SUBJECT: USDAO SAIGON MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE (MIEU)


2. (SECRET) DURING THE PAST MONTH THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY WILL SOON RENEW THE MAIN FORCE WAR. IN FACT, SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE "NEW" CEASEFIRE ON 15 JUNE, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN DEEMPHASIZING THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY IS PREPARED TO REACT TO RWN INITIATIVES.
3. (SECRET) THIS UPDATE OF THE DAO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

A. NVN MIG ACTIVITY
B. COMMUNIST AIRFIELDS IN SVN
C. COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE SVN
D. ENEMY INFILTRATION
E. LOGISTICAL ACTIVITY
F. ORDER OF BATTLE
G. ARTILLERY THREAT
H. EFFECTS OF NEW CEASEFIRE
I. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
J. CONCLUSION

4. (SECRET) IN REGARD TO NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG ACTIVITY, THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD AFFECT SOUTH VIETNAM. DURING THE WEEK OF 17-23 JUNE 153 MIG COMBAT-RELATED TRAINING FLIGHTS WERE NOTED. THIS FAR EXCEEDS THE NUMBER OF SUCH FLIGHTS FOR ANY SIMILAR PERIOD SINCE THE 23 JANUARY CEASEFIRE. THE LARGEST NUMBER OF FLIGHTS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED WAS 80 DURING A WEEK IN LATE MARCH. THESE TRAINING FLIGHTS INCLUDED MIG NAVIGATIONAL FLIGHTS TO THE BAI THUONG AREA. BETWEEN 18 AND 22 JUNE, PHUC YEN AND KEP BASED MIGS MADE 14 FLIGHTS TO THE VICINITY OF BAI THUONG AND RETURNED TO THEIR BASES. PRIOR TO THIS PERIOD, THE LAST SUCH FLIGHTS WERE ON 1 JUNE. NO MIGS HAVE BEEN DETECTED FURTHER SOUTH THAN 40 KMS SOUTH OF BAI THUONG SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.

5. (SECRET) THE HIGH LEVEL OF MIG TRAINING AND THE 21 JUNE RETURN OF AT LEAST 10 MIG-17S TO NVN FROM CHINA UPGRADES THE MIG FORCE IN BOTH QUALITY AND QUANTITY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF AN IMPENDING SOUTHWARD DEPLOYMENT, BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS COULD PERTEND THE BASING OF FIGHTERS AT SOUTHERN AIRFIELDS, A MOVE WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE NVN'S CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTH.
SECRET CONCERNING COMMUNIST AIRFIELDS IN THE SOUTH.

NORTH VIETNAM PRESENTLY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING: KHE SANH, CA LU, BONG HA, KHAN DUC, BEN HET, BAK TO, DUC CO, BU PRANG, LOC NINH, THIEN NEON, KATUM AND MINH THANH.

While no instances of actual airfield use have been noted in or photography, there have been occasional references to planned flight activity.

7. (SECRET) The principal airfield renovation effort in SVN is at Khe Sanh in MR-1. This field has been rebuilt and the runway currently has a length of 4,300 ft. It is considered sufficient for all NVA transports and some jet fighter aircraft. Although they might be limited to reduced armament and/or fuel loads, some limited support capability has been noted.

8. (CONFIDENTIAL) Additionally, the airfields at Ca Lu and Bong Ha are being repaired: with present runway lengths sufficient to accommodate some transports.

9. (CONFIDENTIAL) The field at Khan Duc is not being repaired or rebuilt but does have the capability of accommodating some light transport aircraft.

10. (CONFIDENTIAL) In MR-2 and MR-3, the runways of all the enemy held fields are of sufficient length to accommodate most NVA transport aircraft. The fields in MR-3 could be used to support Communist activity throughout the northern portion of the MR.

11. (SECRET) The overall effect of the renovation of these airfields will be to provide NVA/PRG forces within one logistical support and permit the movement of VIP's from one PRG controlled area to another.

12. (SECRET) In a related development, there are continuing indications that NVN is expanding its SAM defense capabilities in SVN. Both the 275th SAM regt and the 236th SAM regt have indicated they were moving to new locations, possibly southward. The 275th was located near Dong Tam, N VN on 31 May. One of its subordinate units indicated it was in a travel status of 15 June. The Dong Tam

COMMUNIST AAA DEFENSES HAVE ALSO BEEN IMPROVED IN COUNTRY WITH THE ADDITION OF THOSE AAA REGIMENTS (44TH, 218TH,...)
AND 593RD) IN RECENT MONTHS IN MR'S 2 AND 3. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WITH A BUILDUP IN AAA UNITS IN SOUTHERN SVN, A DIVISION LEVEL AUTHORIT Y MAY BE ORGANIZED TO ASSUME CONTROL OVER AAA OPERATIONS, JUST AS THE 673RD AD DIVISION HAS DONE IN QUANG TRI. THE 377TH AD DIV, PRESENTLY LOCATED AT TCHEPONE, LAOS, COULD MOVE SOUTH AND ASSUME TACTICAL CONTROL OF AAA UNITS IN SOUTHERN LAOS AS WELL AS THOSE IN MR'S 2 AND 3, SVN.

20. (SECRET ) THEIR OVERALL EFFECT OF THE EXPANSION OF THE ENEMY'S AAA DEFENSES IS TO EXTEND THE HIGH THREAT THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS IN NORTHERN MR-1 INTO THE TRI BORDER OF RVN MR-2, LAOS AND NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA.

21. (SECRET ) IN INFILTRATION ACTIVITY, NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES TO SEND REPLACEMENTS SOUTH, BUT IN GREATLY REDUCED NUMBERS SINCE THE JAN CEASEFIRE. ONLY TWENTY SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUPS WERE DETECTED DURING JUNE, MARKING THE LOWEST NUMBER OF NVA INFILTRATORS DETECTED PER MONTH THIS YEAR. INFILTRATION ESTIMATES FOR 1973 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DMZ/MRTTH</th>
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<th>3-3 FRONT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN 1990</td>
<td>1600</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1400</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>19900</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>10800</td>
<td>25800</td>
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22. (SECRET ) OVERALL, INFILTRATION US DOWN 37 PER CENT FROM THAT OF LAST YEAR. THE RECENT ABSENCE OF REGULAR UNFILTRATION GROUPS INDICATES THE COMMUNISTS ARE STILL NOT ATTEMPTING TO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THEIR INFANTRY STRENGTHS IN THE SOUTH OF THE TOTAL NUMBER INFILTRATED, 48,000 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS POSSIBLE INFANTRY REPLACEMENTS. THE CURRENT DAO INFILTRATION ESTIMATE, COMPARED WITH THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD FOR 1972, IS AS FOLLOWS:
AREA      1972      1973
DNZ/NRTTH  18000     19900
B-3 FRONT  3500      10800
MR-5       15600     3800
COS VN     42100     25800

23. (SECRET) THE COMMUNISTS ARE CONTINUING TO DEVELOP THEIR
RT 473 COMPLEX. A NEW COMM-O-LIAISON REGT, THE 572 ND, HAS BEEN
IDENTIFIED IN THE GROUP 473 AREA OF OPERATIONS. IN EARLY JUNE,
GP 473 REPORTED THAT THERE WERE TEN COMM-O-LIAISON STATIONS LOCATED
ALONG ROUTE 24 BETWEEN THE KHE SANH AND KHAM DUC AREAS.

24. (SECRET) ALSO IN EARLY JUNE THE HQ 974TH COMM-O-LIAISON
REGION MOVED ITS BASE OF OPERATIONS FROM CENTRAL LAOS TO NEAR THE
SOUTHERN TERMINUS OF ROUTE 14 AND THE HQ GP 470, AND NOW CONTROLS
INFEITRATION GROUPS MOVING WITHIN THIS AREA OF THE RUN. AN
UNIDENTIFIED COMM-LIAISON REGT OPERATES IN THE GP 472 AO OF
SOUTHERN LAOS. THE SHIFT OF EMPHASIS AWAY FROM THE LAOS LOGISTICS
CORRIDORS TO ONE IN RUN WILL AFFORD THE ENEMY A DRY ALTERNATE
ROUTE TO THE ONES IN LAOS DURING THE RAINY SEASON AND PROVIDE
A SHORTER SECURE ROUTE CLOSE TO THE "BATTLE FRONT".

25. (SECRET) THE FVA HAS RESUMED THE INFILTRATION OF ARTILLERY
GROUPS FOLLOWING A FIVE MONTH LAPSE. TWO GROUPS (5058 AND 5059)
TRANSMITTED THE BAN KABAI PASS IN LATE JUNE. GROUP 5056 PROBABLY
TRANSMITTED THE SYSTEM UNDETECTED AND WAS ADDED TO OUR ESTIMATE
BY GAP FILL METHODOLOGY. THE FOLLOWING IS THE CURRENT DAO ESTIMATE
OF COMMUNIST ARTILLERY DESTINED FOR OR DEPLOYED IN RUN. (IT DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE NEW DETECTIONS (14 GUNS) BECAUSE THEIR DESIGNATIONS
ARE STILL NOT KNOWN)

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<th>AREA</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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26. (SECRET) NO REGULAR ARMOR INFILTRATION GROUPS WERE DETECTED
MOVING IN THE SYSTEM IN JUNE; HOWEVER, COMINT INDICATED ARMOR MOVE-
MENTS IN RUN AND 14 TANKS WERE PHOTOGRAPHED ENTERING THE LAOS
LOGISTICS CORRIDOR IN EARLY JUNE. AGAIN, ULTIMATE DESTINATIONS
ARE UNKNOWN AND THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE OF
NVA ARMOR IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

<table>
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<th>AREA</th>
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<th>TOTALS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>180-200</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100-120</td>
<td>345-370</td>
<td>445-490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TO VIGOROUSLY RESIST ANY GVN ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND ITS CONTROL.

CONSEQUENTLY COMBAT ACTIVITY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE IN AREAS WHERE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED AND OPPOSING INTERESTS CLASH.

23. (SECRET) THE CURRENT DAO ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS OVER THE NEAR TERM IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE MEN AND MATERIAL INTO RVN TO SUPPORT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND SUPPORT FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

B. EXCEPT FOR MRTH IN NORTHERN MR-1, THE NVA HAS NOT YET INFILTRATED SUFFICIENT INFANTRY REPLACEMENTS TO RAISE MANEUVER UNITS TO THE LEVEL OF STRENGTH NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AND SUSTAIN A MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE.

C. THE ENEMY IS RAPIDLY STOCKPILING SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO IMPROVE HIS LOGISTICS POSTURE THROUGHOUT RVN.

D. THE COMMUNISTS WILL NOT LAUNCH SUSTAINED COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

E. THE COMMUNIST WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT "POLITICAL WARFARE" WHILE MAINTAINING AN AGGRESSIVE DEFENSE. THEY WILL SELECTIVELY USE MILITARY FORCE TO SUPPORT "POLITICAL WARFARE" AND IMPROVE AND FACILITATE AREA AND POPULATION CONTROL.
CONTINUED A HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY.

DESPITE A "NEW" CEASEFIRE THE RVN INITIATED A "TRANSPORTATION OFFENSIVE" IN NORTH AND NORTHERN MR"S IN ORDER TO REPLENISH DEPLETED MILITARY STOCKPILES. THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO LAST THROUGH THE END OF JUNE. TO SUPPORT THE OFFENSIVE, HQ Binh Tran 42 RETURNED TO RVN AND MOVED DOWN RT 14 INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY. AT LEAST THREE TRANSPORTATION REGIMENTS (THE 27TH, 32 ND AND 33RD) ARE CURRENTLY PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION ALONG THE NORTHERN PART OF RT 14. IN ADDITION THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MOVED THREE MAJOR STORAGE FACILITIES FROM LAOS INTO MR"S POSSIBLY TO THE RT 14 AREA.


IN OTHER REAR SERVICE ACTIVITIES DURING JUNE, LOC IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUED IN RVN AND LAOS. SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WERE MADE TO MEET SEASONAL AND OPERATIONAL DEMANDS. COMMUNIST FORCES IN CAMBODIA CONTINUED TO RECEIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM NVA UNITS AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS OF RVN CONTINUED.

A RECENT DIA STUDY ASSESSED THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN A MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM BASED UPON ENEMY REAR SERVICE SHIPMENTS FOR THE 1972-73 DRY SEASON. THE STUDY CONCLUDED THAT AS OF THE END OF THE DRY SEASON (END OF MAY 1973), REAR SERVICE UNITS HAD MOVED SUPPLIES IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES INTO SOUTHERN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM TO SUPPORT COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN RVN AT ANY TIME.
16 MONTHS. FURTHER, SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES TO EXECUTE THIS MILITARY OPTION WOULD BE IN PLACE IN OR ADJACENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM BY THE END OF JULY 1973.