SUBJECT: USDAO SAIGON MONTHLY INTEL SUMMARY AND THREAT ANALYSIS (MISTA)

1. (CC) THE FOLLOWING MISTA WAS PRESENTED TO MG MURRAY, DATT, ON 6 OCTOBER 1973.

2. (C) SINCE THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, HANOI HAS DEVELOPED ITS STRONGEST MILITARY POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE COMPLETE TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THERE IS CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION, HOWEVER, AS TO HOW AND WHEN THE ENEMY PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. THIS DAO MONTHLY

September 1973 MISTA
• LICHT CURRENT IN DEVELOPMENTS.

1. (C) SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, HANOI HAS IMPROVED ITS MILITARY POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY:
   - DEPLOYING 9 AA AND 1 SA-2 REGIMENTS TO MR-1, 2 AA REGIMENTS TO MR-2 AND 1 AA REGIMENT TO MR-3.
   - DEPLOYING THE EQUIVALENT OF 3 ARMORED REGIMENTS TO SVN.
   - DEPLOYING THE EQUIVALENT OF 5 ARTILLERY REGIMENTS TO SVN.
   - SHIFTING SOME 20,000 REAR SERVICE PERSONNEL TO SVN.
   - ESTABLISHING NEW AND EXPANDING OLD BASE AREAS.
   - PREPOSITIONING SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES INSIDE SVN TO SUPPORT AND SUSTAIN A MAJOR COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE.

2. (S) WE BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY HAS AT LEAST THREE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH HE CAN PURSUE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE HIS OVERALL OBJECTIVE:
   - POLITICAL - CREATE A RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT WITHIN SVN CAPABLE OF COMPETING WITH SVN IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES.
   - LIMITED MILITARY OFFENSIVE - A PHASED MILITARY OFFENSIVE TO CREATE A MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION BEYOND CAPABILITY OF SVN TO HANDLE.
   - MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE - TO CAUSE THE IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES.
   - POLITICAL-ECONOMIC STRUGGLE WILL SUPPORT EITHER MILITARY COURSE OF ACTION. THE PHASED MILITARY OFFENSIVE COULD DEVELOP INTO A MAJOR, DECISIVE OFFENSIVE.

3. (S) SEVERAL FACTORS WILL CRITICALLY AFFECT HANOI'S DECISION ON TIMING AND WHICH COURSES OF ACTION TO ADOPT. A MAJOR CONSIDERATION WILL BE SOVIET AND PRC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID.
   - MOSCOW AND PEKING ARE NOW EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN MILITARY AID. PRONOUNCE-
HEAVY IN HANOI INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH HPA IS GIVING PRIORITY TO RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AT HOME, IT IS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS MUST ALSO BE MET. ALTHOUGH HARD INTELLIGENCE IS LACKING, THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUING SOME ARMS DELIVERIES, BUT PROBABLY AT LEVELS REDUCED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS. ANY ASSESSMENT OF MOSCOW'S AND PEKING'S REACTIONS--IN TERMS OF MATERIEL SUPPORT--TO ANY FUTURE HPA OFFENSIVE IS FRAUGHT WITH UNKNOWNS AND UNCERTAINTIES. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS OR CHINESE WOULD INCREASE ARMS DELIVERIES THAT WOULD IMPLY THEIR SUPPORT OF A RENEWED OFFENSIVE. NEVERTHELESS, HPA HAS SUFFICIENT STOCKPILES OF WAR MATERIEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND BORDER BASE AREAS NOW TO MAINTAIN A MAJOR OFFENSIVE. IN ADDITION, THERE
ARE STOCKPILES IN THE NORTH WHICH CANNOT BE ESTIMATED. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HANOI COULD REALIZE IMPORTANT GAINS OR EVEN ACHIEVE ITS FINAL OBJECTIVE IN THE SOUTH WITHOUT RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL MATERIEL SUPPORT FROM ITS ALLIES.

IF THE ENEMY CONCLUDES THAT HE CAN ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES IN SEA THROUGH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, HE WILL COMMIT THE NECESSARY FORCE - REGARDLESS OF CHINESE OR SOVIET INFLUENCE OR
6. (5) OTHER FACTORS THAT WILL AFFECT ANY COMMUNIST

DECI SIONS ARE THE LEVEL AND EXTENT OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
SUPPORT TO SVN, THE THREAT OF U.S. AIR AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO
THE GVN IN ANY FUTURE OFFENSIVE, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COMMUNIST PROSLEYTING OF RVNAF AND GVN OFFICIALS.

(6) THE FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THREE POSSIBLE ENEMY
COURSES OF ACTION.

8. (5) COSVN GUIDANCE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CEASEFIRE I EM-
PHASIZED THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE, WHILE CONTINUING TO STRESS THE
NEED FOR A STRONG MILITARY ALTERNATIVE. THE MILITARY, UNDER THIS
GUIDANCE, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING THE "LIBERATED"
AREAS AND CONDUCTING HARASSING ATTACKS WITHIN GOVERNMENT CON-
TROLLED AREAS. THE COMMUNISTS HOPED TO USE THE "LIBERATED" AREAS
AS STAGING AREAS FOR A MASSIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN DIRECTED
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOAL WAS TO CREATE A POLITICAL
ALTERNATIVE TO THE GVN. THE COMMUNISTS PLANNED TO EXPLOIT
INTERNAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GVN TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GVN
WOULD BE FORCED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS.

IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FORCED
TO AGGREGATE IN THE FACE OF INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES AND PUBLIC
PRESSURE.

9. (SN) SINCE THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI) IS THE MAIN
ARM IN THIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GVN, HIGH PRIORITY WAS GIVEN TO
REBUILDING ITS STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS. REPORTS FROM COSVN
CONTINUE TO INDICATE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
VCI. FOR EXAMPLE, COMMUNIST DIRECTIVE 973 STATED THAT THE LACK OF
COMMUNIST SUCCESS TO DATE WAS DUE TO THE CADRE'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE
IN THE REVOLUTION AND TO THEIR NEGLECT IN ACCOMPLISHING POLITICAL
AND TROOP PROSLEYTING OBJECTIVES. IN THE PAST, A SHORTAGE OF EX-
PERIENCED LOCAL CADRE, THE ISOLATION FROM THE LOCAL POPULACE DUE
TO PAST MILITARY OFFENSIVES AND MORE EFFICIENT GVN SECURITY PRO-
GRANS DIRECTED AT THE VCI HAVE HAD A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE
10. (S) THE COMMUNISTS ARE STRIVING TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS BY EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR MORE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING, STRESSING THE NEED TO REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE, REASSIGNING EXPERIENCED CADRE DOWN TO LOCAL LEVELS, AND BY INFILTRATING OVER 3,000 SPECIALISTS AND CADREMENT FROM HVN. THESE RECENT INFILTRATORS, HOWEVER, HAVE PROBABLY BEEN USED PRIMARILY TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT IN THE "LIBERATED" AREAS.

11. (C) REBUILDING AND UPGRADE OF THE VCI IS A LONG, SLOW PROCESS. IMMEDIATE RESULTS ARE DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE BUT INDICATIONS STILL POINT TO CONTINUING LACK OF SUCCESS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS NOW THAT THE ENEMY DOES NOT EXPECT THE VCI TO OBTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES AND THAT THE ROLE OF THE VCI IN A FUTURE OFFENSIVE WILL BE TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF PASSIVITY AMONG THE POPULACE SO THAT IT WILL ACCEPT THE EVENTUAL TAKEOVER BY THE COMMUNISTS. THIS REPORTED SHIFT IN EMPHASIS LENDS CREDENCE TO A SHIFT FROM A POLICY OF A POPULARLY SUPPORTED POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SOLUTION.

12. (C) FURTHERMORE, AS THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO REEVALUATE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ITS CURRENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH, HE HAS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH SEVERAL PROBLEMS. DESPITE SERIOUS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GVN, THE CURRENT CEASEFIRE HAS ENABLED THE GVN TO IMPROVE CONTROL OVER THE POPULACE—ESPECIALLY IN THE LOWLANDS OF MR-1.

13. (S) ONE OF THE PRIMARY COMMUNIST GOALS IN THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP AND RESETTLE THE SO-CALLED "LIBERATED-AREAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. MAJOR RESETTLEMENT AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED
IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES, IN THE DAK TO AND Duc CO AREAS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, IN THE LOC NINH, KATUM AND THIEN NGON
AREAS IN NORTHERN MR-3 AND IN SEVERAL AREAS AROUND THE U MINH
FOREST IN MR-4. BY DEVELOPING THESE "LIBERATED" AREAS, THE COM-
MUNISTS HOPED TO ADD LEGITIMACY TO THE PRG AND TO PROVIDE A
POPULATION AND LOGISTIC BASE. THE ENEMY'S
PRIMARY EFFORT IN RESETTLEMENT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD
PERSUADING CIVILIANS IN CVN CONTROLLED AREAS TO MIGRATE TO THE
SO-CALLED "LIBERATED" AREAS. IT ALSO INCLUDES RESETTLING
VIETNAMESE FROM CAMBODIA IN ENEMY CONTROLLED AREAS OF MR-5 3 AND
4. IN THE NORTH, OVER 30,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN INFILTRATED
FROM CVN TO RESETTLE; MOSTLY IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
14. (C) DESPITE ENEMY EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND RESETTLE THESE
AREAS, IN NEARLY EVERY CASE THESE AREAS HAVE A PARASITIC RELATION-
SHIP WITH NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREAS. MOST OF THE
ENEMY RESETTLEMENT AREAS ARE SITUATED IN REGIONS UNFAVORABLE FOR
INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE OR CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A
LARGE POPULATION BASE.
15. (C) THE SETTLERS WILL HAVE TO RELY INCREASINGLY ON NORTH
VIETNAM FOR THEIR SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IF THE PRG HOPE
TO SUPPORT A SIZABLE POPULATION. OVER THE LONG TERM, THE
PRG "LIBERATED" AREAS -- THE THIRD VIETNAM APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE
CHANCE OF BECOMING VIABLE AND WILL PROBABLY BE A SIZABLE DRAIN
ON CVN RESOURCES.
16. (C) THE RICE SITUATION WILL BE ANOTHER FACTOR IN COMMUNIST
PLANNING AND POLICY FORMULATION IN THE COMING MONTHS.
ENEMY SELF-SUSTAINING RICE PRODUCTION IS OF
MARGINAL VALUE. HIS REQUIREMENTS ARE CONSIDERABLE AND WILL
INCREASE WITH ANY EXPANSION OF HIS RESETTLEMENT AREAS. MEANWHILE,
THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENEMY RICE PROCUREMENT HAVE DIMINISHED.
17. (C) CAMBODIAN RICE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN PURCHASED BY THE
ENEMY FOR ELEMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM.
REPORTS REVEAL THAT KI FORCES HAVE BECOME IN-
ANGLY RELUCTANT TO SELL RICE TO THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS;
IN INSTANCES THIS PRACTICE HAS BEEN TERMINATED ALTOGETHER AND
ARMED CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, ENEMY RICE PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS IN CVN CONTROLLED AREAS ARE USUALLY INADEQUATE, AND WILL BECOME MORE SO IF THE CVN IS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS CRACK-DOWN ON ECONOMIC ACCOMMODATION. THE MAJOR REMAINING MEANS OF RICE PROCUREMENT, TAXATION AND CONFISCATION IN THE "LIBERATED" AND CONTESTED AREAS, HAVE BECOME MORE IMPORTANT.

18. (C) THE FOLLOWING, DERIVED FROM A RECENT ARVN INTELLIGENCE CENTER ASSESSMENT ON THE RICE SITUATION, SHOWS THE RICE REQUISITIONED BY THE ENEMY WITHIN THE CVN DURING 1972:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MR-1</th>
<th>2400 METRIC TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR-2</td>
<td>2600 METRIC TONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-3</td>
<td>1800 METRIC TONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-4</td>
<td>58,000 METRIC TONS</td>
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It is evident that the enemy relies heavily on requisition of rice.

19. (C) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UPCOMING HARVEST HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON COMMUNIST LEADERS. CVSVN HAS REPORTEDLY ORDERED ENEMY UNITS TO DRAW UP COMBAT PLANS TO FORCEFULLY ACQUIRE RICE DURING THE COMING HARVEST IN ORDER TO PROVIDE RICE TO ENEMY UNITS IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS OF MR-2 AND THE NORTHERN AREA OF CVN MR-3.

20. (C) THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IS MAGNIFIED BY THE FACT THAT CVN RICE SHIPMENTS FROM THE DELTA, AS OF 1 SEP, WERE 100,000 METRIC TONS BEHIND LAST YEAR'S SCHEDULE (1972: 465,500 METRIC TONS; 1973: 326,000 METRIC TONS). IN ADDITION, AN EARLY SEASON DROUGHT DISRUPTED PLANTING AND MAY RESULT IN A DROP FROM LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION IN THE DELTA. FOR THE CROP YEAR 1971-72 FADDY PRODUCTION (NOT HUSKED RICE) WAS 6,324,000 METRIC TONS FOR THE 1972-72 YEAR.
ARMED CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, ENEMY RICE PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS IN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREAS ARE WASTefully, INADEQUATE, AND WILL BECOME MORE SO IF THE GOVERNMENT IS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS CRACK-DOWN ON ECONOMIC ACCOMMODATION. THE MAJOR REMAINING MEANS OF RICE PROCUREMENT, TAXATION AND CONFISCATION IN THE "LIBERATED" AND CONTESTED AREAS, HAVE BECOME MORE IMPORTANT.

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IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ENEMY RELIES HEAVILY ON REQUISITION OF RICE.

19. (C) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UPCOMING HARVEST HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON COMMUNIST LEADERS. GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTEDLY ORDERED ENEMY UNITS TO DRAW UP COMBAT PLANS TO FORCEFULLY ACQUIRE RICE DURING THE COMING HARVEST IN ORDER TO PROVIDE RICE TO ENEMY UNITS IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS OF MR-2 AND THE NORTHERN AREA OF GOVERNMENT MR-3.

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USAID estimates paddy production at 5,900,000 MT and the GVN estimates 6,546,000 MT. In short, the GVN can less afford to lose rice to the communists, who, if indications are correct, will rely on delta rice more than ever.

21. (c) Thus, it is feasible that a "Rice War" may erupt with
- The main thrust in early and secondary emphasis in
  the ARVN around the
  lowlands of MR-3 and Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces. It is
  doubtful that in-country rice procurement will be sufficient to
  support any significantly expanded enemy population base without
  a corresponding seizure of productive land.

- Although communist directives have been emphasizing
  the primacy of the political campaign, the enemy has strengthened
  his military option considerably. The communist successes during
  the 1972 offensive provided them with virtual control of great
  portions of western SVN. Subsequently, the major communist
  forces have been able to deploy closer to strategic areas
  in SVN than ever before. Within this "liberated" area, the com-
  munists have upgraded existing bases and have created new
  logistical supply areas, such as Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, a Shau
  Valley, Dak To, Tan Canh, Loc Ninh and Katum-Thien Ngon areas.
  These areas provide the communists with forward supply areas
  to support future offensives.

23. (S) Since the ceasefire, the communists have infiltrated
  large quantities of armor and artillery, especially to the COSVN
  area. A comparison of RVNAF
  and enemy armor and artillery is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NVA Armor</th>
<th>RVNAF Armor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMZ-NORTH</td>
<td>M41 M48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-5</td>
<td>69-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-3 FRONT</td>
<td>68-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>61-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN-COUNTRY</td>
<td>260-670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN-COUNTRY</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NVA Artillery Totals (122-130mm):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NVA Artillery</th>
<th>RVNAF Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMZ-NORTH</td>
<td>180-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-5</td>
<td>70-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-3 FRONT</td>
<td>40-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>80-90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MORE TANKS THAN RVNAF. ALTHOUGH THE CVN HAS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN ARTILLERY, THE INCREASED INFILTRATION OF 122 MM AND 130 MM ARTILLERY PROVIDES THE NVA/VC WITH GREATER RANGE AND AN INCREASED ABILITY TO MASS FIRE. THE NVA'S LARGE ARSENAL OF HEAVY ROCKETS AND MORTARS MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

24. (S) SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A LARGE-SCALE ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. THE MAJOR EFFORTS HAVE OCCURRED IN NORTHERN MR-1, IN THE B-3 FRONT, AND IN NORTHERN MR-3. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN SVN OF THE ROUTE 14 COMPLEX WHICH CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF PREVIOUSLY EXISTING ROUTES THAT HAVE BEEN UPGRADED, PLUS NEWLY ESTABLISHED CONNECTING LINKS. THE COMMUNISTS ARE CURRENTLY USING ROUTE 14 AS THEIR PRIME AVENUE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIEL THROUGH NORTHERN MR-1. AT LEAST 5 ENGINEER REGTS HAVE BEEN DETAILED TO CONTINUE CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THIS ROUTE. THE LATEST ADDITION TO THIS COMPLEX IS THE SECTION BEING CONSTRUCTED FROM SOUTHERN PLEIKU PROVINCE.
THROUGH WESTERN BAKLAC TO THE VICINITY OF BU PRANG. FROM THAT
POINT THE COMMUNISTS WILL BE ABLE TO USE OTHER EXISTING ROUTES
WHICH CONNECT WITH THE SIGNIFICANT ENEMY LOC'S IN MR-3. THE
ROUTE 14 COMPLEX, USING BY-PASS 615 IN THE HIGHLANDS, NOW PROVIDES
THE ENEMY WITH A LOC NETWORK WITHIN SUN EXTENDING FROM THE DMZ
tO NORTHERN MR-3.

25. (C) WITHIN THE REPUBLIC, IMPROVEMENT OF THE NETWORK OF
SECONDARY ROADS, TRAILS AND INLAND WATERWAYS THAT AUGMENT THE
MAJOR ENEMY LOC'S HAS ALSO BEEN NOTED. THESE NETWORKS FACILITATE
DISTRIBUTION TO FORWARD UNITS, A SERI-
OUS PROBLEM IN THE PAST.

IN WATERWAY ACTIVITY, THE ENEMY HAS DEVELOPED THE CUA
VIET ESTUARY AND PORT OF LONG HA AS A MAJOR
LOGISTICS COMPLEX. AN ESTIMATED 6,000 TONS ARE NOW BEING SHIPPED
INTO DONG HA MONTHLY WITH REPORTED PLANS TO EXPAND THIS PORT TO
1,000 TONS DAILY.

27. (S) THE DRY SEASON WILL
BEGIN SHORTLY IN LAOS. THE NVA PLANS TO ACCELERATE THE
CONSTRUCTION ON THE NEW 300 MILE, DUAL-LANE, ALL-SEASON ROAD THROUGH
LAOS. THE MONSOON RAINS SLOWED CONSTRUCTION AND THE ROAD REMAINS
IN POOR TO FAIR CONDITION. BY NOVEMBER THE ROAD NETWORK SHOULD
BE FAIRLY DRY WITH HEAVY VEHICLE MOVEMENT POSSIBLE. IN PREPARATION
FOR INCREASED MOVEMENT, THE COMMUNISTS ARE IMPROVING THE EXTENDING
HOUSING FACILITIES AND BIVOUAC AREAS, INSTALLING COMMUNICATION
LINES, AND RELOCATING AAA POSITIONS IN S. LAOS ALONG THE NEW
ROAD.

27. (S) TO SUPPORT HIS LOC IMPROVEMENTS, THE ENEMY IS CONTINU-
ING TO EXTEND HIS FOL PIPELINE SYSTEM. SINCE JULY, THE COMMUNISTS
HAVE EXTENDED THE PIPELINE FROM BA LONG INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY.
THE PRESENT SOUTHERN TERMINUS OF THE PIPELINE IS NOW AT A NEWLY-
CONSTRUCTED PETROLEUM STORAGE AREA NEAR A LUOI. THE NVA IS PRO-
WORKING TO EXTEND THIS PIPELINE SOUTH ALONG ROUTE 16 TO THE KHAN LUC VIA, WHERE IT WILL PROBABLY JOIN THE PIPELINE EXTENSION THROUGH LAOS. THIS INTERLINKED PARALLEL SYSTEM PROVIDES THE ENEMY GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN SUPPORTING HIS LOGISTICS ALONG ROUTE 16 AND THE NEW LAOS HIGHWAY.

29. (S) THE COMMUNIST LOG SYSTEM DEVELOPED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE PROVIDES THESE ADVANTAGES WHICH DID NOT EXIST PREVIOUSLY:

-=COMPLIMENTARY LAOS ROAD AND ROUTE 14 WILL PROVIDE AN ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY TO MOVE MEN AND MATERIEL TO AND WITHIN SVN.

-=LOC NETWORK FACILITATES THE MOVEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIEL FROM BASE AREAS TO FORWARD UNITS.

-=LOC NETWORK FACILITATES THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES OBTAINED VIA ILLEGAL TRADE ACTIVITIES WITH MERCHANTS IN SVN CONTROLLED LOWLANDS AREAS.

30. (S) TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO DEPLOY ELEMENTS OF TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS -- THE 308TH AND 312TH DIVISIONS -- BACK INTO SVN TO RECONSTITUTE A STRATEGIC RESERVE. BOTH DIVISIONS HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO REFIT AND COULD BE REDEPLOYED BACK TO SVN IF NEEDED.

THE ESTIMATED DEPLOYMENT STRENGTH OF EACH DIVISION IS 6,000 MEN. ADDITIONALLY, THE CEASEFIRE IN LAOS COULD FREE OVER 18,000 NVA INFANTRY FORCES FOR REDEPLOYMENT BACK TO SVN AND/OR SVN, AS THE 312TH DIV. DID LAST YEAR.

THREAT IN QUANG TRI SO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT
VNAF COULD SURVIVE AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY ENEMY SUPPLY AND
MILITARY BASES IN THIS AREA. EXTENSION OF THIS COVERAGE INTO
THE A SHAU VALLEY, ALONG INTERNAL LOC'S AND MAJOR RESETLEMENT
AREAS, HAS FORCED VNAF UP TO ALTITUDES WHERE INTERDOTION IS OF
INTELLIGENCE ALSO INDICATES THAT THE COM-
MUNISTS HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING INCREASED TRAINING, ESPECIALLY
IN TANK/INFANTRY TACTICS. RECENT COMINT HAS ALSO INDICATED
INCREASED TRAINING BY AAA FORCES IN NORTHERN MR-1, NOT ONLY
IN AIR DEFENSE BUT ALSO IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF INFANTRY.

REGARDING LOGISTICS, WE CURRENTLY ESTIMATE LOGISTICS
IS NO LONGER A LIMITING FACTOR IN NORTH VIETNAMESE PLANNING. IN
JUNE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATED THAT THE ENEMY HAD
PREPOSITIONED SUFFICIENT MUNITIONS TO SUSTAIN A 6-MONTH GENERAL
OFFENSIVE. DIA ESTIMATED THAT DURING SEPTEMBER THE ENEMY SHIPPED
OVER 10,000 TONS OF ALL TYPES OF SUPPLIES TO SVN BY LAND AND OVER
6,000 TONS BY SEA. CURRENT EXPENDITURE AND CONSUMPTION RATES ARE
ABOUT 8,000 TONS PER MONTH. APPROX 4,000 TONS ARE BELIEVED TO BE
PROCURED LOCALLY. THIS INDICATES THAT THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO
STOCKPILE INCREASING AMOUNTS OF SUPPLIES. IN ADDITION, THE NVA
IS NOW MARSHALLING ENOUGH MUNITIONS IN SOUTHERN SVN TO SUSTAIN
AN OFFENSIVE OF THE 1972 INTENSITY FOR AN ADDITIONAL 10 MONTHS.
SINCE EARLY JULY, AT LEAST 8,200 METRIC TONS OF MUNITIONS HAVE
BEEN STOCKPILED IN SOUTHERN SVN FOR PROBABLE MOVEMENT THROUGH THE
BAN KARAI PASS. WITH ROUTE 14 IN SVN MOSTLY SUPPLYING MR-1, WE
BELIEVE THE MUNITIONS BEING STOCKPILED IN SOUTHERN SVN ARE FOR
FUTURE SHIPMENT TO COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, CAMBODIA
AND MR'S 3 AND 4.
SINCE 1967 THE COMMUNISTS HAVE SENT AN AVERAGE OF 52,000 INFILTRATORS DOWN TO SVN PER DRY SEASON. THIS YEAR THE NUMBERS CAN GO AS HIGH AS THE 1967-1968 PRE-TET EFFORT, WHEN NEARLY 96,000 MEN WERE INFILTRATED INTO SVN. THE ENEMY HAS SAID THAT HE IS GOING TO SEND ONE GROUP SOUTH PER DAY THROUGH VINH STARTING 19 SEPT. IF HE MAINTAINS THIS RATE, OVER 90,000 TROOPS, VICE THE AVERAGE OF 52,000, COULD BE EXPECTED THROUGH NEXT MARCH.

37. (S) ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO ASSESS ENEMY INTEN-