CONFIDENTIAL SGN 01786 INTEL

NKP FOR USSAG DI/INOE, CINCAPAC FOR J-2, DIA FOR DIAM2, COS PARIS FOR PATTON.

ZUSJ: J-2, JCS STATUS REPORT (U).

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) FOLLOWING INFO HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY RVNAF JCS AS OF 21 JUN 73, FOR THE PERIOD 230630H TO 211200H JUN 73.

A. EN-INITIATED CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS:

MR-1 4127
MR-2 2755
MR-3 3324
MR-4 7216

B. CASUALTIES:

VC/MIA: 24358 KIA 870 POW
RVNAF: 6263 KIA 39019 WIA 1787 MIA
GVN GIV: 1076 KIA 2881 WIA 1262 MIA

C. HAMLET STATUS:

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End 2
2. (CONFIDENTIAL) THE FOLLOWING INFO HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY
RWNJ JGS AS OF 21 JUN 73, FOR EN-INITIATED VIOLATIONS DURING
CEASEFIRE II:

A. FOR THE PERIOD 201200 JUN 73 TO 211200 JUN 73.

<table>
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(NOTE: PARA 2A. FIGURES ARE INCLUDED IN TOTALS OF PARA 1A.)

B. VIOLATIONS SINCE 151200H JUN 73 TOTAL 516.

GES 31 DEC 79

225

7408
CONFIDENTIAL

FM SSO SAIGON
TO AFSSO NKP
INFO COS SAIGON
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL SGN 01791 INTEL SECTION ONE OF TWO
ACSOP-1-I4 SENDS, "NKP FOR USSAG/INTEH AMBASSAY SAIGON PASS TO
MR. BENNETT AND MR. POLGAR.

SUBJ: SIGNIFICANT SURFACE INTELLIGENCE FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION
IN THE USSAG DISUM (U)

1. OUT-COUNTRY (NEGATIVE) (U)

2. SOUTH VIETNAME (CONFIDENTIAL)

A. COUNTRY WIDE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE FIRST SEVEN DAYS OF CEASE-
FIRE II.

(1) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY SINCE 15 JUNE REVEALS THAT NO
COMMUNIST "LAND GRAB" OCCURRED, AND THAT PROBABLY NONE WAS PLANNED.
AS WAS SHOWN PREVIOUSLY IN STATISTICS, COMBAT ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT
SOUTH PEAKED ON 15-16 JUNE, BUT SINCE THEN GRADUALLY HAS DECLINED.

(2) THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT APPEAR TO EXPLAIN WHY COMMU-
NIST FORCES CHOSE NOT TO INITIATE A "LAND GRAB" OPERATION THIS
TIME. DURING THE "LAND GRAB" OPERATIONS OF OCT AND JAN, ENEMY
LOSSES, ESPECIALLY AMONG LOCAL FORCE ELEMENTS, WERE SUBSTANTIAL.
NO APPRECIABLE GAIN IN CONTROL OF ADDITIONAL TERRITORY OR POPU-
TION RESULTED.

THE COMMUNISTS MAY HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY ALREADY HAD GOT ALL
THE TERRITORY THEY REASONABLY COULD GET WITHOUT A GREAT LOSS IN
COMBAT POTENTIAL. BEYOND THESE BATTLEFIELD CONSIDERATIONS,
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS MAY HAVE LED THE COMMUNISTS
TO A BELIEF THAT RENEWED "LAND GRAB" OPERATIONS WOULD ACTUALLY
BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THEIR CURRENT OBJECTIVES. THE BASIC
GUIDANCE OF COSVN DIRECTIVE 2/73 STILL SEEMS TO REMAIN IN EFFECT.
THE CURRENT ENEMY OBJECTIVES ARE BELIEVED TO BE THESE:
--TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE CONTROL OVER TERRITORIES HE CONSIDERS
HIS OWN.
--TO REBUILD, UPGRADE, AND STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH THE REPUBLIC.
--TO INCREASE HIS ACCESS TO THE HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS
UNDER GVN CONTROL.
--TO PERSUADE PEOPLE NOW UNDER GVN CONTROL TO RETURN TO PRC
TERRITORY.

(3) REGARDING THE FIRST AND SECOND POINTS, THE PERSONNEL LOSSES
THAT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFERED DURING A NEW "LAND GRAB"
OPERATION WOULD HAVE AGGRAVATED THE ALREADY ACUTE PROBLEMS OF
REBUILDING AND UPGRADING THE LOCAL FORCE UNITS AND CADEE. THESE
ELEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL IF THE COMMUNISTS ARE TO SUSTAIN AN EFFECTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

(4) REGARDING THE THIRD AND FOURTH POINTS, THE PRC APPEARS TO
BE INTENT ON PROJECTING AN IMAGE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
THAT THE COMMUNISTS INTEND TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE SCRUPULOUSLY.
THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ALLOW ARVN TO ENroach ON PRC AREAS, BUT THE
COMMUNISTS WON'T ATTACK ARVN EITHER--THIS IS THE IMAGE OF REASONABLE
ABSENCESS THAT THEY HAVE Sought TO PROJECT. MOREOVER, A LAND GRAB
OPERATION WOULD HAVE RUN COUNTER TO CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE
people in cvn controlled areas to return to their former homes—now located in prg controlled territory thus negating communist efforts at building up the prg popular base.

(5) there is a further very practical reason the communists chose not to initiate major operations. arvn probably could have contained another land grab operation, and might very well have taken advantage of the situation to improve cvn control in certain areas, like the coastal lowlands of southern mr-1. additionally, vnaf might have used this an an excuse to bomb major communist logistic areas, such as dong ha in mr-1, or northern tay ninh province in mr-3.

(6) what then has occurred in the seven days since ceasefire ii? arvn incursions into communist dominated areas just prior to 15 june probably upset enemy plans for localized attacks designed to hold and improve prg control in communist controlled areas, and to protect other areas of vital interest, such as major supply corridors. action has centered in three provinces:
guang nam, kontum, and cuong thien.

(7) current attacks in southern mr-1 are probably meant to hold arvn in place and hinder attempts to clean out pockets of communist influence in the coastal lowlands. communist activity in duc duc district of guang nam prov is designed to force arvn to contract their positions, and eventually withdraw the rangers from the area near the thu ban river. by accomplishing this mission, the enemy would facilitate his access into the coastal lowlands.
gbs 31 dec 79
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8003*.

confidential
CONFIDENTIAL SGN 41791 INTEL FINAL SECTION OF TWO
AOSOP-I-IX SENDS; NKP FORUSSAG/INOE; AMEMBASSY SAIGON PASS TO
MR. BENNETT AND MR. POLGAR.

(CONT'D)

BLOCK THE SOUTHERLY EXPANSION OF GUN CONTROL, AND DENY FRIENDLY
GROUND OBSERVATION OF THE IMPORTANT INFILTRATION ROUTES TO HIEP
DUC.

(UL IN MR-2, THE RECENT ACTIVITY WEST OF KONTUM CITY IS A CON-
TINUATION OF COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE A BUFFER ZONE WEST OF THE
PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, IN ORDER TO PROTECT AN IMPORTANT NORTH-SOUTH
SUPPLY ROUTE AND THE FORDING SITE AT THE YALI FALLS.

(9) COMMUNIST FORCES PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE IN SECURING THESE
AREAS SINCE THEY ARE PROBABLY THE PLACES MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO GUN
INTERFERENCE ANYWHERE ALONG THE ENEMY'S ROUTE, IN COMPLEA-

THAT MAJOR COMMUNIST IN-COUNTRY ROAD NETWORK WHICH
RUNS FROM THE DMZ TO THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

(10) IN MR-4, AGGRESSIVE ARVN OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST STRONGHOLDS HAVE CONTINUED FOLLOWING CEASEFIRE II. THE GVN'S MAJOR AREA OF EMPHASIS WAS CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE.

ORTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE AND EACH IS WORKING TO PREVENT THE OTHER FROM GAINING DOMINANCE.

CHUONG THIEN IS THE HUB OF THE LOWER DELTA OR, AS THE VIETNAMESE DESCRIBE IT, THE BOTTOM OF THE RICE BOWL. THE SIDE THAT CONTROLS THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION HERE—THE CANALS AND ROADS—MAKES CREDIBLE A CLAIM TO EFFECTIVE CONTROL. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CHUONG THIEN THE CORE OF THEIR "LIBERATED" AREA IN THE LOWER DELTA; ARVN IS JUST AS INTENT ON PREVENTING THIS.

(11) IN CONCLUSION, COMMUNIST FORCES SINCE THE NEW CEASEFIRE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO: PROTECT "LIBERATED" AREAS FROM GUN PENTRATION; EXPAND AND IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL OVER THOSE AREAS; IMPROVE ACCESS TO AND EXPAND INFLUENCE IN THE MORE POPULATED AREAS UNDER GVN CONTROL; AND TO REBUILD THEIR OWN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.

FOR THE MOMENT THEN, THE COMMUNISTS SEEM INTENT ON SOLIDIFYING THEIR OWN POSITION IN ORDER TO CREATE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT GVN. THIS COURSE OF ACTION IS BEING PURSUED AT A RELATIVELY LOW COST IN COMBAT RESOURCES, WHILE CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS CONTINUE AT IMPROVING THE COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITY. SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE TO ABANDON THE POLITICAL OPTION.

B. NR-4 (CONFIDENTIAL)

(1) IT APPEARS THAT COMMUNIST FORCES IN AN XUYEN PROVINCE WERE FOLLOWING VC NR-3 INSTRUCTIONS WHEN THEY INCREASED POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY PRECEDING THE NEW CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. PRIOR TO THE CEASEFIRE ON 15 JUNE, ENEMY PRESSURE INCREASED NEAR THE CAI DOI CANAL IN CAI NUOC DISTRICT, PROBABLY IN REACTION TO GVN
Attempts to improve the security along the canal since 15 June, enemy pressure has continued, with activity switching to the Route 12 area, where several major engagements have occurred. Recent military activity in the province may be an attempt by the VC to force RANAF to commit its forces to RANAF controlled areas in order to protect LOC's and other areas of vital interest. The result would be to relieve GVN pressure on the large areas of southern and eastern and Xuyen, now under PRG control, and subsequently enhance communist claims to effective control over these areas.

(2) The PRG already has extensive political control in an Xuyen province. Nowhere else in HR-4 is the political organization as complete. The PRG has created a working local government structure which serves as an alternative to the GVN. Its achievements include public services and development projects.

(3) The PRG's governmental efforts may start showing important results. Recently reports have indicated that four thousand refugees, a notable number, have returned to PRG controlled areas since the end of January.

(4) Since January, VC forces have improved their access to some major populated areas, while the GVN has made several inroads into areas under PRG control. Gun operations have improved, security along the Bay Nap River, a main loc for southern at Xuyen, facilitating gun movement along the river. Attempts were also made to improve security along the Song Bong Doc River; however, this operation has only been partially successful, and VC forces reportedly still maintain check points along the route. Gun forces have been successful in securing the Dom Doi Canal in Dom Doi District. Additionally, an RANAF base area was established at
RvNAF INCURSION INTO THE NAM CAN FOREST IN MAY YEARS AND DENIES THE VC THE ONLY DEEP-WATERPORT IN THE AREA. IN THE PAST, THE VC HAD HEAVILY TAXED VESSELS MOVING ALONG THE RIVER. BY INCREASING GUN PRESENCE ALONG THE RIVER, A MORE DIRECT ROUTE FROM CENTRAL AN XUYEN TO THE CHINA SEA, AND SUBSEQUENT MARKETS, IS AVAILABLE WHEN SHIPS ARE UNABLE TO MOVE DOWN THE RIVER, THEY MUST EXIT THE PROVINCE INTO THE GULF OF THAILAND, AND ROUND THE "UI BAI PUNG," ROUGH AND CERTAINLY LONGER ROUTE.

(5) AN XUYEN, WITH ITS LONG HISTORY OF VC INFLUENCE AND UNCONTESTED CONTROL OVER SEVERAL AREAS, COULD BECOME THE POLITICAL SHOWCASE FOR THE PRG IN MR-4. SO IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT IN AN XUYEN ALL EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO IMPLEMENT CGSVN DIRECTIVE 2-73 TO CONSOLIDATE THE PRG HOLD ON LIBERATE AREAS BY IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND STRENGTHENING MAIN, LOCAL AND GUERILLA FORCES.

IN THE COMING MONTHS, MILITARY OBJECTIVES WILL BE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE POLITICAL ENDS. SPECIFIC TARGETS MAY BE TH-12, THE BAY HAP CANAL, AND THE SONG ONG OOC. THREATS WILL PROBABLY ALSO BE FORTHCOMING AGAINST OTHER LOCOS RECENTLY SECURED BY RVNAF.

GDS 31 DEC 79

CONFIDENTIAL
SUB: USBAO-SOA MONTHLY INTEL ESTIMATE UPDATE (MIEU)

Ref: SSO SAI CO 0789214 JUN 73 (MIEU)

I. THE MIEU WILL BE AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PRODUCED MONTHLY BY DAO SAI CO AND COORDINATED WITH USSAG. AS SUCH IT WILL REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATED USSAG POSITION CONCERNING THE ENEMY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM AND CONTIGUOUS AREAS. DISSEMINATION WILL BE TO THE ADDRESSEES OF THIS MESSAGE.
INTJ: (UK) BUNCHGA1694 1662484-UJUJ--RHSMVA.
2NR-UJUJ
R 1953022 JUN 73
FM GINOPAC HAWAII
TO FUMTGA/GOMUSSAO/RRP TRAF THAI
RHSMVA/USDAO SAIGON RVN
ST
GCL-AR/12332A
DAO SAIGON INTELLIGENCE REPORTING.
1. TO ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN RVN.
DU
G1694
REV: OF USSAG AND DAO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING INDICATES THAT CINCPAC IS RECEIVING ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AS SPECIFIED IN REFERENCE A. USSAG WILL CONTINUE TO INSURE THAT CINCPAC IS INFORMED OF ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM DAO IN A TIMELY MANNER.
AOSOP-IS-F

SUBJECT: Intelligence Center, Vietnam

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: The purpose of this Fact Sheet is to provide fundamental information pertaining to the Intelligence Center, Vietnam.

FACTS:

1. (U) The Intelligence Center, Vietnam, formerly known as CICV (Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam), was established in January 1966 under the impetus of the then J-2, MACV, Gen. McChristian. Despite many changes since then, its mission still remains, "TO PRODUCE INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, AND STUDIES CONCERNING AREAS OF OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF J2/JGS".

2. (C) The number of ARVN troops assigned to the Intelligence Center, Vietnam has remained fairly constant since its inception. Currently it has an authorized strength of 165 (66 officers, 64 NCO's, and 35 EM), and an actual strength of 135 (54 officers, 53 NCO's, and 28 EM). The number of US troops assigned to CICV reached a peak of 684 in 1967. From then it gradually decreased until by early 1972 there were slightly more than 200 US troops working at CICV. This number continued to decrease and by December 1972, the US element was redesignated as a liaison element. Currently there are four full-time DAO personnel working at the Intelligence Center, Vietnam: a US Liaison Officer, an Imagery Interpreter, a Local National Interpreter/Translator, and a clerk typist.

3. (C) The center consists of an Imagery Interpretation Sub-Division, Order of Battle Branch, Targets Branch, and Area Analysis Branch.

4. (C) The Imagery Interpretation Sub-Division has both an In-Country and an Out-Country Branch. It is a very active branch and lately has been concentrating on detecting enemy road building activity.
5. (C) The Order of Battle Branch maintains an extensive file of all enemy units. Specifically, it reports on enemy unit designations, personalities, areas of operations, and strengths. At present, this branch is engaged in a three-part conference with DAO's Intelligence Branch.

6. (S) The Targets Branch maintains an elaborate targeting data base of map over-lays for both tactical air strikes, as well as strategic B-52 bombing within RVN. It also prepares studies of enemy base areas. Because of a new emphasis in preparing contingency ARC LITE strikes, the strength of this branch was augmented by seven in May, making for a total of twenty-one personnel.

7. (C) The Area Analysis Branch maintains and prepares files of maps and charts pertaining to terrain analysis, as well as responding to specific requests from the Corps and J-2/JGS for an Area Analysis of a specific area. These studies are prepared within seven days of the receipt of the request.

8. (C) The Intelligence Center, Vietnam carries a well-deserved reputation for hard-work and competent professionalism under the energetic leadership of LTC Vu Van Nho, who assumed command of the center one year ago. Plans are under-foot to consolidate the former Combined Centers into one organization effective 1 July 1973. It is too early to tell what practical effects this will have on the Intelligence Center, although this consolidation is decidedly unpopular at the Center.

W. E. LeGRO
COL, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
FACT SHEET

AOSOP-IS-F

SUBJECT: Document Exploitation Center (DEC)

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: To provide background on the mission, organization, strength, and problems of DEC.

FACTS:

1. (U) The Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) was formed on 31 October 1965, when BG J. A. McChristian (then ACoS, J2, MACV) sent a letter to Col Ho Van Loi (then ACoS, J2, JGS) proposing formation of the unit.

2. (C) Subsequent to MACV's termination, CDEC dropped the word "combined" from its title and now is designated: Document Exploitation Center (DEC).

3. (C) Organization: The US element liaisoning with DEC is basically organized into two functional sections: Production and Support.

4. (C) Strength:

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<th>US Paid LN's</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>ARVN Paid LN's</th>
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<td>30</td>
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Grand Total: 102

(Note: Prior to MACV's termination, US element strength of CDEC was: 22 US, 130 LN's, ARVN as shown.)

DEC itself has five functional sections: Operations, Receiving and Screening, Evaluation, Analysis, and Storage. All ARVN and US elements are co-located in one building.
5. (C) Problem: Dwindling number and belated receipt of captured documents; however, sufficient volume continues to be received to maintain needed productivity and staff workload. As the future situation stabilizes, VC and NVA expected to begin widespread publication of newspapers and periodicals with exploitable intelligence and constituting major data source for DEC to exploit in replacement of captured items.

1 Incl
Sample of Hard-Copy IR

W. E. LeGRO
COL, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
This report contains information obtained from NVA documents and concerns combat activities and low morale of members of the 210th Antiaircraft Regiment, Artillery Command, Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army.

Four documents, dated between 21 September 1972 and April 1973, maintained by a member of D86 aka the 86th Battalion, 210th Antiaircraft Regiment, Artillery Command, Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army, concern combat activities of the 210th Antiaircraft Regiment during the 1972-1973 Dry Season and weaknesses and low morale displayed by members of the Regiment.
A. (C) Combat activities of the 210th Antiaircraft Regiment during the 1972-1973 Dry Season: A letter, prepared on 21 September 1972 during the 9th Congress of representatives of the Party Headquarters of the 210th Antiaircraft Regiment, and an undated report reveal that the regiment was originally a mobile antiaircraft artillery unit of NVA Group 559 in Laos. During the 1971-1972 Dry Season, the regiment shot down 21 aircraft and succeeded in protecting 99.74% of NVA "assault" vehicles [meaning armored vehicles] against US air raids. During the 1972-1973 Dry Season, the regiment participated in 41 battles and shot down five aircraft. On 21 December 1972, C1-D18 aka the 1st Company, 18th Battalion shot down one AC130. On 30 December 1972, C2-D8 aka the 2nd Company, 8th Battalion shot down one RC-47. On 2 January 1973, D18 shot down one F-4 jet. This was the 240th aircraft shot down by the regiment. On 4 January 1973, C2-D8 downed one OV10 reconnaissance plane. On 9 January 1973, C1-D8 aka the 1st Company, 8th Battalion shot down one C-47. On 4 January 1973, C2-D18 aka the 2nd Company, 18th Battalion damaged F-4 jet. The regiment also protected 1,885 NVA trucks against US airstrikes; established 25 artillery positions, five command posts for its battalions, one command post for the regiment, and 71 underground shelters; and cleared 1,500 kilometers of route. Regarding its logistical activities, the regiment received and issued 18 metric tons of rice and two metric tons of food provisions and 364,000 liters of gasoline. 95.05% of the personnel of the regiment was in good physical conditions. The regiment was commended by the Headquarters of NVA Group 559 twice and by the Headquarters of Unit 471 [possibly aka B2 Front] three times.

B. (C) Low morale and weaknesses displayed by members of the Regiment: The regiment was strongly criticized for its poor combat proficiency, namely the 57mm and 85mm antiaircraft gun companies which were considered as the weakest elements of the Regiment. Members of the Regiment feared combat operations in day-time and dared not shoot at OV10 reconnaissance planes. Therefore, all subordinate personnel were to make effort to improve the combat efficiency of the regiment. They were further directed to fully understand Resolutions 19 and 20 adopted by NVN Politburo.

C. (C) Improvement of leadership: A directive dated 26 September 1972 and signed by Hoàng Đình Cửu for the 210th Antiaircraft Regiment Current Affairs Committee instructs the 18th and 86th Battalions to review their strengths and weaknesses in leadership and to study the aforementioned letter so as to improve their leadership. Another directive, dated April 1973 and signed by Trần Hiền Đệ, Secretary of the 210th Regiment Current Affairs Committee directs the 86th Battalion Party Committee to review its past leadership activities.
Field Command: (C) These documents were acquired on 28 May 1973 in South Vietnam (vic XT760890, Binh Long Province, RVN Military Region 3) from NVA Captain Trương Văn Vị, Political Officer of the 86th Battalion, 210th Antiaircraft Regiment, Artillery Command, Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army, who rallied to the 31st Ranger Battalion, RVN III Corps, on the cited date. These documents were received by the C & L Section on 15 June 1973 and logged under number 06-1020-73 (PET 129/73) and are classified RVN KIN which is equivalent to Confidential and will be handled accordingly.
FACT SHEET

AOSOP-IS-F

SUBJECT: Military Interrogation Center (MIC), Vietnam (U)

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: The purpose of this fact sheet is to provide fundamental information pertaining to the Interrogation Center.

FACTS:

1. (U) The Military Interrogation Center (MIC) was established in 1966 in Cholon, Saigon, and moved to its present location (2 To Hien Thanh Street, Phu Tho) in 1967. Despite the many changes since then, its mission still remains, "TO INTERROGATE SELECTIVE CAPTIVES AND RETURNEES AND TO PROVIDE J2/JGS WITH COLLECTED INFORMATION."

2. (C) The MIC currently has an authorized strength of 92 (49 officers, 26 NCO's and 17 EM), and an actual strength of 85 (45 officers, 20 NCO's and 20 EM). The number of American troops assigned to MIC reached a peak of approximately 100 personnel gradually decreasing until the American troops pulled out. Presently there is one full-time US DAO Liaison Officer working at MIC with a Local National staff of eight personnel.

3. (C) The Center consists of a Headquarters, Operations, Division, Exploitation Division and an Editing Division.

4. (C) The Operations Division is in charge of the Administration Section, Political Warfare Section and the Supply Section.

5. (C) Exploitation Division has two subordinate sections, the Requirement Section and the Interrogation Section. This Division is the more active of the three divisions in the MIC, and the one which the US DAO Liaison Officer works closely with.

6. (C) The Editing Division has a subordinate Editing Section and a Technical Section. This division receives the
Interrogation Reports from the Exploitation Division and finalizes and distributes these reports to agencies concerned.

7. (C) The Military Interrogation Center, Vietnam is under the leadership of LTC Le Trong Nhan, who is highly respected by the troops under his command, and who has cooperated with the DAO Intelligence Branch in the fulfillment of its mission. The planned consolidation of the centers by JGS, on 1 July 1973, is not to the liking of LTC Nhan or his officers.

8. (C) While the above indicates that the flow of POW's and accompanying reports should be a smooth process, the contrary is true. Since the original cease fire, ARVN has virtually halted the flow of POW's and reports to Saigon. POW's are now held in detention centers in the military regions, i.e. DaNang, Pleiku, etc. Interrogation Reports are now usually maintained at that level. Only by indirect means, i.e. agent reports, etc., does the DAO hear of POW's with information of US interest. Because of the relative isolation of the POW's, the DAO maintains a mobile liaison team, constantly traveling. This team to date has provided extremely lucrative information supporting the Bright Light Program. It should be noted that once the DAO Liaison Team is in contact with their ARVN counterparts anywhere in the field, maximum cooperation has been displayed.

W. E. LeGRO
COL, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Materiel Exploitation Center (MEC), Vietnam (U)

Defense Attache

PURPOSE: The purpose of this fact sheet is to provide fundamental information pertaining to the Materiel Exploitation Center.

FACTS:

1. (U) The Materiel Exploitation Center, formerly known as Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC), was established in 1965 under the impetus of J2, MACV. Despite some changes since then, its mission still remains, "TO PRODUCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF ENEMY MATERIEL IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J2/JGS."

2. (C) The number of ARVN troops has remained fairly constant since its inception, but with the advent of the cease-fire, its strength has dropped. Currently the MEC has an authorized strength of 34 (13 officers, 13 NCO's and 8 EM), and an actual strength of 32 (12 officers, 12 NCO's and 8 EM). The number of US troops reached a peak of 120 in 1967 (30 officers, 60 NCO's and 30 EM). In late 1972, there were 33 US troops still assigned (12 officers, 15 NCO's and 5 EM). Currently there is one US DAO Liaison Officer assigned to MEC.

3. (C) MEC consists of an Administrative Branch, and a Technical Intelligence Division. In the past, there were also five field teams, but these have been recently deactivated.

4. (U) The Administrative Division carries out the normal day to day administrative activities, and a supply and maintenance function.

5. (O) The Technical Intelligence Division is divided into five sections: an Ordnance Section, Medical Section, Signal Section, Engineer Section, and a Quartermaster Section. As materiel is received, it is sent to the section that has responsibility to analyze the specific type of item and formulate a report.
6. (C) MEC has received very little materiel since April, largely due to the cease-fire. All captured materiel of intelligence value is required to be sent to MEC for exploitation. It goes from the capturing unit to the sector S-2 to the Corps G-2 to J-2/JGS, and then to MEC. After exploitation, the materiel is sent to the Central Logistics Command for storage.

W. E. LeGro
COL, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
SECRET

FACT SHEET

AOSOP-1S

SUBJECT: Project Fast Pass (U)

DATT

PURPOSE: (U) Provide historical backdrop, explanatory comment, and status report on Fast Pass.

FACTS:

1. (S/NF) Fast Pass planning per se was actively and broadly initiated at local operational level in Oct 71 as a result of a MACV-issued Letter of Instruction (not included due to classification). The project purpose was and remains the achievement of continuity in covert and clandestine intelligence collection and reporting upon the withdrawal of US military collection resources from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

2. (S/NF) DIA-issued Human Resources Collection Directive (HRCD) PH-00290 contains comprehensive detail on current Fast Pass tasking and EEI (not included due to classification).

3. (S/NF) Under referenced HRCD and earlier CINCPAC and MACV guidance, the 500th MI Group established 15 billets in the RVN in early 1973 to pickup and continue the MACV unilateral clandestine collection operations that had been conducted by the 525th MI Gp. No Air Force or Navy unilateral operations were picked up or continued because neither of these two services conducted such operations in the RVN at the time Fast Pass was implemented.

4. (S/NF) Of the 15 unilateral Fast Pass billets in the RVN, 12 are under DAO cover and form DAO Liaison Team 4. The remaining three slots are under State Department cover support. All 15 slots are filled except for three spaces in the DAO.
5. (S/NF) MACV bilateral clandestine collection operations were picked up and are being continued through assets, who form DAO Liaison Team 2 and Liaison Team 3.

6. (S/NF) Liaison Team 2 interfaces with ARVN Unit 101, MSS, and the VNN Special Collection Detachment. Liaison Team 3 interfaces with the VNAF Special Collection Detachment. Chart at TAB A depicts more fully the organizational and liaison interrelationships of the aforementioned teams.

7. (S/NF) The DAO supports Team 2, 3, and 4 administratively and logistically but the 500th exercises operational control over 2 and 4 and the 7602d operationally directs Team 3.

8. (S/NF) While the DAO considers the intermediate Fast Pass objectives relevant to RVN as having been fulfilled, additional planning and action are required vis a vis two contingencies:

   a. The DAO drawdown.

   b. The evolution of a coalition or possibly hostile indigenous regime that would force a precipitous and total US withdrawal from the area.

1 Incl as

W. E. LeGro
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch

W. E. LeGro
IN-COUNTRY COLLECTION
UNITS AND RELATIONSHIPS

DAO
Intel Br

Coord&Ln
Sec

Ln Elm

500th
MIG
(Hawaii)

Det K
(Bangkok)

7602d AIG
(Ft Belvoir)

J-2, JGS, RVNAF
Intel Cen-Vietnam
Doc Exp Cen
Mtl Exp Cen
lpw Cen
MR G-2s
VNN(2) Staff
VNAF(A-2) Staff

Supplemented by

JGS, RVNAF

SPL Det, VNAF

Unit 101

MSS

SPL Det, VNN

Note: TM conducts unilateral clandestine operations and therefore has no RVNAF counterparts.

12
9

Lane
Tm 1

20
20

Lane
Tm 2

5
5

Lane
Tm 3

3
3

Lane
Tm 4

20
20

LAN

Counterparts

RVNAF

LN

Operations Control

Admin. Control

Auth US Str

Asgd US Str

KEY

7602d AIG

note: This diagram is not to scale. The 7602d AIG is not at Ft. Belvoir.
FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Regional Liaison Officers and Provincial Observers (U)

PURPOSE: Provide facts on mission, operations, and deployment of Intelligence Branch regional liaison officers (RLOs).

FACTS:

1. Mission: MR RLOs and POs, in accordance with JCS, CINCPAC, and USSAG/7th AF guidance, are to fulfill DOD-assigned military intelligence requirements.

2. Specific Key Requirements: RLOs will obtain timely and accurate friendly and enemy force order of battle, early warning of cease-fire violations, acts and intentions of military nature, and resolution of MIA cases. POs share these requirements, but are to emphasize investigation and reporting of cease-fire violations.

3. RLO Team Strength: One liaison officer (US civilian intelligence specialist, GS-11/12); one liaison officer assistant (US civilian clerk, GS-7); three Vietnamese civilian language/clerical assistants.

4. PO Strength: Ten POs are to be assigned; five Army from 500th MIG, and five Air Force 7602d AIG. At present only three POs of Army sponsorship are present; a fourth resigned 20 June 1973. To date, no Air Force PO's are assigned, or even in country. PO's have been redesignated as RLO/USS (under state sponsorship) and all will be OPCON to DAO.

5. RLO and PO Deployment: Base offices will be used in Consulates General in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. Subsites may be set up subsequently in Pleiku, My Tho, and elsewhere when and if warranted.
6. Concept of Operation: Operating from same base office, all RLOs will perform their mission through independent observation and elicitation, and by overt direct liaison with military region staffs, principally the military intelligence staffs in each MR. RLOs will scrupulously avoid assumption of any role as tactical military advisors and will remain disassociated entirely from clandestine collection activities. All collection activities and reporting will be closely coordinated with Con Gens. RLOs are assigned to DAO; POs will be supported thru State Department correspondence, Sr RLO/PO present will supervise base operations.

7. There have been minor problems in housing and vehicular support, directly traceable to the newness of the program. Difference in Con Gen's personalities and modus operandi causes slightly different approaches in each region. All of these problems are resolvable.

3 Inc!

1. RLO Operating Instruc.
2. Amendment to RLO Operating Instructions
3. Examples of RLO Spot Report

W. E. LeGRO
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICER (RLO) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of these Operating Instructions is to define the mission, personnel authorization, concept of operation, office relationships, responsibilities, and support arrangements of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) RLO's in each military region (MR).

2. (C) MISSION: The mission of the RLO is to fulfill military intelligence collection requirements as assigned by the Defense Attache (DATT) or higher headquarters and as approved by the U.S. Embassy.
   a. To obtain current assessments of the local military situation.
   b. To collect current order of battle information on friendly and enemy forces.
   c. To serve as the DAO Intelligence Branch point of contact in the MR.
   d. To assist the DAO and the Consul General (CONGEN) in responding to Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) intelligence requirements.
   e. With the approval of the Chief, Intelligence Branch, DAO, to perform such additional military intelligence functions and duties as may be requested by the CONGEN.

3. (U) PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION: Each Consular District.
   a. One RLO - GS 11 or 12.
   b. One Intel Clerk - GS 7.
   c. Three Local Nationals (Driver/Messenger, Interpreter/Translator, Typist).

4. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
   a. The RLO will accomplish his assigned mission through the conduct of overt liaison with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) offices as a representative of the DAO, Saigon.
b. The RLO will not engage in any activity or function that involves or associates the RLO with covert or clandestine operations.

c. While a chief secondary function of the RLO is to provide informational and intelligence support to RVNAF liaison contacts as requested, the RLO will not assume any responsibility or role as a tactical military advisor.

5. (C) OFFICE RELATIONSHIPS:

a. The RLO is assigned to and serves under the operational control of Liaison Team 1, Liaison Element, Coordination and Liaison Section, Intelligence Branch, Operations and Plans Division, DAO, Saigon.

b. In performance of assigned DAO duties, the RLO will coordinate these duties with the Consul General and his staff. In so far as fulfillment of his responsibilities to the DAO will allow, the RLO will also respond to the military intelligence liaison and collection requirements formulated by the Consul General.

c. The RLO and any US and local national personnel under his staff cognizance or supervision will be subject to the policies, procedures and regulations of the DAO and of the Consulate General.

6. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The RLO is responsible for collecting and reporting timely, accurate, and comprehensive military intelligence information in response to assigned requirements, and for developing assessments of the friendly and enemy order of battle situation to include plans and intentions.

b. The RLO is also responsible for serving as the field representative of other DAO Liaison Officers who are Saigon-based and who interface with the four centers under J2/Joint General Staff (JGS) control. These are the Intelligence Center, the Document Exploitation Center, the Materiel Exploitation Center, and the Military Interrogation Center.

7. (C) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

a. The RLO will conduct operational liaison in full coordination with, and with the prior approval of, the Consul General.
b. The principal point of RVNAF contact will be the office of the Corps G2. Expansion of this liaison will be developed only upon the prior approval of the Consul General and Corps G2 in that order.

8. (U) **INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:** See paragraph 6 above. Priority EEl are contained in the attached inclosure.

9. (U) **SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS:** To the maximum extent possible within resources available, the DAO will provide required administrative and logistical support to the RLO. Given DAO nonavailability of required support, assistance will be requested of the Consulate General. All aid and support requested of the Consulate General will be provided on an "as available" basis, with issuance priority and criteria determined by local policy and procedure.

10. (C) **COMMUNICATIONS:**

   a. Secure electrical communications means available to the Consulate General will be used by the RLO only upon the approval of the Consul General and as dictated by the importance or perishability of the data to be transmitted.

   b. RLO administrative reporting will be sent directly to the DAO and accomplished as required by RLO need or Liaison Element direction.

   c. RLO military intelligence reporting will be sent directly to the DAO and accomplished with a frequency and scope as determined and approved by the DAO. Copies will be furnished the Consulate General.

   d. Intra-Consulate General routing of RLO military intelligence will be as determined by the Consul General.

G. E. JACOBSON
SAA/FO
U. S. Embassy, Saigon

W. E. LeGRO
Colonel, USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Defense Attache Office

1 Incl
as

CONFIDENTIAL
1. **Enemy Order of Battle**
   a. Size, strength and location of VC/NVA units in the MR.
   b. Location of command posts.
   c. Major unit relocations.
   d. Biographic data on commanders.

2. **Enemy Logistics Capabilities and Activities**
   a. Type, quantity, and value of supplies in transit; destinations.
   b. Location of supply dumps, depots, caches, contents.
   c. LOC's, location, size, trafficability, development or improvement.

3. **Enemy Infiltration/Exfiltration**
   a. Size of infiltration unit.
   b. Route used by infiltration group, substations, rest stops, commo liaison support, point of departure, and terminus.
   c. Problems encountered by the infiltration unit, impact of sickness, interdiction, and morale.
   d. Mission of personnel in the infiltration/exfiltration party on arrival at destination.

4. **Enemy Plans, Intentions, Operational Capabilities, and Activities.**
   a. Cease-fire violations.
   b. Planned infiltration, reinforcement, and retraining.
   c. Military operations and intentions.
d. Introduction of new weapons, or weapons not previously in VC/NVA hands.

e. Introduction of new ammunition types, projectiles, explosives and pyrotechnics.

f. Introduction of other types and equipment, signal, quartermaster, engineer, and GBR.

5. US/RVNAF/FWMF MIA/POW

   a. Information on the capture, detention, disposition and MIA/POW's.

   b. Locations of crash sites on graves of MIA/POW's.

   c. Information on specific security situation at above sites.

6. Friendly Order of Battle and Operations

   a. Location of friendly units and disposition.

   b. Bio-data on major commanders.

   c. Use and disposition of US-supplied equipment as observed while performing primary missions.

   d. Military operations.

7. Friendly LOC

   a. Status and condition of LOC's.

   b. Improvement of LOC's on plans to improve LOC's.
AMENDMENT TO REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICER INSTRUCTIONS

REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS/UNDER STATE SPONSORSHIP (RLO/USS)

1. (C) PURPOSES: The purpose of this amendment to RLO operating instructions is to define the mission, personnel authorizations, concept of operation, office relationships, responsibilities, and support arrangement of the Regional Liaison Officers/Under State Sponsorship (RLO/USS), who are under the operational control of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and assigned for duty in each military region (MR).

2. (U) MISSION: The mission will be the same as outlined in RLO Operating Instructions.

3. (C) PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION:
   A. MR-I, two RLO/USS (subject to change in accordance with requirements).
   B. MR-II, three RLO/USS (subject to change in accordance with requirements).
   C. MR-III, two RLO/USS (subject to change in accordance with requirements).
   D. MR-IV, three RLO/USS (subject to change in accordance with requirements).
   E. Each of the above RLO/USS will have one local national (VGS-11) Intelligence Operations Specialist assigned.

4. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
   A. The RLO/USS will operate under the instructions contained in the RLO Operating Instructions, signed 1 June 1973.
   B. The Senior individual, DAO/RLO or RLO/USS, will be designated the station chief for each MR RLO team, and will be responsible for team operations within the guidelines of the RLO Operating Instructions, 1 June 1973.

5. (U) OFFICE RELATIONSHIPS: Per RLO Operating Instructions, 1 June 1973.

7. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: Per RLO Operating Instructions, 1 June 1973.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: Per RLO Operating Instructions, 1 June 1973.

9. (C) SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS: The support for RLO/USS will be as provided under the terms of the ISSA between 500th MIG, the 7602d AIG and OSA.

10. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: Per RLO Operating Instructions, 1 June 1973.

G. D. JACOBSON
SAA/FO
U. S. Embassy, Saigon

W. E. LE GRO
COL/USA
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Defense Attache Office
DE RUMPO #2761 17327553
ZNY SSSS3 ZZL
0223/222 JUN 73
FM AMCONSUL DANANG
TO USDAO SAIGON IMMEDIATE
RT
SECRET DANANG 2761

TOI DAO SNR LNO AOSOP-18-F
ALSO FORI DAO AOSOP-11 AOSOP-36 AOSOP-XI AOSOP-OR

1. VS
2. SPOT REPORT
3. N/A
4. 220630HJUNE73 - 210630HJUNE73
5. ARVN I CORPS HQS, DANANG, 210630JUNE73
6. 5-2
7. ARVN I CORPS, G-3 TOC LOG
8.
9. 210630HJUNE73
10.
11.
12. USDAO, MR-1 LIAISON OFFICE, DANANG, RVN

MACAG: AGAFIELD, JAMES W.
15. THE FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF INCIDENTS BY PROVINCE, IN MR-17 RVN.

1. INCIDENTS

A. QUANG TRI - NONE REPORTED

B. THUA THIEN

1. 210400H, 114 AIRBORNE CO BLOCKING POSITION AT YD500374 HAS
   PROBED BY SMALL ARMS AND B40 FIRE. RESULTS: NONE.

2. 211015H, 4/129 RF BN ACTIVATED AN ENEMY BOoby TRAP AT YD580
   254. RESULTS: FRIENDLY 1 KIA.

C. QUANG NAM

1. 210615H, 25 PF PLATOON CLASHED WITH AN ENEMY UNIT AT BT064
   628. RESULTS: FRIENDLY NONE; ENEMY 2 KIA; ONE 45 PISTOL
   CAPTURED.

2. 210910H, 16 PF PLATOON ACTIVATED AN ENEMY MINE AT BT110953;
   RESULTS: FRIENDLY 3 KIA.

3. 211000H, 79 PF PLATOON ENGAGED AN ENEMY UNIT AT BT559480;
   RESULTS: FRIENDLY NONE; ENEMY 2 KIA & 3 HAND GRENADES CAP-
   TURED.
RESULTSI FRIENDLY NONE; ENEMY 2 KIA & 1 AK CAPTURED.

5. 211409H, QUE SON POLICE CHECKED BT375395; RESULTSI 3 VC AND 2 SUSPECTS ARRESTED.

6. 211030H, 1114 RF BN ENGAGED AN ENEMY UNIT AT BT056386; RESULTSI FRIENDLY 2 WIA, ENEMY UNKNOWN.

7. 212145H, TEAM OF 2314 TASK FORCE ENGAGED AN ENEMY BOAT AT BT191545. RESULTSI FRIENDLY NONE, ENEMY ONE BOAT & DOCUMENTS CAPTURED.

QUANG TIN

1. 210959H, 116 RF BN AT BT172259 RECEIVED 50 RDS 82/60MM MORTAR ABF AND 12.7MM HMG FIRE; RESULTSI FRIENDLY 1 KIA, 4 WIA.

2. 211409H, 102 RF BN AT BT292141 RECEIVED 7 RDS 82MM MORTAR ABF. RESULTSI NONE.

3. 210900H, 3/2/66 REG ACTIVATED AN ENEMY MINE AT BT072286; RESULTSI FRIENDLY 1 WIA.

4. 210745H, 210855H, 116 RF BN ENGAGED AN ENEMY UNIT AND ACTIVATED A MINE AT BT172259 AND BT169260. RESULTSI FRIENDLY 1 KIA, ENEMY 2 KIA & 2 HAND GRENADES CAPTURED.
5. 213615H, 97 RF PLATOON ACTIVATED AN ENEMY MINE AT BT126342;
   RESULTS: FRIENDLY 1 KIA & 1 M16 DESTROYED.

6. QUANG NGAI

   1. 211632H, 2/142 RF BN ENGAGED AN ENEMY UNIT AT BS722957;
      RESULTS: FRIENDLY NONE; ENEMY 10 KIA & 5 840 RDS CAPTURED.

II. FRIENDLY MOVEMENTS, G-3

   TIME PERIOD: 21 JUNE 73
   60TH REG - CHU LAI
   3/56 REG - BT297304
   1/1 REG - YD459226
   2/18 CAV - HOA MY
   2/20 CAV - HOA MY
   1/17 CAV - MY CHANH
   2/4 CAV - QUANG NGAI AIR FIELD.

III. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE

   21 JUNE 73 (RECEIVED FROM ARVN I CORPS G-2, 200920JUNE73)
   YD346281 - 8 TRKS IN TRK PARK
   YD39278

   YD385237 - SUPPLIES

   YD475191 - 2 BULLDOZER REPAIR ROAD;
   YD313176

MACAG 148 (1-69)
YC481977 - 16 TRKS MOVING NORTH
YC479990

YC565929 - 6 TRKS MOVING EAST

YC92934 - 5 STRUCTURES

YC756638/YC756614/YC810593 - 51 STRUCTURES

YC836613 - 4 TRKS IN TRK PARK

YC639610 - 13 TRKS WITH SUPPLIES MOVING SOUTH

YC649973/YC649521 - 31 TRKS & 1 JEEP IN TRK PARK

YC932479/YC970364 - FLOATING BRIDGE

YC973066 - 5 TRKS MOVING WEST

AS793991 - 4 TRKS IN TRK PARK

AS856980/AS917939 - 8 TRKS MOVING EAST

BS928223/BS147985/BS192740 - 5 TRKS & 1 SEDAN PARKED

BS177727 - 3 TRKS UNLOAD SUPPLIES
IV. ENEMY POW/RALLIERS

GUANG NGAI

ONE RALLIER TO 55577702 FROM 0481 LOCAL COMPANY.

THOMSEN

87

#0761

NNNN