DEPLOYED FROM GO DAU HA TO KHIEM HANG DIST TOWN TO REPLACE DEPARTING 7TH ARVN REGT FORCES. THE VOID CREATED BY THE MOVEMENT OF 48TH REGT IS BEING FILLED BY 64TH RGR BN AND 15TH ARMOR BN.

SHOULD TAY NINH PROV BE ISOLATED, WITH ENSUING HIGH LOSSES TO RVNAF, THERE WILL BE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE WESTERN APPROACHES TO SAIGON INCREASES GREATLY.
4. (S) In central Mr-3, on 24 and 27 Mar, Communist forces launched major combined arms atks against RVNAF defenders at Chon Thanh, Binh Long Prov. VC/NVA losses were approx 240 KIA and 16 T.54 tanks destroyed. RVNAF suffered 11 KIA and 38 WIA. Besides LF, poss elements of 9th NVA Div and 273rd Regt/341st NVA Div involved. A 27 Mar POW from 273rd Regt indicated that this regt was supported by approx 32 tanks and was planning to continue assaults against Chon Thanh. Atks, which have primarily taken place SE and SW of Chon Thanh appear designed to fix and destroy Binh Long Prov defenders, before they can link up with 5th ARVN Div at Lai Khe.

An LOC has been successfully evacuated.
5. (S) STATEMENTS BY PL'S AND OTHER SOURCES SUGGESTS THAT THE
341ST REGT MAY BE DEPLOYING TO MR-3.
THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF 341ST DIV IS UNCLEAR.
DAO, SON, HAS CARRIED THIS DIV WITH 31ST, 32ND AND 270TH
INF REGTS; HOWEVER, SINCE MID MAR, ARVN HAS Captured
7 POW'S WHO CLAIM TO BE FROM
273RD REGT/341ST DIV AND WHO INDICATE THAT 341ST DIV IS
COMPRISED OF 266TH, 270TH AND 273RD INF AND 35TH ARTY
REGTS.
6. (S/NOP) IN EASTERN MR-3, SITUATION HAS
TEMPORARILY STABILIZED, ALTHOUGH THE NEWLY FORMED BINH
KHANH DIST HQ43 AT THE RUNG LA RESETTLEMENT SITE WAS
OVERRUN ON 26 MAR. QL AND 20 REMAIN INTERDICTED.
INTEL INDICATES THAT A REDEPLOYMENT OF 6TH AND 7TH NVA
DIV'S IS TAKING PLACE. RECENT INTEL SUGGESTS
209TH REGT/7TH NVA DIV, WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT
FIGHTING ALONG QL-20 IN LONG KHANH PROV, IS PREPARING TO
MOVE TO AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THERE HAS BEEN NO
FIRM INFO CONCERNING 141ST OR 165TH REGTS/7TH DIV. IN
SEVERAL WEEKS, INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF REDEPLOYMENT
BY THESE REGTS. WHILE AN AGENT REPORT INDICATES SOME
7TH DIV FORCES HAVE DEPLOYED TO NORTHERN HAU NGHIA PROV
TO SUPPORT THE TAY NINH/HAU NGHIA PROV BATTLEFIELD, DAO
SGN BELIEVES THAT MAJOR ELEMENTS OF 7TH NVA DIV, SUPPORTED
BY ELEMENTS OF 301ST CORPS, ARE SHIFTING INTO
A O OF 6TH NVA DIV. CURRENTLY, DEPENDING AGAINST
THIS THREAT ARE THE BATTERED 43RD AND 52ND REGTS/18TH
ARVN DIV, SUPPORTED BY ARMOR. ONE AIRBORNE BDE ALSO
IS EXPECTED TO BE COMMITTED TO DEFEND EASTERN MR-3.
7. (S) THE MOVEMENT OF SOME 7TH NVA DIV FORCES INTO
6TH NVA DIV AO APPEARS DESIGNED TO ALLOW 6TH NVA DIV
TO DEPLOY TO NEW AO.
A recent rallier from a protection element of the Bien Hoa Prov Unit (BHPU) indicated that, by early Mar, 33rd Regt was to combine with the BHPU for OPs in Long Thanh and Nhơn Trạch dists. Bien Hoa Prov. DAO SGN believes that 6th Div forces will move into southern Bien Hoa and Phước Tuy provs for atks along QL-15 and GVN population centers. The location of HQ-3 6th NVA Div N of QL-1 in Bien Hoa Prov does not preclude possible atks in this area also.

(S) In the near term, VC/NVA forces are expected to continue heavy atks in southern Tây Ninh and northern Hau Nghia provs. Increased pressure by elements of 341st Div in central MR-3 and by 6th and 7th NVA Div forces in eastern and SE MR-3 will occur. Targeting of QL's 4 and 15 appears to be in the offing. Currently, MR-3 has little or no reserve to deal with this increasing
THREAT. THE JGS RESERVE, WHICH, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, IS
ALSO THE MR-3 RESERVE, CONSISTS OF 3 AIRBORNE BDES AND
A NEWLY FORMED RGR GP. IF ADDITIONAL VC/NVA FORCES
ARE OR HAVE DEPLOYED TO MR-3, THE MILITARY SITUATION IN
THE MR AND THE SAIGON AREA WILL QUICKLY DETERIORATE,
WITHOUT GVN REINFORCEMENT.
4. (S/NFD)  

1. (C) ACTIVITY TAPERED OFF IN THE DELTA AND THE COMMUNIST THREAT IN SEVERAL AREAS HAS TEMPORARILY ABATED. ALTHOUGH THE NORMAL PATTERN WOULD DICTATE A CONTINUATION OF THIS DOWNSWING, SEVERAL INDICATORS, WHEN VIEWED AGAINST DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS, SUGGEST THAT THE VC/NVA MAY ATTEMPT TO RENEW A HIGH LEVEL ACTIVITY BEFORE THE USUAL THREE TO FOUR WEEK WAIT. COMMUNIST SUPPLY AND INFILTRATION EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE CONTINUING UNABATED AND THE VC/NVA ARE NOT BURDENED WITH ANY PROHIBITIVE OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. TOTAL INCIDENTS DECLINED FROM 863 TO 533, ARTY EXPENDITURES FROM 48,038 TO 31,726, AND RVNAF CASUALTIES (KIA/WIA) FROM 1261 TO 526. THERE WERE 205 VNAF SORTIES.

2. (S/NFD), ACTIVITY IN KIEN PHONG PROV WAS ONCE AGAIN CENTERED IN HONG NGU DIST AND ALONG THE LOWER STRETCHES OF RTE 1-A IN MY AN AND KIEN VAN DISTS. PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF 24TH AND 207TH REGTs STRUCK OP'S AND RVNAF ELEMENTS WITH THE HEAVIEST CONCENTRATION 5 KM E-NE OF MY AN DIST TOWN. THIS PARALLELS OTHER INFO REFLECTING EXTENSIVE COMMUNIST SUPPLY EFFORT TO 8TH NVA DIV FORCES.
INDICATING THAT COMMUNIST UNITS IN GENERAL TRI-PHAP
AREA INTEND TO HEIGHTEN ATKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. (S/NPD) KIEN TUONG PROV WAS QUIET, WITH MINOR SHELLINGS
AND CONTACTS NW OF MOC HOA AND AROUND TUYEN NHON DIST
TOWN. THIS CALM MAY NOT PREVAIL FOR LONG, SINCE 6TH
REGT/5TH NVA DIV IS RETURNING TO KIEN TUONG BATTLEFRONT
FROM GVN MR-3 AND 201ST REGT/3RD NVA DIV MAY BE MOVING
TO SUPPORT 5TH DIV. THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF 201ST IS
ESTIMATED AT OVER 1000 AND ITS INVOLVEMENT COULD HAVE
ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF MOC HOA AND ITS
DEFENDERS. CURRENT PLANS CALL FOR 275TH REGT/5TH NVA
DIV TO ATK RTE 29 SE OF MOC HOA AND CLOSE OFF ARVN 9TH
DIV SUPPLY LINES, WHILE 174TH, 6TH AND POSSIBLY 201ST
REGTS ATK MOC HOA FROM AS YET UNK DIRECTIONS. THE
COMMUNISTS MAY ALSO COMMIT ARMOR. THE INTERDICTIOON OF
RTE 29 IN DEC BROUGHT ARVN SUPPLY LEVELS DOWN TO HAZARDOUS
LOWS. SOME REPORTS MENTION THAT THE COMMUNISTS PLAN TO
ATK KIEN BINNH DIST TOWN AS WELL. IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS
WOULD SEVER SUPPLY LINES TO BOTH MOC HOA AND TUYEN NHON
DIST TOWN. COMMUNIST CHANCES FOR SUCCESS ARE NOT CLEARCUT,
BUT THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY ENHANCED BY THE COMMITMENT OF
LARGER FORCES. THE CRITICAL FACTORS MAY BE THE AVAILABILITY
OF AIR ASSETS AND THE MORALE OF 9TH ARVN DIV TROOPS.

4. (C) DINH TUONG PROV REPORTED A SLIGHT DROP IN
COMBAT INCIDENTS, BUT STRONG UPSURGE IN CENTRAL CAI LAY DIST.
PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF Z.15 REGT CONDUCTED NUMEROUS SHELLINGS
AND HARASSMENT ATKS IN MOST NOTICEABLE UPSURGE IN
CAI LAY IN SEVERAL WEEKS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAI LAY
CENTERS AROUND KEY *** INTERSECTION OF QL-14 AND RTE 29.
THE TIMING OF INTENDED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY MAY BE SET
BACK TEMPORARILY, UNTIL MUNITIONS SHIPMENTS ARE RECEIVED.
REMAINING ACTIVITY INCLUDED SHELLINGS IN HAU MY DIST,
MINOR SKIRMISHES ALONG QL-4 IN SAM GIANG DIST AND AN AMBUSH
OF AN RF BN ELEMENT JUST E OF MY THO CITY. THE RF
SUPERRED 14 KIA, 24 WIA AND 5 MIA WITHOUT INFlicting
ANY KNOWN COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. A CONTACT OF THIS
NATURE INDICATES THAT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED VC/NVA PLANS
TO STRIKE MY THO, IF ONLY FOR ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT,
MAY STILL BE VALID.
5. (C) KIEN HOA PROV REPORTED SLIGHT DROP IN MILITARY ACTIVITY; HOWEVER, PROB DONG KHOI 2 REGT ELEMENTS, WITH LF SUPPORT, KEPT PRESSURE ON BA TRI DIST AND RTE 26. RTE 26 RUNS FROM BEN TRE CITY THROUGH GIONG THOM DIST AND INTO BA TRI. AN UNCONFIRMED AGENT REPORT INDICATES THAT EFFORT IS DESIGNED TO PULL THE RF OUT OF DON NHON AND MO CAY DIST TO ENABLE VC/NVA ELEMENTS TO STRIKE THERE. IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT THE VC WILL ACHIEVE ANY IMMEDIATE SUCCESS, BUT THE ACCELERATION OF RURAL DETERIORATION IS POSSIBLE.

6. (S/NFD) THE LOWER DELTA EXPERIENCED A 40 PERCENT DECLINE IN REPORTED INCIDENTS, AS THE VC/NVA MAINTAINED THE THREAT IN WESTERN PHONG DINH. SEVERAL AREAS HAVE COME UNDER RENEWED VC/NVA PRESSURE, BUT MAJOR POSITIONS AND DIST TOWNS HELD.
7. (c) VINH LONG PROV REPORTED A MODERATE DROP IN VC/ NVA ATKS, WHICH WERE EQUALLY DISTRIBUTED ACROSS THE PROV. DONG THAP 1 REGT CONTINUED TO HIT OP'S AND VILLAGE HQ'S IN CHO LACH DIST, WHILE D.1 AND D.3 REGT UNITS CONDUCTED PERIODIC SHELLINGS AND HARASSMENT ATKS IN TRA ON AND TAM BINH DISTS. THE LATTER HAS BEEN CUT OFF BY ROAD FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, AND LOCAL SOURCES REPORT THREAT BY UNK VC/NVA FORCES. 857 VC BN HAS ALSO REPORTEDLY OVERRUN SEVERAL OPS 5 KM SW OF VINH LONG CITY, BRINGING THIS UNIT WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE MY THUAN FERRY LANDING ON QL-4. IMMINENT ATKS ARE NOT BELIEVED LIKELY AT THIS TIME, BUT CONTINUED COMMunist ACTIVITY WILL PLACE VC/NVA IN MORE FAVORABLE POSITION FOR FUTURE OPNS, UNLESS MET WITH MORE AGGRESSIVE RF/PF RESPONSE.

8. (S/NPD) PHON DINH PROV REPORTED A DECLINING LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, AS 18B AND 95A REGTS SHIFTED AWAY FROM CAN THO-A LPHA BELT WHILE SUBJECTED TO RVNAF ARTY. SPORADIC CONTACTS IN PHON DINH DIST PICKED UP, INDICATING SOME REMAINING PRESENCE WITHIN 10-15 KM OF CAN THO, PROBABLE LF UNITS. PROB TAY DO 2 BN FORCES CONSTRUCTED
BARRICADES ON RTE 31 AND U/I ARTY ELEMENTS STEPPED UP SHELLINGS ALONG THE QL-4 CORRIDOR IN PHUNG HIEP DIST. BOTH INCIDENTS MAY PRESAGE VC/NVA EFFORTS TO APPLY PRESSURE ON LOC'S. THE OUTLOOK FOR COMING WEEK IS UNCLEAR. IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED IF 18B AND 95A REGTS/4TH NVA DIV WILL PULL OUT OF PHONG DINH.

9. (C) THE LOWER COASTAL PROVS OF BA XUYEN, BAC LIEU AND AN XUYEN EXPERIENCED DIMINISHED COMMUNIST PRESSURE DURING THE WEEK. IN BA XUYEN, U/I VC/NVA UNITS KEPT PRESSURE ON TWO CENTRAL POCKETS IN KE SACH AND THUAN HOA DISTS. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS ARE UNK; HOWEVER, PERSISTANT AND CONCENTRATED ATKS OF THIS NATURE ARE NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE USUAL PATTERN OF DISPERSED COMBAT IN BA XUYEN AND SUGGESTS THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE AND HOLD GAINS PERMANENTLY. BAC LIEU, WHICH NOW HAS AN ADDITIONAL VC BN, BAC LIEU 3, RECEIVED PREDOMINANCE OF SHELLINGS AND ATKS IN PHUOC LONG AND GIA RAI DISTS. NO CLEAR GAINS WERE ESTABLISHED BEYOND THE LOSS OF A FEW OP'S, BUT THE CONTINUING BURDEN WILL TAKE A TOLL OF RF/PF STRENGTH, RESOURCES AND MORALE.

AN XUYEN PROV WAS RELATIVELY QUIET FOR THE 5TH WEEK. AVAILABLE INFO INDICATES THAT THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE HAVING SOME PROBLEMS WITH LF UNITS WHICH WERE USED IN THE BRUNT.
OF EARLIER ATKS. THIS BRIEF RESPITE DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT RVNAF HAS GAINED ANY MOMENTUM. ONCE VC RE-
CUPERATION PHASE IS COMPLETED, AN XUYEN RF/FF WILL HAVE THEIR HANDS PULL TRYING TO STAVE OFF RENEWED ATKS.

10. (C) CHUONG THIEN AND KIEN GIANG PROVS EXPERIENCED MODERATE COMMUNIST ATKS AND SHELLINGS, NONE OF WHICH RESULTED IN MAJOR SETBACKS FOR EITHER SIDE. IN CHUONG THIEN, POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF 2315 ARTY BN CONTINUED TO SHELL KIEN HUNG DIST AND THE RTE 31 CORRIDOR W OF VI THANH. KIEN LONG DIST TOWN REMAINS CUT OFF, WITH OCCASIONAL SHELLINGS ALONG THE CANALS LEADING INTO CITY. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK IS UNCERTAIN. IN KIEN GIANG, THE ACTIVITY CONTINUED W OF KIEN BINH DIST TOWN AND N AND S OF HIEU LE DIST TOWN. THE LATTER APPEARS INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE, WHEN VIEWED AGAINST DIMINISHED RVNAF AIR SUPPLY CAPABILITIES. THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES, IS PROBABLY CONTINUING DOWN RTE 1-C. PERSISTENT UNCONFIRMED RUMORS STATES THAT HAI TIEN DIST TOWN HAS BEEN OVERRUN; HOWEVER, THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY EITHER JGS OR OTHER AVAILABLE SOURCES.
11. (S/NPD) THE OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING WEEK IS UNCERTAIN, WITH SEVERAL NEW FACTORS BEING INTRODUCED. THESE INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT OF 201ST REGT TO KIEN TUONG AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RVNAF SET-BACKS AND WITHDRAWALS IN MR'S 1 AND 2. MAJOR GENERAL NAM, MR-4 CG, IS REPORTEDLY CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE SKEPTICISM OF RVNAF TROOPS, AND 9TH ARVN DIV SOURCES ARE WONDERING IF THEY, TOO, WILL BE ORDERED TO PULL OUT OF THE DELTA. THE LOSSES OF NORTHERN KIEN TUONG WOULD ALLOW THE VC/NVA TO SHIP MEN AND SUPPLIES DIRECTLY TO DINH TUONG AND QL-4 WITH TOTAL IMPUNITY AND TO APPLY FULL PRESSURE ON 7TH ARVN DIVS. ADDITIONAL INFO INDICATES THAT 7TH ARVN DIV, THE MAINSTAY OF RVNAF FORCES IN CENTRAL UPPER DELTA, MAY BE CONSIDERED A RESERVE FOR IN GVN MR-3. THIS WOULD GREATLY, IF NOT DETRACT FROM RVNAF'S CAPABILITY TO KEEP QL-4 OPEN AND, AT AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, WOULD PLACE THE REMAINING FORCES IN UPPER DELTA IN A VERY CRITICAL SITUATION, AMPLIFIED BY THE POSSIBLE ARRIVAL OF 5TH NVA DIV. THE SITUATION IN THE LOWER DELTA REMAINS PRECARIOUS IN SOME
POCKETS, BUT RVNAF CAN WITHSTAND DIRECT COMMUNIST ATKS, IF MORALE HOLDS UP AND NO 21ST DIV ELEMENTS ARE PULLED INTO GVN MT-3.
4. (S) INTENTIONS-
A. (S) THE FALL OF THE GVN'S FINAL ENCLAVE IN MR-1, DANANG, IS IMMINENT. MASS CHAOS PRECLUDES EVACUATION OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND CITIZENS WHO WILL SOON BE SUBJECT TO COMMUNIST CONTROL. REMAINING COMBAT EFFECTIVE RVNAF FORCES (MARINE DIV AND ELEMENTS OF ARVN 3RD DIV) ARE IN GRAVE DANGER OF BEING CUT OFF AS WELL, PRECLUDING THEIR USE IN MR-3.
B. (S) PRECISE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN MR-2 ARE GENERALLY UNCLEAR, BUT BINH DINH AND LAM DONG PROVS WILL EXPERIENCE HEAVY PRESSURE, AND ACCELERATED DECLINE IN RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS LIKELY TO AFFORD NEW COMMUNIST GAINS. PROSPECTS OVER SLIGHTLY LONGER TERM FOR GVN RETENTION OF ENTIRE CENTRAL COAST ARE NOT GOOD.
C. (S) IN MR-3, NVA PRESSURE ON TAY NINH AND NORTHERN HAU NGHIA PROVS WILL REMAIN INTENSE. ADDITIONAL PRESSURE BY THE NEWLY INTRODUCED NVA 341ST DIV ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL MR-3, AND BY NVA 6TH AND 7TH DIVS IN THE EASTERN AREA APPEARS LIKELY. LIMITED RVNAF REACTION CAPABILITY PRECLUDES DECISIVE COUNTERMEASURES TO THE INCREASED THREAT.
THE SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE QUICKLY WITHOUT THE
INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL RVNAF FORCES FROM MR-1 AND
MR-2.

D. (S) THE OUTLOOK FOR MR-4 IS UNCERTAIN, HINGING
PRIMARILY ON POSSIBLE SKEPTICISM AMONG RVNAF TROOPS OVER
WHAT TERRITORY SHOULD BE STRONGLY HELD IN WAKE OF
MASSIVE CONCESSIONS IN MR-1 AND MR-2. THE POSSIBLE
DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR RVNAF UNITS OUT OF DELTA ALSO
COULD BEAR DIRECTLY ON COMMUNIST NEAR TERM INTENTIONS.
THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA, THEREFORE IS SUBJECT TO
POSSIBLE DRASTIC CHANGES TO DETRIMENT OF GVN, WHICH
MAY ENCOURAGE THE COMMUNISTS TO INTENSIFY ACTIVITY IN A
PERIOD THAT COULD NORMALLY BE EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELY
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* REFLECTS SIX DAYS DATA ONLY.

XGDS-2