MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

29 March 1973

RE: DAO-J2 Intelligence Liaison

1. In preservation of the spirit of mutual cooperation that has existed between U.S. and Vietnamese forces in the Republic of Vietnam, the signatories below execute this memorandum to define and support inter-office relationships to exist between the Office of the Defense Attache of the United States of America and the Office of the J2, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam.

2. The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America, through the offices named above and through the authority granted both, will exchange on a free and timely basis, intelligence requirements and intelligence data that are pertinent to mutual military threats and are, therefore, of mutual concern.

3. As particular support of its responsibilities under this memorandum, the Office of the Defense Attache will select and appoint individual liaison officers to establish and maintain close and frequent liaison with the Office of the J2, JCS, and the various elements under its purview, such as: Military Region G2's; Republic of Vietnam Air Force and Naval Intelligence Offices; and the various intelligence centers that are presently or may become subordinate to J2, such as the Combined Intelligence Center (CIC-V), Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC), and the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC).

4. In further support of its responsibilities, the Office of the Defense Attache will employ and exercise operational control over a staff of local national Vietnamese civilian specialists who will be mission oriented toward fulfillment of the above-mentioned, jointly-held intelligence requirements.

5. As particular support of its responsibilities under this memorandum, the Office of the J2, JGS will provide office...
space and related logistic and administrative support when needed and when available, to include, for example, provision of transportation support, security badges and passes, and cooperative use of RVAF intelligence personnel when necessary and appropriate.

6. Whereas a spirit of harmony and full coordination will prevail between the U.S. Liaison officers and their JF counterparts, requirements and matters falling outside this memorandum and falling outside the normal relationships and routine resulting from this memorandum will be addressed by the signatories on a case by case basis, as such matters may arise or are anticipated.

SIGNED:

[Signature]

Will. Geo., Col. USA

9 April 1973
**SCHEDULED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

**Country/Area:** South Vietnam (including Paracel Islands and Spratley Islands)

**Reporting Responsibility:** MACOM

**Geographic Area:** Macom

NOTE: Reports in support of the Scheduled Reporting Requirements listed on this page will be submitted in accordance with DIAM 58-2, Volume 1, Part Three, para 3.

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<th>CONTROL NUMBER</th>
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<td>Military Intelligence Summary</td>
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<td>Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces</td>
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<td>1E Intelligence and Security (Naval Forces only)</td>
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FACT SHEET

AOSOP-I-IX

DEFENSE ATTACHE

SUBJECT: Current Intelligence Production (U)

PURPOSE: To delineate the current intelligence production of the Current Intelligence Section (CIS), DAO, Saigon

FACTS: (SECRET)

1. The Current Intelligence Section (CIS) performs a 24 hour watch and warning function concerning hostile forces, provides daily all-source current intelligence on the RVN and adjacent areas, coordinates and evaluates RVNAF intelligence products, inputs to USARPAC data bases and prepares estimates and special studies as required.

2. Currently, the CIS has one military officer (Chief), a deputy/ops officer, ten analysts (two of which are TDY), five intelligence clerks (two TDY), two illustrators and two clerk typists (one TDY).

3. The following is a brief review of the major products produced by the Current Intelligence Section:

   a. Monthly Intelligence Estimate Update (MIEU): A briefing prepared for and presented to the DATT, Saigon and usually to the Ambassador and Commander USSAG as well. A message version is dispatched upon Commander USSAG's approval to DIA, DIRNSA, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, PACAF, ACSI DA, and BANGKOK. A releasable version is also prepared and provided to the RVNAF upon USSAG approval (enclosure 1).

   b. Daily Highlights Message: Significant intelligence items briefed to the DATT, Saigon, and forwarded via message to USSAG for possible inclusion in the USSAG Disum (enclosure 3).

   c. Chief, Intelligence Branch discussions with J-2, JGS: A message prepared by CIS and dispatched to USSAG containing pertinent all-source information and CIS comments, derived from discussions between Ch, Intelligence Branch and the RVNAF J-2, JGS.

   d. SEA Working Level Ground Order of Battle Exchange Messages: Periodic reports, analysis, and comments prepared by CIS on important developments concerning enemy ground forces.

SECRET
e. RVNAF JGS Daily Status Report: Message prepared by CIS reflecting daily statistical information on ceasefire violations as provided by RVN JGS (enclosure 2).

f. ARC Light Target Messages: Target nominations and intelligence provided by RVNAF, plotted and assembled into message format by CIS and forwarded to USSAG.

6 Enclosures
1. Monthly Intel Est Update, (S), 19 pgs
2. Msg, J-2, JGS Status Rpt, (C), 1 pg.
3. Msg, CIS Input to USSAG Disum, (C), 7 pgs
4. Msg, USDAO-SGN MIEU (U) 1 pg
5. Msg, CINCPAC Request to be info (U) 1 pg
6. USSAG Response to Encl 5. (U) 1 pg

W.E. LEGRO
COL, USA
Ch, Intelligence Branch
SUBJECT: USDAO-Saigon Monthly Intelligence Estimate Update (MTEU) May 1973

1. (S) During the past month, there were no indications that the enemy will soon renew main force warfare. With the start of the rainy season in Laos, North Vietnam has probably stopped sending infiltrators to the COSVN and N-3 Front areas, but is apparently continuing attempts to rebuild its forces in the northern MR-1 area. During the past month enemy infiltration to MRTTH was estimated at about 7,000-8,000 men. Our current country-wide infiltration estimate is 63,000-65,000 which represents a 1/3 reduction in infiltration from the total estimate for this time last year.

2. (S) Over the past several months, there have been several significant changes in the enemy's force situation in northern MR-1. One entire enemy division has apparently withdrawn to the Hanoi area of NVN. Another division probably remains in the NVN panhandle, with subordinates in the DMZ area. This division is apparently rotating units between the panhandle of NVN and the DMZ.

3. (S) Two subordinate regiments and the headquarters of a third NVA division are apparently located in extreme southern NVN, with one subordinate regiment remaining in the DMZ-Quang Tri area. Additionally, DAO estimates that a fourth division possibly has deployed into the NVN panhandle, and that one other regiment, may also have relocated north of Dong Ha in NVN.
4. (S) In a series of recent infantry divisions and elements of two others have probably deployed from Quang Tri back to NVN. At the same time it appears that two NVA infantry regiments remain in Quang Tri Province. Four regiments are probably deployed northeast of Quang Tri City, near the Cua Viet River, while 3 regiments are deployed southwest of the city from Nha Le to Phu Perben. Two additional regiments are believed to be in support role in northcentral Quang Tri Province while a third remains near the central DMZ.

5. (S) Although the current disposition of enemy forces in the province is sufficient to deter any ARVN initiatives, the NVA forces (equal to three divisions) are not yet considered sufficient to launch a major offensive of the magnitude of the Spring 1972 offensive.

6. (S) In the MRTTH area, recent reporting indicates that about 7000 infantry replacements have arrived in May and early June. This significantly changes the capabilities of enemy forces currently deployed in the province. These new arrivals will enable the six regiments currently deployed there to rebuild to levels equal to those prior to the Spring 1972 offensive. Each regiment is now estimated at about 2,000 personnel. In addition, the recent movement of a NVA armor regiment to west of Hue also increases the Communist capabilities in the province. This unit probably deployed to MRTTH in order to facilitate the command and control of armor assets with infantry forces. Our estimate is that approxi-
mately two enemy armor battalions, or slightly less than sixty tanks, mostly T-54s, are deployed in Thu Tu.7. (S) Enemy forces in the province continue to have the following objectives:

a. To protect vital supply areas from Da Long to the YSF Veghel area;

b. To secure three major avenues of approach to Hue (the Song Bo Corridor, Route 547, and the Ta Trach River Corridor);

c. To have a disruptive effect on newly-resettled refugees along QL-1. Although these recently-strengthened units will have the capability of significantly increasing pressure on, and perhaps even forcing a concentration of, ARVN positions west of Hue, our current estimate is that the enemy could not eliminate GVN presence along Route 547 or significantly strengthen his position in the Song Bo Corridor leading up to An Lo Bridge.

8. (S) Concerning the infiltration of weapons, there has been no change in the artillery and armor estimates that were presented last month.

9. (S) The current DAO estimate of the enemy threat within or adjacent to RVN is as follows:

a. MR-1:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>52-52,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total Personnel</td>
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b. MR-2:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>25-30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admin Services</td>
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c. MR-3:

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<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Personnel</td>
<td>15-20,000</td>
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<td>Admin Services</td>
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d. MR-4:

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<td>Combat Personnel</td>
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e. Total in-country strength:

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10. (S) These strength figures do not differ sizably from those of 1 May 1973, but a few changes should be noted. There is a decrease of one division headquarters and four regiments in MR-1. The strength increase in MR-1 results from some 7000 additional combat personnel reported to have infiltrated into MRTTH.

11. (S) In MR-3, there is an increase of two regiments. The change in MR-4 from three divisions to two, and sixteen regiments to thirteen, was caused by the movement of one division and its regiments to Cambodia and MR-3.

12. (S) The estimated enemy strength by unit is as follows:

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<td>8500</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>5200</td>
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<td>3100</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>-3400</td>
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13. (S) In rear service activity, a significant new development is emerging in the enemy's resupply effort. Throughout South Vietnam, the enemy appears to be establishing a comprehensive logistics network. Over the past several months, an interior road network has been created inside the western fringes of South Vietnam. This road system, represents an outward shift from the Laos-based rear service network. This new system has the potential of becoming a major conduit for men and material from North Vietnam as far south as Pleiku Province.

14. (C) In creating this system, the enemy has built new roads and repaired old ones. Further NVA/VC road construction is anticipated within MR's I, II, and III. Already, infiltration of supplies within South Vietnam's borders has noticeably increased.

15. (S) To provide the mechanism to move the men and supplies, the enemy has deployed two major logistic headquarters from their traditional areas of operations to the RVN/Laos border. The move of these headquarters into RVN will improve command and control of in-country rear service elements. This
Complementary supply network will afford the Communists an alternative to their weather-sensitive Lao corridor, as well as assuring them of continued re-supply in the eventuality of a political settlement in Laos and Cambodia which would preclude use of existing routes.

16. (C) The following gives a general overview of the current enemy logistics effort, the major infiltration corridor, the heavily-travelled logistics routes, and the recently-constructed road network within South Vietnam. The RVNAF study, which is the source of this section, is based upon aerial photo and recon information collected from last January until mid-May.

17. (C) The enemy uses two major infiltration systems into MR-1. The first runs directly from North Vietnam through the DMZ into Quang Tri Province and includes Routes 182, 103, 106, 106b, 1032, and one other undesignated route. The second system connects the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos at various points across the Lao-Viet border into the four northernmost provinces. These include Routes 925, 9, 926, and 9222 into Quang Tri; Route 922 into Thua Thien; 614 to Quang Nam, and Routes 966, 9661, and 9662 into Quang Tin.

18. (C) Aerial reconnaissance since the ceasefire indicates significantly increased utilization of this infiltration network, particularly those portions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. In Quang Tri Province, heavy movement has been noted along a 25 KM stretch of QL-1 from Gio Linh to Quang Tri City, along a network totaling 83 KM from the Laos-
19. (C) Newly built road sections have been discovered by aerial photos. Recent VNAF recon indicates attempts are being made to connect these new sections and they will eventually link up with the rest of the road network.

Recently completed road construction includes approximately 5 KM of dirt roads in southwestern Quang Tin and western Quang Ngai Provinces. New construction also centered in areas to the west of Ba Gia, north of Ba To, and northwest of Hau Duc.

20. (C) Repair of old routes is being conducted throughout MR-1, particularly on QL-1, QL-9, and Routes 556, and 557, leading to Quang Tri City. In Thua Thien Province, roads linking several base areas are under repair.

21. (C) Enemy logistic activity in MR-1 appears aimed at consolidating Communist controlled areas by improving internal LOC's and providing bases for possible attacks against the coastal lowlands, particularly in Quang Tri and Thua Thien...
Provinces. As noted by LDR in his visit of study, the newly established routes in the mountainous areas of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces are important strategic routes, which can influence the situation in Quang Ngai and Northern Binh Dinh Provinces.

22. (C) Major activity in MR-2 is centered in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac and Binh Dinh Provinces. The enemy has expanded road networks into new areas and facilitated his control and movement in occupied areas by improving internal LOCs. To infiltrate men and supplies from MR-1, the Communists use QL-14 in the Highlands, and Routes 514 and 515 from Quang Ngai into Binh Dinh on the coast.

23. (C) From Laos, Routes 512, 96, 110, 509/613 and 19 run through BA 609, 701 and 782 which are on the western borders of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. Heavy activity has been noted along these supply routes.

24. (C) Within Kontum, heavy movements of supplies have been noted on Routes 572, 14, and 511, which lead to enemy forward staging areas in the vicinity of Kontum City. Within Pleiku, arterial activity has been focused on Routes 615, near BA 702 and along Route 19 near Đức Cơ. On the coast, heavy activity has occurred along Route 514 into the An Lo Valley, and along TL-3 which runs west of BA 226, and eventually meets QL-19 near the An Khe Pass. Much of this heavy activity has been located near areas of new road construction.

25. (C) New roads completed and those under construction in MR-2 provide the enemy with additional arteries for solidifying...
his control over areas he holds and expanding into new areas.
The new roads will allow the enemy greater access to Kontum
and Pleiku Provinces. The logistical movements to areas in
and around these provincial capitals will be greatly facili-
tated by new routes such as the one that link Kontum 613 near
BA 702 and Route 511 leading into Kontum. New roads have
also been constructed from BA 702 leading towards Pleiku and
Buôn Ho in Darlac. To the east, new roads have been constructed
in BA 128. A southern route from BA 128 leading towards TL-3
will eventually offer greater access to QL-19. Meanwhile,
other routes out of BA 128 will probably join roads under
construction near Sa Huỳnh and Route 577, thus providing improved
LOC's within Southern Quang Ngai.

26. (C) In summary, enemy road activity in MR-2 appears aimed
at improving and expanding internal LOC's in order to facili-
tate enemy control in areas he holds, as well as being of great
value in preparations for future attacks against Pleiku or
Kontum cities and the lowlands in Bình Dinh.

27. (C) Most of the infiltration routes currently employed
by the communists within MR-3 are located in Phước Long, Bình
Long and Tây Ninh Provinces.

28. (C) Major infiltration routes into northern MR-3 from
Cambodia include roads entering from the border areas
between BA 354, Fishhook, and BA 351. Highway 22 is the prime
road into Tây Ninh. From the Snoul area in Cambodia, QL-13
is the prime route into Bình Long. From the BA 712/351 area,
enemy traffic generally moves along highways 14A and 1-A into
Phuoc Long. In the west, infiltration routes enter Tay Ninh and Han Nghia from DA 354 and the Parrot's Beak, respectively.

29. (C) New dirt roads have been constructed by the enemy within Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces since the ceasefire. A series of new roads leading from Fishhook/BA 708 vicinity connect with Route 246, which runs east and west in northern Tay Ninh. Tonla Chau sits on Route 246 where it meets the Binh Long border, and RNANF defenders at the camp have reported truck traffic along this road. Another road, 14 KMs long, crosses the Cambodian border into Binh Long Province south of BA 712, runs southwest towards the Loc Thanh Plantation and finally connects with QL-13 approximately 8 KMs north of Loc Ninh. Additionally, a returnee has reported that a new route has been built, running from the Cambodian border near Route 13 all the way to War Zone D. This report, plus other intelligence, suggest that the enemy may be expanding his use of War Zone D as a major support base for operations in Eastern Military Region 3.

30. (C) Air reconnaissance and imagery interpretation information confirms that enemy use of the routes in MR-3 has increased greatly, especially in Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces. Routes located in the Michelin Plantation area, Binh Duong, also have been heavily used.

31. (C) Enemy logistic intentions in MR-3 appear to be aimed at projecting his military power ever closer to Saigon, strengthening his control in areas vacated by ARVN and establishing forward base areas.
32. (S) In recent air and air defense activity, a gradual southward extension of the North Vietnam air defense system has been noted since the ceasefire.

33. (S) We have seen no incremental approach in this activity. Newly arrived units have displaced some of the older units, allowing the latter to deploy farther south. The resulting gaps have been filled by reshuffling air defense assets currently on hand in the affected areas.

34. (S) Six AAA regiments are believed to have deployed south to the Republic of Vietnam since the ceasefire, joining the 10 regiments already in place. These deployments apparently have allowed two of the AAA regiments in Quang Tri Province to deploy farther south, possibly to the Laos/Cambodia/RVN border areas. Certain changes have also taken place in the north which may allow additional units to be deployed south from MR-1 or North Vietnam itself.

35. (S) The movement of the two AAA regiments to Laos allowed one regiment in Laos to move and initiate operations in Cambodia. This gradual southward movement leaves at present 14 NVA AAA regiments in MR-1, nine units in Laos, and three AAA units located in Cambodia which may have elements deployed in RVN.

36. (S) These suspected air defense deployments indicate long-range enemy plans to protect his vital base areas and LOC's. Future deployments along the new roads from Quang Tri south, would enable the enemy to protect his development and use of this supply corridor.
37. (c) Although the road building and the deployment of\nAM units in MR-1 are military activities, they are linked\nto long term political objectives. The enemy controls\nneatly 75 per cent of the land in MR-1 and, while much of\nthe terrain is inhospitable, several areas are capable of\nsupporting large populations. A communist goal is to\nresettle and develop these lands with the eventual aim of\nestablishing PRC administrative control over a sizable\npopulation. Vital to this program is a coordinated LOC\nnetwork to link these various areas with NVN and allow local\neconomic development.

38. (f) It is estimated that a civilian population of over\n100,000 is located in enemy controlled areas in Western\nMR-1, with nearly half being located in Quang Tin and Quang\nNgai Province. This figure includes population already\nscattered in the area, Montagnards who had previously fled\nto Laos due to the war, but are now returning, North Viet-
namese settlers and South Vietnamese who were evacuated to\nNorth Vietnam last year. Although still on a relatively small\nscale, the resettlement of these areas by the movement of\npeople from the provinces just north of the DMZ probably\ncontinues. Reporting in early May indicated that over 3,000\npeople, with furniture and tools, departed from the three\nsouthernmost provinces in NVN to the DMZ area. In Thua Thien,\n1000 North Vietnamese civilians reportedly have arrived in\nthe A Shau Valley area. Quang Tri and Thua Thien, being\nnearest to the logistical and population resources of NVN,\nwill probably show the largest initial gains in North Viet-
human resettlers. However, logistical and support problems will probably hinder the massive relocation of civilians from RVN at this time. Ultimately, the richer valleys of the southern provinces of MR-1 will most likely support the largest population.

39. (S) In Western Quang Nam, new settlements and villages planned for settlement by the Communists have been detected. The Hua Duc area of Quang Tin Province is apparently a major area of emphasis. In Quang Ngai, an extensive civil works program has been initiated apparently designed to support a very ambitious resettlement effort there. Dikes and canals have been rebuilt in Son Tinh and Tu Nghia Districts, two areas often mentioned as planned resettlement centers. Communists in southern MR-1 must rely heavily on trade with merchants in CVN areas for needed goods. Eventually the Communists hope to persuade farmers to return from the CVN resettlement camps to work potentially prosperous lands in enemy controlled areas.

40. (S) The overall pattern of Communist activity in enemy controlled portions of MR-1 suggests an enemy intention to back up his claims of control in the area with tangible evidence. A large civilian population resident in the area would provide the basis for a viable economic and political entity. The road building program would develop a cohesive and expanded LOC network. Finally, the extension of air defense capabilities in the area enables the enemy to consolidate his control without major disruptions by ARVN forces.

41. (S) In MR-3, the primary enemy activity continues to be
political in nature, supported by selective military actions and steady build-up of men and supplies. COSVN Directive 2-73 continues to serve as the guiding document. At a conference in late April in Tay Ninh, communist cadre reiterated the following guidance:

- Motivate the masses within the framework of the Paris agreements,
- Political force is the key to victory,
- Political struggle must be spearheaded by military attacks to undermine SVN military forces.

This guidance apparently remains in effect.

42. (S) Within this framework, a primary task for the military forces is to protect the territory currently under Communist control. The recent build-up in NVA forces in MR-3 seems designed to strengthen the enemy's defensive posture. It lacks the magnitude necessary for a successful general offensive. Limited offensive actions are expected, however. Such attacks would deny ARVN access to the territory PRC claims it controls, complicate ARVN defense problems, and remind civilians that Communists retain a potent force in the area.

43. (S) Therefore, recent reported movements of enemy units from the 7th and 9th NVA divisions can be seen as attempts to strengthen control in Northern MR-3. 9th Division elements have moved southward from Binh Long Province, while forces from the 7th NVA division have moved eastward across QL-13 into the V-shaped area formed by routes QL-13 and 1-A.

44. (S) The concentration of enemy forces in northern Binh
Duong and Southern Binh Long Provinces presses menacingly against heavily populated Southern Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Bien Hoa and Cia Binh. This military threat is designed to provide leverage the enemy needs to support his political objectives in the region.

45. (S) Within northern MR-3, the areas of Communist influence are fairly well defined. The enemy can locate and move freely throughout this region except in the close vicinity of isolated outposts such as Toan Cham, An Loc, Song Be and Chen Thanh. All the major roads into Northern MR-3 are considered interdicted. ARVN can open only one route without a major operation. This is Route 1-A from central Binh Duong to Song Be, which was temporarily opened in mid-March. At that time, an ARVN convoy was ambushed, and no subsequent convoys have negotiated the road. More recently, ARVN forces operating along Route 1-A between Phu Giao and Phuoc Vinh have engaged elements of the 165th Regiment, 7th Division. The enemy seems intent on preventing any convoy operations along this route. A successful convoy would strengthen ARVN contentions of control in the area and thus weaken the Communist's claim to control.

46. (S) Region-wide, the recent deployment of enemy units also suggests Communist attempts to strengthen his position along the fringes of enemy controlled areas. The current dispositions of units probably depict the enemy's view of his areas of control. Two regiments recently arrived from NR-4
are deployed generally north of Tay Ninh. The 9th Division forces, plus three other regiments occupy the area west of QL-13 while 7th Division forces occupy the terrain east of the road. These recent shifts may be related to speculation that the current round of Paris talks will result in a more precise definition of control.

47. (S) For the present, therefore, fighting in MR-3 will probably continue at about the current level, far short of a regionwide, major offensive. However, if heavy personnel infiltration occurs next fall, the Communists could be prepared to launch a major offensive, with armor and artillery, by late January 1974.

48. (S) Turning to the political scene, recent reporting suggests increasing dissension within the VC infrastructure. Permanently, the VCI has encountered a number of persistent difficulties. There has always been a shortage of experienced cadre at local levels that has diluted their effectiveness. Lower level cadre have long chafed under dictatorial, bureaucratic treatment by high VC officials whom they feel are out of touch with the realities of life in the field. Old line revolutionaries and newer cadre are often at odds. The older cadre feel they are the true revolutionaries and tend to impugn the revolutionary fervor of newer cadre, while the newer cadre feel deprived of meaningful responsibilities and the resultant rewards. Finally, there is traditional resentment between Northern cadre and native Southerners.
49. (5) In addition, Tet 68 had a devastating effect on VCI morale, from which it is yet to completely recover. The cadre were decimated and much of the populace in the south was alienated. Rebuilding has been a slow, painful process.

50. (5) The post-ceasefire situation has created additional difficulties within the VCI as well as accentuating long-standing problems. Many cadre are disillusioned over the lack of tangible gains resulting from the ceasefire accords, feeling that a little more time would have yielded significantly larger gains. There is the unmistakable implication to Southern cadre that they must continue pursuing an objective that was previously unattainable, even with full main force warfare. Many Southern cadre are resentful toward the north over the ceasefire accords, feeling the north was the primary beneficiary while leaving the Southern question unresolved.

Finally, there is a growing awareness, within the VCI, in the post-ceasefire period that the past emphasis on primarily military means has resulted in a loss of rapport with the local citizenry. This has led to difficulties in recruiting new cadre as well as contributing to a sense of isolation.

51. (5) In summary, the ceasefire has intensified long-standing morale problems within the VCI. Although a complete collapse of the infrastructure is not foreseen, a convergence of many of these problems could create extreme difficulties for the VCI in many areas. It is likely that such problems will
52. (S) In conclusion, major preparations for a renewal of combat operations continue. The deployment of considerable armor and artillery throughout the Republic, the suspected rotation of major combat units in MR-1, the reported infiltration of significant numbers of combat replacements to MRTR, the continued stockpiling of supplies, and the improvement of internal lines of communication leaves the enemy with considerable resources to begin an offensive, particularly in MR-1, perhaps in early summer. The build-up of air defense units in areas adjacent to South Vietnam will facilitate the protection of vital supply networks and forward storage areas. Meanwhile, the new supply corridor, currently being developed within South Vietnam, will complement already existing supply routes, and provide Communist forces with a partial all weather capability from the DMZ through the B-3 Front.

53. (S) If the units presently believed to be in North Vietnam were to return to South Vietnam, Communist forces in the two northern provinces of MR-1 could be in a better position this month (June 73) to commence an offensive than they were in March of last year. However, the lack of necessary replacements would probably preclude a major push in either MR-5, the B-3 Front, or COSVN until at least next fall. At present, the importance of the military build-up should be balanced against the guidance provided by COSVN.
Directive 2-73. We believe that the enemy will concentrate on consolidating political and military control within occupied areas. The strengthening and rebuilding of the Communist infrastructure within both liberated and GVN-controlled areas is probably the prime objective. Additionally, the current Paris peace talks have probably provided an important impetus to Communist forces to consolidate their political and military control structure. Furthermore, the continued presence of an active U.S. Air Force within S.E. Asia is considered a deterrent to any ideas of renewing a major offensive.

54. (8) The current DAO estimate of enemy intentions over the near term is as follows:

(1) The enemy will continue to infiltrate men and material into SVN to support his political plans and prepare for military operations.

(2) Except for MRTH in Northern MR-1 the NVA has not yet infiltrated sufficient infantry replacements to raise maneuver units to the level of strength necessary to support a major military offensive.

(3) Although the enemy can move sufficient supplies to begin a countrywide offensive, except in the Northern areas, he has not stockpiled adequate quantities to sustain an offensive.

(4) The VC/NVA will not launch sustained countrywide offensive military operations.

(5) The enemy will conduct a primarily political campaign while maintaining an aggressive defense and selectively
using military force to support political operations and expand area and population control.