base and was paid 2,500 piasters from the VIP funds. Later that afternoon, another boy found an anti-tank mine and turned it over to a CG 11 junk. This boy also received 2,500 piasters from VIP funds. Finally, on 29 July, another boy found a Russian TM-41 anti-tank mine and turned it in to a Yabuta on patrol. The youth was also paid 2,500 piasters from the VIP funds.

MARKET TIME units were also active in the field of civic action projects. USCGC MORGENTHAU was very active in the Fourth Coastal Zone, sometimes conducting as many as three and four MEDCAPS each week. The Fourth Coastal Zone PSYOPS Advisor frequently accompanied the MEDCAP teams to act as liaison, to develop personal contacts, to provide preventive medicine for livestock and pets, and to initiate civic action projects. The following is a recount of some of the highlights from MORGENTHAU's MEDCAPS: 6 July, Pouli Obi Island, four hours, 34 patients treated; 7 July, Hon Tho'm, 3 hours, 20 patients treated during a howling gale; 8 July, Hon Panjang, 7 hours, 35 patients treated; 9 July, Hon Rai, 8 hours, 279 patients treated; 10 July, Poulo Dama, 9 hours, 106
Petty Officer Second Class William Sturdivant shows off a 15-minute-old piglet born at the Task Force 114 hog farm at Cam Ranh Bay. Sturdivant and three other U.S. Navy men are currently training Vietnamese sailors to take over their facility which began operations in September of 1969, and until May 1971, was the only OHH distribution center in Vietnam.
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patients treated; and finally, 13 July, Hon Rai (north side), five hours, 148 patients treated.

Also in the field of community and civic action projects, ISB Qui Nhon reported continuing medical and financial support for St. Paul's Orphanage in the city of Qui Nhon. Despite increasing pressure from the ISB's own VNN hog feeding program, the orphanage was still receiving edible garbage three times a week from the base to support the orphanage's hog feeding program, its primary source of income. ISB Qui Nhon has also provided assistance in procuring and showing Vietnamese and suitable U.S. movies for the dependent community. A VN movie operator has been trained and a projector is being salvaged for direct turnover to the community. The ISB also modified a building in the dependent community to provide a school for 84 children. The base also built necessary furnishings including desks, benches, and black boards.

In July, CTG 214.2 moved to initiate a swine program for the Nam Can area. ISB Nam Can requested a pilot program of one gilt, one boar, and two feeder pigs. The Biet Hai Naval Rangers ordered one gilt and two feeder pigs. The boar ordered by the ISB was to be shared with the Biet Hai.

In the Dependent Shelter Program, Seabees of CBMU 302 and
Petty Officer Third Class John Moran, a Navy Seabee, puts his masonry skills to work on a debris shelter project at Cat Lai.
volunteers from Advisory Team 159 contributed significantly to an excellent US/Vietnamese relationship in An Thoi Village during July. Recent civic action work included assistance in digging a drainage ditch and installing a culvert to accommodate the village main street. Recent projects have included hauling sand, gravel and rocks for home construction, and pouring cement frontage for village stores and homes.

On 17 July, a 15 man detachment of CBMU 302 was ordered to OP Base Chu Lai in Military Region One in order to construct 16 new dependent shelters on an existing concrete slab, and to improve drainage of existing shelters. The detachment was to arrive in early August and was scheduled to remain there about three months.
ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The logistics support aspect of the ACTOV program reached a halfway mark during the month of July. Eighteen of the 34 support bases had been turned over, with 98 craft remaining to be turned over, by the end of July. The turnover of craft in other areas had been essentially completed, with 138 coastal surveillance craft already turned over, and only one ship remaining for turnover, the DER USS FORSTER. All 293 river security craft, all 224 river assault craft, and all 137 harbor and mine defense craft had already been turned over. The first operational ACTOVRAĐ site was turned over on 7 July.

Fifteen craft were turned over during the month, with logistics support craft in the majority. On 1 July, the yard repair craft YR-71 was transferred at Tan Chau. More than 120 U.S. Navymen spent two months preparing for the YR-71 turnover. During that time, VNN sailors were brought aboard to be trained. As they became proficient in repair skills, Americans left. Five U.S. Navymen remained on board as advisors at the time of turnover. Three other yard repair craft had been transferred in addition to the 155-foot craft. Also on the first of the month, the USS MARK (AKL-12) was leased to the Chinese Navy in Taiwan. On 14 July,
two LCM-6s were turned over at DaNang. On 28 July, six USARV PBRs and their mission were turned over to the VNN at Qui Nhon. On 30 July the Fleet Command at Nha Be received the refrigerator craft, YFU-90, and on 31 July received one LCM-8 and four LCM-6s.

The heavy pace of training continued unabated during July, in the effort to bring qualified men into positions where the ACTOV program required them. During the month, 294 VNN enlisted men graduated from various schools at the VNNTC at Nha Trang. On 10 July, five officers and 23 enlisted men of the Cambodian Navy arrived at the PBR MoBase II for six weeks training in base maintenance and boat repair. On 16 July the VNN OCS Class number 11 graduated at Newport, Rhode Island. On 24 July, 211 enlisted men graduated from various rating classes at the NTC at Cam Ranh Bay. On 30 July, at the NTC in Saigon, 54 OCS candidates, just returned from Newport, were designated aspirants by RADM Chon, CNO, VNN. As the 10th of 12 classes to graduate, they brought the total to 604 men having completed the OCS training program.

The vanguard ACTOV RAD station at Vung Tau commenced operations on 1 July and was turned over on the seventh.
Vietnamese crew manning the site had been in training since March. The motivation was reported as high among teachers and students alike, as the ACTOVRAV designated personnel were considered a cut above the average VNN man. All of the 15 sites are scheduled for operation by the end of June, 1972. The sites are being built for direct turnover to the Vietnamese by Seabees and civilian firms.
Several aggressive measures were taken during July to bolster the clearly flagging Vietnamese Navy supply system. RADM W.R. Dowd, Jr., SC, called in to country in June, gave extensive counsel on the VNN logistics support situation. RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, also 'took to the road to review the situation in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO, arriving at ATSBs' Tra Cu and Go Dau Ha on 21 July. It was noted that very poor supply support was being given to the ATSBs by ISB Ben Luc. In particular, spare parts were not being received in a timely fashion, thereby severely hampering repair and PMS efforts. It was decided to disband the Moc Hoa rear base, also in the AO, which had been disestablished on 16 July for tactical reasons. Orders were given to ISB Ben Luc to shift personnel and facilities at Moc Hoa to ATSB Tuyen Nhon at month's end. An NSAS referendum taken in July throughout the support base structure of the VNN revealed advisor confidence in the Vietnamese handling of normal maintenance and repair, with reservations as to the depth of their technical experience.

The Accelerated Overhaul program continued satisfactorily in July, ensuring that with USN departures, an operational VN
Navy would indeed be on the rivers and not languishing at
dockside. The program was in some areas delayed when
repair parts were a long time arriving, and the Vietnamese
had to learn to handle this typically ambitious American-style
operation. At LSB Binh Thuy, the repair effort was, at first,
largely ineffective due to the shotgun approach of trying to
work on all the boats at once. The disorder was due to the
magnitude of the projects underway, with poor progress
reporting and quality control evinced. The advisors at Binh
Thuy then established a boat pipeline (*a la General Motors)
to direct all attention on timely completion of a small group
of boats vice the previous method of spreading resources over
all boats awaiting availability. SA LSB Binh Thuy voiced
another shortcoming in the overhaul arena, the drain on
USN personnel due to the withdrawal: "The pace of the
accelerated overhaul program, coupled with the need for
more intensive supervision of VNN logistics activities has
created a critical need for the assignment of additional
storekeepers to this command."¹

Functioning in full-time USN supply billets, the six NAG SK
personnel assigned could only act as token advisors, while

¹. SA LSB Binh Thuy msg 210850Z July 71
the need for NAG supply personnel to become fully involved in VNN logistics was described as acute. It was noted that one year earlier, in 1970, the Binh Thuy supply department was manned by 30-35 USN SKs tasked with providing repair part support to PBR craft. In July, 1971, the USN supply department had to provide repair part support not only for PBRs but for all varieties of heavy boats under the Accelerated Overhaul Program, with only eight NSA and six NAG SK personnel. Discounting completely the advisory aspect of the logistics business, the workload had magnified while staffing was drastically decreased. Moreover, RADM Dowd had visited Binh Thuy on 19 July and decided that they would undertake full repair support of ISB Rach Soi and Long Xuyen as well. The VNN SK counterparts were sufficiently numerous, but were of more value as trainees due to their absolute lack of experience. It was felt that 19 additional USN SKs would be required to have an effective supply system, though this would be an evident reverse in Vietnamization.

Shortages in USN personnel were felt elsewhere, as the USS SATYR was extended in country for the Accelerated Overhaul Program while experiencing a deterioration in
manning levels, making it impossible to accomplish ships force work previously accepted. The COMNAVFORV Overhaul Coordinator estimated that the cost impact of tasking SRF Guam to accomplish the SATYR's essential ships force items would be approximately 450,000 dollars. The greatest loss increment of personnel on the SATYR occurred as personnel completed their Vietnam tours and replacements were not forthcoming. The overhaul program had reassuring moments, however, and RADM McManus was quick to point one of them out. COMNAVSUPPACT msg 210522Z July 71 cited LSB Nha Be: "8,300 man hours were required to bring eight LCMs to turnover standards. The ability to work this in to the already heavy workload, perpetrated by the Accelerated Overhaul Program, exemplifies the outstanding leadership of LT Moore and the professional performance of the entire repair department."

On 15 July, the Newport throughput stevedore strike was finally settled, after a prolonged period with marginal unloading services for the capital city's port. Since the beginning of a work stoppage on 22 June, the Newport throughput capability was reduced by approximately 50
percent creating a backlog of ships awaiting discharge, and slowing the movement of cargo into and out of the port. At the end of the strike, there were some 23,000 short tons of cargo awaiting movement. Of this, 6,000 short tons were retrograde equipment. Between the 15th and the end of the month, there were an estimated 50 ship wait days, eight of which were with deep draft vessels; operations of other port areas in Vietnam were also adversely affected by the disruption of the scheduled arrival of ships from Newport which had calls elsewhere in the country. Operation of the Newport port required 1,100 personnel. During the strike the Saigon Supply Command had mustered 150 military personnel and 300 contractor personnel to fill in, but in anticipation of an extended layoff, MACV personnel were being selected for emergency service. The timely accord reached by the Trieu Tiet Stevedoring Company, the Ministry of Labor, and worker representatives on 15 July, made the employment of MACV personnel unnecessary. NAVFORV supplied 46 personnel who could help fill the gap. By 16 July, approximately 70 percent of the required work force had returned to Newport.
U.S. Naval Support Activity maintenance and repair

support for July was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Personnel supported</th>
<th>Craft supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DaNang</td>
<td>1,735</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cat Lo</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoBase II</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBM 21</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS KRISHNA</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSAS support ships deployed during the month were as follows:

USS ASKARI (ARL 30)
USS SATYR (ARL 23)
USS TUTUILLA (ARG 4)
USS KRISHNA (ARL 38)
USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY
USS BRULE
APL 21
APL 30
YRBM 21
YF 866
PBR MoBase II

The NAVFORV drug amnesty program, begun on 1 June, had by the end of July, admitted 110 patients at the drug rehabilitation center at LSB Nha Be. Another ten Navy personnel in Vietnam were granted amnesty, but were designated experimental users and sent back to duty without entering the center. Of the 65 men having completed the center's program, four returned to duty in Vietnam at

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their own request. All the others were sent to the Navy Rehabilitation Center at Miramar, California: five to await discharge; two to await reassignment in the U.S.; and 54 to receive further evaluation, further rehabilitation, or both.

The comprehensive NAVFORV program included: drug education throughout Vietnam and off the coast down to the lowest level, with teams reaching the Navy personnel to discuss the problems of drug abuse; information on the dangers of drugs daily disseminated to the Navy men in circulars, PODs, messages, and at quarters; spot checks of living quarters taken at virtually all U.S. naval units in Vietnam, with lockers sometimes being opened; urine tests given to all departing servicemen to determine opium content, under the broader Army program; rigid customs inspections, aided by sniffing dogs, to prevent the smuggling of the drugs back to the U.S.; and the most crucial phase, the actual rehabilitation, both physical and in attitude.

The NAVFORV program is but a part of the overall effort in Vietnam and in the U.S. Indeed, President Nixon carried the "offensive" around the world in buying Turkey's entire opium crop. In the President's news conference of 17

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June, he asserted his stand as waging an all out offensive on the "public enemy number one." getting 350 million dollars for the program and promising that one of the major inlets of the problem—G.I.s returning from Vietnam would be especially combatted. In this light, he asked Congress to increase the VA budget by 14 million dollars to initiate a drug rehabilitation program at VA hospitals. He cited the remarkable differences between the stateside and Vietnam drug problem: In Vietnam, heroin is cheap and 95 percent pure, and its effects are commonly achieved through smoking or snorting the drug, while in the U.S., the drug is impure, consisting of only about five percent heroin; it has to be main-lined or injected into the bloodstream to achieve a comparable effect. Further, a habit which costs five dollars a day to maintain in Vietnam can cost 100 dollars a day to maintain in the U.S.

In comparing the various service programs, 460 Army members were undergoing detoxification at any one time, as compared to the 100 Navy and 350 Air Force members. The Navy, consequently, had the opportunity to develop a more homespun and personalized program, generally
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considered more likely to succeed than the more massive Army program. The NAVFORV drug rehabilitation center is on the APL-30, where the inmates are physically removed from the source of drugs and the opportunity for drug abuse. The program is one of intensive personal counselling and group discussions, which breaks down the element of distrust commonly felt by the drug users, and induces the man to seek within himself a solution, and to seek further rehabilitation elsewhere.

Patients arriving at the center spend from one to four days in a security area undergoing detoxification and testing. Most have smoked or "snorted" heroin, some as much as four or five vials per day. Only one so far has taken it by injection. There was a lull in applicants for the amnesty program in the beginning of July, as the drug users waited for feedback from the rehabilitation center, but as the word was passed that it was a sincere and well-directed program, the applications increased considerably.

As four Blacks had applied for the program, it was felt that the counselling staff should contain Blacks, who would be more understanding of the Black feelings.
The last of the month saw a series of tragedies befall NSAS personnel, from varied causes. On 21 July at the NSAS Detachment Qui Nhon, SH2 Harold B. Flynn apparently attempted to commit suicide while lying on his bed in the berthing spaces. At 1000H he was discovered unconscious with a self-inflicted .45 caliber head wound behind his right ear. Flynn underwent follow-on surgery 34 hours later, but the prognosis for life was not hopeful.

Navy personnel driving in Vietnam are always exposed to hazards from the anarchic conditions that reign on the roads. While several traffic accidents occurred during the month involving naval personnel, two proved fatal. On 18 July FTGSN Stewart L. Herbst was driving a Navy bus to the Annapolis BEQ, traveling at 15 MPH, when a Vietnamese on a motorcycle attempted to pass him on the left side. The victim cut in too quickly and hooked the left bumper of the bus, causing himself to be thrown onto the pavement in front of the bus, which passed over his body, causing immediate death. The limited hostile reaction by the local populace was brought under control by the authorities.

On 23 July at 2130H BM1 Arthur R. Streeper was driving a
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Navy Ford pickup, proceeding towards the Long Binh stockade on the Bien Hoa Highway, in the vicinity of Gate #2, when a motorcycle, carrying the operator and a female passenger, attempted to pass him on the left side. Upon reaching a point just ahead of the U.S. vehicle, the motorcycle swerved to the right to avoid another motorcycle and collided with the left front of the Ford pickup, causing the victims to be knocked to the pavement. Because of the traffic to the immediate front, rear and right, BM 1 Streeper was unable to stop and proceeded approximately one mile from the scene of the accident before halting. The two Vietnamese died at the scene, while the uninjured BM 1 Streeper, a mile down the road, confronted three enraged VN soldiers, who struck him approximately five times before VN police authorities could bring the situation under control.

As in the previous month, drinking appeared to have resulted in the drowning of a U.S. sailor. At 0215H on 26 July, EN 2 Clifford F. Dowling, an advisor for RAID 71, fell overboard from an ATC alongside the USS SATYR. At the time, the quarterdeck watch on the SATYR, making the rounds on the AMMIs moored alongside, heard a splash and a cry for help.
The watch called out "man overboard" and proceeded to the aft end of the after docking AMMI. The OOD on the bridge illuminated the water and located a man approximately 30 yards astern. A SATYR patrol boat off the ship’s bow was ordered astern to effect rescue. Dowling was seen to go under twice by the bridge and quarterdeck watches and was not seen to come up again. The second time he went under at 0218H, he was approximately 70 yards astern, and the patrol boat was just clearing the after AMMI at full speed, being directed by the bridge searchlight to the spot where Dowling last went under. The patrol boat conducted a 20 minute search with negative results. A second search was conducted from 0310H to 0415H along the west bank with negative results. Investigation disclosed that Dowling had been drinking, but was not considered overly intoxicated, though earlier he had gone aft to vomit during a conversation he had with a Vietnamese counterpart. Dowling had finished the conversation with the Vietnamese after midnight and then went aft to the flight deck to sleep, while still fully clothed. The current was around five knots at the time, with the closest shore being 600 yards away. The VNN asked the local fishermen to watch for the body.

On 27 July, an American seaman fell to an ally’s bullet in a
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Saigon bar. SKSN Robert E. Schulze was imbibing in the back of the Snow Bar with several comrades when some Vietnamese, dressed in army attire, confronted them. Later one of the American sailors was beaten up in front of the bar by the soldiers, his cries falling to deaf ears. As the beaten buddy was crawling back to his comrades, the Vietnamese approached Schulze and forthwith fatally shot him. The event was clouded in uncertainties, aided by the considerable liquor drunk by the sailors.

During the month COMNAVFORV departed Saigon to explore the MARKET TIME Cloud Concept at firsthand. On 23 July, he travelled to Coastal Group 14 at Hoi An, to ACTOVRAD Site #2, and to the OP Base at Hue, to tour the bases and discuss with the advisors the newly formulated Cloud Concept. During the same trip, he toured LSB DaNang, receiving an update on the base repair and logistics situation. RADM W.R. Dowd, Jr., S.C., accompanied by CAPT Dinh of the VNN and CAPT Weiskopf, S.C., toured LSBs Long Xuyen, Cho Moi, and Rach Soi on 19 July, LSB Vinh Long and LSB Dong Tam on 21 July, and LSBs Nha Be and Cat Lo on 23 July, discussing VNN logistics and supply problems. RADM Dowd arrived in-country on 20 June for an extended stay to assist in training and upgrading the VNN supply
systems. On 18 July, DEPCOMNAVFORV, RADM Price, toured ATSB Tuyen Nhon pier area and received an operational brief at COSFLOT 5 Headquarters at My Tho.

On 21 July he toured LSB Cat Lo and the Third Riverine Headquarters at OP Base Long Binh, and received an operational brief at ATSB Ben Keo.
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

During the month, Seabee units in Vietnam, NMCB-5 and CBMU 302, based at Bien Hoa, continued to work at a steady pace on a wide variety of construction and maintenance jobs. Seabees were involved in sporadic combat action, but, fortunately, none of them were killed, and only four were injured.

The first incident of the month occurred on the Phung Hiep Canal at WR 30 23 on 9 July when one LCM-8 and two LCM-6s of Detachment Pinto, NMCB-5, at Binh Thuy, came under mortar fire. Between 10 and 15 rounds impacted near the craft, but there were no personnel or material casualties reported. Earlier on the same day, at 1230H at WR 646 560, the ill fated convoy was struck by a Vietnamese water taxi. The water taxi overturned and one Vietnamese child was drowned, despite repeated attempts by the U.S. sailors to rescue him. All other civilians were rescued and delivered safely to the bank of the canal.

On 13 July, two Seabees of Detachment Mustang were injured when an explosive round of some type landed inside the west boundry of ISB Ca Mau. The two injured men, SF3 James J. Schmidt and BM2 B. F. Lee, were injured running for the bunkers. Schmidt suffered a broken leg and was medevaced while Lee's
In the most serious combat related incident of the month, a minesweep team of Detachment Bronco, on Route 314, leading to the ACTOVRAE site at Nui Ta Kou, had a five ton dump truck mined, injuring HM1 G. W. Smith and SW3 F. C. Reynolds. The mining took place at 0840H at ZS 140 950. Both men were medevaced to FSB Mace but were returned to duty in less than a week. The mine dog, after missing the mine at 0840H found one later in the morning at ZS 140 959. This mine was blown in place leaving a crater seven feet wide and three feet deep.

On 23 July at 1330H, in An Thoi Village, a Seabee was involved in an incident with a Vietnamese enlisted man. The Vietnamese threw bricks at the Seabee, cutting his lip. The Seabee then drew his knife whereupon various Vietnamese military spectators locked and loaded their weapons. A VNN officer and some local villagers broke up the altercation and as a result, the Seabees were restricted to the base until tempers cooled.

Construction was continuing at ISB Ca Mau (Detail Mustang), and at the ACTOVRAE sites at Mui Dinh (Detail Maverick) and Nui Ta Kou (Detail Bronco). Detail Trotter completed shortfall work at Chau Doc on 25 July, and part of the detail proceeded to Tan Chau while
another smaller group went to Cho Moi to install an erdlator.

Detail Colt planned to move to An Khanh (XS 89 93) to construct a footbridge early in August.

Units of CBMU 302 were busily engaged in construction of dependent shelters for the VNN and in maintenance of existing facilities at various USN and VNN bases. Naval Civic Action Teams (NAVCATs) responsible for the construction of dependent housing are located in the following places:

- NAVCAT 1: Camp Tien Sha
- NAVCAT 2: NSF, Cam Ranh Bay
- NAVCAT 6: An Thoi
- NAVCAT 8: Cuu Long
- NAVCAT 16: NAF, Cam Ranh Bay
- NAVCAT 17: Rach Soi
- NAVCAT 18: Saigon
- NAVCAT 19: Tuan An
- NAVCAT 20: Nam Can

Detail Golf of CBMU-302 at Cam Ranh Bay, and liaison teams at various LSBs such as Dong Tam, Cat Lo, Binh Thuy and Ben Luc provided maintenance and repair of facilities, transportation equipment, structures, and utilities systems. They also performed limited construction tasks at the employment sites.
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Appendix I

OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION
TF 21/22

JCS
GEN VIEN

CO CAPTAIN:
MILITARY DIST.
LT. GEN. MINH
COL. KOTTE

CTF 211/CHDS
LT. PHU
COL. GAUL

CTF 213/ICZ
CAPT. THORST
COL. MAUZ

CTF 212/3\CZ
CAPT. THORST
COL. MAUZ

CTF 2142/3 CZ
CAPT. THORST
COL. MAUZ

CTF 215/ICZ
CAPT. THORST
COL. MAUZ

CTF 216/ICZ
CAPT. KIEM
COL. SHINE

CONTRO/CHI
CAPT. CHI
CAPT. GUSTIN

CONTRO/2/CZ
COL. THANH
COL. STEWART

CONTRO 1/CZ
CAPT. LUONG
COL. COWANS

CONTRO 3/CZ
CAPT. PHU
COL. WRIGHT

CONTRO 2/CZ
CAPT. TONG
COL. GIBSON

CONTRO 1/CZ
CAPT. LAM
LT. BROWN

CONTRO 5/CZ
LT. LO
LT. SNYDER

CONTRO 4/CZ
LCOR. PHU
LCOR. WARD

CONTRO 5/15/21
LCOR. LUAN
LT. HIE

CONTRO 1/CZ
LCOR. LUAN
LCOR. LUAN

CONTRO 2/CZ
LCOR. LUAN
LCOR. LUAN

CONTRO
CHI
CAPT. CHI
CAPT. GUSTIN

CONTRO 1/CZ
CAPT. LUONG
COL. COWANS

CONTRO 3/CZ
CAPT. PHU
COL. WRIGHT

CONTRO 2/CZ
CAPT. TONG
COL. GIBSON

CONTRO 1/CZ
CAPT. LAM
LT. BROWN

CONTRO 5/CZ
LT. LO
LT. SNYDER

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Appendix II
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## NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

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### TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATION/COORDINATORS (AOC)

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**AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)**

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION
(TF 213)

SA SCMD
CAM RANH BAY

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG

SA COSFLOT TWO
QUI NHON

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI

SA COSFLOT FIVE
MY THO

SA HARDU CRB

CAPT C.R. QUANSTROM, USN (D)
CAPT T.I. KOLSTAD, USN (R)

LCDR D.C. WILSON, USN

LT G.H. ROBERTS, USN

LCDR R.S. WATKINS, USN

LCDR J.G. TONTI, USN

LCDR J. MCCORMICK, USN

LT J.L. JANSEN, USNR (D)
LT P.A. LINTON, USN (R)

GENERAL RESERVE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 214)

SA GENRESCOMD
CAT LAI

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE
CAT LAI

SA MID NINE ONE
CUU LUONG

SA MID NINE TWO
CUA VIET

SA MID NINE THREE
NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU

SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT
SAIGON

CAPT L.A. DWYER, USN

LT J.M. STEUSSY, USN

LT J.W. HAMILTON, USN

LT T.A. COMER, USN

LT R.F. ELLIOTT, USN

LT G.W. DORAN, USN

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SA SALVAGE UNIT CAT LAI

SA RID FOUR ZERO GO DAU HA

SA RID FOUR ONE TAN CHAU

SA RID FOUR TWO DONG TAM

SA RID FOUR THREE PHU CUONG

SA RID FOUR FOUR TRA CU

SA RID FOUR FIVE DONG TAM

SA RID FOUR SIX NAM CAN

SA RID FOUR SEVEN NAM CAN

SA RID FOUR EIGHT TAN CHAU

SA RAG TWO SEVEN NHA BE

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.1)

SA FIRST CZ DANANG

SA CG ONE ONE CUA VIET

SA CG ONE TWO THUAN AN

LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN

LT R. O. MILHAM, USN

LT R. A. DORSI, USN

LT C. VOTAVA, USN

LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN

LT G. C. COOLEY, USN

LT C. F. TIBBETTS, USN

LT W. C. SMITH, USN

LT W. TAYLOR, USN

LT W. R. RUSLING, USN

LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN

CDR P. MCLAIRD, USN

LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR

LT R. N. MYERS, USN

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SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

SA CG ONE FIVE
CHU LAI

SA CG ONE SIX
QUANG NGAI

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

SA HARDU DANANG

SA CSC DANANG

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.2)

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI

SA CG TWO SIX
BINH BA ISLAND

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHU

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET

SA HARDU NHA TRANG

LT J. SCOTT, USN

LTJG R.G. MCCAIN, USN

LT D. ROBINSON, USN

LT W.R. OWENS, USNR

LT G.L. MAGER, USN

LT D.W. WIRICK, USNR

LT R.M. SCOTT, USN

CDR A.S. JEFFERIS, USN

LT J.K. ENGELKEN, USN

LT E.L. SIWINSKI, USNR

LT E.F. GIER, USN (D)

LT D.G. THOMAS, USN (R)

LT J.P. MCGRAH, USN

LTJG P. MILLER, USN

LT G. NORDLAND, USN

LT J.E. BINGHAM, USN
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<td><strong>Rach Dua</strong></td>
<td>LT E.J. GIBSON, USN (R)</td>
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<td><strong>CG Three Four</strong></td>
<td>LTJG T.E. ARNOLD, USN</td>
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<td><strong>Thanh Pho</strong></td>
<td>LT C.L. DOBSON, USN</td>
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<td><strong>CG Three Five</strong></td>
<td>LT N. BARBOUR, USN</td>
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<td><strong>Thu Vinh</strong></td>
<td>LT D.R. ROGUS, USN</td>
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<td><strong>CG Three Six</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Long Phu</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hardu Vung Tau</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CSC Vung Tau</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fourth CZ</strong></td>
<td><strong>An Thoi</strong></td>
<td>CDR M.J. SHINE, USN</td>
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<td><strong>CG Four One</strong></td>
<td>LTJG R. JOHNSTON, USNR</td>
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<td><strong>Poulo Obi</strong></td>
<td>LT O.R. COLE, III, USN</td>
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<td><strong>CG Four Two</strong></td>
<td>LT M.A. SOBYNA, USN</td>
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<td><strong>An Thoi</strong></td>
<td>LTJG D.C. SNYDER, USN</td>
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<td><strong>CG Four Three</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hon Tre Island</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>CG Four Four</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ha Tien</strong></td>
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SA CSC AN THOI

LT P.D. MCCURDY, USN

THIRD RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 216)

SA THIRD RIVERINE ZONE
LONG BINH

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO TWO
NHA BE

LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO FOUR
PHU CUONG

VACANT

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
NHA BE

LT R.M. ANDREWS, USN

SA RAG THREE ZERO
PHU CUONG

LT R.M. ANDREWS, USN

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

LT C.E. ROBE, USN

FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)

SA FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE
CAN THO

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

LT K.J. PLIS, USN

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
Vinh LONG

LTJG R.E. BROWN, USN

SA RAG TWO FIVE
CA MAU

LT R.J. GILLESKIE, USN

SA RAG TWO NINE
BAC LIEU

LT W.T. MAGEE, III, USN

SA RAG TWO SIX
CA MAU

LTJG R.W. BASS, USNR

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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 228)

SA RSSZ
NHA BE

CDR D.A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC NHA TRANG
SA NTC CAM RANH BAY
SA NTC SAIGON

CDR P.R. FOURNIER, USN
CDR R.R. WARD, USN
CDR R.R. GROVE, USN (D)
CDR R.A. WILD, USN (R)

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LSC AND SA VNN DCOS LOG
DEP SA VNN LSC
SA VNNSY
SA VNNSC
SA LSB AN THOI
SA ISB RACH SOI
SA ISB QUI NHON
SA ISB BEN LUC
SA LSB DONG TAM
SA LSB CAT LO
SA LSB CAM RANH BAY
SA LSB DANANG
SA LSB NHA BE
SA ISB THUAN AN

RADM P.S. MCMANUS, USN
CAPT E.P. TRAVERS, USN
CAPT F.T. SHAVER, USN
CDR C.H. BARSTAD, USN
LCDR R.W. HOTZ, USN
LT D.E. WARD, USN
LCDR T.A. HEAD, USN
LCDR C.W. ALBAUGH, USN
CDR W.M. COLE, USN
LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN
CDR G. MCINTOSH, USN
CAPT R. PADDOCK, USN
CDR A.L. BADER, USN
LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

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SA ISB BINH THUY
SA ISB LONG XUYEN
SA ISB LONG PHU
SA ISB VINH LONG
SA ISB CAT LAI
SA ISB NAM CAN
SA ISB CHO MOI
SA ISB CA MAU
SA YRB M ALFA

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR
LCDR A. THIEL, USN
LT J. R. MURRAY, USN
LT W. MCALISTER, USNR(D)
LCDR J. LASWELL, USN (R)
LT J. F. MAYER, USN
LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN
LCDR B. BURGETT, USN
LT D. CHALFANT, USN
LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN
APPENDIX IV

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

ABF  Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON  A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'
AO  Area of operations
ARVN  Army of the Republic of Vietnam
A/S  Air Strike
ASP  Ammunition supply point
ASPB  Assault Support Patrol Boat
ARTY  Artillery
ATC  Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB  Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W  Automatic Weapons
BDA  Battle Damage Assessment
BLACK PONY  OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop
CCB  Command and Communication Boat
counterinsurgency
CG  Coastal Group
CHICOM  Chinese Communist

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Capital Military District</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civic Operations for Rural Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Camp Sentinel Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIW</td>
<td>Dead in the water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy Initiated Firefight</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOM</td>
<td>French Patrol Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
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<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAFT</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction fire support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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