
33. (SECRET) THE MAIN LINE IN LAOS COULD EASILY BE EXTENDED INTO CAMBODIA. ALL OF THE COMPLETED LINES CONSIST OF FOUR INCH DIAMETER PIPE HAVING A DAILY CAPACITY OF 1,100 METRIC TONS (1210 SHORT TONS).

34. (SECRET) WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY COMBAT THREAT HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED OVER THE PAST MONTH. THE ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH BY DIVISION IS AS FOLLOWS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>30 MAR 73</th>
<th>30 MAY 73</th>
<th>30 JUNE 73</th>
<th>NET DIFFERENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>-1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>8510</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>5600</td>
<td>-2900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>324A</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>8000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>711</td>
<td>6100</td>
<td>4600</td>
<td>4600</td>
<td>-1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5600</td>
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<td>4510</td>
<td>-1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>320 (-1)</td>
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<td>4000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>-1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STRENGTHS ADJUSTED TO REFLECT ONLY TWO REGIMENTS.

35. (SECRET) THE UPWARD CHANGES IN STRENGTHS FROM 30 MAY TO 30 JUNE OF THE 325TH, 326TH, 2ND, 16TH, 7TH, 9TH AND 5TH DIVISIONS REFLECT ADJUSTMENTS MADE AFTER A RECENT CONFERENCE WITH THE J-2.
36. (SECRET) THE TOTAL THREAT WITHIN THE REPUBLIC IS AS FOLLOWS:

NOTE: USSAG CARRIES FOUR ADDITIONAL REGIMENTS IN MR1-27TH INDEPENDENT REGT AND THREE REGIMENTS OF 312TH NVA DIVISION

A. MR-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>REGIMENTS</th>
<th>COMBAT PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GUERRILLA</th>
<th>ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52-62,000</td>
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B. MR-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>REGIMENTS</th>
<th>COMBAT PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GUERRILLA</th>
<th>ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25-35,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. MR-3

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<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>REGIMENTS</th>
<th>COMBAT PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GUERRILLA</th>
<th>ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15-20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. MR-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>REGIMENTS</th>
<th>COMBAT PERSONNEL</th>
<th>GUERRILLA</th>
<th>ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15-20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. TOTAL IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH

| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
37. (SECRET) CHANGES IN ORDER OF BATTLE HAVE OCCURRED ONLY IN MR-1. THE WHOLE 344TH NVA DIVISION IS NOW CARRIED IN COUNTRY.

FURTHER ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT THE 274TH REGIMENTBAT FRONT PROBABLY REMAINS JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ AND HAS NOT BEEN COMMITTED INTO QUANG TRI. IN SOUTHERN MR-1 THE 459TH AND 5TH SAPPER REGTs WERE DROPPED FROM THE OB, AND THEIR SUBORDINATE BATTALIONS WERE REASSIGNED TO OTHER VC MR-5 UNITS.

39. (SECRET) CONCERNING THE THREAT IN THE VICINITY OF PLEIKU CITY,
THE ENEMY CURRENTLY HAS OR COULD GAIN ACCESS TO THREE AREAS, ALL
OF WHICH ARE WITHIN 25 KM OF THE CITY. THESE AREAS CAN BE
REACHED AND RESUPPLIED VIA SEVERAL EXISTING ROUTES. AREA 1 IS IN
THE VICINITY OF PLEI MRONG ON THE PLEIKU/KONTUM BORDER AND IS
ACCESSIBLE TO THE ENEMY VIA ROUTES 110, 617, 511, AND SECONDARY
ROUTE 613 FROM THE TRI-BORDER AREA. AREAS 2 AND 3 NORTHWEST
AND SOUTHWEST OF THANH AN, RESPECTIVELY, ARE TERMINALS FOR A
SECOND SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES ROUTES 615, 567, AND 19 FROM THE
KHMER AND THE TRI-BORDER AREAS. MOST OF THESE ROUTES WILL SUPPORT
VEHICULAR TRAFFIC YEAR-ROUND.
SECRET IN MR-3 POTENTIAL 422/430 TARGETS IN THE TAY HINH AND SAIGON/BIEU HOA AREAS WOULD BE WITHIN RANGE OF FIELD GUNS

- FIRING FROM FIVE AREAS: ACCESS TO THESE AREAS COULD BE GAINED VIA SEVERAL KNOWN INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THE VICINITY OF TAY HINH.
- AREA 1 LOCATED EAST OF BASE AREA 354 AND AREA 2 LOCATED WITHIN BASE AREA 355 ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE FROM THE SHOUL AREA OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC VIA ROUTES 24, 25, 7, 4 AND SEVERAL SECONDARY ROADS. MOST OF THESE ROADS ARE PAVED OR HAVE BEEN RECENTLY REPAIRED. TRAFFIC HAS INTENSIFIED IN THESE AREAS SINCE FEBRUARY AND MARCH OF THIS YEAR. AREA 3, LOCATED WITHIN BASE AREA 359 NORTH OF BIEU HOA, AND AREA 4, NORTHWEST OF BIEU HOA, ARE ACCESSIBLE OVER TWO ROAD NETWORKS: CONSISTING OF RTS 1A, 1 A, AND 322, ALSO ORIGINATING IN THE VICINITY OF SHOUL AND RUNNING THROUGH LOC NINH. THESE ROADS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED BY THE ENEMY DURING THE PAST YEAR. AREA 5, IN THE IRON TRANGLE NORTHWEST OF PHU CUONG, IS REACHED VIA INTERPROVINCIAL ROUTE 1. A POTENTIAL EXTENSION OF THE SYSTEM SUPPORTING AREA 2 EAST OF TAY HINH.

However: This segment is under GVN control, as are areas 4 and 5.

41. SECRET CONCERNING COMMUNIST ACTIVITY SINCE THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF 15 JUNE: NO OVERT COMMUNIST LAND GRAB HAS OCCURRED.

- COMBAT ACTIVITY PEAKED ON 15-16 JUNE AND HAS GRADUALLY DECREASED SINCE THEN, EXCEPT IN KONTUM, QUANG NAM, AND CHUONG THIEN PROVINCES.

42. SECRET ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS THAT NO LAND GRAB HAS OCCURRED. SINCE SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO CURRENT COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE COMMUNISTS HAD CHOSEN TO INITIATE A LAND GRAB SIMILAR TO THOSE OF FEBRUARY, THE GVN PROBABLY COULD HAVE MAINTAINED IT AND MIGHT VERY WELL HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO FURTHER IMPROVE GVN CONTROL. ALSO, RAF MIGHT HAVE USED THIS SITUATION TO BOMB MAJOR COMMUNIST LOGISTICS AREAS SUCH AS DONG HA IN MR-1 OR NORTHERN TAY HINH. THE BASIC GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY COSVN DIRECTIVE 2/75 WHICH SIGNALLED A CHANGE FROM HEAVY MILITARY
CONDUCTING A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN: STILL REMAINS IN EFFECT. FURTHERMORE, A NEW COSVN DIRECTIVE 3/73, ISSUED IN EARLY JUNE, DIRECTED STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND PLACED RENEWED EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. REBUILDING OF THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IS TO BE ACCORDED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. FOLLOWED BY PROSPECTING AND IMPROVING CONJOINT OF LIBERATED AREAS. OPERATIONALLY,

"TO STRICTLY OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE" ONLY MEANS THAT THE ENEMY WILL NOT INITIATE LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVES. THE "POLITICAL STRUGGLE" HOWEVER, INCLUDES PROPAGANDA SUPPORTED BY SAPPER ATTACKS ON GVN OUTPOSTS, DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL GVN SUPPLIES (LONG Binh AMMO STORAGE), TERRORISM AND ABDUCTIONS.

AS (SECRET) THE CURRENT COMMUNIST INTENTIONS, IN LIGHT OF "CEASEFIRE II," ARE:

A. OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE IN TERMS OF MAIN FORCE WARFARE. COMMUNIST FORCES HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO REACT STRONGLY TO ANY GVN "NIBBLING" OPERATIONS. THE PRC IS INTENT ON PROJECTING AN IMAGE TO THE PEOPLE THAT THE COMMUNISTS INTEND TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE. GENERALLY SPEAKING, ENEMY ACTIONS IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE BEEN DEFENSIVE, DESIGNED TO HOLD AND IMPROVE PRC CONTROL IN COMMUNIST OCCUPIED AREAS.

ALTHOUGH THE GVN'S POSITION SINCE THE END OF JANUARY HAS ERODED IN SEVERAL PROVINCES, SUCH AS AN THUENT AND CHUONG THIEM, IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO EXPAND ITS CONTROL IN SEVERAL KEY AREAS, SUCH AS THE LOWLANDS OF QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES.

B. REBUILD, UPGRADE AND STRENGTHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE.

C. DEVELOP AND IMPROVE CONTROL OVER "LIBERATED AREAS."

D. PROMOTE FREEDOM OF TRADE AND TRAVEL BETWEEN PRC AND GVN CONTROLLED TERRITORIES. A CESSION OF HOSTILITIES FACILITATES THE KEY OBJECTIVES OF ENCOURAGING FREEDOM OF TRAVEL AND TRADE BETWEEN PRC AND GVN CONTROLLED AREAS. TRADE WITH GVN CONTROLLED
FOOD: POLN MEDICINES AND MACHINE WORKS, NEEDED TO SUSTAIN AN INCREASED CIVILIAN POPULATION. ADDITIONALLY, BY OFFERING A BETTER PRICE FOR GOODS, THE COMMUNISTS PROBABLY HOPE TO INDUCE MORE PEOPLE TO COPE INTO THE PRG ECONOMICS AND EVENTUALLY, POLITICAL SPHERE.

E. IMPROVE ACCESS TO THE POPULATION IN GWN CONTROLLED AREAS AND ATTRACT PEOPLE TO LIBERATED AREAS. FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE IS VITAL TO PRG INTENTIONS OF USING "THE PULL OF THE LAND" TO ENCOURAGE THE POPULACE BACK TO THEIR FORMER HOMES AND TO THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INCREASED TRADE.

F. PROSELYTE GWN TROOPS AND OFFICIALS. INCREASED PROSELTYING
IS CONSTRUCTIVE TO BREAK DOWN LOCAL GVN GOVERNMENTAL

KONTROL-ONE INDICATION OF GVN CONCERN OVER THIS PROBLEM IS ITS
RIGID POSITION THAT NO COMMANDER BELOW DIVISION LEVEL HAVE DIRECT
CONTACT WITH HIS COMMUNIST COUNTERPART- ACCOMMODATIONS THAT HAVE
BEEN AGREED UPON WHEN SUCH LOW LEVEL CONFERENCES HAVE OCCURRED UN
THE PAST HAVE USUALLY BEEN TO THE COMMUNISTS' ADVANTAGE

44. (SECRET) CURRENT ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN MR'-1 IS THE RESULT OF
RNAR ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE SPHERES OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
THE COASTAL LOWLANDS ACTIVITY BY 711TH DIV FORCES IN DUC DUC
DISTRICT IS DESIGNED TO FORCE ARVN UNITS TO CONTRACT THEIR POSITIONS,
AND EVENTUALLY FORCE THE RANGERS TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS AREA. BY
ACCOMPLISHING THIS MISSION, THE ENEMY WOULD FACILITATE HIS ACCES
INTO THE LOWLANDS; BLOCK THE SOUTHERLY EXPANSION OF GVN CONTROL
AND DENY FRIENDLY GROUND OBSERVATION OF THE IMPORTANT INFILTRATION
ROUTES TO HIEP DUC

45. (SECRET) IN MR'-2, THE ACTIVITY WEST OF KON TUM CITY IS A
CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO PROTECT A BUFFER ZONE West
OF THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL IN ORDER TO OPERATE AND IMPORTANT NORTH-
SOUTH SUPPLY ROUTE AND THE FORGING SITE AT THE TALI FALLS. ELEMENTS
OF THE 24TH AND 66TH REGTS HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR
OCCUPYING THE AREAS WEST OF THE CITY. DESPITE GROUND ASSAULT AND
AIR AND ARTY FIRE, ENEMY FORCES CONTINUE TO HOLD THEIR POSITIONS.
ENEMY FORCES PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE ON SECURING THE AREAS WEST
OF KON TUM SINCE THEY ARE PROBABLY THE PLACES MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO
GVN INTERFERENCE ALONG THE ROUTE 1.4 COMPLEX

46. (SECRET) IN MR'-4, AGGRESSIVE ARVN OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST
STRONGHOLDS HAVE CONTINUEF FOLLOWING CEASEFIRE II. THE GVNS
MAJOR AREA OF EMPHASIS HAS BEEN CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE. BOTH SIDES
RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE AND EACH IS
WORKING TO PREVENT THE OTHER FROM GAINING DOMINANCE. CHUONG THIEN
IS THE HUB OF THE LOWER DELTA"-OR, AS THE VIETNAMESE DESCRIBE IT,
THE "BOTTOM OF THE RICE BOWL." THE SIDE THAT CONTROLS THE LINES
OF COMMUNICATION HERE"-THE CANALS AND ROADS"-SUBSTANTIATES A
Claim to effective control: The communists would like to make
Chuong Thien the core of their "liberated" area in the Lower Delta;
ARVN is just as intent on preventing this.

47. (SECRET) Concerning political developments, in order to
improve the international stature of the PRG, it appears that
diplomats from perhaps 10 countries visited the Dong Ha - Cam Lo
area in early June, ostensibly to establish diplomatic relations
with the PRG in SVN. Numerous references to this meeting have
appeared in Liberation radio broadcasts, and
tightened security precautions in the Dong Ha area in early June
may be related to this visitation of dignitaries.

48. (SECRET) While the communists seem to be attempting to bolster

the prestige of the PRG, analysis suggests Hanoi has apparently
annexed communist controlled areas of Quang Tri province unto SVN
and that the eventual annexation of enemy-controlled areas of
Thua Thien may be in the formative stages.

49. (SECRET) Hanoi is establishing a provincial level
governmental apparatus in Quang Tri province with a structure
similar to the provincial governments in SVN. (Since November 72)
HAVE BEEN NOTED. ADDITIONALLY, NVA LAO DONG PARTY ENTITIES HAVE
BEEN OPERATING IN THE PROVINCE SINCE THE END OF JANUARY, AN
EXTENSIVE GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK WITHIN QUANG TRI
AND A PROVINCE DEPARTMENT OF POSTS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCASTING HAS BEEN CREATED, THUS FURTHER LINKING THE PROVINCE TO NVN.
ALSO, A RECENT ARVN RETURNEE OF EARLY MAY REPORTED THAT COMMUNIST
CADRE IN DONG HA WERE REFERRING TO THAT CITY AS THE QUANG TRI
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS OF NVN. WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BASIC
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE PROVINCE IT WAS NOT SURPRISING
CONSIDERING THE INCREASED MOVEMENT OF CIVILIANS
FROM NVN BACK TO QUANG TRI. SOME OF THESE PEOPLE ARE FORMER
RESIDENTS OF THE PROVINCE WHO ARE BEING RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES.
SINCE LATE APRIL THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL DETECTED MOVING
SOUTHWARD TO NVN GUANG TRI PROVINCE HAS BEEN OVER 11,500. HOWEVER,
OTHER ALL SOURCE REFERENCES REVEAL THAT PERHAPS AS MANY AS 25,000
PEOPLE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING SOUTHWARD. HANOI HAS ENCOUN-
TERED SOME DIFFICULTY IN THIS RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM DUE TO
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS AND ADVERSE WEATHER. THE PROGRAM CONTINUES.
NONETHELESS, AND RECENT MESSAGES HAVE REVEALED THAT SCHOOLS ARE
BEING CONSTRUCTED IN VIMH LINH AND A 15 JUNE MESSAGE INDICATED
THAT 50 PRIMARY GRADE LEVEL TEACHERS WERE MOVING TO SUPPORT
OPERATIONS IN GUANG TRI.

50. (SECRET) OBVIOUSLY, AT LEAST IN THIS AREA, THE COMMUNISTS ARE
ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT THEIR POLICY GOALS OF CREATING A Viable
POLITICAL COMMUNITY TO COMPETE WITH THE GVN. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NORTHERN MR-1 WOULD ALSO FACILITATE THE SUPPORT OF NVA MILITARY
UNITS IN THE AREA.
51. OMITTED
52. (SECRET) IN CONCLUSION, HANOI CONTINUES TO IMPROVE ITS
COMBAT POTENTIAL IN THE SOUTH. THE INCREASED TRAINING STATUS OF
THE NVN MIG FORCE AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF AIRFIELDS IN OCCUPIED
AREAS OF SVN PORTEND A POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF NVN AIRCRAFT TO
THE SVN IN THE FUTURE. COMMUNIST FORCES CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND
IMPROVE THEIR AAA CAPABILITY WITH THE PROBABLE GOAL OF CREATING AN
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THROUGHOUT OCCUPIED AREAS SIMILAR TO THE HIGH
THREAT AREA IN GUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE IMPROVED LOGISTICAL STATUS
OF THE ENEMY, AND HIS EXPANSION OF VITAL LOC'S FURTHER ENHANCES
THE COMMUNIST'S COMBAT POTENTIAL. DESPITE THIS BUILDUP IN COMBAT
POTENTIAL, HOWEVER, COMMUNIST FORCES SEEM INTENT FOR THE PRESENT
ON SOLIDIFYING THEIR OWN POSITION IN ORDER TO CREATE A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO THE GVN. THE
COMMUNISTS DO NOT PLAN TO INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION AT THIS TIME
BUT GENERALLY PLAN, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY TO ADHERE TO THE CEASEFIRE
IN REGARDS TO MAIN FORCE WARFARE. BUT ENEMY FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED