PARTISAN WARFARE RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES DURING WORLD WAR II
IN THE U.S.S.R.

1. Introduction

The German campaign against Russia is the outstanding example in modern times of a war of wasted political warfare opportunities, of the sort which are not likely to recur in the future. German policy and operational blunders created a situation in which resistance movements were inevitable and quickly took the form of partisan operations which were brought under Soviet control and although their contribution to the German defeat in Russia has been greatly over-rated, they would have rendered a continued occupation impossible. Practically every known principle of successful political warfare was violated during the German campaign in Russia, and the results are well worth serious study.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. How did the German campaign in Russia become a laboratory of political warfare, resistance movements and guerrilla warfare?

b. How did Nazi ideology and the German image of Russia affect their military estimates and political objectives?

c. What were the principal components of the political warfare potential which the Nazi regime had at its disposal in Russia?

d. What were the contradictions and blunders in the Nazi dismemberment policy?

e. What was the Soviet response to Nazi occupation?

(1) What were the major weaknesses of the Soviet Partisan effort?

f. On the basis of the German campaign, what are the essential preventive measures against resistance movements?
3. **Scope and Purpose**

To examine and analyze partisan warfare resistance activities during World War II in the U.S.S.R.

4. **Required Reading**


5. **Reference Reading**

COMMUNIST STRATEGY FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS--THE CHINA EXPERIENCE

1. Introduction

a. The proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, marked the successful conclusion of one of the most extended and successful campaigns of protracted conflict ever waged by one man. That one man, Mao Tse-tung, present head of the Chinese Communist Party, had been seeking to extend his sway over all of China for more than two decades. With the proclamation of his regime, world Communists claimed they had a model for bringing their system and doctrine to economically underdeveloped areas.

b. Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, there have been several other attempts to follow the pattern set by the Chinese in creating other new Communist states. In Vietnam and Cuba the efforts have been fairly successful, and in both cases there are instructive parallels with the Chinese experience. Thus the pattern and lessons of developments in mainland China need close study by all those who are concerned with insurgency and counterinsurgency.

c. There are, to be sure, certain aspects of the China scene which make the China experience unique. For this reason Mao's successful formulas for China are not necessarily automatically exportable. There was, for example, the drastic invasion by Japan, beginning in 1931. This undermined the legitimate government almost more than Communist activities. Again, China is one of the largest countries in the world with one of the longest cultural traditions, and there were many aspects of Chinese traditional culture upon which the Communists, led by Mao, could draw in their drive for power. Such aspects included Chinese pride, contempt for foreigners, and the concept of the "Mandate of Heaven." Mao's propagandists were able to convince millions of Chinese peasants and soldiers that the Communists had received heaven's mandate to rule China and thus win many battles without firing a shot.

d. But the Chinese experience also had its lessons for the smaller and weaker countries, and many of the insurgents around the world, particularly in the underdeveloped lands, have made a point of studying Mao's strategy. In these terms then the China experience becomes one of the most significant stories in the modern world.

e. The Chinese Communists have placed their own stress on the importance of their experience, and in their zeal for revolutionary leadership in the underdeveloped areas they have frequently worked
at cross purposes with the leaders in the Soviet Union. This has become one of the major reasons for disagreements within the Sino-Soviet alliance. Following Mao's strategy, the Chinese Communists have been far more blatant in pushing for guerrilla violence in underdeveloped areas, despite the obvious risks. Since Mao and his cohorts have seen fit to spend great amounts of their scarce natural resources in supporting the export of their strategy, it is most important that we have a clear idea of what is involved.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Why are the Soviets hesitant today when it comes to supporting the type of guerrilla violence which proved successful in China?

b. What are the advantages as opposed to disadvantages for the Communists in gaining responsibility for additional underdeveloped areas?

c. Which aspects of Mao's strategy would be particularly applicable in Latin America? In Africa?

d. What is the role of the "intellectuals" in underdeveloped countries? Why are they such an important target in the propaganda operation?

e. Why did Mao devote special attention to the students and youth groups? Where else have they proved effective allies of insurgents?

f. Why are international organization, united fronts, and front groups of such importance?

3. Scope and Purpose

To understand the effectiveness of guerrilla strategy in economically underdeveloped areas and its application by the Chinese Communists.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading

a. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, United States Foreign Policy, Study No. 12, "Economic, Social, and Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for United States Policy", pp. 1165-1266.


e. Pye, Lucian W., Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, Princeton University, Press, 1956.


g. Tang, Peter S. H., Communist China Today, Washington, Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962, Chapter II.

1. Introduction

a. Of the leaders of the twentieth century surely Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese peasant who led his Communist forces to victory in mainland China during a struggle that lasted more than two decades, is surely one of the greats. And although recent disagreements with the Kremlin have indicated Chinese intentions to stake out great claims for Mao as a Marxist theorist, it is probably for his theories of guerrilla strategy and protracted conflict that Mao will go down in revolutionary history.

b. Mao came to power in a country where there had been long traditions of peasant guerrilla activities in times of discontent and stress. He drew much inspiration from his reading of the Chinese classics, including one of the earliest treatises on warfare, Sun-tzu's *On the Art of War* (circa 500 B.C.). He was an avid reader of the Chinese novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* which dealt with the adventures of battling leaders in early Chinese history. And he was tremendously impressed with the stories centering around the great Paiping Rebellion of 1850-1861 which devastated much of China and almost upset the Manchu dynasty. Further, the province from which Mao came, Hunan, had been famous for its revolutionary and military leadership in Chinese history. So there was much of Chinese history for Mao to draw upon.

c. From the time of the split of the first united front between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the Communists in 1927, Mao became a peasant revolutionary leader in revolt against established authority. He developed strategy and tactics for resistance operations against infinitely superior forces--first against the Nationalist armies with their German advisors in southeast China from 1929 to 1934, then during the famous 5,000-mile Long March, 1934-1935, then against Nationalists and Japanese from 1937 to 1945 and finally against American-equipped Nationalist troops from 1945 until the final victory in 1949.

d. Mao has committed to paper many of the lessons which he learned during his long campaigns, and his writings show an incisive mind. His works on guerrilla warfare have formed the inspiration for writings by other revolutionary leaders including those in Vietnam, Africa, and Cuba. He has thus become probably the outstanding theorist on resistance activities, and whoever wishes to understand such activities must be acquainted with the works of Mao Tse-tung.
e. It is worth noting that according to one story when the Soviets sent to their Chinese comrades a manual on guerrilla warfare in 1943, Mao and his fellow leaders of the Chinese Communists are reputed to have said, "It is a good thing we did not get this manual in 1940; we'd all be dead now!" Certainly the Chinese Communists and Mao himself are proud of their success and convinced of the validity of their theories of resistance activities. They are pushing their program elsewhere in the world. It is therefore desirable to examine in some detail Mao's views on this important subject.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. Which aspects of Mao's guerrilla strategy are Communist? Which could be used by any partisan group?

b. Why would China be an especially good place to develop theories of guerrilla warfare?

c. What are the key elements of Mao's strategy which are applicable only in underdeveloped areas?

d. Why do Communists, according to Mao, make more effective insurgents?

3. Scope and Purpose

To examine the principles and concepts of guerrilla warfare and expounded by its most important living advocate, and to understand how guerrilla warfare is viewed as a part of the total spectrum of conflict of the Communist camp.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading


RESISTANCE AND COUNTERRESISTANCE ACTIVITIES

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CURRENT DOCTRINE ON GUERRILLA AND COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. Introduction

Strategic thermonuclear deterrence and a strategy of flexible deterrents backed up by a balanced mix of weapon systems and armed forces has emphasized the importance of guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla operations as a form of warfare by which the weaker side may assume the tactical offensive under certain conditions. Because of the widespread publicity given to the exploitation of guerrilla warfare by the USSR and Communist China in the underdeveloped areas of the world, Western military strategists have developed the outlines of a body of doctrine which merits serious consideration.

2. Topics for Consideration

a. What roles have guerrillas played historically in defense against invasion, in the revolutionary seizure of power, and as instruments of foreign intervention with examples of each?

b. What are the military geographic, demographic, and political prerequisites of successful guerrilla operations?

c. What are the operative principles underlying successful guerrilla operations?

d. What are the three tasks or steps required for successful countermeasures?

e. What role does civic action play both in the prevention and countering of guerrilla warfare movements?

3. Scope and Purpose

To examine current doctrine on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.

4. Required Reading


5. Reference Reading


b. Paret, Peter and Wishy, John, Guerrillas in the 1960's (Praeger, 1962)

c. Tanham, George K., Communist Revolutionary Warfare (Praeger, 1962)
I. Introduction

a. Civil affairs is defined as "those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly (including US home territory) or occupied area where military forces are present".

b. Civil affairs operations are defined as those activities which directly support a commander's political-military mission. Any project or activity of a military unit involving points of contact with or designed to influence or control civilians as a civil affairs operation regardless of the location of the activity or the size of the participating military unit.

c. The scope of military authority or control in a civil affairs operation may extend from measures of liaison and coordination with appropriate local civilian agencies to the furnishing of assistance and support to local officials and populations or even to the assumption of responsibility for the exercise of some or all of the functions of government in the locality in question. The degree of authority or control necessary to assure the success of civil affairs operations will at all times be consistent with law and the factual posture of the civil affairs relation.

d. One of the basic civil affairs objectives is to support military operations--assist in the accomplishment of military missions through support or control of local agencies in implementing measures to:

1. Maintain public order.

2. Safeguard, mobilize, and utilize local resources such as labor, supplies and facilities for tactical or logistical purposes.

3. Control disease and epidemic conditions that might endanger the military forces.

4. Prevent civilian interference with military operations.

e. Control measures may be required as a result of natural disasters, civil defense emergencies, counter-insurgency operations, contingency operations, limited or general war situations and occupation of enemy territory.
f. Since the functions of government are directed toward the political, economic and social well-being of the community, it follows that control measures within any or all of the civil affairs functions may be employed.

g. It should be remembered that population control measures are employed to impose the will of the commander on the population to accomplish specific objective or objectives; that they are infringements on individual liberties and freedom of action, and therefore, it may be expected that certain resentment will develop among the people who are subjected to them. As a result, arbitrary imposition of control measures, without adequate consideration being given to persuasive and educational techniques should be avoided.

II. Topics for consideration.

These questions are posed to stimulate individual analysis and for possible use on discussion groups.

a. To what extent should US or Allied forces implement guerrilla tactics and techniques in counter-insurgency operations to insure civilian support and compliance to control measures?

b. In order to insure the effectiveness of control measures, should military and para-military elements disregard moral principles in enforcing measures--particularly on guerrilla-sympathetic civilians?

III. Purpose and scope

To develop an appreciation for the complexities involved in initiating and enforcing control measures.

IV. Required reading

a. Chapter 8, FM 41-10 (Revised)

b. Paragraph 47-51, FM 41-15

V. Reference reading


b. Staff Paper, Operations Research Office., John's Hopkins University, Second Printing, October 1961, "Civil Affairs in the Cold War".
1. Introduction

a. One of the most immediate problems facing the US Army is that of becoming an effective member of the US country team in the many countries throughout the world where Army personnel are stationed. In some countries, the problem is one of developing and maintaining good community relations - of being a good neighbor. In other countries, the Army is already heavily committed in counter-insurgency work, including extensive civil assistance programs. In view of the future possibilities that Army may become even more heavily committed, it is imperative that Army personnel be trained in these functions.

b. This practical exercise is designed to provide officers realistic training in making a systematic study of an assigned country, preparing an estimate of the situation, and developing a country plan. The six countries selected as representative of various regions of the world and of the various degrees of Army involvement in foreign relations, are Colombia, Ghana, Italy, Iran, South Vietnam, and Turkey.

c. Civil assistance activities in which the Army engages should be in accordance with the country plan representing the joint thinking and experience of the civilian and military agencies making up the US country team. For the Army to undertake civil assistance programs without first ascertaining that they are consistent with the country plan could result in duplication of effort, abortive programs,
embarrassment to the US Army and Government, and ineffectual implementation of U. S. foreign policy.

2. **Topics for Consideration**

a. What are some of the principal reasons why the United States and the Free World have not been more successful in countering the spread of Communism?

b. What are some of the factors which are forcing the US military forces to assume a more active role in the Cold War?

c. How can the U.S. and the Free World better marshal their capabilities to meet the threat of World Communism?

d. In determining the extent of the Cold War role of the military forces vis-a-vis civilian agencies, what are some of the principal guidelines to be considered?

e. Which elements of the military establishment are especially suitable for on-the-spot assistance to governments of underdeveloped countries threatened by Communist influence.

f. The Free World's approach to combating Communism has been criticized as being primarily reactive in nature. What are some of the inherent weaknesses of such a strategy?

3. **Scope and Purpose**

To develop an appreciation of and facility in country planning in selected representative countries of the world.

4. **Required Reading**


b. Hausrath, Alfred H., *Civil Affairs in the Cold War*, Chapters 3 and 5.

5. **Reference Reading**

a. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran*.


c. *Latin America, The Development of Its Civilization*. 
d. Colombia, by Pan American Union.

e. Munger, Sub-Sahara Africa.

f. Carlyle, Modern Italy.

g. Kahin, Government and Politics of Southeast Asia.

h. Thomas, Lewis V., The United States, and Turkey and Iran.