Cloud units continued to maintain an effective barrier against enemy transshipment/infiltration during October. COMNAVFORV designated the period 18-22 October as a possible highpoint for enemy coastal infiltration. As a result, VARS flights were increased, Seawolf helicopters and Black Pony OV-10s aiding in the effort. At the month's close, no enemy craft had been detected attempting to infiltrate into the Southern Special Surveillance Zones, although several trawlers were being tracked by MARKET TIME forces on the high seas.

On 1 October, in line with the formation of the new Sea Operations Command, Fourth Zone/Southern Special Surveillance Zone task groups were redesignated. CTGs 213.4 and 213.5 became CTFs 234 and 235 respectively. The individual clouds were also redesignated. CTUs 213.4.1 and 213.4.2 became CTUs 234.3.1 and 234.4.1 respectively. Similarly, CTUs 213.5.1 and 213.5.2 became 235.0.2 and 235.0.3 respectively.

On 13 October, CTF 235 lost one of his PCFs. PCF 3905, conducting patrol sweeps in the vicinity of the Bo De River mouth, suffered an engine casualty and moored to a buoy to effect repairs. Meanwhile, the weather worsened. The craft slipped its moorings and was driven hard aground at WQ 234 656. A USN salvage team was air lifted in on the morning of 15 October, and reported that the vessel could not be salvaged with in-country assets. All VNN efforts at salvage failed. Finally, the craft was stripped of all armaments and other useful items, and the PCF was abandoned.

An Thoi, on Phu Quoc Island, was the focal point of much interest during October. On 4 October, RADM David H. Jackson, USN, Pacific Fleet and Service Force Pacific Maintenance Officer, visited An Thoi for discussions on operations, maintenance, repair and logistics of patrol craft. Also during the month, COMNAVFORV expressed concern over the deteriorating condition of An Thoi's airfield, closed to all but light traffic since 9 August. This meant that U.S. Navy and Army advisors would be without direct air logistics support when the USAF unit located there stands down. The source of the problem was whether the Army or Navy had the repair responsibilities for the airfield. Therefore, COMNAVFORV requested from COMUSMACV "early resolution of the An Thoi Airfield repair responsibilities in order to expedite repairs and preclude unacceptable reduction in basic advisor support" (COMNAVFORV msg 020545Z Oct 71).

Also on 6 October, 1971, LT A. L. Perkins, USN, relieved LT Ambobring, USNR, as NILO, Ha Tien.
OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

SCALE: 0 - NAUTICAL MILES 30

CA MAU POINT

CG 41 BASE POULO 8B1

X PGF 3905 grounding

PHU QUOC

HAI THOI
CG 42/46 BASE

HA TIEN

CG 43/44/45 BASE
RACH GIA

ONG DOC R.

BAY HAP R.

ONG R.

DOI NG R.
During October, the Sister Ship Program continued its momentum as plans were furthered to allow several officers of RPD 56 and 58 to visit their Sister Ship Unit, DESRON 17, aboard the USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), presently located off the west coast of Military Region IV in a NGFS role. COMDESRON 17 planned to host the officers for an overnight stay aboard the flagship. The Vietnamese officers were to observe NGFS and an underway replenishment, typical evolutions for a gunline ship. The original visit was scheduled for mid-October, but had to be postponed until early November due to pressing in-country operations. COMDESRON 17 visited both RPD 56 and 58 in September in order to further two-way communication between the Sister Ship units.

On 14 October, 1971, Mr. Donald Whyte, Executive Director of the Helping Hand Foundation's Washington, D. C. office visited LSB Dong Tam to observe Operation Helping Hand projects. He was accompanied by two members of the Board of Directors of the Foundation, and by LCDR Jack Martin, USN, (OP 44V), the OPNAV coordinator for Operation Helping Hand.

USCGC COOK INLET was active in the field of civic action during October. She participated in two MEDCAPs on 8 and 12 October. On the former date, the ship's doctor, a corpsman, and nine other U. S. and VNN crewmembers provided medical assistance and treatment to approximately 59 Hon Nam Du (VR 31 69) civilians during a four hour period. On the latter date, the ship provided treatment for 54 civilians and VNN dependents on Hon Tre Island (VR 80 99).

The Dependent Shelter Program in Military Region I suffered a grave setback in October as a result of Typhoon Hester. The storm, the worst in 27 years, damaged many of the dependent housing roofs throughout MR I. At the month's close, temporary repairs were being effected to the roofs of the structures.

In the Delta, dependent shelter needs were being reevaluated at several bases. NAVCAT 20 of CBMU 302 was tasked by COMNAVFORV to build only 40 units vice 100 units originally planned at ISB Nam Can. The reduction was predicated on predicted low occupancy of the programmed shelters. A similar situation existed at OP Base My Tho. COMNAVFORV envisaged building only 50 of 100 planned units, again due to predicted low occupancy brought about by unit reassignments.
By the end of October, the U.S. Navy's ACTOV program was drawing to a conclusion, with 943 ships and craft having been transferred to date and only 21 Navy craft remaining to be turned over. Of the 33 Navy bases in the Republic of Vietnam, 29 had been turned over, and three of the four remaining bases had been shifted to VNN command. The remaining 21 craft and four bases are scheduled for transfer to the VNN prior to mid-1972. The craft remaining consist of two WHECs, eight yard craft, and 11 Boston Whalers.

During the month, three Boston Whalers, one LCM, and an LCM Pusher were turned over at various bases in Vietnam. Each craft is put into excellent working condition before turnover.

On 29 October, the command of Logistic Support Base, Nha Be, shifted to a VNN officer. The base, located 15 miles south of Saigon, is due for turnover in January of 1972.

On October 19, the fourth in a series of 16 radar stations was turned over to the VNN. The US Navy is building or modernizing the ACTOVRAD stations, as well as training the VNN personnel who will man them. The station turned over, at Nui Chap Chai, is 240 miles northeast of Saigon, and serves as one link in the network of radar stations which will eventually cover the entire 1200 mile coastline of South Vietnam. Three USN personnel serve as advisors to the station.

During October there was extensive shakedown training for the VNN crews of the WHECs COOK INLET and CASTLE ROCK in Subic Bay, Philippines. The tender USS AJAX, situated in Vung Tau, conducted repair and damage control training for all VNN crews of craft coming alongside during the month.

The month saw the commencement of the two-year academic curriculum at the VNN Naval Academy at Nha Trang. The changeover to a two-year academic curriculum began with the arrival of the members of Class 24. Classes started on 15 October, with an enrollment of 279 midshipmen. The faculty increased to 19 full-time members, but was still well short of the authorized strength of 37.

Also on October 15, the first VNN class in the RVN to be conducted entirely by VNN personnel was graduated at U.S. Naval Support Facility Da Nang. The class was composed of 23 senior navy men, and the instruction covered numerous repair fields.

At NTC Cam Ranh Bay on 9 October, a graduation ceremony was held.
for classes 5C/71 and 3C/71 with 139 and 338 students respectively. On 19 October, Recruit Class 81 with 300 students was graduated.
NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

The aggressive VNN Supply Support Improvement Program continued to meet its milestone deadlines in October, while the program's protagonist, RADM W. R. Dowd, left Vietnam on 2 October. The Accelerated Overhaul Program, under a revised schedule, ironed out many of the initial problems and was proceeding satisfactorily and on schedule at the month's end.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program, begun in July, came under review during mid-October, which led to a more realistic revised schedule, as well as to some shifts in emphasis. During the week of 11 October, a review of the manpower utilization at the overhaul bases was conducted revealing that an average of 59 percent of the repair personnel were utilized in the overhaul program. Since the manning of the repair departments of the bases involved averages of only 57.5 percent, the study indicated that only about 33 percent of the programmed craft maintenance manpower was supporting the repair effort. Also, none of the bases involved in the program had achieved the scheduled RAC overhaul duration of 45 days, and only one of the bases, Rach Soi, had achieved a 15 day overhaul duration for PBRs. It was noted that the original objectives for the program called for restoration of the entire craft to an as-built or brand new condition, rather than to correct those deficiencies required to provide the craft with a dependable engineering plant, reliable ordnance and communications system, and a maximum degree of watertight integrity. Undue emphasis was placed on cosmetic repairs or engine overhauls where engine repairs would have sufficed. With the revised schedule, the proposed increase in manning and manpower utilization of repair departments, and the change of the overhaul objective to emphasize only the work necessary to provide operationally ready craft, the program took on brighter prospects.

The last USN Landing Craft Repair Ship in RVN, USS KRISHNA (ARL-38), departed Binh Thuy on 10 October enroute to the Philippines for transfer to the Philippine Navy on 30 October. The 26-year old ship was the first ARL to serve in Vietnam, arriving in June 1965. Except for periodic overhauls, she remained in the Vietnam area ever since, primarily in the Mekong Delta and the Gulf of Thailand. Other ARLs to serve in Vietnam were the ASKARI, SATYR, and SPHINX. All were sister ships of KRISHNA, and were converted from WWII Tank Landing Ships (LST). The major advantage of the ARLs as repair ships was a heavy lift capability for lifting small craft out of the water onto barges. This permitted full service to the underwater body, hull, screws, and shafting of the craft. ARLs also provided full repair to diesel engines, auxiliary machinery, electrical, electronic and ordnance systems.

During the month of October, RADM David H. Jackson, Fleet Maintenance:
Officer for CINCPACFLT, visited support bases and ACTOVRAD stations throughout Vietnam. RADM Jackson inspected the ACTOVLOG/ACTOVRAD programs to evaluate progress, and discussed the VNN overhaul and maintenance progress. Also during the month, RADM Bagley, Pers-P, and his retinue, toured USN facilities throughout Vietnam and spoke to all hands about programs, on-going studies, paybills, retention, Z-grams, and items of general interest.

In another area of general interest, the Fiscal and Disbursing functions were transferred to the Force Comptroller on 15 October. The Force Comptroller became responsible for all NAVFORV financial accounting and disbursing matters.

Also in October, a number of milestones of Phase II of the VNN Supply Support Improvement Program were completed: a failsafe plan at the VNN Supply Center was implemented to provide computer and record back up in case of loss/destruction; and, a system was placed in operation at the VNNSC for reporting the workload in the warehouse operation.

The NAVSUPPACT Saigon Program Management and Expediting Unit moved to the VNN Supply Center on 21 October. This unit will serve as a nucleus VNNSC expediting unit and will train and assist VNNSC personnel.

The VNN Shipping Center became a part of the VNN Supply Center on 29 October. The shipping unit had previously been an independent unit. This transfer placed all material shipment responsibilities under the VNNSC.

The Brown Water repair part stock records were transferred from NAVSUPPACT to the VNNSC on 31 October. The VNNSC thereby assumed management control of all Brown Water material in-country.

The Field Supply Assistance Teams (FAST) commenced inspecting the field supply activities (LSB/ISB/Ships). There were 12 activities inspected in October with the following grade assignments: three excellent, three good, five satisfactory and one unsatisfactory.
### PERFORMANCE FACTORS - RAC OVERHAUL ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Repair Department Manning (% TO&amp;E)</th>
<th>Manpower Utilization (week of 11 OCT) (% of assigned)</th>
<th>% Programmed Craft Maintenance Manpower</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>PBR</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>46 days</td>
<td>24 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>52 days</td>
<td>32 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>31 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>51 days</td>
<td>25 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rach Soi</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 9610</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 9613</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Shortage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>12/40</td>
<td>10/29</td>
<td>2/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another PBR is completed under the Accelerated Overhaul Program at LSR Binh Thuy, as Vietnamese sailors apply the finishing touches under the watchful eyes of BM3 Larry Malvasi.
October marked a milestone in the Naval Construction Forces History as NMCE-5 finished all of its projects and departed from Vietnam. A small delay party of fifty personnel, charged with taking care of last minute details was scheduled to leave early in November. CBMU-302 remained in country, the last major unit of Naval Construction Forces to be actively engaged. There were also six Seabee Teams in country working in support of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].

Detail Mustang of NMCB-5 completed its task at ISB Ca Mau on 20 October, and all men and equipment redeployed on 24 October. The last two weeks in Ca Mau were spent building access roads with very wet conditions prevailing. Detail Bronco at Nui Ta Kou, ACTOVRED Site Nine, completed all work on 20 October and redeployed all material and men to Bien Hoa on the same day. During October, Detail Bronco had finished road and culvert work, and, as had been the case in previous months, were harassed by VC implanted mines on the site’s access roads. Luckily, no casualties were incurred.

CBMU-302, whose primary responsibility is the construction of dependent housing, is currently operating at 15 major sites in-country. CBMU-302 is organized into three companies, Echo Company in MR-1, Charlie Company in MR-2, and Delta Company, encompassing MRs 3 and 4. In October, Echo Company, commanded by LT Kovack, was engaged in dependent housing construction at Thu Van An, Danang, Chu Lai, and Cu Lao Re Island. In addition, small jobs such as Sea Huts and other support tasks are being completed at Danang.

In MR-2, LT Scott Cross commands Charlie Company, composed of NAVCAT Two and Details Golf and Sparks. NAVCAT Two is currently tasked with the completion of dependent shelters at LSB Cam Ranh Bay, as well as maintenance of vehicles. Detail Golf supports the Naval Air Facility there, while Detail Sparks has been working in support of the VNN Training Center, also at Cam Ranh.

Delta Company, commanded by LT Wayne Tomiak, had the largest and most far flung organization of the three. His NAVCATs worked on dependent housing at An Thoi, Hon Tre and Poulo Obi Islands, Nam Can, Cho Moi, Ha Tien, and recently completed and turned over to the VNN 34 units at the VNN shipyard at Cuu Long. They also made major modifications to the new Annapolis BOQ/BEQ and drainage improvements at Air Cofat. In addition, there were 225 men at the base camp at Bien Hoa serving as support for the scattered units.

Seven Seabees of Detail Sparks at Cam Ranh Bay received Letters of
Commendation for their work from the Commanding Officer, VNN Training Center, who cited their exemplary attitude, conduct, and industry, as well as their professional workmanship.

Two Seabee teams working for USAID were relieved in October. They were replaced by Teams 7107 and 7108, relieving teams 1019 and 1020 at My Tho and Go Cong respectively.
The above map shows the location of major CHMU 302 construction sites.
THE DUFFLE BAG/TIGHT JAW PROGRAM

DUFFLE BAG is the code name for the U.S. Navy's unattended ground sensor program. Similarly, TIGHT JAW is the code name for the VNN program. The U.S. Navy first began working with sensors in late 1963. The earliest sensors were modifications of sonobuoys. Other sensor types developed from these. Today, three basic sensor types are in use: seismic, activated by undulations in the ground near the sensor; magnetic, activated by metal objects disturbing the sensor's electromagnetic field; and finally, acoustic, a direct offshoot of the old sonobuoy, activated by sound sources near the sensor.

The U.S. Navy's sensors are primarily utilized in the Delta. USN sensor teams are located at Ha Tien, Tinh Binh, Tan Chau, Phuoc Xuyen, Tuyen Nhon, Tra Cu, and Nam Can. In addition, sensors are utilized for base defense at Kien An, ISB Ca Mau, and at HAL-3 Detachment 8 near Rach Gia. Recently, sensors have also been employed in I Corps at Coastal Group 14, near Hoi An.

On 15 January, 1970, all USN DUFFLE BAG sites were co-manned by VNN personnel, the beginning of an eventual turnover of the program to the Vietnamese. Prior to the co-manning, U.S. DUFFLE BAG teams consisted of, on the average, two officers and 20 enlisted men, all of whom received specialized training in counter-insurgency techniques, as well as maintenance and operation of the sensors and associated equipment. Presently, the U.S. advisor complement at a typical site is one officer and two enlisted, while the VNN teams consist of about four officers and 15 enlisted men. The U.S. has responsibility for all above ground equipment, while the VNN personnel have responsibility for all below ground assets. However, in November-December of this year, all U.S. advisors will be withdrawn to Binh Thuy, where some of them will be formed into a mobile repair team travelling to the various sites as needed.

The composition of the sensor sites vary as to size of the sensor field, the terrain to be monitored, and the capability for support. A basic site consists of an antenna system with pre-amps, a multicoupler, and a number of portatales to monitor the sensor field. The whole system must be powered by either an electric generator or by batteries.

The initial mission of the U.S. Navy sensor program was to support boat operations in the Delta on rivers and canals, and to provide warning for ATSBs. However, since enemy forces infiltrate and exfiltrate Corps Military Regions III and IV in South Vietnam along established routes, the Navy sensor program was expanded to include the detection and interdiction of these forces, especially since the Navy had the only sensor capability in the IV Corps Zone.
There are many different kinds of the three basic types of sensors. Also, there are different generations of the same basic sensors, called phases, the earliest being 'Phase I. Some of the various sensors are:

MINISID I (Mini Seismic Intrusion Detector)
This is a hand emplaced sensor which detects the seismic disturbances created by movement of personnel or vehicles into the area of the sensor. This sensor is 9"x7"x7" and weighs ten pounds, is buried in the ground, and has a 30 meter range for personnel detection, and a 300 meter range for vehicles. The sensor operates on batteries which must be replaced roughly every two months.

MAGID (Magnetic Intrusion Detector)
This is also a hand emplaced sensor which detects magnetic disturbances created by movement of ferrous metal, such as a rifle or vehicle into the area of the sensor. This unit has a similar range and battery life as described for the MINISID.

PIRID (Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector)
This is a hand emplaced sensor which detects body heat in its field of view, a bracket of from 5 to 50 feet from the sensor. The unit physically resembles a three inch piece of broomstick.

ACOUBUOY / SPIKE BUOY / ACOUSTIC BUOY
This sensor is either an airdropped or hand emplaced acoustic sensor detecting audible sounds within its detection range.

Sensors can be emplaced by a variety of methods: by hand, dropped from the air, or even fired from a mortar. The sensors can be used singly or in groups. They are normally planted in strings of three or four along a trail or stream. This enables the monitor team to determine directions and rates of enemy movement.

Employment of sensors requires a great deal of coordination with other units, both riverine and non-riverine. The monitor site is usually located in the NOC, where there is free access to tactical radio communications, first hand knowledge of friendly troop locations, and access to personnel who can grant necessary clearances for reaction fire. Permission for sensor employment normally comes from the Province, Sector, or Division level, and is necessary before commencing sensor operations. Inplants are usually conducted concurrently with ground force operations to cover the fact that sensors are being planted.

Within the VNN chain of command, the Mobile Operations Command
(Riverine) designates the areas to be supported by TIGHT JAW teams on the request of task force commanders or as evaluated intelligence indicates. Task force commanding officers then assign TIGHT JAW teams to the task group commanding officers. The CTGs, in turn, provide berthing and logistics support, operational and intelligence direction, and guidance for coordination with friendly forces, and for the employment of the sensors. The TIGHT JAW team O-in-Cs, in turn, coordinate with U.S. advisors to procure equipment, set up and organize monitoring sites, and, in coordination with the CTGs, plan the sensor deployment to achieve desired goals while maintaining close liaison with local friendly forces. Prior to each implant mission, the team O-in-C conducts a visual reconnaissance to determine what kind of sensors to use, what are the security needs, and what will be the method used for the implant (air, hand, mortar, etc.). The team then carries out the implant mission. The O-in-C then supervises monitoring techniques and procedures. The O-in-C insures all sensor information is promptly passed to the CTG.

There are basically four types of implant missions. In the first type, sensors are implanted near streams, trails, roads, or possible enemy rest areas to determine enemy movement and infiltration routes. Another type of mission utilizes the sensor as a base defense aid. The sensors are planted along routes leading to the base to give early warning of enemy movement towards the base. In a third type of mission, sensors are planted as preplanned targets, and upon activation, artillery, air strikes, troop sweeps, or reaction by riverine craft is called. Finally, sensors can be used to aid ambushes. They can give early warning of enemy movement for an established friendly ambush, or give warning of an enemy ambush. They can be used in conjunction with a remote firing device, such as a claymore mine, in an unmanned ambush. Finally, they can provide the intelligence needed to set up friendly ambushes.

There are certain specific considerations which must be taken into account in planting the sensors. One of the most important of these is the location of the sensor itself. During a hand implant mission, this location must be determined in the field to take advantage of proper camouflage, soil density, and closeness to the trail. All sensors must be emplaced within line of sight distance from the receiving antenna. Another important consideration is the type of delivery to be used. The hand implant mission has the advantage of accuracy of sensor emplacement, but has the tactical limitation that you must have access to the area. Conversely, an air delivery mission can be used for areas which are inaccessible due to terrain features or enemy activity. This method is also more covert. However, the accuracy of emplacement of sensors suffers considerably.
Sensor implant missions, of course, can be very dangerous. Contact with the enemy is likely; that is why it is desirable to conduct implant missions in conjunction with other ground operations. The enemy by now also knows something about the sensors. He may not understand exactly how they work, but he pretty well understands their purpose. He has found a number of the sensors and realizes that they must be reenergized periodically. This fact has allowed him to devise clever booby traps which he sets under or near the sensors. For example, in one incident at 1530H on 20 October, 1971, U.S. DUFFLE BAG advisors were on a re-battery mission of the base defense sensor field near HAL-3 Detachment 8, 1500 meters north of Rach Gia (WS 101 004). On arrival at the implant area, the advisors found the area had become heavily overgrown, and there were indications that unknown personnel had been in the area. The mission now became other than routine. The sensor field was vital to the security of the helicopter detachment, so the advisors had to enter the area, locate the sensors, and renew the batteries. Due to the changes in landscape and foliage growth, the team had extreme difficulty in locating the sensors. However, one by one, each sensor was located and removed from its resting place. One of the sensors was booby trapped with a grenade and sharpened bamboo spikes placed under it. LCDR William J. Fogle, USN, the team leader and also the Senior Advisor to the TIGHT JAW Program, aided by SN Timothy L. Fredrickson, USN, and EN2 Peter J. Strebe, USN, disarmed the booby trap. LCDR Fogle sustained severe lacerations to both of his hands from the sharpened grenade spoon and the bamboo spikes during this process. For their part in this action, LCDR Fogle and EN2 Strebe were recommended for the Bronze Star Medal, and SN Fredrickson for the Navy Commendation Medal.

In conclusion, U.S. Navy DUFFLE BAG teams have played a unique role in the Vietnam war. In a counterinsurgency situation, sensors have done an admirable job detecting enemy movements, where stealth, and the ability to fight the enemy in his own element is so important. On over a thousand occasions, boats on patrol or in WBCP were warned of enemy personnel either moving or waiting in ambush positions. This gave the boats a first strike capability. Furthermore, the Commanding Officer, ATSB Song Ong Doc, when the USN still occupied that base, situated astride the major infiltration route into the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula from the U Minh Forest region, credited the DUFFLE BAG team in over six instances with thwarting enemy ground attacks by giving early warning of enemy movement. In another instance, strategically placed sensors at suspected mortar sites gave early warning of impending attacks on ATSB Tra Cu, two of which were aborted when friendly forces initiated fire on these positions. There are, of course, countless other illustrations of the effectiveness of DUFFLE BAG sensors.
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APPENDIX I

1. (C) NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

CHNAVADVGRU U S. MACV

CHIEF OF STAFF

SENAVADV

SENA DV, COMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA CTF 227) SAIGON

RADM R. S. SALZER, USN

CAPT R. A. PADDOCK, USN

CAPT D. G. STONE, USN

LCDR J. H. GAUL, USN (E)

LCDR J. FERGUSON, USN (R)

TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATIONS COORDINATOR (AOC)

AOC COASTAL SA MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS COMMAND CTF 116

CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN

CAPT R. S. MOORE, USN

AOC NORTHERN LONG BINH SA THIRD RIVERINE AREA

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

SA THD 24 BEN LUC VNN TG 214.1

LCDR D. MYCALCHUCK, USN

SA THD 27 FHU CUONG VNN TF 216

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

SA THD 25 TUYEN NHON VNN TG 212.2

LCDR J. C. ROGERS, USN

AOC EASTERN CAN THO SA FOURTH RIVERINE AREA

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA THD 26 DONG TAN VNN TF 217

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

AOC SOUTHERN CA MAU SA ATF 211/ TF 210

CAPT P. C. GIBBONs, USN

SA THD 4 NAM CAN VNN TG 214.2

CDR H. V. SHORES, USN

SA THD 6 RACH S0I VNN TG 212.5

LCDR G. STEFENC AVAGE, USN

SA THD 21 CA MAU SA TF 210

CAPT P. C. GIBBONs, USN

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AOC WESTERN
TAN CHAU

SA THD 18
TAN CHAU

SA THD 20
HA TIEN

SENIOR ADVISOR, FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON

SA THD 18
CDR A. WRIGHT, USN

SA THD 18
VNN TF 218

VNN TG 219.1

LT D. C. SNYDER, USN

SENIOR ADVISOR, FLEET COMMAND

FLEET COMMAND

CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN

AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)

SA PHIBCOMD
CA MAU

SA RAID SEVEN ZERO
KIENTHAN

LT R. C. MONSON, USN

SA RAID SEVEN ONE
KIENTHAN

LT S. L. HOLMES, USN

SA RAID SEVEN TWO
KIENTHAN

LT R. J. LINDSTEDT, USN

SA RAID SEVEN THREE
KIENTHAN

LT K. E. KOLARICK, USN

SA RAID SEVEN FOUR
CA MAU

LT C. ARMENTRIGUT, USN

SA RAID SEVEN FIVE
CA MAU

LTJG R. BOLLER, USN

RIVER PATROL TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 212)

SA RIVPATCOMD
BINH THUY

SA RPD FIVE ONE
CAI LAI

SA RPD FIVE TWO
PHU CUONG

SA RPD FIVE THREE
BEN LUC/TRA CU

SA RPD FIVE FOUR
BEN KEO/GO DAU HA

SA RPD FIVE FIVE
CHAU DOC

CDR G. E. PIERCE, USN

LT J. R. FRONDORF, USN

LT J. R. RECKNER, USN

LT J. R. JONFS, USN

LT R. ARMITAGE, USN

LTJG T. ROUNDS, USN

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59
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SA RPD FIVE SIX
MOC HOA

SA RPD FIVE SEVEN
NHA BE

SA RPD FIVE EIGHT
MY THO

SA RPD FIVE NINE
TAN CHAU

SA RPD SIX ZERO
THUAN AN/DA NANG

SA RPD SIX ONE
RACH SOI

SA RPD SIX TWO
RACH SOI

SA RPD SIX THREE
PHOUC XUYEN

SA RPD SIX FOUR
TUYNH Nhon

MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TG 213)

SA MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS CMD
CAM RANH BAY

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG

SA COSRON TWO ONE
QUI NHON

SA COSRON TWO TWO
CAM RANH BAY

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI

SA COSFLOT FIVE
NAM CAN

SA HARDU CRB
CAM RANH BAY

LT J. B. CIBNEY, USN

LTJG E. HENDRICKSON, USNR

LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN

LT W. A. GOODWIN, USN

LT B. WATERMAN, USN

LT J. SCOVILL, USN

LT P. J. GASKIN, USN

LT R. B. FLORE, USNR (D)

LT R. C. HULL, USN (R)

LTJG J. D. COLE, USNR

CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN

LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN

LCDR G. H. ROBERTS, USN

LCDR R. W. LOWMAN, USN (D)

LCDR R. S. WATKINS, USN

LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN

LCDR J. MCCORMICK, USN

LT P. A. LINTON, USN

CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL RESERVE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 214)

SA GENRESCOMD
CAT LAI

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE
CAT LAI

SA MID NINE ONE
CUU LONG

SA MID NINE TWO
CUA VIET/HUE

SA MID NINE THREE
NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU

SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT
SAIGON

SA SALVAGE UNIT
CAT LAI

SA RID FOUR ZERO
GO DAU HA/TRA CU

SA RID FOUR ONE
TAN CHAU

SA RID FOUR TWO
DONG TAM

SA RID FOUR THREE
PHU CUONG

SA RID FOUR FOUR
BEN LUC/TAN AN

SA RID FOUR FIVE
NAM CAN

SA RID FOUR SIX
DONG TAM

SA RID FOUR SEVEN
NAM CAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CAPT L. A. Dwyer, USN
LT J. M. Steussy, USN
LT J. W. Hamilton, USN
LT T. A. Comer, USN
LT R. F. Elliott, USN
LT G. W. Doran, USN (D)
LT B. Vanheertum (R)
LCDR E. H. Shipp, USN (D)
LT R. J. Secord, USN (R)
LT R. O. Milham, USN
LT R. A. Dorsi, USN
LT C. Votava, USN
LTJG T. B. Wagsenseil, USN
LT G. C. Cooley, USN
LT C. F. Tibbetts, USN
LT W. C. Smith, USN
LT W. Taylor, USN
CONFIDENTIAL

SA RID FOUR EIGHT
CHAU DOC

SA RAG TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION ( TF 231 )

SA FIRST CZ
DANANG

SA CG ONE ONE
CUA VIET

SA CG ONE TWO
THUAN AN

SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

SA CG ONE FIVE
CHU LAI

SA CG ONE SIX
QUANG NGAI

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

SA HARDU DANANG

SA CSC DANANG

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION ( TF 230 )

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI

SA CG TWO SIX
DINH BA ISLAND

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHA

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET

SA HARDU NHA TRANG

SA HARDU QUI NHON

SA CSC NHA TRANG

SA CSC QUI NHON

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 233)

SA THIRD CZ
VUNG TAU

SA CG THREE THREE
VUNG TAU

SA CG THREE FOUR
THANH PHO

SA CG THREE FIVE
THU VINH

SA CG THREE SIX
LONG PHU

SA HARDU VUNG TAU

SA CSC VUNG TAU

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 234)

SA FOURTH CZ
AN THOI

CONFIDENTIAL

LT D. C. THOMAS, USN

LT J. P. MCGRATH, USN

LTJG P. MILLER, USN

LT G. NORDLAND, USN

LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN

LT B. VALENTINE, USN

LT S. C. AREY, USN

Lcdr P. J. CISEK, USN

Cdr J. G. SULLIVAN, USN

LTJG C. JOHNSON, USN

LT E. J. GIBSON, USN

LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN

LTJG D. C. BOGER, USN

LT N. BARBOUR, USN

LT D. R. ROGUS, USN

Cdr H. J. SHINE, USN
CONFIDENTIAL

SA CG FOUR ONE
POULO OBI

SA CG FOUR TWO
AN THOI

SA CG FOUR THREE
HON TRE ISLAND

SA CG FOUR FOUR
HA TIENT

SA CSC AN THOI

LT R. JOHNSTON, USNR

LT O. R. COLE, III, USN

LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN

LT D. C. SNYDER, USN

LT P. D. MCCURDY, USN

THIRD RIVERINE AREA ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 216)

SA THIRD RIVERINE AREA
LONG BINH

SA RAG TWO TWO/TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
LONG BINH

SA RAG THREE ZERO
PHU CUONG

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

LT C. E. ROBE, USN

FOURTH RIVERINE AREA ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)

SA FOURTH RIVERINE AREA
CAN THO

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
VINH LONG

SA RAG TWO FIVE/TWO NINE
CA MAU

SA RAG TWO SIX
CA MAU

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

LT K. J. PLIS, USN

LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN

LT J. GILLESKIE, USN

LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

CONFIDENTIAL
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 220)

SA RSSZ NHA BE
CDR D. A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION
SA NTC NHA TRANG
CDR P. R. FOURNIER, USN
SA NTC CAM RANH BAY
CDR R. R. WARD, USN
SA NTC SAICON
CDR R. A. WILD, USN

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION
SA VNN LS& DD VNN D&COS LOG
RAHM P. S., McMANNUS, USN
SA VNN SY
CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN
SA VNN SC
CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN
SA ISB NAM CAN
LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN
SA LSB BINH PHU
LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN
SA ISB RACH SOI
CDR R. J. COEN, USNR
SA ISB CA MAU
LT D. E. WARD, USN
SA ISB LONG XUYEN
LT D. CHALFANT, USN
SA LSB CAM RANH BAY
LCDR A. THIEL, USN
SA ISB QUI NHON
CDR G. MCLINTOSH, USN
SA LSB CAT .O
LCDR I. A. HEAD, USN
SA ISB LONG PHU
LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN
SA LSB DANANG
LT J. R. MURRAY, USN
SA ISB THUAN AN
CAPT E. MOUNTFORD, USN

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SA LSB DONG TAM
SA ISB VINH LONG
SA ISB CHO MOI
SA LSB NHA BE
SA ISB BEN LUC
SA ISB CAT LAI
SA YRBM ALPHA UNIT
CDR R. E. GREER, USN
LCDR J. LASWELL, USN
LCDR B. BURGETT, USN
CDR A. L. BADER, USN
LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN
LT J. F. MAYER, USN
LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN
### Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Attack By Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFVN</td>
<td>American operated radio and television service in the Republic of Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMI PONTOON</td>
<td>A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/S</td>
<td>Air Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPB</td>
<td>Assault Support Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Armored Troop Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSB</td>
<td>Advance Tactical Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/W</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK PONY</td>
<td>OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counter-insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Command and Communications Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Coastal Group or Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Capital Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civic Operations for Rural Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Camp Sentinel Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Coastal Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIW</td>
<td>Dead In the Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSTOFF</td>
<td>Medical evacuation by helo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENIFF</td>
<td>Enemy Initiated Firefight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOM</td>
<td>French Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIFF</td>
<td>Friendly Initiated Firefight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDA</td>
<td>Gun Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>Harassment and Interdiction fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Anti-tank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPL</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Personnel, Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team, and SEALs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>Local Forces (VC terminology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHFT</td>
<td>Light Helo Fire Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSC</td>
<td>Light Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Mining Interdiction Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNK</td>
<td>Cambodian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105 Howitzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeper, boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSC</td>
<td>Medium Seal Support Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCAT</td>
<td>Naval Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVLEDRA C</td>
<td>Naval Liaison Delta Regional Assistance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGFS</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOTC</td>
<td>Naval Inshore Operations Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCB</td>
<td>Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAD</td>
<td>Naval Support Activity Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTC</td>
<td>Officer in Tactical Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70
PBR: Patrol Boat, River
PCF: Patrol Craft, Fast
PF: Popular Forces
POL: Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRU: Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA: Province Senior Advisor
PSDF: Popular Self-Defense Forces
PSYOPS: Psychological Operations
RAC: River Assault Craft
RAG: River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID: River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RECH: Recharger (boat)
REF: Refueler (boat)
RF/PF: Regional Forces/Popular Forces
ROK: Republic of Korea
RPD: River Patrol Division
RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group
RSSZ: Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Air Force or Armed Forces
SA: Senior Advisor
SAR: Search And Rescue
SEAL: Navy commandos (Sea, Air, Land)
SEAWOLF: UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated
C-119 Aircraft

20-foot fiberglass motorboat

UH-1B, U.S.A. operated

Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)

Tactical Area Of Responsibility

Convoy designation for ships traveling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa.

United States Army, Vietnam

Visual Air Reconnaissance Search

Vietnamese Marine Corps

Vietnamese Navy

Vietnamese Navy Logistic Supply Command

Vietnamese Navy Supply Center

Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang)

Waterborne Guard Post

Wounded In Action

Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor