ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM

SUGGESTS THAT THE BASIC OUTLINE OF SOUTH VIETNAM DIRECTIVE 2/73 IS STILL BEING FOLLOWED. THE DIRECTIVE ANNOUNCED THE COMMENCEMENT OF AN ERA OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE WHEREIN MILITARY FORCES PERFORM SECONDARY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. THE MILITARY FORCES ARE TO BE USED TO EXPAND VC PROSELYTING CAPABILITIES, EMASculate GVN MILITARY UNITS, DEFEND LIBERATED AREAS, CONDUCT ASSASSINATIONS, AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR RESETTLEMENT AND REBUILDING PROJECTS. A LATE MARCH DIRECTIVE FROM FRONT 4 IN NORTHERN MR-1 REITERATED THIS GUIDANCE AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN PROSELYTING ACTIVITIES.
ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST ARE CURRENTLY PRESSING THE POLITICAL COURSE OF ACTION, THEY ARE ALSO LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION TO RESUME LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS SHOULD THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE FAIL. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THIS SECOND OPTION AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE, THE COMMUNIST HAVE INCREASED INFILTRATING, REORGANIZING AND INITIATED A TRANSPORTATION OFFENSIVE. THEIR INFILTRATION EFFORT HAS INCLUDED LARGE AMOUNTS OF SUPPLIES, ARTILLERY AMOR AND ARMOUR. TO FACILITATE THIS OPERATION, AND ALSO TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE TERMINATION OF THE U.S. AIR INTERDICATION CAMPAIGN, HANOI HAS ATTEMPTED TO STREAMLINE AND INCREASE EFFICIENCY IN THE REAR SERVICE STRUCTURE.

THE NVA ARE NOW IN THE MIDST OF A GENERAL TRANSPORTATION OFFENSIVE. THE OFFENSIVE STARTED IN MID-MARCH AND IS TO EXTEND THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE DRY SEASON IN LAOS – NEAR THE END OF MAY.
LARGE VOLUMES OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION HAVE BEEN NOTED BEING SHIPPED TO BT-12 IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. BIMTTRAN, A SELF-CONTAINED ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY MACHINES, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STORAGE AND MOVEMENT OF CARGO THROUGH ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE NEXT BIMTTRAN AREA OF OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS LARGE NUMBERS OF TRUCKS TRANSITING THE INFILTRATION ROUTE IN SOUTHERN LAOS. ONE CONVOY NOTED MOVING SOUTH THROUGH LAOS WEST OF THE DMZ IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE CONTAINED OVER 300 TRUCKS. THE NVA ARE WELL TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE BOMBING HALT IN LAOS AS WELL AS THE CURRENT DRY SEASON TO PUSH SUPPLIES SOUTH.

IN THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, MOST GROUPS TRANSITING THE SYSTEM ARE TRAVELING BY VEHICLE, WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASES THE TRAVEL TIME. IN ADDITION, A NEW ELEMENT, THE 574TH COMMO-LIAISON REGIMENT, IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERALL CONTROL OF INFILTRATION. PREVIOUSLY, THE INFIL-
TRATION OF PERSONNEL WAS PERFORMED BY INDIVIDUAL BINH TRAMS.

THE 574TH REGIMENT IS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED IN THE GROUP 472 AREA OF S. LAOS.

NOW THAT THE U.S. BOMBING HAS ENDED, THE NVA CAN CONDUCT LONG-DISTANCE HAULS RATHER THAN THE SHORT SHUTTLING OPERATIONS AS PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED. AS A RESULT, FEWER BINH TRAMS ARE NEEDED. THE EXCESS MANPOWER HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS AAA, INFANTRY AND ENGINEER UNITS. AT LEAST SEVEN BINH TRAMS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED; BT-28 ANO 46 TO AAA REGTS, BT-47 TO AN INFANTRY REGT, AND BT-29, BT-34, BT-35 AND BT-37 TO ENGINEER REGTS.

THE ADDITIONAL ENGINEER UNITS WILL ENHANCE HANOI'S CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN SOME SUPPLY MOVEMENT THROUGH THE LAOS PANHANDLE DURING THE UPCOMING RAINY SEASON.

RECENT PHOTOGRAPHY HAS ALSO NOTED INCREASED ATTEMPTS BY
EN FORCES TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR ROAD NETWORKS FROM SUPPLY AREAS ON THE FRINGES OF SVN TO FORWARD UNITS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT OF FOUR MAJOR ROUTES RUNNING FROM THE DMZ INTO QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES. FARHER SOUTH, ROUTE 534 FROM LAOS TO HIEP DUC HAS BEEN IMPROVED AND HEAVY TRAFFIC NOTED. IN THE B-3 FRONT, EXTENSIVE ROAD WORK HAS BEEN NOTED. THE PATTERN OF EN REPAIR AND IMPROVEMENT IS TO LINK FORWARD UNITS WITH BA 609 AND 702. PHOTOGRAPHY HAS ALSO NOTED AN INCREASED BUILDUP AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE ROAD NETWORK WITHIN TAY NINH PROVINCE, WHERE RECENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT MAJOR COSVN/ SVNLA ELEMENTS ARE RELOCATING.ALTHOUGH THESE ROADS DO NOT HAVE AN ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY, THE TOTAL EFFECT SEEMS TO BE THAT THE COMMUNISTS CAN RELY INCREASINGLY ON VEHICLES TO MOVE SUPPLIES CLOSER TO FORWARD UNITS, AND PERHAPS PARTIALLY ELIMINATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF DISTRIBUTING SUPPLIES FROM BASE AREAS NEAR THE SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER TO
FROM:

TO:

FORWARD UNITS. DURING THE SPRING 1972 OFFENSIVE, THIS PROBLEM OF DISTRIBUTION CAUSED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR THE COMMUNISTS. CONCERNING THE ENEMY INFILTRATION OF WEAPONS, ONLY ONE ADDITIONAL ARMOR GROUP HAS BEEN DETECTED AND ADDED TO OUR ESTIMATE SINCE THE END OF MARCH. NATIONAL IN COUNTRY TOTALS AS OF 1 OCT 72 WERE 100-120 TANKS. INfiltrATION OF 335-360 BRINGS THE CURRENT TOTALS TO 435-480 TANKS IN SVN. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH NO TANK GROUPS HAVE BEEN DETECTED TRANSITING TO THE DMZ AREA, THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MASS OVER A HUNDRED TANKS FROM WITHIN QUANG TRI PROVINCE OR THE NVN SOUTHERN PANHANDLE WITHIN A TWO TO FOUR DAY PERIOD.

ALTHOUGH ALL TANK GROUPS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE ARRIVED AT THEIR RESPECTIVE DESTINATIONS, SOME STRAGGLERS FROM THESE GROUPS CONTINUE TO TRANSIT THE SYSTEM. CONCERNING THE INFILTRATION OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS, NO NEW GROUPS HAVE BEEN DETECTED SINCE THE END OF MARCH.
IN COUNTRY TOTALS AS OF 1 OCT 72 WERE 75-180 x 122/130 MM WEAPONS. THE INFILTRATION OF 165-180 BRINGS THE TOTAL TO 240-280.

CONCERNING THE EN'S EFFORT TO REPLACE PERSONNEL LOSSES, AT X+90 THE 1973 INFILTRATION ESTIMATE STANDS AT 55,600. BASED ON THE DATA RECORDED FOR THE SAME TIME PERIOD LAST YEAR, THE CURRENT ESTIMATE REPRESENTS A 42% NET REDUCTION IN INFILTRATION ACTIVITY.

NO NEW COMBAT GROUPS HAVE ENTERED THE INFILTRATION PIPELINE SINCE 11 MARCH, BUT SPECIAL-PURPOSE GROUPS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS CONTINUE TO BE DETECTED. HANOI IS EVIDENTLY INTENT ON REINFORCING ITS ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS IN THE SOUTH AS 105 SPECIAL-PURPOSE GROUPS WITH ABOUT 3,000 PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN SENT SOUTH SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.

THE LOW NUMBER OF REGULAR INFILTRATION GROUPS DETECTED THIS YEAR, 135, WITH 14 SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, INDICATES THE
ENEMY IS NOT AT THIS TIME ATTEMPTING TO REBUILD HIS DEPLETED FORCES TO A STRENGTH POSTURE EQUAL TO THAT ATTAINED FOR THE 1972 OFFENSIVE.

IN ADDITION, RECENT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT AT LEAST IN MR-1, THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO ROTATE HIS UNITS BACK TO NVN FOR REST, REGROUPING AND REFITTING, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING THESE ACTIVITIES WHILE THE UNITS REMAIN COMMITTED. THE ENEMY HAS APPARENTLY DEPLOYED ELEMENTS OF THREE INFANTRY DIVISIONS, THE 304TH, 308TH AND 312TH NVA DIVISIONS, FROM QUANG TRI PROVINCE BACK TO NORTH VIETNAM. THE ENEMY'S INTENTION IS PROBABLY TO RE-ESTABLISH A MOBILE/STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCE, WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. ASSUMING THESE DIVISIONS FOLLOW PAST PATTERNS, THE 304TH AND 312TH DIVS WILL RETURN TO THE NVN PANHANDLE WHILE THE 308TH APPARENTLY WILL REMAIN IN HANOI AREA. THESE WITHDRAWALS WERE PROBABLY LIMITED TO HEADQUARTERS AND CADRE PERSONNEL, WITH
SUBORDINATE UNITS LEFT BEHIND. EVEN UNDER OPTIMUM CONDITIONS, THESE UNITS WOULD NOT BE READY TO BE RECOMMITTED UNTIL THE END OF MAY. IT NORMALLY TAKES A NVA DIVISION APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS TO REBUILD, RESUPPLY, REFIT AND RETRAIN. FURTHERMORE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ELEMENTS OF THESE DIVISIONS TO SVN PROBABLY INDICATES THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN NORTHERN MR-1 IS NOT PLANNED AT THIS TIME. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THESE UNITS BACK TO SVN WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A SOLID INDICATOR OF SUCH INTENTION.

(SECRET) THE CURRENT DAO ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTHS THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC IS 14 DIVISIONS AND 65 REGTS. COMBAT PERSONNEL:

- 100-125,000; GUERRILLAS: 20-34,000; ADMIN SERVICES: 60-75,000; FOR A TOTAL IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH OF 180-234,000.

IN ADDITION TO THE INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES, PERSONNEL, ARMOR AND ARTILLERY, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAVE REVEALED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN THE REHABILITATION OF
SEVERAL AIRFIELDS IN ENEMY-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE AIRSTRIPS AT THE KHE SANH AND DAK TO (PHUONG HOANG) ARE OPERATIONAL, WHILE AGENT AND PHOTOGRAPHIC REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE AIRSTRIPS AT KHAM DUC, HIEP DUC, BEN HET, DUC CO, LOC NINH AND KATUM HAVE MARGINAL SERVICEABILITY WITH SOME UNDER-GOING LIMITED REPAIRS. THE OVERALL INTENT OF THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS ON UPGRADING THESE AIRFIELDS CAN ONLY BE TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO OPERATE NVN AIRCRAFT IN SVN. AT PRESENT, KHE SANH APPEARS TO BE THE MOST LIKELY AIRSTRIP FOR UTILIZATION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THERE IS SUFFICIENT AIR DEFENSE PROTECTION AT KHE SANH TO PROTECT AGAINST ATTACKS BY VNAF. ADDITIONALLY, A GCI SITE, WHICH RELOCATED FROM LAOS, MAY PROVIDE A GCI FUNCTION FOR FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE, AT PRESENT, TO INDICATE THAT THE NVA ARE BUILDING POL AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS. ALSO, ADDITIONAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
WOULD BE NEEDED SHOULD THE NVAF DESIRE AN ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY. AT PRESENT, ALL THESE AIRFIELDS ARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING AT LEAST THE AN-2, WITH MOST BEING CAPABLE OF HANDLING IL-12 AND IL-14 TRANSPORTS. WITH PROPER RESURFACING, THE STRIPS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE MOST MIG AIRCRAFT: HOWEVER FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM THESE RUNWAYS AT THEIR PRESENT LENGTHS WOULD BE CONSTRAINED BY THE NECESSITY FOR REDUCED FUEL AND ARMAMENT LOADS.

IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE NVA/VC UTILIZATION OF THESE STRIPS PROBABLY WILL BE LIMITED TO THE MOVEMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL AND AERIAL RESUPPLY.
THE NEED FOR CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN FLIGHT CONTROL FACILITIES WOULD PROHIBIT THE PRACTICAL UTILIZATION OF THESE FIELDS BY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. LIMITED AAA PROTECTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES, AS WELL AS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RVNAF OPERATIONS, WOULD ALSO SERVE TO LIMIT AIR OPERATIONS.

SINCE THE PRG/DRV DID NOT HAVE ANY AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED PRIOR TO THE CEASEFIRE, THEY WOULD BE VIOLATING THE PARIS AGREEMENT BY ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE AIRCRAFT NOW. HOWEVER, ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE ENTRANCE OF A FOREIGN AIR FORCE (NVAF) WITHIN GVN TERRITORY WOULD PROBABLY BE FUTILE. THE PRG WOULD ASSERT THAT THESE AIRCRAFT BELONG TO THEM RATHER THAN THE DRV, AND DISPROVING THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. AGENT REPORTS HAVE MENTIONED PRG PLANS TO CHOOSE DISTINCTIVE COLORS FOR MARKING "PRG" AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS REPORTS ABOUT VC TRAINING OF HELICOPTER PILOTS.