INTRODUCTION

With each passing day it becomes increasingly apparent that the United States is deeply involved in developments all around the world. A great number of our citizens are grasped up in world affairs as members of our armed forces stationed abroad - almost a million. The commitment of our own armed forces, our support of local armed forces, and the maintenance of bases abroad are the result of a Communist challenge to free institutions and to our own security, a challenge which involves all continents and all aspects of international relations.

One of the most important aspects of that challenge lies in those activities, usually termed "civil affairs", which have ordinarily not played an important part in the relations among nations. Yet the Communist system is so all-embracing that it has been able to utilize cultural, informational, economic and other activities as a part of its weapons system. The result has been, for more than a decade and a half, a developing struggle between the Communists and the Free World which has run the whole gamut of human activities from the dance of life to the dance of death. This struggle with the Communists short of formally organized armed violence we have come to know as the "Cold War". In recent years we have been learning that although it is not fought with the normal weapons of the military, the Cold War is just as crucial and just as serious as a full-scale Hot War.

The Cold War, because the threat of overt violence is always present, has called for a constant state of military preparedness on the part of the United States and its allies, and for this reason our military have been involved around the world. In the absence of violence on a large and organized scale, the civil affairs functions of the United States military have assumed an importance unparalleled in the past. Military and civil affairs functions are inextricably intertwined wherever our forces are stationed or go - in Western Europe, in Vietnam, in Chile, or in Japan.

Sometimes far more significant for the security of the United States than their initial military mission is our military's frequent performance in civil affairs -
whether it be cooperating with a village headman or a Chamber of Commerce, whether it be in organizing self defense forces or in promoting friendship for the United States, whether it be in public health or in technical education. Today, when the civil government and domestic peace in many of the newly independent countries of the world are threatened by violence, corruption, inadequate communications, lack of trained civil servants, and such problems, the Communists are showing a marked ability to exploit these conditions in order to organize support for their camp. Our military are in an ideal position through their civil affairs functions to ensure that impetus is given to organizing local populations in support of the cause of freedom.

This course on "Civil Affairs in the Cold War" is designed to present in a systematic manner to a selected group of officers a basis for understanding the importance of the United States Army's civil affairs functions abroad and how these are directly related to the overall Cold War struggle. It covers the nature and extent of the Communist challenge as well as the various methods by which the Communists attempt to project their power abroad and to organize support for their cause in other lands. The course analyzes the various organizations and approaches which the United States employs to help other countries develop their own economies and political institutions and to resist Communist subversion and violence.

A unique feature of the course is the practical application of the material covered in developing plans and programs. Working in committee teams, officer students will study a specific geographical area and then a country. They will then work out an estimate of the situation in the country, draw up a plan for civil affairs action and finally a program to support the plan. These committee plans and programs will not assume any familiarity with the assigned country. The experience of drawing up a specific plan and program is expected to be of great value in stressing the necessity for close attention to the customs, patterns of authority, and other social and political aspects of different countries.

In the Cold War struggle with the forces of Communism, the United States must eventually look to the viability, stability, and prosperity of its allies as a source of strength and eventual victory for freedom. It will hardly be worthwhile to expend resources saving countries from Communist violence unless in the course of doing so we have helped through our civil affairs capability to develop the institutions which are worth saving. Thus, our military have not only a unique role in the next few years, they have a unique opportunity.
Obviously a four week course on "Civil Affairs in the Cold War" cannot begin to answer all the questions which will arise concerning the diverse activities of United States forces abroad. Yet it is felt that this course can provide the background materials and analysis necessary for a new and important approach to a vital phase of United States security policies.

This course has been developed with the assistance of many highly trained reserve officers who returned to active duty during the past year. In addition the Civil Affairs School has been able to call on the members of the Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina.

Needless to say, we feel that this is one of the most important courses we have undertaken at the Civil Affairs School. We regard it as intense and demanding and are confident that the officers taking the course will find it, in addition, to be stimulating and rewarding.

WILLIAM R. SWARM  
Colonel, Arty  
Commandant
## COURSE ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION TO THE COLD WAR

1. Introduction
   a. This one hour conference period considers the format for the course, Civil Affairs in the Cold War (41-A-F6), the scope of the course and sets the stage for an intensive study of the role Civil Affairs plays in Cold War.
   b. The period consists of an orientation on the Cold War efforts of the United States and the nation's role in the defense of free institutions of government and society.
   c. The period also includes a discussion of research and planning programs along with a consideration of the seminar techniques to be used throughout the balance of the course.

2. Topics for Consideration
   a. What relationship do Civil Affairs officers carry on with respect to Cold War operations?
   b. What role can Civil Affairs play in the prosecution of America's Cold War efforts?
   c. What causes insurgency and how can it be overcome?
   d. What is my responsibility as a Civil Affairs officer to a commander engaged in Cold War operations?

3. Scope and Purpose
   To introduce the student to the scope and definition of the Cold War and to briefly preview the Civil Affairs approach to the problem.

4. Required Reading
   None.

5. Reference Reading
   a. Chicago Daily News, You and the Cold War (10 June - 3 July 1961)


THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIMES

1. Introduction

a. It has become so commonplace to note that we live in an age of rapidly accelerating change that it has become difficult to persuade people of the unique situation in the present world. The depth and scope of changes around the world make them the most revolutionary in the history of mankind. Many of these changes—population explosion, scientific revolution, emergence of new nations, etc.—are enough in themselves to cause great uncertainty and instability. But at the very moment when the world is in a convulsion of change, it must deal with a Communist challenge which seeks to take advantage of disrupting influences and to exploit the changes over the wide spectrum of conflict in which it challenges the Free World.

b. The Cold War being waged against the West and its allies around the world takes place within a setting of changing institutions and patterns of life. Therefore, in order to understand the full nature of the challenges of the Cold War, it is necessary that we first understand the revolutionary changes which form the basic environment within which the United States must pursue policies of peace, defense, and victory in the Cold War.

c. No foreign policy, no activity of the United States at home or abroad can hope to be successful unless it is based on an understanding of the revolutionary nature of the changes sweeping the world. Static concepts of status quo, and even the words and phrases which argue against change have to be abandoned.

d. It is also important that we appreciate the unique role which the United States has played in the twentieth century in inspiring the world revolution of our times. Much of the spread and popularization of technology and ideas of development have come from the United States. We have been the world leader in advocating and assisting the improvement of the conditions of human life in the world. In fact, it is the American achievement in improving the lot of the common man that has been the chief ingredient in what has been called the "revolution of rising expectations". The Communists, therefore, have no monopoly in the field of world leadership in this age of change.
2. Topics for Consideration

a. To what extent are the underdeveloped areas of the world prepared to assimilate the change of the technological age?

b. How would it be possible for the United States to reach, organize, and inspire the leaders in the developing countries?

c. What have been the comparative programs of the United States and the Communist Bloc countries in dealing with the forces of change in the world?

d. In what ways does the introduction of modern military technology under United States military assistance programs constitute a revolutionary type of action abroad?

e. What are some of the limitations to economic assistance? To military assistance?

3. Scope and Purpose

To discuss the great changes which have come together to make the present an age of crisis.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading


1. **Introduction**

   a. Marxism began as an obscure secular religion with a set of Utopian appeals, a materialist and "dialectical" philosophy of history, and a call for proletarians of the world to unite in the cause of "World Revolution." After the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Bolshevist seizure of power, the movement was transformed under Lenin and Stalin into a political system of strategy and tactics for seizing power, into a "guide to action," although the old Utopian ideals continue to win converts. With the organization of the **Communist** Parties, the movement became and has remained an instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy working through a world-wide conspiratorial network of Communist Parties, guided and often directly controlled by the U.S.S.R. in its drive toward World Domination, a natural continuation in new ideological garb of the Messianic tradition of Czarist Russia and its imperialist expansion.

   b. In practice, since the movement was tied to the Soviet State, its Ideology and operative slogans or "general line" were tied to the struggle for power among Soviet leaders and reflected such internal disputes as the Trotsky-Stalin feud symbolized in the slogans "Permanent Revolution" and "Socialism in One Country." Tactically, in relationship to the Socialist parties, the principal rivals for power, there have also been major shifts from the "hard line" of the 1928 6th Comintern Congress attacking the "Social Fascists" to the Popular Front line of 1935 calling for an "anti-Fascist" coalition of all "progressive" forces and a denial that the U.S.S.R. ever had any revolutionary plans or intentions.

   c. After the brief, embarrassing Interlude of the Nazi-Soviet Pact period (1939-41) the "soft tactics" were continued during the War-time "Grand Alliance" and the Comintern was abolished in 1943.

   d. After World War II, with the resurgence of Russian Imperial expansion, and as a fighting response to the Marshall Plan, the Cominform was established in 1947, and the so-called Cold War between the Free World and the Soviet Bloc was intensified, reaching a climax with the Berlin Air Lift (1948-49) and direct military aggression in Korea (1950-53).
e. The popular term Cold War has been applied to the protracted East-West conflict. It is for the most part political warfare in that it describes the aggressive use of a wide variety of non-military instruments of foreign policy ranging from overt diplomatic or economic pressure to such clandestine activities as political assassination and the use of spies, agents, and saboteurs for carrying on subversive revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements in which limited forces are used. In practice these operations have been accompanied by a broad range of information activities ranging from straight news service to the most scurrilous forms of rumor-mongering and "black" or non-attributable propaganda.

f. The common denominator of all these methods or instrumentalities is their purpose: to extend the influence of one state over another by means short of general war, although limited military activities, such as border raids, guerrilla warfare and active internal resistance may be an integral part of them. Since their purpose is aggressive their employment is often secret or covert.

g. All major powers have at one time or another intervened aggressively in the internal affairs of other states, but both Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. in particular have developed and employed certain standardized operational techniques or stages in the extension of control over their victims. Three initial stages may be distinguished and described as (1) penetration or infiltration, (2) forced disintegration or atomization, and (3) subversion. These stages are usually followed by a period of covert control. In maximal cases, such as the Nazi or Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, covert operations have been followed by seizure of power and open assimilation of the victimized state into the political system or power complex of the aggressor. Intensive persuasion, ranging in form from propaganda to extreme violence, is used in order to catalyze each stage or process of intervention, and operationally, is often an inseparable adjunct to it.

h. The Cold War reached a peak of intensity in the Stalinist period and his death in 1953 was followed by a period of uncertainty and indecision in foreign policy which masked an internal power struggle over the succession. Meanwhile rapid technological advances in the field of thermo-nuclear weapons and the expansion of delivery systems to include intercontinental missiles motivated a reappraisal of foreign policy aims and intentions on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
I. By 1955 the U. S. S. R., under a collective leadership with Khrushchev in the ascendency, had achieved nuclear parity with the U. S., and, given the destructive threat of a thermonuclear exchange adopted a policy of relaxing tensions in an understanding to this effect with the U. S. at the 1955 Summit Meeting and its "Spirit of Camp David" aftermath. The new general line was formalized in the 1956 XXth Party Congress under the slogan of "peaceful co-existence," with an emphasis on competition in the technological and economic areas. The new general line abandoned the classic Leninist-Stalinist image of a world divided into two camps, the U. S. S. R. on the one hand, surrounded or encircled by a ring of hostile capitalist-imperialist powers on the other - each locked in mortal combat in which one or the other would finally triumph after a series of frightful collisions. In place of the fatalistic image of a completely bi-polarized world the U. S. S. R. now recognizes a third group of powers which have emerged since World War II from former colonial status, powers such as India or the new African states. These are regarded as a protective belt of neutralist states which make up a so-called "zone of peace." The moribund Cominform, which had never been effective as an organization center for conducting the Cold War, was abandoned. Paradoxically, however, Khrushchev has made it explicitly clear that the U. S. S. R. would continue to support "wars of national liberation" in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Stalin's doctrine of the "fatal inevitability" of wars among the imperialist powers (and presumably between the two camps) has been pronounced outdated. This last point of doctrine, that war is no longer inevitable, is most important and has been reaffirmed at the XXIIId Party Congress in November 1961. It reflects the Soviet conviction that in an age of nuclear plenty and reciprocal deterrence, there has been a shift in the balance of forces in favor of the U. S. S. R. The doctrine that war is no longer inevitable has not been accepted by Communist China. It is the ideological center of a growing rift between the U. S. S. R. and the Chinese Communists, and further threatens the one-time "monolithic" unity of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This former unity, now badly shaken by the ideological defection of both Communist China and Albania, was first broken by the defection of Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito in 1948 under the banner of "national Communism," i.e., the heresy that there may be "more than one road to Socialism". Revolt in East Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956 have been additional signs of malaise within the loosening Soviet satellite empire.
In spite of official adherence to the general line of "peaceful coexistence," the U.S.S.R. has employed an alternate strategy of aggressive political warfare by deliberately increasing and then relaxing tensions in Berlin and other focal points in the continuing struggle. Soviet economic gains, scientific and space achievements since Sputnik in 1957 have been spectacular, and the ambitious new 20 Year Program adopted in 1961 pledges to overtake the Western standard of living in the next two decades. The program re-asserts the softline of 1956, but the leadership has explicitly pledged to continue relentless political warfare against the Free World and has denied that "ideological coexistence" is possible, and is apparently convinced that the Soviet system will prevail, that, Communism will "bury" Capitalism, as Khrushchev has promised.
1. Introduction

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 1917 following the earlier March Revolution they inherited a national state in a state system with certain national interests and continuing historical drives to secure them. They also inherited an autocratic political and social system, described as a "seedbed" of revolution, which automatically radicalized the opposition and provided a training ground in the conspiratorial organization and terrorist tactics which have since characterized the worldwide organization of Communist Parties.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What major elements entered into the concept of national interest prevalent in the 19th Century Western State System in which Czarist Russia figured as a major power?

2. Economic advancement.
3. Power and imperial expansion: the balance of power and the Concert of Europe; the Franco-Russian Entente (1891-92) and the Triple Entente (with England a partner) in 1907.
4. Recognition, status and prestige.

b. What were the principal historic Russian state drives?

1. Imperial Expansion.
   a. Overland to the Pacific (comparison with the U.S.)
   b. Windows on the Baltic.
   c. The drive to the Straits at Constantinople.
(2) "Security" of the open Western frontier vs. imperial expansion; the Partitioning of Poland; the rivalry with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.

(3) World Domination as a goal of Russian expansion: Marx and Engels on "The Russian Menace to Europe."

c. What was the ideological basis of the Messianic drive to World Domination, and the Russian sense of mission?

(1) Dostievsky, the Slavophiles and Pan-Slavism

(2) What were some of the principal tactics of Czarist foreign policy?

d. What were the characteristics of Russian society which made it a "seedbed" of revolution?

(1) Czarist autocracy and institutions: what was the role of the land-owning nobility and church? the role of the Army and the Security Police? the peasantry?

(2) How did the separation of State and society, i.e., no popular participation in government radicalize the opposition?

(3) What was the role of the anarchists, nihilists and terrorists? e.g., the Necheyov conspiratorial "group of five"?

e. What is meant by the "Dual Power" status of the Provisional Government of March 1917? How did this facilitate the Bolshevik seizure of power?

f. What were the operational principals which assured the success of the Bolsheviks?

(1) How did the military setting facilitate seizure of power?

(2) What was the role of organization?

(3) How were "divide and conquer" tactics used?

(4) How were psychological appeals used? What were the operationally effective slogans?

3. Scope and Purpose

To give the historical, cultural, economic and political background that gave rise to revolutionary action in Russia.
4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

None.
COMMUNISM IN PERSPECTIVE

COMMUNISM AS A SECULAR RELIGION

1. Introduction

Communism has often been described as a secular religion, i.e., a Utopian faith, which within the last century has taken control of one-third of the World's people and one-fourth of the world's territory. The basic tenets of this faith, its moral appeal and its pseudo-philosophical underpinning by so-called "scientific materialism" and the dialectic of history are examined in this conference.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What are the basic Utopian appeals of Marxism?
   (1) "From each according to his abilities," etc.
   (2) The ideal of the classless society.
   (3) The withering away of the state in an anarchist Utopia.

b. What are the moral appeals of Marxism?
   (1) The dilemma of social injustice--moral men in an immoral society.
   (2) Anarchism: the dilemma of rebellion vs. becoming an accomplice of the established order.

c. What are the principal tenets of "dialectic materialism?"
   (1) The Hegelian dialectic of history.
   (2) Scientific materialism.
   (3) The basic (Marxian) contradiction of Capitalism.
   (4) The class struggle and the inevitability of Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

d. What would have happened to Marxism if the Bolsheviks had failed to seize power in the U.S.S.R.?
   (1) The basic errors of the Marxist forecast.
(2) The normal fate of quasi-religious and philosophical movements: Existentialism, Zen Buddhism.

e. What is meant by the "Leninist-Stalinist transformation of Marxism into Communism?"

(1) The Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917.

(a) Doctrine becomes a system of strategy and tactics for seizing power in revolutionary situations.

(b) Communism becomes official ideology of the Soviet State.

(c) Use as an instrument of Soviet power and imperial expansion.

3. Scope and Purpose

To explain the Utopian and moral appeals of Marxism to the people of Russia.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

None
1. Introduction

When the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's guidance, seized power in November 1917, Marxism was transformed into a "guide to action," i.e. the secular faith was subordinated into a system of strategy and tactics adopted by a worldwide conspiracy under the aegis of the new Soviet State and used by that State to extend its influence and control abroad. The basic guidelines of the transformed doctrine, the role of the party, the Leninist analysis of the situation, the Soviet image of the world, and the establishment of the COMINTERN are examined in this lecture.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What were Lenin's main contributions to Marxist Theory?

(1) Theory of the strategy and tactics of revolution

(a) Two Tactics of Social Democracy:

1. Necessity of bourgeois-democratic revolution.

2. Revolutionary dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry to lead the revolution.

(2) Theory of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat to remain in power until total transition to Communism (State and Revolution), i.e. State will not "wither away."

(a) State Administration -- "accounting and control"

(3) The nature and role of the Party as "the vanguard of the proletariat." (What is to be Done, 1902)

(a) The dedicated professional revolutionary

(b) Conspiratorial, cell-type organization plus iron discipline (Left-wing Communism, 1920):
1. The Czarist heritage (Nechayev and Dostievsyky's The Possessed).

2. Totalitarian controls.

3. The end justifies the means.

   (c) Operative principle: "giving history a shove".

b. What additional contradictions did Lenin add to the "Analysis of the Situation."

   (1) Imperialism: the Highest State of Capitalism (1916) leads inevitably to war.

       (a) Imperialism = monopoly capitalism -- the final stage

       1. The struggle for raw materials and markets.

       2. "The law of uneven development" = clash of imperialist countries with colonies.

c. What is the Soviet "two-camp" image of the world?

   (1) Lenin: 8th CP Congress, March 1919 statement: "Coexistence is unthinkable and war inevitable."

   (2) Stalin, 1925: The Kto-Koco formula

   (e) 1928, 6th Comintern Congress and the "hard line."

3. Scope and Purpose

   To explain how Marxism was subordinated into a system of strategy and tactics by the Soviet State to extend its influence and control abroad.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

   None.
1. Introduction

In extending their influence and control over other states the major powers have made use of a wide variety of essentially non-military instruments of foreign policy ranging from overt diplomatic pressure through such clandestine activities as political assassination and the use of spies, agents and saboteurs for carrying on subversive revolutionary movements. Such indirect aggression has been widely recognized since the rise of Nazi Germany, but has traditionally been denied by the major powers when intervening in the affairs of others. Analysis of such intervention has been obscured by anti-Communist polemical literature on the one hand, and by the Marxist Leninist obsession with revolution on the other.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What have been the principal features of the Cold War setting in which political warfare has taken place?

b. What have been the traditional attitudes of the U.S. and the USSR toward intervention?

c. Why have covert operations been neglected by Western political scientists and historians?

d. How has the "literature of exposure" confused analysis?

e. How has Marxist-Leninist preoccupation with revolution confused thinking on political warfare?

3. Scope and Purpose

To define and examine the concept of political warfare including covert operations, the Cold War setting in which they take place, traditional Great Power attitudes and sources of confusion in concepts and terminology.

4. Required Reading

5. Reference Reading

1. Introduction

Political warfare including covert operations is best understood by adopting a basic model in which Aggressor State A intervenes in the affairs of Target State B using as an operational base either normal channels of diplomatic representation or stay-behind networks in case relations have been broken. From this, or a similar base, selected political and social groups are penetrated in order to extend influence and control. Penetration may be facilitated through the use of such institutional bases as ethnic group movements, religious institutions, international labor and youth organizations, and, of course, such militant political groups as the Communist Parties abroad.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What element of motive or purpose characterizes all political warfare techniques and often necessitates cover?

b. What operational bases are available to states which have not achieved diplomatic recognition?

c. Why is penetration a better term than "infiltration?"

d. How have native nationalist movements been used as an operational base?

e. How has anti-colonialism facilitated penetration?

3. Scope and Purpose

To introduce the theory of covert political operations, define, analyze and illustrate the technique of penetration.

4. Required Reading

None

5. Reference Reading

1. Introduction

Following the planned penetration of selected political, social, ethnic minority and other groups the tensions normally present in any society may be exploited to disintegrate the political and social structure of the target state. Public morale and the ability to resist aggression are based on political, social and ideological loyalties attached to symbols of the state and society. These loyalties may be undermined, detached, and under ideal conditions transferred to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor; this transfer is called either conversion or subversion, which are opposite sides of the same coin, and the ultimate pay-off is treason; i.e., active support of the enemy in time of war.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. How are tensions present in any society held in check?

b. Socialist theory has recommended exploitation mainly of what type of tension present in any exploitative society?

c. What widespread vulnerability did the Nazis regard as their best "secret weapon"?

d. How have race prejudices affected both Soviet and U. S. political warfare operations?

e. What are the roles and relationships ascribed in modern political theory to the counterelite and the masses?

f. How has political and attitudinal bipolarization since the Russian Revolution affected political warfare and specifically subversion?

3. Scope and Purpose

To define, analyze, and illustrate the techniques of forced disintegration (atomization or Zersetzung) and subversion.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

1. Introduction

Following successful penetration, forced disintegration, and subversion, an interventionist power may achieve de facto and usually covert control over politically significant actions within the target state, i.e., over actions affecting its military dispositions and power position, foreign policy interests or objectives, and the relative strength of internal factions, among which one or more will be effectively used as an instrument of the aggressor. Control is never absolute and its covert aspect is usually exposed or may be dropped as the situation requires. The transition from covert control to open intervention may be followed by seizure of power in a pre-fabricated revolution and later assimilation of the target state into the power complex of the aggressor.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What are the main classes of actions over which covert control is extended? What are some examples of covert control of foreign policy interests?

b. Why is it impossible in the long run to keep control under cover?

c. What are some examples of transition to open intervention?

3. Scope and Purpose

To define, analyze and illustrate the technique of covert control in political warfare operations.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

None
1. Introduction

The massive use of a broad range of informational activities ranging from straight news services and cultural exchanges to the most scurrilous forms of rumor-mongering and "black" or non-attributable propaganda has accompanied political warfare operations. Also included are such manipulative persuasive techniques as bribery, kidnapping, torture, assassination, and discriminate terror exploited for their propaganda effect. Quasi-military moves and threats as well as military presence are also exploited for their persuasive effects. The combination of these various instruments serves as a catalyst in all stages of aggressive intervention and is reinforced by a constant feedback factor between operational techniques and their exploitation for persuasive purposes.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What is the accepted relationship of force and violence to persuasion in a political warfare context?

b. What is included in the "grey area" of manipulative persuasion?

c. What are the traditional role and limitations of "creative violence"? (i.e., terror)

d. How is manipulative persuasion used as SOP in all covert operations?

e. Illustrate the use and limitations of bribery.

3. Scope and Purpose

To define, analyze and illustrate the use of propaganda, violence and manipulative persuasion as an integral part of political warfare, especially covert operations.

4. Required Reading

5. Reference Reading


1. Introduction

The phenomenal success of both Nazi and Soviet political warfare has led to an exaggerated faith in the ease and efficacy with which established techniques may be used as an instrument of national policy, and has obscured the fact that certain types of problems constitute built-in limitations to effectiveness. These persistent problems to which there are no optimum solutions fall into three main areas: (1) divided policy-making and operational responsibilities, (2) reliable intelligence and counterintelligence, and (3) the problem of counterelites and operational control.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Why is foreign policy a focal point of intense bureaucratic competition and what are the principal agencies involved?

b. How can the problem of institutionalized personal rivalries be minimized?

c. How do political and ideological factors distort intelligence estimates for political warfare purposes?

d. What are the special difficulties presented by police-state regimes with effective counterintelligence agencies?

e. How is the problem of building a counterelite related to that of legitimacy and permanency?

f. What are the limitations of emigres and refugees in political warfare?

g. What are some of the problems in negotiating with counterelites and maintaining effective control over them?

3. Scope and Purpose

To analyze and illustrate the types of problems which limit the effectiveness of political warfare as an instrument of policy, the most important which are (1) divided policy-making and operational responsibilities, (2) reliable intelligence and counterintelligence, and (3) the problem of counterelites and operational control.
4. Required Reading
   None

5. Reference Reading
   None
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. Introduction

a. What is meant by the International Communist Movement, and does it exist? The way in which this question is put may surprise some of you. Many people take for granted that there is an "International Communist Movement", and yet they may have only a sketchy idea of what the phrase means. As in our other conferences on the subject of Sino-Soviet activities, we must first begin by defining the terms we use.

b. Among the elements usually associated with the term "International Communist Movement", there is, of course, the body of doctrine called Marxism-Leninism. Then there are the national Communist parties that function, with varying degrees of effectiveness, in almost every country of the world. The fact that for a long time the Soviet Union was the only Communist state in the world had the effect of placing it and its Communist party in a position of unique and undisputed authority within the movement. At the present time, Communist parties are in power in a number of countries, where they are in a position to put their programs into effect in terms of domestic and foreign policy. The term, therefore, can also be applied to the bloc of Communist states, as well as to their joint and individual policies toward the non-communist world. Finally, there has appeared in the background from time to time the shadowy form of an actual organization purporting to exercise formal leadership over International Communism, maintaining a semblance of continuity through changes and reorganizations, and, it might be argued, playing a far more potent role in directing Communist strategy on a worldwide basis than might be apparent from its visible structure and activities.

c. It may appear to you that the outline of this course is badly conceived because a general topic, The International Communist Movement, is presented as a portion of a narrower subject heading - that of "Sino-Soviet Activities". Such is not the case, because we are dealing with a relationship where, in effect, the dog is wagged by the tail.

d. The development of the state organization, social structure, and Communist theory in the Soviet Union had a
decisive effect on the actions of Communist movements in other parts of the world. For a full generation the Stalinist regime was an ideal for all Communists, and the phrase "world revolution" became synonymous with the extension of Stalinism to all other countries. International Communism, therefore, did not develop as an independent movement with control over its own organization and policies. Instead, it became an organ of the CPSU and an instrument for the execution of its policies, using the resources and facilities of the Soviet Union as a base of operations, and forming a component element in that country's foreign policy.

e. In his history of World Communism (From Lenin to Khrushchev), a work now generally accepted as a standard text on the subject, Hugh Seton-Watson has the following evaluation of the international Communist agencies and organizations: "I have thus paid little attention to the international agencies of communism, even to the Comintern itself...Nor have I attempted to penetrate the mystery which surrounds the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, and the operation of post war communist international organizations. Not only are these subjects veiled in mystery: I am not sure that they are important. The essential fact is that...the international communist movement has been subject to the orders of Moscow. Whether this control is exercised by foreign communists, established in a central office in Moscow or some other Soviet-controlled city, who transmit the orders of the Soviet leaders to their respective parties; or whether the orders come to the national parties directly from Soviet officials, without passing through a central office or Comintern or Cominform - is an interesting question for a specialist in institutions, and an important question for a counter-intelligence officer. But for the analysis of the social basis of communist movements, and of communist bids for power, it is of small significance." (Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, p. xi.)

f. For the purpose of this conference we are therefore defining the International Communist Movement rather narrowly, by limiting our discussion only to the organizational forms and the structure of international Communist agencies, as well as to their functions and historical development. The actual policies of Communist parties, and their role in national and international events, will be covered in other portions of the course.

g. International Communist Agencies, other than functional or professional front organizations, are not being used at the present time, possibly because of the disorganized condition of the Communist movement as a whole. However, it is important for you as Civil Affairs Officers to know what organizational
forms were used in the past to coordinate and direct the activities of Communist parties. The technique was a useful and an effective one in many way, and it may be employed again in the future in some phase of the Cold War.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Would it be in the interest of National Communist parties to form an International Communist organization? What would be some advantages and disadvantages?

b. Would an international organization of Communist parties be a help or hindrance to Communists in the Cold War?

c. What functions could an organization of Communist parties perform?

d. From the point of view of Communists, what would be the best form of organization (i.e., centralized? a loose association of parties? Overt? Covert?)

e. Would an organization of Communist Parties reduce or increase friction between National Communist parties?

3. Scope and Purpose

To present a survey of the development of the International Communist Movement, with emphasis on its formal structure and organizational forms, including its relationship to the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

4. Required Reading

a. Seton-Watson, Hugh, From Lenin to Khrushchev, pp. 50-77; 327-329. and one of the following:

b. Dallin, David, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 18-44; 322-358; 445-463

c. Possony, Stefan, Century of Conflict, pp. 397-412.


5. Reference Reading


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h. Seton-Watson, Hugh, From Lenin to Khrushchev: The History of World Communism, Praeger, New York, 1960


k. Possony, Stefan T., Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution, Regnery, Chicago, 1953

1. Introduction

After the period of War Communism and Allied Intervention accompanied by the failure of early hopes for successfully carrying the torch of "Permanent Revolution" abroad the USSR adopted a policy of economic retrenchment and "back to normalcy" at home, and of searching for recognition, status, prestige and profits abroad from 1921 to 1928. The collapse of intervention in China was followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and forced industrialization under the Five-Year Plans, culminating in the Great Purges during the years 1936-1938. Abroad the rise of Hitler was first aided by the Comintern "hard line" of 1928, which was scuttled with the Popular Front tactic in 1935. Soviet opposition to Hitler, like that of the Western Powers was both too little and too late, and with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, Stalin turned Hitler west, only to have him reverse himself and attack the Soviet Union two years later in June 1941.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What were the basic economic principles underlying the N.E.P.?

b. What principal feud characterized the ascendancy of Stalin and what slogans were used to epitomize it?

c. What were the main breakthroughs in the Soviet search for diplomatic recognition?

d. What three main developments took place internally in the USSR in the period 1928-1933?

e. By what mutual-assistance treaties did the USSR seek to counterbalance the power of Nazi Germany?

f. What were the principal stages in the collapse of Western efforts to block Nazi expansion?

g. What were the main Soviet strategic alternatives after Munich?

3. Scope and Purpose

To discuss the relationship of Communism in the USSR as related to internal political and economic developments and the pursuit of Russian national interests abroad from 1921 through World War II.
4. **Required Reading**


5. **Reference Reading**


1. Introduction

The breakdown of the Wartime Grand Alliance was characterized by disputes over the future spheres of influence which were determined by developments in the military theaters of operation and subsequent occupied territories. Soviet expansionist pressure against Iran, Greece and Turkey was followed by the takeover of Eastern Europe, culminating in the pre-fabricated revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Western response to Soviet pressure took the form of the Truman Doctrine in 1946, followed by the Marshall Plan (1947) and NATO (1949). Soviet counter-action was characterized by the hard line of the Cominform (1947), the Berlin Blockade (June 1948-May 1949), the division of Germany (1949) and finally the Korean Conflict (June 1950-January 1953). The death of Stalin in March 1953 was followed by the ascendancy of Khrushchev and a re-appraisal of Russian national interest as a result of such new historical factors as nuclear plenty and equal delivery systems, adding up to thermonuclear deterrence and the threat of reciprocal destruction. The 1955 Summit Conference was followed by De-Stalinization and a new "soft line" of peaceful coexistence set by the 1956 XXth Party Congress and re-confirmed at the 1961 XXIst Party Congress. Khrushchevian Russia has been characterized by rapid industrial growth, a rising standard of living and a down-grading of Police-state controls internally. Abroad the USSR has followed a general policy of relaxing international tensions combined with brinkmanship in Berlin and relentless political warfare, including the use of guerrilla movements in so-called "wars of national liberation" in the under-developed areas of the world.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. How can Stalinist strategy during the latter stages of WWII be regarded as a reversion to the "Permanent Revolution" tactics after WWII?

b. How did U. S. policy during World War II facilitate Soviet expansion?

c. Given the military dispositions and estimates in the latter stages of World War II could the U. S. have prevented Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe?
d. Compare and contrast the Nazi (1938-39) and Soviet (1948) take-over of Czechoslovakia in terms of long-range political and strategic effects?

e. What were the new historical factors conditioning a re-appraisal of Russian national interest after Stalin's death? How do they affect U. S. national interest?


g. What have been the main lines of development in Khrushchevian Russia:

(1) internally?

(2) externally?

3. Scope and Purpose

To examine Communist expansion under Stalin, the Cold War and Soviet policy under Khrushchev.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading


b. Seton-Watson, Hugh, Neither War Nor Peace (Praeger, N. Y., 1960).
I. Introduction

a. In the years after World War II, Communism entered a new period of its history. Up to that time the Soviet Union existed as the only Communist state. The system that developed there took over certain elements of its special national environment. It acquired, or was influenced by, many Russian social, political, and historical characteristics, to the point where it becomes difficult even for specialists to distinguish between what is peculiarly Russian, and what is a manifestation of Communist ideology as such.

b. After World War II the Soviet Union took advantage of the opportunity created by the presence of Soviet troops, to impose by force and intrigue Communist regimes upon the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Except for Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, these countries lacked strong Communist parties or any popular support for them. Yet the political system that resulted was for all practical purposes a stable one, for Communist regimes, as well as the society they began to create, were permanent to the degree that the Soviet presence was permanent. The system imposed on the Soviet bloc states was of the Soviet variety, including both its Communist and Russian features.

c. In time the Cold War extended to other parts of the world. Today the world is divided into three parts: the Communist Bloc, the Western nucleus of democratic, stable, and technologically advanced states, and the underdeveloped areas. The latter include lands of great diversity, united only in their vulnerability to Communist penetration and subversion. The bulk of our Cold War Course is devoted to the study of Communist efforts to penetrate the underdeveloped areas. It therefore emphasizes the study of Communist techniques and tactics for extending influence and seizing power, as well as the counter-measures we have developed for stopping Communist advances.

d. As the Cold War continues (and assuming that it does not develop at some point into major war), the arena of action will shift from one part of the world to another. The Cold War is likely to be a long one, lasting perhaps decades. One by one, the countries now in the underdeveloped category will find themselves on one side of the line or the other.
During this protracted, worldwide struggle, what will be the course of internal development within the Soviet Bloc? Will it be such as to increase or reduce Communist capabilities for penetrating underdeveloped areas and engaging in other aggressive acts? In the Western preoccupation with Soviet foreign policy it is easy to forget that the direction, duration, and acuteness of the Cold War depends not only on the vulnerability of specific areas to Communist penetration, but also on the internal character of the Communist Bloc and the dynamics of its development.

Some fifteen years have passed since the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. In terms of historical perspective, fifteen years is a short time, often hardly enough to detect significant trends. Yet during this time there have been substantial changes in relations between the Soviet Union and some members of the Soviet Bloc. The same can be said for internal developments in many Communist states, the Soviet Union included. One complete historical cycle has run its course in Eastern Europe, embracing the following events: Soviet occupation, the installation of Communist regimes, and the Stalinist period of direct Soviet control. What followed was a new phase, but one still hard to define precisely because it has barely begun. It is clear only that the Communist world is becoming disunited at a time of its increasing physical strength, and that major dislocations and adjustments are taking place. We see evidences of cultural and ideological differences, the development of national Communism, and the beginning of power rivalries.

What we do not know with certainty is whether the long term development of Communism will move toward conformity or diversity, toward the erosion or the strengthening of its present totalitarian character. Our survey of Eastern Europe will consider the evidence available on this crucial problem.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What capabilities did the Allies have to prevent the Communist takeover in Eastern Europe after World War II?

b. What characteristics did the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe have in common? What were important differences?

c. What tactics did Communists use in dealing with Peasant parties? Socialist parties? Conservative parties?

d. Consider specific issues on which national Communist regimes might diverge
1. With little danger to ideology or unity;
2. With considerable danger to both.

e. What do you think will be the probable fate of Communism in Eastern Europe? Examine alternatives, such as:

1. Evolution of Communist parties until regimes become substantially different from Soviet Communism;
2. Overthrow of Communism by anti-Communist forces;
3. No substantial change of present compromise equilibrium;
4. Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe in part or in whole;
5. Reestablishment of total Soviet control.

3. Scope and Purpose

To examine two related developments in the history of Communism: how the Soviet Union extended control over Eastern Europe after World War II by installing Communist regimes there, and how Communism then began to accommodate itself to a multi-state system of national Communist states.

4. Required Reading

Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, pp 210-218; 248-270

and one of the following:

a. Frank Gibney, The Frozen Revolution, pp. 32-87
b. Feliks Gross - The Seizure of Political Power, pp 275-323


5. Reference Reading

Bibliographic Note:
The literature available on Communism, the Soviet Union, and the Communist seizure of Eastern Europe is enormous. Recommended readings include textbook type surveys (Seton-Watson; D. Dallin), scholarly investigations (Brzezinski),...
popular reportorial accounts (Gibney), and partisan literature (Ojilas). Both bibliography and readings have been deliberately selected from works published after 1956. That year represents a major watershed in the history of Communism. Very many excellent studies of Communism appeared prior to that date. However, they dealt only with one period in the history of Communism -- Stalinism -- and were written at a time when real alternatives to rigid Stalinism, or the capability of the system to make major internal readjustments, appeared improbable and speculative. Much of the pre-1956 work, therefore, lacks the historical perspective available today. It fails to consider either the actuality or the significance of such factors as variety, flexibility, change, and conflict within the Communist movement. In recent years a special type of literature on Communism has appeared in large quantity. It consists of simplified, popularized treatments of Marxist ideology, stressing Communist techniques of infiltration, deception, coercion, political manipulation, and seizure of power. Some publications of this type are reliable and may be recommended. Their drawback, insofar as usefulness to the Cold War course is concerned, is that they often fail to consider the context of historical circumstances, tend to magnify Communist efforts to a level of omnipotence, and relate Communism to the domestic rather than to the world scene with which we are concerned.


m. Fred Warner Neal - Titoism in Action, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1958


Principal Periodical Sources:

a. Problems of Communism (pub. by USIA)

b. Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR

c. East Europe

d. The Reporter

e. The New York Times
CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Introduction

a. China is a fact of geography and people which cannot be ignored in any approach to world problems. With the advent of a Communist regime and the development of military and industrial power China today is a major force not only in the areas of the Far East, but around the whole world. The Chinese Communists are extending economic assistance, technical advice, and military know-how to lesser developed areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Chinese Red leaders have been quite blunt in stating their ambitions to keep China a major world power. The dragon has indeed stirred.

b. But it is in the areas of East Asia that China's emergence as a world power carries the most immediate impact. The pattern of the new rule in China makes itself felt around the borders of China and particularly in the smaller countries of Southeast Asia where there are large and influential Chinese minorities. It is in these areas that the Chinese attitude and approach to world affairs is most sensitively felt. In Southeast Asia the leaders of the various countries follow with close attention to the shifts in China's foreign policy line or in Communist strategems.

c. Other countries are also affected by the great new military power and totalitarian institutions of China. Japan, which owes a great cultural debt to China, is sensitively aware of the nature of the Communist regime on mainland China. Korea has already felt the full weight of Mao's power. Taiwan, the stronghold of the Chinese Nationalists, is under constant threat of attack by the forces of Mao. Thus within the immediate context of its surroundings Communist China is a major source of threat and instability. Even India and the smaller states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan along the borders of Tibet have not been immune to Mao's power.

d. Communist propagandists and insurgents in the areas of East Asia look to Mao's China for inspiration and assistance, and to date they have not been disappointed. Red China is the major source of instability around its borders, in Korea, in Vietnam, in Malaya, and in Indonesia. Even non-Communist leaders have drawn some guidance from the manner in which Mao Tse-tung and his fellow Communists have consolidated their hold on their people and have provided internal political stability for their land.
e. The facts of divided countries as well as United States commitments in the Far East make it particularly important that we give full attention to the new Chinese center of power and to its impact on the food-surplus areas of Southeast Asia.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. By what means have the Communists been so effective in controlling the vast population in China?

b. Why are some of the experiences in China inapplicable to the smaller countries in Southeast Asia?

c. In what manner do historical traditions play a role in the influence which Mao and his regime exert in their area of the world?

d. Which of the Southeast Asian countries have the greatest problems with Communist insurgents?

e. Why is Indonesia of particular importance in the Cold War?

f. Can you explain why there has been a recent trend toward military coups d'état in Southeast Asia?

3. Scope and Purpose

To understand the pattern and significance of the Communist seizure of power in China and to assess the impact and influence of China in the areas of Southeast Asia where diversity and problems lend themselves to exploitation by many forces.

4. Required Reading

United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, United States Foreign Policy, (Document No. 24), pp. 515-535 and 451-480.

5. Reference Reading


I. Introduction

a. "We do not intend to abandon Cuba to the Communists." Quotation from President Kennedy's speech of April 20, 1961.

b. The present situation in Cuba, a "socialist" regime established on the Sino-Soviet pattern, confronts the Western Hemisphere and the Inter-American system with a grave and urgent challenge. Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism and a base for communist agitation and subversion within the inner defenses of the Western Hemisphere. Fidel Castro has provided an ideological screen of nationalism and social reform behind which communist parties in the area are at work. This situation creates a serious threat to the individual and collective security of the American republics and by extension to the security of all nations allied with the United States.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Does Cuba really matter?

b. Is economic warfare fully effective against the Communist regime in Cuba?

3. Scope and Purpose

To acquaint the student with the strategy and technique by which the Communists obtained Cuba.

4. Required Reading

None

5. Reference Reading.

a. Department of State Papers 1961

(1) The Lesson of Cuba...Address by President Kennedy

(2) Cuba

(3) The Castro Regime in Cuba

(4) Department of State Bulletin, February 19, 1962
b. Reporter Magazines

c. Time Magazines

d. U. S. News and World Report

e. Area Handbook for Cuba 1961......American University

f. Cuba - The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas......Daniel James

g. You can Trust the Communists (To do exactly as they say)......Dr. Fred Schwarz

h. Arms and Politics in Latin America, 1960.....Edwin Lieuwen

i. Cuba-90 Miles from Home......Warren Miller
1. Introduction

Due to the various projections used in making maps, Africa may not seem to be as large as it really is. It is greater than 5,000 miles from North to South and almost 4,700 miles from West to East; the North American continent (including Central America and the Caribbean Islands) is only 4/5 the size of Africa. It has a land mass of 11,699,000 square miles, a population of more than 230 million people, and unknown and largely untapped amounts of natural resources. This vast continent, with its strategic and economic importance, has only relatively recently become a target for extensive Communist penetration and greatly increased Sino-Soviet activities. Evidence of increasing Sino-Soviet competition in Africa is a recent and complicating factor in the Cold War. Its effect on Communist activities and our own policies may be important, worth careful study and evaluation.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Is Communist interest in Africa a recent development? How did World War II affect Communist aims in Africa?

b. What are the objectives of the Soviet Union in Africa?

c. Why does Communism appeal to many Africans?

d. What advantages might you expect Communist China to have over the Soviet Union in penetrating newly independent former colonial areas?

e. If Soviet Union and Communist China engaged in competition for control of the Communist movement in neutral and underdeveloped countries, such as those found in Africa, what differences would you expect in their tactics? Would you expect differences in ideology to play a significant role?

3. Scope and Purpose

A consideration of the Communist activities in the newly developing nations of Africa.