1. (C) The following MISTA was presented to MG Murray, DATT, on 6 June 1974.

2. (S) Over the past month, while personnel infiltration was at a low level, the enemy continued a high rate of logistical shipping to the south. No major combat units were noted deploying or preparing to deploy into or out of South Vietnam. This month's Intelligence Summary and Threat Analysis contains the following subjects:
   a. Air and Air Defense.
   b. Infiltration
   c. Logistics
   d. Tactics
   e. Order of Battle
   f. Activities
   g. Conclusion

3. (S) Over the past year the NVN air and air defense forces have been steadily expanding and improving their capability. Recent developments include the following:
   a. Dispersal of aircraft.
   b. Renovation of airfields.
   c. Southward deployment of aircraft.
   d. Establishment and improvement of air defense alert facilities.

4. (S) Deployment of aircraft from Phuc Yen allowed the NVN to complete needed repairs at the airfield, which suffered heavy damage during Linebacker II operations in December 1972. Repairs have been completed and activity resumed on 15 May.

5. (S) Recent MIG shifts seemed designed to enhance NVAP operating capabilities. Flights as far south as Vinh could presage the transfer of aircraft to the southern panhandle.
Presently, Bai Thuong as well as Vinh and Dong Hoi Airfields have Ground Control Intercept (GCI) facilities. In addition, Bai Thuong has recently been afforded SA-2 protection.

6. (S) The present MIG strength in NVN consists of 72 MIG-21's, 71 MIG-19's, and 113 MIG-15/17's.

7. (S) The majority of more than 250 jets in the enemy's inventory are combat operational and flown for the most part by experienced and well-trained pilots.

8. (S) In air defense developments, the NVN continue to consolidate command and control and expand their air defense capability southward.

9. (S) Also in air defense developments, the NVN have taken steps to improve air defense alert facilities. These improvements have consisted of the following:

   a. Establishment of visual observer battalions.
   b. Establishment of alert system by rear service units.
   c. Establishment of alert system by air defense units.

10. (S) Visual observer bns provide early warning and tracking data to air defense units. Since early 1973, some 19 bns, previously subordinate to the 368th Air Defense Div in NVN, have been reassigned to the 673rd Div at Khe Sanh and deployed throughout northern MR-1 and adjoining areas of Laos. An air defense alert network has been established by AD units and rear service entities located through northern MR-1. If properly implemented, the alert system should provide timely data to facilitate necessary precautions against air strikes and preparations to engage VNAF aircraft.

11. (S) Enemy air defense units have the following weapons and equipment in their inventory:

   **Guns**

   * 12.7mm (D SH K)
   * 14.5mm (ZPU-1,2 and 4)
   * 23mm (ZU-23)
   * 30mm (M53)

   * Confirmed In-Country
37mm (M1939)
57mm (S60)
85mm (KS-12 and M1939-M1944)
100mm (KS 19M2)

Missiles
* SA-2 (Guideline)
* SA-3 (GOA)
* SA-7 (Grail)

Radars
* Firecan (AAA Fire Control)
* Whiff (AAA Fire Control)
* Fansong (Missile Control)
* Spoonrest (Early Warning)
* Kniferest (Early Warning)
  Flat face (Early Warning)
  Lowblow (Missile Control)
  Gundish (AAA Fire Control)
* Sidenet (Height Finder)
  Tallking (Early Warning)
  Flapwheel (AAA Fire Control)
  Barlock (Early Warning)
  Slot Rest (Early Warning)
  Big Bar (Early Warning)
  Rock/Stonecake (Height Finder)

12. (S) Aerial photography confirmed a SAM site some 11 KM east of Khe Sanh, extending the SAM threat to Quang Tri City. In addition, the province has AAA threat which includes 18 AAA regiments. A total of approximately 1,000 AA guns and 100 SA-2 missiles are currently concentrated in Quang Tri (P). In the remainder of MR-1, enemy's air defense threat is represented by the 545th and 571st AAA regiments with most guns concentrated along the Route 14 logistical complex. These two units control some 100 guns ranging in size from 12.7mm to at least 57mm.

13. (S) Further south in MR-2, four AAA units with some 200 guns are also deployed along the Route 14 complex. These units have guns ranging in size from 12.7mm to 100mm.

14. (S) Since the ceasefire, Communist forces have been improving their AA capability in MR-3 by adding new units and equipment and by increased training. Current enemy AA OB in MR-3 consists of the 377th AA Division and two subordinate AA regiments (71st and 210th). Recent intelligence also suggests
that another AA regiment may be moving to MR-3 and 1000-1500 AA trained personnel have apparently infiltrated into COSVN this year. The enemy is also in the process of significantly improving his AA posture with the addition of radar-controlled 57mm AA guns. The addition of radar control to the 57mm AA guns will increase the tactical AA altitude of this weapon from about 12-13,000 feet to approx 19,600 and double the enemy's first strike capability.

15. (S) In the past six months several new AA threat areas have been confirmed in MR-3, the most significant of which is in western Hau Nghia (P) and SW Tay Ninh (P). Since 1 Jan 74, seven aircraft have been lost to SA-7 and light AA fire in this area. VNAF pilots have also confirmed 23mm and 37mm AA fire and have indicated the possibility of 57mm in the area. Two other new areas of AA concentration in Binh Tuy (P) along the Long Khanh and Lam Dong (P) borders have been noted in the region.

16. (S) During May, NVA infiltration reached its lowest level in six months. All detected infiltration groups that have been dispatched from NVN during the past month are bound for MRTT and VC MR-5, giving credence to the belief that the current emphasis is on northern South Vietnam. The current infiltration totals for 1974 compared with those as of this date last year are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMZ/MRTTH</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>19,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-5</td>
<td>8,920</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3 Front</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>45,930</td>
<td>24,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. (S) During 1973 a significant number of infiltrators were detected enroute to the DMZ/MRTTH areas. This year the effort appears to be very small. The NVA could be meeting its manpower needs in these areas by using a system other than the standard infiltration method. Small unit rotations to and from NVN from this area is one likely means for keeping the units up to strength.

18. (C) Hanoi is apparently conducting a continuous review of conditions in the south by dispatching high-ranking cadre on fact-finding missions. One such delegation to the COSVN area early this year was led by To Huu, a central committee member specializing in information and propaganda. According
to a usually reliable source, one of the specific objectives of To Huu's trip was to assess living conditions and morale among troops and cadre. Other delegations this year have reportedly traveled to MRTT and VC MR-5. These visits, together with others last year, including delegations led by Huu and possibly General Van Tien Dung, may indicate that Hanoi lacks confidence in field reporting and is relying on first hand reports in formulating policies to be followed in the south. It is possible that last year's fact-finding tours provided Hanoi decision-makers with a basis for Central Committee Resolutions 21 and 22 and that reassessments of the situation in the south will be based on reports brought directly to Hanoi by respected northern party members.

19. (S) In prior years, NVA logistics activity has been dictated by changing monsoon seasons. During the past year the NVA has attempted to develop a year-round capability to move supplies and troops rapidly by vehicle from NVN through Laos and RVN as far south as COSVN. It has become apparent, however, that an all-weather capability has not yet been achieved, either in Laos or along the western highlands route to COSVN, but efforts are continuing to achieve this goal. In southern Laos, recent photos indicate that the enemy is starting to shift his southbound truck convoys to Route 14 in South Vietnam in lieu of the S. Laos road. Elms from five transportation regiments in south Laos will probably shift into RVN to support the activity.

20. (S) To support supply shipments and personnel movements, NVA engineers are extending the existing POL pipeline eastward and southward in the tri-border area of Kontum (P) and intend to extend it further south along the southern portion of Route 14 past the Sre Pok River. Work on Route 14 and the pipeline south of Kontum is being carried out by engineer units formerly in S. Laos. By the resumption of the dry season in this area next October, the improvements made on Route 14, coupled with a steady gasoline supply, will greatly enhance the NVA's ability to move supplies and infiltration groups to COSVN.

21. (S) Concerning enemy objectives, the Communists continue to strive toward the overall goal of unifying Vietnam under their control. We estimate that they will eventually be forced to resort to a primarily military option to achieve this goal. Intermediate Communist objectives emphasize the following:

a. Reconstruction and redevelopment in NVN.

b. Improvement in combat capability in both SVN and NVN.
c. Rebuilding of infrastructure and political organization in SVN.

Accomplishment of these objectives requires actions to exacerbate GVN political, economic, and military problems.

22. (S) In March 1974, COSVN Directive 1-74 provided specific guidance for the first half of this year:

a. Stand firm near GVN controlled areas.
b. Destroy GVN population and resettlement plans.
c. Regain lost territories.
d. Develop population base in "liberated" areas.
e. Concentrate attacks on sensitive GVN facilities.
f. Develop party and infrastructure.
g. Motivate the masses and troops to a heightened awareness.

23. (S) Subsequent amplification of COSVN guidance indicated that a period of heightened combat activity was to occur. Initial reporting indicated that this activity was to occur from April to June while subsequent reporting indicated a May to September time period. The apparent initial implementation of this guidance was a series of attacks, most notably in western MR-3, to regain lost territories and, according to the Communist propaganda line, to force the GVN to implement the ceasefire accords "correctly." Western MR-3 was a good choice for an initial effort, since the attacks would support a near-term military objective: Forge a corridor into Dinh Tuong (P) to facilitate the infiltration of personnel to refill depleted units. These attacks were initially unsuccessful and the subsequent ARVN operation into Cambodia has made future successful attacks there unlikely. This significant increase in combat in MR-3 caused some alarm concerning a possible widespread increase in activity. Nonetheless, despite the dramatic improvements in the Communists' military capability, their guidance still emphasizes that they are not yet strong enough to defeat the GVN. The setbacks in April apparently reinforced this point.

24. (S) Several recent reports allude to an apparent change in emphasis for military actions in MR-3 to counter RVNAF initiatives. Reportedly, the objectives are not to "liberate" or "regain" more territory immediately. Rather, they are to
inflict heavy casualties on troops and to disrupt the GVN's goals for 1974:

a. Improve territorial security.
b. Consolidate political strength.
c. Build economic strength.
d. Ameliorate social ills.

Attacks are to be made primarily against outposts in the contested areas, although enemy plans to penetrate deep into GVN areas to overrun targets and quickly pull out also have been reported. Enemy planning apparently calls for constant attacks against the GVN, designed to attrite both RVNAF personnel and materiel. Meanwhile, stress on improving Communist weaknesses, especially the infrastructure, continues.

25. (S) It is within the framework of attritting RVNAF, disrupting the GVN's four goals and improving the Communist position that current activity should be judged. The probable impact of certain recent RVNAF successes against main force units, especially in the Parrot's Beak and in the northern Delta, must also be taken into account. These successes had tipped the momentum in favor of RVNAF in MR-3. A short analysis of activity by region may further illustrate the varying implementation of current enemy guidance.

26. (S) Enemy activity in MR-1 over the past month was at the highest level of the year. The most significant fighting centered on the Hill 300 area of Thua Thien Province and the Ky Tra/Tien Phuoc area of Quang Tin Province. Elsewhere the enemy maintained a generally high level of harassment against GVN resettlement and pacification areas.

27. (S) In southern Thua Thien Province, enemy forces (5th Regt) defending Hill 300 and neighboring terrain captured in April gradually lost ground in the face of sustained ARVN attempts to retake the terrain. While losses appear to have been substantial, the enemy has successfully tied down and restricted ARVN movement in the area.

28. (S) In Quang Tin Province, on 4 May the enemy launched a campaign to consolidate control of the area between Ky Tra and Tien Phuoc District Town. Initial enemy assaults involving 1st Regt/711 Division elements resulted in the fall of the Ky Tra Village complex on 5 May. The enemy gradually expanded the fighting westward and northward, necessitating extensive ARVN reinforcements. Elements of the 31st Regt/711 Division have been confirmed in the more recent fighting. As many as
four enemy local force battalions have also been involved. The enemy has suffered heavy casualties, but at the same time has inflicted heavy casualties on ARVN forces, necessitating diversion of ARVN forces from already vulnerable "pacified" areas in Quang Ngai Province.

29. (S) In MR-1, the Communists have thus been able to tie down ARVN and inflict casualties, threaten key LOC's and disrupt pacification efforts at a fairly minimal cost. Meanwhile, improvement in their military capability continues and activities to accomplish certain other objectives, such as improved access into GVN territories, necessary for political development and rebuilding the infrastructure, continue.

30. (S) Enemy combat strength in MR-1 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>4 (+1 AD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>32 (+21 AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>95-105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Personnel</td>
<td>30-35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>355-385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>288-324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. (S) Enemy activity in MR-2 during the past month has been characterized by efforts to protect and develop LOC's and base areas in the highlands and renewed limited attacks in the coastal area. In the highlands, attacks since mid-May against isolated GVN outposts at Dak Pek in Kontum Province and Tieu Atar in Darlack Province have removed GVN presence in enemy rear areas near vital LOC's. The enemy in Kontum Province has also reacted vigorously to RVNAF threats to logistics centers and LOC's north and northeast of Kontum City. The 10th NVA Division and associated B-3 Front elements are currently massed north of the city. Since 24 May, these forces have blunted an RVNAF push toward their forward supply center at Vo Dinh. There are indications that during the next month, the enemy will attempt to eliminate the remaining isolated GVN outposts of Mang Buk and Chuong Nghia to facilitate east-west LOC development. In the coastal lowlands, following six months of relative inactivity, the enemy in Binh Dinh Province initiated limited attacks during May designed to challenge GVN territorial and population control. Such efforts thus far have not met with notable success.

32. (S) Enemy combat strength in MR-2 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>40-45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Admin Personnel  20-25,000
Armor  115-135
Artillery  60-75

33. (C) In MR-3, Communist forces are trying to implement recent COSVN guidance. Following the 5th NVA Division's unsuccessful and costly attacks in April and May to free enemy logistics corridors into Dinh Tuong, 7th and 9th NVA Division forces initiated a series of attacks in Binh Duong Province in mid-May. Available intelligence indicates these enemy objectives:

a. Inflict heavy casualties on RVNAF.

b. Arrest GVN progress in consolidating its political and military strength in contested areas.

c. Halt ARVN momentum achieved by a series of recent operations in MR-3.

d. Consolidate their military and political strength in contested areas of MR-3.

e. Test combined arms training.

34. (S) West of Ben Cat, two regiments from the 9th Division (95C and 272D) conducted combined arms attacks against three company-sized outposts along TL-7, and forced the subsequent abandonment of all three camps. A destroyed T-54 tank was the first confirmed use of armor in MR-3 since the ceasefire; however, the enemy reportedly sustained three additional tanks destroyed and one captured in the ARVN counter-attack. Enemy forces relied heavily on accurate artillery/mortar fire and mines to stall RVNAF attempts to regain control west of Ben Cat and to inflict casualties.

35. (S) In the Phu Giao area the 209th and 165th Regiments, 7th NVA Division, attacked south of Phu Giao District Town, especially near the Song Be Bridge. Captured documents indicated that enemy plans called for the severing of all land LOC's into Phu Giao followed by an attack by another regiment, probably the 141st, against the district seat. Enemy attempts to isolate Phu Giao were unsuccessful and in these and subsequent attacks, the 209th and 165th Regiments suffered heavy casualties. Artillery elements continue to conduct attacks against GVN positions along L-A. On 5 June elements of 165th Regiment are reported moving north towards Song Be Bridge. The 209th Regiment is reported moving into positions east of Ben Cat, and the 141st Regiment is reported moving west towards Route 13 north of Lai Khe.
36. (S) Enemy planning apparently calls for attacking RVNAF wherever they are vulnerable and it is possible that the Communists, who now have caused the commitment of most of ARVN, might use these units to strike other vulnerable targets. In addition, elements of the 271st Regiment, 9th NVA Division, have now been moved into the Iron Triangle.

37. (S) The Communists may feel that heavy personnel losses are warranted in the current attacks in order to blunt the increasing ARVN momentum and cause heavy personnel and materiel expenditures. With the arrival of a replacement pool of approximately 40,000 men since January, enemy losses can be replaced immediately. The price of the current heavy RVNAF commitment may become apparent later this summer.

38. (S) Enemy combat strength in MR-3 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>26 (+2 AAA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>40-45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Personnel</td>
<td>30-35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>190-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>60-90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. (S) During the past month, VC/NVA forces in the northern Delta were primarily concerned with forging an expanded logistical corridor through the Elephant's Foot, and restoring combat capabilities in Tri Phap and Dinh Tuong Province. Aggressive RVNAF operations effectively denied these objectives, especially in northern Kien Tuong (P) and Tri Phap, where Communist forces sustained approximately 1200 and 300 KIA, respectively. Despite these losses, VC/NVA units will continue to receive replacements and enemy strength will fluctuate around these levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>23-24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Personnel</td>
<td>10-12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. (S) The qualitative increase will not be proportional, however, as inexperienced replacements fail to demonstrate the expertise and competence of their predecessors. Other serious enemy problems are the inability to reestablish a logistical base area to replace Tri Phap and buildup supply stocks to support a higher level combat. These developments notwithstanding, VC/NVA elements have reacted with flexibility and arrested their backslide by adopting a mobile defensive posture and restoring to guerrilla tactics. The situation remains fluid and will probably produce moderate to heavy activity in these areas.
41. (S) The lower Delta presents a much less optimistic picture as VC/NVA units pressed on with their campaign to expand domination of contested areas. In contrast to their less successful counterparts in other areas of MR-4, Communist elements in the southern Delta initiate the majority of combat incidents, a trend that has become increasingly evident in the past six months. The Communists are not believed to be planning to depart from their strategy to concentrate on dominating rural areas; however, isolated district towns in An Xuyen, Kien Giang and Chuong Thien also are highly vulnerable. The enemy has succeeded in beginning to erode GVN control without offering lucrative and fixable targets. To capitalize on the current situation, VC/NVA units have the options of increasing shellings of district towns and initiating sapper attacks against key installations and LOC's thus forcing RVNAF into a more defensive role than before. Although a critical threshold has yet to be reached, the established trend is a definite plus for the Communists.

42. (S) In summary, the enemy will probably continue his campaign for limited objectives for the next two or three months. The length and severity of this campaign will depend, at least partly, on the success or failure of RVNAF counterattacks. Recent experience leads us to believe that the enemy is prepared to take moderate casualties and to expend large quantities of ammunition in the campaign. Viewed individually, the limited attacks appear to dissipate enemy combat potential in piecemeal operations that achieve meager results. Viewed as a country-wide campaign, however, the enemy probably sees significant gains accruing to him. It is still possible, however, that as ARVN counter-attacks and security operations decimate more and more enemy units as the summer goes on, the North Vietnamese may realize that their combat power is being dissipated without meaningful gains. If they reach this conclusion, they may then reevaluate this strategy and we may see a sharp decline in combat actions, followed by a period of intensive rebuilding, and ultimately by a general offensive in the winter or spring. On the other hand, if ARVN reaction to this limited objective campaign is ineffective, the enemy may continue this strategy with the purpose of wearing ARVN down to the point where continued resistance becomes eventually impossible.

43. (S) In conclusion, we believe that the limited objective campaign will continue until about the end of July. It will be followed either by a decline in activity, while a reevaluation takes place, or by another similar limited objective campaign.