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<td>B</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE BRANCH ORGANIZATION CHART WITH STRENGTH FIGURES</td>
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<td>INTELLIGENCE BRANCH AND REVISED OPLAN 001</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN, USDAO, SAIGON, RVN</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS AND PROVINCIAL OBSERVERS</td>
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FACT SHEET

AOSOP-I

SUBJECT: Intelligence Branch Functional Statement

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: (U) The purpose of this Fact Sheet is to provide a functional statement for the Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Division, Defense Attache Office, Saigon.

FACTS:

1. (U) The functional statement given below for the Intelligence Branch is the same as given in DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001 of 6 May 1973, and has been approved by the American Ambassador, Saigon, and by USSAG and CINCPAC. It remains unchanged in the revision of OPLAN 001 in accordance with guidance received from CINCPAC and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

2. (S) The Intelligence Branch acts as the primary US element for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information pertaining to NVA/VC activities in the RVN, to include the mutual exchange of PHOTINT with RVNAP. It coordinates requirements for US air reconnaissance operations over RVN and contiguous waters, and coordinates all US surveillance activities in RVN territorial waters and contiguous international waters. The Intelligence Branch provides a timely exchange of military intelligence with the JGS, VNAF, and the Country Team. It is responsible for furnishing special intelligence communications support to the USDAO.

W. E. LeGRO
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
FACT SHEET

AOSOP-I 22 June 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Branch Organization Chart with Strength Figures (U)

Defense Attaché

PURPOSE: (U) The purpose of this fact sheet is to provide an organization chart with strength figures of the Intelligence Branch.

FACTS:

1. (U) A current organizational chart of the Intelligence Branch is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (U) The number of military and civilian personnel assigned to the Branch by Section is shown in Inclosure 2.

W. E. LeGRO
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch

2 Inclosures a/s
### INTELLIGENCE BRANCH PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

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FACT SHEET

AOSOP-I 22 June 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Branch and Revised OPLAN 001 (U)

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: The purpose of this Fact Sheet is to indicate the proposed role of the Intelligence Branch in Revised OPLAN 001.

FACTS:

1. (S) Following publication of DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001 in May 1973, guidance from the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and from CINCPAC indicated the desirability of maintaining a substantial civilian intelligence presence in Vietnam after January 1974.

2. (S) Concurrent guidance from JCS directed a re-examination of OPLAN 001 to determine minimum essential residual DAO functions after January 1974.

3. (S) In the re-examination of OPLAN 001 by the Intelligence Branch it was determined that the present strength of 10 military and 97 DoD civilian employees (total: 107) could be reduced by the end of January 1974 to 3 military and 87 DoD civilian employees (total: 90). This reduction represents austere manning conditions in terms of mission assignment. A detailed breakdown of residual functions and personnel strength in the form of the Intelligence Annex to DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED, is attached as Inclosure 1.
ANNEX B TO DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED (U)
INTELLIGENCE (U)

1. (S) FUNCTIONS:

a. General. The Intelligence Branch acts as the primary US element for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military intelligence information pertaining to NVA/VC activities in the RVN, to include the mutual exchange of PHOTINT with RVNAF. It coordinates requirements for US air reconnaissance operations over RVN and contiguous waters, and coordinates all US surveillance activities in RVN territorial waters and contiguous international waters. The Intelligence Branch provides a timely exchange of military intelligence with the JGS, VNAF, and the Country Team. It is also responsible for furnishing special intelligence communications support to the USDAO. The total authorized strength is 10 officers and 97 civilians.

b. Office of the Chief.

Acts as the principal staff advisor to the Defense Attache (DATT) for all intelligence matters. Coordinates the exchange of intelligence information between the DAO, other US Commands, and the GVN. Directs, supervises, and coordinates the planning, administration and operation of all intelligence activities in support of the DAO. 1 military chief, 1 civilian deputy, and two civilian clerical personnel are associated with these functions.

c. Coordination and Liaison Section.

(1) Serves as the focal point in DAO for all of the SIGINT/PHOTINT collection requirements. 1 civilian employee is associated with this function.

(2) Provides the necessary PHOTINT interface between the USAF and the RVNAF. 4 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(3) Serves as office of primary responsibility for the SEA Aerial Reconnaissance Program. 1 civilian employee is associated with this function.
DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

(4) Represents the DAO on the Defector Committee of the U.S. Vietnam mission and coordinates its staff actions. 1 civilian employee is associated with this function.

(5) Acts as the office of primary responsibility for receiving validated HUMINT collection requirements in response to higher headquarters or in support of the DAO. 4 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(6) Acts as the focal point in DAO for coordination of HUMINT collection requirements and operations with designated representatives. 3 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(7) Provides the necessary discreet liaison with the Four Power International Commission of Control and Supervision. 1 military officer is associated with this function.

(8) Provides overt sensitive and clandestine HUMINT collection requirements for the DAO Intelligence Collection Plan. 1 civilian employee is associated with this function.

(9) Acts as the office of primary responsibility for determining and maintaining the DAO Statement of Intelligence Interest. 1 civilian employee is associated with this function.

(10) Maintains DAO dissemination procedures for HUMINT Reports. 2 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(11) Provides personnel for continuous coordination and liaison with the G-2's and all GVN security agencies in each of the Military regions. Represents the J-2 support centers in resolving field problems using US communications. 9 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(12) Performs daily liaison and coordination functions with J-2/JGS, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC), and the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC). 6 civilian employees are associated with this function.

(13) Functions as the DAO office for monitoring, coordination, review, and support of clandestine HUMINT operations conducted within the DAO's area of interest by Department of Defense elements, i.e., 7602d Air Force Intelligence Group, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the 500th MI Group, Hawaii. 20 civilian employees are associated with this function.
(14) Provides all recurring and specialized reports to the concerned offices and agencies regarding the scope, objectives and status of the DAO HUMINT projects and operations. 1 clerical civilian employee is associated with this function.

(15) Provides information regarding the status of all U.S. personnel Missing in Action (MIA) in South Vietnam and other countries of Indochina to include burial sites and/or possible detention sites. This function requires direct contact and coordination with various other elements and sources within Indochina that have knowledge of, and/or interest in activity. All the above listed personnel contribute to the totality of information evolving from this function.

d. Current Intelligence Section.

(1) Produces all source intelligence on RVN including the Monthly Intelligence Estimate Update (MIEU) for dissemination as directed by USSAG.

(2) Contributes to the daily intelligence summary produced by USSAG.

(3) Maintains a watch desk between production cycles to a 24 hour monitoring/warning capability.

(4) Provides limited inputs for update of USARPAC data bases to support current intelligence and Ground Order of Battle production and targeting, including targeting data for USSAG as required.

(5) Coordinates with RVNAF intelligence production activities, furnishing copies of DAO products as appropriate, and receiving such RVNAF products as are made available for DAO use and further dissemination.

(6) Provides a limited capability to produce special studies and assessments as directed.

(7) Provides the DAO point of contact for US and allied agencies on current intelligence matters.

(8) Provides current enemy situation intelligence data in support of c.(15).
One military and 21 civilian employees are associated with the above functions. The military chief directs the overall operation of the Section and reviews all products. He is assisted by 1 deputy civilian employee, two civilian clerical employees, two civilian illustrators and 16 civilian intelligence analysts all of whom engage jointly in the performance of the closely interrelated functions listed above.

e. Security Section.

(1) Serves as the office of primary responsibility for providing the DAO guidance on the disclosure of US classified Defense information to foreign governments.

(2) Provides DAO point of contact for security matters with U.S. and allied agencies, reviewing and evaluating plans dealing with security.

(3) Administers the KIP program.

(4) Coordinates and assists in internal investigations and inspections.

(5) Reports and assists in investigation of possible contacts made by actual or suspected foreign intelligence agents.

(6) Administers the DAO document security program.

(7) Administers the DAO personnel security program.

Nine civilian employees are required to perform the combined functions listed above. Of these 2 civilian employees are clerical; 5 civilian employees are associated with the personnel, document and internal security matters; and 2 civilian employees are associated with overall coordination of security policy, disclosure actions and liaison with other agencies.

f. SSO Detachment.

(1) Maintains a separate, secure communications area for receipt, transmission, storage, and utilization of Special Intelligence and other compartmented intelligence and special access material as directed by Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Department of the Army (ACSI, DA).
(2) Provides representation in the field for ACSI, DA on matters pertaining to the security dissemination and utilization of Special Intelligence and other compartmented intelligence.

(3) Manages and administers the Special Intelligence billets and personnel access program at DAO for ACSI, DA.

(4) Acts as a focal point for additional security offices and SSO facilities in the Saigon area which are under the cognizance of ACSI.

(5) Conducts all security investigations of compromises involving Special Intelligence or other compartmented intelligence for which ACSI, DA has cognizance.

(6) Manages and administers travel and duty restrictions for all personnel who have been authorized access to Special Intelligence or other compartmented intelligence.

(7) Establishes and maintains secure, privacy communications for use by senior Department of Defense officials assigned to the Saigon area.

(8) Assists the DAO in obtaining required Special Intelligence and other compartmented intelligence.

(9) Provides the DAO with specialized assistance which may be required to fulfill the mission.

Seven military and 9 civilian employees are associated with the performance of the above functions on a 24-hour basis.

g. TECH REP. Security restrictions preclude the discussion of functions and other operational data regarding this activity. All aspects of this activity are dictated by the National Security Agency (NSA) for appropriate support requirements.

2. (S) CONCEPT OF PHASE DOWN

a. The only two elements of the Intelligence Branch in which personnel savings can be effected are the Security Section and the Special Security Office Detachment.
b. Normal reduction in the activities of the two-man Personnel Security Element will permit a reduction of one individual by 1 September 1973, and the remaining individual by 1 November 1973. Normal reduction in the three-man Internal Security element's activities will permit the reduction of one individual by 1 September and a second individual by 1 November 1973. Overall reduction in activities will permit the reduction of the Section Chief's office by 1 individual by 1 September 1973. In short, by 1 November 1973 the Security Section will drop from its present strength of 9 civilians to the residual strength of 4 civilians.

c. The remaining complement of 7 military and 5 civilian spaces of the Special Security Office Detachment will be transferred to the JTD of the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team by 31 January 1974. This Detachment, however will continue to provide the support functions set forth in paragraph 1.f. to the DAO in its present position.

3. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR MINIMUM ESSENTIAL RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL.

a. Office of the Chief.

The Chief must continue to act as the principal staff advisor to the DATT on all intelligence matters. He must also manage all DAO intelligence planning, administrative and operational activities. One military chief, 1 civilian deputy, and 2 civilian clerical personnel are required to perform these functions.

b. Coordination and Liaison Section.

(1) Serves as the focal point in DAO for all of the SIGINT/PHOTINT collection requirements. 1 civilian employee is required for this function.

(2) Provides the necessary PHOTINT interface between the USAF and the RVNAF. 4 civilian employees are required for this function.

(3) Serves as office of primary responsibility for the SEA Aerial Reconnaissance Program. 1 civilian employee is required for this function.
(4) Represents the DAO on the Defector Committee of the U.S. Vietnam mission and coordinates its staff actions. 1 civilian employee is required for this function.

(5) Acts as the office of primary responsibility for receiving validated HUMINT collection requirements in response to higher headquarters or in support of the DAO. 4 civilian employees are required for this function.

(6) Acts as the focal point in DAO for coordination of HUMINT collection requirements and operations with designated representatives. 4 civilian employees are required for this function.

(7) Provides the necessary discreet liaison with the Four Power International Commission of Control and Supervision. 1 military officer is required for this function.

(8) Provides overt sensitive and clandestine HUMINT collection requirements for the DAO Intelligence Collection Plan. 1 civilian employee is required for this function.

(9) Acts as the office of primary responsibility for determining and maintaining the DAO Statement of Intelligence Interest. 1 civilian employee is required for this function.

(10) Maintains DAO dissemination procedures for HUMINT Reports. 2 civilian employees are required for this function.

(11) Provides personnel for continuous coordination and liaison with the G-2's and all GVN security agencies in each of the Military regions. Represents the J-2 support centers in resolving field problems using US communications. 10 civilian employees are required for this function.

(12) Performs daily liaison and coordination functions with J-2/JCS, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, (CICV), Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC), and the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEO). 6 civilian employees are required for this function.

(13) Functions as the DAO office for monitoring, coordination, review, and support of clandestine HUMINT operations conducted within the DAO's area of interest by Department of Defense elements, i.e., 7602d Air Force Intelligence Group, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the 500th MI Group, Hawaii. 20 civilian employees are required for this function.
DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

(14) Provides all recurring and specialized reports to the concerned offices and agencies regarding the scope, objectives and status of the DAO HUMINT projects and operations. 1 clerical employee is required for this function.

(15) Provides information regarding the status of all U.S. personnel Missing in Action (MIA) in South Vietnam and other countries of Indochina to include burial sites and/or possible detention sites. This function requires direct contact and coordination with various other elements and sources within Indochina that have knowledge of, and/or interest in activity. All the above listed personnel contribute to the totality of information evolving from this function.

c. Current Intelligence Section.

(1) Produces all source intelligence on RVN including the Monthly Intelligence Estimate Update (MIEU) for dissemination as directed by USSAG.

(2) Contributes to the daily intelligence summary produced by USSAG.

(3) Maintains a watch desk between production cycles to a 24 hour monitoring/warning capability.

(4) Provides limited inputs for update of USARPAC data bases to support current intelligence and Ground Order of Battle production and targeting, including targeting data for USSAG as required.

(5) Coordinates with RVNAF intelligence production activities, furnishing copies of DAO products as appropriate, and receiving such RVNAF products as are made available for DAO use and further dissemination.

(6) Provides a limited capability to produce special studies and assessments as directed.

(7) Provides the DAO point of contact for US and allied agencies on current intelligence matters.

(8) Provides current enemy situation intelligence data in support of c.(15).
One military and 24 civilian employees are required for the above functions. The military chief must direct the overall current intelligence operation on a 24-hour basis and must review all major products. He will be assisted by 1 civilian deputy, 1 senior civilian operations officer, 2 civilian illustrators and 16 civilian intelligence analysts all of whom engage jointly in the performance of the closely interrelated functions listed above.

d. Security Section

(1) Serves as the office of primary responsibility for providing the DAO guidance on the disclosure of US classified Defense information to foreign governments.

(2) Provides DAO point of contact for security matters with U.S. and allied agencies, reviewing and evaluating plans dealing with security.

(3) Coordinates and utilizes offshore assistance for internal investigations and inspections.

(4) Reports, coordinates and utilizes offshore assistance for the investigation of possible contacts made by actual or suspected foreign intelligence agents.

(5) Administers the DAO document security program.

The termination of the KIP program on or about 1 July 1973 and the personnel security program by 1 November 1973 will permit a reduction in this Section from 9 to 4 civilian employees. 1 civilian chief, 2 civilian operations officers and 1 civilian clerical employee will be required to perform the functions listed above with the assistance of offshore investigation personnel.

e. SSO Detachment.

All functions listed in paragraph 2 above will continue to be performed by the Detachment in support of the Intelligence Branch and DATT in its present location. 7 military and 5 civilian spaces will be transferred from the DAO JTD to the JTD of the US Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team by the end of January 1974 so that these spaces are no longer chargeable to the DAO.
DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

f. TECH REP.

(1) There are 121 authorized positions within this activity that are dedicated to support requirements as dictated by the NSA. Because of security restrictions, discussion of the concept of operations for TECH REP is omitted from this plan. (See paragraph 1.g.)

(2) The elimination of the 121 positions will be conducted as follows: 11 in May, 15 in June, 15 in July, 8 in August, 3 in September, 10 in October, 13 in November, 16 in December, and the remainder in January 1974. (See Appendix 4, Page B-4-1.)

g. Time-Span for Residual Operations.

Residual operations of the Intelligence Branch as outlined above are expected to continue at the levels planned until such time as local, USSAG, U&S Command and national-level military intelligence requirements are substantially modified. Planned manning for the performance of these operations is 3 military and 87 civilian employees or a total of 90 personnel.

4. (S) MISSION IMPACT.

a. Fifteen weeks of operation have proven that the Intelligence Branch is staffed below desirable levels. Unforeseen requirements have been imposed, e.g. the Monthly Intelligence Estimate Update (MIEU), and adequate analysis of available intelligence is not being performed. Liaison functions have occupied and will continue to occupy more man-hours than anticipated. Therefore, this plan contains only a small reduction in intelligence staffing.

b. The reduction of ten civilian spaces from Intelligence Branch will affect only the Security Section which monitors personnel security and document security, and provides staff coordination for counterintelligence activities. With the assistance from the 500th MI Group now being provided, security staffing, while austere, will provide adequate coverage. The other part of the intelligence reduction appears in the proposed transfer of Special Security Detachment to the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team JTD. The Detachment, however, will still be in a position to provide essential support to the DAO.
c. Failure to maintain the proposed residual intelligence structure would result in a serious degradation of significant timely military intelligence on NVA/VC activities in and adjacent to South Vietnam for U.S. policy makers.

JOHN E. MURRAY
Major General, USA
Defense Attaché

Appendices:
1 - Disposition of Functions and Transfer Schedule
2 - DOD Civilian Phase (Milestone Chart)
3 - Proposed Residual DAO Personnel Structure

OFFICIAL:

W. E. LEGRO
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
# APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

## DISPOSITION OF FUNCTIONS AND TRANSFER SCHEDULE

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### APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

**DISPOSITION OF FUNCTIONS AND TRANSFER SCHEDULE**

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B-1-2
### APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

**DISPOSITION OF FUNCTIONS AND TRANSFER SCHEDULE**

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## Appendix 1 to Annex B to DAO Saigon OPLAN 001, Revised

### Disposition of Functions and Transfer Schedule

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JUL  | AUG  | SEP  | OCT  | NOV  | DEC  | JAN  
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B-1-5
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO DAO SAIGON OPLAN 001, REVISED

PHASE DOWN OF DAO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (MILESTONE CHART)

TECH REP

AUTHORIZED CEILING 121

NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

SECRET

300
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0

JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION, ANALYSIS, MACHINE TRANSMISSION

OPERATOR, TYPEWRITER

GRADE/NOE POSITION TITLE

05
06
06
FACT SHEET

AOSOP-ISM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection Plan, USDAO, Saigon, RVN (U)

PURPOSE: Transmittal of DAO Intelligence Collection Plan

FACTS:

1. The DAO Collection Plan supersedes the MACV Collection Plan dated 1 May 1971. It was approved by the Chief, Intelligence Branch on 12 June 1973, following coordination with the Assistant DATT. It is now in the process of being disseminated to USSAG, 500th MIG, 7602D AIG and within DAO.

2. The Plan delineates the collection and liaison responsibilities of the Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Division. It also defines the relationship between DAO, the Attache Element, and the Saigon-based elements of the 500th MIG and 7602D AIG. While these elements are not under DAO operational control, they are responsive to requirements levied by the DATT.

W. E. LeGro
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN

REFERENCE: See Annex B

1. (S NF) Intelligence Mission

a. The Intelligence Branch of the Operations and Plans Division, Defense Attaché Office, shares responsibility with the Defense Attaché Element for overt intelligence collection of friendly and enemy Order of Battle, capabilities, and intentions within the Republic of Vietnam and in contiguous areas having activities which affect the internal South Vietnamese military situation. The Intelligence Branch also supports the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Nakom Phanom, Thailand, by obtaining information concerning U.S. personnel who are prisoners, missing in action, killed in action, or defectors.

b. Essential Elements of Information (EEI's) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR's) to be collected are contained in Annex A.

c. Directives and instructions that provide the basic guidance for the collection efforts of the Intelligence Branch are listed in Annex B. The MACV directives are being rewritten by the Operations and Plans Div. and will be published as USDAO Vietnam Instructions, with the exception of 381-9, Biographic Reporting, which will be prepared by the Attaché Element.

d. The Operations and Plans Division will maintain a register of current Intelligence Collection Requirements.

*This Collection Plan supersedes MACV Collection Plan, dated 1 May 1971.
Intelligence Collection Plan

May 1973

2. (S NF) Collection Task Organizations

a. Assigned Collection Units.

There are no organized US collection units in RVN. However, there are overt HUMINT collection assets integral to the Intelligence Branch. (Annex C provides an organization chart of the Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Division).

b. Assigned Collection Equipment.

The Intelligence Branch has no assigned collection equipment, but it has access through its Liaison Officers to the equipment in the Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Document Exploitation Center and the Materiel Exploitation Center.

c. Mutual Support Arrangements.

(1) Attache Element - The Attache Element of the Defense Attache Office and the Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Division, DAO, maintain close coordination and support each other in the collection effort. The collection plan of the Attache Element will be published as a separate document.

(2) Office of Special Assistant (OSA), Saigon - All clandestine collection activity in-country must be coordinated with the OSA office in the US Embassy in accordance with DIAM 58-11. OSA also has collection responsibility for political, socio-economic, and other non-military intelligence.

(3) 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) - Elements designated as Liaison Team 2 and Liaison Team 4 conduct bilateral and unilateral collection operations, respectively (see organization chart, Annex C). Liaison Team 2 maintains liaison and conducts bilateral operations with the Military Security Directorate, 101st MI Group (ARVN) and the Vietnamese Navy. The Commander, 500th MIG, exercises operational control over the teams. Within their capability, these teams will give maximum responsiveness and priority attention to the fulfillment of DAO requirements. Annex D provides Memorandum of Understanding.
Intelligence Collection Plan

May 1973

(4) 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AIG) - Elements designated as Team 3, under the operational control of the Commander, 7602d AIG, conduct HUMINT collection with the VNAF. Within its capabilities, Team 3 will give maximum responsiveness and priority attention to the fulfillment of DAO requirements. Annex E provides Memorandum of Understanding.

(5) Office of the J2, Joint General Staff - Intelligence Branch personnel, designated as Team 1, maintain close and frequent liaison with the Office of J2, JGS, and the various elements under its purview in accordance with Memorandum of Understanding (Annex F). Liaison Officers work closely with the following agencies in Saigon:

(a) Intelligence Center, Vietnam (ICV) - Liaison with ICV provides intelligence based on its capability to produce studies and briefs from electronic intercept, photography, agent nets, unit contact, and prisoner interrogation sources.

(b) Document Exploitation Center (DEC) - The Liaison Officer coordinates document acquisition lists, document reference materials, reports and requirements. The Center screens and selects those documents of high intelligence value for translation. Dissemination of the information contained in these documents is made by means of DAO Intelligence Information Reports. The Center also identifies cryptologic documents and makes them available to Intelligence Br. (See para 3c(4)).

(c) Materiel Exploitation Center (MEC) - Liaison with the MEC provides technical intelligence concerning enemy signal, chemical, engineer, medical, ordnance, and quartermaster equipment.

(d) Military Interrogation Center (MIC) - Liaison with the MIC provides information based on interrogation of prisoners, defectors and ralliers.

(6) Corps G-2's - Team 1 personnel assigned to field locations maintain liaison with the Corps G-2's and other Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) agencies to obtain information on military activities.

(7) International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) - Liaison with ICCS delegations known to be friendly to US interests for exchange of mutually beneficial information.
Intelligence Collection Plan
May 1973

3. (S NF) **Collection Environment**


      (1) **Order of Battle** - Bilateral operations and liaison with RVNAF provide intelligence on enemy and friendly Order of Battle, capabilities and intentions, ceasefire violations, infiltration, US prisoners of war, and related subjects.

      (2) **Communist Bloc Weapons** - A large variety of communist weapons are in the possession of the VC/NVA. Many of the latest communist weapons have been captured and are available for acquisition from the RVNAF.

      (3) **Biographic Data** - If biographic data on NVA/VC personnel and members of the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) become available to the Intelligence Branch, it will be forwarded to the appropriate agencies.

   b. Collection Deterrents.

      (1) Imposed by the Host Government and the Presence of Hostile Forces.

         (a) **In-Country** - The Intelligence Branch obtains most of its intelligence from bilateral, overt activities with RVNAF agencies. Therefore, the RVNAF can exercise a high degree of control over the type of information which it makes available by: (1) withholding intelligence from US personnel; or (2) providing misleading information (when it suits RVN national interests, such as the case of RVNAF violations of the ceasefire accords).

         (b) **Presence of Hostile Forces** - Large areas of the country are occupied by hostile VC/NVA forces. These areas (especially those of military significance such as base camps and command-liaison stations) are usually heavily guarded and denied access to the local populace. Despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, travel remains restricted by VC/NVA ambushes and the destruction of highway bridges.
Intelligence Collection Plan

(2) The ceasefire protocols limit the number of US military and civilian personnel permitted in-country, restrict travel, and limit types of collection assets and equipment.

(3) Embassy and Senior Theater Commanders - The Embassy can be expected to restrict those collection activities which could embarrass the United States if exposed. Clandestine HUMINT collection responsibilities have been assigned to commands not directly subordinate to the DAO, and in-country personnel remain under operational control of their respective commands.

(4) Natural Influences. Although the Republic of Vietnam is a small country (66,000 square miles), travel is limited. The areas occupied by the VC/NVA are highly inaccessible because they are located in heavily vegetated and mountainous regions. The heavy vegetation is also used by the enemy to conceal his presence. Since this is a situation where people of a similar race and culture are in conflict, it is difficult to tell friendly forces from the enemy.

(5) Materiel Limitations. Since the RVNAF acquired communications, photographic, and electronic intercept equipment from US sources, these assets can be used through the liaison efforts of Intelligence Branch personnel.

(6) Personnel Manning. Limitations on personnel have concomitantly reduced in-country collection capability. DAO efforts are being concentrated on the Essential Elements of Information (Annex A).

c. Inventory of Collection Methodologies Employed.

(1) Human-source exploitation (HUMINT)

(2) Agent Nets - None exist under operational control of DAO. However, the Intelligence Branch is the focal point for coordination of intelligence requirements and operations of the 500th MIG and 7602d AIG which have agent nets throughout the Republic of Vietnam and in the border areas of Cambodia.
Intelligence Collection Plan

(b) RVNAF Agencies - Information obtained through liaison with the agencies indicated in paragraph 2c(5) and (6) will be reflected in DAO Intelligence Reports, as appropriate.

(c) Travellers - DAO and US contract personnel are assigned to major cities and bases throughout the country. Intelligence Branch personnel will debrief these individuals periodically for information of military significance.

(d) Interrogation - Liaison Officers will obtain information from MIC based on interrogation of prisoners, defectors and ralliers.

(2) Document Exploitation - Liaison Officers will coordinate the acquisition and exploitation of open source and captured documents which will partially or wholly satisfy EEI's.

(3) Material Exploitation - The Intelligence Branch is responsible for managing the acquisition of communist weapons mentioned in the Foreign Material Requirements Listing (FMRL). Liaison personnel are responsible for coordinating the purchase or barter of material from RVNAF. They also have responsibility for collecting information to support the Factory Markings Program as defined in DIAM 58-9-1.

(4) Technical Resource Exploitation:

(a) Special Projects Office - This element of the Intelligence Branch monitors daily SIGNINT & photo-related message traffic. It maintains a database on current airborne communications intercept and reconnaissance platforms operating in Southeast Asia and levies requirements on same.

In addition, it serves as the contact point for in-country National Security Agency (NSA) representatives.

The TAREX officer receives cryptologic documents from DIIC and forwards them to the NSA representatives. This office also coordinates photo requirements of DAO analysts and the VNAF/ARVN photo interpretation effort at the Intelligence Center, Vietnam.
Intelligence Collection Plan
May 1973

against US and RVNAF resources. Through established contacts with the 432nd Reconnaissance and Technical Squadron (RTS) at Udorn and the Targets Office, 14th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) at Nakorn Phanom, Thailand, DAO and the RVNAF receive aerial reconnaissance support in RVN (Laos and Cambodia) in the form of photo mission readouts and selected prints covering area of current interest. Special Projects employs various techniques to provide a more detailed readout and analysis of selected photography in support of DAO, ICCS and VNAF/ARVN projects and requirements.

(b) Photographic Intelligence - The Intelligence Branch receives photography from the Vietnamese Air Force which has an aerial processing and photo reconnaissance capability of six F-5s and three C-47s. Nine additional C-47s are scheduled to arrive in October 1973.

4. (S NF) Collection Operations

Assigned Programs - Responds to all requirements, including RODCA and Project Bright Light, levied by DAO elements, the American Embassy, OSA, DIA, CINCPAC, US Support Activities Group (USSAG), Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and other agencies as capabilities permit.

5. (S NF) Reporting

a. As scheduled by DIA.

(1) Scheduled In-Country Requirements Reporting, as outlined in Annex G, is the responsibility of the Attaché Element, with the Intelligence Branch providing support.

(2) The Plans and Management Element, Coordination and Liaison Section, submits a report at the end of each calendar year accounting for all the IIR numbers used by the Operations and Plans Div. The Attaché Element will account for all IIR numbers used by that office.

b. As scheduled by DAO.

No recurring reports of an intelligence nature are scheduled by the DAO at this time. IIRs, situation reports, and other intelligence reports will be sent out as the information becomes available.
Intelligence Collection Plan

May 1973

c. Precedence.

The requirements outlined in Annex A have the following priorities: all EEI are Priority 1 and all OIR are Priority 2.

W. E. LeGRO
Colonel, USA
Ch, Intelligence Branch
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

EEI 1: (S) WHAT ARE SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES TO RENEW THE WAR?

a. Attempts to launch at least battalion-level attacks in areas where there was no influence prior to the ceasefire.

b. Status of air, sea, and ground forces in SVN.

c. South Vietnam's capability to support a large-scale penetration into North Vietnam.

d. Improvement or modification of South Vietnam's supply system to its northern and western borders.

e. Changes in the South Vietnamese military conscription system and training establishment.

f. GVN plans or activities to obstruct activities of ICCS.

g. RVNAF actions to deny US officers access to plans and operations centers; changes in the free exchange of information.

EEI 2: (S) WHAT ARE NORTH VIETNAM'S INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES TO RENEW THE WAR?

a. Status of air, sea, and ground forces in North Vietnam.

b. Improvement or modification of North Vietnam's supply system to its southern border.

c. Movement of Main Force regiments and evidence of resubordination of major enemy units.

d. Compositions, identifications, strength of units in new base camps and areas. Identify as to PRC, NVA, NVA disguised as PRC, or mixed units.

e. Fresh units and replacements being infiltrated to build up in-country assets to achieve the desired 70% offensive posture.

*Indicates EM which is the result of CINCPAC Intelligence Collection Requirements validated by DIA.
f. Level and type of resupply activities to units in base areas, including areas peripheral to RVN in the border regions of Cambodia and Laos; improvements - temporary or permanent structures - and resupply of existing bases and camps.

g. Locations, subordination and functions of Binh Trams, Commor-Liaison stations, and Rear Service entities supporting resupply/infiltration systems.

h. Status of military supply assistance from other Communist Bloc countries.

i. Introduction of new and sophisticated weapon systems into NVN or those NVN-held territories in SVN and plans for their employment/deployment.

j. Changes in the North Vietnamese military conscription system and training establishment.

REFERENCES: (C) ICR U-UPE-U1908 "Enemy Threat to Saigon Area" (U); Exp date 31 Mar 73; DIRM 1A4a; ISC 720.400.

(S) ICR U-UPE-U1909 "VC Reorganization in SVN" (U); Exp date 30 Sep 73; DIRM 1C2b; ISC 720.100, 727.000.

(S) ICR U-UPE-U1910 "Draft Requirements for North Vietnam" (U); Exp date 31 Mar 73, DIRM 2B; ISC 702.000

(C) ICR G-FST-26135 "SPG-9 Recoilless Gun" (U); Exp date 31 Aug 73; DIRM 4E1d, ISC 681.255.

(C) ICR A-NN-28805 "Unidentified SAM" (U); Exp date 30 Jun 73; DIRM 1P7d, 4E2e, 4E4e, ISC 688.125.

(S) ICR U-UPE-26663 "VC/NVA Use of Trucks" (U); Exp date 30 Jun 73; DIRM 1N2, 2B5, 4E2f; ISC 504.000, 507.400, 510.200, 654.130; 744.585.

(S) ICR D-4C3-26850 "Enemy Supply Route" (U); Exp date 30 Jun 73; DIRM 1N; ISC 779.000
EEI 3: (S) BY WHAT MEANS WILL THE PRESENT GVN BE REPLACED?

a. NVN/PRG political maneuverings:

(1) PRG/NVN plans to influence proposed national elections by weakening allegiance of key South Vietnamese military personnel.

(2) Extent of present and planned infiltration by dissident elements into RVN armed forces.

(3) Kind and degree of external financial assistance to PRG/NVA activities in conjunction with proposed elections.

(4) Terrorist attempts against local village chiefs, intelligence, and politicians loyal to the GVN.

(5) PRG/NVA propaganda and stimulation of dissent in localized areas under GVN control.

(6) Expansion and influence of PRG/NVN covert cells in GVN areas of control.

b. Coup d'état

(1) Unusual shifts of elite or armored forces not called for by tactical situation.

(2) Expressions of dissatisfaction by military leaders of rival factions.

(3) Unusual, covert meetings of key military officers.

EEI 4: (S) ARE THERE ANY REMAINING US/FREE WORLD PRISONERS THAT THE PRG/NVA INTEND TO HOLD DESPITE THE PW EXCHANGE AGREEMENT?

a. Specific locations where the prisoners are being held.

b. Number and nationalities of prisoners in each location.
c. Names, physical descriptions, state of health, and background data of individual prisoners, as well as where, when, and by whom captured.

REFERENCES: (S) ICR D-7CX-24000 "Initial Report of Perishable Priority Prisoner of War Intelligence" (U); Exp date 31 Jan 74; DIRM 6G3; ISC 723.690.

(S) SCP BRIGHT LIGHT
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT

*OIR 1: (S) WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC INDICATIONS THAT THE PRG/NVA ARE PLANNING A CEASEFIRE VIOLATION?

a. Location and anticipated date of the violation.

b. Unit and number of troops to be involved.

c. Specific objective to be obtained by the violation. Has intensified reconnaissance of objectives been noted?

d. Intensified propaganda concerning GVN ceasefire violations or changes in attitude or policies of negotiators or ceasefire commission representatives.

REFERENCE: (S) ICR U-UPA-U0153 "Ceasefire Violations" (U); Exp date 31 Oct 73; DIRM 1A1, 1A3, 1B; ISC 720.400, 723.000.

*OIR 2: (S) IF A CEASEFIRE VIOLATION WERE COMMITTED, WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT OCCURRED?

a. Location and time of the violation.

b. Unit and number of troops involved.

c. Number of casualties and kinds of equipment losses sustained.

d. Specific objective of the violation.

e. Observation of the violation by members of the International Commission for Control and Supervision and their subsequent reporting of the incident. If the incident was reported, who was found responsible?

REFERENCE: (S) ICR U-UPA-U0153 "Ceasefire Violations" (U), Exp date 31 Oct 73; DIRM 1A1, 1A3, 1B; ISC 720.400, 723.000.

*OIR 3: (S) WHAT IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF AND GVN INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IN UNCOVERING PLANS FOR INSURGENCY AND ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS?
a. Comparison of effectiveness of RVNAF, GVN, and US intelligence activities.

b. RVNAF and GVN capabilities to avoid surprise by opposing forces.

OIR 4: (S) ARE THERE ANY US DESERTERS WHO HAVE CHOOSEN TO REMAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

a. Names, physical description and residences.

b. Political affiliations.

c. Means of livelihood, especially their dealing with narcotics and dangerous drug traffic.

OIR 5: (S) WHAT IS THE RATE AND PERCENTAGE OF RVNAF, NVN, AND VC DESERTION?

a. Locations and occupations of deserters.

b. Political affiliations.
ANNEX B

INSTRUCTIONS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

1. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (U), 27 Jan '73.


3. CINCPAC Intel Collection Plan FY 71, (S NFO), 6 Nov 70.


5. DIAM 58-9-1, Factory Markings, (C), 1 Sep 65.

Guidance for Operations and Plans Division

1. DAO Directive 381-11, Intelligence Procedures for Exploitation of Human Sources (U), (to be published).

2. DAO Directive 381-16, Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR) Program (C) (to be published).


4. DAO Directive 381-40, Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Plans, Orders, and Requests for Collection of Intelligence Information (C) (to be published).

ANNEX B


7. DAO Directive 381-1, Observer situation report (S/NF/SEN) 31 Ma 73
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding (U)

1. (S) PURPOSE:
   a. To define the mission, concept of operations, and command/control relationships of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) team of Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group and the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, RVN (hereinafter referred to as Detachment K and DAO.
   b. To establish responsibility for the support required by Detachment K teams for the conduct of its mission in the DAO area of responsibility.
   c. To record agreement with respect to the foregoing between the DAO and Detachment K.

2. (S) MISSION:
   a. To facilitate HUMINT collection, counterintelligence, and exploitation operations conducted by Detachment K.
   b. To provide direct intelligence and counterintelligence support to the DAO.

3. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
   RVN Teams, Detachment K is the designation of civilian intelligence case officers in Liaison Team 2 and Liaison Team 4 of Coordination and Liaison Section, DAO. Personnel in Liaison Team 2 will conduct bilateral collection operations; those in Liaison Team 4 will conduct unilateral collection operations. Counterintelligence and exploitation operations will be conducted by Detachment K personnel on a TDY basis from Bangkok.
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4. (S) COMMAND/CONTROL RELATIONSHIP:

   a. Commander, Detachment K, exercises operational control over the RVN Teams.

   b. Commander, Detachment K is the designated representative of the Commander, 500th MI Group, to exercise authority for all 500th MI Group operations throughout Southeast Asia.

   c. Intelligence collection requirements not of DAO origin will be assigned by the 500th MI Group through normal 500th MI Group levy procedures. Commander, Detachment K will provide the DAO an information copy of each requirement assigned. Intelligence collection requirements of DAO origin will be levied by the DAO direct to RVN Teams in accord with DAO procedures. The RVN Teams will give maximum responsiveness and priority attention to the fulfillment of DAO requirements. Copies of intelligence collection plans developed by the DAO and 500th MI Group will be exchanged.

5. (S) DAO - DETACHMENT K RELATIONSHIPS:

   a. Adherence to DAO directives: RVN Teams will be subject to DAO Administrative policies, procedures, and regulations governing the conduct of individuals assigned to the DAO.

   b. Administration, Logistics, and Funding:

      (1) The DAO provides administrative and logistical support to the RVN Teams, to include O&M funds (less operational TDY expenses), office space,
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office furnishings, translators/interpreters, and other station expenses. PCS travel expenses and pay and allowances will be provided to members of Liaison Team 2 carried on the DAO Joint Table of Distribution. The DAO will prepare an annual budget, as required, to meet support expenses.

(2) Commander, Detachment K will provide operational funding and equipment from Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) to support Detachment K ECMINT collection, exploitation, and counterespionage operations. TDY funds to support required counterintelligence operations will be funded by Detachment K and DAO, as appropriate.

6. (S) REPORTS:

Detachment K RVN Teams will disseminate Early Warning and other perishable intelligence information by electrically transmitted messages in an FIR format prescribed by DIA. Content of such information will determine its dissemination, but at a minimum the following will be addressees of each electrically transmitted FIR: US Embassy, Saigon; DAO; USSAG/7th AF; CINCUSAMPAC; and 500th MI Group. Intelligence information not requiring electrical transmission will be reported in a DD 1396 format. Dissemination of such reports will be determined by the content of the information, but at a minimum the above offices will be included as FIR recipients.

7. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

The DAO will provide appropriate secure communications in Saigon for the use of the RVN Teams.
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding (U)

8. CHANGES:

This Memorandum of Understanding is effective immediately. It will be reviewed, as necessary, by the DAO and Detachment K. Changes, amendments or rescissions will be published as annexes.

__________________________
Commander
Detachment K
500th Military Intelligence Group

__________________________
Chief
Intelligence Branch
DAO, Saigon
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. PURPOSE:

   a. To define the mission, concept of operations and command/control relationships of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Bilateral Operations Team, 7602d Air Intelligence Group (7602 AINTLGS), Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS) and the Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon, RVN.

   b. To establish responsibility for the support required by the Bilateral Operations Team for the conduct of its mission in the DAO area of responsibility.

   c. To record agreement with respect to the foregoing between the DAO, Saigon and the 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AFIS).

2. MISSION: To continue the human source intelligence collection operations conducted between the USAF (7602d) and VNAF as expressed in the VNAF/USAF Bilateral Collection Agreement, as amended, 29 July 1972.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

   a. Effective 18 Mar 73, the RVN Bilateral Operations Team, DAO, Saigon assumed the collection responsibilities of Detachment 6, 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AFIS) regarding bilateral human source intelligence collection operations with the VNAF.

   b. The Bilateral Operations Team is the designation of three civilian intelligence case officers employed by the DAO for the purpose of conducting bilateral human source intelligence collection operations with the VNAF.

   c. All USAF/VNAF collection operations are conducted bilaterally with the VNAF. Direct briefings and debriefings of agent personnel will not be conducted by US members of the Bilateral Operations Team without prior approval of the DAO. Expansion or termination of existing collection projects and development of new collection proposals will be coordinated
with the DAO prior to their implementation. Subsequent to Seventeen's DAO coordination, the Bilateral Operations Team will coordinate as required by Director Central Intelligence Directive 5/1 and OMA 00065034-7955-7759.

Results of this coordination will be provided to the DAO in information.

b. COMMAND/CONTROL RELATIONSHIP:

a. Command and Control Relations: The Commander, 76026 Air Intelligence Group, exercises operational control over the Bilateral Operations Team in coordination with the DAO.

b. Tasking: Intelligence collection requirements not of DAO origin will be assigned by the 7602 AIRTELE through normal tasking procedure. The Bilateral Operations Team of the 7602 AIRTELE will provide to the DAO an information copy of each requirement received. DAO originated intelligence collection requirements will be treated in accordance with DAO procedures with an information copy provided to the 7602 AIRTELE. To the fullest extent of its capability, the Bilateral Operations Team will give maximum responsiveness and priority attention to the fulfillment of DAO and USAF requirements. Copies of intelligence collection plans developed by the DAO and 7602 AIRTELE will be mutually exchanged.

5. DAO-76026 RELATIONSHIPS:

a. Adherence to DAO directives.

(1) The Bilateral Operations Team will be subject to the DAO administrative policies, procedures, and regulations governing the conduct of individuals assigned to the DAO.

(2) Normal clearance procedures will apply to visitors entering the DAO area on official business concerned with the Bilateral Operations Team or their activities.

b. Administration and Logistics.

(1) The DAO provides administrative, clerical and logistical support to the Bilateral Operations Team to include pay and allowances, OMA funds, office space, office furnishings, translators/interpreters and other station expenses. The DAO will prepare an annual budget, as required, to meet team support expenses.
6. **COMMUNICATIONS:** The Bilateral Operations Team will disseminate 1R, Intel Summary, and other pertinent intelligence information by electrically transmitted messages in an IR format prescribed by USA. Content of such information will determine its dissemination but at a minimum the following will be addressed in each electrically transmitted IR: USA, Secretary, Saigon; USA/USA/1st AP; DIA; CORPAC; CORPACAF; CORPACAF; 13th A/B and 7602 AIRTEC. Intelligence information not requiring electrical transmission will be reported in a DB-1396 format. Each reports will be prepared by the Bilateral Operations Team or the 7602 AIRTEC. Dissemination of such reports will be determined by the content of the information, but at a minimum the above officers will be included as 1R recipients. All reporting by the Bilateral Operations Team will be under a 7602 AIRTEC reporter designator.

7. **COMMUNICATIONS:** The DAO, Saigon, will provide appropriate secure communications for the use of the Bilateral Operations Team.

8. **CHANGES:** This Memorandum of Understanding is effective immediately. It will be reviewed, as necessary, by the DAO and the 7602d Air Intelligence Group. Changes, amendments or recusations will be published as annexe.