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COMMANDER
U.S. NAVAL FORCES
VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
November 1971

Force Historian................................. LCDR George C. Womble

Field Historians........................................ LCDR John P. Sudigala
LT Barnaby S. Ruhe
LT William Y. Frentzel, II

Historical Journalist............................... JO3 Michael L. Holt
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APPENDIX I - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory Organization

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APPENDIX III - Operational/Administrative Chains of Command
Enemy activity was generally light throughout the riverine areas of Vietnam during November, limited to sporadic ABFs and minings. The enemy did, however, step up his pressure against the Mekong River Convoys to Phnom Penh, as two out of three convoys were attacked with greater intensity than in the past few months. November also saw the first shipping harassment on the Long Talho Shipping Channel in the Rung Sat Special Zone in over a year.

In line with the trend of decreasing USN presence in Vietnam, a new advisory concept for riverine operations was inaugurated during the month. This concept, called MCAT (Mobile Operations Advisory Team), originated by RADM A.W. Price, USN, DEP COMNAVFORV (OPS), envisioned the withdrawal of all riverine advisors, replacing them with a mobile team based in each TRAN HUNG DAO AO which would travel to various locations within the AO whenever its services are needed. This concept is planned to be fully implemented by the end of December. A similar idea has also been discussed in connection with USN personnel at coastal groups.

The efforts of Coastal Surveillance Forces were hampered throughout November by severe weather conditions persisting since the end of September. At the months close, the First Coastal Zone was just beginning to return to full effectiveness from the damage caused by Typhoon Hester.

November also saw the decommissioning of the Third Naval Construction Brigade, ending most of the Seabee involvement in Vietnam. The only active Seabee personnel still remaining in country are the men of CBMU 302, concerned primarily with civic action projects.

Overall Navy strength in country continued to decline during the month. As of 30 November, 8,923 Navy personnel remained in country, 1,474 officer and 7,449 enlisted. A large number of these, 3,762 officers and men) were concentrated in MR III, in and around the Saigon area. The overall figure declined by 852 over last month's total. An greater decline is forecast for December, when 1,725 USN personnel are scheduled to depart for CONUS.

1. COMNAVFORV msg DTG 270912Z NOV 71
4 NOV-- PGM 610 ambushed on Cua Lon River (THD IV)

5 NOV-- Brown Water repair parts turned over to the Vietnamese

6 NOV-- Third Naval Construction Brigade decommissioned

8 NOV-- Shipping harassment against SS RAPHAEL SEMMES on Long Tau Shipping Channel

-- Tight Jaw sensor site turned over at ATSB Tuyen Nhon

9 NOV-- Mekong Convoy TP-37 departed Tan Chau

10 NOV-- House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Delegation visited Tan Chau for briefing on Mekong Convoy operations

-- MOBASE II turned over to the Cambodians

-- ACTOVRAD Site 303 (Nui Ta Kou) turned over to the Vietnamese

11 NOV-- LT R. L. Hubbard, CHC, USNR, and EN3 G. P. Coder, USN wounded by accidental discharge of claymore mine (THD XXI)

13 NOV-- LCM-8 damaged by mine on Trem Trem River (THD XXI)

15 NOV-- PCF 3913 ambushed VQ 890 580 (THD IV)

16 NOV-- ATC HQ 1237 mined at Hoa Binh (THD XXI)

17 NOV-- TP-38 departed Tan Chau

18 NOV-- TP-38 attacked at 0955H (WT 195 670)

-- Seawolf 312 shot down 20 miles north of Chau Doc

21 NOV-- CDR Luat, VNN relieved CAPT Thieu, VNN as Commanding Officer, TRAN HUNG DAO IV

-- Seawolf 26 experienced mechanical failure and force landed at WR 045 465
25 NOV -- USAF H-53 helo downed by enemy fire (RSSZ)

28 NOV -- Mekong Convoy TP-39 departed Tan Chau

-- TP-39 attacked at WT 233 657
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Mobile Operations Command (Riverine) and CTF 116 Summary

One of the most important trends to emerge in the Riverine arena in November was the mobile operational advisory team concept (MOAT). This concept will allow the Naval Riverine Advisors to cut down to one advisory team for each TRAN HUNG DAO; a move that would allow the U.S. Advisors to draw down to minimum force levels. The concept was tested and deemed a success and RADM Price, Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, has directed that the concept be implemented in all areas in December 1971.

In the continuing effort to insure civilian safety and positive control of fire power, CTF 116 addressed himself to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for aircraft. The following three points were emphasized in CTF 116 messages 200340Z NOV 71 and 200517Z NOV 71:

1. All TF 116 units placing air strikes must have clearance granted from the Province Chief or GVN higher authority (i.e. a division commander); and if the clearance is being relayed through other than a division or province TOC, units will request the relaying TOC to affirm that the clearance was in fact granted from the province or higher level GVN authority.

2. The practice of requiring the initials of VN/US clearance granting authorities must be continued.

3. When contacted for HAL-3 detachment scramble missions (including for troops in contact with the enemy), NOCs must not execute the Seawolf scramble until target clearance is granted by the province chief or higher GVN authority.

The Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) reduced helicopter services that U.S. Army Aviation Units had been providing in MR III. The reduction was necessitated by the drawdown of U.S. assets. Combat assault support missions must now be requested through Vietnamese channels to CG III Corps, and will be provided from III Corps monthly allocations of VNAF assets to major elements. The major naval elements most directly effected were the Rung Sat Special Zone, the Third Coastal Zone, and units under the OPCON of AOC Northern.
TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO was moderate during November. There were eight incidents of naval interest, resulting in no friendly personnel or material casualties, while the enemy suffered ten killed, and an assortment of weapons captured. Five of the incidents were friendly initiated, and three were enemy initiated ambushes. The TRAN HUNG DAO IV Commander employed USN air support relatively lightly during the month, with only 12 Seawolf missions flown within the limits of the AO.

The first incident occurred on 3 November, when two ATCs of RID 45, enroute to ISB Nam Can, surprised and engaged a small force of VC near WQ 064 790 at 1100H. The enemy was situated in a prospective ambush site when the boats unexpectedly discovered them. The ATCs killed two VC, and captured three launch bombs, while suffering no friendly casualties.

On the following day, the enemy was better prepared for their ambush of the PGM 610 on the Cua Lon River. The PGM 610 was transiting to her MARKET TIME patrol area, when she was taken under fire nine miles east of ISB Nam Can at 1345H. The attack consisted of four or five B-40 rockets launched from the north bank, and heavy AK-47 fire from the south bank. There were no rocket hits, and the PGM 610 effectively suppressed the enemy fire with 20mm and 40mm cannons, 81mm mortar, .50 caliber machine gun, and M-79 grenade launcher fire. There were no friendly casualties or damage, and enemy losses were undetermined. The PGM cleared the ambush area and proceeded to her assigned patrol sector as directed by CTF 235.

On 5 November there was a personnel change in the intelligence community at Nam Can. LT R. J. Lesley relieved LT A. P. Santoro as NILO. On 6 November, four LDNN (VN Seals) engaged ten VC near VQ 945 617 in a rather unusual manner. The LDNNs were routinely fishing in a sampan on the Cua Lon River, seven kilometers southeast of ISB Nam Can. The VC, armed with B-40 rockets and AK-47s, motioned the sampan to approach the south bank. The LDNNs replied with M-16 fire and beat a hasty retreat. The surprised VC returned a heavy volume of fire, but otherwise did not pursue the contact. There were no friendly casualties and enemy losses were undetermined.

Civilians became the victims of a VC attack on 11 November. An unspecified number of woodcutters were attacked with B-40 rockets near WQ 02 69 at 0900H. Attacks of this nature were usually conducted to scare civilians away from areas of enemy activity. In this incident, two woodcutters received fragmentation wounds.

VC terrorist activity has sometimes backfired on them by alienating the civilian population in an area. At 1450H on 11 November, LSSL 229, on routine patrol east of Nam Can, received information from a local civilian that 7 to 8 armed VC were located at WQ 113 707. In a well coordinated response, Seawolves diverted and flew a VARS mission over the area, resulting in negative contact. Meanwhile the LSSL relayed a second civilian report of VC activity, indicating that two sampans carrying 7 or 8 VC were sighted on
the Rach Cai Ngay near WQ 09 71. RID craft on the Cai Nhap patrol were
directed to investigate. The two sampans were detained, and three suspicious
males held for interrogation.

The VC continued their sporadic, harassing tactics on 15 November, when
PCF 3913 was taken under fire with launch bombs at 1200H. The attack oc­
curred near VQ 890 580, and two additional PCFs were dispatched to support
the PCF 3913. The PCFs laid mortar fire along both banks, and the enemy
fled, inflicting no damage to the PCFs, and leaving four launch bombs and
two launchers behind.

On 16 November, HAL-3, Detachment One changed Officers in Charge.
LCDR C. F. Montag relieved LT A. E. Mears as O-in-C of the Nam Can
based detachment.

In a combined operation on 17 November, units of RIDs 45 and 47 assisted
two companies of the 43rd ARVN Ranger Battalion conducting a sweep of a
four square mile area near VQ 390 580 (in the general vicinity of the PCF
3913 ambush two day earlier). The sweep met light resistance, resulting
in one VC killed, two bunkers destroyed, and one AK-47, two launch bomb
tubes, and three hand grenades captured.

A major change of command occurred on 21 November. Trung Ta (CDR)
Luat, VNN, relieved Dai Ta (CAPT) Thieu, VNN, as Commander TRAN
HUNG DAO IV/CTF 235.

A rapid response to intelligence netted significant profits for the TRAN
HUNG DAO IV Forces during the latter part of the month. At 0800H on 22
November, the Han Rong Hamlet Chief reported to the VNN N-2 (Intelligence
Officer) that a woodcutter from his hamlet had observed a large weapons
cache, containing 100 German and French rifles, three heavy machine guns,
and eight 60mm mortars in the vicinity of WQ 081 672. The weapons were
alleged to be rusty and in bad condition. The woodcutter claimed that the
cache was located in two hootches on the bank of an unnamed canal, and
that he had observed the area for three days without seeing any guards or
booby traps. The NILO at Nam Can believed the size of the cache to be
exaggerated, because a cache of that size would not be left undefended.
However, a ranger sweep was organized.

On 23 November, two companies of the 43rd ARVN Ranger Battalion
swept through a four square mile area centered at WQ 084 670, led by the
woodcutter who discovered the cache. At about 1200H, the rangers encountered
light resistance, but no casualties were inflicted on either side. The sweep
continued. The enemy was again encountered at 1330H, when an unknown
size force offered heavy resistance, resulting in seven VC killed and no
friendly casualties. Near the point of contact, at WQ 084 670, an arms cache
containing two sampans, eight 20mm anti-aircraft guns, five light machine
guns, 184 individual weapons, and six 60/61mm mortar tubes was captured.
As reported by the woodcutter, all the weapons were old and rusty, but about
30 percent could have been made serviceable by cannibalizing the rest. The
discovery of this cache illustrated one reason why the VC have consistently
attacked woodcutters throughout the Delta, and why the GVN has been prone
to conduct woodcutter security operations with LDNN and ranger forces.
Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO was very light during the month of November. There were no surface contacts with the enemy by naval assets, but Seawolves flew 14 strikes within the AO.

Although no contacts with the enemy were established, TG 212.5 forces actively pursued anti-infiltration tactics. In addition to the usual patrols and WBGPs, units of RFDs 61 and 62 reacted to intelligence received on 3 November by establishing a 12 boat blockade on the Rach Sol Di Vam Cong Canal from WS 15 07 to WS 20 13. The blockade was conducted from the 3rd through the 9th of November, and consisted of six patrol zones, each three kilometers long, across the intelligence predicted infiltration route. Although no contact was made on this blockade, the halting of VC/NVA infiltration from Cambodia into the U Minh continued to be the mission of CTG 212.5.

In the area of psychological operations, units of RPD 62 were active during the month. The Kinh (canal) Tron was twice the target area for "Chieu Hoi" tape missions. On the evening of 6 November, six PBRs of RPD 62, with two US advisors embarked, played pre-recorded Chieu Hoi tapes for a total of six hours. A few days later, on 10 November, six more units of RPD 62, without advisors, conducted another six hour tape recorded "Chieu Hoi" psychological operation on the same canal.

Throughout the month, units of RPD 62 provided continuing support to elements of the 16th ARVN Regiment of the Ninth ARVN Division. This support took the form of blocking force, ARVN night ambush insertion, and WBGP missions. One unusual mission was conducted on 11 November. Units of CTG 212.5 provided security for the USN YFU-57 which was grounded at WR 013 995. The YFU-57 went fast aground on a high tide, and presented the VC with a lucrative target. The possibility of a mortar attack presented the most serious threat, but fortunately none occurred. In addition to the security force, two LCM-6s and one LCM-8 unsuccessfully attempted to refloat the YFU. The salvage operation is covered in detail in the Naval Support Activity, Saigon section of this summary.
Three convoys successfully transported vitally needed POL and MAP materiel to Phnom Penh during the month of November. Two of the convoys encountered stiff, but ineffectual resistance. A USN Seawolf gunship was shot down while flying air cover for the second convoy, but efforts by converging allies saved the crew and aircraft.

Mekong Convoy TP-37 departed Tan Chau staging area at 0005H on 9 November, escorting six cargo ships, six tankers, and three tugs towing five barges, and carrying a total of 2,122,320 gallons of POL, 200 tons of ammunition, 300 tons of trucks and 7,896 tons of general cargo. The convoy arrived in Phnom Penh at 1430H without incident. The return convoy, PT-37, departed Phnom Penh the next day at noon with three cargo ships, seven tankers, and three tugs towing three barges. The convoy arrived seven hours later without incident. The composition of the escort was: one VNN LSIL Flagship, 22 VNN PBRs, six VNN ASPBs, eight MNK PBRs and three MNK LCM-6s. A total of 90 sorties were flown for TP/PT-37 with Seawolves flying eight night missions.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Delegation visited Tan Chau on 10 November for a briefing on the Mekong River Convoy operations. DEPCOMNAVFORV for OPS, RADM Price, and SA CTF 218, CDR Wright, participated in the briefing.

At 2350H on 17 November, TP-38 departed the Tan Chau staging area, composed of seven cargo ships, four tankers, three tugs towing five barges, and one towboat. A total of 1,834,904 gallons of POL, 8,761 tons of general cargo, and MPA materiel was transported. At 0955H the next morning, the convoy came under the most severe enemy attack since before the flood season. The enemy struck from WT 195670 with twenty 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. One cargo ship received eight hits, three in the berthing spaces, and two in the vessel's stack. The resultant fire, quickly extinguished, caused minor damage and no injuries. The convoy escort rendered aid and the ship continued its transit. Two other cargo ships were attacked in the same area with 14 B-40 rocket rounds. The rounds fell short into the water due to the extreme range of the firing position. Escorting Army gunships returned fire into the area, destroying the 75mm recoilless rifle position, and receiving intense return fire in return. Seawolves scrambled to assist. FANK troops in the area reported making contact with the enemy and maintained pressure on the enemy positions. At 1050H a tanker received fire from WT 210 660, resulting in no damage or casualties. Throughout the attack, the convoy's waterborne escorts returned fire into all enemy positions. A USN Seawolf LHFT was spotting for artillery when it took heavy A/W fire from WT 205 685. Multiple hits on the wing aircraft caused engine failure, and the pilot made a forced landing at 1122H. At 1200H a US Army helicopter relieved the Seawolf overhead, and at 1430H, an army Chinook skycrane extracted the downed Seawolf 52. At 1700H, the convoy arrived at Phnom Penh without further incident. The downriver convoy, PT-38, departed Phnom Penh the next day at 1215H, arriving at Tan Chau six hours later without incidents. There were 50 air sorties flown for the upriver convoy, and 21 flown for
the downriver one.

Mekong Convoy TP-39 departed for Phnom Penh at 0010H on 28 November, transporting 2,568,768 gallons of POL and 3,916 tons of general cargo. At 0850H the convoy was attacked by an unknown size force at WT 233 657. The attack consisted of eight B-40 rocket rounds. There were no damage or casualties reported. US Army gunships and escorting river craft returned the fire with unknown results, and the convoy continued the transit. At 1005H, the convoy was again attacked, this time at WT 090 743, with 57mm recoilless rifle, B-41 and A/W fire. Four B-41 rockets hit one cargo vessel, resulting in a small fire and minor bow damage. The fire was quickly suppressed and no personnel casualties resulted. One escorting VNN PBR was hit by S/A fire causing minor damage but no personnel casualties. The convoy continued transiting and arrived without further incident at 1400H. Subsequent to the initial attacks on TP-39, an air strike was delivered against NVA/VC in the vicinity of WT 236 661. FANK troops conducted a ground sweep after the strike, reporting signs of many enemy wounded. CTF 218 requested FANK reinforcements, and again requested replacement of the FANK 63rd Battalion, as the enemy persisted in penetrating their area to harass convoys. The enemy presence, due to ineffective bank security, has required the extensive use of escorting craft and aircraft.

Several convoys between Neak Luong and Tan Chau carried POL, ammo, and ARVN troops without incident during the month. TP-39A departed Tan Chau on 30 November for Neak Luong with MNK MOBASE II, consisting of four repair ammis. The MOBASE was turned over to the MNK on 10 November at LSB Nha Be under the MAP program.

NILO Tan Chau SPOTREP 210830Z Nov 71 outlined several changes in enemy tactics related to the annual Mekong River flood recession. TP-38 received the most severe enemy attack since before the flood, ushering in the expected increase in enemy activity. The NILO felt that the NVA were again attempting to cut off Phnom Penh from support, with emphasis shifting to the interdiction of Mekong shipping, because the highway access to Phnom Penh had been previously interdicted.
Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was concentrated on infiltration and resupply from Cambodia. No contact with the enemy was established by naval or Seawolf assets within the AO. Intelligence reports continued to indicate that the enemy was crossing the Vinh Te Canal from Cambodia.

In one particular intelligence report received from the NILO Chau Doc, units of the 66th ARVN Ranger Battalion reacted swiftly to intercept a VC infiltration attempt. The intelligence, evaluated as "source usually reliable and information probably true", indicated that a group of 50 men would attempt to infiltrate on the evening of 27/28 November by crossing the Vinh Te Canal near VS 58 65. This group was believed to be part of two groups of VC/NVA of 1000 men each that were breaking into small units in preparation for infiltration into Kien Giang Province. The Ranger units set an ambush resulting in one enemy killed, and three hand grenades and two sampans captured. Although naval assets were not directly involved in this action, the engagement was precipitated by NILO intelligence.
Contact with the enemy was moderate in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO during November. Seawolves flew 12 strikes within the AO, and there were eight incidents of a naval interest. Of the eight incidents, there were three accidents, three mining, one ambush, and one ABF, resulting in two boats damaged, two rocket launchers captured, and two USN and five VNN personnel wounded or injured.

The ambush occurred on 3 November at 1055H. Six units of RAG 29 patrolling the Song Ong Doc received three rounds of B40/B41 fire from the north bank of the river near VR 995 035. All three rounds missed. The boats returned suppressive fire and then beached, capturing two locally produced launch tubes. The boats returned to Song Ong Doc district town, embarked one RF company, returned to the ambush site, and inserted the troops for a sweep resulting in no contact with the enemy.

The first water mining incident occurred on 5 November. A convoy consisting of one MID 93 boat, one ARVN LCM-8, and four RAID 74 boats experienced three small underwater detonations while transiting from Hoa Binh to Ca Mau. The three leading boats were minesweeping with chain drag rigs. At 1115H one mine detonated off the port side of the LCM-8, the fourth boat in the convoy. No casualties or damage resulted from the detonation, but an M-16 was blown overboard. The convoy proceeded to an RF outpost at WR 007 365 and beached. At 1140H the convoy commander (the RAID 74 XO) controlled Black Pony strikes on both banks of the river. At 1150H, while retracting from the bank opposite the RF outpost, the LCM-8 experienced two more low order mine detonations, one aft and one off the port side, resulting in no casualties and only minor damage. The convoy then continued its transit to Ca Mau without further incident.

The second mining incident occurred on 13 November, when a convoy was again attacked. Three ASPBs of RAID 71 and one VNN LCM-8 were transiting from Rang Dong to Toan Thang on the Trem Trem River. At 1530H near WR 025 500, the LCM-8 the third boat in the convoy, was hit by one watermine and a B-40 rocket fired from the west bank, resulting in one VNN wounded and flooding damage to the bow section of the LCM-8. The convoy returned suppressive fire, and the LCM-8 beached just south of the attack area, with two ASPBs alongside to assist. At 1600H the wounded VNN was medevaced by US Army helicopter. At 1615H one ARVN company was inserted in the area, and four boats of RAID 72 were dispatched for additional security. A P-250 pump was delivered by a Sealord helicopter from Ca Mau to control flooding in the forward voids of the LCM-8, and the cargo of 2,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition was transferred to ATCs. Other RAC then towed the LCM-8 to Toan Thang.

The third and final mining incident occurred on 16 November at 0330H. The ATC HQ 1237, one of five RAID 74 boats providing security at Hoa Binh, was attacked by a swimmer emplaced or floating 20 kg mine. The HQ 1237 was beached on the east bank, opposite the 32nd ARVN Regiment Command Post near VR 987 383. The mine exploded against the starboard quarter, resulting in three VNN wounded, two seriously. The boat immediately sank by the stern, with the forward half remaining above water.
The SA OTF 210 reemphasized the steady increase of VC/NVA mining water sapper capabilities in recent months in a message addressed to SA CTGs 210.1 and 210.2. The enemy was anticipated to make greater efforts against friendly waterborne logistic supply lines in the northern U Minh Forest. Local "Boat Hunting" teams were believed to be reinforced by hard core NVA sappers. The mining threat was expected to continue throughout the coming months.

A result of the enemy sapper activity has been the conduct of salvage operations throughout the AO. Three salvage operations were under taken during November.

The first salvage job was completed on 6 November, when the HQ 1271 an ATC of RID 45, was raised, dewatered, and beached near ISB Ca Mau. This ATC was discovered not to have been a victim of enemy battle damage. No hull damage was found, with the exception of a minor pinhole leak in the forward bulkhead, and the craft appeared to be water tight. The sinking was caused by open bilge drainage plugs. The plugs had apparently been removed, because a wrench was found in the bilge during the salvage operations.

During the second salvage operation of the month on 15 November, one of three unfortunate accidents during the month occurred. An ASPB of RAID 73 was assisting in the salvage of the RAG 25 Commandement HQ 6002 on the Trem Trem River near WR 054 453. The ASPB was attempting to pull the Commandement toward the bank while salvage craft attempted to lift the boat. The bit to which ASPBs line was attached pulled loose from the Commandement’s deck, snapped back, and hit a VNN crewman fracturing his skull and inflicting chest wounds. The injured man was treated by the USN Salvage Team corpsman to stop the bleeding, and was medevaced by a Seawolf helicopter to the Third Surgical Hospital at Binh Thuy. The salvage of the Commandement was terminated on 24 November. The stern of the boat was lifted, but the bow could not be raised. The craft could not be towed to the bank, because of the crafts extreme bow angle and its mud filled hull. After stripping the armament off of the boat, the craft rolled over in place. Since the craft no longer presented a hazard to navigation, the salvage operation was terminated.

The final salvage operation was conducted on 25 November. Five RAC of RAID 73 escorted two LCM(S)s to the site of the sunk RAID 75 ATC HQ 1227 in the vicinity of WR 057 447. A survey of the ATC confirmed it to be unsalvageable. From the site of the sunk ATC, the convoy proceeded to WR 075 388, the reported site of the RAG 25 LCM-6 HQ 1506 which was sunk on 11 January 1971. The salvage mission was aborted after three sweeps along a three kilometer long stretch failed to locate the craft. One company of 33rd ARVN Regiment troops and Seawolves provided bank security and air cover for this aborted salvage operation. Salvage operations were a costly investment in man power and machinery, indicating the importance of countering the VC mining activity in the U Minh.

In addition to the salvage operation accident on 15 November, two other accidents occurred on 11th and 21st. The accident on the 11th involved another claymore mine firing, similar to the ones that occurred in October 1971.

1. SA CTF 210 240501Z NOV 71

CONFIDENTIAL
At 1030H, a claymore mine adjacent to the OpBase Kien An Officers Quarters accidentally detonated, injuring LT R. L. Hubbard, CHC, USNR, and EN3 G. P. Coder, USN. LT Hubbard received a broken right leg and multiple shrapnel wounds in both legs. EN3 Coder received shrapnel wounds in the back and legs. Both injured personnel were medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital. All claymore mines at Kien An were disarmed and EOD personnel ordered to Kien An to assist in conducting an investigation.

The final accident involved an emergency landing of Seawolf 36 while it was providing air cover for units of RAIDs 72 and 74 on the Trem Trem River in the vicinity of WR 045 465 at 1045H on 21 November. The aircraft experienced heavy vibrations and jettisoning rocket pods and ammunition boxes did not alleviate the condition. An emergency landing was made at an RF outpost while three ATSBs beached to assist troops providing security for the downed aircraft. The helicopter's wingman and a Black Pony provided air cover. The failure of a tail rotor drive shaft bearing was the cause of the vibrations and at 1300H a Sealord helicopter inserted a rigging crew. Eighteen minutes later the rigging was completed, and a US Army Chinook lifted the downed Seawolf and transported it to Binh Thuy.

One ABF occurred in the AO on 16 November. Two USN LCM(S)s and escorting units of RAIDs 72 and 73 were beached at the Toan Thang, 33rd ARVN Regiment Light Command Post near WR 042 475. At 2010H, three incoming 60mm mortar rounds fell short of the base perimeter. The boats immediately dispersed while Fire Support Bases Toan Thang and Tan Phu fired 105mm artillery at suspected enemy positions with unknown results. No casualties or damage to boats or the base was incurred. The entire incident lasted 35 minutes and appeared to be a harassing attack.

Two special missions were also conducted during November. The first of these, conducted on 7 November, involving a coordinated ARVN artillery barrage, a USN Black Pony CBU-55 strike, and a VNAF A-37 strike, followed by a troop insert. The target area was a box of coordinates along the Trem Trem River (WR 034 444, WR 050 444, WR 034 433, and WR 050 433). After the strikes, one battalion of 33rd ARVN Regiment troops was inserted by helicopter and RAID 73 RAC. The troops swept the area while RAID 73 provided a blocking force. The operation resulted in 40 bunkers, 60 structures, and 20 spider holes destroyed, with 1000 rounds each of AK-47 and M-16 ammunition, and 100 grenades captured.

The second special mission was an attempted VC POW camp raid by ARVN troops led by a Hoi Chanh. An insertion was made in the vicinity of WR 984 885. Black Ponies flew strikes and one slick was shot down. Three VC were killed and five hooches destroyed, but there were no signs of any prisoners.

A personnel change occurred in the intelligence community during the month. On the 9th, LT R.S. Smith relieved LT M. L Barret as NILO Ca Mau.

The final significant event of the month occurred on 27 November, when TC 210.2 stood down for repairs prior to the scheduled commencement of a new operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIX, in December.
Naval contact with the enemy in the TRÀN HƯNG ĐẢO XXIV AO was light during November. There were six incidents of naval interest, and Seawolves flew 14 missions in the AO. The six incidents, two of which were enemy initiated, resulted in a total of one VC suspect detained, one boat damaged, one VNN wounded, and five VC killed.

The first incident occurred on 6 November, when SEALs of SEAL Team One, Mike Platoon conducted a reconnaissance and interdiction mission seven miles east of Tan An. A Vietnamese suspect with no identification was detained by the SEALs. The detainee was turned over to the Tan Tru district Operations Officer for interrogation.

On 7 November, PFs alerted three RAG from RID 46 to a VC crossing of the Song Vam Co Tay in the vicinity of XS 385 775. The boats proceeded to the position which was close to their own and took the crossing sampans under fire at 1945H. Artillery was requested at 1950H, and 10 rounds were delivered at 2005H. Seawolves were requested and scrambled at 2015H, arriving over the target at 2027H. Clearance was granted at 2047H and the strike made. There were no friendly casualties and enemy losses were undetermined. This incident was an example of prompt response to timely information and smooth communications.

The only VNN casualty of the month occurred on 15 November, when two units of RID-44 were ambushed four kilometers west of ISB Ben Luc. At 1510H, the boats were taken under fire from the south bank of the Vam Co Dong River with four B-40 rockets. The ASPB HQ 5133 took one rocket hit in the coxswain flat, wounding one VNN and causing 10 percent damage to the boat. The boats suppressed the enemy fire and cleared the area. The wounded sailor was medevaced to ISB Ben Luc by a U.S. Army helo; enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 20 November, two RPD-53 PBRs were called in to support RF troops in contact with an undetermined size VC force. The PBRs arrived at the scene in the vicinity of XT 468 039, and supplied fire support for about one hour. The VC broke contact after inflicting no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were again unknown.

The second VC ambush of the month occurred on 26 November, when four PBRs of RPD-54 were taken under fire with an estimated 15 rounds of B-40 rockets. The attack commenced at 2115H while the boats were in a WEPGP position near XT 150 408, and lasted 10 minutes. The boats returned suppressive fire and withdrew to ATSB Ben Keo. No friendly casualties were taken. A sweep of the ambush site on the following day discovered two unexploded rockets, one B-40 and one B-41, with bullet holes in them, and a blood stained shirt, indicating that the PBR fire had been accurate.

The final incident of the month occurred on the 28th, when three RAG of RID-40 inserted and provided fire support for one ARVN and one PF company in the vicinity of XT 360 190. The engagement resulted in no friendly casualties. Five VC were killed, two by boat fire, and one AK-47, rice, mosquito nets, ponchos, and assorted documents were captured.

The month of November also saw the SA of RID 44 relieved. LT E. A. Arlen relieved LT G. C. Cooley on 12 November.
In an attempt to prevent the recurrence of last months accidental clay­more mine firings, a team of USN and VNN EOD personnel completed a tour of TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV bases on 2 November. The team conducted inspections of mine fields, and trained Vietnamese personnel in the use of claymore mines at ATSBs Tra Cu, Ben Keo, and Go Dau Ha.

During the past month and a half, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV was the test area for a new naval advisory plan. On 15 October, the Mobile Operational Advisory Team (MOAT) concept was introduced to find a way to reduce the advisory effort to a minimum force level. The plan called for operational advisory services for the three TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV ATSBs to be provided by the MOAT, home based at ISB Ben Luc, directly under the TRAN HUNG DAO SA. After the trial period, the plan was evaluated as a success, and COMNAVFORV directed the Senior Advisor of Deputy Commander TRAN HUNG DAO (Riverine) and the four Area Operational Commanders to expand the MOAT concept to all riverine operations during December 1971.

The final significant administrative event of the month occurred on 27 November. A PMS/Material Inspection was conducted on RPD-53 units at ATSB Tra Cu by the Senior Advisor and Commander of TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV. The craft were found to be in fair to good condition, and RPD-53 personnel demonstrated their knowledge of the PMS checks. PMS was found to have been conducted in most instances, however, the lack of tools hampered maintenance.

1. COMNAVFORV 210716Z NOV 71
Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO was very light during November. Seawolves flew four strikes in the AO, and there were five incidents of naval interest, of which three were VC crossings, one was a boat ambush, and one was an ABF. No friendly casualties were taken during the month, and enemy casualties were unknown in each of the incidents.

The first VC crossing incident occurred on 5 November. At 1910H a Phuoc Xuyen PF unit informed RPD-63 that five sampans were crossing the Kinh Cung at WS 891 775. At 1915H PBRs scrambled and embarked PF troops to interdict the sampans. At 1930H, artillery took the crossing point under fire and PBRs followed with machinegun fire, with the sampans evading into a small canal. Seawolves and Black Ponies scrambled, but the strike was delayed because clearance could not be obtained. The PBRs inserted 30 troops at 2115H, and then supported a sweep of the area, resulting in no friendly and undetermined enemy casualties.

On 9 November three units of RID-46 encountered a VC unit near XS 38 78 after extracting PF troops. The troops refused to insert and pursue the engagement, so contact was broken.

The last VC crossing interdiction occurred on 16 November. Two RAC from RID-46 discovered two people crossing the Vam Co Tay River near XS 390 775 at 1930H. The boats took the sampan under fire, but the two men escaped. The sampan contained one VC flag and documents.

The only boat ambush during the month also occurred on 16 November. Two PBRs of RPD-63 were taken under fire with small arms at 0155H, six kilometers west of Phouc Xuyen. The contact was not prosecuted, because the banks were heavily populated and returning fire would endanger innocent civilians.

ATSB Tuyen Nhon received one round of unknown caliber mortar or rocket fire at 2030H on 28 November. The round impacted on a road 75 meters outside the base perimeter, causing no damage. The attack appeared to be only a harassing probe, but information was received from the 75th ARVN Ranger Battalion, located adjacent to the naval base, that the VC would attack the base that night. The base remained at General Quarters, and alerted both artillery and Seawolves, but the attack did not occur.

Earlier in the month, two unit shifts were completed. On 1 November, RID-46 reported for operations in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO. Following the arrival of RID-46, the last increment of RPD-56 departed TRAN HUNG DAO XXV for the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI AO on 2 November.

Also in the first week of November, the "TIGHT JAW" sensor turnover was completed on the 8th. The sensor advisors withdrew from ATSB Tuyen Nhon, completing the turnover three weeks ahead of the scheduled 1 December date.
Naval contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI AO was light by surface units and moderately heavy by air assets. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 21 strikes within the AO, and surface units engaged the enemy, twice.

The first incident of the month occurred on 7 November, when two ASPBs of RID-42 and one PBR of RPD-58 were ambushed in the vicinity of XS 563 360. The boats were returning from a mission in support of troops in contact with the enemy, when they were taken under fire with B-40 rockets and small arms by an estimated two platoons of VC. The boats were under fire for approximately 15 minutes, resulting in a rocket hit on one ASPB and the PBR. The rocket hit on the PBR was unusual. The B-40 exploded prior to impact, imbedding the rocket tail section in the hull. The ASPB was not as fortunate, receiving 20 percent damage. The engagement left a total of five VNN wounded, two of them officers. Enemy losses were unknown.

The other incident of naval interest occurred on 22 November. An ambush team, consisting of four PBRs and an ARVN reconnaissance platoon, was counter ambushed at 2130H in the vicinity of XS 373 513 with B-40 rockets. The boats provided supporting fire for the ARVN troops, who suffered one killed and two wounded. Enemy losses were unknown.

During the month, an O-in-C and an SA were relieved. LCDR R. N. Whalen relieved LCDR A. E. Pellerin as O-in-C HAL-3, Detachment 9 on 2 November, and LT L. G. Long relieved LT H. M. Highland as SA RPD-58 on the 11th.

A boat accidentally sank at LSB Dong Tam on 17 November. On the 16th the HQ 7552 was placed in the water while correcting sea trial discrepancies. The VNN repair department removed the port engine at about 2000H, and moored the boat alongside a synchrolift. At 0350H the synchrolift guard observed that the boat was taking on water while the boat crew was sleeping on the synchrolift. Unfortunately, the boat sank before the damage control party arrived. When the boat was refloated, the sea valves on the port engine were found open.

During the month, intelligence reports were received that indicated a possible reversion to Phase I insurgency tactics by the VC in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI AO. Phase I tactics were characterized by the building of a political infrastructure, and engaging in acts of sabotage, terrorism, and subversion. The general level of enemy contact in the AO was low in November, as it had been for the past several months.

1. SA DEPCOMTHD (RIVERINE) 161235Z NOV 71
Contact with the enemy by naval forces was light in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII AO during November. The VC conducted three ambushes on RPD-52 units, and U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 13 strikes in the AO. The majority of the naval effort was directed toward anti-infiltration patrols of the upper and lower Saigon River, and units of RAG-24 conducted an ammunition re-supply mission to FSB Song Lo on 5 November, with PBRs and Seawolves escorting the convoy.

While participating in the ammunition re-supply for FSB Song Lo on 5 November, a VNAF CH-47, Chinook, accidentally dropped its externally carried cargo of 155mm projectiles. The 80 rounds of ammunition fell to earth in the vicinity of XT 532 321 at 1140H. Ground troops inserted into the area at 1430H found only empty cargo nets. The NILO Cu Chi warned naval assets of the mining danger that was now present. Each 155mm projectile contained 14.6 pounds of TNT, and provided the VC with a ready source of explosives for homemade sapper bombs and water mines.

On 6 November, COMNAVFORV appraised the SAs in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII AO of reports of an unidentified VC water sapper unit operating in their area. The sappers were reportedly targeted against boats, and were armed with small arms, rockets, and watermines.

Confirming earlier intelligence predictions, four PBRs of RPD-52 were attacked with an estimated 12-16 B-40 rockets and small arms fire at 1710H on 9 November, near XT 672 295. The boats returned fire and cleared the area. Seawolves of CTU 116,14,1 scrambled and placed a strike on the suspected enemy position, receiving light small arms return fire. The engagement resulted in no friendly casualties or damage, and enemy losses were unknown.

Two days later, four more PBRs were taken under fire with two B-40 rounds and AK-47 fire. The attack occurred at 1905H on the 11th, in the vicinity of XT 650 318. The PBRs returned fire and cleared the area, while Seawolves placed strikes on the suspected enemy positions. The enemy registered one B-40 hit on the HQ 7536, resulting in only minor hull and engine damage, because the round failed to detonate. Upon their return to Op Base Phu Cuong, VNN EOD personnel removed the rocket; boat repairs were within the capabilities of RPD-52.

A lull occurred in enemy activity against craft on the Saigon River until 22 November, when two more PBRs were ambushed with six B-40 rockets. The attack took place near XT 542 351 at 1650H. The boats returned fire and cleared the area, while Seawolves scrambled and placed strikes on the suspected enemy positions. This attack resulted in the two PBRs hit by rocket fire. The HQ 7530 received two hits amidships at the waterline, resulting in hull damage only. The HQ 7530 received one hit amidships, well above the waterline, resulting in one VNN wounded and slight hull damage. Enemy losses were undetermined.

Earlier in the month, RID-43 changed Senior Advisors. LT P.J. Hughes
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relieved LT T.B. Wagenseil on 14 November.
RuNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Enemy activity appeared to be picking up during the month of November, indicating the possibility of resupply and reinforcement in or around the Rung Sat. The Chuong Duong operations conducted during the month yielded minimal results, and three RFs were killed while three of the enemy were killed during these operations. On 8 November, the first harassment incident during the past year against shipping occurred on the Long Tau Channel. On November 25, a USAF H-53, Jolly Green Giant, helo crashed on the Soi Rap River due to enemy fire, with two survivors and three bodies recovered, leaving one man missing.

Recent reports of enemy resupply in the Rung Sat were substantiated when a Rung Sat intelligence squad located and destroyed four water mines in the vicinity of XS 976 653. Based on intelligence from an informant, the squad inserted by PBR on 1 November. The mines discovered could have been used to attack large vessels, and could have been detonated by either the command or time delay method.

At 1530H on 8 November, the merchant ship Raphael Semmes, transiting north on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, reported being hit by rockets fired from the south bank in the vicinity of XS 996 750. Subsequent investigations revealed that she may have been hit by shrapnel. This was substantiated by chipped paint on the side of the ship. At the time of the incident, two PBRs of RPD 51 were escorting the ship, and an RF company was providing a ground sweep on each bank in the immediate vicinity. Two minutes after the purported attack, USN Seawolves arrived to provide overhead air cover. None of the forces in the immediate vicinity could report having heard or seen shooting.

On 25 November, a USAF H-53, Jolly Green Giant helicopter, went down in the Soi Rap River due to enemy fire, in the vicinity of XS 950 730. The aircraft was returning from a previous SAR mission in which it had taken nine rounds of ground fire of an unknown type. The aircraft had landed for POL and damage assessment prior to the crash. The crash occurred during a heavy squall. The helo went down while operating under Instrument Flight Rules, and had negative communication with the second H-53 flying in formation. At 1525H, one of the survivors who had swum ashore, radioed for help. Within 25 minutes a Seawolf helo had picked up the first survivor. At 1600H an air rescue team from Tan Son Nhut arrived to coordinate recovery efforts, and 15 minutes later they had picked up the second and final survivor. Divers from the Ton Son Nhut team, LSB Nha Be, USS TUTUILA, and EOD Det Saigon continued the search despite extremely inclement weather. Three bodies were subsequently recovered with one man MIA, and the main fuselage of the helo located. An autopsy of the aircraft commander revealed he had been shot in the groin, which was the basis for terming the crash a combat loss.
Tactical boundaries of the Rung Sat Special Zone. The dotted line indicates the Long Tau Shipping Channel.
The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>CTF 210.1</td>
<td>Kien An</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>CTG 210.1</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>CTG 210.2</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

On 27 November 10 RAID 72, eight RAID 73, and one RAID 74 craft left LSB Ca Mau for a repair stand down at LSB Dong Tam.
The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RPD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>CTF 227</td>
<td>Cat Lai/CMD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>CTG 216.2</td>
<td>Phu Cuong/XXVII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc/Tra Cu/XXIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>CTG 214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha/Ben Keo/XXIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>CTU 218.1.2</td>
<td>Tan Chau XVIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>CTU 217.1</td>
<td>My Tho/XXVI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be/RSSZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>CTF 217</td>
<td>My Tho/XXVI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>CTU 218.2.1</td>
<td>Tan Chau XVIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>CTG 231.2/231.4</td>
<td>Hoi An/Thuan An</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>CTU 212.5.1</td>
<td>Rach Soi VI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>CTU 212.5.2</td>
<td>Rach Soi VI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>CTU 212.2.2</td>
<td>Phuoc Xuyen XXV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>CTU 212.2.1</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon XXV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.
The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RID</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Go Dau Ha/Tra Cu</td>
<td>XXIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>218.1.3</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>XVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>217.2.3</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>216.4</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc/Tan An</td>
<td>XXIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>214.2.1</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>212.2</td>
<td>Tuyen Nhon</td>
<td>XXV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>214.2.2</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>218.1.3</td>
<td>Tan Chau</td>
<td>XVIII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.
RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAG</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>THD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CTF 227</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>CMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CTG 216.1</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Vi Thanh</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Vi Thanh</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CTF 228</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>RSSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>CTF 216</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>3rd Riverine Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>CTG 210.3</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CTF 216.3</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>CTG 231.2</td>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>FCZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/33</td>
<td>CTG 217.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/31</td>
<td>CTF 217.2</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTED 81</td>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth Riverine Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each RAG is composed of approximately, one MON, one CCB, three LCVPs, and four LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.
The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detachment</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>O-in-C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team One</td>
<td>116.6.2</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LT Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det Golf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas. On 1 November the Seals ceased operations except for POW rescue operations which also were concluded by month's end. On 1 December, November Platoon was removed from the field for stand down, while some individual Seals remained in an advisory capacity.
November was a very light month for the Seawolves of CTG 116.7 as far as enemy contact was concerned. The Seawolves were credited with 27 enemy KBA. They were also responsible for 14 sampans, 31 bunkers and structures damaged or destroyed, while flying 534 missions during the month of November.

The disposition of HAL-3 detachments were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DET</th>
<th>TASK ORG</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Det O-in-C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.11</td>
<td>Nam Can</td>
<td>LCDR C.F. Montag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>116.9.1</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>LCDR L.L. O'Neal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>116.13.1</td>
<td>Ca Mau</td>
<td>LCDR R.S. Morrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>116.10.1</td>
<td>Ben Luc</td>
<td>LT T.W. Fulbright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>116.15.1</td>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>LCDR D.S. Hull</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>116.14.1</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
<td>LCDR K.J. Owen</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>116.6.1</td>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td>LCDR N.R. Sparks</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>116.5.1</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
<td>LCDR R.H. Jesberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>116.17</td>
<td>Binh Thuy(*)</td>
<td>LCDR R.N. Whalen</td>
</tr>
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* Temporarily

Four forced landings by Seawolf aircraft occurred during the month of November. The first, occurring on 18 November, was made when Seawolf 312 received three hits from small arms fire (two in the main rotor blade and one severing the main fuel line), 20 miles north of Chau Doc. The pilot, LTJG G.E. Campbell, was forced to autorotate into a marsh area, WT 1968. No personnel were injured, and the crew was rescued by an Army UH-1H within minutes.

Seawolf 26, while providing air cover for units of RAID 72 and 74 on the Trem Trem River in the vicinity of WR 045 465 at 1045H on 21 November, experienced heavy vibration. All efforts to lighten the aircraft proved useless and the Seawolf made a forced landing at a RF outpost. While RF troops provided security on the ground, the Seawolf's wingman and a Black Pony provided air cover. Failure of a tail rotor drive shaft bearing was found to be the reason for the vibrations. Later a US Army Chinook lifted the downed Seawolf and transported it to Binh Thuy.

The remaining two forced landings were made during test hovers at the parent command, LSB Binh Thuy, on 29 November. Both aircraft experienced compressor stalls, but landed safely without damage to the aircraft.

Three rescue missions were made by Seawolf aircraft during the month. The first, which occurred on 25 November, was made to rescue four personnel of a CH-46, downed by enemy action near WR 908 960. The four personnel were flown to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. No Seawolf personnel were injured and the CH-46 was "hooked out" to Binh Thuy by an Army H-54 later the same day.

The second rescue took place the same day. Seawolf 314 rescued a flight engineer of a downed CH-53 four miles south of Nha Be on the Soi Rap River, XS 954 728. The crewman was flown to Vung Tau for medical treatment.

The last rescue was made by Sealord 1 on 27 November. While on a logis-
tic support mission, Sealord I, piloted by Captain C. O. Borgstrom, Commanding Officer of HAL-3, conducted the rescue of eight personnel and all equipment from a downed Army UH-1H helicopter 15 miles northwest of Dong Tan at XS 323 535. Captain Borgstrom made a downwind approach bringing his aircraft 180 degrees around into the wind as he approached the hover point near the downed aircraft. Unable to actually land his aircraft in the flooded field, Captain Borgstrom skillfully maintained a low hover while the crew and passengers of the downed craft scrambled on board. With the load in his aircraft now reaching critical gross weight conditions, and in spite of the small cabin area of the UH-1H helicopter, Captain Borgstrom skillfully executed a flawless takeoff. During the incident, a US Army AH-1G (Cobra) provided constant overhead cover for the unarmed UH-1L (Sealord). For their parts in the rescue mission, the crew of Sealord I were recommended for awards as follows: Captain Borgstrom, Single Action Air Medal; LTJG Charles R. Taylor, the co-pilot, Navy Commendation Medal; and AMH2 Anthony J. Salvatore, crewman, the Navy Commendation Medal.

HAL-3 crewmembers made a notable civic action gesture during the month. A Province Orphanage at Can Tho received a large unexpected electrical bill in early November. Personnel of HAL-3 conducted a fund drive to assist in the payment of the bill and on November 28th, Captain Borgstrom, representing HAL-3, presented the orphanage with over $1,300.

On 16 November LCDR C. F. Montag relieved LT A. E. Mears as Officer in Charge of Task Group 116.1.1.
OV-10A aircraft flew 571 sorties during the month of November, in which they accounted for the destruction of 24 structures, 7 sampans and 16 bunkers. They were also credited with 41 KBAs during the month. The largest reported strike made by Black Ponies during the month resulted in eight enemy killed on 12 November. The strike was made on a reported enemy position along a small lake, located at WR 077 525.

Although a greater percentage of the missions flown by Black Ponies in the Delta were to provide air support for friendly ground forces, VAL-4 aircraft played a key role in the safe transit of many water convoys during November. Once during the month because of communications problems, OV-10A aircraft were unable to complete their convoy escort mission. The incident occurred on 9 November when Black Pony aircraft were told to provide air cover for a tanker convoy transiting through the Bo De River. When the Ponies arrived at the rendezvous point at 0630H at the mouth of the river, the convoy was not in sight. The aircraft searched the area within a 30 mile radius and finally found the convoy 15 miles to the southeast, streaming away from the rendezvous point. After the convoy was turned around and directed on course, the Ponies requested release because of low fuel.
US. MARKET TIME and VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Coastal Surveillance Forces maintained a good barrier against sea-borne infiltration again in November, despite poor weather conditions that have existed since 29 September, severely hampering MARKET TIME patrols. Initially, this condition was due to monsoonal change, which ended on 17 October. Since the change, one typhoon, continual heavy seas and gale force winds have hampered patrol operations in all coastal zones to a degree, but most severely in MRs I and II. This extended severe weather condition is not normal for the South China Sea once the monsoon transition from southwest to northeast has occurred.

U.S. MARKET TIME Forces inspected 481 wooden and steel hulled junks and sampans during day and night patrols, boarded 174 vessels, and detained no personnel. U.S. Forces averaged two MSOs, one LST, two PGs, and one WHEC on patrol during the month. VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Units boarded 15,563 craft, and detained 65 personnel during the course of the month.

MARKET TIME patrol aircraft, and the Seventh Fleet ship USS A. J. ISBELL (DD-869) continued surveillance of the SL-6 trawler first detected on 28 October. The vessel travelled south to the Great Natuna Island and remained in this general vicinity for several days.

In addition, on 2 November at 1820H, a possible SL-2 trawler was sighted by VP 19 aircraft at 06-30N, 107-54E, on course 215, speed 5 knots. COMNAVFORV called an alert for the early morning hours of 3 November, the projected time for a possible infiltration attempt. However, the vessel was subsequently identified as a Nationalist Chinese fishing trawler, so the alert was cancelled, and normal VARS and patrols resumed.
Bad weather continued to plague the First Coastal Zone during November. Salvage operations initiated in the wake of Typhoon Hester concluded in November: PCF and Harbor Entrance Control Point repairs were completed on 1 November, as were those to the First Coastal Zone Headquarters on 2 November. In addition, all electronics repairs at the coastal groups were completed, as well as base dwelling repairs on CGs 15 and 16. CG-14 completed their repairs on 8 November. Furthermore, FASU Da Nang, with the aid of CBMU-302 reported the completion of damage repairs early in the month.

The rough seas during this period may have also affected the Cua Viet Waterway. Again only a handful of mining incidents were reported, two involving enemy ordnance recoveries, and three involving harmless mine detonations.

Further south in the CHI LANG ONE AO, enemy activity remained moderate, mostly limited to sporadic ABFs. A Yabuta junk of CG-14 received AK-47 fire two and a half miles southeast of Hoi An (BT 168 531) from an unknown-size enemy force. The junk was slightly damaged, however, no casualties resulted from the incident.

Vietnamese LDNNs were particularly active in the AO during November. The LDNNs with U.S. Seal advisors conducted six operations during the month, wounding one VC and destroying many bunkers and enemy structures. On LDNN was slightly wounded by a grenade booby trap during an operation on the 11th.

On 24 November, LT. W. Moore, USN, relieved LT T.A. Comer, USN as Senior advisor, MID 92.
SECOND COASTAL ZONE

During November, enemy initiated activity with the Second Coastal Zone Provinces remained at a low level with enemy units engaged in resupply and logistic activities. When the enemy did strike, his activity was characterized by isolated terrorist attacks, mining and booby trap incidents, and small scale unit attacks involving small arms and B-40 rocket fire.

Enemy watersappers were again active in the Qui Nhon area. Army pier sentries sighted possible watersappers on 24 November, probing defenses in the vicinity of the Ammunition Wharf, and on 25, 26, and 27 November, in the vicinity of Bridge Number Two on the Causeway. All of the swimmers escaped, and no explosives were found attached to the bridge.

The ISDS (Improved Swimmer Defense System) unit recently deployed in Qui Nhon Harbor contributed little to harbor defense during November. The unit was plagued with electrical casualties and deteriorating water conditions brought on by the change in weather from the Southeast to the Northeast Monsoon. The choppy seas consistently reduced the unit's radar and sonar performance. As these conditions were expected more or less to prevail during the entire Monsoon season, COMNAVFORV concurred with recommendations set forth by CTF 115, CTU 115.9.3 (O-in-C Qui Nhon Harbor Defense Unit) and CTE 115.9.3.1 (O-in-C ISDS Unit) to redeploy the unit elsewhere where it could be utilized more effectively. Since Qui Nhon Port was due to be turned over to the ARVN on 31 December, and a need for increased swimmer detection capability existed at Vung Tau to protect U.S. retrograde shipping, COMNAVFORV planned to shift the ISDS Unit to that site about 15 December.

At the end of November, the Senior Advisor Second Coastal Zone reported to COMNAVFORV that serious degradation had occurred in coastal surveillance effectiveness since mid-October, and as a result, coastal surveillance could be rated as only marginally effective. The events leading to the degradation of coastal surveillance were as follows:

1. The reduction of assigned PGMs from three to two.
2. The removal of Yabuta junks from Cloud units.
3. Adverse weather conditions during much of the reporting period.
4. Elimination of U.S. fixed wing VARS assets.
5. Concurrent failure of VNAF to provide adequate air assets for VARS.
6. Inability to effectively utilize Radar Station 204 (Mui Dinh) during the reporting period.

In spite of these conditions, the Second Coastal Zone Surveillance Forces did have two encounters while on patrol. In the first, on 10 November, a PCF detained two fisherman four miles east of Nha Trang for possessing improper papers, while in the second, on 17 November, a CG 21 ambush team detained two men with incorrect ID cards, 22 miles north of Qui Nhon.

1. Second Coastal Zone Intell. Off. PERINTREP 22-71 020200Z NOV 71
2. SA Second Coastal Zone /SA CTF 232 300445Z NOV 71

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Throughout November, intelligence reports filtered in about enemy intentions to target Coastal Radar Stations at De Gi and Nui Chap Chai. These reports caused enough concern to cause COMNAVFORV to request additional protective security from the Director of the Second Regional Advisory Group.

In addition, construction on Hon Tre Radar Station (203) was proceeding smoothly, and the station was scheduled for turnover to the Second Coastal Zone Headquarters on 14 December 1971.
THIRD COASTAL ZONE

The Third Coastal Zone is unique among the other zones in that it comprises six provinces and portions of two military regions. This gives rise to unique organizational and tactical problems, especially in command and control leadership.

Major changes, both conceptual and organizational have occurred since the implementation of the Cloud Concept in late May, and in its execution after 1 September. These changes have brought about a marked decrease in VNN patrol activity. Conceptually, the pre-September operations were aggressive patrols and actions directed against known transshipment locations and choke points. Patrol to prevent trawler infiltration was subordinated to these activities on the basis that if rear service was disrupted, trawler infiltration could not occur. Since the majority of coastal activity within the zone consisted of transshipment, and since long alert periods preceded trawler infiltration attempts, surprise infiltration was thought to be precluded, especially since the most likely infiltration areas coincided with the locations where these aggressive actions were taking place. However, this concept has been replaced by one which assumes that an essentially passive patrol of an area will prevent infiltration of a trawler. Thus, trawler interdiction is now thought to be the principal mission of the zone.

Organizationally, the pre-September operation consisted of a separate staff headed either by a COSFLOT staff officer or the commanding officer of a coastal group. He was afloat and was given the authority to utilize all assets within the zone, combining COSFLOT units with coastal group units at his discretion to conduct direct liaison with district officials for combined operations and for obtaining clearances for operations when required. The zone commander provided general guidance based on review of intelligence and assessment of operations. At the present time, the OTC is the commanding officer of a Fleet Command ship, usually a PGM or LSIL. The guidance he receives consists only of an area assignment and reports to be submitted. He may employ junks only when directed and has no liaison authority. Also, the commanding officer of a small Fleet Command ship rarely exhibits much more leadership ability than a PCF O-in-C; he lacks direct authority over the PCF/WPB, is not well informed on local intelligence, and usually has his hands full running his own ship, and so has little time left for planning other than passive patrol. This is a great detriment in this area where successful inshore patrol is dependent on playing the tides, and in this season, the weather.

Another difficulty in this zone is maintaining adequate communications at the district level. This is important in that the Zone covers a large area, and face to face contact is essential to effective liaison and operational planning. In most cases, the helicopter is the only reasonable method of effecting this liaison. Helicopter services at present are minimal.

Combined operations, because of concept and current helicopter limitations, are now limited to the coastal group in its respective district or