1. (C) This Month's Intelligence Summary and Threat Analysis contains the following subjects:

- NVN Political Developments
- Recruitment
- Infiltration
- Military Region Review
- Conclusion

NVN Political Developments

2. (U) Hanoi and Peking media indicate that a high level military delegation from the People's Republic of China (PRC) arrived in Hanoi on 28 February. The visit is reportedly at the invitation of the North Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense. The purpose of the visit is not known at this time. There are also press reports that Nikolay Firyubin, Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, is on an unannounced visit to North Vietnam.

Recruitment

3. (S) There are tenuous indications that North Vietnam has initiated its first major military recruitment campaign in 1975. There is insufficient information to measure accurately the overall intensity of the on-going effort. Nevertheless, training cycles in NVN have been shortened from the six months training most recruits received last year. Moreover, the large manpower base in NVN can support projected infiltration starts of two groups a day indefinitely.

Infiltration

4. (S) Infiltration of replacement personnel to the Republic of Vietnam has also increased. If the current rate continues throughout March, April and May, over 125,000 NVA will arrive in RVN by the start of the rainy season. This would be over a 50 percent increase over the same period for 1972 and nearly the same for the like period in 1968:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>25,400</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>20,100</td>
<td>25,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>30,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125,900</td>
<td>83,500</td>
<td>130,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (S) Since 1973, the NVA has significantly increased its armor and artillery inventories in South Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMOR*</th>
<th>NVA</th>
<th>28 JAN 73</th>
<th>31 JAN 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>150-250</td>
<td>220-260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In SVN</td>
<td>90-115</td>
<td>665-750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>240-365</td>
<td>885-1,010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes a few armored personnel carriers

Shown below is ARVN's tank inventory. These numbers include only operable equipment in field units. They do not include tanks in maintenance or maintenance float.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARVN TANKS</th>
<th>28 JAN 73</th>
<th>31 JAN 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-41</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In artillery, RVNAF has a slight advantage overall which is often negated when the enemy fires at known RVNAF positions from covert ones:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NVA 28 JAN 73</th>
<th>31 JAN 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns (85-130MM)</td>
<td>85-105</td>
<td>350-490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars (120-240MM)</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>82-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets (107-140MM)</td>
<td>500-750</td>
<td>875-1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>610-905</td>
<td>1,297-1,601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARVN*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105MM</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155MM</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175 SP Gun</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes only operable equipment in field units.

6. (S) There are several tenuous indicators of major offensive activity in the very near term. The following Military Region discussions review the Communists' chances for success, given their current force structure.

**Military Region Review**

7. (S) Military activity in MR-1 during the month consisted of Communist harassing actions and attacks by fire against ARVN positions. Activity continued to center on RVNAF operations in Quang Ngai Province, as ARVN 2nd Division efforts continue to dislodge elements of the 52nd Brigade from the highground in Nghia Hanh District. To date, the 2nd Division, supported by the 12th Ranger Group, has achieved some primary objectives.

8. (S) Elsewhere in MR-1, activity was primarily confined to Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. ARVN 1st Division forces were able to reoccupy Hill 273 (YC9299) successfully. In Quang Nam Province, ARVN 3rd Division conducted artillery and air strikes against NVA 304th Division positions west of...
Duc Duc District Town. Activity continued in Dai Loc District, as elements of the 3rd ARVN Airborne Brigade attempted to expand GVN-controlled areas.

9. (S) Concerning the balance of forces in the region, there have been indications of introduction of new Communist units; overall, however, NVA and RVNAF forces are evenly matched.

10. (S) In northern MR-1, NVA 325th Division and associated units are deployed opposite the Marine Division and GVN territorial forces. The 325th Division has not been involved in significant activity since the spring of 1974 and should be capable of conducting major attacks against RVNAF. The 4th Regiment/MRRTT, which was involved in recent activity, has apparently been reinforced by the 18th Regiment/325th Division. The Marine Division is rated as highly effective and has performed well against enemy attacks. Quang Tri Regional Forces OPCON to the division are considered able; however, those of Thua Thien are less so. Equipment problems continue to plague these units. Lack of communications gear could create serious problems in the event of an all-out Communist offensive, particularly if the Marines are forced to withdraw in order to defend Hue.

11. (S) Further South in Thua Thien Province, NVA 324B Division is located near the highground south of Hue. The division is supported by one armor, one artillery and four independent infantry regiments. Since heavy fighting around Mo Tau subsided in early January, elements of the 324B have had an opportunity to rest and refit. Facing the 324B Division is ARVN 1st Division. It demonstrated its offensive capability in its successful efforts to retake the highground south of Hue in December and January. Recently, the division has been engaged in only minor activity. Replacements appear to be adequate to meet division's quantitative requirements, although their quality is questionable due to the high percentage of deserters. Major NVA initiatives would seriously strain the 1st Division and the Communists may regain the highground lost around Mo Tau and press attacks along QL-1 in Phu Loc District.

12. (S) In northern MR-1, neither side is expected to make major gains, given the present force structure; however, there are tenuous indications that the 341st NVA Division may deploy to MR-1.

13. (S) The introduction of the 341st NVA Division would substantially alter this assessment. It would be able to conduct limited operations and possibly relieve the 325th
Division for operations elsewhere in MR-1. The increased NVA force structure in the Song Bo River Valley might permit the Communists to seize the An Lo Bridge (YD 6230). However, without the introduction of elements of the strategic reserve, major objectives, such as forcing withdrawal of the Marine or capture of Hue, do not appear to be within Communist capabilities.

14. (S) In southern MR-1, NVA main forces consist primarily of the 2nd and 304th NVA Divisions. Both divisions appear to be preparing for increased activity. Elements of the 304th have shifted south of Thuong Duc in preparations for possible attacks in Duc Duc District and the 2nd Division is in a position to conduct attacks in Thien Phuoc District in Quang Tin Province. Both divisions have the capability to launch major attacks.

15. (S) Opposing these forces are the 1st and 3rd Airborne Brigades deployed along LTL-4 between Thuong Duc and Danang and elements of ARVN 3rd Division currently deployed throughout Quang Nam Province. In late January, the 3rd Division recovered critical highground located at the eastern end of Queson Valley, which improved defense along major approaches to Duy Xuyen District Town and QL-1. The 916th RF Group and the 77th Ranger Battalion are deployed in the vicinity of Thien Phuoc District Town. Airborne units have responded well to NVA initiatives and appear capable of containing major Communist attacks. The 3rd ARVN Division remains generally effective.

16. (S) The remaining NVA forces in MR-1 are the 52nd Brigade and local force units of Quang Ngai Provincial Unit. The capability of the 52nd Brigade to conduct major operations in the near future has been degraded due to recent RVNAF operations in the province. Local forces retain the capability to conduct minor attacks, and are expected to do so in an effort to relieve pressure on the 52nd Brigade. The 2nd Division is moderately capable of providing security for QL-1, but might not be able to contain major attacks, should the 52nd Brigade be significantly reinforced.

17. (S) Given the current force structure, the Communists can make only minimal overall gains in the near term. They may attempt to regain control of the highground around Mo Tau and Bong Mountains in southern Thua Thien Province. Heavy fighting can be expected in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces and the Communists may make some minor gains in isolated areas. Unless elements of the NVA strategic reserve
are committed, GVN forces will probably maintain control of the most important areas and continue to inflict costly casualties on Communist forces.

18. (C) In MR-2, activity during February was limited to local force harassment in Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Darlac. Since 28 February, however, anticipated major Communist attacks began developing in Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa.

19. (C) Concerning the balance of forces in the region, there have been some qualitative changes in military forces, as well as the introduction and creation of new Communist units, in recent months.

20. (C) In Binh Dinh Province, the 3rd NVA Division has operated since late January 1974 against elements of the 22nd ARVN Division. After extensive rebuilding following heavy losses in the 1974 campaign, the 3rd Division is again considered combat effective. The division has upgraded and augmented its artillery support through the creation of the 68th Artillery Regiment, which has up to 150MM field gun capability. In mid-February, major division elements began deploying southward to the QL-19 area in Binh Khe District. Attacks began on 4 March against RVNAF positions along the road and in the An Khe Pass. A recent raillier stated that the campaign would be guided by the following slogans, which may reflect the scope of Communist intentions: "Repeat 1968, Attack as in Nguyen Hue Campaign in 1972, Victory like Dien Bien Phu."

21. (C) At the end of February, the 22nd ARVN Division had all four of its regiments in Binh Dinh, all of which were committed to the fighting in late 1974. All regiments have performed well, with the exception of the 47th which displayed a lack of offensive drive last year. This unit has, however, undergone refitting and unit training, and has received new leadership since that time. The division had a respite from intensive combat for over a month, but continued to conduct clearing operations designed to preempt major Communist initiatives. The 47th Regiment bore the brunt of initial Communist attacks on 4 March and had one battalion overrun.

22. (C) On balance, the 22nd ARVN Division is not only capable of defending its AO, but can and has conducted aggressive offensive operations. The 3rd NVA Division probably has a limited offensive capability and could probably conduct major attacks for 10 - 15 days. A recent PW from the 2nd Regiment reported, however, that Communist forces would attempt to hold QL-19 for three months. With the southward shift of
most 3rd Division elements, the Communists probably still intend to reinforce northern Binh Dinh with elements of the 52nd Brigade from Quang Ngai Province. The move of the 52nd was precluded by RVNAF operations in Quang Ngai, and 3rd Division operations were at least temporarily delayed by the 22nd ARVN Division's operations. With the possibility of continued 3rd Division attacks in Binh Dinh, the 22nd Division faces the prospect of securing LOC's in Binh Dinh, as well as possibly being ordered to move some elements to the central highlands for the developing dry season campaign there. In that event, ARVN responsibility for the defense of populated areas in Binh Dinh will fall largely to ranger and territorial force units.

23. (C) In coordination with attacks in Binh Dinh, Communist forces have, since 28 February, launched a series of ground probes and ABF's against RVNAF positions northwest of Kontum City and in Thanh An District. Pleiku Province. Early on 4 March, probable 95B Regiment forces interdicted QL-19 in seven places in Le Trung District, Pleiku Province, effectively closing the road. On 5 March, probable 25th Regiment elements interdicted QL-21 and attacked and overran RF positions in Khanh Duong District, Khanh Hoa Province.

24. (C) In the central highlands, B-3 Front responsibility is now shared among the 10th, 320th and 968th NVA Divisions. The 10th and 320th Divisions have engaged in only sporadic activity in recent months and are considered combat-effective. The 968th Division, recently deployed from South Laos, has not engaged in combat activity in two years and is not considered as effective.

25. (C) In Kontum Province, the 10th Division is estimated to be at near full strength, although the division has been reduced from four to three infantry regiments. Most of the division's activity in recent months has been limited to an aggressive defense of LOC's and territory around Kontum City. The division is conducting limited attacks against forward RVNAF positions around the city and presents a credible threat to critical LOC's in southern Kontum. Outside reinforcements would be required for major 10th Division attacks.

26. (S) In Pleiku, the situation is more confusing. Reporting during January indicated the entire 320th had moved to the Pleiku/Darlac border area; however, the developing trend of attacks indicate some division elements may remain in their normal AO's. If consolidated, the division
would have the capability to launch limited attacks against specific targets in either province. At least two regiments of the division are considered combat effective, but the other regiment, the 9th, has suffered for over a year from morale, health and discipline problems.

27. (C) The 968th Division has been untested for two years. This lack of activity and the division's apparent split AO, with two regiments presumed to be in Pleiku and one in Kontum, make the 968th a less dangerous threat. The division could, however, conduct limited operations in support of the 10th or 320th Division attacks.

28. (C) Responsibility for the defense of the central highlands is shared by the 23rd ARVN Division and the 2nd Corps Ranger Command. The 23rd Division has elements spread over Pleiku, Da Lat and Quang Duc Provinces. Most battalions of the division are understrength and the division suffers from equipment shortages and generally low morale.

29. (C) The Ranger Command was given operational responsibility for the first time in late 1974, with plans to consolidate its five integral groups and two strategic reserve groups in Kontum Province. Currently, four groups are under direct Ranger Command control in Kontum, with one group each in Pleiku and Quang Duc. The 4th group is currently designated 2nd Corps reserve in Pleiku. The command is considered relatively effective and is able to defend its AO and to conduct limited offensive operations. The Ranger Command is similar to a light infantry division in that it lacks integral medical, signal and artillery assets, which limit its combat capabilities.

30. (S) ARVN forces in the highlands can cope with limited attacks, such as those experienced since the Ceasefire. 2nd Corps has exhibited considerable adroitness in the past in reacting to Communist threats over wide areas. In the face of concentrated NVA attacks, however, ARVN forces would be strained considerably and could suffer at least temporary setbacks. If the current activity continues throughout the MR over a sustained period, RVNAF could possibly be facing major setbacks.

31. (C) In Military Region 3, activity remained at a moderate level. Main force units are continuing preparations for major attacks, with the principal Communist concentrations in Tay Ninh and Long Khanh Provinces. In Tay Ninh, the major goal is reportedly to either overrun or isolate Tay Ninh City. Intermediate objectives may be Tri Tam and outlying GVN
positions around the provincial capital. A Communist force structure equivalent to 10 to 11 regiments, supported by armor and artillery, could be committed. The 3rd Division has deployed from Phuoc Long to Tay Ninh Province. Meanwhile, the 205th Regiment has probably been joined by the 6th Regiment/5th NVA Division in southwest Tay Ninh Province. The 101st Regiment and the Tay Ninh Provincial Forces pose a threat to LOC's east and southeast of Tay Ninh City. The 9th NVA Division remains in western Binh Duong, but is within easy striking distance of Tay Ninh and vital LOC's leading there. Our current estimate is that the 3rd Division will attack RVNAF from the north. Elements of the 9th Division will probably attack into southeastern Tay Ninh/Northern Hau Nghia and other units will support with attacks southwest and southeast of the city. Increased AAA against VNAF and heavy indirect fire can be expected.

32. (S) The new corps leadership is confident that Tay Ninh can be successfully defended and that LOC's will be kept open. The principal ARVN unit defending is the 25th Division. During operations, each battalion fields about 500 men. This is called paddy strength. Province territorial forces have assumed most of the division's static positions, allowing divisional units to be more mobile. Currently, the division is conducting operations north of Tay Ninh City in an effort to spout Communist attack preparations. Another small task force is deployed at Go Dau Ha, the key point along LOC's leading into Tay Ninh City. The 25th has never been tested against such a formidable force, and its previous performance is only fair. But, assuming that the city is not isolated, it can probably hold. A Communist attack at Tri Tam could result in its loss.

33. (S) Throughout central and eastern MR-3, Communist forces can be expected to conduct attacks in support of Tay Ninh operations. Some elements of the 9th and 7th Divisions will probably remain in Binh Duong to harass and force the continued commitment of the 5th ARVN Division there. Recent intelligence indicates that one and possibly two regiments of the 7th NVA Division have moved to eastern Long Khanh Province to conduct attacks along QL-20. Meanwhile, elements of the 6th NVA Division are preparing for attacks along QL-1 from Xuan Loc to Gai Ray. The near term goals of these attacks are to interdict the LOC's mentioned and to erode GVN control in Long Khanh Province. Over the long term, however, the objectives are to isolate Saigon and to force the continued commitment of the ARVN 18th Division in eastern MR-3.
34. (S) In central MR-3, the 5th ARVN Division, badly attrited last fall, has been rebuilding and improving its combat capabilities. Current paddy strength has been increased to 390 men per battalion. Recently, division forces have been conducting probes north and northwest of Lai Khe. These actions are designed to fix and divert the 9th Division during its preparatory phase. The 5th ARVN Division, with the support of territorial forces, can defend the vital approaches to Saigon.

35. (S) The 18th Division, still considered the most effective in the region, is responsible for eastern MR-3. Paddy strength is about 470 men per battalion. Divisional forces were heavily committed in December and January in northern Binh Tuy and generally performed well. Two regiments remain deployed in eastern MR-3 with the other regiment at Long Binh in a reserve role. A coordinated 6th and 7th NVA Division operation to interdict both QL-1 and QL-20 would seriously extend the 18th Division and probably prevent its redeployment elsewhere, especially since territorial forces are not very effective.

36. (S) Meanwhile, elements of the JGS reserve are currently operating in the capital military district. Their actions are designed to eliminate Communist concentrations and base areas and also provide these recently formed units with combat experience.

37. (S) Timing for major attacks in the region is unknown, but our current estimate is mid- to late March. The Communist plans are ambitious, and, if all actions are properly coordinated, the GVN's defense burden will be great. The first phase may be to attack in eastern MR-3 to force ARVN commitments to that sensitive area. This would be followed by attacks in Tay Ninh.

38. (C) In MR-4, last month's highpoint was brief and well below the scope and extent anticipated. The Communists' low profile during February was probably a result of increased RVNAF counteroperations, disruption of Communist staging areas, the impact of the past three months' casualties and munition drawdowns, and the Communists' need to conserve resources for future missions. For the coming month, no significant changes are expected in the primary areas under contention.

39. (C) In northern Kien Tuong, the 5th NVA Division continues to be pitted unsuccessfully against ARVN's 9th Division. The move of the 6th Regiment/5th Division toward Tay Ninh suggests that the Communists may be reordering priorities for the time being and thus may reduce the scope
of their operations in northern Kien Tuong. Although fillers from 1975 infiltration groups are replacing past losses, the 5th Division's overall combat capability will probably remain poor.

40. (S) Opposing the 5th Division are 7 battalions of the 9th ARVN Division and Kien Tuong Territorial Forces. 9th Division paddy strength is about 250 men per battalion. Despite low manning, 9th ARVN Division forces, with RF/PF assistance, should be able to stave off renewed 5th Division pressure. However, unlike last year, they do not have the capability to strike the 5th's rear areas to force it to deploy back into Cambodia.

41. (S) In Dinh Tuong and adjacent areas, the principal threat is posed by 8th NVA Division forces, whose subordinate units are reportedly receiving fillers. Elements of the Z.18 Regiment have yielded to ARVN pressure and pulled out of Tri Phap, but, upon receipt of fillers and supplies, will probably attempt to return. Elements of the Z.15 Regiment have recently moved eastward to the northeast corner of Dinh Tuong, which will probably result in the deployment of 7th ARVN Division elements to counter them. Continuous combat over the past year has brought the 7th Division paddy strength down to about 270 per battalion, but its units have retained their aggressiveness and provide the main bulwark against VC/NVA units in and around Dinh Tuong Province.

42. (S) VC/NVA activity for the coming month will probably consist of stepped-up harassment in Tri Phap, LOC harassment and interdiction, shelling of district towns and OP's and sapper/terrorist incidents in the My Tho area.

43. (C) The brief highpoint in the lower delta failed to attain the scope and intensity expected. The deliberate phase down, after three days of heightened activity, suggests that threats of attacks against key areas, such as Vi Thanh City and Bac Lieu City, may have been propaganda. There were only two areas of significant concentrated combat during the past month: Beleaguered Dam Doi District Town held out under incessant shelling and repulsed sporadic ground attacks and, in central Kien Giang, ARVN 21st Division forces successfully struck VC/NVA battalion-sized units and transportation elements in an effort to relieve pressure north of Rach Gia City and interdict the flow of supplies down Route 1-C. The Communists are presently gearing up for their March highpoint and can be expected to exert more pressure than during the past month.
44. (S) Factors exploitable by the VC/NVA remain the same:

a. Expansive battle area, precluding RVNAF defense in depth,

b. RVNAF inability to reinforce all hot spots during a highpoint,

c. Understrength RF/PF units supported by limited firepower and,

d. RVNAF inability to equal VC/NVA firepower in selected areas.

The opposing RVNAF force structure has declined over the past year, with ARVN 21st Division paddy strength at about 250 men per battalion and RF at less than 200. During the coming month, the NVA 4th Division will probably emerge from its relative somnolence and could conduct long expected attacks against several district towns.

45. (S) For MR-4 as a whole, VC/NVA forces find themselves in a better position than a year ago. RVNAF tactical flexibility and available firepower have diminished, as has total RVNAF troop strength (from 199,000 to 160,000), all of which places the Communists at less of a relative disadvantage. With fillers on the way, VC/NVA staying power should allow the Communists to conduct extensive highpoints similar to those of December or January, if they are willing to accept the cost in combat losses. They can also spread their resources out over time and revert to a less spectacular erosion of rural security and RF/PF. The March highpoint will probably exceed the average monthly upsurge of last year.

46. (S) In conclusion, the visit of a high level Chinese military delegation to Hanoi, the recent 23rd Plenum, and a substantial new recruiting drive in NVN attest to a continued Communist emphasis on preparing for major military activity in the South. In a more immediate sense, the high level of infiltration reinforces already strong indications that major combat is in the offing. The outcome of any major Communist attacks will depend to a much greater degree than ever before on RVNAF's ability to direct its increasingly limited assets in the most efficient manner possible. The GVN could suffer serious setbacks over the next few months.
4-. (S) We foresee the following for the near term:

MR-1: Continued ABF's against RVNAF positions and key LOC's. Possible major attacks in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provinces in late March.

MR-2: Continued attacks against RVNAF positions in Kontum, Pleiku, Daklak, Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa, with emphasis on key LOC's and district towns.

MR-3: Major attacks likely in eastern and western MR-3 in mid-to late March. Tay Ninh and Long Khanh Provinces are objectives.

MR-4: Intense monthly highpoint throughout the Delta.
CONCLUSION:

In conclusion, the visit of a high level Chinese military delegation to Hanoi, the briefing of military cadre on an apparent new bored resolution, the continuation of various indicators among days of the NVA strategic reserve, and a substantial new recruiting drive in NVA all attest to a continued communist emphasis on preparing for major military activity in the South. In a more immediate sense, the high level of infiltration, particularly to 3-5 front and 501st, with signs already strong indications that major combat is on the option.

The outcome of any major communist atks will depend to a high greater degree than ever before on RVNAF's ability to direct its increasingly limited assets in the most efficient manner possible. The GVN could suffer serious setbacks over the next few months.

b. (3) We foresee the following for the near term:

**MR-1**

Continued atks against RVNAF positions and key logistics, possible major atks in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provs in late Mar.

**MR-2**

Continued atks against RVNAF positions in Kontum, Pleiku, Daklac, Khanh Dinh and Khanh Hoa, with emphasis on key log's and east towns.

**MR-3**

Major atks likely in eastern and western MR-3 in mid-to-late Mar. Tay Ninh and Long Khanh Provs are objectives.