SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/LIMDIS

SUBJ: WEEKLY WRAP-UP SOUTH VIETNAM 15-21 MAR 75

THE FOLLOWING WRAP-UP CONTAINS 5 ITEMS:

1. MR-1
2. MR-2
3. MR-3
4. MR-4
5. INTENTIONS
1. (SNFD) MR-1

A. (C) THE SITUATION IN MR-1 CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE AS GVN GAVE UP HARD-TO-DEFEND TERRITORY IN HOPES OF CONSOLIDATING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND THE KEY AREAS OF INTENSITY OF HUE, DANANG AND TAM KY-CHU LAI AIR BASE. ACTIVITY DECLINED THROUGHOUT REGION AS COMMUNISTS JOCKEYED FOR POSITIONS SUITABLE FOR ATKS; HOWEVER, INCIDENT TOTALS (520 THIS WEEK) CONTINUED AT CEASE-FIRE RECORD LEVELS. ARTY EXPENDITURE OF 95,871 ROUNDS IS HIGHEST SINCE MAR 73. RVNAF CASUALTIES (KIA/WIA) WERE 918; THERE WERE 213 VNAF SORTIES. FOLLOWING STATISTICS FROM JAN 75 HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) REPORTS ARE RELEVANT TO ONGOING OR POSSIBLE RVNAF REDEPLOYMENTS FROM HUE CITY AND QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVS:

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<tr>
<th>Quang Tri Prov</th>
<th>Thua Thien Prov</th>
<th>Hue City</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Population:</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>593,000</td>
<td>214,000</td>
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<td>Pop. in GVN Areas:</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>582,000</td>
<td>214,000</td>
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<td>Anticipated Refugees:</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>459,000</td>
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<td>Total Hamlets:</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamlets in GVN Areas:</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Villages:</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages in GVN Areas:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10</td>
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B. (C) AGENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT ELEMENTS OF 316TH DIV MAY HAVE TRANSMITED THE DONG HA PORT FACILITY IN LATE FEB. REPORTEDLY, AS MANY AS 1800 TROOPS FROM 316TH LEFT THE PORT AREA. WHILE THEIR DESTINATION IS UNKNOWN, THEY MAY HAVE MOVED TO NR-2 OR BEEN USED AS A RESERVE FOR FIGHTING S OF HUE. AN EARLY FEB AGENT REPORT INDICATED 316TH WOULD DEPLOY TO THE HAI VAN PASS AREA TO CUT QL-1.

C. (S) ACTIVITY DECLINED ON 14 AND 15 MAR., AS COMMUNIST FORCES CONTINUED TO PROBE GVN DEFENSES, POSSIBLY IN HOPES OF FREEZING POSITIONS, ENABLING COMMUNIST FORCES TO MOVE MORE FREELY. VNAF AIR STRIKES AND 175MM ARTY FIRE WERE CONCENTRATED AT SUSPECTED 325TH DIV HQ IN RUONG RUONG VALLEY (YC9490) IN HOPES OF DELAYING POSSIBLE DIV MOVES INTO PHO LOC DIST TO INTERDICT QL-1.

D. (S) BETWEEN 14 AND 18 MAR., 369TH MARINE BDE WAS WITHDRAWN FROM QUANG TRI AND REPLACED BY ELEMENTS OF 14TH RGR GP. ONE BN (77TH) WAS DEPLOYED IN QUANG TRI, WHILE THE REMAINING BNS (78TH AND 79TH) WERE DEPLOYED WITH 147TH MARINE BDE IN NORTHERN THUAN THIEN.

RGRS COMBAT-READY STRENGTH
IS CURRENTLY 300 MEN PER BN WHEREAS MARINES HAVE 700-750 PER BN.

E. (C) REPORTEDLY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MARINES FROM QUANG TRI, NVA/VC FORCES BEGAN ATKS ALONG THE CONTACT LINE IN QUANG TRI EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON OF 19 MAR. AT 1600 HOURS 20 TANKS WITH INFANTRY CROSSED THE CEASEFIRE LINE. AT FIRST REPORT OF ATK, RF/PF REPORTEDLY DISSOLVED AND FLED S TOWARD HUE. LTC DO KY, QUANG TRI PROV CHIEF, HOPE TO HOLD AT MY CHANH RIVER VIC YD4539.

F. (S) CONTACT WAS LOST WITH 77TH BN/14TH RGR GP, ALTHOUGH BY 20 MAR, ELEMENTS OF 14TH RGR AND 147TH MARINES WERE ENDENVORING TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS AT MY CHANH RIVER. JGS REPORTED THAT QUANG TRI PROV WAS OCCUPIED IN THE AFTERNOON OF 19 MAR. ATTACKING FORCES INVOLVED MAY HAVE BEEN LOCAL FORCES OF THE QUANG TRI PROV UNITS (QTPU) OR HA TAY PROV UNIT, WHICH REPORTEDLY DEPLOYED
TO QUANG TRI IN SUPPORT OF QTPU. IT IS EXPECTED THAT NVA
MF WILL NOT BE COMMITTED UNTIL A MAJOR PUSH, POSSIBLY AGAINST
HUE, IS INITIATED.

G. (C) IN THUA THIEN PROV, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ATKS IN
QUANG TRI, A 20 RD ABF WAS CONDUCTED ON THE CITY. THIS
WAS PROBABLY ARMY FIRE AS EVIDENCED BY IMPACT PATTERN AND
ADJUSTMENTS OF FIRE.

H. (C) ACCORDING TO J-2/JGS, A RECENT RALLIER FROM
101ST REGT/325TH DIV SAYS DIV WOULD INITIATE A TWO REGT
ATK (18TH AND 101ST) ALONG THE ROAD FROM BACH MA MTN,
CURRENT LOCATION OF DIV HQ, TOWARDS PHU LOC DIST.

I. (S) ON 20 MAR, ACTIVITY WAS LIGHT, AS COMMUNIST FORCES
CONTINUED LIGHT HARASSMENT TO KEEP GVN FORCES OFF BALANCE
AND ALLOW THEMSELVES TIME TO CONSOLIDATE AND FORMULATE
NEW PLANS FOR PUSH ON HUE. THE SPEED WITH WHICH QUANG
TRI PROV FELL AND CONTINUOUS CRUMBLING OF DEFENSES AROUND
HUE HAS POSSIBLY CHANGED THE TIME TABLE FOR A CONCERTED
EFFORT TO TAKE HUE. HEAVY ATKS BEGAN 21 MAR IN THE
PHU LOC AREA. SEVERAL RVNAF POSITIONS HAVE FALLEN.

J. (C) EVACUATION OF QUANG TRI PROV HAS FLOODED ROADS
WITH APPROX 100,000 PEOPLE HEADING S INTO HUE. ABF'S ON
HUE HAVE PROMPTED THESE PEOPLE, PLUS A POSS EQUIAL NUMBER,
TO FLEE HUE HEADING FOR DANANG.
K. (SNFD) In other developments, extensive coordination by NVA 2nd Corps, the overall control authority for MRTT, indicates large scale activity is to take place in the near future. Tactical command post HQ 2nd Corps has coordinated with the tactical command post HQ MRTT, HQ MR-559, HQ 9th Regt/MRTT and 271st/MRTT in early to mid-March. Furthermore, 2nd Corps Tactical Command Post is apparently assuming command and control of all NVA unit subordinate to Corps HQ. These include 325th Div, 324B Div, Poss 304 Div in Quang Nam Prov, 202 Armor Bde, 164th Arty Bde and 9th and 271st Indep Regts. Additionally, the Tactical Command Post may also control Quang Tri and Thua Thien Prov units,
4TH, 6TH AND 27TH INDEP RGT'S, 45TH ARTY BDE AND A SECOND ARMOR REGT (POSS 201ST). LATE REPORTS INDICATE HEAVY ABF AGAINST HUE AND GND ATKS S OF HUE WERE INITIATED ON 21 MAR.

INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE 324B AND 325TH DIV FORCES ARE INVOLVED. A CAPTURED PW FROM 101ST REGT/325TH DIV INDICATES THAT 18TH REGT/325TH DIV HAS CAPTURED HILL 300 (YC9599) WHILE 101ST REGT IS AT ZC0297. THE PW REVEALED THAT 324B DIV IS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE ATKS AND 78TH ARTY REGT WAS LOCATED AT ZC9897. J-2, JGS ALSO REPORTS THAT BONG MTN HAS BEEN LOST AND THAT QL-1 AT PHU LOC IS BLOCKED DUE TO ROCKET FIRE. BACKED UP VEHICLES OF PEOPLE EVACUATING HUE ARE ADDING TO THE PROBLEM. PW'S HAVE ALSO BEEN CAPTURED FROM 8TH BN/271ST REGT NEAR MO TAU AND 8TH BN/29TH REGT. REPORTEDLY, 271ST REGT HAS SUFFERED VERY HEAVY CASUALTIES AND ITS 9TH BN IS ALMOST DESTROYED. 29TH REGT, WHICH MOVED TO THUA THIEN FROM QUANG NAM, HAS RECEIVED REPLACEMENTS AND ITS BNS NOW HAVE ABOUT 400 MEN EACH. THE 101ST REGT PW ALSO INDICATES THE VC ARE TRYING TO MOVE 130MM GUNS TO A HILL 530 (UNLOCATED) AND SUCCEEDED IN PLACING THEM ON HILL 806 (ZC033976).

L. (SNFD) S OF THE HAI VAN PASS, IN QUANG NAM PROV, NVA/VC FORCES CONTINUED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON DIEN BAN AND QUE SON DISTS. 304TH NVA DIV FORCES, HOWEVER, REMAIN
DISENGAGED FROM THE CURRENT FIGHTING. RECENTLY, THE TACTICAL COMMAND POST, HQ, 2ND CORPS COORDINATED WITH HQ 304TH DIV. THIS INDICATES 2ND CORPS MAY BE, AND PROBABLY IS, PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR NVA ELEMENTS BOTH N AND S OF THE PASS.

N. (S/NFD) ON 15 MAR, RVNAF LAUNCHED PREEMPTIVE OPNS AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES STAGING IN DIEN BAN DIST. 911TH RF GP REINFORCED BY ARMORED CAV UNITS OF 3RD ARVN DIV, INFLECTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON Q-82 BN. RECENT INFO INDICATED Q-82 BN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH 35TH AND T-89TH SAP BNS, WAS TO CONDUCT ATKS AGAINST QL-1 BETWEEN HOI AN AND DANANG. ABF'S WERE CONDUCTED AGAINST RVNAF FORCES IN HIEU DUC DIST. ARVN SOURCES INDICATE THAT BRIDGES ON RT 540 ARE ALSO PRIME TGT.

N. (SNFD) ACCORDING TO RECENT REPORTS, 575TH ARTY BN/FRON 4 HAS MOVED OVER 200x122MM RKTS FOR USE AGAINST DANANG. 575TH ARTY BN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY 500 ROUNDS OF 122MM STORED FOR USE AGAINST DANANG. AN AGENT REPORTS INCREASED SAP ACTIVITY IS TO OCCUR IN DANANG FROM 23 TO 26 MAR. PURPOSE OF THE ATKS IS TO CREATE TERROR AND CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE CITY, AND, HOPEFULLY, CAUSE THE GVN TO ABANDON DANANG. GVN OFFICIALS INTEND TO CONDUCT PREEMPTIVE OPNS.

O. (S/NFD) AGENT REPORTING LISTS THE PRESENCE OF TWO NEW COMMUNIST UNITS OPERATING IN QUANG NAM PROV. A NEW SAP BN, DESIGNATED "BN 7", RECENTLY ARRIVED IN QUANG NAM PROV. IT IS BELIEVED OPERATING IN THE HIGH GROUND OF HIEN DUC AND DAI LOC DISTS. ARVN SOURCES REPORT THE FORMATION OF A VC 96TH REGT SUBORDINATE TO VC FRONT 4. THE REGT WAS FORMED FROM EXISTING V-25, D-3, R-20 AND 76TH INF AND 91ST SAP BNS SPECIFICALLY FOR THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE. PRINCIPAL TGT OF THE REGT IS HOI AN CITY.

P. (S/NFD) IN QUANG TIN PROV, COMMUNIST FORCES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON ARVN 12TH RGR GP AND 5TH REGT FORCES DEPLOYED W OF TAM KY CITY (BT 3121), FOLLOWING THE CAPTURE OF HAU DUC AND TIEN PHUOC DIST TOWNS ON 9 AND 10 MAR. COMMUNIST FORCES CONDUCTED AFB'S AND GROUND ATKS IN THANG BINH DIST. THREE VILLAGES, AS WELL AS TERRITORIAL OUTPOSTS, WERE OVERRUN ON 16 AND 17 MAR. THESE ATKS FURTHER REDUCED GVN
CONTROLLED AREAS TO A NARROW STRIP ALONG QL-1. AGENT REPORTING INDICATES THAT 70TH BN AND ELEMENTS OF A V-15 BN (NFI) ARE PROBABLY INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY IN THANG BINH DIST. RECENT Q. (SNFD) /INFO CONFIRMS THE PRESENCE OF 7TH, 8TH, AND 9TH BNS/52ND NVA BDE IN QUANG BINH PROV. ARVN SOURCES HAVE LOST CONTACT WITH 1ST AND 31ST REG'T/2ND NVA DIV. AND IT IS BELIEVED ELEMENTS OF 52ND BDE ARE REPLACING THESE UNITS ALONG THE CONTACT LINE FROM TIEN PHUOC TO HAU DUC DIST TOWN. 1ST AND 31ST REGTS ARE BELIEVED TO BE PREPARING FOR A MAJOR ATK AGAINST TAM KY CITY OR CHU LAI AIR BASE (BT5306). COMMUNIST FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE PRESSURE IN THANG BINH DIST, THREATENING TO CUT QL-1 IN AN EFFORT TO PULL RVNAF FORCES AWAY FROM TAM KY CITY. ARVN 2ND DIV IN QUANG NGAI, AS WELL AS 3RD DIV FORCES IN QUANG NAM PROV. ARE FULLY COMMITTED AND APPARENTLY UNABLE TO REINFORCE RVNAF IN QUANG BINH PROV.

R. (S/NFD) TO COUNTER COMMUNIST INITIATIVES DEVELOPING IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG BINH PROVS, MAJOR SHIFTS OF GVN FORCES HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
ON 19 MAR, 2 BNS OF 468TH MARINE BDE WERE SENT TO DANANG FROM SAIGON TO BE DEPLOYED W OF THE CITY, REPLACING THE 2ND ABN BDE, WHICH DEPLOYED TO SAIGON.

S. (C) 369TH MARINE BDE DEPLOYED TO QUANG NAM FROM NORTHERN MR-1, REPLACING THE 3RD ABN BDE, WHICH MOVED TO KHANH HOA. GVN FORCES IN QUANG TIN PROV CONSIST OF 5TH REGT/2ND DIV, 12TH RCR GP AND TF.

T. (SNFD) COMMUNIST LF IN QUANG NGAI PROV KEPT PRESSURE ON RVNAF UNITS AS THREE BNS OF 52ND BDE DISENGAGED AND MOVED TO QUANG TIN PROV. ON 16 MAR, EVACUATIONS OF SON HA AND TRA BONG DIST TOWNS BEGAN. TOTAL POPULATION OF SON HA IS ESTIMATED AT 15,700, WHILE THAT OF TRA BONG IS 12,270. 68TH AND 69TH RCR BNS AND LF WERE ALSO WITHDRAWN FROM THE TOWNS IN AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE FORCES IN MORE DEFENSIBLE AREAS. ON 17 AND 18 MAR, COMMUNIST FORCES OVERRAN SIX PF OUTPOSTS N OF BINH SON DIST TOWN (3C6091) ON QL-1. THESE ATKS CLOSED QL-1 BETWEEN BINH SON DIST TOWN AND CHU LAI AIR BASE (BT5306). BG TRAM VAN NHUT, CG, 2ND ARVN DIV, ORDERED 2ND BN/5TH REGT/912TH
RF GP REINFORCED BY ONE TROOP OF ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS TO REOPEN QL-1, BUT EFFORTS, SO FAR, HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.

U. (S/NFD) ARVN 2ND DIV FORCES ARE PRESENTLY DEPLOYED AT KEY LOCATIONS ALONG QL-1. INCREASED ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED, AS ENEMY UNITS PUT PRESSURE ON GVN FORCES IN NHGIA HANH AND HO DUC DISTS. GVN FORCES WILL HAVE TO CONDUCT RENEWED OPNS IN BINH SON DIST TO REOPEN QL-1, THE PRIMARY ROUTE FOR SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS FROM QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVS.

V. (S) FOR COMING WEEK COMMUNISTS WILL GREATLY INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON HUE.

NVA

325TH DIV CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTACK TOWARDS PHU LOC DIST TOWN TO CLOSE QL-1.

HEAVY A/BF'S ON DANANG CAN BE EXPECTED IN LARGER NUMBERS. QUANG TIN ACTIVITY WILL FEATURE 2ND DIV'S EASTWARD PUSH TO TAKE TAM KY CITY. COMMUNIST FORCES ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE PRESSURE IN BINH SON AND SON TINH DISTS TO KEEP QL-1 CLOSED AND EFFECTIVELY Cutoff ARVN REINFORCEMENTS FROM QUANG NGAI PROV DESTINED TO AID TAM KY DEFENDERS.
2. (SNFD/LIMDIS) MR-2:


CONCERNING COMMUNIST FORCES, AT LEAST TWO REGTS OF 10TH NVA DIV HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED IN DARLAC PROV, ALONG WITH ANOTHER DIV TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS 316TH NVA DIV FROM THE NVN STRATEGIC RESERVE. II CORPS HQ, NOW REESTABLISHED IN NHA TRANG, HAS REDEPLOYED 22ND ARVN DIV ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO RELIEVE ONE BATTERED REGT IN BINH DINH AND TO BOLSTER THE DEFENSE OF NW KHANH HOA PROV. 3RD ABN BDE WAS ALSO DIVERTED TO KHANH HOA TO STEM THE COMMUNIST ADVANCE.

C. (SNFD) THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KONTUM BEGAN, IN EFFECT, ON 15 MAR, WITH THE MOVE OF 6TH RGR GP TO PLEIKU; AND BY 16 MAR, THE REMAINING FIVE RGR BNS WERE BELIEVED ON THE WAY S. KONTUM CITY WAS COMPLETELY ABANDONED BY 18 MAR. DURING THE EVACUATION OF THE REMAINING TERRITORIALS AND CIVILIANS, THE PROV CHIEF, COL HUNG WAS REPORTED KIA IN THE CHU PAO PASS. CIVILIAN EVACUATION OF PLEIKU CITY BEGAN ON 16 MAR. ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL PLAN CALLED FOR RVNAF TO WITHDRAW BY CLEARING QL-19, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO MOVE INSTEAD VIA LTL-7B, A SECONDARY ROAD THEN FREE OF COMMUNIST HARASSMENT, THRU PHU BON PROV TO TUY HCA. AFTER A SERIES OF TACTICAL COMMAND CHANGES FORCED BY THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING SITUATION, BG TAT, THE II CORPS RGR COMMANDER, MOVED BY ROAD TO CHEO REO ON 16 MAR, WITH ONE RGR GP AND ONE ENGR BN, TO ASSUME CONTROL OF THE COLUMN. HE WAS FOLLOWED BY BG CAM AND COL LY, CORPS DEP CG AND CHIEF-OF-STAFF, RESPECTIVELY, WHO ESTABLISHED A LIGHT CORPS CP. BY 19 MAR, BG LAM MOVED TO CUNG SON (VIC BQR00470) IN PHU YEN TO COORDINATE THE ENTRY INTO TUY HOA.

D. (SNFD) THE COLUMN WAS PRECEDED BY AN ENGR GP WHICH CONSTRUCTED PONTOON BRIDGES AND IMPROVED FORD SITES ALONG LTL-7B, WHICH HAD LONG BEEN IN A STATE OF DISREPAIR BETWEEN CHEO REO AND CENTRAL PHU YEN PROV. BY 19 MAR, LEAD ELEMENTS OF THE CONVOY HAD REACHED CUNG SON IN WESTERN PHU YEN IN
IN GOOD ORDER, AND PREPARATIONS WERE UNDERWAY FOR THE ENTRY INTO TUY HOA. A KEY BRIDGE VIC BQ877443 WAS TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY 20 MAR, AND THE CUNG SON PASS (VIC BQ9144) WAS REPORTED CLEARED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT TRAILING ELEMENTS OF THE CONVOY WERE HARD HIT. PROB 320TH DIV ELEMENTS STRUCK THIS SEGMENT ON THE NIGHT OF 19-20 MAR, NW OF CHEO REO. RESULTS OF THE ATK ARE UNCLEAR; HOWEVER, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY INDICATES SOME 60 VEHs DESTROYED, SOME 450 VEHs, 20 FA AND 10 TANKS ABANDONED DUE TO MECHANICAL OR OTHER FAILURE. RESULTS OF THE ATK ARE UNCLEAR. THE PROBABLE 48TH AND 64TH REGTS/320TH DIV ATTEMPTED TO TRAP THE CONVOY BETWEEN PHU THIEN DIST TOWN AND CHEO REO AFTER 17 MAR, BUT THEY WERE PROBABLY HAMPERED BY OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND TACTICAL ERRORS. DETAILS ARE UNCLEAR, BUT SOME LEAD ELEMENTS OF THE COLUMN, CONSISTING LARGELY OF CIVILIANS, MAY HAVE ARRIVED IN TUY HOA BY 20 MAR. ETA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVOY, TOTALLING PERHAPS AS MANY AS 5,000 VEHICLES AND 100,000 PEOPLE, IS UNKNOWN.

E. (SNFD) DURING THIS PERIOD, GVN FORCES IN EASTERN DARLAC PROV COMPLETELY COLLAPSED. WHEN 23RD DIV COUNTERATK STALLED ON 15 MAR, MG PHU APPARENTLY ABANDONED HIS PLANS TO RELOCATE HIS LIGHT CP TO THE AREA IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE DRIVE. HQ'S OF 23RD DIV, 21ST RGRS, AND DARLAC SECTOR WERE PROGRESSIVELY PUSHED EASTWARD, FIRST TO PHUOC AN DIST TOWN (VIC BQ100053), THEN TO CHU KUK (VIC BQ226168), AND ULTIMATELY, IN THE CASE
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
OF THE 23RD DIV HQ, TO KHANH DUONG DIST TOWN IN KHANH HOA PROV. BG THUONG, THE DIV. COMMANDER, WAS REPORTED WIA AND MEDEVACED TO NHA TRANG BY 16 MAR. COMMAND OF THE DIV PASSED TO COL DUC, SENIOR OFFICER ON THE SCENE. THE REMNANTS OF GVN FORCES BEGAN TO DISINTEGRATE AND, BY MID WEEK, 23RD DIV OFFICERS CONCEDED THEY WERE NO LONGER COMBAT EFFECTIVE OR CAPABLE OF REPULSING AN ENEMY ATK.
TOTAL DIV STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED AT LESS THAN 1,000 MEN.
NONETHELESS, THE REMNANTS OF 53RD REGT CONTINUED TO HOLD OUT AT BMT E AIRFIELD UNTIL ABOUT 18 MAR. BY 20 MAR, ELEMENTS OF 53RD HAD MOVED TO POSITIONS APPROX 10 KMS SE OF THE AIRFIELD; WHILE FURTHER TO THE E, REMNANTS OF 45TH REGT, 44TH RGR (MINUS) AND 21ST RGR GP (MINUS) WERE BELIEVED LOCATED GENERALLY S OF CHU KUK. SOME STRAGGLERS HAD REACHED KHANH DUONG BY 21 MAR AND WERE MOVED WITH 23RD DIV HQ TO CAM RANH.
F. (SPFD) TO THE E, RVNAF INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO REOPEN QL-21 IN KHANH DUONG DIST ON 15 MAR, MEETING WITH SOME LIMITED INITIAL SUCCESS. NVA FORCES IN POSITIONS N OF THE ROAD AND ON HILL 519 COULD NOT BE DISLODGED, HOWEVER.
ON 17 AND 18 MAR, II CORPS REINFORCED KHANH HOA AND NINH THUAN SECTOR FORCES WITH 2ND AND 3RD BNS/40TH REGT/22ND ARVN
DIV. BY 18 MAR, HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO REOPEN THE ROAD WERE ABANDONED; AND GVN FORCES WENT INTO DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE GVN FURTHER REINFORCED KHANH DUONG BY DIVERTING 3RD ABN BDE, THEN ENROUTE FROM DANANG TO SAIGON. THE BDE DISEMBARKED AT CAM RANH AT 190100H, WAS IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO KHANH DUONG, AND SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY 21 MAR.

G. (SNFD) ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION, FIGHTING CONTINUED IN BINH Dinh AND QUANG DUC AND LF ACTIVITY INCREASED SOMEWHAT IN PHU YEN. IN BINH Dinh, THE SITUATION IN THE AN KHE PASS REMAINED STALEMATED. 3RD NVA DIV CONTINUED TO HOLD THE PASS AGAINST 22ND ARVN DIV ATKS. 47TH REGT, WHICH HAS BORNE THE BRUNT OF ATKS SINCE 4 MAR, WAS PULLED OUT O/A 17 MAR AND MOVED TO HOAI NHON DIST. LF FORCE ACTIVITY INCREASED IN THE COASTAL DISTS, RESULTING IN BRIDGES ON QL-1 BEING DESTROYED IN TAM QUAN, PHU CAT AND AN NHON, AS WELL AS BETWEEN QUI NHON CITY AND 22ND DIV GARRISON AT AN SON. IN QUANG DUC, ATKS BY POSS 10TH DIV ELEMENTS CONTINUED AGAINST 24TH RCR GP FORCES AT KIEN DUC DIST TOWN AND NHON CO AFLD, ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST FORCES HAVE NOT MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT IN THE PROV FOLLOWING THE FALL OF DUC LAP DIST ON 9-10 MAR. LF ACTIVITY ALSO INCREASED IN PHU YEN, AS THE PROBABLE K-13 AND K-96 BNS/PHU YEN PROV UNIT ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE THE ARVN CONVOY ON LTL-7B. LF ALSO INTERDICTED QL-1 IN THE DEO CA PASS ON THE PHU YEN/KHANH HOA BORDER. LF IN KHANH HOA...
INCREASED HARASSMENT IN DIEN KHANH DIST AND VIC CAM RANH BAY, ALTHOUGH A SERIOUS THREAT HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED.

IN TUYEN DUC PROV, MAJOR LOC'S REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN INTERDICTED SW AND SE OF DALAT CITY; HOWEVER, NO DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE. THE REMAINING PROVS OF LAN DONG, NINH THUAN AND BINH THUAN HAVE REMAINED GENERALLY QUIET, ALTHOUGH A BRIDGE ON QL-1 VIC PHAN THIET WAS DESTROYED BY LF ON 20 MAR.

H. (S) CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION PERSISTS CONCERNING THE COMMUNIST FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. THE 10TH DIV AND ANOTHER UNSPECIFIED DIV (POSSIBLY THE 316TH) AT KD BAN ME THUOT, AND AT LEAST THE 10TH IS IN PURSUIT OF RVNAF TOWARD THE KHANH-HOA PROV BORDER. THERE ARE ALSO TENUOUS INDICATIONS THAT ANOTHER NEW DIV MAY BE COMMITTED IN PLEIKU.

I. (SNFD) SPECIFIC INDICATORS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS FOLLOWING THEIR UNPRECEDENTED VICTORIES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS ARE LACKING. CLEARLY, ONE OF THEIR FIRST PRIORITIES AND PRIME CONSTRAINTS WILL BE CONSOLIDATION OF NEWLY-OCCUPIED TERRITORY. A NEWLY-ACQUIRED POPULATION BASE, POSSIBLY NUMBERING AS MANY AS 200,000 PEOPLE, WILL HAVE TO BE ORGANIZED AND GOVERNED. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE B-3 FRONT AREA HAS BEEN OR SOON WILL BE UNDER NVA CONTROL. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT TYPE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY WILL EMERGE, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE B-3 FRONT WILL NOW ACQUIRE A
Political Structure to supplement its long-standing semi-autonomous military position within MR-5. Although NVA units achieved impressive military victories, they undoubtedly sustained considerable personnel and equipment losses. There are also indications that some units, particularly the 320th Div., are seriously over-extended. It is likely that Communist forces are in the process of regrouping and rebuilding and will be preoccupied with mopping up the remnants of RVNAF units in the Highlands.

With the vastly-expanded Communist force structure in the B-3 Front, however, the NVA could opt to press the attack against demoralized GVN units. The primary effort would be along LTL-7B into Central Phu Yen Prov and down QL-21 into Northern Khanh Hoa Prov. There are also tenuous indications that the NVA will reinforce 3rd Div in Binh Dinh, which is now free to redeploy for attacks against the Lowlands. The current demoralized and battered state of RVNAF in the region and the substantial degradation of VNAF assets would probably preclude an effective GVN reaction to any concerted NVA attacks. Only the newly-introduced 3rd ABN Bde is unbloodied. The effectiveness of those territorial forces which have not yet been confronted with Communist atks must now be considered marginal. Therefore, the Communists are now in an unprecedented position to be able to eventually press the attack against weak spots along the coastal provs and in the Southern Highlands, designed to force RVNAF into isolated enclaves.