INDICATES THAT ELEMENTS OF 101ST REGT ARE NOW DEPLOYED IN
EXTREME SOUTHERN TAY NINH AND NORTHERN HAU NGHIA PROVS. IT
COULD POSSIBLY SUPPORT 205TH REGT ELEMENTS IN ATTEMPTING
TO ISOLATE TAY NINH OR CREATE A DIVERSION FOR MAJOR ASSAULTS
IN SW HAU NGHIA AND LONG AN PROV.

6. (S) IN CENTRAL MR-3, FIGHTING HAS CENTERED AROUND
CHON THANH, BINH LONG PROV. AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED,
9TH NVA DIV AND 273RD REGT, SUPPORTED BY TANKS AND ARTY,
WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY REMAINING GVN FORCES BEFORE
THEY COULD LINK UP WITH 5TH ARVN DIV AT LAI KHE. IN
ENSUING BATTLE, WHICH LASTED APPROX 6 DAYS, NVA LOST OVER
300 KIA AND 27 TANKS REPORTED DAMAGED OR DESTROYED. GVN
LOSSES WERE APPROX 20 KIA AND 120 WIA. ON NIGHT OF 1 APR,
REMAINING GVN FORCES AT CHON THANH (3 RGR BNS AND ONE RF BN)
COMMENCED OPN'S TO ABANDON POST. REPORTING IS CONTRADICTIONARY
ON EXTENT OF EVACUATION AND CASUALTIES SUFFERED. LOCATION
OF 9TH AND 341ST NVA DIVS SUGGESTS THAT LAI KHE AND PHU
GIAO WILL COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE SHORTLY. POSSIBILITY
ALSO EXISTS OF 9TH DIV ATTEMPTS TO FLANK 5TH ARVN DIV BASE
CAMP BY ATKG ALONG SAIGON RIVER CORRIDOR OR INTO IRON
TRIANGLE.

SOME ELEMENTS OF 271ST REGT/
9TH DIV AND 71ST AA BDE ELEMENTS ARE MOVING TO N TAY NINH
FOR A NEW MISSION.
H. (S) IN EASTERN MR-3, ACTIVITY WAS LIGHT. SOME
ELEMENTS OF 209TH INF AND 210TH ARTY REGTS AND POSSIBLY
141ST REGT/7TH NVA DIV, HAVE DEPLOYED INTO MR-2 FOR ATKS
IN LAM DONG AND POSSIBLY TUYEN DUC PROVS. OTHER ELEMENTS
OF 7TH NVA DIV REMAIN LOCATED IN NORTHERN LONG KHANH PROV.
I. (S) IN BINH TUY PROV, ELEMENTS OF 6TH NVA DIV ARE OPERAT-
ING ALONG QL-1 AND WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT ATKS AGAINST
OUTPOSTS IN EASTERN BINH TUY PROV.
J. (S) IN AA DEVELOPMENTS, AA UNITS COUNTRY-WIDE ARE
IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND SOME MAY BE PREPARING
TO MOVE. IN MR-3, VC/NVA FORCES HAVE BEEN UPGRADED,
CONSOLIDATING AA UNITS AND SHIFTING AO'S. CONCURRENT WITH
SVNLA REALIGNMENT OF ARTY/AA ASSETS, 71ST REGT/377TH AA
DIV WAS APPARENTLY UPGRADED TO BDE STATUS. 71ST BDE MAY
HAVE EIGHT SUBORDINATE BNS. ITS AO IS TAY NINH, BINH DUONG,
BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG PROVS. SUBORDINATE BN'S MAY HAVE
BEEN TEMPORARILY RESUBORDINATED TO INF FORCES OPERATING IN
THOSE AREAS. AS OF EARLY APR, DIV'S 12TH AA BN WAS
SUPPORTING 101ST NVA REGT, VIC GO DAU HA (XT3924), 128TH
AA BN WAS SUPPORTING 95C REGT/9TH NVA DIV IN W BINH DUONG
PROV, 16TH AA BN VIC BAU DON (XT4335), 20TH AA BN NW BAU
BANG (XT7933), 18TH AA BN E OF BAU BANG SUPPORTING 271ST
REGT/9TH DIV, 86TH AA BN VIC CHON THANH (XT7561) AND 128A
AND 128B AA BN'S UNLOCATED. BDE IS EQUIPPED WITH 37MM AND
57MM GUNS.
K. (SNFD) SITUATION FOR COMING WEEK IS VERY VOLATILE. MAJOR UNIT DEPLOYMENTS CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE INDICATE THAT NVA FORCES ARE LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR MAJOR COORDINATED ATKS THAT WILL INCLUDE VC/NVA UNITS IN NORTHERN MR-4 AND WESTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN MR-3. ATKS IN NORTHERN HAU NGHIA AND BINH DUONG PROV ALSO MAY BE IN OFFING. PROSPECTS FOR EASTERN MR-3 ARE LESS CLEAR, BUT INCREASED MOBILITY OF COMMUNIST FORCES COULD ENABLE THEM TO INCREASE PRESSURE IN BINH TUY AND LONG KHANH PROVS SHORTLY. GVN'S ABILITY TO REACT TO SUCH ATKS DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY GVN MORALE AND WILL TO RESIST. GVN'S ABILITY TO QUICKLY ORGANIZE
AND MOBILIZE FORCES ARRIVING FROM MR'S 1 AND 2 AND NVA'S
CAPABILITY TO EXPLOIT THEIR RECENT SUCCESS ELSEWHERE CAPABLY.

L. (S) CURRENTLY, GVN FORCES HAVE THREE ABN BDES AND
8TH RGR GP IN RESERVE. APPROX 4,000 MARINES HAVE LANDED
IN VUNG TAU ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND TROOPS OF VARIOUS
UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN MR'S 1 AND 2. SOME 2ND
ARVN DIV FORCES HAVE ARRIVED IN HAM TAN, BINH TUY PROV.
ATTEMPTS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER WAY TO SORT OUT AND ORGANIZE
THESE FORCES. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE THAT III CORPS
IS PREPARING TO DISPATCH A FORWARD CP TO BINH TUY PROV,
PROBABLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE SOME SORT OF DEFENSE
ALONG MR-3/MR-2 BORDER, AND ORGANIZE ARRIVING FORCES AND
REFUGEES. MR-3 NOW INCLUDES NINH THUAN AND BINH THUAN
PROVS.

M. (S) AGAINST THIS FACTOR, IS LACK OF INFORMATION ON
WHEREABOUTS OF SEVERAL NVA DIVS AND NVA'S LOGISTICAL
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT AN IMMEDIATE BUILD-UP FOR
MAJOR ATKS IN MR-3 BEFORE GVN CAN ESTABLISH A FIRM DEFENSIVE LINE AND CONTROL OVER VARIOUS FRAGMENTED UNITS.
TIMING IS IMPORTANT TO COMMUNISTS AND CRITICAL FOR GVN.
3. (SNFD) MR-4:

A. (SNFD) Military activity tapered off as both VC/NVA
and RVNAF prepared to confront each other in possible
decisive atks in Delta. Low erb of RVNAF morale has spread
into Delta and, while a critical point may not yet
have been reached, it is low a factor of concern. Timing
of upcoming atks is uncertain, but Communist units are
within striking positions near or approachable to several
major objectives. While combat preparation may extend into
and possibly beyond coming week, these atks will occur and
will constitute most critical and severe threat ever faced
by RVNAF in MR-4.

B. (SNFD) Activity dropped off in both Kien Phong and
Kien Tuong provs, as Communist forces appear to be gearing
up for major atks along RVN/Cambodian border, against MOC
HoA and RTE 29. 174th regt/5th div elements are reportedly
moving towards Hong Ngù Dist, Kien Phong prov, in a poss
attempt to lure ARVN 9th div forces away from more critical
areas in northern Kien Tuong. ARVN has an element of an ACS in
Hong Ngù and is not going to reinforce this unit, leaving
bulk of forces in Kien Tuong. Threat around Elephant’s Foot
and MOC HoA appears to be building with reported arrival of
271st and 201st regts/3rd NVA div in staging areas in the
Elephant’s Foot.
REMAINING ELEMENTS OF 174TH REGT/5TH NVA DIV MAY ALSO BE COMMITTED IN ATKS AGAINST MOC HOA AND RTE 29. IN EASTERN KIỂN TUONG, 275TH AND 6TH REGTS/5TH NVA DIV ARE REPORTEDLY MOVING DOWN RTE 1-B TO STRIKE OBJECTIVES IN NE DỊNH TUONG OR ADJACENT AREAS IN LONG AN PROV. THESE WOULD INCLUDE BEN LUC AND TAN AN BRIDGES IN LONG AN (ON QL-4), QL-4 IN DỊNH TUONG AND POSSIBLY MY THO CITY.

C. (SNFD) VC/NVA THREAT ALSO APPEARS TO BE LOOMING IN DỊNH TUONG AND WILL PROBABLY BE FOCUSED IN EASTERN AREAS OF PROV, WITH 8TH NVA DIV ELEMENTS ALSO ATK IN WEST. SHOULD COMBAT BREAK OUT ON BOTH FRONTS, RVNAF WOULD BE UNABLE TO REINFORCE EITHER AREA WITHOUT CREATING A DANGEROUS VOID. 7TH ARVN DIV, RECENTLY REINFORCED WITH 1 RF BN PER REGT, NOW 12 INF BN'S, AND SOON WILL HAVE ANOTHER REGT COMPOSED OF RF TROOPS. KEY FACTORS WILL BE MORALE AND HOW IT AFFECTS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND WILL TO FIGHT. IF THIS HOLDS, 7TH ARVN DIV ELEMENTS COULD WITHSTAND ATKS AND PROBABLY INFLECT DAMAGE ON VC/NVA UNITS WHO ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH DELTA TACTICS AND WARFARE. DỊNH TUONG RF/PF CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP A STIFF FIGHT, BUT OBVIOUS SEVERITY OF SITUATION COULD POSSIBLY GALVANIZE THEM SOMEWHAT.
ANOTHER OPTION AVAILABLE TO COMMUNISTS IS REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DONG THAP I REGT FROM VINH LONG ACROSS TIEN GIANG RIVER TO DINH TUONG. THIS HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN AVAILABLE INFO ON COMMUNIST INTENTIONS, BUT ATKS COULD BE LAUNCHED AT ANY TIME.

D. (SNFD) LOWER DELTA EXPERIENCED LOW AND DISPERSED ACTIVITY. CENTER FOR BOTH RVNAF AND VC/NVA ATTENTION WAS IN WESTERN DIST OF PHONG DINH PROV WHERE ENTIRE 4TH NVA DIV, 3 PROV BNS AND ONE ARTY BN HAVE ASSEMBLED FOR EXPECTED ATKS NEAR OR AGAINST CAN THO CITY. OTHER AREAS OF LOWER DELTA EXPERIENCED ONLY LIGHT COMBAT.

E. (C) VINH LONG REPORTED A DOWNSWING IN COMBAT INCIDENTS WITH NO SIGNIFICANT CONCENTRATIONS. PROV INTEL SOURCES BELIEVE D.3 REGT ELEMENTS ARE MOVING TOWARDS VINH LONG CITY.

RVNAF HAS REACTED BY PULLING 16TH REGT/9TH ARVN DIV INTO A PROTECTIVE BELT S AND SE OF CAPITAL. D.1 REGT IS NOW OUT OF CONTACT AND ARVN SOURCES QUESTION WHETHER IT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS QL-4 IN BINH MINH AND CHAU THANH DIST OR CROSS HAU GIANG RIVER TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE ATKS ON CAN THO CITY. DONG THAP I ELEMENTS HAVE ASSUMED A VERY LOW PROFILE IN CHO LACH DIST, AND THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS ARE UNCERTAIN.

FROM CHO LACH, DONG THAP I HAS OPTION OF RETURNING TO KIEN HOA PROV, RETURNING TO DINH TUONG PROV OR SUPPORTING POSSIBLE ATKS ON VINH LONG CITY. LATTER APPEARS MOST PLAUSIBLE AT
THIS TIME.

F. (SNFD) PHONG DINH PROV REPORTED A SLIGHT INCREASE IN CONTACTS AND SHELLINGS IN A 10 KM POCKET ENCOMPASSING PARTS OF THUAN TRUNG, PHONG PHU AND PHONG DIEN DISTS. OTHER MINOR ACTIONS TOOK PLACE WITHIN A 8 KM RADIUS OF RTE 31/QL-4 INTERSECTION. ALL ACTIVITY STEMS FROM NVA 4TH DIV ELEMENTS SPARRING WITH RVNAF TO ESTABLISH STAGING AREAS FOR EXPECTED ATKS AGAINST CAN THO-BINH THUY AIRFIELD, RTE 31 AND QL-4. ELEMENTS OF 2.7 BN/18B REGT HAVE REPORTED ALREADY A PENETRATED ALPHA BELT AROUND CAN THO CITY TO SET UP RKT SITES. SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT IS EVIDENCED BY SHELLING OF CAN THO SUBURBS WITH 107MM RKT'S ON 5 APR. DAMAGE WAS MINIMAL. BUT PROBABLY SERVES AS A PRECURSOR OF THINGS TO COME. NEITHER ARVN 21ST DIV NOR 11TH REGT/7TH ARVN DIV ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVE IN SEEKING OUT VC/NVA UNITS IN STAGING AREAS, AND COMMUNIST FORCES CURRENTLY OUTNUMBER RVNAF DEFENDERS BY A MODERATE MARGIN. D.2 REGT, RECENTLY INFLITRATED FROM CHUONG THIEN PROV, REPORTEDLY HAS 1,400 TROOPS, MOST OF WHOM ARE INEXPERIENCED FILLERS. VC/NVA OBJECTIVES ARE STILL UNCLEAR: SEIZE AREA OR INFLECT CASUALTIES. DETERMINING FACTOR WILL BE RVNAF'S WILL TO STAND AND FIGHT. MG NGUYEN KHOA NAM, MR-4 COMMANDER, HAS ALL FORCES ON ALERT AND HAS BEEN SENDING HIS STAFF OUT REGULARLY INSPECTING AND ENCOURAGING RVNAF TROOPS. A PERSONAL VISIT BY GEN NAM TO 21ST DIV TROOPS BROUGHT REMINDER THAT, UNLIKE
MR'S 1 AND 2, THERE IS NOWHERE ELSE TO GO. MORALE CANNOT
BE CALLED HIGH, BUT SUCH PERSONAL CONCERN AND ATTENTION
BY GEN NAM MAY STIFFEN RVNAF'S RESOLVE SOMEWHAT.
G. (C) REMAINING AREAS OF DELTA ARE STILL CONFRONTED
WITH THREATS OUTLINED IN PREVIOUS WRAP-UPS. IF ALL-OUT
DECISIVE ATKS ARE CONDUCTED, SOME PROVS WILL CERTAINLY
LOSE DIST TOWNS, BUT THIS WILL NOT PROVE FATAL, IF THE
NORTHERN DELTA AND QL-4 CORRIDOR THRU VINH LONG AND PHONG
DINH CAN HOLD OUT.
H. (SNFD) COMING WEEK IS ONE OF UNCERTAINTY, WITH RVNAF
WAITING AND DIGGING IN FOR EXPECTED ATKS. MANY FACTORS WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO OUTCOME. OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IS RVNAF'S
WILL TO STAND AND FIGHT. THIS FACTOR COULD OUTWEIGH CUMULATI-
VE IMPACT OF ALL OTHERS. AT THIS POINT, MORALE IS FIRM IN
SOME AREAS, BUT AN OVERALL PREDICTION CANNOT BE MADE.
SECONDLY, ALL DIVISIONAL ASSETS MUST HOLD AND NOT BE DEPLOYED
TO MEET A DETERIORATION IN GVN MR-3, WHICH ARVN SOURCES
CONCEDE WOULD CAUSE A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF RVNAF'S ABILITY
TO WITHSTAND VC/NVA ATKS AND WOULD LEAD TO FALL OF MR-4.
NEXT, QL-4 MUST BE KEPT OPEN. THIS MEANS THAT GVN FORCES
IN GVN MR-3 MUST PROTECT IT AND DEFEND BEN LUC AND TAN AN
BRIDGES IN LONG AN PROV. AIR ASSETS MUST BE AVAILABLE AS
WELL, WHICH AGAIN IS BASED ON GVN MR-3 FORCES ABILITY TO
KEEP BIEN HOA OPEN FOR A-37 MISSIONS. BINH THUY AIRFIELD NW OF CAN THO CANNOT HANDLE A-37 AIRCRAFT DUE TO UNFINISHED RUNWAY SURFACING. ON COMMUNIST SIDE, VC/NVA UNITS HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN PITCHED PROLONGED BATTLES IN MOST AREAS OF DELTA. THEY COULD SUFFER VERY HIGH LOSSES, IF RVNAF STAND AND FIGHT AGAINST MAJOR GND ATKS. IN ADDITION, COMMUNIST UNITS THREATENING NORTHERN DELTA HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO MASTER DELTA TACTICS AND WARFARE AND WILL BE MATCHED BY BATTLE-TESTED ARVN 7TH AND 9TH DIVS. SOME DESERTIONS ARE SURE TO OCCUR AS RF ARE TRANSFERRED TO A MORE HAZARDOUS MISSION, BUT OVERALL DIVISIONAL STRENGTH WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY UPGRADED. MOST SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREA IS PHONG DINH, WHERE NEITHER 21ST ARVN DIV NOR PHONG DINH RF/PF HAVE SHOWN SIGNS OF FIRM DETERMINATION. IF CAN THO COMES UNDER HEAVY SIEGE, WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY CUT OFF QL-4 TO LOWER DELTA PROVS, PSYCHOLOGICAL RIPPLE EFFECT WOULD HAVE MOST SEVERE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTINUED MILITARY/POLITICAL VIABILITY OF GVN MR-4 AND COULD SET OFF A CHAIN OF DEFEATS WHEREBY "FALLING DOMINOES" EVENTUALLY RESULT IN A COMMUNIST VICTORY IN DELTA.
OUTLOOK:

(SNFD) CONTINUED HIGH MOVEMENT OF REPLACEMENTS AND UNITS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE, EXPECTED. ELEMENTS OF 2ND NVA CORPS MAY MOVE SOUTHWARD TO ASSIST IN OCCUPATION OF VAST CONQUERED TERRITORY. IN MR-3, MAJOR ATKS DO NOT APPEAR IMMINENT IN THE NEXT WEEK. ADDITIONAL UNITS ARE EXPECTED BEFORE ANY MAJOR ASSAULT IN MR-3. POTENTIAL CVN PROBLEM MAY LIKELY BE CONTROL OF LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES AND SOLDIERS FROM MR'S 1 AND 2. CONTROL IN REAR AREAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE MOVEMENT OF UNITS AND TO GUARD AGAINST MOB MENTALITY THAT PREVAILED IN MR'S 1 AND 2. IN MR-4, TIMING IS UNCERTAIN, BUT STRONG THREAT EXISTS NEAR MOC HOA, MY THO/RT 4 AND W OF CAN THO. KEY FACTOR AT THIS TIME IS RVNAF MORALE AND RESOLVE.

XGDS-2.