1. (U) USDAO Saigon Monthly Intelligence Summary and Threat Analysis (MISTA) for November 1974 follows.

2. (C) This month's MISTA contains the following subjects:

   **North Vietnam**
   - Infiltration
   - Conscription

   **South Vietnam**
   - Base Areas
   - Communist Strategy
   - Activity by MR

**Conclusion:**

3. (S) Total infiltration this year is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Infiltration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>17,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>9,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>18,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>21,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>2,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>7,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>3,190*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The December figure reflects only six groups to-date, but more are expected.
4. (S) In related activity, Hanoi continues to conduct conscription drives to provide trained troops to meet its manpower needs in the South and maintain unit strengths in NVN. Youths conscripted during the present recruitment campaign would be ready to start to infiltrate by Feb/Mar 1975. Hanoi's news media claim that many local quotas have been met or exceeded, but several months ago there were indications of difficulties in satisfying quotas. This may partially explain why the current recruitment campaign is being conducted so soon after the drive held in the late summer. Although the intensity of the drive is not known, several hundred thousand NVN males come of age each year and are subject to conscription. In short, NVN could send over 100,000 combat replacements South without seriously affecting its reserves in the North.

5. (S) Concerning the NVA's POL pipeline, on 29 Nov, a five-man ARVN Raider Team was helilifted into an area on the Darlac Prov-Khmer border, to measure and interdict the pipeline. The following information on the pipeline was obtained:

a. The pipe (according to the team) appears to be cast iron and is approximately four inches in diameter.

b. No identification markings were noted on the pipe.

c. A foot trail runs along the pipeline.

d. Pipe was probably installed about 2 months ago.

e. No evidence of fuel was noted in the pipe.

6. (U) The following, prepared by the ARVN J-2 Staff, discusses the base areas (BA) and logistical sites to which NVN supplies are destined. The new base area study reflects significant changes over the past six months.

7. (U) BA is defined as an area in which the Communists establish their commun systems, logistical/rear service facilities, defensive fortifications, or other physical structures to be used for:

A. Initiating military activities in adjacent areas.

B. Concentrating storage sites and supply installations to facilitate distribution of supplies to combat units.
c. Training, retraining, receiving replacements, reorganizing, and refitting units.

d. Quartering military headquarters temporarily or permanently.

8. (U) The areas and boundaries should not be considered as fixed or under permanent Communist control. These areas are only temporarily established to support operational requirements.

9. (C) In GVN MR-1, four existing BA (100, 112, 128 and 129) have been reconfigured and shifted to East and South, reflecting changes in enemy activity and logistics developments. In adjacent border areas of Laos two BA's (607 and 614) have been dropped. In-country portions of BA 607 have been integrated into BA 129 and used to establish the newly designated area 131 in Quang Nam Province. In-country portions of BA 614 now constitute the new BA 130 in the Kham Duc area of Quang Tin Province. Both of these new areas are important logistics stations on the Route 14 complex.

10. (C) In GVN MR-2, all traditional BA remained unchanged. The J-2/JGS has, however, designated three new BA's. The An Lac logistics area in Binh Dinh Province has been designated BA 225, reestablishing an area dropped in 1968. In Kontum Province, BA 253 has been established reflecting increased enemy development of the Route 613/615 complex in the Plei Trap Valley. Corresponding to this change, BA 702 in adjacent Cambodia has been reduced to reflect the separate nature of Communist activities in these areas. BA 251 on the Binh Thuan/Binh Tuy Province border has been reestablished for the first time since 1971, reflecting increased development of the VC MR-6 Headquarters complex.

11. (C) In GVN MR-3, BA 300 has been dropped, reflecting a decrease in Communist activity, and several others (303, 351, 352, 356 and 702 (Cambodia)) have been reconfigured, reflecting changes in friendly and VC/NVA areas of control. Changes in BA 351 and 352 and dropping four BA's (711, 712, 714, and 715) in adjacent areas of Cambodia reflect movement in-country of major VC/NVA logistics installations and activities.

12. (C) In GVN MR-4, three areas (470, 480, and 490) have been reconfigured. BA's 470 and 490 have been constricted as a result of increased GVN control in these areas. BA 480
has been enlarged, reflecting increased Communist rear service development in South Kieng Giang Province.

13. (C) In its first unilateral base area study in July 1973, J-2/JGS designated six new areas as overt logistical support areas: Dong Ha/Cam Lo/Khe Sanh in MR-1; An Lao Co and Tan Canh in MR-2; Loc Ninh and Xa Mat/Thien Ngon in MR-3. As previously mentioned, the An Lao area has been re-designated as resurrected traditional BA 225. Of the remaining areas, the Tan Canh area has been expanded North to include new logistics developments via Dak Seang and along Routes 14 and 609. In MR-3, the Thien Ngon area has been expanded South to include increased activity in the Tral Bi area.

14. (C) Thus, throughout SVN, the Communists have continued a trend established since the January 1973 ceasefire by placing increasing emphasis upon in-country logistical and rear service development, and by improving and expanding in-country bases.

15. (S) COSVN guidance indicates that a significantly heightened level of military activity is planned by Hanoi for 1975. The guidance, issued in August in the form of a COSVN resolution for 1975, places top priority on inflicting a fundamental defeat upon the GVN Pacification Program. The resolution, to be implemented immediately, calls for an initial wave of widespread attacks, followed by attacks on the most vulnerable GVN areas. The document, only the gist of which has been recently provided, states the Communists have made considerable strides during 1974 while the GVN has been weakened further.

16. (S) GVN handicaps are assessed as follows by the Communists:

a. Military:

(1) Acute troop shortages
(2) Desertion rate twice as great as casualty rate.
(3) LF unequal to their tasks
(4) Morale declining
(5) Budgetary constraints on air and artillery.
b. Economic:

(1) U.S. aid reduction
(2) Cost of living increase of 200 per cent
(3) Unemployment and threat of famine
(4) Near stoppage of business and industry
(5) Economic blockage of Communists a failure

17. (S) Conversely, the Communists claim their position has improved on all major fronts and the document asserts that the Communists now have the capability to win victories leading to accomplishment of the revolution.

18. (S) Projecting the course of the revolution in 1975, the resolution envisions two potentialities:

a. Continued military, economic, political, and diplomatic pressure by the Communists will topple the Thieu Government and force implementation of the Paris Agreement.

b. The GVN will accomplish much of its Pacification Program, stabilize the government and recover its war capabilities which will lead to abandonment of the Paris Agreement and a return to war.

19. (S) The first potentiality is contingent upon keeping armed violence in the forefront. The second potentiality is considered a remote possibility, but must be considered. The key mission, therefore, is to defeat pacification and push the GVN toward potentiality one, which envisions a favorable negotiated settlement.

20. (S) To inflict a fundamental defeat upon the Pacification Program, the following goals must be achieved:

a. Kill one-third of the GVN armed forces
b. Remove all isolated GVN outposts
c. Liberate the bulk of the countryside
d. Gain control of additional population

e. Cut key LOCs and isolate Saigon

f. Liberate Binh Dinh, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces

g. Develop the revolutionary spirit among the masses

21 (S) A counter-pacification and area upgrading campaign is to be launched from January through June 1975, striking initially on a wide front, then concentrating on the GVN's most vulnerable areas. Preparations were to have been completed by the end of November with initiation of the campaign to be as early as December. Emphasis is to be placed on the provinces surrounding Saigon, designed, in part, to pull an ARVN division from the Delta. The bulk of the Delta countryside is to be liberated. To the north, activity will be controlled directly by Hanoi in MR-5 and the B-3 Front, where the resolution asserts that the fundamental defeat of pacification will lead to total victory in 1976.

22. (S) At a minimum, then, early 1975 will probably mark the beginning of significantly increased military pressure against the GVN. Within this context, analysis of current military activity and anticipated activity in each military region follows.

23. (C) In MR-1, during the past month, activity continued at a moderate level. NVA units (5th, 6th, and 271st Regiments) deployed Southwest of Hue continued to oppose RVNAF efforts to secure Mo Tau and Bong Mountains. In Quang Nam, airborne units successfully resecured Hill 1062 and consolidated their positions against opposition from elements of the 304th Division. Further South, in Quang Ngai, elements of the Quang Ngai Province Unit continued to resist ARVN clearing operations in Binh Son and Mo Duc Districts.

24. (S) There were increased indications in November that the NVA is preparing for a major military campaign in the MR-1 lowlands:

   a. Reinforcement of the Thua Thien battlefield South of Hue by the 271st and 6th Regiments in the foothills overlooking Phu Bai provides the NVA with distinct terrain and military
advantages. Additionally, a rallier from the 304th Division stated that the 9th Regiment had surveyed positions in South Thua Thien during September. Another rallier stated that coordinated attacks by elements of 304th, 324B, and 325th Divisions would be conducted possibly in late 1974 against RVNAF deployed around Hue.

b. Briefings to 324B Division cadre during August indicated that, once the high ground south of Hue had been secured (and it has), attacks would be directed against the GVN lowlands in Phu Loc District. Prior to the attacks into the GVN lowlands, the NVA was to consolidate its positions.

25. (C) In Quang Nam Province, the inability of the 304th Division to secure Hill 1062 limits NVA initiative in this area. PW's from the 304th Division have indicated NVA intentions to seize Dai Loc during the MR-1 dry season, provided that Hill 1062 can be secured during the period of heavy rains. According to some of the PW's, the 29th Regiment, formerly of the 324B Division, has been resubordinated to the 304th, bringing the latter back up to three infantry regiments.

26. (C) In South Quang Nam, a recent PW from the 2nd Division has indicated that all units of the 2nd are currently in training which is to continue until the last week in December. After that time, the division will conduct attacks in the Quezon Valley and against Thang Binh District Seat.

27. (C) In Quang Tri, a recently captured document states that Communist units are to consolidate their "liberated areas" and to continue attacks on GVN resettlement areas and LOC's until the end of 1974.

28. (S) Overall in MR-1, NVA/VC forces could make some limited gains, if the Communists either reinforce from the North or concentrate their forces against selected specific areas. Otherwise, RVNAF forces are sufficient to meet most NVA/VC threats.

a. In South Thua Thien, NVA forces are already concentrated and could make limited gains against RVNAF units; however, additional reinforcements would probably be needed to fully accomplish their objectives.
b. In Quang Nam, NVA units would have to make a major redeployment or receive substantial reinforcements in order to accomplish their objectives.

c. In the Queson Valley, there are already some indications of NVA unit redeployments, and they could be expected to make some limited gains in securing territory and population.

d. In Quang Ngai, attacks can be expected in opposition to ARVN clearing operations and to consolidate NVA "liberated areas".

29. (C) Communist activity in MR-2 during the past month continued at relatively low levels. In the central highland, military activity consisted of the usual light contacts, ABF's and probing actions North of Kontum City and West and Southwest of Pleiku City. In the coastal lowlands, VC units conducted light probing attacks harrassed LOC's, and conducted sapper attacks against SVN installations from Binh Dinh to Ninh Thuan. In Binh Dinh, Province Unit forces completed rebuilding and stepped-up activity along QL-1 in the central and southern districts and harrassed QL-19 in Binh Khe District, while 3d NVA Division elements continued their ineffective efforts to counter the ARVN intrusion into the An Lao Valley.

30. (S) There have been virtually no direct indications of Communist intentions in the central highlands. The COSVN directive for 1975 did, however, indicate the B-3 Front would be the scene of major military activity. Additional information will be required to determine the actual scope of this activity.

31. (S) There were increasing indications during November that Communist forces are planning and preparing for a new military campaign in the coastal areas in early 1975. During the latter stages of the summer campaign in Binh Dinh, Province, ralliers and PW's had indicated new attacks would come in January 1975. A recent railler reports preparations for a three-phased Winter-Spring campaign, which will culminate in January or February 1975 in province-wide major attacks by 3d Division and Binh Dinh Province Unit forces. An agent report corroborates the major points of the railler's report. Principal objectives will be to seize population and territory. Military targets and Communist forces are nearly identical to those involved in the recent summer campaign.
32. (C) Recent information from province-level documents in Khanh Hoa Province and from low level cadre in Phu Yen also indicate Communist plans to initiate widespread attacks with unreinforced available units in December 1974 or January 1975. The Khanh Hoa documents, taken from the Province nit headquarter on 1 November, outline an ambitious program in two phases over a period of 30-35 days to attrite RVNAF, disrupt GVN facilities and rear areas, and interdict LOC's.

33. (S) Thus, there are strong indications that Communist military activity during the coming month will reflect an increase in low level attacks, probing of GVN reactions, harassment of LOC's and attacks on GVN depots and installations, all in an attempt to generate momentum for large scale attacks sometime during late December or January. The timing of Communist progression through preliminary stages to major attacks will depend upon initial successes. The rallier in Binh Dinh indicated that second phase low level attacks could last from six to ten weeks, with major attacks to come anytime from mid-January to mid-February 1975.

34. (S) An estimate of Communist intentions, as outlined by these sources, compared with VC/NVA military capabilities in the coastal provinces, particularly Binh Dinh, indicates these plans may be overly ambitious. Recent GVN military successes in the lowlands and Communist defeats or very limited gains, using the same forces against basically the same targets, must be considered. GVN commanders in Binh Dinh have expressed considerable optimism concerning prospects of further victories. Major attacks in the coastal lowlands by existing forces would not result in tangible gains for the Communists.

35. (S) In the central highland, as in the lowlands, existing Communist forces probably could not achieve lasting significant gains from large scale attacks without major outside reinforcements.

36. (C) In MR-3, fighting remained at a low level, as Communist main forces continued the pattern of avoiding major contacts. Fighting consisted mainly of minor ABF's and contacts scattered throughout the region.
37. (S) The most significant activity consisted of the following:
   a. RVNAF recaptured Rach Bap
   b. 205th Regiment assumed AO of 6th Regiment/5th Division in West Tay Ninh Province
   c. 2x57MM radar controlled AA sites identified vic Loc Ninh.
   d. Possible reorganization of 75th Artillery Division.

38. (S) Preliminary information indicates an ongoing, yet not confirmed, integration of fire support units and sappers under division control throughout MR-3. All divisions are expected to have an artillery and sapper regiment plus integral armor support attached directly to the division. When completed, this will allow an integrated, combined-arms force to deploy and fight under division control.

39. (S) In the COSVN area, the Communist have also redesignated their regions. MR's 1, 2, 3 and 4 are now MR's 7, 8, 9 and Saigon-Gia Dinh MR, respectively. These actions are reportedly part of a program to redesignate, and in some cases, reconfigure, military regions throughout Vietnam, thus returning to the system used in the early 1960's, when the MR's were numbered sequentially from the China border to Ca Mau. This illustrates Hanoi's open admission of control over the Communist war effort in the South and helps foster the image of one-country, one-army within the Communist ranks. The changes are more political than military and should not affect current Communist command and control. Henceforth, we will refer to the MR's as DRV MR's.

40. (S) Regarding Communist intentions to MR-3, recent reporting and the COSVN resolution for 1975 indicate goals and objectives are to:
   a. Inflict heavy losses upon RVNAF
   b. Mount counter-pacification effort
   c. Secure corridor in Western MR-3 into MR-4
   d. Increase pressure in Tay Ninh Province
41. (S) Specifically, there are indications of:

a. Heavy attacks in East and South Tay Ninh Province by the 205th Regt and Tay Ninh Province unit.

b. The deployment to, or formation of a division in Tay Ninh Province.

c. Attempts by 5th NVA Div and MR-8 elements to eliminate all GVN presence West of Vam Co Dong River, including Duc Hue outpost.

d. Attacks by NVA Regts in Hau Nghia, West Binh Duong and North Bien Hoa Provinces and resettlement areas in eastern MR-3.

42. (S) Reporting has emphasized a December to June time period. DAO Saigon does not believe strong attacks will occur before late December.

43. (S) The most sensitive area mentioned for possible major attacks is Tay Ninh Province with the current VC/NVA forces (4,500 main force, 1,000 local force), the Communists could inflict moderate losses upon RVNAF (5,600 ARVN, 9,000 RF/PF) and make resupply of Tay Ninh City a hazardous proposition for a short period. However, the Communists' chances of making major lasting gains will be small, unless the Communists can reinforce their units in this area and force the withdrawal of the majority of the 25th ARVN Division to central MR-3. The key to this success, or a successful attempt to draw RVNAF into another Iron Triangle type meat grinder early in the COSVN dry season and then try to hit ARVN units hard after they have been weakened. We view the Communists' chances of major lasting successes as small.

44. (S) If VC/NVA forces launch major attacks in MR-3 during the COSVN dry season, they will probably be able to score moderate successes. We could expect initial GVN losses as the RVNAF absorbed the first heavy blows. Once the initial blow was taken, a stabilized war of attrition involving both sides might develop. Currently, the Communists do not have the necessary manpower to capture and hold sensitive areas of MR-3.
45. (S) The monthly highpoint in MR-4 was characterized by a pronounced upswing in the upper Delta which exceeded previous levels of combat. VC/NVA units, departing from usual reaction and harassment tactics, launched attacks against RVNAF along key LOC's and canals in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces. Similar attacks were concentrated in East and West Dinh Tuong. The Communists succeeded in denying RVNAF the ability to break loose and conduct operations to intercept the 5th NVA Div which is believed to be entering the upper Delta.

46. (C) The lower Delta was relatively quiet. The exceptions were Vinh Long and An Xuyen Provinces, where Communist success should not be measured solely in overrun outposts, but also by the fact that eight VC bns were able to force the commitment of seven ARVN bns and an armored Cav squadron in reaction to VC initiatives. The reaction blunted the effectiveness of Communist attacks, but did not inflict high losses on VC units. Of possible greater significance, the lower Delta's six Communist regts remained uncommitted for the second month.

47. (S) Current information points to heightened activity in the upper Delta in December or early January:

   a. COSVN directive for 1975
   b. (1) Seize bulk of territory in Delta
   c. (2) Move 5th Div to MR-4 (screened by recent high point).
   d. Large ammo shipments
   e. Establishment and improvement of hospitals
   f. Forming of 8th NVA Div.

48. (S) For early 1975, Communist activity will include widespread attacks throughout the Delta. Major LOC's will be subject to periodic interdiction and some weakly defended towns in the lower Delta may fall.
49. (S) The sustained performance of 7th ARVN and 5th NVA Div units will be critical factor. The 7th Div is battle tested and has proved superior to main force Communist regts in Dinh Tuong. Prolonged combat, however, may produce a casualty drain sufficient to reduce 7th Div capabilities. The 5th NVA Div, on the other hand, is relatively untested and has not performed well in previous missions. The goal will be to wear down RVNAF in outlying areas, while also attempting to force RVNAF to engage in counter operations to secure key LOC's and installations.

50. (S) Indicators for the lower Delta are as follows:

a. COSVN directive for 1975: Seize bulk of territory in Delta.

b. Reliable reports of planned:
   (1) Extensive attacks
   (2) LOC interdactions
   (3) Sapper probes in urban areas
   (4) Increased control in rural areas

c. Main force uncommitted for 2 months and training.

d. VC/NVA tactical initiative.

51. (S) The lower Delta poses different problems for both RVNAF and the Communists in that the battlefield is spreadout. The SVN position here is much more exploitable than in the upper Delta and, in the event of a concerted VC/NVA push, RVNAF territorial control will be contracted during initial attacks. This could well include the loss of several district towns in An Xuyen, Kien Giang and Chuong Thien Province, a possibility recognized by the respective Province Chiefs.

52. (S) In the lower Delta, RVNAF, by virtue of its numbers and armament, has more staying power than the Communists, and attrition could well be a critical factor. For the Delta as a whole, the Communists are facing conditions which have been brought about by VC/NVA pressure during the year and are further exploitable at this juncture:
A. Decreased RVNAF tactical flexibility
B. Inconsistent territorial performance
C. Communist battlefield initiative
D. Territorial gains and increased access to key target areas due to 1974 Communist successes.
E. Possible deployment of MR-4 resources to meet future exigencies in GVN MR-3.

53. (S) Conclusion

A. Although the current level of Communist military activity is relatively low, the weight of available evidence points to a pronounced increase in Communist military operations throughout SVN in the coming months. These operations will have an intermediate goal of forcing a negotiated settlement favorable to Hanoi, but the guidance stresses that even negotiations will not deter continued military pressure.

B. From a practical standpoint, Hanoi currently does not have the military manpower in SVN to alter the fundamental situation. NVA/VC forces would require substantial augmentation through infiltration of combat personnel and the introduction of reserve forces from NVN.

C. The DRV is preparing for and planning to conduct major offensive operations against SVN during the current dry season. This offensive will include strong attacks in all four GVN MR's. Success will depend largely on the amount and quality of replacements received to fill depleted NVA units and the extent of employment in the South of the strategic reserve from the North.