42. (C) In MR-3, activity was very low and consisted mainly of ABF's and minor ground probes against territorial positions and outlying outposts. The inactivity of main force units was partially compensated by increasing sapper attacks and terrorist incidents in the area surrounding Saigon.

43. (S) The Communist Order of Battle in MR-3 is:

| DIVISIONS | 6 (3 Inf, 1 Arty, 1 Sap, 1 AA) |
| REGIMENTS | 31 |
| BATTALIONS | 170 |
| COMBAT PERSONNEL | 40-45,000 |

44. (S) The principal enemy threat in western MR-3 is posed by the 5th NVA Division, currently located in the Parrot's Beak area. This division is considered the second worst Communist division in-country and has not accomplished its assigned tasks. Brief forays by the division into western MR-3 and along the Kien Tuong Border of MR-4 have not been particularly successful. The future area of operation of this division is unknown, but reports indicate it will again attempt to move into MR-4.

45. (S) Opposing the 5th NVA Division in western MR-3 is the 25th ARVN. Its mission is to assist territorial forces in providing security for western MR-3 and guarding the western and northwestern approaches to Saigon. It is tasked with keeping the lifelines to Tay Ninh City open and meeting the threat posed by the 205th NVA Regiment and 5th NVA Division.

46. (S) The combat effectiveness of the 25th Division has not been seriously tested since the ceasefire. This unit has long had a reputation of non-aggressiveness. Although
47. (S) The Communist Order of Battle in the area is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>0</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGIMENTS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATTALIONS</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT PERSONNEL</td>
<td>22-27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. (S) The principal threat in northern Military Region 4 comes from five Communist Regiments in the Dinh Tuong Province area. These units have suffered from the loss of a major base area in NW Dinh Tuong and do not have the capability to conduct major operations against ARVN units. Consequently, they tend to avoid ARVN and concentrate on territorials. Their principal mission has been an attempt to establish a new base area. To date, they have not been successful, but, should the 5th NVA Division deploy to the area, Communist capabilities will be significantly increased. Opposing these forces are the 7th ARVN Division and part of the 9th.

49. (S) The greatest threat in southern MR-4 is from the four regiments which operate in and around Chuong Thien Province; however, local forces have created sufficient pressure to force the commitment of ARVN. Communist units in the southern Delta have concentrated on eliminating GVN control and territorial positions in outlying areas. Their success has moved them closer to strategic targets, such as district capitals and key LOC's. They will probably continue this pattern.

50. (S) ARVN in the northern Delta can accomplish its missions against the current Communist force there. Should the 5th NVA Division move in, ARVN will be hard-pressed.

51. (S) Intelligence on Communist intentions does not suggest any drastic departures from the current relative lull in country-wide activity in the short term.

52. (S) Communist activity throughout 1974, measured in terms of RVNAF killed-in-action, has been at one of the highest levels of the war. Projecting the current KIA rate through the remaining two months of the year, RVNAF KIA in 1974 will be second only to those suffered in 1972, reflecting considerable Communist success in one of their basic goals of attriting RVNAF.
53. (S) RVNAF KIA (by Communist action) 1966-1974
(Source: AG, RVNAF JGS)

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<td>11,952</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>26,872</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>22,783</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24,057</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>26,956</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>39,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>25,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>28,000 (Est)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. (S) The overall thrust of Communist activity, including command and control and their continuous pressure on RVNAF, signifies a commitment to a primarily military course of action. COSVN Document 08, the gist of which was provided only recently, reiterates the basic goal of attriting RVNAF by cutting them in half, causing the fall of the Thieu Government, and forcing the formation of the "Council of National Reconciliation and Concord." Should the Thieu Government survive this campaign, the document points out that the Communists will launch a general offensive in January 1975. This offensive, which would surpass that of 1968, would isolate ARVN forces defending the perimeters of the cities. If political concessions were not then forthcoming, Communist forces would persevere until the cities had been taken. Military activities would be closely coordinated with anti-GVN political activities during this period.
this evaluation may not be totally accurate, the unit did little
to distinguish itself in the later summer fighting west of Tay
Ninh City or in the base of the Iron Triangle. The division has
a new Commander who formerly commanded the 23rd ARVN Division
and, more recently, the Armor Command.

47. (S) Assuming the VC/NVA do not substantially upgrade their
force structure in western MR-3, the 25th and territorial forces
should be able to accomplish their missions.

48. (S) In Central Military Region 3, COSVN has deployed the
9th and 7th NVA Divisions with QL-13 roughly being the dividing
line. The 9th NVA Division is understrength as a result of
constant commitment since last spring, 1975 infiltrators will
probably bring it up to strength. It has not been particularly
effective in offensive actions, but has proven, in the case of
Route 7, to be adept at holding terrain. The 7TH NVA Division
has also suffered heavy losses and needs some replacements. It
also has not been particularly effective in attacking major
ARVN field positions. At least one additional NVA division will
be required to conduct effective offensive operations in GVN
MR-3.

49. (S) Opposing these two Communist divisions is the 5th
ARVN Division, supported by two or three ARVN regiments from
other divisions in MR-3. Its mission is to guard the northern
approaches to Saigon. The 5th ARVN Division is considered
marginally effective. The battalion combat strength in two
of the division's three regiments was reduced to approximately
300 per battalion by early October due to the division's
commitment on Route 7 southwest of Ben Cat.

50. (S) If a reinforced 9th NVA Division launches a combined
arms attack against the ARVN 5th, the ARVN will probably
suffer some initial territorial losses. We believe, how-
ever, that this division, with support from other ARVN units,
will bend rather than break, as long as the opposing force
is relatively equal.
55. (S) Although the goal of destroying half of RVNAF is obviously exaggerated, the call for a general offensive is consistent with other reporting from a number of sources. A nationwide general offensive of this magnitude is probably beyond the current capabilities of Communist forces in SVN. A substantial infiltration effort would be required and the deployment of substantial portions of the NVN strategic reserve would be expected. Activity on these two fronts will be key indicators of NVA intentions in 1975.

56. (S) In the meantime, the Communists will continue to maintain constant pressure on the RVNAF attempt to exploit and maximize internal dissension in the GVN and continue to build their military might.
51. (S) Elements of the 7th NVA Division and two other regiments (33d and 274th) are the principal enemy forces in eastern MR-3. The Communists apparently plan to use two regiments in the area as the core of a new division. With the addition of another regiment to the area, this new division could be successful in interdicting key LOC's and harassing GVN positions and populated areas. Terrain favors 7th Division attempts to move south towards Bien Hoa, but it is doubtful whether it could permanently secure the area just north of the Dong Nai River.

52. (S) The 18th ARVN Division has the responsibility of defending the eastern part of the region, including the critical area north of Bien Hoa. In addition, the division is the corps mobile reserve. The 18th Division is considered the best division in MR-3. Heavy losses of NCO's and company grade officers in mid-1974 fighting, however, have lowered combat leadership in this unit. In the event of major regionwide attacks, the division can accomplish its mission of reinforcing the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions in central MR-3, but not without sacrificing security in the eastern part of the region.

53. (S) Throughout MR-3, based upon the current Communist threat, RVNAF are capable of performing their assigned missions, defending their AO's, and successfully reacting to Communist initiatives.

54. (C) Activity in MR-4 was at its lowest level since June. The usual monthly highpoint was far less damaging than preceding ones, but it did allow the VC/NVA to consolidate their position in critical areas of western and southern Phong Dinh Province. Nevertheless, the well-established pattern of deteriorating security and GVN control continued despite relatively low level of VC/NVA initiatives. Current indications point to stepped up activity for the remainder of the year, as Communist forces begin their yearly rice and tax collection effort.
55. (S) The Communist Order of Battle in the area is:

DIVISIONS 0
REGIMENTS 14
BATTALIONS 85
COMBAT PERSONNEL 22-27,000

56. (S) The principal threat in northern Military Region 4 comes from five Communist Regiments in the Dinh Tuong Province area. These units have suffered from the loss of a major base area in NW Dinh Tuong and do not have the capability to conduct major operations against ARVN units. Consequently, they tend to avoid ARVN and concentrate on territorials. Their principal mission has been an attempt to establish a new base area. To date, they have not been successful, but, should the 5th NVA Division deploy to the area, Communist capabilities will be significantly increased. Opposing these forces are the 7th ARVN Division and part of the 9th.

57. (S) The 7th Division is rated the best ARVN Division in MR-4. The prime factors behind the 7th's success appear to be good leadership combined with an aggressive attitude. Major problems encountered by the 7th are a constant drain of combat casualties and cutbacks in support. During intervals between assignments of trainees, combat battalion strength of the 7th Division has dropped from 400 to below 350.

58. (S) The 9th Division has also acquitted itself well. Its AO and mission are different in nature from that of the 7th in that its regiments are spread out across the northern half of the Delta and very seldom operate with each other. Due to constant combat commitment, the 9th has a desertion rate higher than the other two divisions of MR-4. This has not, however, seriously detracted from the combat capabilities.
of the 9th up to this point, and its battalion strength generally remains close to 400. Performance of the 9th should remain satisfactory within the near term.

59. (S) The greatest threat in southern MR-4 is from the four regiments which operate in and around Chuong Thien Province; however, local forces have created sufficient pressure to force the commitment of ARVN. Communist units in the southern Delta have concentrated on eliminating GVN control and territorial positions in outlying areas. Their success has moved them closer to strategic targets, such as district capitals and key LOC's. They will probably continue this pattern.

60. (S) The principal ARVN unit in the southern Delta is the 21st Division. It is not rated highly affective. Despite a recent change of command, some time will be required to turn it around.

61. (S) ARVN in the northern Delta can accomplish its missions against the current Communist force there. Should the 5th NVA Division move in, ARVN will be hard-pressed. In the southern Delta, the poor territorial performance has exacerbated already serious 21st Division problems. Further deterioration is expected.

62. (S) Intelligence on Communist intentions does not suggest any drastic departures from the current relative lull in country-wide activity in the short term.

63. (S) Communist activity throughout 1974, measured in terms of RVNAF killed-in-action, has been at one of the highest levels of the war. Projecting the current KIA rate through the remaining two months of the year, RVNAF KIA in 1974 will be second only to those suffered in 1972, reflecting considerable Communist success in one of their basic goals of attriting RVNAF.
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