SINCE LAST MONTH'S UPDATE, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE 324TH, 396TH, AND 3243 DIVISIONS. THE STRENGTHS OF THE 394TH AND 362TH DIVISIONS HAVE BOTH INCREASED TO 8,200 FROM 7,700 AND 5,600 RESPECTIVELY, BECAUSE THESE UNITS HAVE REDEPLOYED INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO REBUILD. THE 3243 DIVISION HAS ALSO BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF AUGMENTING ITS STRENGTH AND HAS PROBABLY INCREASED ITS MAY STRENGTH OF 4,700 TO 8,200, THE LEVEL AT WHICH IT ENTERED THE SPRING 1972 OFFENSIVE.

IN REAR SERVICE ACTIVITY, A SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT IS EMERGING IN THE ENEMY'S RESUPPLY EFFORT. THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY APPEARS TO BE ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE LOGISTICS NETWORK. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, AN INTERIOR ROAD NETWORK HAS BEEN CREATED INSIDE THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS ROAD SYSTEM, DESIGNATED ROUTE 14 BY THE NVA, REPRESENTS AN EASTWARD SHIFT FROM THE LACS-BASED REAR SERVICE NETWORK. THIS NEW SYSTEM HAS THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING A MAJOR CONDUIT FOR MAN AND MATERIAL FROM NORTH VIETNAM AS FAR SOUTH AS PLEIKU PROVINCE.

IN CREATING THIS SYSTEM, THE ENEMY HAS BUILT NEW ROADS AND REPAIRED OLD ONES. FURTHER NVA/VQ ROAD CONSTRUCTION IS ANTICIPATED WITHIN NS'S I, II, AND III, ALREADY, INFILTRATION OF
25. (CONFIDENTIAL) THE ENEMY USES TWO MAJOR INFILTRATION SYSTEMS INTO MR-1. THE FIRST RUNS DIRECTLY FROM NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH THE DMZ INTO QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND INCLUDES ROUTES 12, 13, 126, 133, 132, AND ONE OTHER UNDESIGNATED ROUTE. THE SECOND SYSTEM CONNECTS THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL IN LAOS AT VARIOUS POINTS ACROSS THE LAO-VIET BORDER INTO THE FOUR NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES. THESE INCLUDE ROUTES 925, 9, 926, AND 9222 INTO QUANG TRI, ROUTE 922 INTO THUA THIEN, 614 TO QUANG NAM, AND ROUTES 966, 9661, AND 9662 INTO QUANG TIN.

26. (CONFIDENTIAL) AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SINCE THE CEASEFIRE
ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED UTILIZATION OF THIS INFILTRATION NETWORK, PARTICULARLY THOSE PORTIONS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, HEAVY MOVEMENT HAS BEEN NOTED ALONG A 25 KM STRETCH OF QL-1 FROM GIO LINH TO QUANG TRI CITY, ALONG A NETWORK TOTALLING 83 KM FROM THE LAOS NORTH BORDER WEST OF THE SANN TO THE SANN TO DON HAI, ALONG A 15 KM STRETCH OF ROUTE 546 SOUTHWEST FROM QUANG TRI CITY, AND ALONG AN 83 KM STRETCH OF QL-1 FROM THE LAOS BORDER RUNNING SOUTH OF THE SANN TO THE THUA THIEN BORDER. INTENSE VEHICLE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE ALONG A 71 KM STRETCH OF ROUTE 540, ALONG A 15 KM PORTION OF QL-7 FROM THE A SHAU VALLEY TO THE VICINITY OF FSB VEHICLES AND ALONG A 25 KM STRETCH OF WIRAM FROM THE A SHAU ACROSS THE MOUNTAINS TO THE VIC OF FSB MAIYEN.

27. (CONFIDENTIAL) NEWLY BUILT ROAD SECTIONS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED BY AERIAL PHOTOS. RECENT USAF RECON INDICATES ATTEMPTS ARE BEING MADE TO CONNECT THESE NEW SECTIONS AND THEY WILL EVENTUALLY LINK-UP WITH THE REST OF THE ROAD NETWORK.

RECENTLY COMPLETED ROAD CONSTRUCTION INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY 25 KM OF DIRT ROADS IN SOUTHWESTERN QUANG TRI AND WESTERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. NEW CONSTRUCTION ALSO CENTERED IN AREAS TO THE WEST OF BA GIA, NORTH OF BA TO, AND NORTHWEST OF HAN DUC.

28. (CONFIDENTIAL) REPAIR OF OLD ROUTES IS BEING CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT MR-1, PARTICULARLY ON QL-1, QL-9, AND ROUTES 556, AND 557, LEADING TO QUANG TRI CITY. IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, ROADS LINKING SEVERAL BASE AREAS ARE UNDER REPAIR.

29. (CONFIDENTIAL) ENEMY LOGISTIC ACTIVITY IN MR-1 APPEARS AIMED AT CONSOLIDATING COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS BY IMPROVING INTERNAL LOC'S AND PROVIDING BASES FOR POSSIBLE ATTACKS AGAINST THE COASTAL LOWLANDS, PARTICULARLY IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES. AS NOTED BY RMAF IN THEIR LOC STUDY,
THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED ROUTES IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS OF QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES ARE IMPORTANT STRATEGIC ROUTES, WHICH CAN INFLUENCE THE SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI AND NORTHERN BINH DINH PROVINCES.

30. (C) MAJOR ACTIVITY IN MR-2 IS CENTERED IN KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC AND BINH DINH PROVINCES. THE ENEMY HAS EXPANDED ROAD NETWORKS INTO NEW AREAS AND FACILITATED HIS CONTROL AND MOVEMENT IN OCCUPIED AREAS BY IMPROVING INTERNAL LOGS TO INFILTRATE MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM MR-1, THE COMMUNISTS USE CL-14 IN THE HIGHLANDS, AND ROUTES 514 AND 515 FROM QUANG NGAI INTO BINH DINH ON THE COAST.

31. (C) FROM LAOS, ROUTES 512, 96, 114, 509/613 AND 19 RUN THROUGH BA 905, 701 AND 762 WHICH ARE ON THE WESTERN BORDERS OF KONTUM AND PLEIKU PROVINCES. HEAVY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED ALONG THESE SUPPLY ROUTES.

32. (C) WITHIN KONTUM, HEAVY MOVEMENTS OF SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN NOTED ON ROUTES 572, 14 AND 511, WHICH LEAD TO ENEMY FORWARD STAGING AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF KONTUM CITY. WITHIN PLEIKU, ARTERIAL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON ROUTES 615, NEAR BA 702 AND ALONG ROUTE 79 NEAR DUC CO ON THE COAST. HEAVY ACTIVITY
USSAG FOR II-ING; AMBASSADY FOR MR. BENNETT AND MR. FOLGAR.

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(CONT.)

 HAS OCCURRED ALONG ROUTE 914 INTO THE AN LO VALLEY, AND
ALONG TL-3, WHICH RUNS WEST OF BA 226, AND EVENTUALLY MEETS
CL-10 NEAR THE AN KHE PASS. MUCH OF THIS HEAVY ACTIVITY HAS
BEEN LOCATED NEAR AREAS OF NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION.

33. (C) NEW ROADS COMPLETED AND THOSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN
MR-2 PROVIDE THE ENEMY WITH ADDITIONAL ARTERIES FOR SOLIDIFY-
ING HIS CONTROL OVER AREAS HE HOLDS AND EXPANDING INTO NEW
AREAS. THE NEW ROADS WILL ALLOW THE ENEMY GREATER ACCESS
TO KONTUM AND PHU OI PROVS. THE LOGISTICAL MOVEMENTS TO
AREAS IN AND AROUND THESE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS WILL BE GREATLY
FACILITATED BY NEW ROUTES SUCH AS THE ONE THAT LINKS ROUTES
819 NEAR BA 722 AND ROUTE 511 LEADING INTO KONTUM. NEW ROADS
HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED ON THE SOUTHERN END OF THE ROAD FROM TAN PHU TO CHAN TIEU. A SOUTHERN ROUTE FROM BA 128 LEADING TOWARDS TL-3 WILL EVENTUALLY OFFER GREATER ACCESS.
LEAVING TOWARDS TL-3 WILL EVENTUALLY OFFER GREATER ACCESS TO CL-19. MEANWHILE, OTHER ROUTES OUT OF BA 128 WILL PROBABLY JOIN ROADS UNDER CONSTRUCTION NEAR SA HUYNH AND ROUTE 577, thus providing improved LOC'S WITHIN SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI.

34. (C) ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN TARLAC PROVINCE FROM BASE AREA 702 MAY EVENTUALLY EXTEND INTO MR-3, PROVIDING THE ENEMY AN INTERNAL NORTH-SOUTH INFILTRATION ROUTE INTO COSVN.

35. (C) IN SUMMARY, ENEMY ROAD ACTIVITY IN MR-2 APPEARS AIMED AT IMPROVING AND EXPANDING INTERNAL LOC'S IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ENEMY CONTROL IN AREAS HE HOLDS, AS WELL AS BEING OF GREAT VALUE IN PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE ATTACKS AGAINST PLEIKU OR KONTUM CITIES AND THE LOWLANDS IN BINH DINH.

36. (CONFIDENTIAL) MOST OF THE INFILTRATION ROUTES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE COMMUNISTS WITHIN MR-III ARE LOCATED IN PHUOC LONG, BINH LONG AND TAY NINH PROVINCES.


38. (CONFIDENTIAL) NEW DIRT ROADS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED BY THE ENEMY WITHIN BINH LONG AND TAY NINH PROVS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE. A SERIES OF NEW ROADS LEADING FROM FISHHOOK/BA 728 VICINITY CONNECT WITH ROUTE 246, WHICH RUNS EAST AND WEST IN NORTHERN TAY NINH. TOKLE CHAM SITS ON ROUTE 246 WHERE IT NEARS THE BINH LONG BORDER, AND RVNAF, DEFENDERS

at the camp have reported truck traffic along this road.
Another road, 24 km long, crosses the Cambodian border into Bình Long province south of Đa 712, runs SW towards the Log Thanh plantation, and finally connects with QL-13 approximately 8 km north of Log Minh. Additionally, a returnee has reported that a new route has been built, running from the Cambodian border near Route 13 all the way to War Zone D. This report, plus other intelligence, suggest that the enemy may be expanding his use of War Zone D as a major support base for operations in Eastern Military Region III.

33. (Confidential) Air reconnaissance and imagery interpretation information confirms that enemy use of the routes in MR III has increased greatly, especially in Bình Long and Tây Ninh provinces. Routes located in the Michelin plantation area. Bình Dương, also have been heavily used.

45. (CONFIDENTIAL) Enemy logistic intention in MR III appear to be aimed at projecting his military power ever closer to Saigon, strengthening his control in areas vacated by ARVN and establishing forward base areas.
USSAG FOR DI-INOE, AMBASSADY FOR MRT. BENNETT AND MRT. POLGAR.

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(CONTWJD)

41. (S) IN ENEMY AIR AND AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITY, A GRADUAL SOUTHERLY EXTENSION OF THE NORTH VIETNAM AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.

42. WE HAVE SEEN AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH IN THIS ACTIVITY. NEWLY ARRIVED UNITS, OR THOSE CONVERTED FROM REAR SERVICE UNITS, HAVE DISPLACED SOME OF THE OLDER UNITS, ALLOWING THE LATTER TO DEPLOY FURTHER SOUTH. THE RESULTING GAPS HAVE BEEN FILLED BY RESHUFFLING AIR DEFENSE ASSETS CURRENTLY ON HAND IN THE AFFECTED AREAS.

AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO WERE EVACUATED TO NORTH VIETNAM LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH STILL ON A RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE, THE RESETTLEMENT IN THESE AREAS BY THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM THE PROVINCES JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ PROBABLY CONTINUES. COMINT OR EARLY MAY HAS INDICATED THAT OVER 3,200 PEOPLE, WITH FURNITURE AND TOOLS, DEPARTED FROM THE 3 SOUTHERNMOST PROVINCES IN NVN TO THE DMZ AREAALW WITH OVER 400 SCHEDULED TO GO TO GIA Lihn. IN THUA THIEN, 1,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS REPORTEDLY HAVE ARRIVED IN THE A SHAU VALLEY AREA. QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN, BEING NEAREST TO THE LOGISTICAL AND POPULATION RESOURCES OF NVN, WILL PROBABLY SHOW THE LARGEST INITIAL GAINS IN NORTH VIETNAMESE RESETTLERS. HOWEVER, LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS WILL PROBABLY HINDER THE MASSIVE RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS FROM NVN AT THIS TIME. ULTIMATELY, THE RICHER VALLEYS OF THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES WILL MOST LIKELY SUPPORT THE LARGEST POPULATION.

49. (SECRET) IN WESTERN QUANG NAM, NEW SETTLEMENTS AND VILLAGES