1. This thirteenth distribution of Current Civil Affairs Trends, contains material gleaned from official publications, news media, addresses, personal letters, and other information sources. It does not necessarily reflect approved Department of the Army doctrine. It is designed to keep Civil Affairs officers informed of developments pertaining to their field of military activity. Included in this issue are:

a. A study on Civic Action in Laos, 1957-59 by Brigadier General Oudone Sananikone, Royal Lao Army. This article was written while the author was a student at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1962-63. General Sananikone's career has been of real interest to American officers in Southeast Asia because he had demonstrated an outstanding and energetic temperament and a perceptive mentality. General Sananikone has been Secretary of State for the Ministries of Public Health and Public Welfare. Prior to assuming the ministerial posts he served as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 of the Royal Lao Army. He was the Commissioner of Civic Action during the period upon which he reports.

b. The text of the graduation address to a recent Civil Affairs Career Course by Colonel Wendell W. Perham, USA Ret. Col Perham served in key Military Government and Civil Affairs positions from the cessation of World War II hostilities until his retirement in 1958. Included were assignments to the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs at Department of the Army; duty at the 1954 Hague Convention and service as Commanding Officer of the 95th Civil Affairs Group. He also had served two terms as Mayor of Iola, Kansas prior to entry on active duty in 1940.
SUBJECT: Current Civil Affairs Trends

10 September 1963

C. A reprint of a talk by the Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, to the Conference of American Armies in Panama in July 1963. The Secretary re-enforces the Army's place in Civic Action as he discusses the Role of American National Armies as fighters, doctors, readers, explorers, engineers and statesmen.

d. A series of quotes from prominent persons on the important contribution rendered by Armies in Civic Action:

e. A copy of a letter to Lt Colonel Marion B. Noland, Director of Instruction at the Civil Affairs School from Major General Kyong Wan Pak, ROK Army, giving a progress report on activities which Colonel Noland instituted while stationed in the Land of the Morning Calm.

f. Several clippings from newspapers showing some of the activities which have been going on at the Civil Affairs School.

2. Comments and contributions of material are invited, and should be addressed to the School, ATTN: Secretary.

W. R. SWARM
Colonel, Artillery
Commandant

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"
CIVIC ACTION IN LAOS: 1957-1959

by

Oudone Sananikone*

Civic Action is a very popular topic of discussion today, particularly in connection with underdeveloped countries and those faced with a threat of Communist insurgency.

What constitutes Civic Action? How does one go about establishing a Civic Action program and what are the special problems that one must cope with? Answers to these questions are not easy to come by. They will vary greatly from nation to nation and will be largely dependent upon the existing political, economic, and social structure. However, this paper is designed to give a few of the problems and solutions that were reached in Laos during the period 1957-1959. There is one point that should be made clear before going into detail on our particular program.

While the primary motivating factor in getting a Civic Action program is, in many cases, the threat of Communism, we cannot overlook the fact that such a program is a necessity regardless of the Red threat, the only difference being the urgency of the matter.

It is interesting to note that while Civic Action is widespread in
Asia it is not necessarily known as Civic Action but rather a variety of
other titles--Community Development--Village Self Help, Aid, etc.

It might be of value, before going further into a Civic Action program
discussed, both has an enormous impact development activity in Laos
that was developed and executed during the period in Laos, to take a brief
look at the special conditions and peculiarities that existed in Laos at that
time. Laos, a land locked nation of some 90,000 square miles, is com-
posed of rugged, forested mountains and plateaus between 500 and 4,000
feet. The Mekong River Valley forms the main artery of life throughout
the country and the majority of the estimated 3 million Lao live along
this great river valley. The area is characterized by poor communi-
cation facilities, and movement, except up and down the Mekong, is ex-
tremely difficult and tedious. Village life is predominant; farming is
the principal economic endeavor.

Politically the country is divided into 12 provinces which are sub-
divided into Muongs or districts, Tassengs or sub-districts and Bans or
villages. During the period 1957-1959, the political power revolved
around the Lao Houam Lao Party, supporters of the national government,
and the Neo Lao Hek Xat, which was the front organization for the Commu-
nist party, and their military arm, the Pathet Lao. Both the Royal Lao
Government and the Communists were making a major effort during this
period to broaden their base among the rural population and the principal tools for both were Civic Action and propaganda. The Pathet Lao had rather an extensive organization at that time throughout Laos, but it was strongest in the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Both provinces had been under Pathet Lao domination for several years following the end of the Indochina war in 1954. In other provinces their political party—Neo Lao Hak Xat—had varying degrees of popular support and was able to pose a threat to the Royal Lao Government.

CIVIC ACTION OBJECTIVES:

The Royal Lao Government, through its Civic Action effort, hoped to achieve three major objectives, first to strengthen the local political apparatus through training political cadres and indoctrinating the people with an awareness of the Lao nation and its broad national plans. The second, and possibly the one that might have the most far-reaching effects, was to generate a spirit of "self-help" in the villages which, in turn, would result in an over-all improvement in living standards. The third and motivating objective was a major "anti-Communist" effort. The vehicle for Civic Action was the mobile training team.

Naturally, the objectives of the mobile training teams were more specific in nature. One was to show the flag and thus counter one of the

5
major Pathet Lao propaganda themes, which revolved around the idea that the Royal Lao Government was not interested in the rural areas and that its officials and influence never touched the lives of the villagers. Learning the problems of the villages and of the rural population assisted in filling one of the major voids in the Government's knowledge. Prior to this time, adequate channels of communication did not exist between the government and the rural areas which comprised the larger part of the nation. The key long-range objective which would play a major part in the eradication of Communist influence and the development of the nation was to train local village leaders. As will be pointed out later, key village leaders were not necessarily the real leaders of the community. The first aim was to explain the Government's objectives and policies to the people. This was vitally necessary if the Pathet Lao propaganda campaign was to be countered. Finally, the area in which the most lasting results could be achieved was that of assisting the people in agriculture, health, sanitation, irrigation, transportation, local engineering projects, and any other local projects that met a need felt by the people. The key to this action was the ability of the team leader to convince the people that the project of improvement was going to be of value to them and to obtain their support. Otherwise, there would be no lasting value from the efforts
of either the teams or the villagers; the whole Civic Action program might well be wasted and only serve to bolster Communist propaganda.

ORGANIZATION OF CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM:

The organization of the Royal Lao Civic Action Program began at the national level with a NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF CIVIC ACTION composed of the Directors of the various ministries that had an interest in or contributed to Civic Action. The president of the committee was the Prime Minister, but the actual operator was the Commissioner General of Civic Action. The committee was primarily one of information and coordination. The team leader could make and implement policy decisions in most areas. For example, the Commissioner General established priorities in men, money and material and selected the geographic locations of the various teams. On the provincial level the same committee for Civic Action existed and it, too, had the primary mission of coordination. The team leader could make and implement decisions in the field. This was necessary for two reasons: the difficulty of communications and the diverse and varied situations existing in the country.

TEAM RECRUITMENT:

It is well known that most underdeveloped areas are critically short
of trained leaders, and Laos was no exception. This problem was solved by a nation-wide recruiting program which, in effect, was centered primarily on the Civil Servants. Aside from a few teachers, most of the people supervising the program had to come from governmental agencies. Of course, this, in effect, reduced efficiency in other areas because of the loss of their best trained personnel and, even worse, those people who had exhibited the most necessary ingredient--leadership talent. Such a program was bound to meet opposition by the various department heads, but sufficient pressure was behind it to overcome the bottleneck, and the "cream" of the young civil servants was made available to the Civic Action Program. The Commissioner General was given full authority to select the people that he needed and he hand-picked most of them. In addition to the professional qualifications, an ability to communicate was desired. (This was of extreme importance, as in many cases the whole program in a given area would depend on the team leader or member being able to convince the local population against Pathet Lao propagandists who are among the cleverest and most capable in the nation.) Another important prerequisite was that volunteers possess good personal habits and not have any impediments in either speech or looks that would be a handicap in dealing with the local people.

A formal education was not considered necessary, but most of those
selected had a college background and all had the equivalent of high school training. A minimum age of 25 years was required for volunteers. Another important qualification was previous training or experience in one of several technical specialties, such as public administration, health, engineering, or agriculture. Volunteers needed not only to be trained in a technical specialty but also to be in excellent health and good physical condition. They would be operating in remote areas away from medical help and the ability to translate knowledge into practical experience and to pass this experience on to the local villager. In fact, practical experience and a demonstrated ability to teach others had the first priority. Finally, the applicants had to be in excellent health and good physical condition. They would be operating in remote areas away from medical help and the ability to traverse rugged terrain would be a great necessity for the Civic Action Teams.

In the fall of 1957, 14 teams of 10 men each were selected.

TRAINING:

After selection a two-phase training program was instituted. The first phase consisted of six weeks, for a total of about 400 hours of formal instruction. Classes were held six days a week and included evening sessions. The following broad curriculum was covered.

History of Laos

Political Dynamics of Laos

Detailed Examination of the Lao Constitution
The instruction was given by officials of the National Government and other experts available in the nation. Phase Two consisted of one additional week and it was during this period that the ten-man teams were prepared for action in five main areas:

1. Public Health and Sanitation
   - Improve and maintain existing health and sanitation
2. Education
   - Develop educational programs
3. Public Works
   - Build and maintain infrastructure
4. Agriculture
   - Promote agricultural development
5. Public Relations (team leaders in most cases)
Two experts from each field were incorporated into each team. One of the major problems in assigning the specialists was that of making sure that at least one or more members of the team was from the area to which the team was assigned. The reasons for this are quite obvious and need not be elaborated on further. The Team Leaders were selected primarily by the Commissioner General upon recommendation of the other committee members and government agencies. The team members were given 60 hours of formal instruction in their area of specialization with primary emphasis devoted to solving practical problems soon to be faced in the field. There was also some instruction given by the Royal Lao Army in which the Army's role and the assistance that the teams' members could expect from local Army officials was covered in detail. From the beginning the Civic Action teams were dependent on Army communication facilities. As quickly as team assignments were finalized they were informed of the support available from Army units. The Royal Lao Army's role in Civic Action will be covered a little later. The Army was by far the largest and most cohesive national organization within the country and it played a major role in the Civic Action effort at a later date.

After the completion of the second phase, the team leaders were sent to Saigon, Vietnam, to attend a special two-week leaders' course given by the Government of South Vietnam (Civic Action Training Course). The other nine members of the team went to their assigned area of operation and used this period to organize the first phase of the actual operation.
It might be useful here to outline some of the administrative details of the program. The Royal Lao Civic Action organization was not established as a permanent government agency. Volunteers were recruited for one year, then were expected to return to their former positions. In order to attract suitable people, the pay was excellent. Team members were given the status of Royal Lao Army officers and provided with uniforms. They were not allowed to bring their families with them on their assignment, nor were any special family benefits provided. Team members, naturally, were entitled to hospitalization when needed.

It would be appropriate to point out here that speed in getting these people into the field to counter the growing Pathet Lao threat influenced many decisions at this time. There are several areas in which major changes would be desirable if this type of program were being started anew.

Everyone knew that if this program were going to work, it would be necessary to assist the teams in securing the support of local governmental officials. Sub-district and village headmen are unpaid officials and are normally volunteers. To gain the support of these officials, two types of training programs were started. First, all the Governors and Chao Muongs were brought to Vientiane for a six weeks' training course similar to that given the team members. Of course, it was of a
broader nature and the hours of instruction during the day were reduced.

Shortly thereafter all the village headmen or Nai Bans and Tasseng Chiefs were brought into the District Headquarters for one weeks training. The Government paid them a salary during this period. This training, as can be seen, was the key to the whole project. The team leaders taught this course and the whole thrust of the instruction was to gain the confidence of these officials—assuring them that Civic Action had something to offer them and their people. Since long run success was dependent upon these unpaid officials, great stress was placed on the fact that the Civic Action Teams were not going to undercut the local officials, but, in fact, were there to assist them and build up their influence by strengthening the people's feelings for the local officials, National Government, and the Kingdom of Laos.

During this time the rest of the teams were in the visiting period. This was when the team members got acquainted with the local villages and target areas. As pointed out previously, one major problem was lack of adequate information, statistics and knowledge of attitudes in the target areas. Therefore, this phase of the operation also was vital to the success of the team's effort. The primary mission of the team during this period was to explain the Civic Action concept to the local people. This in itself was difficult, as the opposition—the Pathet Lao, in this case—was making a major effort to distort the program and to
create an unfavorable reception. It is of equal importance to learn what
the villagers feel they need to make their lives better. It's of little value
for the government to enter areas and make this decision, as there would
be no support and the project would die; thus creating a profitable propa-
ganda item for the Communists. This job can be made easier if the
Tasseng and Nai Ban are sold on Civic Action during their training period.

It was found, in our peculiar circumstances, that many times the
real key man in the village was not the headman, but rather some other
person. This might be a leading merchant, farmer, or, in many cases,
the local temple head or monk. The "visiting period" was used to
identify and win over, to the Civic Action concept, the true holders of
local power. There is no need to start any projects until this has been
accomplished if long term results are to be achieved. Of course, there
are certain pivotal areas where you are forced to act without the support
of these officials because of success by the opposition; but in these areas
the objectives will be a bit different, more of a "holding action" as com-
pared to any expectation of permanent success with only Civic Action
effort. These areas require additional effort by more than one Civic
Action team. This, also, may be an appropriate area for the military
Civic Action teams as well as armed forces which are mentioned in
another part of this paper.
The Commissioner General's office, in an effort to assist the teams as much as possible, instituted an information gathering service prior to the dispatch of the teams to the field. It gathered all available information on the selected areas to include the current status and the needs of the area in terms of health, education, welfare, transportation, and economic conditions. Great stress was also placed upon the gathering of biographic information on local leaders, both pro-Government and Pathet Lao. Most of this information came from the Ministry of Interior and the local Army company that is normally stationed in each Muong or district. The information provided was fairly good; however, it was normally old and incomplete. Each team stopped at the Provincial Capital and spent one day in briefings on the local situation. The teams did not stop at the Tasseng or Muong level as they had met those leaders during the week's briefing conducted by the team leaders.

One of the main things each team leader watched for was a man to assume the job of permanent Civic Action representative in the village. Realizing that the Royal Lao Government did not possess the men or material to establish permanent teams in the village it was hoped that the impetus of the movement could be maintained by selecting such men and by return visits of members of the original Civic Action team. This was to be a paid position and, in essence, was the hope for long term
projects. After this person was selected, he spent the remainder of the time accompanying the various team members and assisting them as he could while he gained as much as possible from the team in a sort of on-the-job training. The Civic Action team planned on remaining in any given area for one month. It then hoped to be able to leave the unfinished projects under the guidance of the local Civic Action man. The normal arrangement was for one member of the ten-man team to return after one month to the original village and inspect the progress of the local man, pay him and assist him in any manner possible and help him get any additional tools or material required to complete or start new projects. Then another member of the team would replace him. By the end of the first week of "visiting period" the team quickly had to determine the effective strength of the local Communist organization for several reasons, not the least of which was their own personal safety. The Civic Action teams described here were not armed, however, this was not the case with the military six-man Civic Action teams used later in 1958 and 1959. The Civic Action teams described here were not armed, however, this was not the case with the military six-man Civic Action teams used later in 1958 and 1959. The Civic Action teams described here were not armed, however, this was not the case with the military six-man Civic Action teams used later in 1958 and 1959. The

SECOND PHASE OPERATIONS:

After the "visiting period" was over, the team gathered information and began to establish new villages. After the "visiting period" was over, the team gathered information and began to establish new villages. After the "visiting period" was over, the team gathered information and began to establish new villages. After the "visiting period" was over, the team gathered information and began to establish new villages.
self-help that the village could be encouraged to take. If the project was to have any lasting value it had to come from the villagers and reflect their appraisal of need. Decision was easy in the outlying districts; however, those villages near the district headquarters and towns had been exposed to repeated campaign promises by the local politicians and political parties. Such promises sometimes had fostered the attitude that the government should do all the development for the villagers; and, as a result, it was most difficult to generate any concept of self-help.

The projects selected took many forms: improvement of the local pagoda; work on the village school; construction of a dispensary; road development; minor irrigation projects; or the establishment of a community hall type facility. The team members found that at times they had other ideas as to what the village actually needed, but for success they either had to go along with the desires of the people or do a super selling job to convince them that the other item was really what they had in mind. Of course, one of the major problems was lack of time and the need for impact-type items. So the team normally went along with the villagers' desires.

One point that was stressed to the people was that there would be no forced assembly of the village, a common Pathet Lao tactic and one that was a great irritant to the local people. Rather, the same thing might be accomplished by holding a "Boun" or a village celebration or
fair. Further, work on the village project was encouraged on Lao Sunday so that all members of the village could participate. To obtain maximum impact a formal dedication ceremony was held and a number of local people were asked to do most of the speaking. Plaques were donated and installed to serve as a reminder to the people of the source of the new village improvement.

After the initial projects were completed the team then moved to another village in the same general area leaving the local Civic Action man in charge. It was planned that the team would stay in one area for a month, but in general practice they remained between one and two months in one locality. When the team moved on, one of the members tried to return every month to maintain contact with the village and to encourage a continuation of the self-help attitude. The local Civic Action team member was paid, and, in most cases, additional supplies for the dispensary were provided and limited replacement of tools were made. These return visits ranged from between one week to up to a month. The main object of the visit was to maintain the momentum of the movement.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON PROBLEM AREAS:

ASSIGNMENT OF TEAMS:

It is necessary to have at least one member of the team from the same general area but it is not a wise move to send a team of local
people back to their own villages or to adjacent areas where they are well known. They may not be respected and may have difficulty in exerting any real influence. There is also the problem of being forced to associate with relatives and constantly facing the problem of undue influence. This is particularly true if the team members are young. However, it is of major importance to the success of the team mission to include at least one minority member if the team is to work with minority groups. This must be done even at the expense of accepting a less qualified team member, as his knowledge and information concerning these groups will more than compensate for reduced technical skill.

**SELECTION OF TEAM MEMBERS:**

First, the strong points of our system will be covered. The fact that the Commissioner General personally interviewed each member allowed him to hand pick the people that he wanted. Inasmuch as it was a fairly small program, this approach was practicable. Additionally, those people who were not willing to work hard or to serve in any location in Laos were weeded out early in the training stage.

Now, for the weaknesses. Since the program was not of a permanent nature the Government did have difficulty in attracting first class personnel. This resulted in some forced "volunteering" in some cases.
This was further complicated by the fact that Laos does not have a wide base of highly trained personnel from which to select. This problem is, of course, one facing any underdeveloped country. It was found that former monks made particularly good trainees and this source should not be overlooked, even though some of them may not have the educational background required.

TRAINING:

All involved in the project probably would agree that the training course was not long enough. Many of the volunteers did not have the special skills that they were recruited for; others were well qualified on a theoretical level, but lacked the practical experience necessary to pass information on to the villagers. This was particularly true of the second group that was recruited. The answer to this problem could have been a longer on-the-job training program. The subject matter given in the training course was adequate. About the only addition that might be suggested would be a review of statistics and simple record keeping. (Some records were requested by the Minister of Interior.)

The trainees complained that the course was too difficult, but admitted that it was a great help to them and they did not suggest any additions or deletions. About 25 per cent of the trainees came from the Civil
Service, 33 per cent were former military, and the remainder came from the various schools in the country.

If the program were to start again, it would be preferable not to give officer status to the trainees, and provide them with uniforms. While it did have the advantage of easy identification of the Civic Action members, it also closely identified them with the military and the Government, a factor that the Pathet Lao tried to exploit.

As you might well expect, the relationship between the team leader and the local officials was potentially difficult. If the Chao Muong and Tasseng were doing their jobs and utilizing all available government support, there was no real need for the Civic Action Team working in their area. Therefore, the team had a real job in launching a crash program and still retaining the active support of the local leaders. On the village level the only way to make progress was to win and keep the respect of the village leaders and to constantly stress that the Civic Action people were in no way competing or attempting to reduce the local officials' influence. In many cases, the religious leaders are the overriding factor in the community. Much of the village life revolves around the local pagoda and in many areas no move can be expected to be successful without its support. The influence that the women have in local matters should not be overlooked either; it may be very necessary
to convince them as well as the men if the village is going to support the projects.

Crash Civic Action programs had a tendency to cause confusion and problems in other ministries of the government. Coordination was difficult and caused considerable inter-departmental interference and bickering. Nearly all of the ministries already had long-term projects in this field and it was difficult to integrate these long-term projects with short term, crash efforts. There was considerable duplication of effort and bad feeling as in some instances the other agencies were reluctant to give their full support.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION:

As mentioned before, the Civic Action Plan was planned for one year, and extended for the second year. By late 1958, the military was to take over the effort and the Commissioner General of Civic Action was to disband his organization. It was felt that by utilizing the military structure of the volunteer battalion and its volunteer companies that were permanently located in each Muong, manpower would be more effectively used. This would release the Civic Action personnel to return to their permanent jobs and positions. There would remain a permanent organization that could engage in long-term projects and have
the secondary benefit of creating a better relationship between the army and the civilian community. The army utilized a six-man team under an NCO and was supplied through military channels. It had many advantages, such as a far broader base, more manpower, and made use of an existing organization that was already oriented towards the area and local population in its home station. The military teams were also better prepared to work in areas of Pathet Lao influence inasmuch as they were armed and capable of standing up to armed propaganda efforts.

CONCLUSION:

For the majority of the Lao people their villages are still the hub of life. From necessity and by tradition, the village, large or small, strives to be a self-sufficient unit. It is not usually, however, a unit large enough to do much about improving living conditions; nor does it generate much initiative among the people. Yet the closeness and personal nature of village life tend to give people a comforting feeling of stability and security. The problem of an enlightened national government is to improve living conditions and standards without destroying the cohesive influence of village life. Civic Action is a reasonable first step because it builds on what is there; but tangible results are not likely to be dramatic.
The Pathet Lao and its political front tried to sabotage the Royal Lao Civic Action Program. Their propaganda line was to promise the moon and insist that it was the responsibility of the Government to provide improvement without any effort on the part of the recipients. Where Civic Action was begun in an area relatively unpoisoned by propaganda or irresponsible political promises, the idea of self-help took hold quickly. After all, the Lao tradition is that work is the source of all property. In areas previously dominated by the Pathet Lao there was sometimes a demand for showy improvements at the expense of more modest, long-range benefits. Nevertheless the Royal Lao Civic Action Program was demonstrated to be worthy of continuation.

Regardless of specific projects undertaken, the channel of communication between the Royal Lao Government and its people was broadened. People with principal local leaders elected or appointed to office were able to voice criticisms and suggestions to higher levels in a way that refuted the saying, "The voice of the poor has no carrying power." Many civil servants received training and experience which equipped them for more effective service to the people. Local leadership became real and important to the people. Thus national unity was fostered.

The Royal Lao Government's efforts have been supported by the people of Laos who have demonstrated their willingness to work for the betterment of their country.
I am reminded today of Victor Hugo's observation that "It is through fraternity that liberty is saved." We are all engaged in the preservation of liberty. Perhaps more importantly, we are all committed to its extension. This Conference is a positive manifestation of this engagement, this commitment, and of the ever-strengthening fraternity which binds the Americas together in these great undertakings.

Rarely have there been more compelling reasons for fraternity than those which ally our countries and which have brought you here. We share a heritage of revolt from colonial rule. We believe in the dignity and freedom of the individual, and we aspire to the fullest realization of this freedom by all our peoples. In varying ways and degrees, we are confronted with social, economic, and political barriers to our ultimate aspirations. And, as President Kennedy said, we are all beset by "alien forces which once again seek to impose the despotisms of the Old World on the people of the New."

We Americans, North and South, intend to sustain our heritage. We mean to surmount the barriers to full freedom. We aim to defeat despotism once more. In all of this, the military of our nations have central parts to play.

They remain fighting men -- standing against external and internal aggression -- and in this they must be more broadly talented, trained, and educated than ever. The threats range from nuclear war to the infinitely subtle problems of insurgency and guerrilla action. The doctrines, techniques, and weapons devised to counter these challenges are increasingly varied and complex. To meet these threats, and to counsel on the uses of force, the soldier, now more than before, needs a wide understanding of basic issues so that he can properly relate military power to national policy. The task, then, demands a new order of knowledge, training, imagination, and versatility.
But the dimensions of the soldier's role are even greater than these in the mid-20th century. Because of his skills and equipment, because he is trained to organize and manage, and because he is dedicated to his country, the soldier is often called upon to assist, and sometimes to lead, in a host of nation-building endeavors. In many lands there are roads to be constructed, bridges to be built, structures to be raised, water systems to be installed, and health measures to be taken. These are not new missions, but they are newly important in a time when the people are justly impatient for progress and the communists are promising them tomorrow today.

It is the total role of the military with which I am now concerned. I would hope it is this which underlies our discussions here. We have much to learn from each other as we seek, together, to develop the ways in which our military can contribute to the security, welfare, and forward progress of our countries, and so to advance our mutual aspirations. We move upward along separate paths, but we are all climbing up the same hill, intent on seeing from its heights the vision of tomorrow which all our peoples hold.

In the sense of sharing experiences, and so deriving lessons from the past which bear upon today, perhaps it would be useful for me to recall something of the place which the Army has occupied in my own land. It began with a struggle for freedom in which the Army was the peoples' right arm and of liberty. From that moment until this, it has been the instrument of the people, subordinate to their will, dedicated to their security, guarantor of stability, and repositor of the strength that comes from freedom under law.

In the generations which have followed, the Army, of course, along with its sister services, has fought our wars. It is deployed today to help defend free men everywhere; some of its soldiers are giving their lives to this end. Most recently, in this hemisphere, the Army's ready strength was a major contributor to the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Along with these uses of force to protect the land, support the popular will, and carry out the national purpose, the military have often been the instruments of economic and social progress in my country. Comprising, as they did initially, the only body of engineers and scientifically trained men in the country, it was they who explored the frontiers, opened the trails, built the roads, led and protected and doctored the settlers, surveyed and mapped the country. These roles have their modern counterparts. In this present time, our Corps of Engineers devotes a major part of its effort to the improvement of rivers and harbors, to flood control, and to other works for the general welfare. Further benefits are the result of military research and developments in such fields as medicine, communications, and transportation.
As nations grow, their problems and needs shift. So, today, in the United States, there is far less need than once was the case for our armed forces to join in projects for internal expansion and development. Instead, we are able to focus on the major military threat which the free world faces and to offer assistance to other countries who have problems of security and stability, and who seek to advance the welfare of their people.

What lessons have we learned from all of this? There have been many, the more important of which may be worth recording as we face together the future of this hemisphere, and as we face independently the diverse problems of our own lands.

We have gained an understanding of the place of the military in a society which would be free. It must be strong; its advice must be sought; but above all it must be subordinate to society, responsive to the people's needs. In assuming this place, it will gain public confidence, draw strength from popular support and understanding, and so be better able to fulfill its missions.

We have learned, too, that our armed forces have much to contribute to national growth in all fields. This is important to the building of a land; this is also important to the establishment of mutual confidence between a people and their military men.

After turning away in earlier days from the need for professional armed forces, we now know, of course, how essential it is to have them in being, trained and ready, if a country is to be stable internally and guarded against external aggression.

We have come to understand, also, that a nation's military can never remain static in thought, planning or action. There are new types and orders of aggression, and armed forces must comprehend and nature of these and devise responses suitable to the threats of this day and the next.
Allied to the foregoing, we now see more clearly than before that the soldier must know more than his weapons, tactics, and materiel. He remains essentially a fighter; this is crucial, and no one can replace him in this. But he must also grasp the import of the social, economic, and political forces which are in ferment in the world today if he would put himself and his mission in context.

We have learned, too, that a country must set priorities for its military, priorities which are related to total national needs and geared to the speed and stage of a nation's forward march. No nation, and no armed force, can undertake everything at once. Nor should they. There are times when the shovel is more important than the gun. There are times when the dump-truck is more valuable than the tank. A nation may face poverty, disease, guerrilla warfare or invasion. The challenges vary; so must the military responses.

Lastly, and perhaps the thread which runs through all the long cloth of our experience, we have sensed the great need for unity. Unity of the people. Unity among popular will, national goals, and military roles. And within a narrower sphere, unity of purpose and effort in the tasks undertaken by the various armed services of a country.

On this latter point, there have been numerous examples in the Old World of armies and navies setting themselves up as rival power blocs, intent on parochial advancement or the preservation of dogma rather than upon national well-being and progress. In my own land we have come, somewhat grudgingly but with increasing speed, to understand the necessity for focusing the particular talents and capabilities of all the armed services on national rather than service objectives. We have learned the essentiality of joint schooling, joint training, joint planning, and of relating all military effort to the welfare of the country. This joining together of the energies of our Army, Navy, and Air Force has given new order and strength and meaning to our national defense.

Although we have learned much, we have much still to learn. The experiences and advice you share with us at special meetings and in our daily relations are invaluable. I am struck by the historical and present-day parallels in the development of our nations and I would hope, in turn, that our North American experiences would be useful to you as you confront great problems and even greater opportunities.
Such problems and such opportunities there are! Diverse, varying in kind and scope and intensity from country to country, they range the spectrum of human experience. One problem is nearly universal, taking different forms in different places: the menace of the communists who would step to power over the backs of our very real human problems. Mao Tse Tung has expressed the relentless nature of this threat in these terms: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." It is clear that we are all the "enemy" of which he writes. It is equally clear that we must not halt, tire, or retreat. To advance is our mission.

Then there are the problems of hunger, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and the swelling growth of population. There are roads which haven't been built, schools which haven't been raised, waters which haven't been tapped, lands which haven't been explored. There are all the great human dreams to be turned into awakened reality.

The physical and human resources are here - the lands, forests, minerals, and seas; man's courage, vigor, imagination, and hunger for liberty - which, as Simon Bolivar said, can make the Americas the greatest region in the world, "not so much by virtue of her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory."

What roles there are to take in all this! Fighter. Teacher. Engineer. Doctor. Explorer. Statesman. Civilians and military striving together. National armies and navies and air forces united for progress and security. And across the rich and splendid sweep of the Americas, roles enough to fire and fuse us all as we sense, in our mutual aspirations and challenges and opportunities, what the poet, Edwin Markham, felt when he said: "There is destiny which makes us brothers; none goes his way alone."

We are met here with that destiny in view; the roles and the challenges and the opportunities are ours to accept.