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VIETNAM: HISTORY OF THE BULWARK B2 THEATRE,
VOL 5: CONCLUDING THE 30-YEARS WAR

By
Tran Van Tra
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan Report</th>
<th>Near East/South Asia Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean Affairs Report</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia Report</td>
<td>West Europe Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia Report</td>
<td>West Europe Report: Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian Affairs</td>
<td>Latin America Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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- Problems of the Far East
- Science and Technology Policy
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---

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>Middle East and Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To order, see inside front cover
SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT
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CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter One The New Front................................................................. 6
Chapter Two The Only Path Is That of Revolutionary Violence........ 30
Chapter Three Punishing the Agreement Violators................................. 48
Chapter Four The Greatest Rainy Season Ever........................................... 76
Chapter Five Beginning of a New Phase....................................................... 105
Chapter Six A Once-in-a-Thousand Years Event: The Spring General Offensive and Uprising................................................................. 136
Chapter Seven The War-Deciding Strategic Battle:
The Historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign............................................................... 166
Chapter Eight Final Hours of a Regime: The Ho Chi Minh Campaign Wins Total Victory................................................................. 194
Last Chapter The Municipal Military Management Committee......... 214

- a -

[III - ASIA - 107]
INTRODUCTION

In 1978 the Political General Department of the Vietnam People's Army adopted the policy of having cadres who worked and fought on the battlefields write memoirs about our nation's glorious war against the United States and recommended that I write about the B2 theater during the victorious spring of 1975: "How did the B2 theater carry out the mission assigned it by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee?" How did it contribute to that glorious spring?

Along with the other battlefields throughout the nation the B2 theater, in order to fulfill its glorious mission, contributed considerably to our people's great victory. The B2 theater and its people are proud of being part of the heroic Vietnamese fatherland, of the heroic Vietnamese people. Recalling and recording the events that occurred there is an honor and a responsibility of all cadres, enlisted men, and people of B2. I accepted the recommendation.

But I believe that the contributions of B2, one of the key war theaters, were not only its battles, its rice, its routes, and its people who sacrificed their lives, but also things that were much greater and which were valuable strategically and with regard to organizational art, and which by actually furthering the process of victory in the war contributed to the policies and lines of the Central Committee. They included not only heroic victories but also temporary, bitter defeats in certain places and at certain times, for they were all true and were valuable experiences. They are musical notes which are indispensable to composing the heroic symphony of the area. Therefore, to only record some events of the final victory, although it was a very great victory, would be a major deficiency. In order to create a bright spring it is necessary to pass through a gloomy winter, and a victorious dry season can be based only on the rainy season of the preceding year. It is difficult to speak of the foliage without speaking of the roots, and to do so would be inaccurate.

Therefore, I decided to record what I knew and remembered of the B2 theater throughout the long anti-U.S. resistance war. That was not a simple matter, so it was necessary to spend a good deal of time thinking, seeking documents, meeting with cadres I once knew, and returning to the battlefields of the past, in order to find the truth, which changes very faithfully. It was necessary to request many comrades to lend their assistance and cooperation, and to add together the memories of many comrades holding many positions in many areas of the theater. But I was determined to succeed in that project, for I regarded it as my final responsibility toward the liberation war—one which I could not delegate to others—and toward B2, an area which I love and in which I lived and served for most of my life, from the days of secret political activity prior to the August Revolution to the complete victory which unified the fatherland, and which I may select as my final resting place.

I have divided my book into five parts:

Part 2: From 1961 to 1965, the period of effective resistance to the special war.

Part 3: From 1965 to 1968--the defeat of the U.S. limited war.


I begin by writing about the final strategic phase (Part 5), a phase that is still current because it is appropriate to the requirements of many people, especially the men of B2.

But what was B2? Perhaps even now there are many people who are not very clear about that. To help the reader better understand the events about which I have written, I believe that it is necessary to mention some of the features of the B2 theater.

"B2" was the code name of the land and people in the southernmost part of the homeland during the anti-U.S. war period. Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel was divided into four theaters. B1, usually called Zone 5, included the central coastal provinces from Quang Nam-Da Nang to the present Phu Khanh Province. B3, the Central Highlands region, consisted of the provinces of Gia Lai, Kontum, and Dac Lac. B4 was made up of Quang Tri Province and the former Thua Thien Province. B2 consisted of the rest of South Vietnam, from the former Gia Nghia Province (part of the present Dac Lac Province), Lam Dong, Thuan Hai, and on down to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Con Son, Ha Tien, and Phu Quoc. It included a vast jungle-and-mountains area, the tail of the great Truong Son mountain range. From mountain peaks north of Dalat and Lam Dong 1,500 to 2,000 meters high, the elevation gradually declines in the direction of eastern Nam Bo. Bordering that area is the vast, fertile, highly populated lowland area of the Mekong Delta, the location of such famous resistance war bases of the past and the U Minh forest, Dong Thap Muoi, etc. It is a flat, open, humid area with rice paddies alternating with gardens and hamlets and is intersected by such large rivers as the Dong Nai, Soai Rap, Vam Co, and Cuu Long, and a large number of small rivers, canals, and arroyos. Some areas are inundated practically the year round, or are wet 6 months and dry 6 months. In some places there is a shortage of fresh water the year round. A coast thousands of kilometers long, a vast continental shelf rich in natural resources, and such major seaports and river ports as Vung Tau, Saigon, My Tho, Can Tho, Rach Gia, etc., are advantages for aggressors coming from the sea. The road network in Nam Bo, the most highly developed in South Vietnam, was improved by the Americans to support their mechanized operations. Saigon, the capital of the lackey puppet administration, the largest city—at one time it had a population of 4 million—and the political, military, and economic center of South Vietnam, was situated in the center of the B2 theater and, along with many other large cities such as Da Lat, Phan Thiet, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, My Tho, Vinh Long, Can Tho, Ca Mau, and Rach Gia, formed a system of bases from which the U.S.-puppet operations were launched in all directions. It was also the center for the application of the neocolonial policy, a place where
the debauched American lifestyle flourished, and a place which consumed American goods and served the large expeditionary armies and the lackey forces. The United States and its puppets organized South Vietnam into four tactical zones. The area south of the Ben Hai River was Military Region I and the Mekong Delta corresponded to Military Region IV. Saigon, situated in the middle of Military Region III, was organized into the Capital Special Zone and was the command headquarters and the center of the U.S.-puppet war apparatus.

Our B2 theater accounted for about half of the land and about two-thirds of the population of South Vietnam, and encompassed part of the enemy's Military Region II and all of their military regions II and IV.

To facilitate guidance and command in the extremely fierce warfare, we divided the B2 theater into Military Region 6 (the southernmost part of Trung Bo [Central Vietnam], Military Region 7 (eastern Nam Bo), Military Region 8 (central Nam Bo), and Military Region 9 (western Nam Bo and Saigon-Gia Dinh).*

It must be added that about three-fourths of the border between our country and Kampuchea lay within the B2 theater. That area included land routes and river routes connecting the two countries, such as national routes 1, 22, and 13, the Mekong and So Thuong rivers, the Vinh Te Canal, and other roads and small rivers. The people of the two countries had always had good relations with each other in work and business. Friends, relatives, etc., usually experienced no problems in crossing the border by road, river, or canal. The destinies of the people on the two sides of the border have always been closely bound together and have fought shoulder-to-shoulder for the common well-being and shared good times and bad. That angered the enemy, who expanded their aggression and tried to sink their talons into both countries.

The people of B2 are honest and loyal and are independent in nature and their deeply patriotic ancestors came from north and central Vietnam. They always think of our beloved Uncle Ho and Hanoi, the capital and the ancient Thang Long, with an immortal sentiment:

*The military regions encompassed the following provinces:

Military Region 6: Quang Duc (Gia Nghia), Tuyen Duc (Da Lat), Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, and Binh Tuy.

Military Region 7: Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy (Ba Ria), Binh Long, Binh Duong (Thu Dau Mot), Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia.

Military Region 8: Long An (Tan An), Kien Tuong (Moc Hoa), Kien Phong (Sa Dec), Dinh Tuong (My Tho), Go Cong, and Kien Hoa (Ben Tre).

Military Region 9: Chau Doc, An Giang (Long Xuyen), Vinh Long, Vinh Binh (Tra Vinh), Phong Dinh (Can Tho), Ba Xuyen (Soc Trang), Kien Giang (Ha Tien-Rach Gia), Chuong Thien (Bad Lieu), and An Xuyen (Ca Mau).

Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone
"From the time we used swords to expand the nation we have for a thousand years remembered Thang Long" (Poem by Huynh Van Nghe, a military commander in Nam Bo during the anti-French resistance war).

The people of B2 are proud of their indomitable national-salvation, revolutionary traditions of the past, such as the anti-French movements of Nguyen Trung Truc, Thien Ho Duong, Doc Binh Kieu, Thu Khoa Huan, and Truong Dinh, of the staunch patriotic spirit of Nguyen Dinh Chieu, etc., with the "clusters of leaves that hide the sky," Can Giuoc, and Go Cong, the "Eighteen Hamlets of Vuon Trau," Hoc Mon, Ba Diem, etc. B2 still cherishes the celebrated feats of arms of the cloth-shirted Nguyen Hue on the Rach Gam River, and still has fond memories of our wise leader Ho Chi Minh who led the way to national salvation, and lived in Phan Thiet City, Ben Nha Rong, etc. Then there was the blood shed by our predecessors in the Nam Ky uprising in 1940, the August Revolution in 1945, etc. All of those things continually reminded and encouraged the people of B2 to be prepared to arise, once they had awakened, and sacrifice everything for independence and freedom.

In writing these thoughts and memories, I hope only to fulfill the obligations of a soldier who was fortunate enough to have lived and operated in a glorious era of the fatherland and of the people, and above all his obligation toward B2 or, more accurately, toward the people of B2, whom I love, all the people in the cities and in the rural areas, living scattered about the jungles, the mountains, and the maquis or concentrated in the subwards and villages. Especially, toward my friends, relatives, comrades, and fellow unit members, people I knew as well as those I didn't know, who were from all over the country, from Lang Son to the Ca Mau Peninsula, who fell in the B2 theater and whose blood stained every inch of the B2 theater so that we could win independence and freedom, and who sacrificed everything so that the North and South could be united and work together in building socialism. They were people who had great merit toward the great recent victory of our people and the homeland. Only they, people who never thought of themselves and contributed their entire lives, are worthy of living in the memories of thousands of future generations. That very sacred mission, which is also an order of history and the people, is to faithfully record and correctly evaluate the developments and events, and the hardships and noble sacrifices of the land and people of B2 which I witnessed, know about, and still remember.

Of course, because my knowledge and writing ability are limited, and because an article or book can only concentrate on a certain number of matters, I unfortunately could not deal with all of the miraculous accomplishments of the Vietnamese in the B2 theater, who resolutely, heroically, and creatively responded to the skilled leadership and guidance of the party Central Committee throughout the long and glorious resistance war and contributed their effort and skill to the historic resistance war. I only hope to record some of those events within the limits of my understanding, in order to make a small contribution to the people who are still alive today and to those of future generations. To do so is also to make a small payment on the debt I owe to the people who gave there lives in the B2 theater for their nation and class.
Because of that heavy responsibility, I decided to write only the complete truth, the truth that everyone knows as well as the truth some people do not yet know, which some people like and other people do not like. History is always truthful and will mercilessly eliminate what is not true, if not today then tomorrow. I hope that the readers everywhere, especially those who operated in the B2 theater, will contribute opinions and supplement the deficiencies and the omissions. I will be very pleased and grateful.

I also would like to express my gratitude for my comrades and friends who encouraged and assisted me, and who have contributed very valuable opinions and cooperated in all regards.

I would like to thank the comrades in the war recapitulation sections of the Ministry of National Defense, Military Region 7, Military Region 9, and Ho Chi Minh City, and the comrades who were members of the provincial unit commands in B2. My special thanks go to comrades Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Ta and Captain Vo Tran Nha, who devoted much effort to assembling documents and contacting the localities, and who contributed worthily to the contents of this book.

Spring, 1980
CHAPTER ONE

The New Front

A series of violent, incessant B52 bomb explosions shook the headquarters bunker of the Regional Command. Immediately afterwards loudspeakers hanging from tree limbs announced the report of the area duty officer: "Nine B52's divided into three groups dropped three strings of bombs across Zone A and between B1* and B2**. Everyone is safe."

We continued the conference. A staff cadre arrived to report that "The Central Staff has sent a message informing us that the Paris Agreement had been signed!"

I instinctively smiled and thought about those strange final minutes between war and peace, if indeed there was to be peace. It seemed that, significantly, the Americans had made full use of the final minutes of a war that had lasted decades by sending B52 steel crows to send "messages of reconciliation!"

Even so, news that the Paris Agreement had been signed caused everyone to breathe a sigh of relief. Joyful expressions appeared on the faces of the commanders. Those faces were all weatherworn: everyone looked thin but healthy. Was that not a valuable prize for nearly 10 months of continuous fighting all over the theater to force the enemy to sign an agreement to end hostilities and conclude a strategic phase?

Never before had a military activity campaign been as prolonged and as increasingly intensive as during the recent period. The military regions and units reported to the Regional Command the victories they had won, and the positions our troops had taken from the enemy hour by hour, but at the same time there were continual reports about the difficulties, the shortages of troops, food, and ammunition, and especially the fatigue of the cadres and men. The Military Region 9 Command (western Nam Bo) sent a message recommending straightforwardly that the Regional Command order an immediate cessation of hostilities so that we could reorganize our forces. The troops were no longer capable of fighting! But the enemy was extremely obstinate. They had been painfully defeated on the battlefield, had been outnegotiated at the conference table, and had been forced to sign in October, but had then reneged on their promise. So what should we do? Conclude our activities and rest, at a time when our objectives had not been attained? No! We had to continue to fight. We would fight until they understood the will of revolutionaries.

The difficulty was deciding what to do at that time. If we stopped, things would go in one direction. If we made a little more effort and won a few more victories we would bring about a qualitative change and things would go in another direction. That is what we did. We made a little more effort and won a few more victories in South Vietnam at a time when it was thought that we were exhausted and could no longer fight because we were out of rice and

* The Regional Command
** The Regional Staff
ammunition. We were steadfast, fought back intelligently and proudly, and shot
down large numbers of B52's and other airplanes during 12 long days and nights
in Hanoi and Hai Phong, as if something miraculous had happened, as in the
ancient myth of Lac and the dragon. And clearly, we were able to create a new
quality. The enemy—the leading, most dangerous and cruelest imperialist coun­
try of the era—had to bow its head and submit. They had to sign an agreement
to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam and agree to completely withdraw
the U.S. and puppet troops from South Vietnam and recognize the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.

"Fight until the Americans get out and the puppets collapse.
"Advance! The soldiers and people of the
"North and South will meet in a happier spring."

Dear Uncle Ho! We had carried out to a decisive degree your instruction of a
previous year, which manifested the skilled policy of the state. Once the
Americans got out the puppets would have to get out and the north and south
would be reunited. We pledged to go all-out to achieve his dream as soon as
possible.

The decisive turning point of the war had been created. A difficult route had
been traversed with great effort and we gathered together all our strength to
travel the remaining distance, which might prove to be no less complicated and
difficult. But we could see rosy rays of light on the horizon.

On a Monday in January 1973, at the Regional Command Headquarters, in a bunker
in the middle of a jungle base area, the atmosphere was bustling and seething.
We were monitoring the situation on the battlefield and the units, but our
focus was on urgently discussing a plan and measures for implementing the Paris
Agreement strictly and effectively. Many tasks had to be carried out: quickly
reorganizing our forces, being vigilant toward the enemy, whom we had known
well for a long time, etc. Suddenly a staff cadre entered and handed comrade
Nam Nga (i.e. Maj Gen Nguyen Minh Chau), regional chief of staff at that
time, an urgent message. Comrade Nam Nga quickly read the message then, with
a serious expression that could have meant either happiness or worry, handed it
to me. The message said that the Central Committee had appointed me head of
the military delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission in
Saigon. Oh!. How sudden! The Central Office [COSVN] and the Regional Military
Party Committee had decided on the make-up of the delegation in advance, and it
had already been approved by the Central Committee, but now there was a sudden,
last-minute change. In only 3 more days I would have to be in Saigon!.

During my several decades as a soldier I had experienced many surprises, on
the battlefield, in my work, and from people—both friends and enemies—but
that surprise both pleased and worried me. It worried me because I was unfa­
miliar with such work and the time was too pressing: I had to pack and set
out before I had time to get a handle on the job, let alone making full prepa­
rations for the new struggle front, which was completely different from the
battlefield. However, that was not the first time I had been surprised by an
assignment from the upper echelon. I was used to it. I had confidence in the
leadership of the upper echelon and in my colleagues, and confidence in myself. I calmly accepted my responsibility. In fact, in this instance there was greater enjoyment in it for me. My beloved Saigon! For a long time, during the era of the French colonialists, I had lived, engaged in seething revolutionary activities, won victories, and tasted defeat there. I had been away from the city fighting for decades, and was now returning in full view of the people and my comrades, and within the thick encirclement of the enemy. The streets, markets, factories, poor workers' neighborhoods which I knew in the past had now certainly changed greatly, but even so I still had memories of other people from Saigon, like myself, who decided to leave so that they could later return in triumph. Once before I had tried to return but couldn't. This time, although it was not to be a permanent return, was as delightful as a beautiful dream. Every minute many imagined images of Saigon, both in the past and in the present, passed across my mind like a roll of film. When he saw me sitting in silence, comrade Muoi Khang (i.e. Senior General Hoang Van Thai, then a lieutenant general), asked me, "What else can you do but accept the mission? Congratulations!"

He then came up to shake my hand and hug and kiss me, and suddenly the room was echoing with congratulations and requests, and was tumultuous with the sound of laughter. There was no longer the atmosphere of a meeting. I exchanged a few pleasantries with Muoi Khang, then requested permission to prepare for my trip to Saigon. Muoi Khang would care for everything for me at home.

When I went back to my house and looked around at what had been familiar surroundings for years, I was suddenly saddened by the prospect of leaving. A light breeze blew in, bringing along the sweet scents of a myriad of flowers in the green jungle. In front of the house, in a narrow field extending along the valley, flocks of small birds hastily gleaned the grains of rice which were dropped during the recent harvest. The stream running along the fields was winding its way under rows of trees that were leafless because of the bombing and shelling. There had just appeared a few fresh young saplings. Every object that day seemed to have an overflowing, fresh, affectionate soul. I don't know how long I would have sat there meditating if Chin Vinh (Maj Gen Tran Do) and Hai Le (Maj Gen Le Van Tuong), the deputy political officer and political director of the Regional Command, had not come in and pulled me back to reality.

"Do you need anything else? Are you satisfied with the organization and composition of your Joint Commission delegation?" asked Chin Vinh.

I agreed to maintain unchanged everything that had been arranged, and only requested the addition of comrade Tu Bon (Senior Colonel Nguyen Huu Tri), an intelligence cadre and Army Hero who had lived in Saigon more than 3 years and who had come to the base only a few months previously, after learning that he had been compromised. He was an expert on Saigon and knew all of its streets and many people in various circles in the city. In addition to helping me carry out a number of tasks, he would be my driver if the enemy agreed to let us provide our own drivers.
Hai Le informed me that "The Central Committee had requested you to tell it what name you intend to use so that it can be passed on to Paris. Our delegation must inform the U.S.-puppet side."

Like everyone else, I had never used my real name, but had habitually used a code name, which I had changed now and then to make it difficult for the enemy to monitor me and maintain secrecy for our operations. The usual practice in wartime was for us to use a different name for each task during each phase. Now, faced with a new mission, I would meet the enemy face to face and would of course have to choose a name. Almost without thinking, I took the name "Nguyen Viet Chau," the name of a younger brother with whom I had been very close and who was killed in 1969 when he was presiding over a meeting of the party committee of Can Tho City. My brother and I had lived in Saigon, had participated together in secret revolutionary activity there during the period of French domination, had been released from a French prison at the same time, had participated together in the August 1945 uprising, and had left our beloved Saigon to take part in the resistance war. Now I was returning to that city and naturally thought about my esteemed younger brother, my comrade in death as well as in life. I was happy to take that unforgettable name. But then ond day, during an ordinary meal at the Regional Command at which Bay Cuong (comrade Pham Hung, a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of COSVN) was present, I suddenly remembered that I was not returning to Saigon as a stranger but was going under an assumed name, which would be inconvenient.

Many of the people of Saigon could not forget their children who had gone to fight in the resistance war years ago and in whom they had placed their confidence and hope. And a considerable number of the enemy, such as Tran Thien Khiem, the puppet premier, Lam Van Phat, a puppet major general, and a number of others, knew me. After graduating from the French military academy in Dalat they went to Dong Thap Muoi to join the resistance. As the commander of Military Region 8 at that time, I accepted and sent them to study and practice at the military region military administration school. But then, because they could not bear the hardships and did not love their country or their people, they deserted, surrendered to the French, and continued to serve their French, and the American, masters. Even the Americans might have dozens of photographs of me. Thus it would be best to use a name with which everyone, friend and foe alike, was familiar. The members of COSVN and the Regional Military Party Commission agreed. Thus I recommended that the Central Committee agree to the change and send a message to Paris so that the other side could be informed that the head of the delegation of the PRG of the RSVN would be Lt Gen Tran Van Tra.

Within a short period of time I drafted a plan to prepare in all ways for my new assignment, reviewed the organization of the delegation, and discussed in detail with Ba Tran (Maj Gen Tran Van Danh) the mission, personnel, documents, and facilities, especially the communications-liaison facilities, foresaw contingencies, decided on the measures, and assigned Ba Tran, the deputy delegation head, to represent me in directing all implementation tasks.

Ba Tran, who was born in Hoc Mon, grew up in Saigon and joined the anti-French resistance war in 1945, was the regional deputy chief of staff and was responsible for organizing and guiding the delegation and for strategic guidance.
He was an expert on Saigon and knew a good deal about the enemy. I had confidence in his ability and thought that the enemy would also respect him because he was robust, fair-skinned, stout, muscular and proper.

I attended a Regional Command meeting, in which the staff, political, rear services, and other organs participated, to discuss in detail all measures for coordinating struggle between the conference table and the battlefield. I emphasized that if the enemy respected us at the four-party conference table in Saigon and we were victorious in implementing the Paris Agreements, that it would principally be due to the strength of our troops and to our comrades on the outside. We promised that we would be worthy of being representatives of the heroic people's armed liberation forces of the South in the middle of the enemy's capital and in the bosom of our beloved compatriots.

We were due in Saigon on 28 January 1973. We had agreed to a time for the Americans to pick us up by helicopter at Thien Ngon, a location in northern Tay Ninh on National Route 22. In the past, Thien Ngon had been a small settlement of people who earned their living in the forest. During the war the Americans chased away all the people and built a strongpoint there for a U.S. brigade. It had an airfield, a supply depot, and a drill ground. From it were launched sweeping operations in the surrounding areas. At the beginning of 1972--by that time the puppet army had replaced the Americans--Thien Ngon was the main focus of the "Nguyen Hue" campaign.* In the course of our campaign we completely eliminated that strongpoint. Thus Thien Ngon was then only an old, desolate battlefield on which the vegetation had been burned and the surface of which was scarred by bomb and shell craters and littered with the hulls of U.S. tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and trucks, which were strewn all over. There remained only a runway usable only by helicopters. After informing the enemy of the pick-up time we sent a reconnaissance team to Thien Ngon to rebuild some old bunkers, in which we would await the enemy before, during and after the appointed time. The members of that team reported to us every 15 minutes on all developments in the situation there. Meanwhile, a fully equipped delegation of cadres prepared our actual departure point at the Loc Ninh airfield. Our delegation organized a leisurely Tet celebration in advance. We knew that when we arrived in Saigon we would have to urgently begin work, even though the lunar New Year was only 4 or 5 days away, so we wanted to enjoy a Tet "at home," in our free, liberated area, that was imbued with friendship between those leaving and those remaining behind. Celebrate Tet in advance! We were only repeating something that had happened several times in the history of our people's combat. Quang Trung-Nguyen Hue had his troops celebrate Tet in advance in 1789 at the Tam Diep bivouac area before they advanced on Thang Long, destroyed the Manchu-Ch'ing army, won a brilliant victory at Dong Da, and permanently ended the Chinese protectorate in our country. In the spring of 1968 the South celebrated Tet in advance--Tet Mau Than--so that it could carry out the general offensive and uprising, smash the aggressive will of the U.S. imperialists, create a crisis in the White House, scare the Pentagon to death, and force the United States to deescalate the war, negotiate with us at Paris, then conclude the endlessly long conference during the spring of 1973. This spring--the spring of 1973--we were again celebrating

*Our offensive campaign in eastern Nam Bo in 1972.
Tet in advance so that we could go into the very lair of the enemy, force them to correctly implement the agreements, and see what tricks they would play and what they truly wanted.

The Tet feast in the bunker of the Regional Command was very flavorful. It was not very elegant but there were Tet cakes, including glutinous rice cakes, pork, both from pigs we had raised and from wild pigs, and with watermelon, liqueur, local products, and products from Hanoi. The comrades at COSVN, the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the government, and the Regional Command, representatives of the mass association organs, and even a reporter from the liberation press, etc., joined in the festivities with the members of our delegation. The atmosphere was truly intimate and cozy. Happiness spread over everyone's face. The happiness increased with every glass of liqueur. We toasted the victory, pledged to meet again under even more auspicious circumstances, and toasted the success both at the conference table and on the battlefield. In the midst of the Tet meal, when the conversation was deafening, we received a message from Thien Ngon: "At the appointed hour the U.S. helicopters did not arrive to pick up the delegation. Instead, two enemy airplanes circled twice and dropped bombs around the air strip. Bomb fragments and fragments of the hulks of tanks and armored vehicles flew over our bunker. Then there was silence." Everyone poured some more liqueur and lifted their glasses to toast the health of the delegation members, to toast our cleverness and vigilance, and to warmly toast our delegation's first victory over the cowardly treachery of the Americans and their puppets. The conversation during the meal became even more resounding because of discussions about the Thien Ngon incident, the U.S.-puppet capability to violate the Paris Agreements, and the complications of our mission and of our work on the battlefield. Despite all that, everyone was burning with strong confidence, confidence in the inevitability of our victory under any circumstances. Everyone's eyes were alive with the brilliant vitality of spring. Outside, rays of sunlight shining through the foliage illuminated the jungle. The weather was dry, cool and pleasant. Everywhere, along the roads, there were streaks of white flowers, interspersed with the shiny golden color of wild apricot blossoms. This year spring came early in the base area, and the vegetation seemed to compete in responding to the happiness of victory.

Loc Ninh, a highly populated, prosperous town in the liberated area of eastern Nam Bo, was situated 100 kilometers from Saigon on National Route 13, which extends into Kampuchea and then Laos. Extending northward was National Route 14, which went to Ban Me Thuot and the Central Highlands. Extending southward was Route 17, which connected with our northern Tay Ninh base area. After it was liberated in April 1972, Loc Ninh became an important military position which threatened the enemy's defense of Saigon, and was a political center of the liberated B2 area. Loc Ninh, in the fertile red-soil area, which was appropriate for the growing of tropical crops, had vast rubber plantations left over from the French colonial period and luxuriant orchards of all kinds of fruit—durians, rambutans, mangos, milk fruit, etc.--and hundreds of hectares of valuable pepper and coffee. In the past Loc Ninh had been a district seat in Binh Long Province, a strong point which lay within the puppet III Corps' outer perimeter for the defense of Saigon. During our "Nguyen Hue" campaign, Loc
Ninh was the principal objective and the most important position that had to be taken on the enemy's outer defensive perimeter. We not only wiped out a fortified brigade-level base but also wiped out many tank and armored regiments and many powerful task forces of the puppets' III Corps, and captured many POW's and officers, including Colonel Vinh, whom we later, out of humanitarianism and to demonstrate our good will, returned to the United States and its puppets. For those reasons, Loc Ninh had come to symbolize our victory and the disgraced defeat of the enemy. We wanted the enemy to send helicopters to pick up our delegation at Loc Ninh so that they would remember that terrible blow. From that glorious spot, our delegation would proudly enter the puppet capital.

Immediately after they committed treachery by bombing the designated Thien Ngon location, we vigorously protested and demanded that they pick us up at Loc Ninh. Each time they disgracefully failed in an attack on us they had to be brought to their senses by the strength of their adversary. We hoped that they would not dare play any more dirty tricks, although we were fully prepared, for we knew that the enemy's nature would never change. After bombing Thien Ngon in order to wipe out our delegation to the Central Joint Military Commission, which we protested, they sent troops to carry out sweeping operations and bombed the locations designated as pick-up points for our delegations to the joint military commissions in the Pleiky and My Tho regions and to the local joint military teams in Phu Bai, Da Lat, Kontum, and Tan An. They continually took advantage of every small opportunity, regardless of reason or of the provisions of the agreement, to carry out schemes and plots in hopes of annihilating us—every person and every hamlet—if they could. Every time they did so we vigorously protested their acts at the four-party meetings in Saigon and they apologized and blamed the local security forces, whom they promised to punish. We were well aware that they were making empty promises just to get us to think that the Americans and their puppets had a plan to sabotage the Paris Agreement on both a small scale and a large scale.

Was not history repeating itself? The French had been heavily defeated and had to sign the Geneva Agreements in 1954, after which the Americans endeavored to prevent the agreements from being implemented. Today, the Americans and their puppets had suffered a heavy defeat and were trying to sabotage the Paris Agreement. However, we were people who were experienced. We had fought and negotiated in order to achieve agreements favorable to the revolution. We would struggle to implement all articles of those agreements. For the independence and freedom of the people, we were prepared to sacrifice and fight to the end. At the same time, we held out a hand of national reconciliation and concord in order to save those who had gone astray. But in view of our bloody experience in the past we were not so foolish as to believe that our enemies would sincerely carry out the agreements. Therefore, we were not surprised by such perfidy. We had drafted two plans to cope with two possible developments: first, because our struggle bore results and because of pressure from our people and the people of the world the enemy was forced to correctly implement the Paris Agreement; second, they would sabotage and abandon the agreements. It was all up to the enemy. We were attempting to bring about the first contingency, but we were prepared to cope with the second one.
On 1 February 1973, at the appointed hour, a flight of U.S. helicopters commanded by an American lieutenant colonel who was accompanied by a puppet officer, and flying along the course and at the altitude we had designated, made a circle around Loc Ninh and, one after the other, from the northern end of the air strip. While they were circling around they had clearly seen the air strip, the town and, more importantly, the large number of anti-aircraft positions and tanks, deployed in many perimeters around the town, which were prepared to respond if they tried any funny business. On that day the town of Loc Ninh was like a large festival. Revolutionary flags few everywhere. Especially, at the airfield there was a solemn, orderly atmosphere. A large number of people of all categories, cadres, and neatly dressed troops assembled and formed ranks. There was a forest of gold-starred red flags, mixed in with half-blue, half-red flags and countless banners and slogans applauding the victory of the Paris Agreements on Vietnam, demanding the strict and absolute implementation of the agreements, acclaiming the military delegation of the PRG of the RVN, etc. A quick, seething, and spirited rally was held beside the waiting American helicopters. Many delegates representing the various circles and mass associations arose to make brief speeches in which they demanded peace and national concord, congratulated our delegation, and expressed confidence in the inevitable victory of the delegation's struggle. On behalf of the delegation, I expressed its gratitude to the cadres, enlisted men, and people who had come to applaud and solemnly see off the delegation, acknowledged the advice given the delegation, and promised to be worthy of that confidence. The U.S. officers and flight crews tried to appear civilized and stood looking on in silence, but the puppet officers were perplexed and angry and remained seated in the helicopters, not daring to come out.

After the rally was over, as ordered by the commander of the Loc Ninh airfield the U.S. helicopters started their engines. I turned and glanced at the comrades and people and gave a loving look at the scenery of Loc Ninh, then shook hands with everyone. I hugged and kissed comrade Van Pha, deputy head of the Regional Political Office, with whom I had participated in the "Nguyen Hue" campaign at Loc Ninh several years previously, and comrade Le The Thuong, in charge of propaganda-training in the region, with whom I had once traveled the entire length of the Truong Son trail. Comrade Thuong promised, "I'll send you a photograph I took of the people seeing you and our delegation off to Saigon." Our delegation members waved to the people, then the comrades, two abreast, solemnly boarded the helicopters, amidst the affection of the people and the forest of flags and flowers. The U.S. major commanding my helicopter was very polite, carefully inspecting my seat, then stepped down, stood at attention and saluted, invited me to board the helicopter, fastened my safety belt, then sat down in his seat. The helicopters took off in an orderly formation, circled once above the airfield, then headed straight for Saigon along Route 13. The large number of people at the airfield were not the only ones seeing us off: nearly everyone, people traveling along the road, standing in their yards and on the streets, or working in the rice paddies and potato fields around Loc Ninh stopped work to wave at us. That was an extremely moving, very peaceful scene in an area scarred with the devastation of war. What did the Americans in the helicopters, and the puppets think about that scene, which was completely in contrast to the scene a few days ago. The same helicopters had caused much death and separation for countless families; when
they flew overhead there was nothing below them, not a single person on the
ground below! Suddenly the American major turned toward me and half jokingly,
half seriously said, "You have won the war!"

The flock of helicopters followed Route 13 past Binh Long, Tau O, Chon Thanh,
Bau Bang, Lai Khe, Ben Cat, etc. All of those places had been the location of
many fierce battles between us and the American and puppet troops over the
course of many years and still bore the marks of the glorious feats of arms of
the diligent and heroic eastern Nam Bo troops. I looked down at the jungle,
which previously consisted of thick growths of large and small trees but was
now denuded and desolate. There were many bomb craters on the surface. Many
long scars of devastation caused by B52 carpet bombing succeeded one another and
criss-crossed one another in the devastated jungle. When they looked down from
above, the Americans thought that nothing could survive where their B52's had
passed over, so they boasted that the B52 were terrible gods of war. Then we
flew over the Saigon River, the Binh Loi Bridge lying between two thick nets
of steel, then An Phu Dong, then Tan Son Nhat. The helicopters landed in the
military part of the airfield. Our delegation thanked the crew members and
shook their hands. Looking neat in the tidy insignia-less liberation army
uniforms, we formed into an orderly line on the runway. The officers carried
briefcases and wore revolvers. The enlisted men wore floppy jungle hats and
 carried backpacks and AK rifles. Everyone wore the famous rubber sandals. I
don't know whether the Americans and their puppets understood the significance
of that or not, but the many Vietnamese and foreign reporters who were present
at the airfield that day were very observant. They photographed us with movie
cameras and still cameras. I smiled with delight when I noticed them photo­
graphing our rubber sandals. They said, "Wearing simple, proud rubber sandals,
they sat foot on Tan Son Nhat. They entered Saigon, capital of the Republic of
Vietnam, in the same rubber sandals they wore during Tet of 1968." (UPI,
1 February 1973). The reporters told the truth. Those rubber sandals had
left their proud imprints on the streets of Saigon, at many important objec­
tives, and even at Tan Son Nhat airfield, as well as all the other towns,
cities, and municipalities in South Vietnam during Tet Mau Than, so that there
could be the scene on that day--rubber sandals entering Saigon with good will--
and so that some day it would be certain that the rubber sandals could return
to Saigon yet another time--to a liberated Saigon. I looked at the line formed
by the cadres and men of the delegation from one end to the other and felt very
happy and proud. They had bright eyes and bright smiles and stood erect,
looking correct and imposing, all of which expressed the confidence of victors.
They were cadres and men from all battlefields and holding many different posi­
tions, and they were from many different components and of many different age
groups. Some had served since the anti-French resistance war and some had
answered the call of the simultaneous uprising. Some of them took up arms in
Saigon during the Tet Offensive, and others had been in the army only a year
but had contributed to the immortal Loc Ninh-Route 13 victory. They stood
there like simple, ordinary, natural people before the lenses of the reporters
and before the inquisitive, curious, and surprised eyes of the U.S.-puppet MP's
who were standing around. From the crowd there came toward us people wearing
the uniforms and insignia of the Hungarian and Polish armies. It turned out
that they were our Hungarian and Polish comrades in the International Commis­
sion for Control and Supervision who had come to the airfield to greet us and
offer our delegation all necessary assistance. I intimately greeted those com-
rades and expressed my deep gratitude. After completing several simple forms,
we got into black American Fords and Chevrolets to go to the delegation's head-
quartes--which the Americans and their puppets called "Camp David"--in Tan Son
Nhat airfield.

Camp David, formerly a U.S. military camp, had been renovated. It consisted
of many temporary wooden, sheet-metal roofed barracks arranged in straight
rows, between which there were broad paths and occasionally a shade tree. It
was very hot, especially at midday. In addition to the heat there was the roar
of all kinds of airplanes and helicopters. The noise, which came from all di-
rections, made everyone angry and irritable. It was difficult to think, work
and relax. Fortunately, after the sun went down at dusk the area naturally
became cooler, but there was no way to turn off the incessant noise. It was
indeed a military camp. It was entirely adequate for soldiers in wartime, but
fell far short of the minimum standards of a diplomatic delegation. They were
clearly playing a dirty trick on us there. Perhaps they had spent a lot of
effort to find an "appropriate" headquarters for both of our delegations: the
military delegation of the government of the DRV and our delegation.

As soon as we entered the gate of the camp, Le Quang Hoa, Luu Van Loi, Ho Quang
Hoa, Bui Thanh Tin and many other people I knew, practically the entire DRV
delegation, rushed up and surrounded our convoy. Just after we got out of the
car brother Hoa presented me with a bouquet of fresh lilies from Hanoi, then
everyone hugged one another. There were sounds of laughter and backslapping.
It was truly moving--especially the spirit of brotherhood among the children
of the same mother--the motherland--who had writhed in misery and pain during
years of warfare. It was truly heartwarming and happy when comrades-in-arms
who had lived and died together on the battlefield and faced a cruel enemy, now
met in the bosom of the enemy, surrounded by enemy troops, with one noble objec-
tive: struggling for peace and national concord.

I turned to hug and kiss Doang Huyen, deputy head of the military delegation of
the PRG of the RSVN, who had gone to Saigon in advance to participate in meet-
ings of deputy delegation heads and discuss the work procedures. Duong Dinh
Thao, a member of our delegation who had also arrived at Saigon via Paris,
anxiously relayed to me a letter and warm salutations and congratulations from
Nguyen Thi Binh and our delegation in Paris.

The camp was divided into two parts: one side was reserved for brother Hoa's
delegation and the other was reserved for my delegation. But the Americans and
their puppets had the good intention of preparing for the two delegation heads
a relatively decent house built in the duplex style: each of us had half of the
house, including a living room, an office, a dining room, a bedroom and a bath-
room. There was a door to each of the rooms, and there were airconditioning,
bright lights, a telephone and other conveniences. We clearly understood their
"good intentions." Therefore, we moved into other rooms and lived and worked
with the others. We turned that house over to specialists so that they could
inspect it. After searching around for days they showed us some very small
microphones they had found under tables in the offices and livingrooms. We
joked with one another that we didn't know whether they had been put there by
the Americans or by the puppets, or put there as a practical joke by carpenters who were also electronic technicians. There were many other such stories: jamming the radio channels we used to communicate with the base areas, obtaining copies of our telegrams, etc. But enough! It does no good to talk. Doubtless, that was a common story to the Americans in the age of electronics. What were those stories compared to the Watergate affair in Washington? The important thing was that we were aware of, and were on guard against, even the smallest detail. That was nothing less than the continuation of a war that had not yet ended. The enemy used every trick they could use, from modern weapons that could kill many people at a time to the most sophisticated electronic machinery, the radar and lasers used in the viewing and listening devices, from MacNamara's fence to Camp David. In its 15 March 1973 issue THE STARS AND STRIPES, the newspaper of the U.S. Army in the Pacific, admitted that "The United States had fought three long wars in this century. The Vietnam war was the largest war with regard to the number of bombs dropped and was also the largest with regard to the use of science and technology in warfare!"

That was a matter of abusing modern U.S. technology for aggressive purposes, to kill people and deceive others. As for the puppets, they had neither technology nor intelligence, so their U.S. masters assigned them the task of playing vile, petty tricks every day to give our delegation a hard time, such as limiting the food and goods a contractor could bring into Camp David, preventing the press, and especially the people, from meeting with and talking with our delegation, and seeking to restrict our travel, especially through Saigon, by causing delays, damaging our vehicles, having the escorting MP's arrive late, etc., then intimidating us with helicopters and tanks, and plotting to use money and women to bribe us. With regard to our regional delegations and local teams, the enemy's behavior was even worse. They provided bad, unsanitary, crowded, hot housing quarters which lacked all conveniences. For example, in the My Tho region they provided a recently remodeled chicken-coop in the Dong Tam base. The stench was still very strong. They provided poor-quality food. In one instance, at Hue, the canned goods were so old that they were wormy. At the four-party conference table in Saigon we continually and vigorously protested their treatment and demanded the formation of an investigating team. The Americans blamed the puppets. Major General Woodward, head of the U.S. delegation, pretended that "It is unfortunate that the U.S. delegation knows nothing about such deficiencies. The Republic of Vietnam is responsible for such things. They have informed us that everything is in good shape." On such occasions, the puppets either clammed up or blamed the lower echelon, the local officials, or people who had not done their jobs properly, and then agreed to send an inspection team and promised to fix up the housing and provide additional equipment, but that was the end of it.

Furthermore, they organized gangs of hooligans and thugs to cooperate with their MP's and police to commit acts of violence against PLA officers who were members of the joint military commissions and teams by throwing rocks and trash, and even using steel rods, knives, and hammers to wound our men, such as Major Le Thanh Nhon and two captains on the Buon Me Thuot team, and six of our comrades at Hue. Comrade Tran Hon Ngo was hit on the head and knocked unconscious at Duc Pho in Quang Ngai Province while he was working with an investigation team of the joint commission. All of our officers and men in the joint
commissions and teams were people who had achieved many accomplishments in war on many battlefields and had fought very heroically, like tigers, in the battles. Now, on the new struggle front in the area controlled by the enemy, they always had confidence in the just cause and in the inevitable victory of the revolution, were very calm and steadfast, and did not waver in the face of ugly acts, intimidation, or attempted bribery. We are very proud of them and are grateful to the troops of Uncle Ho who were very ordinary but were indomitable, had military bearing and didn't blink an eye.

Why did the Americans and their puppets play such cheap tricks? Certainly not to create a wholesome atmosphere in order to cooperate in correctly implementing the agreements, and certainly not to create an atmosphere of national reconciliation and concord after years of enmity because of the destructive warfare. How could reasoning people subjected to such acts by the United States and its puppets still believe that they truly wanted to end the war and bring about peace? Clearly, they brazenly and without hiding their perfidious faces intended to sabotage the agreement.

The most important aspect of the agreement, and the first matter that had to be implemented, was the ceasefire. Articles 2 and 3 of the agreement and the protocol on the ceasefire made clear and specific stipulations about the complete cessation of hostilities, the forces remaining in their original positions, etc. But after 28 January 1973, the day on which the ceasefire took effect (and until 30 April 1975), it was ironic that there was not a day on which the guns fell silent on any of the battlefields in South Vietnam.

On the very hour the ceasefire was to take effect, Thieu's puppet administration sent a task force led by tanks on an operation to take Cua Viet from us. There we put up a very stiff resistance, annihilated the encroaching enemy troops, and maintained the liberated area. Thus at the four-party conference table our side held the upper hand in denouncing their violation of the agreement. Lt Gen Ngo Du, head of the puppet delegation argued that we had occupied Cua Viet at 0758 on the morning of 28 January (the ceasefire was to take effect at 0800 on the morning of 28 January). I responded, "But we liberated Cua Viet in May 1972. We have all kinds of clear evidence about the illegal encroachment by your army after the ceasefire. But I would like to inform you of a report we have just received that thanks to their high degree of vigilance our liberation troops have annihilated the encroaching troops and defeated that adventuristic act, after having tried to use loudspeakers to appeal for them to retreat and not violate the agreement, but to no avail. That is a lesson for those who do not want to respect the agreement and not respect their signature." Their faces paled and they were bitter.

In order to prevent enemy airplanes from flying over areas under our control, we demanded an immediate discussion of Article 3 of the protocol regarding the ceasefire: "The joint military commissions will reach agreements regarding the corridors, routes, and other stipulations regarding the movement of military transport aircraft and military transport ships and boats of one side which must pass through an area controlled by the other side." Both the U.S. and puppet delegations regarded that matter as being unnecessary. But during the meeting on 16 February the American side urgently announced that a C47 had been
shot down south of An Loc and two U.S. crewmen had been seriously wounded. During all of the following meetings the Americans protested and demanded the appointment of an investigating team. I agreed to the investigation but stressed that since the Four-Party Joint Military Commission had not yet reached agreement regarding the flight paths, altitude, etc., of airplanes flying over areas controlled by the liberation troops, no one can accept responsibility for their safety. Ultimately, the Americans had to shut up and forget the incident.

Clearly, by basing ourselves on the legality of the agreements while resolutely protesting the violations we forced the Americans and puppets to respect us. In places where we were weak and careless on the battlefield, even if the enemy was 100 percent guilty of a violation it would still argue obstinately, regardless of our protests. An example was the puppets' taking of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai which we had liberated in 1972, along with a relatively long stretch of National Route 1. After the ceasefire took effect the puppets launched a division-sized operation to retake that area in order to restore their communications on Route 1. We vigorously exposed that violation and demanded that an investigation team be sent there, but the Americans and puppets ignored our demand and considered the incident closed. After 28 January the enemy also launched continuous operations to take villages and hamlets along Route 4 in My Tho which we had controlled prior to 28 January, and set up outposts deep in our territory. In that area, because our forces were not on guard and were afraid that if they retaliated they would violate the agreements, the enemy was able to occupy those places and fraudulently claim at the conference table that the area belonged to them. The ceasefire was the heart of the agreement but the Thieu puppet regime completely ignored it and brazenly sabotaged the heart of the agreement. Their 1973 "Ly Thuong Kiet" plan set forth five major strategic goals:

--Encroachment and pacification were the central measures.

--The pillar was building a strong army and a strong governmental administration. Within 5 years the ARVN would be made younger and more effective, and would be modernized.

--Sabotaging the parts of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam which were not beneficial for the Republic of Vietnam.

--Restoring the economic level of 1973-1974 in the 1973-1978 long-range plan, especially with regard to industry, accompanied by the economic blockading of the enemy.

--Maintaining the deterrent force of the U.S. air and naval forces in Southeast Asia.

They also endeavored to carry out "land grabbing" operations and "flag planting" operations in which infantry and helicopters were used to plant flags. They prepared 1.6 million three-barred puppet flags for that task.

The 6 April 1973 report of the Committee To Denounce War Crimes in Vietnam concluded that "In the 2-month period between 28 January and 28 March 1973, the Saigon administration violated the Paris Agreement more than 70,000 times,
including 19,770 land-grabbing operations, 23 artillery shellings, 3,375 bombings and straffings of liberated areas, and 21,075 police operations in areas under their control."

According to enemy data, as of October 1973 they had set up 1,180 outposts in South Vietnam and controlled 7,258 hamlets more than they did prior to 28 January 1973.*

Clearly, although the United States and its puppets had signed the agreement they continued to act imperturbably in accordance with their existing plans, and endeavored to pacify, encroach, and build a strong army in order to change the balance of forces in their favor and gain complete control of South Vietnam. At a meeting of the two South Vietnamese delegations in March 1973, Lt Gen Du Quoc Dong, who had replaced Ngo Du as head of the puppet delegation, when he had been put in a bad position showed his true face by saying, "I don't approve of the Paris Agreement because it only benefits your side." I sternly criticized him, "So it is clear: Lt Gen Du Quoc Dong is representing the Republic of Vietnam in the implementation of an agreement of which he does not approve, and indeed opposes. It is evident and clear that your side is violating and sabotaging the agreement." He hastily corrected himself, "I personally do not approve of it...but...because the agreement has been reached, we must carry it out!"

As everyone knows, before the Paris Agreement was signed the United States urgently sent weapons and war facilities to South Vietnam to bolster the puppet army, make up for the puppets' heavy losses in 1972, and build up a sufficient stockpile so that the puppet army could continue to be strong after the Americans withdrew. Kissinger had often declared during press conferences in the United States that "After the Americans withdraw, the Republic of Vietnam must continue to be strong." That work continued at a rapid pace after the agreement took effect. Many documents have clearly recorded the figures, the world press had written much about them, and there are ample statistics, so I believe that it is unnecessary to repeat them here.

Furthermore the U.S. and vassal troops were required to withdraw completely from South Vietnam in accordance with the agreement, but they turned over to Thieu's army their modern equipment supply depots, and bases.

Articles 5 and 6 of the agreement stipulated that all troops, military advisers and military personnel, including military technical personnel, military personnel attached to the pacification program, and the weapons, ammunition, and war materiel of the United States and the other foreign countries, would have to be completely withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days after the signing of the agreement, and that all military bases of the United States and the other foreign countries were to be dismantled. The protocol on the ceasefire also stated in Article 8 that "The United States and the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the agreement will take with them all of their weapons, ammunition and military equipment."

*Documents captured from the enemy after the liberation and now held at the B2 War Recapitulation Section of the Ministry of National Defense.
In order to insure the correct implementation of those articles, Article 3 stated clearly that beginning with the ceasefire the forces of the United States would remain in their original positions while awaiting a troop withdrawal plan. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission would stipulate the procedures.

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission was responsible for coordinating monitoring and investigating the implementation of Articles 3, 5 and 6. Especially, the International Commission was required to control and supervise the implementation of those articles.

During the meetings of the delegation heads of the four parties at Tan Son Nhat we continually requested the U.S. delegation to inform us of its plan to withdraw troops and dismantle its military bases so that joint inspection teams could monitor and inspect its implementation. It was the same every day: Major General Woodward, head of the U.S. delegation, hemmed and hawed and turned to other matters. But one day he solemnly announced "The results of the strict implementation of the agreements on the part of the United States, which has disarmed torpedoes and mines..." He spoke distinctly about numbers, time, space, etc. When he reached the part about withdrawing troops he said, "Eight thousand troops, including those of the Allies, have been withdrawn from South Vietnam." I immediately protested, "We cannot accept such a perfunctory report by the U.S. delegation. No one can believe the 8,000 figure or any other figure Major General Woodward gives out, without thinking that it could be false. I believe that any withdrawal of U.S. troops or the troops of any other foreign country must be announced in advance so that there can be on-the-spot monitoring and inspection by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission as well as the control and supervision of the International Commission, as has been stipulated. Otherwise, no figures can have any value. As far as I am concerned, to date not a single U.S. soldier, or a soldier from any other country, has left South Vietnam."

Many days later, on 16 February 1973, the Americans sent us a diplomatic note officially agreeing that joint four-party military teams could go to the various locations to observe the withdrawal of U.S. and South Korean troops and could take photographs. Thus they had to make a concession. From those observations it was clear that although when they arrived in Vietnam the U.S. and South Korean troops had been armed to the teeth, when they left they carried no weapons at all, but only sleeping bags, personal effects, and such tacky souvenirs as earthenware and porcelain elephants, stoneware from Marble Mountain, etc. When our men asked about that they were told, "Our weapons and equipment have been sent by ship." Such was their deception!

Only after their total defeat in 1975 did the Americans, dumbfounded over the fact that although they used every trick to provide the puppet army with much equipment it was still defeated, angrily admit the truth: "With the enormous quantity of equipment and materiel left behind when our forces withdrew, added to the aid provided subsequently, the ARVN forces should have been fully capable of coping with the enemy." (From the concluding Chapter 10 of the book "The Last Helicopter," by Weldon A. Brown.)
How about the dismantling of military bases?

The American Major General Woodward solemnly reported that "We are authorized to reply to you that at present we have no bases in South Vietnam. All of them were turned over to the Republic of Vietnam prior to the signing of the agreement. The American troops are now stationed in camps temporarily borrowed from the Republic of Vietnam."

That was a deception that was brazen beyond words.

Once the imperialists had drafted a plan and had objectives, they acted in the style of aggressors, lying brazenly no matter to whom they were talking.

The International Commission should have been fully capable of exposing those dishonest acts, and of reaching accurate conclusions and condemning violations of the agreement by the Americans and puppets in order to prevent them from sabotaging the agreement and continuing the war. Four countries--Hungary, Poland, Indonesia and Canada--participated in the International Commission. After Canada withdrew it was replaced by Iran, which worked in accordance with the principle of consultation and unanimity.

It must be frankly said that Canada practically belonged to the Americans and took the Americans' part in the International Commission, arguing, glossing over and, when necessary, vetoing. The head of the Canadian delegation, Ambassador Gauvin, was outwardly courteous but was said to be a person who was dogmatic, overbearing, domineering and looked down on others. One day Gauvin indicated that he wanted to make a courtesy call on the delegation of the PRG of the RSVN. We were quite willing and regarded that as a good opportunity to speak frankly with that representative of the International Commission. I received him in a living room that had been prepared as decently as conditions in Camp David allowed. I went out to his car to greet the ambassador, escorted him inside, and invited him to sit with me on a divan, the most ceremonious seat in the living room. Accompanying him were a political aide of the Canadian delegation, and a number of others. The person who did most of the interpreting during that meeting was our interpreter, comrade Dung, who interpreted for me during all of the meetings of the heads of the four-party delegations. Dung was a remarkable youth who spoke English fluently in a strong voice and knew how to stress the essential passages.

After the exchange of pleasantries Gauvin spoke of the role and accomplishments of the International Commission, especially during the period in which Gauvin served as its chairman, regarding the ceasefire, the exchange of prisoners, the withdrawal of U.S. and vassal troops from South Vietnam, etc. By doing so he wanted to speak of the effectiveness of the International Commission and its objectivity and fairness and, especially, unjustly criticize us in an accusatory, threatening voice by saying that there had as yet been no ceasefire because of our many violations on the battlefield. I sat listening to him very calmly and politely, both patiently listening and understanding the significance of each word. Even the ambassador realized that he had spoken too long and looked at me inquisitively. I calmly invited my guest to eat some fruit and smoke a cigarette. Then I began to speak:
"My dear Ambassador Gauvin, you have spoken very accurately of the very important role and the very necessary objectivity of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in implementing the agreement. I am sincerely sorry that the sound of gunfire can be heard all over, that although agreement has been reached to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam the devastating war of the past several decades is continuing. I believe that no people in the world desire peace more ardently than the people of Vietnam, who have fought and borne hardships in the cause of justice. But, Mr Ambassador, there is a reason for everything. I would like to turn for you a few pages of recent history. Our nation won independence in 1945. The French colonialists again invaded our country. Only by fighting 9 years, the outstanding victory during which was the battle of Dien Bien Phu, were we able to achieve the signing of the Geneva Agreement. During that period there was also an International Control Commission of which Canada was a member. I'm sure you are well aware of that." Gauvin nodded his head in agreement. I continued, "But Nixon, who was then the U.S. vice president, declared to the press that 'Although France has signed a treaty to end hostilities in Indochina, the United States will act alone if necessary and will send troops to that part of the world.' That was reported by THE NEW YORK TIMES. That is indeed what the United States did."

Gauvin made a motion with his hand to interrupt the interpreter and began to speak at length. I said to Dung, "Continue to interpret what I say. Only after I have finished should you listen to and interpret what he has to say." Dung, unperturbed, continued to interpret for me.

"I would like to bring some figures to your attention, Mr Ambassador. Between 1955 and 1960 more than 800 U.S. ships carrying weapons and war facilities of various kinds arrived at the ports of Vietnam, especially Da Nang. During the same period $600 million worth of aid was given to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. The whole world knows about that. That was a brazen violation of the Geneva Agreement. But the International Commission at that time did not stop those illegal acts because it ignored them, covered them up, or was under pressure. So the guns continued to fire and the war continued on our Vietnamese soil. Canada was an important part of the International Commission at that time and cannot, of course, deny its great responsibility."

Gauvin again interrupted and would have gone on talking if I had not instructed Dung to continue to interpret what I was saying and to speak in a voice louder than Gauvin's.

Dung, who was indeed a remarkable youth, drowned out what Gauvin was saying, forcing Gauvin to stop talking and listen to me. He appeared to be surprised, perhaps because he had never before failed to dominate others and been restricted in such a way. I continued, "Events are now repeating themselves. Before and after the Paris Agreement the Americans shipped weapons and equipment to the ARVN so that it could sabotage the agreement and carry out land-grabbing and pacification campaigns. Furthermore, although the U.S. and other foreign troops returned to their countries they left their weapons, facilities, supply depots, and bases to the army of the Thieu regime, which was a brazen violation of the Paris Agreement."
At that point Gauvin, as if he could stand no more, jumped up, waved his hand vigorously, and mumbled a few words. I had to calm him down: "Mr Ambassador, please take it easy. I only want to say a few more words, then you may have your turn." Then I continued.

"This time, if we, the International Commission, and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission do not cooperate closely with one another, try to operate together objectively and effectively, and stop all such violations, I believe that the sound of gunfire will continue to be heard. That will not be surprising, and the reason will be clear. Our responsibility to history is great but we have not met the desires for peace of the people of Vietnam, the people of Canada, and the peace-loving people of the world. What will the Canadian government, which has twice participated in the international commissions under two treaties, think about its role?

Now Gauvin no longer appeared so eager to speak. His attitude softened. "Dear Lt Gen Tran Van Tra," he said, "I admit that I know nothing about the Geneva Agreement. I know nothing about what happened then." Then the ambassador changed the subject and talked about the weather in Saigon and the various kinds of fruit in Vietnam.

I pleasantly invited my guest to drink beer and soft drinks. Everyone tried to maintain a friendly atmosphere.

Gauvin again spoke and recalled a big reception he had organized in Saigon for Sharp, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs who came here on an official visit. In addition to all the "bigshots" of the Saigon puppet regime and the U.S. Ambassador Bunker, he invited members of the International Commission and of the Four-Party Joint Military Mission, including ourselves.

"General Tran Van Tra was truly the star of that reception, a star in the sky of Saigon that day," he said. "Dear Mr Ambassador," I replied, "that was the star of the just cause of the PRG of the RSVN, which I have the honor of representing here!" "No, no," he said, "I was speaking of your outstanding individual role."

He was attempting to avoid praising the PRG of the RSVN, although it had long had indisputable prestige, not only in Saigon but at Paris and in the world. In order to oppose it, the United States and the puppet Thieu regime adopted the principle that in South Vietnam there existed only one government, that of Thieu's Republic of Vietnam. The United States and China had agreed to that principle during the "Nixon-Mao Zedong-Zhou Enlai political conference which resulted in the Shanghai Communique.

He continued, "You are a great soldier," Now I was truly at a loss. I clearly understood his posturing but did not suspect that he would praise me so highly. Luckily, I suddenly remembered an appraisal of our soldiers by UPI in 1964: "The Viet Cong guerrillas are mythical figures. They are an enemy worthy of fearing, a foe everyone must respect." In 1965 the magazine U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT wrote that "The Viet Cong guerrillas are the most skilled and the greatest in the history of mankind."
I smiled broadly and said, "I thank you for your compliments. The truth is that out of patriotism and love for the people, and because there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom,' our liberation fighters have sacrificed their lives in combat and have won victory. The American press and news agencies, as well as those of the world, have called them mythical figures, the most skilled, greatest fighters. I am truly proud to represent them in Saigon in order to struggle for the correct implementation of the agreement they won only by shedding much blood."

Then Ambassador Gauvin excused himself and left. He suggested that we have a souvenir photograph taken. Gauvin handed the camera he had brought along to our photographer so that he could take a few snapshots.

The 60 days we spent in Saigon with the Four-Party Joint Military Commission were pressing, tense days. Our two military delegations did all they could to struggle for the implementation of the agreement, but the results were limited. The comrades of the Hungarian and Polish delegations to the International Commission, with an international spirit and ardent brotherhood, cooperated closely with us in struggling, protecting one another, and helping one another.

Our comrade Major General Xuyt"[phonetic], deputy head of the Hungarian delegation to the International Commission, a big man who looked husky in his Hungarian army uniform, during the first working session said in a sincere voice, "The party, state, army and people of Hungary have sent us to Vietnam for the sake of the peace and well-being of the Vietnamese people, and for world peace. We regard the success of the Vietnamese revolution as our success and are thus ready to lay down our lives for it. That is the principle which guides all of our actions. We are not afraid of death and of course are not afraid of hardship."

I was very grateful for the heartfelt words of the emissary of the working class who had come from a faraway land to help us during a difficult period, in a spirit of noble international proletarianism!

It would be impossible to relate everything we accomplished or failed to accomplish during those 60 days. Because the Americans and puppets had objectives and plans that had been prepared in advance, the key problem—the ceasefire—could not be resolved. The war continued. Let us listen to what Thieu had to say to the puppet officers at Thu Duc:

"The Republic of Vietnam will implement the ceasefire provisions only when:

"1. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam no longer supports me.

"2. When American military aid is only sufficient for defensive purposes.

"3. When the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam are no longer capable of defending the important areas of South Vietnam."

Clearly, the loyal lackey of the Americans thought that he would be victorious, so he obstinately sabotaged the ceasefire and continued the war as if there had been no agreement!
The American and vassal troops had withdrawn. The vassal troops of the Americans who had sold themselves to the Americans to participate in killing our people, such as the Australians, New Zealanders, Thai, and South Koreans, had completely withdrawn from our country. In the morning of 15 March 1973 USARV, the U.S. Army Command in Vietnam, conducted a flag-folding ceremony and bugged out. In the afternoon, MACV, the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, actually the U.S. GHQ which commanded all U.S. troops, the vassal troops, and Thieu's army and the imposing U.S. aggressive war apparatus in Vietnam, the Tan Son Nhat headquarters of which had been dubbed the "Pentagon of the East" by the press, also pulled down and folded its flag.

Whether by accident or by clever design, the next day the military delegations of the DRV and the PRG of the RSVN drove into the courtyard of that "Pentagon of the East." The two delegations got out of their cars and advanced directly into the reception room, past two rows of American MP's who stood at attention and saluted, in order to attend a party organized by the major general who headed the U.S. delegation. We laughed, drank American whiskey, and talked about the weather and peace in Vietnam, in the "Pentagon of the East."

Thus the U.S. troops also got out. But, as stated above, they left behind all kinds of weapons, military bases, and even officers in civilian clothing, to prop up the Thieu regime.

With regard to the exchange of prisoners in accordance with the agreement, we succeeded in securing the release of our people who had been captured during the war. Maj Nguyen Thi Dung, a member of our military delegation, was responsible for the POW exchange. She was very active and aggressive, visiting all of the puppet prisons, from Bien Hoa to Con Dao and Phu Quoc. She was the only female member of the four military delegations, spoke French and English fluently, was attractive and polite, and struggled resolutely, which won the respect of the Americans and puppets. We were proud of her. She worked at disseminating the articles of the agreement regarding the exchange of POW's to our men who were still imprisoned, struggled for the improvement of prison conditions, and demanded the return of those who were still detained. The enemy did not return everyone and were not sincere, but we were able to liberate a considerable number of our cadres and men, people who had fought heroically but had fallen into the hands of the enemy and had been subjected to their barbarous treatment.

We returned all American and puppet POW's we were detaining.

But another important matter was that in the course of the 60 days of face-to-face meetings with the enemy we gained better understanding of them. The Americans were only interested in obtaining the release of their POW's as a gift to the American people, and in bringing the U.S. troops home, as demanded by the American people. Otherwise, they continued to implement their policy of Vietnamizing the war so that they could remain in Vietnam. The puppets adhered to Thieu's "four nos" slogan: no concession of land to the "communists," no neutrality, no coalition with the "communists," and no talking with the "communists." Although the puppets were forced to negotiate with us at the two-party talks at Tan Son Nhat, in fact they continued to adhere to their "four nos" principles and did not negotiate with us in good faith, but argued about
everything, made careless statements, and agreed to something one day only to change their minds the next day. They even reneged and refused to implement the first and smallest matter—the color of the flag and the insignia—of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission—which was agreed upon at the meeting of deputy delegation heads on 31 January 1973. That decision was that the flag, arm bands, and insignia on the vehicles, boats, and aircraft of the Joint Military Commission were to be orange in color. During a meeting of delegation heads they recommended that the matter be reconsidered and that another color be selected. We rejected that recommendation. What had been agreed to should be carried out, and not reneged on. In the middle of a meeting, during a break, Brig Gen Phan Hoa Hiep, deputy head of the puppet delegation, sat down beside me and whispered, "You don't know me but I know you well." I asked him, "When did we meet?" Hiep replied, "I was a soldier in the 3d Division (at the time of the August Revolution 1945). It's too bad the bigwigs at that time were at odds with one another. Otherwise I might still be a resistance fighter under your command." He chuckled when he said that. What he said was correct. The "big wigs" to whom he referred included me. At the beginning of the resistance war I commanded a unit called the Hoc Mon-Ba Diem-Duc Hoa Interdistrict Liberation Unit, which operated around Saigon. Nguyen Hoa Hiep was commander of the 3d Division and Ly Hue Vinh was commander of the 4th Division. The 4th Division fell apart as soon as the French returned in 1945. The 3d Division disintegrated and surrendered to the French within a brief period of time. I disarmed some of the units of those two divisions which had been robbing and attacking the people in Nhu Duc, An Nhon Tay, Hoc Mon-Gia Dinh, My Tho, and Duc Hoa (Long An). It was said that Phan Hoa Hiep's family name was in fact not "Phan" but a transliteration of "Francois" into "Phan Hoa," for his real name was Francois Hiep, son of a French father and a Vietnamese mother. When I related that rumor to him he tried to ingratiate with me, called himself my youngest brother and pleaded for his "older brother" to agree to change the color of the flag.

"Orange is close to red," he said, "It makes us mad to see it." He had degraded himself to youngest brother, so I took the part of the eldest brother and said, "Why do you get mad? Red is the splendid, brilliant color of the future, and is nothing to be afraid of. You should know that orange is in common use internationally. It is very visible, even from far away. That color is the most appropriate and is attractive. Furthermore, what has been agreed to should be carried out, not haggled back and forth, which wastes time. There are still many things remaining to be done." He continued to plead with me but I resolutely turned him down. Even so, the puppets refused to carry out the agreement. There were many stories similar to the orange color story.

According to the agreement, the Four-Party Joint Military Commission would cease operations after 60 days. But near the end of that period, according to American sources and the Saigon press, the Four-Party Joint Military Commission would be extended. We didn't know what they were up to. Was it in order to prolong the legal presence of the U.S. delegation? Was it that the puppets wanted to remain under the protection of their American masters? Was it to keep the DRV delegation there in hopes of resolving a number of other problems that benefited the Americans, such as searching for missing U.S. military personnel? Was it to weaken the role of the PRG of the RSVN? But we resolutely
prepared for the U.S. military delegation to return to America and for brother Hoa's delegation to return to Hanoi. As for our delegation, when the change was made to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, the Central Committee decided that Maj Gen Hoang Anh Tuan would head the military delegation of the PRG of the RSVN. Of course, I would leave, but my departure became a problem. Would I go to Hanoi? There was reason to do so. Would I go to Loc Ninh? The Americans and puppets would give us a hard time, and would either not provide facilities or carry out some nefarious plot. We knew that at least the Americans and puppets wanted to keep me at Tan Son Nhat. To allow a top-ranking officer—in their estimation—to return to the battlefield would be to "turn a tiger loose in the jungle." It would be useful to keep such a person in their grasp as a hostage.

We had long known that everything was decided by the American masters. The puppets were merely the dutiful servants. The preceding 60 days had made us even more convinced of that. In that matter as well as in many others, if the Americans agreed everything would go smoothly. We had to get the Americans to agree to take me to Hanoi.

On the night of 29 March I invited Woodward, head of the U.S. delegation, to our delegation's headquarters at Camp David. At the designated hour Woodward, Brigadier General Wickham—deputy head of the U.S. delegation—and the interpreter Major Sauvagio, who wore a green beret and had been an advisor for the puppet regime's pacification cadre training school at Vung Tau, arrived.

I informed Woodward that because our communications were difficult I had only just received a delayed message that there was one additional American POW our forces were holding in Tra Vinh Province. In order to express our good will and correctly implement the Paris Agreement, we wanted to turn him over to the Americans. On the following day the two sides would assign cadres to carry out the turning over of that last American POW. I said that personally I regarded that as a friendship gift to the lieutenant general to commemorate the 60 days we worked together on the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (my intention was to suggest that because of that Woodward would be commended and promoted).

Woodward was openly very pleased, thanked me profusely and, in order to express his gratitude, inquired about my health and asked if I had any plans for the future.

It was a question that was asked at the right place and at the right time. That was all I could hope for. I replied that I planned to take a trip to Hanoi and, along the way, visit Laos. Woodward and Wickham thought that I intended to help resolve the question of American and puppet POW's in Laos, but could not say so. Woodward appeared to be very anxious and asked, "When do you plan to go?" "I'll go tomorrow if you'll provide the means." He replied, "You will have the means. I'll arrange for a C130 flight to Hanoi tomorrow morning."

I expressed my gratitude and reminded him that on the following morning one of our officers would meet with the American officer to arrange the turning over of the POW at Tra Vinh. He thanked me and asked me whether the C130 should
wait to bring me back. If not, how would I return? (the U.S. delegation would cease operations and return to the United States on 31 March. After that date it would be necessary to use a puppet facility).

I smiled and said that I might return to Saigon by way of Paris, so that I could visit another famous European capital (Woodward thought that I needed to meet with our delegation in Paris).

Woodward was very pleased, said that that was a good idea, and said goodbye. He did not forget to affirm that an airplane would be available on the following morning.

On the morning of 30 April 1973 the puppet officer who brought a convoy of sedans to pick me up at my residence and take me to the ramp of the airplane was very deferential. Accompanying me to the airfield to see me off to Hanoi were Maj Gen Le Quang Hoa, Major General Woodward, head of the U.S. delegation and his wife. I warmly shook hands with and said goodbye to everyone. The warm, affectionate, and extremely moving handshakes secretly signified a victory and the sympathetic handshakes secretly expressed mutual gratitude. Woodward wished me a safe journey and good luck, and said that he would send an airplane to Hanoi to bring me back, even though I had not requested him to do so. I wished Mr and Mrs Woodward good fortune, stepped aboard the airplane, and waved to everyone. Thus aboard the American C130 (the Americans were courteous enough to provide a seat for me in the cockpit) I, Lt Col Nguyen Quang Minh (a research cadre with the Joint Commission), Dr Le Hoai Liem, the interpreter Dung, the bodyguard Hoa, and a number of other cadres, would fly from Saigon to Hanoi, thus ending 60 days of very seething and tense activity in the bosom of the enemy.

Sitting aboard the airplane and for the first time flying the length of the country, from Saigon to Hanoi, I felt disturbed and moved. There it was, a country that had existed 4,000 years and had been built by the blood and sweat of countless generations, in the past and in the present. The fresh green villages, the endless mountains and jungles, the long coastline with white sand beaches, and the immense blue continental shelf were truly a phantasmagoria. The gentle rays of the bright March sky embellished the scene with marvelous, sparkling colors. It was very beautiful, that homeland of ours. Also very beautiful were the heroism, intelligence, creativity, and persistent labor, generation after generation, of the millions of Vietnamese who built the beautiful country of today. I was very grateful for my ancestors and suddenly I remembered Uncle Ho and what he once told our troops in the Hung Temple on the side of Mt. Nghia: "The Hung kings achieved merit by founding the nation; you and I must work together to preserve it."

The words of Uncle Ho have been deeply engraved in the hearts of the Vietnamese people. No enemy, even the chief imperialists from across the Pacific or the shameless expansionists from the north, will be smashed to smithereens and be chased out of our country. Le Chieu Thong in the past, and Nguyen Van Thieu in the present, will live in infamy. Our homeland was certain to be independent, free and unified by any means.
The airplane was flying over the Red River Delta! Hanoi--our beloved capital and the heart of the homeland. I had lived in Hanoi for a long time and had worked there. Several times I had left it and returned. But this time was somehow different: I was strangely excited and moved, as if I were a child who had been far away for a long time wrestling with the difficulties and dangers of life and now was suddenly able to return to my warm home and be with my sweet, beloved mother. I was home: the child had returned to his sweet mother, so that he could again prepare to set out on another distant journey completely different from the one he had just taken.

Three days later a C130 from Saigon landed at Gia Lam airfield to pick me up—just as Woodward had promised. I sent Lt Col Nguyen Quang Minh to inform the American officer commanding the airplane that I was not yet able to leave. Comrade Minh wrote a notice stating that Lt Gen Tran Van Tra was busy and could not leave, and authorizing the airplane to return to Tan Son Nhat without having to return to Hanoi at a later date to pick him up. He did not forget to express my thanks.

In my extreme happiness over being able to return to our beloved capital, and with a feeling of freedom and relaxation from being with my friends, comrades and compatriots, I thought fondly of my comrades who were still at Tan Son Nhat. Because of a mission that was indispensable in the present phase of the struggle, those comrades had to live and work in a tense atmosphere while surrounded by the enemy, for how long no one knew. In the future, what would happen to those comrades at the hands of the obstinate and insidious enemy? I calmed myself by thinking that those of us in the liberated area must go all-out and cooperate closely with those comrades in order to win victory for the revolution. It was certain that those comrades would not be isolated, for they had us and the people, even in Saigon. One day we would meet again to celebrate the victory.
CHAPTER TWO

The Only Path Is That of Revolutionary Violence

Immediately after I arrived in Hanoi I met with leaders of the party, the government, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the work of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, on what had been accomplished and what had not yet been accomplished, on my conclusions after 60 days of face-to-face meetings with the Americans and puppets, on my observations regarding the situation, etc. I listened to their good observations and evaluations regarding the work of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the enemy plots, and what we would do next. Then I was granted several days' leave, after which I prepared for and participated in a plenary session of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee regarding the situation and mission of the revolution in South Vietnam.

The members of COSVN and the Regional Command—Pham Hung, Muoi Cuc (Nguyen Van Linh, deputy secretary of COSVN), Hai Hau (Tran Nam Trung), Muoi Khang, and Sau Dan (Vo Van Kiet) came to Hanoi via the Truong Son route. We held a separate meeting regarding the B2 theater in order to reach agreement on our evaluation of the situation and our observations regarding the recent developments and our estimates of future developments. We exchanged experiences with Nam Cong (Vo Chi Cong) and Chu Huy Man of the Military Region 5 theater and Hoang Minh Thao of the B2 theater, who had come to Hanoi to participate in the conference.

During the last third of April 1973 the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee, along with delegates from the South Vietnam theaters, was in session. It was an extremely important conference. After the various parties signed the Paris Agreement, i.e. after we had won a decisive victory in the anti-U.S. war, forced the United States to end its war of destruction in the north, and forced the U.S. and vassal troops to withdraw from Vietnam, and especially after 60 days of implementing the agreement, during which there were a number of actual developments on the battlefield, that conference was held to reevaluate the situation, evaluate the balance of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, and delineate the path of advance of the revolution in South Vietnam during the new revolutionary phase. That was a desire of everyone, of the cadres as well as the enlisted men and people.

Until that time, not everyone in the ranks of the cadres at the various echelons, on the battlefields, or even in the Central Committee, agreed about the value of the Paris Agreement, the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy on the battlefield, and especially how the agreements should be implemented and how to cope with the enemy, who were increasingly violating the articles of the agreement. Even the developments on the battlefields differed because on each of them our conditions and those of the enemy were completely different, the strategic value of each battlefield in comparison to the war as a whole differed, and the leaders on those battlefields had different outlooks and acted differently. That was a reality that could be no other way.
Therefore, if common evaluations and policies were based on the actual developments, dangerous mistakes would be made if the theater was not representative of all the rest or was not strategically important with regard to the war as a whole. If, while the war situation was changing, we did not correctly evaluate the role of each theater, mistakes would be made in organizing and deploying forces, and in adopting strategic, campaign and tactical policies, which would of course affect victory or defeat in the war. It was not that no mistakes were made in our war against the U.S. aggressors to liberate the nation. But thanks to the wise, democratic and centralized leadership of our party we were able to promptly correct our mistakes and win victory. Revolution is an undertaking of the masses. Each success or defeat of the revolution in each phase is a success or defeat of the thought and acts of millions of people, especially the collective leadership. It was never a case of "failures are due to you and successes are due to me." In each phase of the revolution, at each historical turning point, correct policies and actions are always the results of collective thought and knowledge, of the combination of many minds, from the mind of the highest leader to the minds of the enlisted men and ordinary people when, out of patriotism and love for the people, they plunge into the actual, specific, lively tasks on the battlefield: No one is always right and no one is always wrong, for everyone is human. What is noblest and wisest is to recognize one's mistakes and resolutely and promptly correct them. Even collective leadership is not always right. But it is certain that the collective leadership makes fewer mistakes than individual leaders. President Ho, the talented leader of our party and our nation, recapitulated and heightened the tradition of our party and nation by means of a very concise but very profound sentence: "Solidarity, solidarity, complete solidarity. Success, success, complete success."

Solidarity in this case is not merely solidarity in action but also in all other spheres: thought, cognizance, ideology and will. It was because he was imbued with that tradition that he was a person who was extremely simple and modest. In him was concentrated the intelligence of everyone, and his thoughts became everyone's thoughts. The virtue of Ho Chi Minh spread light throughout the nation and illuminated the soul of Vietnam. He not only fully understood himself but fully understood everyone else; he was just, upright, and full of love.

Our people forged their tradition in the process of founding and defending their nation by means of the saying, "One tree alone amounts to nothing, but three trees clustered together form a high mountain." The Vietnam people are like that and Ho Chi Minh was like that!

I still remember many questions asked by many cadres from the various theaters, such as, "The Agreement has been signed, so why haven't the puppet army and the puppet administration collapsed?" Or else they made such observations as "The Americans have left but the puppets not only haven't collapsed but have become stronger," or, "The Americans have been defeated but at the same time the puppet administration has not only continued to exist but has become stronger politically, militarily and economically."

There was some superficial evidence which, added to the nefarious, obstinate plots and highly subjective plans of the Americans, prevented those comrades from understanding the true nature of the situation.
Immediately after the Paris Agreement took effect the puppets sent troops to take a number of important areas we were occupying, such as Cua Viet (Tri Thien), Sa Huynh (Quang Ngai), Route 4 (My Tho), Route 2 (Ba Ria), the Bay Nui area (Long Xuyen), etc. They not only took many areas we had expanded into prior to 28 January but also took some areas we had controlled for some time. At the same time, they imperiously launched many sweeping and police operations in areas that previously had been contested by us and the enemy. In the areas under their control, they carried out pacification operations and eliminating our enclave guerrilla bases, in order to eliminate our interspersed positions and expand and fill out their areas. On nearly all battlefields they set up additional outposts in the areas they had just taken and further expanded the areas they controlled along the strategic routes and around the large cities. In the provinces of My Tho, Go Cong, Kien Tuong, and Ben Tre, between January and April 1973 they established 287 additional outposts in 129 hamlets of 24 villages. Also during that time, the Americans brought in weapons and war facilities from the Philippines, the United States and Japan, to bolster and develop the puppet army. They provided additional modern weapons for the puppet army, such as M48 tanks, 175mm "king of the battlefield" cannon, F5E aircraft, etc. The puppets employed all measures to conscript soldiers on a large scale. On the average, every month they conscripted 15,000 youths. Therefore, they were able to rapidly supplement their regular army. The rest of the youths—a rather large reserve force—were trained in the recruit training center, all of which were full. The regional forces and civilian defense forces were greatly increased. By forming mobile Regional Force groups to fight locally in place of the regular army units, during the first 6 months of 1973 the number of RF battalions increased from 189 to 337. In the cities, they strongly developed the police forces. Many police field force battalions were formed, especially in Saigon. The U.S.-puppet plan was to continue to develop the puppet army into a 1.1 million-man army that was modernized, younger, and more effective, especially by strengthening the technical combat arms. The air force would be increased to 1,500-1,800 aircraft of various kinds. There would be 31 to 35 armored regiments, etc.

In addition to consolidating and developing the puppet army, they went all-out to consolidate the puppet regime from the central level down to the basic level. They sent pacification cadres to the villages and hamlets and sent army officers to set up village subsectors—the main tools of fascist suppression—in order to gain tighter control over the people by such activities as consolidating the interfamily system, developing the "regiment the masses" program, etc. They developed agents and spies in all hamlets and sent them into the contested areas and our liberated areas: In order to back up the puppet Thieu regime, and be prepared to support its lackey armies in Indochina—mainly in South Vietnam—the United States stationed in Southeast Asia a mobile military force made up of four aircraft carriers, 735 tactical aircraft and 173 B52 strategic bombers.

All of the above were pursued vigorously by the Americans and puppets as soon as the agreement was signed. It may be said that after the agreement was signed they stepped up their attacks and exercised even tighter control over the people, thus creating considerable difficulties for us.
Meanwhile, for our part, because they had been in continuous action since April 1972 our cadres and men were fatigued, we had not had time to make up for our losses, all units were in disarray, there was a lack of manpower, and there were shortages of food and ammunition, so it was very difficult to cope with the enemy's attacks. In some places we had to retreat and allow the enemy to gain control of the land people. In addition, a number of cadres and some localities, in a spirit of implementing the upper echelon's directive to fully implement the Paris Agreement, were afraid to retaliate against the enemy out of fear of violating the agreement, carried out the work of proselyting among the enemy troops to neutralize the puppet troops in a rightist, dangerous manner, concretized in the form of "five forbids": It was forbidden to attack the enemy; it was forbidden to attack enemy troops carrying out sweeping and land-grabbing operations; it was forbidden to surround outposts; it was forbidden to shell puppet outposts; and it was forbidden to build combat villages. They thought that that would stabilize the situation and avoid creating tension, in order to achieve national conciliation and concord. In a number of places forward units were sent to the rear to be reorganized and consolidated. They thought that if such units were not withdrawn to the rear they would be annihilated. In fact, when one of our armed units was pulled back the enemy methodically destroyed the mass infrastructure, wiped out our party infrastructure, and eliminated the "leopard spot" there.

Against such a background, when they witnessed such initial confused events a number of cadres from the central level down to the local level thought that since the agreement we had grown much weaker and the enemy had grown much stronger. The enemy was winning many new victories while we had suffered additional losses. Thus they concluded that the enemy was stronger than we were, that the balance of forces on the battlefield had changed in favor of the enemy, and that the revolution was in danger. Because of such observations, there were a number of incorrect policies and actions. I will return to that subject later.

That conference of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee fully resolved all worries of the cadres and war theaters. It scientifically and correctly analyzed the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, profoundly analyzed the situation, and set forth a wise policy for guiding the revolution in South Vietnam to victory. The party Central Committee reached unanimous agreement on the results of that conference and issued the 21st Resolution of the party Central Committee. But in order to arrive at that unanimity, the Political Bureau conference passed through a rather animated, and at times very tense, discussion. There was a clashing of many different opinions and interpretations regarding the developments on the battlefields. As a participant in the conference, I was deeply impressed by the strong sense of responsibility of all of the comrades participating in the conference, their spirit of straightforwardly reflecting the actual situation on the battlefield, their spirit of struggling strongly for truth, and their spirit of patriotism, solidarity, and objectivity. That was the democratic, centralized working method of our party, the secret of all correct policies and successes.

The matter that was discussed most seethingly from the very beginning was the question of who was stronger, we or the enemy. It is not easy to evaluate
strengths and weaknesses. If one speaks in generalities without getting into specifics, one cannot determine what is strong and what is weak. If one gets into specifics that are not the most universal ones, conclusions about weakness and strength may not be entirely correct, and indeed the opposite may be true. There is also the question of whether a strength or weakness in a certain place or at a certain time is temporary or basic, and the capability of such weaknesses or strengths to change. And it must also be understood what strength is. For example, after the agreement was signed the puppet regular army battalions were rapidly increased to between 400 and 550 men, with ample food and ammunition, while our main-force battalions had not yet been augmented and totaled at most 200 men, with insufficient ammunition and food. After the American and vassal troops withdrew, the puppets' total troop strength was between 700,000 and 1.1 million, while our forces on the battlefield amounted to at most one-third those of the enemy. It would be incorrect to conclude from that that the puppets were strong and we were weak. In addition to those material numbers, it is necessary to add together many other factors, such as the morale of the soldiers, the deployment of units and their missions in campaign and strategic plans, in attacks and defense today and tomorrow, etc. That is not to mention much broader factors, such as the political factor, the combat objectives, the factor of the people. Our just liberation war, as pointed out by many party resolutions, is waged by both military and political forces. We attack the enemy with both political forces and mass political forces. In speaking of strengths and weaknesses one cannot consider only the military aspect, but must consider all aspects, including the political situations of the two sides.

During several decades of war we had to evaluate the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy many times. In 1959, the most difficult period of the revolution in South Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem puppet regime dragged the guillotine everywhere and carried out a bloody fascist suppression. There was only one army—that of Diem—holding sway on the battlefield, like a martial arts performer demonstrating his skills in a ring without an opponent. Even so, Resolution 15 of the party Central Committee created a simultaneous uprising movement with stormlike strength which liberated many large areas and caused the Americans to panic and launch a special war to prevent the Diem clique from collapsing. If, at that time, we had not had a revolutionary, dialectical point of view we could not have realized that we still had latent strength among the people, but would have seen only the specific strength of the enemy. In 1965, the number of people supporting the revolution in the various areas was quite large, especially in the Mekong Delta, but that number could not have been larger than the number of people under enemy control (but don't think that the people under enemy control belonged to the enemy). In our armed forces, the guerrillas were relatively strong but only a small number of main-force regiments had been formed. In the B2 theater at that time there were only two combat-ready regiments. As for the enemy, in addition to regional forces and militia they had a dozen divisions with strong technical equipment and tens of thousands of U.S. advisers, and they were supported by U.S. helicopter units, combat aircraft, and naval ships which participated directly in the fighting. Despite that, we launched the Binh Gia campaign, wiped out many strong battalions of the enemy and armored squadrons, shot down many airplanes, and began a new era in the war. After
the attack on the Bien Hoa airbase, the Binh Gia campaign, and then the victorious battles at Ba Gia and Pleiku, the Americans and puppets clearly realized that the puppet army would be annihilated and the puppet regime would collapse. Thus the Americans had to impetuously send in U.S. troops to save the puppets, put out the fire, and transform the special war into a limited war, in correct accordance with America's "flexible response" global strategy, so that it could play its role of international gendarme.

Prior to the arrival of the U.S. troops, if the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy had been viewed simply in terms of specific, materiel forces, who would have thought that we were strong and were capable of annihilating the puppet army and overthrowing the puppet regime? Later, when the United States sent in at the same time about 200,000 troops who had modern equipment and relied on the strength of overwhelming firepower and rapid mobility, to carry out a strategic counter offensive during the 1965-1966 dry season, we concluded that the Americans and puppets were not strong but were passive, and continued to press the strategic offensive, launched the Bau Bang-Dau Tieng offensive campaign, gained the initiative on the battlefield, and won many victories. In 1968, when the U.S. troops numbered nearly 500,000, with all kinds of modern weapons except the atomic bomb and with the purchasing of the services of lackey vassal troops in addition to Thieu's army, we could clearly see the enemy's weakness and our strength, and exploited that strength to a high degree in carrying out the general offensive and uprising of Tet Mau Than, a unique event in the history of war. During Tet we not only attacked the enemy simultaneously in all urban centers, including the U.S. war headquarters in Saigon, the puppet capital, but also wiped out an important part of the U.S.-puppet manpower. That strategic blow defeated the U.S. limited war strategy and forced the United States to deescalate the war, begin peace talks in Paris, and adopt the strategy of "de-Americanizing the war" and then "Vietnamizing the war." We thus smashed the U.S. imperialists' strategic global "flexible response" strategy. The international gendarme became terrified of the role it had taken for itself; and the illusion of the "absolute military superiority of the United States" was shattered.

However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm. Although it is true that the revolutionary path is never a primrose path that always goes upward, and there can
never be a victory without sacrifice, in the case of Tet 1968, if we had weighed and considered things meticulously, taken into consideration the balance of forces of the two sides, and set forth correct requirements, our victory would have been even greater, less blood would have been spilled by the cadres, enlisted men, and people, and the future development of the revolution would certainly have been far different. In 1972, after a period of endeavoring to overcome many difficulties make up for the recent losses, and develop our position and strength with an absolute revolutionary spirit on the part of the soldiers and people, our troops participated in winning victories in Kampuchea and Laos. However, not all of our main-force units could return to South Vietnam. In that situation, we correctly evaluated the positions and forces of the two sides, destroyed many fortified defense lines of the enemy in Quang Tri, the Central Highlands, and eastern Nam Bo, and created many integrated liberated areas at Dong Ha, Dac To, Tan Canh, Loc Ninh Bu Dop, and northern Tay Ninh then, in coordination with the great "Dien Bien Phu in the air" victory in the North, attained our goal of smashing the American's scheme of negotiating from a position of strength, and forced the Americans to sign in Paris, agreements which benefited us.

Clearly, in each phase of the revolution and of revolutionary war, the correct evaluation of our strength and that of the enemy, correctly realizing the weaknesses of the enemy and ourselves, and correctly evaluating the balance of forces between the two sides are the most basic conditions for the adoption of correct policies to guide the revolution from one victory to another. Our party's leadership of the Vietnamese revolution to complete victory was also based on an evaluation of the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution, not only in our country but in the world, was generally correct, although at times and in places, and in some specific details, mistakes were made. But correctness was dominant and determined victory. In actuality, nothing is completely correct. One should not fear speaking about mistakes, but only fear not realizing or correcting mistakes. But every time the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy it is possible to be rightist and fear the enemy or to be leftist, subjective and faltering in policies and actions. For that reason, evaluations of the situation and of the balance of forces must be based on lines and policies, collective intelligence and on actual developments.

The signing of the Paris Agreement was the clearest manifestation of the balance of forces on the battlefield at that time. The Americans and puppets also carefully evaluated the balance of forces between the two sides after having contended with us in South Vietnam to avoid losing additional land, and carried out the barbarous, evil scheme of using B52's to bomb Hanoi and Hai Phong, and blockading the North. Only after evaluating their capability and will and those of their adversary were they willing to pick up a pen and sign the agreement, and agree to a number of conditions which did not benefit them. We also carefully weighed the strength of the enemy, their schemes, and the possibility of concluding agreements with many points that benefited us. Thus the Paris Agreement was signed on the basis of the enemy and ourselves weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each other and the balance of forces in the world. By signing the Paris Agreement the Americans were willing to accept a partial defeat, but that was all. We had won a victory, but
not yet a complete victory. But that defeat for the United States and victory for us proved that the revolution was stronger than counterrevolution. So how could we be weak and the enemy strong?

The most important provisions of the agreements, one which affected the war as a whole, were that all U.S. and vassal troops had to withdraw from South Vietnam and that the United States had to end its war of destruction in the north of our country. The interesting thing about those provisions was that they seemed to fit in with the Vietnamization strategy and with the Nixon Doctrine of "regional alliances and self-defense," so that the United States would not have to flee even though it had been defeated. It was interesting in that it helped the United States withdraw its troops to America, satisfy the demands of the American people, and extricate itself from a dilemma: it was no longer being able to maintain a U.S. army abroad but was being increasingly defeated to the point of complete defeat. That withdrawal from South Vietnam as stipulated by the agreement, i.e., with the agreement of the two sides, helped the United States to avoid losing face. As for us, those provisions were extremely important for the development of the revolution in our country and in Indochina. Prior to the agreement we had to fight both the puppet troops and hundreds of thousands of U.S. and vassal troops strongly supported by U.S. naval and air forces, including B52 strategic bombers. Once the agreements took effect and the U.S. and vassal troops withdrew from the battlefield, the puppet troops could no longer rely on the U.S. troops and no longer were strongly supported by U.S. air and naval forces. The puppet's firepower was much weaker than that of the Americans. Although the puppet troops were increased in number and were provided additional facilities and weapons--some of which were more modern than those they had in the past--by their U.S. masters, in order to develop the effectiveness of the new combat arms and new forces, a period of training and tempering was required. However, meeting the technical requirements of the puppet army and of modernization was not an easy matter and could not be achieved in just a few years. That is not to mention the morale status of the puppet troops, who were perplexed by the reaction of the popular masses after the Paris Agreement was signed. In actuality, on the battlefield--according to the reports from all units and localities--after the agreements took effect the firepower of the puppet artillery and air force decreased appreciably and was increasingly tending to decline even more. The puppet artillery and air support given the infantry was very poor, for their firing was inaccurate and the number of shells was limited. The puppet troops, who were accustomed to relying on the U.S. troops, now had to fight alone without the effective aid and support of the United States, so their morale clearly declined. Thus after the agreements the balance of forces on the battlefield changed in an important way in our favor. The fighting strength of the puppet troops declined clearly and our position and strength developed strongly. Even so, there was no basis for thinking that after the Americans withdrew the puppets got stronger, and were stronger than we were, which was no different from imagining a ghost in order to scare oneself.

The agreement stipulated the ending of all U.S. military activities against the territory of the DRV by all forces, on the land, in the air, and at sea, no matter what their point of origin. Thus the socialist North would have
very good conditions to develop the great effectiveness of the base area of
the entire conditions, and would have good conditions for fulfilling as well
as possible its role of being the great rear area of the revolution in South
Vietnam. If we had good position and strength in the South and throughout the
nation it was certain that we would victoriously fulfill our glorious revolu-
tionary enterprise, although we would have to overcome many difficulties.
But we also had to realize our remaining weaknesses and not be subjective,
so that we could endeavor to overcome them. Our armed forces were in dis-
array and had to be urgently supplemented and consolidated. Our local troops
and guerrillas were still too few and there were still many deficiencies in
our proselyting work among the enemy. But we would overcome those weaknesses
from a position of victory and strength and with a spirit of enthusiasm and
self-confidence.

Due to a lack of such understanding, there was worry that our forces exposed
to the enemy would be annihilated and that our free areas would be lost, so
a number of mistaken viewpoints were rectified by the conference of the Poli-
tical Bureau and its 21st Resolution. Otherwise, countless calamities would
have resulted. One of those viewpoints was that we should urgently stabilize
the situation by abandoning the contested areas and take the initiative in
forming two areas: our area and the enemy's area. One was that we should
readjust and reorganize our forces and withdraw our forces from enemy areas
to our areas so that they could be consolidated and reorganized. One was
that we should carry out those tasks as soon as possible. Another was that
we must have clearly defined areas in order to have appropriate struggle
slogans, and could not waver.

Clearly, the puppet regime of Nguyen Van Thieu desired that very much. They
were very afraid of the interspersed, "leopard spot" configuration on the battle-
field. Our forces were everywhere, even in their urban areas and in their
capital. They were able to evaluate the operational and combat effectiveness
of each of our party members, commandos, and guerrillas. They were also able
to evaluate one of our small armed units in an area under their control and
in enclave guerrilla areas. Each such person and each such unit was a gun-
barrel pointed at the enemy's temple, a source of support for the people's
morale, and a pillar of the local secret mass organizations. Each of their
actions was a source of propaganda which bolstered patriotism and the revolu-
tion and opposed suppression, oppression, and injustice. Their actions spoke
louder than their words. Their image was that of a light in darkness, a
light which although small at first was spreading over an increasingly larger
area and could never be extinguished. Each party member and soldier, and each
small unit, in turn, had a source of support in our larger units--platoons,
companies, battalions, or larger units--scattered all over the various areas,
in temporarily occupied areas, the contested areas, and the areas contiguous to
our free areas. That was a system from which we could not lose a single link.
It was an all-encompassing strategy of revolutionary war which caused the
enemy troops to suffocate, to worry apprehensively day and night, and think
that all places had to be defended and they could be safe only with large
forces. Had not the Americans calculated that to cope with one of our men
they had to have 5, and then 10 to 20 men?
Despite that, should we voluntarily withdraw our forces from the areas controlled by the enemy and the contested areas to the rear in order to consolidate them, and ourselves erase the very effective "comb's teeth" position of the revolution, which terrified the enemy? By doing so would we not give the enemy a hand so that they could do other, more important things, which they had been unable to do after many years of fierce attacks and pacification? If it was argued that that was a temporary measure for a certain time, while we consolidated our forces, so that after we had regained our strength we could return and operate more effectively, that was due to the imagination of impractical people. In fact when, in the B2 theater, we withdrew or abandoned a certain base, even on our own accord, within a few days the enemy would occupy that area, gain control of the people, launch sweeping operations, and set up outposts. When we wanted to send forces back to open up an area or an enclave, and organize our masses, we practically had to start from the beginning. It was even more difficult than work in areas in which we had never had a base, and much blood had to be shed by our comrades and compatriots. The comrades who operated behind enemy lines and in contested areas have much experience in that regard. Each comrade and each unit remaining in a base and creating the core of a political or guerrilla base was extremely valuable in a life-and-death struggle such as that between ourselves and the enemy. Every loss of an infrastructure or a base nucleus was a source of worry and pain which we had to find all ways to overcome.

Here I would like to mention the example of unparalleled heroism on the part of the cadres and men of the 320th Regiment who, in 1969-1970, were assigned the mission of operating in Long An Province, in the Duc Hue, Ben Luc, Can Duc, Can Giuoc, Tan Tru, Chau Thanh, and Tan An areas. During that period, none of us could forget that after Tet Mau Than [1968] the Americans sent additional troops to Vietnam, stepped up shipments of all kinds of weapons and ammunition, attained their highest troop level during the war, and insanely counterattacked us. The Americans and puppets continuously attacked, and carried out very fierce sweeping and pacification operations. In many places our people were massacred and herded into strategic hamlets. Many infrastructures were lost and many comrades were lost, especially in the areas adjacent to cities and the highly populated areas which were important strategically. Long An was such an area. It surrounded Saigon from the northwest to the southwest and was a highly populated, fertile area, was the gateway to the Mekong Delta, connected the delta with Saigon, and connected our Dong Thap Muoi area with the northern Tay Ninh revolutionary base. Long An was also a province with a long revolutionary tradition of fighting the French and the Americans. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam bestowed on its people, who were very patriotic and resolute, the golden words "Loyal and resolute, all the people fight the enemy." For those reasons the Americans and puppets concentrated their attacks there and at times made Long An a pacification test point. But they still suffered a bitter defeat.

In addition to all kinds of puppet forces, the Americans used part of the 25th "Tropical Lightning" Division and the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division. I remember that the Long An cadres said to me, "It's true that the enemy is climbing down the ladder of [deescalating] the war, but they have placed the feet of the ladder in Long An Province!" Long An was the last rung, so the
more they deescalated the more troops they sent there and the more fiercely they attacked and bombed! It was truly a strange metaphor—everyone laughed when they first heard it—but it described well the developments at that time. We definitely would not allow the enemy to succeed there, for that would considerably influence the common movement. The Regional Command held many discussions, weighed all factors, and decided to strengthen our forces in Long An. It sent the 320th Regiment, along with the local forces, to fight the enemy, maintain the movement, and maintain our infrastructure and guerrilla bases. The 320th Regiment was a unit with many accomplishments which had undergone much testing in combat and in bearing terrible hardships. It had been an independent main-force regiment which had long operated as a whole unit in a mountains-and-jungle environment, but now it was sent to a highly populated lowland area with open terrain that was intersected by many rivers and canals, and had to fight flexibly, by individual companies and battalions, and often had to disperse into platoons and squads. It not only had to fight to annihilate the enemy but also had to proselytize and organize the masses, proselytize enemy troops, eliminate spies, kill tyrants, and guide and coordinate with the guerrillas and district troops. Sending a concentrated main-force unit to operate in such a dispersed manner, so that it could be said to be no longer a main-force unit, was a reluctant necessity under those circumstances and at that time.

In a war in which our varied operational forms are many and varied and the situation on the battlefield changes every day, such decisions are not unusual. At a time when the guerrillas and local troops in that area had been worn down and had not yet been consolidated, but we had to maintain the movement, that was a correct decision. But there are also instances in which it would be incorrect to use main-force troops in lowland areas, or think that in main-force units it would be possible to open up the lowlands. That is not the case (I will have more to say on that subject later).

On 18 December 1968, on behalf of the Regional Military Party Committee and the Regional Command, I went to a location in Tay Ninh Province to work and assign missions to the regiment in its assembly area, in order to prepare in all ways for the new task. I walked for about 10 days; with a pack on my back, using a rattan walking stick, with my pants rolled up above my knees, and wearing well-worn rubber sandals. I and a heavily armed bodyguard squad made our way along twisting jungle paths and open areas flooded with stagnant water. In the wild tropical jungles there were all kinds of big trees intertwined with vines that had become tattered and denuded, and trees that had lost their tops and leaves because of bombs, shells and chemical poisons. It was a pitiful sight. Comrade Hung, my loyal bodyguard, who was small but wiry and was from Be Cat, which also has many jungles, lay in a hammock near mine in a clump of trees that had not yet been defoliated. After a hard day's journey, he was quietly swaying his hammock. I asked, "Hung, why don't you get some sleep so you'll be fresh when we set out early tomorrow morning? We still have a long way to go." Hung replied, "Oh! I saw you laying there quietly so I thought you were asleep! I'm so sad that our jungles have been so devastated. It takes decades for a tree to grow so big." Hung pointed to a large tree near us that had been uprooted by a bomb and continued, "My home area has also been devastated." To console both Hung and myself I said,
"After we kill all of the enemy troops our country will be much better. Our people are able and creative, so why worry? Our jungles will again be green."

In the regiment's bivouac area the jungle was a little better. There were temporary huts made of small branches and roofed with "trung quan" leaves (leaves as large as a man's hand which do not burn even when dry and grew all over the jungles of South Vietnam). Each hut was big enough for a squad. My squad and I were also assigned a hut. Representatives of the Long An Party Committee and provincial unit had arrived on the previous day to participate in a work session and discuss a coordination plan with the regimental staff. I met comrade Nguyen Duc Khoi, the regimental commander; Le Van Minh, the political officer; and Hong Hai and Trinh Ngoc Cham, the deputy regimental commanders. Those beloved, brave cadres would gloriously sacrifice their lives in battle in 1969 and 1970. I also met many other outstanding cadres in the regimental command, the regiment's staff, political, and rear services organs, and the battalion commands. Some of them became martyrs and others matured, gained experience, and added to the glorious tradition of the regiment, or were assigned elsewhere.

The meeting took place an hour after I arrived, just as soon as the cadres could be convened. We needed no assembly hall and there were no desks and chairs—the men sat on mounds of earth and logs in a cleared area in the jungle under a canopy of green leaves. We worked only during the day. At night, under the light of the stars and the moon, I visited the huts and talked with the cadres and men about their home areas, their families, the war situation in South Vietnam, Hanoi and even the situation in the United States and the world. We talked about all sorts of things, serious subjects, frivolous subjects, and even private thoughts and problems. Every night I visited the huts and returned to my hut late at night to go to sleep. Even so, I didn't have enough time to visit all of the huts.

Standing before a map of eastern Nam Bo—including Long An and Go Cong Provinces and part of Dong Thap Muoi—hanging from a tree trunk, and holding a bamboo stick I had just taken from a nearby cluster of bamboo, I solemnly and directly assigned missions to the regiment. Then I discussed the terrain and our situation and that of the enemy in the places in which the enemy would operate. None of the regimental cadres knew anything about the area. Because I had served since the anti-French resistance war and had waded and walked over the entire area, I was the only one who knew about the people and terrain there and gave the men an initial briefing. I gave them specific instructions about the operational missions, guidelines, and modes, the tactical forms the enemy had used and would use in each area of the province, and the tactics and techniques we needed to apply to win victory. I spoke about the mass proselyting methods, the task of organizing guerrillas and assisting the local troops, and the task of combining the regiment's unit with the local village and district units and the regiment with the provincial unit. Finally, I instructed them about the party work and the political work, and about the spiritual and material lives of the cadres and men in all forms of activity: in large units, in small units, and in individual, scattered teams.
After that briefing the men had 2 days in which to discuss all aspects. I cleared up their remaining questions.

I could never forget those days of urgent and serious work and the sincere, overflowing sentiment in the 320th Regiment. Its men, both the cadres and enlisted men, accepted their mission enthusiastically, discussed it excitedly, and tried to envision the coming battles and the hardships awaiting them.

Not enough can be said about the extremely difficult period during which the cadres and men of the regiment shared hardships with the local cadres and with the guerrillas and people, holding their ground despite bombing and shelling that were so fierce that their only fortifications were the roots of coconut trees. Who wouldn't remember their strange lives: every day living in the mud and stagnant water, firing at helicopters and airplanes, resisting the sweeping operations and "hit and run" operations of the 3d Brigade of the U.S. 9th Division, and every night discussing with the people plans to attack the enemy or buying food and ammunition from strategic hamlets. How could one forget the tense, worrisome night crossings of the Vam Co River? It took a company 5 to 7 days to cross from one district to another, then it had to cross Route 4, along which the enemy had placed outposts, barbed wire, minefields, etc. In addition, for month after month we had to carry our wounded to the rear and bring up weapons, ammunition and recruits via a route nearly 100 kilometers long in the interspersed area, with the slogans "Persistence, stalwartness, and taking the offensive," and "living and fighting here, and also dying here, for the success of the revolution." (Today, before Tet the people in the Can Duoc, Tan Tru, Duc Hue and Chau Thanh areas tidy up the graves of the unknown soldiers of the 320th Regiment in remembrance of them!) The regiment and the localities were able to maintain the revolutionary infrastructures and bases of the districts, villages, and guerrilla enclaves during the most difficult period. During the spring of 1975 the regiment, then part of the 8th Division of Military Region 8, along with the other forces participated in the annihilation of each battalion and regiment of the puppet 7th Division, in coordination with the uprising of the people, in order to liberate the Tien Giang area. With its example of glorious combat, the regiment, along with the other units and localities all over the battlefield, provided the B2 theater with valuable experience. Because of such models on the battlefield, the comrades in COSVN and the Regional Party military Commission would not agree to withdraw their forces to the rear, but gave the order to consolidate and reorganize on the spot and maintain the interspersed position in the three areas, and positively reported that opinion to the Central Committee.

There was also the question of two areas or three areas. Throughout the life-or-death struggle between ourselves and the enemy, a fierce, tense struggle

"Hit and run" was a local term describing a widespread tactic of the U.S. troops in Long An at that time. That tactic was carrying out a surprise attack by landing small units from a few helicopters which flew low and slow. The troops would fire indiscriminately and fiercely into a few suspected positions of our troops, bases of local cadres or places where people were concentrated. Then they would quickly jump aboard the helicopters and make a quick getaway.
took place in all parts of the theater, and on that basis there took form three areas. One was the area in which we were strong, our large units stood fast, and the people participated in all activities and in attacking the enemy by all means, political, military proselyting, and military. Another was the area in which the enemy was strong, exercised military and political control, and heavily suppressed and exploited. In that area, we secretly organized the masses and had guerrillas, commandos, and sappers. We had political cells in which the people secretly had the cadres and helped the revolution by deceiving the enemy in many ways and operating openly and legally. There were guerrilla bases in which weapons and food were cached; there were guerrillas, and sometimes local troops and spearhead main-force units which operated in place. Of course, there were party chapters to provide on-the-spot leadership, the central factor of the movement. Between our area and that of the enemy there was a so-called contested area, which was large or small depending on the location. That was an area in which the two sides were equally strong and were fiercely competing with each other; it was constantly undergoing upheaval and change, at times every day and every hour. In that area most of the popular masses supported the revolution and there were all kinds of revolutionary forces and organizations. District and provincial local troops often operated there, and at times a main-force unit of the military zone or of the upper echelon came into the area to fight the enemy and support the local forces. The enemy often launched sweeping operations, shelled and bombed, and herded the people into areas under their control. It may be said that the struggle there, waged by all means at the disposal of both sides, took place every hour, night and day. Some places were controlled by the enemy during the day and by us at night. Each side tried to push out the other so that it could gain full control. Therefore, the contested area changed continually, like a strip of sand buffeted by winds from two directions. If the wind blew more strongly from one direction the sand would pile up on the other side and spill over on that side, and vice versa. As long as there were two sides—revolution and counterrevolution—and they continued to struggle to control the land and people there would be a contested area. It would disappear only when there was no longer a struggle between the two sides, i.e. when one side yielded and the other side won complete victory. The Paris Agreement did not end the struggle between revolution and counterrevolution and could not immediately end the armed struggle, for the enemy committed violations and grabbed land as described above, hoping to achieve the result of there being only one regime—the puppet regime—and one army—the puppet army. Thus the viewpoint that we should form only two clear areas—the enemy area and our area—in order to have struggle guidelines appropriate to each other in order to immediately stabilize the situation, and so that we could consolidate and rebuild our weakened armed forces and build up economy and governmental administration was completely inappropriate. I still remember that in the meeting held by the comrades in COSVN to prepare for the Political Bureau conference they agreed unanimously that on the basis of the actual situation in the B2 theater it was necessary, under all circumstances and at all times, to keep up the struggle in all three areas. Only if we gave up the struggle would we lose the contested area. In fact, if we did so, the area under our control would gradually become a contested area and then would become an area controlled by the enemy, so that eventually there would not be both our area and a contested area but only an area under enemy control.
According to an analysis by those comrades, there could never be a stable situation on the battlefield because neither we nor the enemy would give up the struggle; even if there was no longer armed struggle there would be political and economic struggle.

During the plenary meeting of the Political Bureau comrade Tran Huu Duc, who had been sent to the Tri Thien [Quang Tri-Thua Thien] theater to study the actual situation, returned to report to the conference that Tri Thien had completed a territorial realignment: the enemy's area extended from the railroad to the sea and our area extended from the railroad to the Laotian border. Our units had been withdrawn to our area so that they could be strengthened. The situation had stabilized and our men were enthusiastic, etc.

We expressed our viewpoint that to do so was dangerous. Such stability would be only temporary. After the enemy had time to reorganize they would attack west of the railroad and if we resisted the contested area would reappear. But this time the contested area would be entirely west of the railroad. Without meaning to we would voluntarily turn over additional land to the enemy and help them destroy our interspersed position, eliminate the "leopard spot" configuration, and fill out their area, an area with fertile land, good roads and a large population which included nearly all of the towns and cities. Anyone could see what the prospects for the future were. As far as the enemy was concerned, such a territorial realignment was ideal. The puppet Thieu regime and the U.S. strategic research companies had researched three territorial realignment modes to serve as a basis for the struggle at the conference table in Paris.

1. A territorial realignment by dividing South Vietnam along a parallel. The area north of that parallel would belong to the Viet Cong (the PRG of the RSVN) and the area south of that parallel would belong to the puppet Thieu regime.

2. A division along the length of South Vietnam. The mountainous area along the Laotian and Kampuchean borders, which had few people, was poor economically, and had poor roads, would be the "Viet Cong" area and the area along the sea, which had a large population and was advantageous in all regards, would be the area of the puppet Thieu regime.

3. An in-place ceasefire, with forces remaining where they were and interspersed zones of control would be formed.

Of those three modes, the puppets were most afraid of the third, with its interspersed "leopard spot" areas of control, for they felt there could be no ceasefire with such an arrangement and that it was quite possible that the people would arise to oppose and annihilate them. If their area were not an integrated whole it would be very difficult for them to develop their economy, effectively control the people, etc. They preferred the vertical division according to the second mode, for such a division would be entirely beneficial to them. They thought that before long, with U.S. aid they would become rich and strong, control large numbers of people, and eventually annihilate the PRG of the RSVN and gain sole control of South Vietnam.
We struggled at the conference table, but only by shedding much blood on the battlefield were we able to force the enemy to reluctantly accept an in-place ceasefire. So would we now voluntarily bring about a vertical division?

Resolution 21 stated clearly that "At present the position and strength of the revolution in South Vietnam are stronger than at any time since 1954" and that "The new victory of the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea has led to a change in the comparison of forces in the Indochinese Peninsula that is more favorable than ever for the South Vietnamese revolution."

The actual development of the situation proved increasingly that those observations were very correct. The revolutionary forces had become much stronger than the counterrevolutionary forces in South Vietnam.

Later, at the plenary conference of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee held in December 1974 to discuss the 1975-1976 strategic plan, i.e. nearly 2 years after the true situation became clear, Le Duc Tho stated that since the Paris Agreement we had, in general, evaluated the enemy too highly and ourselves too lowly. The actual situation on the battlefield had clearly shown that Zone 5 was afraid that if it attacked, the enemy would attack from the rear, but when the upper echelon ordered it to attack it was victorious. Tri Thien also feared the enemy. In the Mekong Delta, in December alone we eliminated more than 500 illegally placed enemy outposts. In only 1 month we attained 70 percent of the 6-months dry season norm. Now, the actual situation was clearly that we were stronger than the enemy.

Resolution 21 also confirmed that "The path of the revolution in the South is the path of revolutionary violence. Under all circumstances we must take advantage of the opportunity, maintain the line of strategic offensive, and provide flexible guidance in order to advance the revolution in the South." The resolution set forth the strategic guidelines and modes for each area: "The liberated area...must build and consolidate," "the contested area...must maintain our position and strength and gradually improve them..." and "the area controlled by the enemy...must lead the masses in struggle."

The determination of that strategy and the assignment of those missions weakened (although not entirely ending) the belief that the Americans and puppets could observe the agreement, and that there could be peace and stability. It also lessened fears that the enemy was strong. During that Political Bureau meeting it was also decided that we must resolutely retaliate against the enemy for having violated the agreement. Resolution 21 stated that "At present the active, positive direction most beneficial to the revolutionary cause of the entire nation is always holding high the flag of peace and justice, and struggling politically, militarily, and diplomatically to force the enemy to carry out the Paris Agreement, in order to defeat the enemy." Clearly, our party affirmed at the very beginning that the Paris Agreement was a victory for us, and that we had to struggle to force the enemy to strictly implement them and that our cause was just and we were certain to be victorious. We signed the agreement and honored our signature. We would also force them to honor their signature. We would not allow the Americans and puppets to sabotage the agreement. In order to maintain the accomplishments of the revolution,
we had to punish the enemy for violating the agreement by its land-grabbing
and pacification activities. We would not retaliate passively in places
where the enemy thought it advantageous to violate the agreement and attack
us. We had to take the initiative by retaliating against them very pain-
fully and attack the places from which their attacks originated and in
places disadvantageous to them. In that spirit, in September 1973 we made
an open declaration over our radio station to warn the enemy and so that
the world could clearly understand our legitimate actions.

We hoped that after that warning the Americans and puppets would awaken so
that we would not have to act and actually open fire. There were still con-
ditions for carrying out the agreement; the door was still open at Paris and
Tan Son Nhat. But Thieu may have thought that he was truly strong and that
his U.S. master was still a solid source of support. Therefore, Thieu in-
creasingly stepped up the fighting, despite the agreement and despite our
warning, and hoped to rule forever in South Vietnam. The United States, for
its part, thought that once it withdrew its troops it could still, by means
of its Vietnamization strategy, remain permanently in South Vietnam.

Let us listen to a story told by an American, Weldon A. Brown, in his book
"The Last Helicopter":

"Thieu continued to think that with U.S. aid and with the secret commitments
made by Nixon, he had nothing to worry about. The commitments were still valid
and he had been strengthened because the United States had provided him addi-
tional jet combat aircraft and very modern weapons, so much so that in 1975,
when the U.S. Congress forbade the continuation of combat aid, Thieu still
felt secure because of the commitments made by Nixon. The aid program and
our promises caused Thieu to have a false sense of security, as a result of
which Thieu turned down all efforts toward reconciliation or negotiations
with the opposition and ignored the Paris Agreement. During the first year
after the signing of the agreement, Thieu carried out small attacks and
pushed the communists from a number of areas in the Mekong Delta and along
the coast, set up outposts there, and resettled refugees in the newly occupied
areas, and even had his troops raid Kampuchea."

"Thieu did not want the political process to succeed and weaken his regime, no
matter in what form." Anthony Lewis wrote the following:

"Thieu prevented people from traveling from one area to another, and changed
political prisoners into common criminals so that he could continue to detain
them, and forbade all political parties except his own to operate. Thieu not
only refused to observe the provisions of the Paris Agreement but regarded
propaganda in favor of those agreements in South Vietnam to be a crime. When
the ceasefire was about to take effect Thieu launched harassing operations.
Thieu needed our tacit support for those acts, which violated the agreement,
and it appears that he got his wish. Just before the ceasefire took effect
Washington quickly shipped Thieu weapons valued at $1 billion. According to
one source, at the beginning of February 1975 Thieu told an American reporter
that since the Paris Agreement was signed the United States had never pres-
sured him to make political concessions to the communists, that is to observe