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FOREWORD

Enemy overt military activity has been low in the Delta for the past two months. The current lull in activity could be attributed to two factors: a general reconsolidation of forces during which time enemy units were training, refitting, and resupplying; and a renewed emphasis on political maneuvering in an effort to influence the outcome of both the Lower House and Presidential elections. It was believed that the former was successfully completed to the point where enemy assets could then be directed toward political action involving increased propagandizing, indoctrination, and proselytizing. An attempt at disrupting the Lower House elections on 29 August did not materialize in the form of overt military activity. During the month, four AOs were essentially dormant, and two AOs made only minor contact with the enemy. Seawolves and Black Ponies readily upstaged other naval units in the tallies, accounting for 60 of the 63 kills recorded, though this was clearly not the whole story of Delta warfare.

On 1 August, further restructuring in operations occurred in the Delta as TRAN HUNG DAO II split into TRAN HUNG DAOs XXIV and XXV at the juncture of Military Regions III and IV to effect clearer and more efficient coordination of operations.
TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV remained under the OPCON of CTG 214.1, while TRAN HUNG DAO XXV fell under the OPCON of CTG 212.2.

On 17 August the SS GREEN BAY was sunk in Qui Nhon Harbor, making her the fourth major ship mined in the last 17 months, and touching off a large scale review of harbor security in all the Coastal Zones by the Military Sealift Command, COMNAVFORV, and the Commanding General, USARV. The First Coastal Zone experienced the usual rash of incidents, with 13 mining incidents occurring during the month. In the Fourth Coastal Zone, TU 213.4.3 was scrapped and the cloud unit around the Ca Mau Peninsula was brought under a staff organization at Nha Trang, TG 213.5, commanded by COMTHD IV, as he was considered privy to the vital infiltration intelligence. The clouds were considered improving all along the coast as the cloud OTOs gained experience, and increased detections for the month seemed to bear this out.

POL stocks at the Cambodian capital reached comfortable levels, as the number of ships per convoy was doubled in July, ending for the second month in a row a POL drought.

During August, the ACTOV program lulled as ten bases prepared for turnover in September. U.S. Navy in-country strength
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continued to reflect U.S. withdrawal status, decreasing to 9,971 men by 26 August, marking a normal reduction of 500 men for the month.
## CURRENT OPERATIONS

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MOBILE OPERATIONS (RIVERINE) SUMMARY

On 1 August, TRAN HUNG DAO II was disestablished and replaced by TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and XXV. The reason for this change was that the borderline between MR III and MR IV split the AO and made it hard to coordinate operations, especially if the operations were using assets from both regions.

The Di Mau Brevity Code, under evaluation for the past three months, was pronounced a success by DEPCOMTHD as it enabled VNN units to surmount the language barrier and direct U.S. Seawolf helicopters in accurate air strikes.

The combined U.S. and Vietnamese military forces in Vietnam were put on alert as the Lower House Elections, held on 29 August, approached, but enemy activity did not appreciably increase and the elections were held with few terrorist incidents to mar the balloting.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program continued into its second month and was considered to be progressing smoothly despite continued problems with boat crews not staying with their boats during overhaul, and poor damage control readiness resulting in the sinking of at least one PBR after arriving at the overhaul site.
A careful watch was being kept on the Mekong River and its tributaries as flood waters continued to rise. Severe flooding was not predicted but all bases were warned to take prudent precautions.

In a reshuffling of command in the Delta, Captain W. J. Crowe, USN, was relieved as SA DEPCOMTHD and CTF 116 by Captain R. E. Spruit, USN, on 18 August. Captain Spruit was in turn relieved of his duties as DEPCOMTHD and CTF 116 by Captain R. S. Moore, USN, formerly Chief of Staff, COMNAVFORV.
TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Action was again light on TRAN HUNG DAO IV waterways during August, but troops of the 32nd and 41st ARVN Rangers applied constant pressure to the enemy forces in the form of daily sweeps. COMCOSRON 5 was moved to Nam Can on 15 August and this gave the TRAN HUNG DAO IV Commander the distinction of being the only naval commander to control riverine, coastal and naval air assets, as well as ARVN Rangers. On 16 August the 32nd ARVN Rangers were relieved by the 41st ARVN Rangers.

Seawolf helicopters continued to plague the An Xuyen guerrillas and their NVA allies, as they flew 36 missions, killing five soldiers, destroying seven structures, 21 sampans, and nine bunkers. In addition, 28 structures, two sampans, and 18 bunkers were damaged.

The TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO combined forces accounted for 16 enemy killed, and one captured during 36 separate firefights. The ARVN Rangers handled the bulk of the action with rivercraft and naval air assets providing invaluable assistance. Their performance proved once more the value of the combined concept in riverine warfare.

The month of August saw two new units arrive at Nam Can;
Sailors of HCU-1 celebrate the successful salvage of another rivercraft, 30 JUNE 71
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HQ9611 (ex U.S. YR-71), a PCF repair craft, arrived on 28 August and anchored in the Cua Lon just off the ISB. On 15 August, COMCOSFLOT 5 reported and initiated cloud operations on both sides of the Ca Mau Peninsula using 24 PCFs, six junk from CG 41, and three PGMs. Minor problems of messing and berthing were encountered due to the influx of more than 80 personnel.

There was one attempted mining on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 077 774 at 2345H on 18 August, when enemy sappers attempted to float a command detonated mine down on Americans of HCU-1 and VNN sailors attached to RID 46 at the salvage site of ATC HQ 5162. The sappers miscalculated and detonated the mine early resulting in no friendly personnel or material casualties.

The salvage effort was unsuccessful however, due to many material casualties occurring on the salvage craft and the sheer weight of the lift, which proved to be heavier than the equipment provided could handle.

Accidents continued to take an appalling toll in Nam Can as one VNN sailor, three LDNN, six ARVN and one civilian were wounded due to careless handling of firearms and grenades. The LDNNs were involved in an accident involving the probable premature detonation of a concussion grenade while fishing. The

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HCU-1 dewatering/demudding VNN FOM on the Cai Nhap Canal in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO. 29 JUNE 1971
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six ARVN troops and the civilian were wounded by a fragmentation
grenade that was mishandled, and the VNN sailor was shot by a ship-
mate who was cleaning his weapon while both were on watch.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Oscar Platoon engaged
in two operations in August. On 2 August they had to abort a reconnaissance
mission due to low water in the Kinh Ngang, although they did
use the opportunity to set a 45 minute waterborne ambush that was
also unfruitful.

On 23 August at 1900H, LT Walsh led a patrol consisting of
five Seals, three Australian Air Service Troops, a guide, and one
interpreter, on an intelligence collection mission. Operating in
support of the group were two Seawolf and two Seaward helicopters,
and Black Ponies from Binh Thuy, along with an MSSC. The Seals
departed by MSSC, switched to sampans due to low water, and
inserted at VQ 868 604. They then walked 200 meters to a hootch
and the point man, interpreter, and team leader entered the hootch
and were immediately engaged by the enemy. Hand to hand combat
with ten VC ensued as both sides used fists, clubs and fishing stakes.
Following this brief but deadly encounter, the Seals moved toward
their extraction point which was rendered unusable due to tide
changes and enemy movement. They then patrolled 800 meters
to another point (VQ 856 570) and were extracted by Sealord
helos. Seawolf and Black Pony aircraft covered the entire operation
and gave excellent support. The Seals killed eight VC and probably
killed two more. Air assets on the scene probably accounted for a
few more, although they were unable to confirm any kills. Seal
casualties were one broken hand and various cuts and bruises.

The VC again carried out harassment: and intimidation of
woodcutters to undercut GVN gains in pacification and population
control. On one occasion on 12 August in the vicinity of WQ 070 670,
woodcutters were accosted by 16 armed VC, warned to stay out of
the area, and when two males tried to escape, one was killed and
one was wounded. On 27 August a village chief from the Rach
Buong Canal area reported four woodcutters had been abducted by
the VC. At 2100H on the same day, the four men were found dead,
floating in the Rach Buong, a VC warning to the woodcutters.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO was again light in August as the Communist insurgents limited their activities to sporadic attacks and ABFs against isolated outposts. CTG 216.1, Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO V, reported only three incidents involving his waterborne assets. Two of these were firefights resulting in the killing of three VC and the serious wounding of one VNN sailor; the third involved the destruction of a watermine. U.S. Navy HAL-3 Detachment 6 Seawolves flew 16 strikes in support of TRAN HUNG DAO V assets resulting in two VC killed. VAL-4 Black Ponies flew one strike in the AO with unreported results.

RPD 52 and RAGs 24 and 30, and RID 43 patrolled the Upper Saigon River during August, attempting to interdict VC infiltration from the Angel's Wing area of Cambodia. Just after 1200H on 5 August, three PBRs of RPD 52 in transit north sighted three VC crossing from the west to the east bank of the Saigon River (XT 651 313). The boats opened fire, killing the men and capturing several weapons and documents.

On 6 August, three PBRs on patrol sighted a contact mine and three packets of plastic explosives floating separately down the river (XT 545 350). The boats had apparently interrupted an
attempted enemy river crossing. The boats recovered the packets
and destroyed the mine, laying down a covering fire while they
worked. No return fire was received, and the boats continued on
their patrol.

On 10 August at 1410H, the insurgents struck back at the
boats. Eight boats of RAG 30 were attacked 12 miles northwest
of Phu Cuong (XT 664 264) with four B-40 rockets and automatic
weapons from the west bank. All rockets missed their mark, and
the boats returned the fire with unknown results. The boats remained
in the area, and again took small arms fire at 1440H, this time
seriously wounding a VNN sailor. A VNAF Dustoff Helicopter was
dispatched from Bien Hoa Air Base, reaching the boat 40 minutes
later, evacuating the wounded man. The boats then continued on
their assigned mission with no further incidents.

Early in August, Commander CTG 216.1 established a
command post/relay station at Song Lo, in the Mushroom area.
This outpost replaced the relay station at FSB Phuoc and was
designed to assist in command and control functions of TRAN HUNG
DAO V boats in the northern portions of the AC. The command
post also provided liaison functions with the 25th ARVN Division
troops in the area.
In an incident not connected with naval assets of this AO, but indicative of the continuing struggle between the guerrillas and the GVN for control of the outlying areas of Vietnam, three squads of VC attacked and overran the outpost of Thoi Moi (XT544 024) at 0331H on the morning of the 21st. The outpost, manned by PFs and PSDFs, just barely 18 miles northwest of the capital city, was quickly surrounded by two squads of VC while the third managed to penetrate, resulting in three PFs killed in action, two PFs wounded, one PSDF killed in action, six PSDFs wounded, one assistant hamlet chief killed, and six M-16 rifles, seven M-1 rifles, 26 M-1 carbines, and two HT-1 radios captured by the VC. There were no known enemy casualties.

A day later, RID 44 boats picked up seven PSDFs and one PF soldier (vic XS 497 960), claiming they had been kidnapped during the attack and had subsequently escaped. Initial interrogation revealed the enemy had contacted one PF and two of the PSDFs prior to the attack. These eight individuals had been released by the VC with the understanding that they would assist the VC in a second attack on the outpost.
Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO in August remained light as CTG 212.5 assets still failed to readily contact the enemy. The Commanding Officer, TRAN HUNG DAO VI, reported his forces engaged in five firefight, killing eight enemy soldiers while suffering no friendly casualties. U.S. Navy Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3 Detachment 8, placed 34 strikes for CTG 212.5, killing four enemy, probably killing 13 others, and wounding one. During these strikes, the "Wolves" destroyed four sampans, two hootches, and one bunker; and damaged nine bunkers and 15 hootches.

Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO VI, continued to be plagued by fires during August. During the evening of 1 August, several LCM-8s containing JP-4, moored at ISB Rach Soi, caught fire. The boats belonged to the U.S. Army 1099th Medium Boat Company, stationed at Binh Thuy; both manned by Vietnamese crews. The two boats were gutted, and, in addition, the conflagration destroyed six civilian hootches, five sampans, and three PBRs erroneously reported destroyed by the 7 July fire in last month's summary.

As if two fires in the space of a month were not enough, a fire broke out in the engine compartment of RPD 63 PBR, HQ 7765, while on patrol in Kien Giang Province, seven kilometers southeast
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of Rach Gia (WS 14 02). The fire was apparently started by a fuel line leak. The crew was unable to extinguish the blaze with a CO₂ extinguisher, so they flooded the engine compartment by opening the jet pump covers while simultaneously removing the craft's weapons and radios. Upon successfully putting out the fire, the cover boats pumped out the water and towed the stricken craft to ISB Rach Soi, where it was lifted onto repair skids. This incident marked the fourth PBR from Rach Soi put out of action in less than a month, none by enemy hands.
Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO continued to be light, with the far ranging and elusive enemy avoiding all contact. During the month of August, TG 217.1 units engaged the enemy on one occasion while participating in 16 troop movements or support missions for the 7th ARVN Division, and RF or PF troops. Twelve special missions were conducted that consisted of four POLWAR operations, five convoy escorts, and three miscellaneous operations. TU 217.1.1 supported Dinh Tuong and Kien Phuong joint operation "Tuong Phuong" centered around the Wagonwheel (WS 99 55) for the entire month. CTG 217.1 in command of boats and one RF company conducted clearing and sweep operations on the lower Kinh Xang for four days. A monitor of RAG 21/33 was the only casualty of the month when it was mined resulting in slight damage to the bottom.

The most potent ground activity was established by Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, November Platoon, as they conducted three clandestine operations interdicting the enemy's lines of communication. Three VC were killed and assorted ammunition and weapons destroyed or captured while numerous bunker complexes were rendered useless.

While the ground war remained quiet, the combined assets of
TG 116.8 and TU 116.7 continued to hammer at the suspected enemy strongholds. Taking advantage of their quick response and mobility, CTG 217.1 was able to provide some lucrative targets that resulted in 34 VC being killed; 37 bunkers, 27 hootches, six structures, and 12 sampans were destroyed.

Intelligence reports for the month indicated that VC MR II directives called for a highpoint in My Tho City to celebrate the 23rd year of the VC struggle for the reunification of Vietnam.

Although the GVN elections were scheduled, and various candidates were proclaiming their messages, enemy water sapper activity targeted against these elections was confined to a very few sporadic incidents.

The only waterborne casualty for the month was on 14 August when a monitor of RAG 21/33, while on a patrol of the Tieng Giang, was mined about 25 kilometers west of Dong Tam (XS 172 406). The mine detonated under the port quarter aft of the screw, resulting in slight bottom damage to the boat. No friendly casualties were reported. This was the first boat mining incident in this area since 1 January. It was possible that the 341st Sappers Battalion, last reported in this area on 24 July, was responsible for the attack.
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In another unrelated development, a possible attempt to infiltrate the Dong Tam Naval Base occurred on 9 August when five men in National Police field uniforms were stopped at the main gate. On being questioned why they were on foot, a satisfactory answer could not be given to the gate guard and when identification was requested, it could not be produced. The gate guard immediately called for reinforcements and the five individuals disappeared. The NILO at My Tho stated that reports of VC intentions to recon and penetrate the Dong Tam Base have been frequently received. Several reports have indicated that VC penetrators are working within the base. (CNFV INTSUM 199-71).

Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, November Platoon, continued to interdict the enemy's lines of communication during the month. On 9 August at 1445H, Seals and Luc Luong 66s conducted a quick reaction mission to capture enemy supplies that had been located by recent intelligence, 12 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 281 584). Seals were inserted by Sealord helicopters after the Seawolves placed preparatory strikes in the area. The Seawolves remained overhead for support as the Seals destroyed hooches and bunkers and removed enemy equipment. The Seals then extracted, and after additional Seawolf strikes inserted approximately 12 miles...
west of their first insertion point (XS 083 590). The Seals again extracted enemy equipment after investigating the area and destroying structures and bunkers. The Seals inserted again approximately one and one half miles northwest of the first insertion (XS 263 595), and again destroyed bunkers prior to extracting with enemy equipment. The Seals then inserted the fourth time approximately one mile north of the previous insertion (XS 266 664), and after destroying bunkers in the area, extracted.

Results of the operation were two VC killed; one AK-47, three grenades, five knives, ten kilos of rice, eight raincoats, and one steel helmet captured; six bunkers, eight structures and two sampans destroyed.

The Seal patrol leader, Lieutenant J. J. Fletcher, received second and third degree burns in the palm of his right hand when a smoke grenade exploded prematurely while he was in the process of marking a spot for the helo extraction of the Seal team. Initial treatment was provided at the Third Surgical Hospital at Binh Thuy where the prognosis was considered excellent.

On 21 August at 1810H, the Seal team, acting on intelligence received from a Hoi Chanh, conducted a recon and interdiction mission against a VC 'commo-liaison station, 21 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 085 568). The Seals inserted by Sealord helicopters with the second squad inserting 250 meters
northwest of the first squad. Upon insertion, the second squad sighted four armed VC evading in the area. The Seals initiated fire and Seawolves placed strikes resulting in one VC killed by the Seals. Both squads then searched the area with negative results, and then extracted.

On 22 August at 0845H, two squads of Seals conducted a mission against a possible VC grenade factory, [21 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 094 571)] which had been located by police intelligence. The basis of the intelligence were residents of the area who revealed that an explosion in a hut three weeks before killed three of four VC. The Seals, after insertion, sighted two VC in a large tree, and, with the aid of the Seawolves, killed both. Upon searching a graveyard suspected as a VC cache area, barrels were unearthed containing B-40 rockets, grenades, and other assorted weapons. Results of the operation were two VC killed; two sampans, seven hootches, and two bunkers destroyed; 14 B-40s and boosters, 13 VC made grenades, 10 blocks of C-4, two AK-47s, and two M-2 carbines captured.

During the month, RPD 58, assigned to TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, furnished four PBRs daily for TRAN HUNG DAO VIII operations. The RPD 58 PBRs were utilized for night ambushes along suspected VC supply routes in the vicinity of XS 325 400.
During the month of August, the three Mekong convoys brought substantial POL stocks to Phnom Penh, which put the POL supply there at comfortable levels for the second month in a row.

Mekong Convoy TP-28 departed Tan Chau on 1 August at 2000H, and split into the usual fast and slow elements. The escort, consisting of one LSSL flagship, seven PCFs, 24 PBRs, four MNK PBRs, four ASPBs, and four MSMs, preceded and flanked the spread out and split convoy, composed of five merchant ships, seven tankers, three tugs, and six LCM-8s. At 0330H the next morning, one of the escorting ASPBs collided with one of the convoy vessels, causing the escort craft to beach. The craft was later taken to Tan Chau where it was soon repaired. The convoy experienced no delay, and arrived at the Cambodian capital city at 1440H, bringing 2,437 tons of general cargo and 1,437,000 gallons of POL. During the trip upriver, continuous airborne cover for the convoy consisted of a USAF FAC and fixed wing gunship, a USA C&C with two Cobras, and two Aero Scouts. USN Seawolf gunships and Black Pories were on ground alert. Sixty-one sorties were required to provide typical continuous coverage for the convoys. The return convoy, composed of seven tankers and
three tugs, with the same escort as the upriver convoy, departed Phnom Penh at 1120H on 3 August, and arrived at Tan Chau seven hours later without incident.

At 2110H on 12 August, Convoy TP-29 departed the Tan Chau staging area with four merchant ships, four tankers, three tugs, two ammo barges, and a general cargo barge, as well as the normal escorting force. At 0035H the next morning one of the ships developed engine trouble and anchored approximately one half mile south of the border at WT 205 050, awaiting daylight to return to Tan Chau. At 0235H, approximately seven miles north of the border at WT 225 180, the convoy was attacked with two B-40 rockets, which nearly hit one of the merchant ships. The unscathed convoy proceeded without delay, as the surface escorts broke the enemy contact with heavy suppressive fire. At WT 311 418, two hours later and three miles south of Neak Luong, the convoy was again attacked with four B-40 rockets and small arms fire. A tanker received one B-40 hit just above the waterline, resulting in only minor damage. The surface escorts returned the enemy fire, but the FAC was denied clearance for strikes as friendlies were in the area. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1250H, with 3,797 cubic meters of POL. The two attacks which occurred were considered typical of the enemy effort for the
remainder of the high-water season, though the two previous convoys had not been attacked. The return convoy, composed of three merchant ships and three tankers, with the upriver escorting force, departed on 14 August at 1155H and arrived at Tan Chau five hours later without incident.

TP-30 departed Tan Chau staging area on 22 August at 1900H, with six merchant ships, six tankers, five tugs, and assorted barges. At 0600H the next morning, 24 miles southeast of Phnom Penh at WT 223 652, the convoy was attacked with five B-40 rockets prematurely fired at an ambush team of two PCFs. Thirty minutes later a tanker was fired at with four B-40 rockets and small arms fire; all rockets missed their mark. In the two attacks on TP-30, the PCFs constituting the ambush teams again proved their worth. One such team prompted the enemy to open fire early and reveal their position prior to the arrival of the convoy. The enemy fired their B-40 rockets during the second attack from maximum range and hence were ineffective. USAF planes also made strikes, and FANK swept the area. With no further contact experienced, the convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1130H with 3,209 cubic meters of POL. This sizeable quantity of POL kept the stocks at comfortable levels in Phnom Penh. The delivery was made possible by the
increased number of vessels available since the first of July, when the new contract with Telakhmer permitted the expansion of the convoy. The POL drought of April, May, and June appeared ended.

Convoy PT-30, composed of three merchant ships, five tankers, six tugs, and four barges, departed Phnom Penh at 1130H on 24 August, and arrived untroubled six hours later at Tan Chau.

A NAVFORV intelligence report of 4 August reported that the French owners of the oil refinery at Kompong Som had not ordered the parts necessary to repair the refinery. Reportedly, the owners decided to keep the refinery inoperative until the physical security of the area improved to the point that the refinery could be operated without further risk of enemy damage, and until POL produced could be safely transported up National Route 4 to the users in Phnom Penh. The refinery, Cambodia's only one, had been attacked on 2 March 1971, resulting in the destruction of several storage tanks and much of the piping used for transfer of POL products throughout the refinery.
The lull that persisted in July continued in August in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO and although enemy initiated activity increased during the latter part of the month, it still remained at a low level. The highpoints of the month occurred on the 16th and 17th of August with the mortar attack on Ben Tre City on the former date, when a total of seven rounds fell near the center of the city, close to the MACV compound where the advisors are located. On the 17th, the Cai Cam Bridge, located between Ben Tre City and Mo Cay District Town was partially damaged by a suspected command detonated mine. Bridge traffic was closed, seriously hampering the daily commercial activity of the inhabitants.

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX waterborne units continued to support the ARVN operations during the month of August. No firefights were recorded and activity centered around support of the Kien Hoa Regional Forces. RAC 23/31 craft carried supplies from the Ben Tre Ferry Landing (XS 483 298) to Phuoc Long Fire Support Base (XS 531 222), and during the period were stationed on the Ham Luong (vic XS 152 400 - XS 540 205). RID 45 boats continued to support the Regional Forces on the West Bai Lai River and were stationed on the upper Giao Hoa Canal (XS 580 348). Coastal Groups 34 and 35 junks,
in addition to their patrols, transported men and material of the 7th Reconnaissance Battalion, 10th Regiment, in their many sweeps in and around the Phuoc Long Fire Support Base. RPD 58 PBRs operated in both TRAN HUNG DAO XIX and TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AOs. In the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO, PBRs of RPD 58 patrolled and were in WBGP on the Phu Huu tributary of the Giao Hoa Canal (XS 575 344) and the West Bai Lai River (XS 586 346).

Most of the activity, as in previous months, has been provided by the highly mobile and devastating Black Ponies of CTG 116.8 and HAL-3 Seawolves of CTU 116.7.9. They combined to support each other on many missions and during the month flew approximately 33 sorties, killing 48 VC and destroying 88 sampans, 81 structures, 49 bunkers, and 26 junks.

The most serious incident of the month occurred on 5 August, when a Seawolf helicopter, responding to a call for help from a Vietnamese outpost under attack, fired a series of rockets at coordinates XR 826 935. As a result of a malfunction, one of the rockets veered off course and out of the target area, killing two civilians and wounding two. The target was cleared by LT COL Duc, District Chief, and reaffirmed prior to the initial assault. Ground observers reported that all other rockets were on target which was
marked from the ground by tracer fire. An investigation confirmed that the rocket was defective, and the incident was closed.

During the month, intelligence reports continued to be received of impending high points of enemy activity, intending to disrupt the GVN elections. Two incidents, directed at the civilian populace seemed to confirm these reports. On the morning of 16 August, Ben Tre City received seven 82 millimeter mortar rounds from an unknown VC unit, wounding one National Policeman. This was the first attack on Ben Tre City in approximately three months. The other incident happened on 17 August when the Cai Cam Bridge (XS 468 287) between Ben Tre City and Mo Cay District Town received medium damage resulting from the explosion of a suspected command detonated, floating watermine. The bridge was closed to all traffic, severely restricting civilian travel. The disruptions during the month placed a heavy burden on GVN officials to protect the local populace.

The continuing infiltration of supplies into Kien Hoa Province was again the subject of an intelligence report, indicating that a company of VC from an unknown location in Kien Hoa Province was being resupplied with arms and ammunition believed to have been transported from the Long Toan Secret Zone (XR 73 72 and
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(XR 69 61). Previous Black Pony strikes in these areas had produced numerous secondary explosions. In another report, a Hoi Chanh recently provided information on the waterborne infiltration of supplies in Thanh Phu District. The source, a former member of the Ben Tre Rear Services unit, stated that weapons and ammunition came from North Vietnam by fishing junks, and were offloaded at the mouth of the Song Ham Luong (XS 83 01). The source further stated that when the junks reached the mouth of the river, a PRC 25 or Chicom K-63 radio was used to signal sampans ashore to come out and offload the junks. This was the first report stating that junks coming into this area had originated in North Vietnam. (CNFV INTSUM 199-71)
The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was characterized by continued very light activity during August. There were no naval firefights. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 16 missions in the AO, mostly in support of VNN ranger battalions. The strikes resulted in 23 structures destroyed, one M-16 captured, and 24 enemy KIA (body count).

The NILO at Chau Doc attributed the low level of enemy activity to concentration on reorganizing and reestablishing bases that were destroyed by earlier ARVN operations in the Seven Mountains Area. Further credence was added to this theory by U.S. Army Intelligence which stated that most of the low lying areas between Nui Giai and the Nui O base area in Cambodia were inundated to a depth of three feet by seasonal floods. Therefore, the enemy had to seek new base areas and resupply points. Visual aerial reconnaissance observed several people carrying supplies up trails in the Seven Mountains Area.

The one noteworthy incident occurred on the evening of 11/12 August. Audio sensor activations vic. (VS 505 547) were observed by USN and VNN personnel. Although conversations were not discernable, several nationalities were identified. Immediate response by 155mm artillery was initiated at 2120H on 11 August 71. The TRAN HUNG DAO XX forces cleared the area to the
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south during the artillery barrage. Attempts to call a sweep through the area resulted in delays. A sweep was finally conducted at 0900H of 12 August 1971, nearly 12 hours after the artillery barrage. Because of the long delay, the artillery results were undetermined. The Senior Advisor to CTF 219.1 recommended that VNN junks carry reaction teams or return to base and pick up reaction teams when artillery response to sensor activity begins. Hopefully, this would cut sweep reaction time to a more acceptable three hours maximum.
Naval engagement with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO was light during the month of August. Only four waterborne firefighting and one mining incident occurred. Enemy casualties and damage were undetermined in all cases. The mining incident occurred on 25 August at 0045H at the Kien An OP Base. The sapper attack accounted for the only VNN losses of the month. Two RAG boats were sunk and two VNN sailors drowned.

On 8 August at 0832H, 12 miles southwest of Ca Mau, a U.S. Army LCU was hit a foot above the water line with one B-40 rocket. Damage was light. Escorting units of RAG 26 returned fire, but had to break off the engagement because of the proximity of friendly civilians in the area.

On 29 August at 0215H, the Kien An OP Base was attacked by fire with an estimated two B-40s/4ls or launch bombs. The attack was suppressed by a combination of base defensive fire and four Seawolf strikes. Only minor damage was sustained on the base and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Salvage operations became necessary on 18 August, when a five ton truck from NMCB-5 collapsed the Kinh My Bridge (vic WR 643 243).
The truck was enroute from Binh Thuy to Ca Mau and loaded with steel plating. A CSB craft from TF 214 raised the bridge and truck on 21 August. ARVN engineers began reconstruction of the vital bridge. An interim pontoon bridge was emplaced at the crossing during construction of the permanent bridge.

A PMS class was conducted 2-10 August at Ca Mau, utilizing USN maintenance advisors as instructors. The class consisted of nine VNN junior officers from units of both TG 210.1 and TG 210.2. The goal of the course was to train VNN instructors who would return to their commands and commence training their own crews. The areas of instruction included the purpose and goals of PMS and the preparation of schedules. Practical work was received by the students as well as demonstrations of specific PMS checks on ATCs, ASPBs, and Monitors.
On 1 August TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV was formed when TRAN HUNG DAO XXII split into TRAN HUNG DAOs XXIV and XXV, on the boundary of MRs III and IV at XS 354 812. The TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO consisted of the Vam Co Tay River from the confluence with the Vam Co Dong River at XS 710 610 to XS 354 812, and the Vam Co Dong River from the confluence to the VN-Cambodian border.

The operation's assets included: RID 40 with 13 river craft, RID 44 with 14 river craft, RPD 53 with 19 PBRs, and RPD 54 with 20 PBRs. The four river divisions were disposed into five task units. TU 214.1.1 at Ben Luc included 10 PBRs of RPD 53. TU 214.1.2 at Tra Cu included 14 river craft of RID 44 and nine PBRs of RPD 53. TU 214.1.3 at Go Dau Ha included 13 river craft of RID 40. TU 214.1.4 at Ben Keo included 10 PBRs of RPD 54. TU 214.1.5 at Tan An included 10 PBRs of RPD 54. The CTUs coordinated with friendly units in organizing ambushes, patrols, and joint operations. The operational zone had been defined to correspond with territory of MR II, making coordination clearer and easier. The operational commander for TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV (CTG 214.1) was CDR Gia, and the SA was LCDR Gesswein, both at Ben Luc.

Enemy activity directed at naval units was low in the AO.
for the month, as the enemy directed their efforts at local force
displays of populace control for the August 30 elections. Naval
units engaged in only one FRIFF, five ENIFFs, and 12 unilateral
firings. USN Seawolves made all the kills for the month, with ten
of the enemy KBA, 13 probably KBA, and 11 WBA. The Seawolves
flew support missions for combined units over 15 times, scrambled
over seven times, and flew intelligence targeted missions approximately
36 times. With their involvement in so many aspects of the fighting,
it is not surprising that they dominated the tallies. The sensor
system at Tra Cu had 151 sensings for the month. Of these, 75 were
determined as targets, with 61 artillery responses.

At 1500H on 3 August, four kilometers south of Go Dau Ha at
XT 398 205, a refueling boat and an ASPB of RID 40 came under fire
from seven B-40 rockets and A/W and small arms fire, from an
estimated seven enemy on the west bank of the Vam Go Dong. One of
the rockets lodged unexploded in the hull of one craft, with two
other rocket hits as well, but the boat incurred only minor damage.
One VN sailor was wounded. Fire was returned, with unknown results.
This was the first enemy contact with boats operating from Go Dau Ha
in over a year.
Seawolves started the month off well when, on 4 August, at 2105H, Seawolves of Detachment 4 scrambled while placing a strike on an intelligence target for Tra Cu. They placed three strikes in a two kilometer radius from XT 430 085, and received light automatic weapons fire from the area. Later sweeps confirmed that the Seawolves killed four of the VC and wounded 11, with four sampans destroyed.

Units of RPD 54 were sent to investigate information gathered from the local populace on the possibility of a VC crossing and arms cache on 5 August. At 1100H the boats arrived at the area of XT 150 431 and, upon searching found two B-40 rockets, six 82mm and two 60mm mortar rounds, five U.S. rifles, and 30 homemade hand grenades.

On 8 August, at 1905H, four miles northwest of Ben Luc at XS 573 776, two ATCs of RID 40, on a troop extraction mission to Ben Luc, were attacked with B-40 rocket and AK-47 fire. One ATC received two B-40 rocket hits resulting in light damage. Two PBRs scrambled from Ben Luc and Seawolves placed strikes on enemy positions with unknown results. Two RFs were killed in the ambush, two fell off the boats and were presumed drowned, while 18 RFs and two VNNs were wounded, as the rockets found their lucrative targets. The Seawolf scramble probably killed five of the ambushers.

This was the second attack in nine days on boats operating in the
Eagle’s Beak area of the Vam Co Dong. It was apparently an effort to break friendly interdiction of enemy infiltration of men and supplies.

On the morning of 10 August, two PBR’s of RPD 53 on routine patrol were attacked with two rockets and small arms fire from the west bank of the Vam Co Dong approximately 14 kilometers northwest of Tra Cu at XT 412 105. No hits or casualties were reported, and the PBR’s made firing runs with unknown results. This was the second attack of the month on boats operating on that portion of the Vam Co Dong between Tra Cu and Go Dau Ha, with little prior activity in the area. One hundred B-40 rockets captured on two separate occasions near Go Dau Ha indicated the enemy was well armed in the area and presented a definite threat to naval units on the Vam Co Dong.

On the afternoon of 13 August, three PBR’s of RPD 53, transiting from Ben Luc to Tra Cu on the Vam Co Dong were attacked with two B-40 rockets and small arms fire at XS530 935. No hits occurred, and the boats continued their transit. About 40 minutes later, the same unit received two more B-40s and more small arms fire at XS 486 970, a position approximately seven kilometers upstream from the previous attack. The PBR’s made firing runs and Seawolves placed strikes during both attacks, with unknown results. The previous day’s ground sweep had been conducted by RF forces in the area in response to intelligence.
that enemy units were targeted against boats in that area. During the sweeps three RFs were killed by booby traps.

On 19 August at 1015H, eight miles east of Tuyen Nhon at XS 420 765, two PBR's of RPD 64 enroute to Tan An for escort duties were ambushed with seven B-40 rockets from the north bank, wounding three sailors. Both PBR's received light damage. Four PBR's scrambled from Tuyen Nhon to complete the escort mission and insert ground sweep troops.

On the afternoon of 22 August, a civilian boat traveling on the Vam Co Dong approximately four kilometers south of Tra Cu at XT 425 093 was taken under fire by three B-40s. Six civilians were wounded in the incident, and the boat sank. This was the first attack on a civilian craft operating on the Vam Co Dong since early March, when a ferry boat was attacked just north of Ben Luc. A connection with the elections but a week off would seem clear.

On 25 August, Seawolves of Detachment 4 scrambled for an RF unit in contact with the enemy at XT 423 118, five kilometers north of Hiep Hoa. Contact was still hot upon arrival at 2110H, and Seawolves placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes, and contact was broken. Two days later the Seawolves of Detachment 4
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scrambled for VN ground troops at XT 439 132, in heavy contact with the enemy. The helos placed rocket and machine gun strikes, resulting in three KBAs and five probable kills.

Intelligence deduced the current enemy use of a known Vam Co Dong crossing point at the Horseshoe in the vicinity of XS 535 929. This area, within the Ben Luc AO, had not seen a night time patrol or WBCP in several months, and apparently the enemy had found the hole,

A C-3 evaluated agent report rated the strength of VC/NVA in the Cu Chi District as 70% of the TET 68 forces. Estimates for 1969 and 1970 were as low as 25%. Intelligence reports of heavy infiltration gave credence to the above figures.
The TRAN HUNG DAO IX campaign was disestablished and TRAN HUNG DAO XXV was initiated as of 0800H on 1 August 1971. The AO for TRAN HUNG DAO XXV was established within the following limits; the Vam Co Tay River from a point 4.8 miles northeast of the Tuyen Nhon Operating Base to the Cambodian Border; and the Dong Tien Canal from a point 4.2 miles west of Phuoc Xuyen (XS 354 812), the Kinh Cung merging into the Kinh Lagrange, to its confluence with the Vam Co Tay River. The operational commander for TRAN HUNG DAO XXV (CTG 212.2) was LCDR Linh and the Senior Advisor was LCDR Cousins; both were located at Tuyen Nhon.

During the month of August, contact with the enemy was very light. VNN craft engaged the VC in only one firefight, which was initiated by enemy ambush, resulting in one PF killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

U.S. Navy Seawolves flew only four missions in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXV forces, one of which was a scramble to provide close air support for the ambushed VNN craft. The results of the missions flown were: two sampans, three bunkers, six structures and two ammunition caches destroyed, and two VC killed.