2. (S) THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH AND SUSTAIN A SIX
MONTH MILITARY CAMPAIGN WITHOUT MAINTENANCE LEVELS IN MK'S 3 AND
4. THERE HAS BEEN A SENSE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL DO SO IN
THE NEAR FUTURE.

BAG INTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

AND THREAT ANALYSIS. OUTLINES THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

- ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM
- NORTH VIETNAM NAVY SERVICE DEVELOPMENTS
- LOGISTICS
- INTELLIGENCE/EXPERIENCE
- NORTH VIETNAM AIR RECONNAISSANCE
- PRG AIRFIELDS
- ECONOMIC SITUATION
- ORDER OF BATTLE
- MILITARY REGION WEAP-UP
- CONCLUSION

NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES TO RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM
ITS COMMMUNIST ALLIES. DURING THE FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF 1973, 174
SOVIET VESSELS ACCOUNTED FOR 53% OF THE ARRIVALS, WITH CHINESE VESSELS ACCOUNTING FOR 32% OF THE TOTAL. 151 SHIPS CARRIED DRY CARGO, AND 23 WERE TANKERS.

4. (S-NOFORN) THESE VESSELS DISCHARGED 679,000 METRIC TONS OF CARGO. COMMODITIES IN THE GENERAL CATEGORY INCLUDE METALS, PAPER PRODUCTS, MACHINERY, CHEMICALS, MEDICINES, CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES, TEXTILES, CEMENT AND A WIDE VARIETY OF CONSUMER GOODS. AN ADDITIONAL 124,000 METRIC TONS OF CARGO WAS DELIVERED TO CHINESE...
PORTS IN JANUARY ACHIEVED A 20% INCREASE IN IMPORTS TO NVA, BRINGING
SOFTWARE IMPORTS TO A TOTAL OF 2,400,000 METRIC TONS.

6. (S-NORDIK) IMPONTON, SUBSTANTIAL SHIPMENTS OF
SUPPLIES ALSO HEADING TO NORTH AND SOUTH ROK THROUGH CHINA:

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOOD</td>
<td>168,421</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>314,040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METALS</td>
<td>60,608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td>247,022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>789,095</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA PROVIDED 85% OF THESE IMPORTS,
WHILE THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIES 15%. TOTAL IMPORTS THROUGH JULY
TOTALED 1,592,000 METRIC TONS. THE BULK OF COMBAT MATERIEL IS
BELIEVED TO BE DELIVERED VIA OVERLAND ROUTES, AND IS NOT INCLUDED
IN THIS TOLLAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT CERTAIN
ITEMS THAT ARE USED FOR BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PURPOSES, SUCH
AS TRUCKS, POL AND CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES, ARE INCLUDED IN
THESE TOTALS. FOR EXAMPLE, TRUCK IMPORTS DURING 1973 TOTALED
4,061 WITH EQUAL AMOUNTS BEING IMPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE

5. THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPILATION OF STATISTICS (THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS) ON NVN SEABORNE IMPORT ACTIVITY OVER A TEN YEAR PERIOD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FERTILIZER</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>FOODSTUFFS</th>
<th>MISC.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (c) A GENERAL LACK OF INFORMATION ON ARMS DELIVERIES PRECLUDES A RELIABLE ESTIMATE ON THE LEVEL OF CURRENT SUPPLIES. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT ARMS DELIVERIES ARE CONTINUING, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE OVER PREVIOUS YEARS. THIS REDUCTION IS DUE IN PART TO THE REDUCED NORTH VIETNAMESE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT MATERIEL — ESPECIALLY AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. RECENTLY THIS REDUCED REQUIREMENT HAS PERMITTED MOSCOW AND PEKING TO EMPHASIZE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AID RATHER THAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

7. (S-RGFD)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volumes</th>
<th>Prices</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Aviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>1,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>1,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>2,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (JAN-JUL)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seaborne imports rose steadily during the 1964-68 period, leveled off between 1968 and 1970 and reached an all-time high in 1971 before dropping off drastically after the May 1972 mining of North Vietnam's major ports. Prior to May 1972, the bulk of North Vietnamese imports were delivered by sea. The use of RRC ports during the ten-month period from May 1972 to February 1973 and the increased volume of overland shipments largely compensated for the interdiction of NVN ports.
24. (SECRET) WE ESTIMATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS EACH MONTH ARE NOW BEING SHIPPED INTO SVN. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES THAT THE COMMUNIST FORCES THROUGHOUT SVN REQUIRE ONLY APPROXIMATELY 8,000 TONS OF SUPPLIES EACH MONTH, MOSTLY FOODSTUFFS. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST HALF OF THIS TOTAL REQUIREMENT IS PROCURED INSIDE SVN. THUS, WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE ENEMY IS STOCKPILING CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF SUPPLIES FOR FUTURE USE.

FROM:

VIETNAM.

29. (S) CONCERNING PRG AIRFIELDS IN THE SOUTH, THERE ARE NOW 16 SIGNIFICANT AIRFIELDS IN COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED AREAS WHICH ARE OR COULD BE RENOVATED BY PRG/NVA FORCES. AT KHE SANH THE NEW RUNWAY WAS COMPLETED ON 5 JULY. IT HAS A 4500-FOOT PSP SURFACE AND RUNWAY LIGHTS INSTALLED. ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN NOTICED WHICH COULD EXTEND IT TO 5500 FEET.

30. (S) SIX OTHER AIR STRIPS ARE BEING RENOVATED. THESE ARE: DONG HA, CA LU, TA RAT, BEN HET AND LOC NINH AND TRAI BI. THREE OTHERS AT DAK TO, BU PRANG AND MINH THANH ARE CONSIDERED USABLE, THOUGH ACTIVITY HAS NOT BEEN NOTED. FIVE AIRFIELDS ARE CONSIDERED PARTIALLY USABLE, ALSO WITH NO ACTIVITY DETECTED. THESE ARE KHAM DUC, DUC CO, BU DOP, THIEN NGON, AND KATUM. CURRENTLY, A LUOI, IN MR-1, IS NOT USABLE, AND NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED.
SONNELL AND SUPPLIES. ALTHOUGH NUMEROUS LOW-LEVEL REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ON THEIR USE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONFIRMED FLIGHTS WITHIN OR INTO SOUTH VIETNAM BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

32. (C) CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ARVN INTELLIGENCE CENTER RECENTLY CONDUCTED A STUDY OF TAX COLLECTION AND COMMODITY EXCHANGE BY THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE PRC BUDGET IS BASED ON THREE PRIMARY MEANS OF SUPPORT: FOREIGN AID, TAXATION, AND TRADE. FOREIGN AID CONSISTS OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL FUNNELED THROUGH TRADITIONAL INFILTRATION ROUTES AND U.S. DOLLARS PROVIDED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL BLACK MARKET SOURCES. DOLLARS ARE NORMALLY PROVIDED ONLY DURING PERIODS OF HIGH MILITARY ACTIVITY, WHEN INTERNAL SOURCES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT.

33. (C) TAXATION IS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNISTS. TAXES ARE COLLECTED ON GOODS AND ACTIVITIES IN COMMunist-CONTROLLED OR CONTESTED AREAS. THEY ALSO RELY TO SOME EXTENT ON DONATIONS FROM SOURCES IN GVN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY. THE TAX YIELD IS HEAVIEST IN MR-4, WHICH PROVIDES 90% OF THE
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND 40% OF ALL TAXES COLLECTED NATIONALLY. THE COMMUNISTS' ATTEMPT TO COLLECT APPROXIMATELY VND 13.5 BILLION PER YEAR. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT EXCEEDED 40% OF THIS QUOTA, OR VND 5.4 BILLION. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ENEMY TAX YIELD BY AREA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>RICE (TONE)</th>
<th>-value</th>
<th>OTHER TAXES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR 1</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR 2</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR 3</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR 4</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>4,536</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. (C) TRADE ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED ON ACQUIRING COMMODITIES FROM GVN DOMAINS. THE COMMUNISTS PRODUCE RELATIVELY FEW COMMODITIES IN AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL, ALTHOUGH THEY PLAN TO INTRODUCE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOODS INTO THE SOUTH TO COMPETE WITH GVN PRODUCTS. TO FACILITATE THE PURCHASE OF COMMODITIES IN GVN-
CONTROLLED AREAS. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ESTABLISHED NUMEROUS ENTRY
POINTS AND OPEN MARKETS, THROUGH WHICH AN ESTIMATED 80% OF THEIR
FOOD REQUIREMENTS PASS. ENTRY POINTS ARE GENERALLY LOCATED ALONG
LINES OF COMMUNICATION WHERE COMMODITIES CAN BE TRANSPORTED EXPEDI-
TIONSLY. OPEN MARKETS ARE LOCATED IN GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS WHERE
ITEMS ARE EITHER PURCHASED OR PARTERED FROM LOCAL MERCHANTS.
THE ITEMS MOST COMMONLY PURCHASED BY THE COMMUNISTS ARE:

RICE, SALT, SUGAR, MILK
CLOTH
MEDICINE
POL PRODUCTS
CANNED MEAT, SAUCE
OFFICE SUPPLIES
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT
FARMING EQUIPMENT
BICYCLES, MOTORBIKES

(C) IN CONCLUSION, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE A TWO-FOLD PURPOSE
IN THE CONDUCT OF TAX COLLECTION AND COMMODITY PURCHASING:

A. RELY ON THE CIVIL ECONOMY TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, AND

B. UNDERMINE THE CIVIL ECONOMY AS PART OF THEIR OVERALL

POLITICAL SUBVERSION EFFORTS IN CVM.

It is estimated that with the reduced level of hostilities,

COMMUNIST COLLECTION AND PURCHASING ACTIVITIES WILL BE MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN IN THE PAST. TAXES HAVE ALREADY BEEN INCREASED IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT TAX COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE BEING EXPANDED TO INCLUDE MORE TERRITORY THAN BEFORE.

36. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS A RE-EVALUATION OF ENEMY STRENGTHS THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

IN MILITARY REGION 1, CHANGES IN ORDER OF BATTLE REFLECT THE ADDITION OF 13 ARTILLERY, 4 ARMOR, AND 18 AIR DEFENSE REGIMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN LOCATED IN MR-1 BUT WERE NOT CARRIED IN THE OVERALL TOTALS.

CONSULTATION WITH CIV/DIA AND ARVN OB SPECIALISTS RESULTED IN REVISED STRENGTH FIGURES. ADDITIONALLY, A NEW UNTIL THE
ARMOR REGIMENT HAS BEEN CREATED FROM EXISTING UNITS IN THE QUE SON VALLEY. THE ADDITION OF SOME 24,000 COMBAT PERSONNEL (WHICH INCLUDES AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL) MORE ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE ENEMY THREAT IN THE REGION.

THE INCREASE IN ADMIN SERVICES WAS DUE TO THE ADDITION OF SOME 15,000 LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL WHO MOVED INTO SVN WHEN THE NVA ESTABLISHED NEW ROUTE 14 AS A PRINCIPAL LOGISTICAL CORRIDOR.

CHANGES IN MR-1 ENEMY STRENGTH ARE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVIOUS ESTIMATE</th>
<th>31 AUG 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIVISIONS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIMENTS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT PERSONNEL</td>
<td>52-62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUERILLAS</td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN SERVICES</td>
<td>14-18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PERSONNEL</td>
<td>71-90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. (S) IN MR-2, THE ONLY CHANGE FROM OUR PREVIOUS ESTIMATE WAS THE INCREASE OF 5,000 ADMIN SERVICE TROOPS, REFLECTING THE
MOVEMENT IN-COUNTRY OF ELEMENTS OF GROUP 470 HQ. THE INCREASE
BY ONE IN THE NUMBER OF ENEMY REGIMENTS REFLECTS THE RECENT
CONFIRMATION OF THE 25TH INDEPENDENT REGT/B-3 FRONT. THE FOLLOW-
ING ARE CHANGES IN THE MR-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREVIOUS ESTIMATE</th>
<th>31 AUG 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIVISIONS</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIMENTS</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11 (+2 AR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td>25-30,000</td>
<td>25-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GUERILLAS</strong></td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADMIN SERVICES</strong></td>
<td>10-15,000</td>
<td>15-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td>40-55,000</td>
<td>45-60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TO:

THE CONTINUED MOVEMENT OF COSVN ELEMENTS FROM CAMBODIA TO NORTHERN MR-3. CHANGES IN MR-3 ESTIMATED STRENGTHS ARE:

PREVIOUS ESTIMATE  
31 AUGUST 1973

| DIVISIONS | 2 |
| REGIMENTS | 15 |
| COMBAT PERSONNEL | 15-20,000 | 20-25,000 |
| GUERRILLAS | 2-4,000 | 2-5,000 |
| ADMIN SERVICES | 30-34,000 | 30-35,000 |
| TOTAL PERSONNEL | 47-58,000 | 52-65,000 |

TO:

PREVIOUS ESTIMATE 31 AUGUST 1973

DIVISIONS 2
REGIMENTS 13

COMBAT PERSONNEL 15-20,000
GUERILLAS 8-10,000
ADMIN SERVICES 6-8,000
TOTAL PERSONNEL 29-38,000

40. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE NEW DAO ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC:

DIVISIONS 13
REGIMENTS 81 (+22 AD)
COMBAT PERSONNEL 135-160,000
GUERILLAS 20-35,000
ADMIN SERVICES 85-105,000
TOTAL IN-COUNTRY 240-300,000

41. (S) IN MR-1 OVER THE PAST MONTH, THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED THE CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF HIS BASE AND LOGISTICAL AREAS
WHILE COUNTERING RVNAF OPERATIONS WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF HUE AND IN QUANG NCAI PROVINCE. OUR SHORT-TERM ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY INTENTIONS IN MR-1 IS THAT THE ENEMY WILL NOT MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT THRUSTS AT GVN CONTROLLED AREAS, BUT WILL MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON ARVN LOCs AND OUTPOSTS.

42. (S) IN MR-2, ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN GENERALLY HIGH IN THE TRUNG NGHIA AREA OF KONTUM PROVINCE AND IN NORTHERN BINH DINH. IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND "LIBERATED" AREAS. IN BINH DINH ENEMY ACTIVITY MAY SHIFT FROM RESISTANCE TO ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM RVNAF.

43. (S) IN MR-3, MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS GENERALLY AT A LOW LEVEL. COMMUNIST UNITS REMAINED DEPLOYED IN FORWARD AREAS AND WERE TASKED WITH IMPROVING AND DEVELOPING COMMUNIST CONTROL ON THE FRINGES OF OCCUPIED AREAS. THE ENEMY PROBABLY WILL NOT INITIATE ANY MAJOR COMBAT ACTIVITIES, BUT WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE UPGRADING HIS COMBAT CAPABILITY WITHIN OCCUPIED AREAS OF MR-3.
44. (S) IN MR-4 DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST, ENEMY INITIATED
ACTIVITY CONTINUED TO BE CENTERED IN NORTHWESTERN DINH TUONG,
CHUONG THIEN AND NORTHERN CHAU DOC PROVINCES. THIS ACTIVITY
WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A PREDOMINANCE OF ABF'S AND HARASSMENT
FIRES. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPAND, TRAIN
AND UPGRADE HIS LOCAL FORCES WHILE CONTINUING TO PROTECT HIS
BASE AREAS AND INFILTRATION EFFORTS.

45. (S) COSVN GUIDANCE THROUGHOUT 1973 HAS EMPHASIZED THE
POLITICAL STRUGGLE AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF ATTAINING COMMUNIST
OBJECTIVES, WITH MILITARY ACTIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT "LIBERATED
AREAS" AND SUPPORT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

46. (S) A RECENT HIGH-LEVEL RALLIER INDICATED THAT THE
POLITICAL STRUGGLE IS MERELY A TEMPORARY PHASE IN WHICH PREPARA-
TIONS ARE BEING MADE TO RESUME MAIN FORCE WARFARE. REPORTS IN-
DICATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS HARBOUR NO ILLUSIONS THAT THE GVN WILL
AGREE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE COMMUNISTS.
A NEW RESOLUTION WHICH WILL RESTORE THE PRIMACY OF MILITARY
FROM:

TO:

ACTION IS SAID TO BE IN PREPARATION. PREPARATIONS ARE TO BE MADE FOR RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES NOT LATER THAN MARCH 1974.

47. (S) ALTHOUGH TRUE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS CANNOT BE CLEARLY ASSESSED AT THIS POINT, THE PRESENT EMPHASIS ON CONSOLIDATING PREVIOUS GAINS IN "LIBERATED AREAS" WHILE STRENGTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES UNHINDERED BY AIR INTERD ICTION FROM U.S. PLANES, AFFORDS THE ENEMY A GREAT DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN DETERMINING HIS FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION.

48. (S) THE CEASEFIRE, IN EFFECT, HAS GIVEN THE COMMUNIST THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES:

IMPOSED CONTROLS ON U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARVN.

( THERE ARE NO SUCH CONTROLS ON COMMUNIST BLOC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM NOR ON NORTH VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE TO PRG. )

PERMITTED THE PRG TO CLAIM DE JURE SOVEREIGNTY OVER AREAS FORMERLY HELD DE FACTO.

ENABLED THE ENEMY TO SETTLE LARGE NUMBERS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS IN THE ABOVE AREAS.
49. (S) In conclusion, in South Vietnam, the communists are rapidly developing their strongest military position in the history of the war.

XGDS-2