a sugar mill. In 1961 Poland contributed 7 million rubles to the Five-Year Plan.

The other Sino-Soviet bloc countries have granted aid since 1955 in the form of financial aid and goods. According to Communist sources Hungary contributed 6 million rubles to the Five-Year Plan. Bulgaria gave 4.8 million rubles in goods and, in 1961, made a contribution of more than 2 million rubles to the Five-Year Plan; Albania supplied goods valued at 62,300 rubles and Mongolia sent goods valued at 367,000 rubles. Mongolia also donated 100,000 animals to be delivered between 1950 and 1965 and has sent veterinarians and expert stockbreeders to North Vietnam. In 1962 North Korea made a gift of 10 trucks.

Pattern of Foreign Trade

The volume of foreign trade has expanded from an insignificant amount in 1955 to a value of 831.2 million rubles in 1960 (see table 7). The bulk of trade has been with the Sino-Soviet bloc countries, growing in value from 76 million rubles in 1955 to 421 million in 1958. The remainder of North Vietnam’s foreign trade was with 58 countries outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, mainly France, Japan, India and Indonesia.

Table 7. North Vietnam’s Foreign Trade, 1957–60
(in millions of rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>163.8</td>
<td>398.0</td>
<td>561.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>204.6</td>
<td>253.2</td>
<td>457.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>260.2</td>
<td>417.9</td>
<td>687.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>319.6</td>
<td>511.6</td>
<td>831.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For value of ruble, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from USSR Government publication.

Exports

Exports of products listed as “industrial” by the North Vietnamese regime have steadily drawn ahead of agricultural and forestry products in importance. Included in the industrial category were coal, handicrafts, ores, cement, floor tiles, clothing and footwear. Of this group of commodities, the major items of export were, however, coal and handicrafts. Beginning with 1957 over half a million tons of anthracite were shipped to Japan annually and significant tonnages were shipped to France, Belgium (re-exported through Czechoslovakia), Singapore and Italy. A considerable amount of coal was exported in the form of bunkering
foreign ships at Hon Gay, a trading port in the center of the coal region.

Handicrafts, consisting of articles made of silver, ivory, horn, bamboo and cane, have become an important export item, accounting for a relatively large share of total exports. Sales abroad have risen spectacularly: from a value of 1 million dong in 1955 to 4 million dong in 1956 and to a still higher value in subsequent years.

Of the wide variety of exports classed as "agricultural and forestry products"—which included rice, peanuts, sesame, castor oil, jute, canned or dried vegetables and fruits, fish and lumber, particularly rare woods—rice and lumber were the most important. More than 180,000 tons of rice were shipped abroad in 1957 to the Soviet bloc, Indonesia and India. No figures are available for subsequent years, except that $2 million worth of rice was sold to countries outside the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1960. No information is available on quantity of lumber shipped, but it appears to be a popular item among North Vietnam's customers.

Imports

The major portion of imports were producer goods (see table 8). Machinery and equipment ranked first and included large quantities of machine tools, precision, mechanical and optical equipment, electrical and radio apparatus, road-building equipment and agricultural machinery. Motor vehicles, especially trucks, and bicycles were also important import items.

Industrial raw materials were next in rank. These consisted of rolled steel, plastics, cotton and cotton thread. Another very important import was petroleum and petroleum products, supplied mainly by the Soviet Union.

Imported consumer goods consisted mainly of fabrics (mostly cotton), sugar and pharmaceuticals.

| Table 8. Composition of North Vietnam's Imports (in millions of rubles) |
|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Producer goods  | Consumer goods |
| 1957            | 266.6           | 131.4          |
| 1958            | 188.5           | 64.7           |
| 1959            | 356.5           | 51.4           |
| 1960            | 460.6           | 51.0           |

For value of ruble, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from USSR Government publication.
Balance of Payments

No balance of payments account is published by the regime. The request to the Sino-Soviet bloc countries for cancellation of debts totaling 480 million rubles is evidence of North Vietnam's unfavorable balance on account with these countries. The regime, however, has continued to point out that the trade balance was improving with exports paying for an increasing percentage of imports. North Vietnam's balance of trade with Japan is favorable; information on other trade partners outside the Sino-Soviet bloc is lacking.
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SECTION IV. MILITARY BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 31

THE ARMED FORCES

The military establishments in North and South Vietnam share a common heritage of Vietnamese history and draw upon the roughly equal human resources of a country divided in half, but they differ from each other in almost all other respects. The Vietnamese National Army in the South grew out of a militarized police force which was formed in 1947 and operated until 1954 as a component part of the French Union Forces in Indochina. In the North, on the other hand, the People's Army of Vietnam, organized officially in 1946, developed out of the Communist-led forces which, after World War II, took the offensive against French colonial rule.

When, in 1954, under the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, the country was partitioned along the Demarcation Line, which roughly follows the 17th parallel, the South and the North each embarked on a program to develop its armed forces. Financial, industrial and technical limitations then and since have made both almost entirely dependent on foreign logistical support and advice in training and organization. In the South this assistance comes mainly from the United States; in the North, from the Communist-bloc countries and chiefly from Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The estimated total strength of the South Vietnamese regular armed forces in mid-1962, based on published accounts, was approximately 250,000—about 1.7 percent of the total population of 14,650,000. The military establishment reportedly included: the National Army of 170,000; the Navy of 8,000; the Air Force of 5,000; and the Civil Guard of 68,000. A program to strengthen all components was in progress; and the Army, for example, was expected to increase to about 200,000 men by the end of 1962.

Military personnel were, on the whole, young. Many of the senior officers were under 40 years of age and had held subordinate positions in the French Union Forces; the bulk of the junior officers had received commissions after attending Da Lat Military Academy or one of the officer candidate schools. Most of the enlisted men were youths who had volunteered or been drafted after 1954. The combat experience of most junior officers and enlisted men had been gained in clashes with local guerrilla bands after the partitioning of the country.

The estimated total strength of the regular military establish-
ments in North Vietnam was estimated to be approximately 400,000—about 2.5 percent of the total population of 16,350,000. This strength included the Army of some 300,000 men and the Militia Units of at least 100,000. There was no separate air force or navy, but the army figures included a group of about 750 aviation specialists and a naval section composed of approximately 2,000 officers and men. Also included were the guerrilla troops, operating with the Pathet Lao forces in Laos and with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam; these, with specialists and advisers, totaled some 20,000 men. Members of the People's Army were generally older than those of the National Army of South Vietnam. Many of the senior officers had held high command positions in the Viet Minh forces which fought against the French in the Indochina War, and most of the junior officers had risen from the ranks. The establishment of conscription in 1959, however, began to bring younger soldiers and junior officers into the Army to take the places of combat-experienced veterans as these returned to civil life.

BACKGROUND

The Vietnamese pride themselves on the courage and fighting ability of their men, and they look back on a long history of bloody wars, generally defensive but sometimes offensive in nature. In the tenth century they expelled the Chinese who had ruled them for nearly a thousand years and thereafter, except for a brief period of Chinese occupation, resisted both Chinese and Mongol invasions.

The first Vietnamese military academy was established in the mid-thirteenth century. The Vietnamese government at that time had a dual hierarchy of civil and military mandarins under the emperor. Many of the Vietnamese generals distinguished themselves in successful defensive actions against stronger enemy forces. Vietnamese historians take special pride in the Vietnamese forces which stopped the formidable Mongol army of Kublai Khan in 1285.

In three successive campaigns before their final defeat, some 500,000 Mongols attempted to subjugate a Vietnamese army of less than 200,000. During the first campaign, in 1281, they succeeded in occupying nearly all of what is now North Vietnam. The Vietnamese, under the command of Prince General Tran Quoc Tuan (later known as Marshal Tran Hung Dao), regrouped in the mountains along the Chinese frontier. Profiting from the lessons learned from the first campaign, Tran Hung Dao compiled the first Vietnamese military manual, the Binh Thu Yeu Luoc (Essential Summary of the Military Arts), a treatise which dealt with
weather, terrain and human factors in warfare. After retraining his troops, he defeated the Mongols in 1285, killing their com-
mander, Sogatu.

A final Mongol attack, in which naval forces played a leading part, was repulsed by the Vietnamese who had installed in the river approaches long pointed stakes which, at low tide, pierced the hulls of the Mongol ships. This same technique was employed successfully by the North Vietnamese army against Franco-Viet-
namese naval craft during the 1946–54 hostilities.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Vietnamese engaged in intermittent wars with the Chams, their neighbors to the south who occupied much of what is now South Vietnam. Eventually the Vietnamese totally defeated the Chams, seized their lands and all but exterminated them.

A cult of military heroes eventually developed: their exploits are celebrated in song and story and temples have been erected in their memories. These celebrated events include heroic defeats as well as great victories, as in the case of the Trung sisters who led a revolt against the Chinese in the first century A.D. and chose suicide rather than surrender (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The episode has long been a source of inspiration to Vietnamese artists, writers and orators, and it is commemorated annually, especially in the South, as an example of self-sacrificing devotion to country.

Some successful generals like Marshal Tran Hung, are also still venerated in both North and South. In the North, however, the historic figures and their achievements have been overshadowed by the officially cultivated images of the personalities and events of the Indochina War and notably the victory at Dien Bien Phu. References to the centuries of resistance against the Chinese are supplanted by laudatory accounts of the “heroic action” of the Chinese People’s Army against the “forces of imperialism.”

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Strategic Considerations

Situated on the southern and southeastern rim of the Indochina Peninsula, South Vietnam has many strategic vulnerabilities and some advantages in relation to the neighboring states of Cambodia and Laos. Almost 750 miles long and from 25 to 130 miles wide, it presents its defenders with lengthy sea and land frontiers in relation to territory.

South Vietnam has an area of about 66,000 square miles (com-
parable to that of the state of Washington); its coastline of approxi-
mately 1,200 miles is about 300 miles longer than that of Cali-
ifornia. The country’s boundaries with its neighboring states—
Cambodia (575 miles), Laos (275 miles) and North Vietnam
(50 miles)—total approximately 900 miles. The boundaries with Cambodia and Laos are generally unmarked, almost inaccessible and virtually indefensible in many sections. Maneuver space is so limited that ground defenses against an attack from the sea or from Cambodia or Laos would have to be virtually in place. Defenses against thrusts from the north or south would risk encirclement.

Most of the people in each of the three geographic regions (the Mekong Delta, the Central Lowlands and the Central Highlands) live mainly on local resources, requiring little from the outside. Hence the loss of any particular area, except possibly the Saigon metropolitan district and the surrounding provinces, would not necessarily bring about the capitulation of the entire country.

The country is closer to important centers in Southeast Asia and India than it is to the cities of Central and North China. It is also farther by air from Saigon to Hanoi (700 miles) than from Saigon to Singapore (650 miles) or to Bangkok (475 miles). Calcutta is 300 miles closer by air than Shanghai (1,775 miles distant), and the distance to Peiping (2,150 miles) exceeds that to Darwin, Australia, by about 100 miles.

Terrain, weather and logistic considerations would present difficult problems to any military force operating in the area. In the Mekong Delta region the terrain is flat and poorly drained. In the dry season, overland movement is hampered by a close network of canals and sluggish streams and by extensive areas of swamp and marshland infested with snakes, leeches and insects. During the wet season, when vast areas are flooded, transport is limited to watercraft and amphibious vehicles (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

In the Central Highlands movement is seriously restricted by rugged mountains and deep, narrow valleys covered with forests and dense undergrowth. Track and wheeled vehicles are limited to the few roads. Pack animals and foot troops can move on the trails only with difficulty. In the wet season movement is likely to be further complicated by swollen streams with swift currents, washed-out bridges and landslides.

Open and rolling terrain occurs in relatively few areas, such as on the highland plateau extending from just east of Saigon to the uplands around Da Lat and in sections of the Central Lowlands coast. Large-scale airdrops would be feasible in these areas, but subsequent troop operations would soon be hampered by the nearby jungles.

The terrain lends itself to ambush and to the hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla warfare and is generally unsuitable for conventional military operations. The dense vegetation throughout the country
provides good concealment from air and ground observation and favors the escape of raiding parties.

Food and equipment deteriorate rapidly in the hot, humid climate. On the coasts special measures must be taken to protect armament, aircraft and motor transport from the corrosive effects of the sea air. During the wet season, fog, low clouds and torrential rains frequently interfere with air operations.

Relation to the National Economy

Manpower and Materiel

It is estimated that about 4,340,000 men are between the ages of 15 and 49 and that about 2,170,000 of these are physically fit for military service. The total manpower employed in maintaining the economy at its mid-1962 level has been put at approximately 2,761,000, and it is believed that about 1,381,000 of these are physically fit for military service (see ch. 13, Labor Force).

 Assuming that the effort to meet a large-scale invasion would require a 20 percent increase in the number of able-bodied men engaged in essential nonmilitary work (a total of 1,657,000 as compared with the 1,381,000 engaged in essential nonmilitary pursuits in 1962), there would remain a surplus of approximately 513,000 men available for military service. Deducting the 250,000 already in military service as of mid-1962 would leave 263,000 still available for mobilization. Thus, any mobilization of manpower for military units in excess of 250,000 to 300,000 physically fit males would impose a corresponding decrease in the number of persons engaged in activities essential for maintaining the country's present level of production. Rice production would suffer from a lack of hands during the short but critical planting and harvesting seasons. Transportation and commercial enterprises would also feel the military drain on the limited pool of persons with special skills.

Military Budget

The struggle against the Viet Cong imposes a burden of military expenditure which the country's economy can carry only with extensive foreign aid. Since independence in 1954 South Vietnam's yearly contribution toward the development and maintenance of its military establishment has been well under 20 percent of the actual cost, and the percentage has decreased with rising costs as the security forces have been enlarged and strengthened (see ch. 27, Public Finance; ch. 30, Foreign Economic Relations).

The funds allocated for defense in the annual budget have remained fairly constant since 1958. In relation to the total budget, the portion allocated for defense has declined from ap-
proximately 44 percent in 1958 to less than 39 percent in 1961 (see ch. 27, Public Finance). During this period the budget increases for the Departments of Public Works and Communications, the Interior, National Education and Public Health went mostly into rural programs, particularly those designed to improve security and living conditions in the countryside. Emphasis was placed on the establishment of agrovilles and strategic hamlets, the construction and maintenance of roads, schools and dispensaries, and the creation of the Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps and Republican Youth Rural Defense Groups.

In 1961 the military budget amounted to approximately 5,797 million piasters (for value of piaster, see Glossary). Of this amount, however, the United States aid program provided about 4,515 million piasters, exclusive of the cost of such things as weapons, trucks, airplanes and naval craft, which were also acquired under the aid program. Including the cost of these items, the South Vietnamese Government actually paid for about 10 percent of the national defense costs. At the same time, the allocation to the military establishment was larger than for any other single governmental agency.

Military expenditures have not roused any significant popular criticism, although the subject is among those exploited by Communist propagandists over Radio Hanoi and clandestinely in South Vietnam. The human and material sacrifices required to counter Viet Cong terror are part of the experience of the people even in remote villages, but few other than the educated minority are in a position to reflect on the division and expenditures of government income. Heavy as is the drain of the military budget on funds which might otherwise be spent for economic and social development, the population has in recent years been receiving more economic support and social services than ever before. In the countryside especially, such dissatisfaction as may exist in this realm undoubtedly relates more to the necessity of paying taxes and the personal impact of defense measures than to concern about budget allocation.

Missions and Organizations

Missions

The dual mission of the armed forces is to defend the nation's sovereignty and to bring about the pacification of the national territory. Since the withdrawal of the French Union Forces from Vietnam in June 1956, the principal task of the military has been the internal one of ending threats to the security of the state—first from armed religious sects and gangsters and currently from
the Viet Cong (see ch. 21, Public Order and Safety; ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities).

The National Army, as the major component of the armed forces, is expected to strike the main blows in offensive operations against the Viet Cong and at the same time to act as a ready reserve in support of the operations of the local Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps against the Viet Cong. In addition, elements of the Army perform many important noncombat functions, most of them indirectly related to the improvement of internal security. Most district, provincial and regional chiefs are army officers, and many others are on temporary duty with government civilian agencies, such as the Commission for Agricultural Development and the Interdepartmental Committee for the Development of Strategic Hamlets. Engineer units help construct roads, bridges and dikes; they also clear land and work on irrigation projects. Army medical teams engage in malaria eradication and other community health projects and treat the sick in some rural areas. Army units also distribute insecticides and fertilizers.

The official mission of the Civil Guard is to enforce the law and maintain public order and security in rural areas. It is also responsible for assisting other components of the armed forces in the pacification of the national territory.

The local Self-Defense Corps groups are charged with helping the authorities in the villages and other administrative units in which they are organized to maintain public order and security. They guard against sabotage and terrorist activities and protect public works. They are also used on emergency relief missions to local areas stricken by fire, flood and devastating storms. Despite their wide range of responsibilities, their police powers are limited to the apprehension of offenders for handing over to the police (see ch. 21, Public Order and Safety).

The general mission of the Navy, as defined by law, is to provide for the security of the sea approaches to the country and for the protection of the inland waterways in the Mekong Delta. It may also be called upon to furnish water transportation for Army personnel and materiel. It is charged with maintaining a marine group capable of conducting operations either alone or in conjunction with Army forces. The Navy also is responsible for maintaining coastal and inland waterway patrols to assist, when called upon, customs officials or internal security authorities operating against smugglers or others engaged in illegal activities.

The Air Force, besides providing close air support for the ground troops, has additional missions which include: attacking guerrilla groups and installations; transporting ground forces and their supplies; airlifting airborne troops; aerial reconnaissance; and search and rescue operations.
Command Structure

The President of the Republic is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 37 of the Constitution). Since his inauguration in 1955 President Ngo Dinh Diem has reserved for himself the portfolio of Secretary of State for National Defense. For actual direction of routine affairs in the Department of National Defense, the President is assisted by an Undersecretary of State for National Defense. New policies and all decisions on major issues require approval by the President himself acting in his capacity as Secretary of State for National Defense. A Permanent Secretariat General for National Defense keeps the President in close touch with departmental matters (see fig. 18).

The Undersecretary of State for National Defense is assisted by a staff called the Cabinet which is headed by a Director of Cabinet. The Director is responsible for collecting and reviewing documents which require approval of the Secretary of State for National Defense and for the preparation of studies as directed by the Secretary. The Cabinet maintains liaison between the Department of National Defense and other departments. It also transmits decisions of the Undersecretary of State for National Defense to the heads of offices and agencies concerned with them within the Department of National Defense and within other executive departments.

The Department of National Defense, as of June 1962, consisted of 21 offices, grouped into three general categories: Central Agencies, Departmental Services and Logistical Services.


The general function of each inspectorate or directorate is indicated by its title. The General Staff is headed by the Chief of the General Staff who has overall responsibility for military organization and training, for the development of the military establishment, and for the general coordination of the activities of the Army, Navy and Air Force. He is assisted by a deputy, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Staff. This officer has four principal assistants: the Armed Forces Field Commander, who is responsible for overall planning; and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force who as the chief representatives of their branches of the General Staff, hold the titles of Assistant Chief of Staff for Army, for Navy and for Air Force, respectively. In mid-1962, Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh, Chief of Staff of the
Figure 18. Organization of South Vietnam's Department of National Defense, 1961.
General Staff, was concurrently Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army.

The General Staff, theoretically a joint staff, is organized into five Joint Staff Sections, abbreviated as J–1 (for personnel matters), J–2 (for intelligence), J–3 (for operations and training), J–4 (for logistics) and J–5 (for psychological warfare and social services). The sections are composed mostly of army personnel, the Army being the largest component of the armed forces. The Joint Staff, in effect, serves as an Army General Staff, which also performs staff functions for the Navy and Air Force.

In the Departmental Services are the Directorates of Personnel, Military Justice and Gendarmerie, Military Security (counterintelligence), Psychological Warfare, Social Services, Veterans Affairs and Geographic Services.

The Logistical Services include the Quartermaster, Engineer, Transportation, Naval Technical, Ordnance, Health and Medical, Signal Communications and Air Force Technical Directorates. These agencies are responsible to the Chief of the General Staff for technical and operational matters but they are under the Department of National Defense for administration.

General Organization and Disposition

Army. The country is organized, for military purposes, into three corps areas and, for police and security matters, the Saigon Special Sector, which includes the capital and its environs. The corps designations, with their headquarters and areas of responsibilities are as follows: I Corps, Da Nang (formerly Tourane)—northern and central coastal provinces; II Corps, Pleiku—the Central Highlands provinces; III Corps, Saigon—the southern part of South Vietnam, including the Saigon Special Sector. The Army’s seven divisions are allocated to corps areas generally in proportion to the density of population and the seriousness of the Viet Cong threat in the area. As of mid-1962 the I Corps and II Corps each had two divisions; III Corps in the densely populated southern region had three. Each division is responsible for an area called a tactical zone which generally includes several provinces. The corps area commander can theoretically move his divisions from one province to another within his area of jurisdiction. The province chief, charged by law with responsibility for security within his province, may request the army commander in his area for additional troops to meet a threatened attack by Viet Cong forces. Differences in rank among these officers frequently complicate the situation. In 1962, 34 of the 39 province chiefs were army officers, and 25 of these held the rank of major—generally lower than that of the zonal military commander. Despite the need for definition of responsibilities and classification of command chan-
nels, in mid-1962 the coordination of the combat activities of the widely distributed line units seemed to be improving. 

_Navy._ The Navy is composed of the small staff section and the Naval Command. The Staff Section, headed by the Commandant of the Navy, consists of several branches, including: operations, which is also concerned with training, communications and intelligence matters; Logistics; and Psychological Warfare. The commandant is Chief of Staff for Navy on the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Naval Command is composed of the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishments. The Operating Forces consist of the Sea Force, the River Force, the Marine Corps and a paramilitary group called the Junk Force. The Sea Force included various types of small ships, such as escort vessels, minesweepers and shallow-draft landing craft. The River Force consists mainly of armed and armored patrol boats and some plastic motor-powered light vessels to supplement the LCVP (landing craft, vehicle, personnel), which are too heavy to be carried overland. The Marine Corps Group, with headquarters in Saigon, is organized into several battalions, each with infantry, light artillery and reconnaissance elements; these are similar to units of the United States Marine Corps. The Junk Force is a small fleet of locally constructed boats armed with rifles and .50-caliber machineguns. They are manned mainly by former fishermen. Supervised by a few men from the regular Navy, the Force patrols inlets and landing beaches to prevent the entry of Communist infiltrators and supplies.

The Shore Establishments include the Naval Headquarters, Supply Center and Shipyard—all in Saigon. The Shipyard, among the largest of its kind between Singapore and Japan, was established in 1886 by French authorities as their main ship-repair facility in the Far East. At the beginning of World War II, it employed up to 3,200 workers and technicians. It was reactivated after the Indochina War under the supervision of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). By 1961 Vietnamese engineers had replaced the 20-odd Japanese technicians who had helped reopen the yard.

_Air Force._ The Air Force, organized in 1952, remained under French control until 1955, when it became a component of the Armed Forces. The Commander of the Air Force, like his Navy counterpart, is also Chief of Staff for Air on the Joint Staff. The Air Force consists of a small Staff Section and four squadrons—fighter, liaison, transport and helicopter. The Squadrons are all based in the Saigon area, principally on a portion of the international airport, Tan Son Nhut, and at Rien Hoa, 15 miles northeast of...
of Saigon. Some planes of the liaison type are based at Da Nang, and some training planes are stationed at Nha Trang where flying and technical training courses are conducted. As of mid-1962, some of the facilities at Nha Trang were being transferred to the Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa bases.

The Military and Civil Order

Civilian Controls

The Constitution vests the President with direct and extensive controls over military affairs:

With the agreement of one half of the members of the National Assembly, the President of the Republic shall declare war and conclude treaties of peace (Article 36).

The President of the Republic shall appoint and dismiss all military and civil servants in conformance with existing laws, except in cases where the Constitution shall prescribe special procedures (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall bestow all decorations (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall exert the right of pardon, of mitigation, commutation, cancellation of penalty (Article 37).

The President of the Republic may sign a decree proclaiming a state of emergency, alert or siege in one or many areas; this decree may temporarily suspend the application of one or many laws in these areas (Article 44).

As Secretary of State for National Defense with 21 offices, including the General Staff of the Armed Forces, under him, the President controls all aspects of the operation of the military establishment. He apparently believes that the contest with the Communists calls for a merging of civilian and military leadership, and he has assigned many military officers to civil posts, especially to those with security functions. At the same time, himself a civilian, he has, by insistence on the personal loyalty of his appointees and the unhesitating use of his powers of dismissal, held in check any tendencies there might be for the military to develop political ambitions of its own. The attempted military coup of 1960 was put down decisively, and 2 years later there was no visible evidence that any important elements of the military still nourished the attitudes of that time (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities).

Indoctrination

Political indoctrination has been receiving increasing attention in the armed forces. Methods are both direct (through formal lectures) and indirect (by incorporation into regular military instruction and training). Initially “political officers” were assigned
to some troop units, but the title was soon changed to that of "psychological warfare officers." These officers, usually graduates of the Intelligence and Psychological Warfare School at Cho Lon, conduct indoctrination classes in the units to which they are attached and develop propaganda against the Viet Cong and the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

In 1959, out of the 132 hours allotted to the basic training of recruits, only 2 were given to indoctrination. Two years later the training schedule at the Da Lat Military Academy provided for 2 hours a week of "ideological guidance."

Political Influence

Military men, individually and collectively, play no overt part in partisan politics—either in the dominant National Revolutionary Movement or in any of the other small and tightly circumscribed minority parties which support President Ngo. Concern that the military establishment remain outside of politics is doubtless conditioned by regard for both the key role of the military in the defense of the country against the Communist assault and for the potential threat to the established government from an armed force which had developed political ambitions and policies of its own.

The political factions that plagued the military establishment just after independence apparently have been eliminated. In June 1954 when Ngo—then Premier—was given full military powers, he encountered a hostile group of pro-Bao Dai senior officers headed by General Nguyen Van Hinh, Army Chief of Staff, and General Nguyen Van Vy, Inspector General. General Hinh openly criticized Premier Ngo in October 1954 and, within a month thereafter, was dismissed from the service with the consent of Bao Dai. He subsequently lent his support to the rebellious sects, and his influence rapidly declined with their defeat in late 1955. Meanwhile, General Vy had been arrested by troops loyal to the Premier. The dissident officers of the sects and their supporters were also screened out during the process of integrating loyal elements of the religious groups into the Army (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities).

By 1956 virtually all of the elements which supported groups opposing the government had been eliminated from the armed forces. The officers and men who participated in the attempted coup of November 1960 were motivated by dissatisfaction with military policies. Their inability to obtain political support indicated a lack of close connection with outside political groups.

Civilian Attitude Toward the Military

The civilian attitude toward the military is generally favorable. Soldiers usually conduct themselves circumspectly and without
arrogance in their dealings with civilians. The Republic is too young to have a military tradition of its own—as distinguished from that common to the whole Vietnamese people—and the excitement of having a national armed force is still fresh. Military parades and exhibitions are viewed by admiring throngs and the population seems to respond generously to appeals for aid to servicemen or their families.

Provincial towns in particular have welcomed military units which give them both protection and an added source of income. Some unfavorable attitudes are reported from villages where military units have taken over property and tended to monopolize the limited facilities. Many villages, however, have asked for troops to defend them against the Viet Cong.

Foreign Influence

United States

The strongest foreign influence on the military establishment since the departure of the French forces in 1956 has been that of the United States. A considerable number of American military advisers are distributed among all staff and command echelons from headquarters in Saigon to company-sized units of all components of the armed forces. Many are teachers in service schools and training camps or instructors in the operation and maintenance of technical equipment. A sizable number of Vietnamese officers and men have attended military schools in the United States or have been sent on orientation visits to American military installations. Moreover, almost all materiel used by the armed forces comes from the United States.

France

Many senior and noncommissioned officers, some of whom had as much as 15 years' service in the French forces, continue to hold the training and tactical concepts they acquired at that time. French influence declined markedly after the defeat of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, but in 1955 about 600 Vietnamese officers were training in France as compared to less than 200 in the United States. Even in 1962, 5 years after the last of the French advisers had left the country, Vietnamese officers not infrequently could be heard voicing their doubts about the advantages of the United States military methods as compared with the more familiar French ones. Some were frankly reluctant to make the change, and their feelings were heightened by the necessity of shifting from French to English as the language of military instruction. These attitudes, which posed a problem for United States advisers, were more frequently encountered in the Army and Navy than in the Air Force, which had relatively few French-trained officers.
Other Countries

Methods employed by the Vietnamese against the Viet Cong owe much to British antiguerrilla tactics in Malaya—particularly the strategic hamlet concept (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities). The discipline and training standards of the British troops and British-trained Indian contingent in the occupation forces in 1945 also won the admiration of many members of the armed forces.

The Chinese Nationalist armed forces are favorably regarded by many ranking officers, some of whom have attended military courses in Taiwan. Vietnamese authorities reportedly have requested the services of a Chinese Nationalist team to organize a course for navy specialists in Saigon. Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek is also admired as a military leader, especially for the manner in which his troops are indoctrinated and controlled.

Quality of Manpower

The average adult male is South Vietnam is about 5 feet, 2 inches tall and weighs about 105 pounds. Accordingly he finds some difficulty in using many items of American equipment. The standard United States rifle stock is too long; the Browning automatic rifle is too heavy; and American parachutes are too large, causing the light-weight jumpers to descend slowly and be scattered over wide areas on landing.

The South Vietnamese soldier also is generally sturdy and wiry and apt to have good stamina. Active and manually dexterous he is readily trained in the use of modern military equipment. Most recruits are accustomed to working out of doors in tropical heat, humidity and monsoonal rains. They can live in the field for an extended period on a daily ration of 2 pounds of rice and a portion of nuoc mam (a pungent fish sauce).

Males in the military age group (18 to 45) are subject to the same diseases—principally malaria, trachoma, amoebic dysentery and tuberculosis—which affect the general population. The proportion of them who are physically fit for military service is commonly estimated to be approximately 50 percent (see ch. 16, Health and Sanitation).

On the whole amenable to discipline and resourceful in carrying out orders, the South Vietnamese soldier manifests little initiative and tends to assume responsibility with reluctance. Reactions under fire are varied and seem to depend largely upon the training and experience of the troops. In antiguerrilla warfare, trained soldiers under capable leadership have displayed excellent combat discipline. American advisers generally regard the troops with whom they are associated as being effective, trustworthy and
courageous under fire. There have been instances of abandonment of equipment and heavy losses through surrender, but, almost without exception, these have been confined to untrained, poorly led Self-Defense Corps units undergoing surprise attack.

Conscription

The conscription system appears to be equitably and efficiently managed and adequate to meet the needs of the armed forces. Evasion of service—formerly common—is being checked by the application of a comprehensive identity card system. Gradual improvement is also being made in the keeping of personnel files of former servicemen and conscripts by the military affairs section chief in each district.

The Military Mobilization Ordinance of 1953, presumably still in effect in 1962, prescribed the military service obligations in wartime for all male citizens between 18 and 33 years of age. A conscription program, initiated in August 1957, established compulsory peacetime military service for all males 20 and 21 years of age. The first contingent served 12 months, devoting 4 months to basic training at the Quang Trung Military Training Center near Saigon before assignment to duty in units. In January 1959 the service period was extended to 18 months and, in July 1961, to 24 months. Meanwhile, the basic training period was reduced to 2 months.

Conscripts may take an examination for admission to the Thu Duc Officers’ Candidate School for reserve officers. Upon the completion of basic training, certain conscripts are selected to take special courses in technical subjects, such as radio maintenance, motor mechanics and field engineering. Others are selected to take advance courses in infantry, artillery or other line units.

Exemptions are given only for health reasons; deferments are granted to students attending universities and advanced schools of fine arts, technical sciences and pedagogy. If two brothers are called up at the same time, one may be given a deferment.

A special program for procuring and training young reserve officers was begun in July 1961. Under its provision all men between the ages of 20 and 33 years who had had a high school education or its equivalent were called into service to attend a 6-months’ course at the Thu Duc Officers’ Candidate School. Another callup under this program was announced in January 1962. Deferments are considered only for those in essential occupations. College students called up during the school year might be given special examinations to permit them to respond to the summons without loss of academic credit or they might be granted a postponement until the time when the regular examinations would be held.
The conscription of young men born in Vietnam of Chinese parents did not begin until early in 1962 when those between 19 and 30 years of age were directed to determine their callup status with precinct or district authorities. Youths in this category have the same privileges and must meet the same requirements for admission to the Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School as do those of Vietnamese extraction.

Civil service employees, when conscripted or recalled for active duty training, are placed on a "military leave." They receive the pay of their military rank and have re-employment rights at the end of their service. Should they be called up during a period of national mobilization, they are given differential allowances to make their pay appropriate to their military rank or to their civil service grade, whichever is higher.

Training

Training activity has increased steadily in scope and intensity since 1956 when military responsibilities were transferred from the French to the Vietnamese. New military schools have been established. Army, Navy and Air Force personnel have been instructed in the operation and maintenance of equipment received from the United States. American advisers and instructors have introduced American training methods, tactical doctrines and strategic concepts.

With the intensification of Viet Cong activity which began late in 1958 the training of the ground forces has emphasized anti-guerrilla operations in jungle terrain. Technical skills have not been neglected and, after completing basic training, about 40 percent of the conscripts are enrolled in technical courses. Army, Navy and Air Force units receive some combined training; on occasion they have taken part in joint actions against the guerrillas along the coast or in the waterways of the Mekong Delta, sometimes in conjunction with Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps units.

The Command and General Staff College, which was organized in 1956 at Saigon as the military college, is the highest institution in the military educational system. Its course for field-grade officers offers instruction in staff work, in combined operations and in general academic subjects. The course for selected company-grade officers provides training in staff procedures. Short refresher courses apparently are available to selected officers of the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel to keep them abreast of important changes in policy and the use of major new weapons.

The Da Lat Military Academy, established by the French in 1950, is the principal source of career officers for the Army.
1953 to 1958 more than 2,500 cadets graduated from 1-year courses with the rank of second lieutenant. In 1957 the cadet course was extended to 4 years. Entrance requirements included: a high school diploma (baccalauréat); age between 17 and 22 years; a physical fitness certificate; bachelor status and a promise to remain unmarried until after graduation. Of the 200 members of the class which entered in 1957, 57 graduated in 1961 and were granted commissions as second lieutenants.

The Thu Duc Officers’ Candidate School, sometimes called the Thu Duc Inter-Arms School or the Thu Duc Military School, was established in the mid-1950’s to prepare students for reserve commissions. By April 1958 it had graduated almost 3,300 reserve officers. Meanwhile the installation was expanded with the addition of special courses in artillery, engineering, ordnance, transportation and signal communications. Branch schools developed out of these courses, and the combined schools became known as the Thu Duc Military Schools Complex. The Complex provides theoretical instruction and practical training for officers and enlisted men in the use of equipment and the handling of units in their respective services. As of early 1961, the engineer and signal communications section of the branch schools were situated at Vung Tau. After July 1961, when males between the ages of 20 and 33 with a high school education or its equivalent began to be conscripted and sent to Thu Duc for a 6-month training course, classes in the Officers’ Candidate School alone have averaged about 1,500 members. The Complex has become the largest and one of the most important military training institutions in the country.

The Air Training School at Nha Trang conducts basic training courses for pilots, observers, mechanics and other specialists. In 1961 some of the courses and training facilities were transferred to Tan Son Nhut, the major airbase at Saigon, and to the secondary base at Bien Hoa.

The Naval Training School at Nha Trang, the Navy’s main training facility, has two sections designated as Class “A” and Class “B.” Class “A” is the Naval Officers’ Candidate School. It also gives basic technical training courses for naval specialists and for potential petty officers. Class “B” offers advanced technical training courses, lasting from 3 to 9 months, for specialists and petty officers. The Center for Practical Training at Saigon supervises on-the-job training for ship and boat crews.

The Intelligence and Psychological Warfare School at Cho Lon was established early in 1956 to train selected officers and non-commissioned officers of the armed forces to be specialists in military intelligence and psychological warfare. President Ngo, in October 1961, presided over the ceremonies marking the graduation of the first class of staff officers from the school.
The Armed Forces Language School was established at Saigon in 1956 as an English-language school to give officers and enlisted men a working knowledge of English in preparation for entering foreign military courses. In 1961 plans were under way to add courses in Chinese, Khmer (Cambodian) and Thai languages.

The Military Medical Training Center, sometimes called the School of Military Health, was established in 1956 as an adjunct of the University of Saigon. The Center, commanded by a colonel, is charged with supervising the work of the military medical students in the medical and pharmacy colleges. It also is responsible for training military nurses, aidmen, pharmacists, medical officers and assistant medical officers.

The Quang Trung Military Training Center near Saigon gives an 8-week course in basic military training to all conscripts and recruits before their assignment to branch courses or technical units. The Center also conducts special training courses for paramilitary and police contingents.

The Civil Guard Training Center is located at Hai Ninh (formerly Song Mao) on the South China Sea coast south of Da Lat. It provides training courses for newly formed Civil Guard companies.

The Ranger Training School at Nha Trang is sometimes called the “Commando School” or the “NCO Academy.” The Ranger courses vary in length and generally consist of basic training followed by special courses which include instruction in antiguerrilla warfare, “commando” tactics, military intelligence and physical training. Both officers and noncommissioned officers are enrolled in some of the special courses.

Members of the armed forces respond well to all types of training and appear anxious to learn. Most recruits and conscripts are unfamiliar with modern machines and equipment, but a high percentage of them display an aptitude for technical skills, which they acquire rapidly. Accustomed as most of them are to hard agricultural work and a subsistence standard of living, they adapt quickly to the rigors of antiguerrilla operations.

Logistics

Transport, terrain, weather and limited industrial facilities create special difficulties with respect to supply, distribution, troop movement and evacuation. Logistical problems are paramount in all military operations, including offensive or defensive action against guerrillas. Almost everywhere in the Mekong River Delta during the wet season, troops and supplies moving on the largely unsurfaced roads encounter extensive flooding, washed-out bridges and deep mud. In many places, shallow-draft river craft and heli-
copters are the only practical means of transport for extended periods. During the dry season, movement off the limited road net is impeded by such obstacles as swampy jungles, canals, drainage ditches and dikes. In the mountainous areas, traffic, except on the few improved roads, is hampered at all seasons by dense jungle growth, narrow gorges, narrow bridges and steep grades—all favorable for ambushes. In the face of these difficulties, the tendency has been to decentralize supply and logistical services to corps areas and to keep supplies in depots to relieve military units as far as possible of the burden of storage and transport.

Equipment

The armed forces are equipped almost entirely with United States equipment of the World War II type. Considerable supplies are on hand, but some equipment, especially motor vehicles, suffers from the shortage of trained maintenance personnel. Troops appear to feel that they are well equipped, but some man-carryed items apparently are too heavy for the average Vietnamese. For example, some units prefer the light and short-barreled carbine or the Armalite automatic rifle to the heavier 11½ pound M-1 rifle.

The Army's heavy weapons include: mortars (60-mm, 81-mm and 4.2-inch); recoilless rifles (57-mm and 75-mm); howitzers (75-mm, 105-mm and 155-mm); antiaircraft guns (40-mm and 90-mm); a considerable number of self-propelled guns; and light and medium tanks. In addition, some armored personnel carriers, including those of amphibious type (M-113), are in use. As of mid-1962, several United States Army helicopter companies were available to the Vietnamese forces for evacuation and transport.

Naval units include escort vessels, minesweepers, and a number of light patrol boats and shallow-draft landing craft.

The Air Force is equipped with fighter-trainer (T-28) planes which bear the brunt of the air attack against the Viet Cong. Other aircraft include: light bombers (B-26 and AD-6); transport planes (C-47); liaison and reconnaissance planes (L-20); and cargo planes (C-123), some of which are equipped for spraying chemicals and others for troop transport.

Medical Facilities

Medical facilities are expanding, and the military forces apparently receive a higher standard of medical care than the general population. At least four military hospitals are in operation—at Saigon, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Pleiku. In other areas civilian facilities are made available for military use if they are needed.

 Physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and technicians
—educated under a government-sponsored program at the Military Medical Training Center in Saigon—may be drafted for service in the armed forces for a period of up to 10 years.

A presidential decree of May 1962 ordered the conscription of civilian physicians, but information regarding the extent of the callup is not available. As of July 1962, however, about half of the approximately 600 physicians in South Vietnam were serving with the armed forces. In addition, United States aid authorities were recruiting American medical teams composed of surgeons, nurses and hospital technicians to work under the Vietnamese Department of Public Health in provincial capitals and other large towns. Team members were on call to fly to combat areas to treat Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps and civilian casualties, leaving the military medical organization free to care for the regular armed forces.

Medical equipment and supplies appear to be adequate. Considerable quantities were turned over to army authorities by the French forces when they withdrew, substantial amounts are provided under the United States aid program, and some are purchased with government appropriations. Vaccines, serums and penicillin are manufactured in the Pasteur Institute Laboratories at Saigon, Nha Trang and Da Lat. Facilities are available for collecting, storing, distributing and administering whole blood and plasma (see ch. 16, Health and Sanitation).

Evacuation of sick and wounded during operations in jungle, swampy or mountainous terrain presents serious problems. Many cases are evacuated by helicopter and, in areas accessible to landing strips, by conventional aircraft, but litter or pack animals are often the only means available.

Morale Factors

Troop morale varies from one unit to another but generally appears to be good. It is perhaps best in the Air Force because of the relatively high educational requirements for admission, the opportunities it offers for the acquisition of special skills, and the satisfactions derived by its members from the operation of complex technical equipment. Similar considerations make for good morale among some components of the Navy, especially the Marines, the Airborne Brigade and the armored units of the Army.

The Director of Social Services in the Department of National Defense has functions which have an important bearing on troop morale. He is charged with planning and supervising social work and mutual assistance activities for military personnel and their families. In 1962 he promoted the establishment of camps for married enlisted men and schools for their children near some of
the military garrisons. Also active in the field of social services for the military is the Vietnamese branch of the Veterans Association (L'Association des Anciens Combattants), which was organized during the colonial period. The Association sends gifts to soldiers in combat units stationed in remote areas and to the sick and wounded in hospitals. In January 1962 it reportedly was trying to establish a committee in each province to act as intermediary between the government's administrative services and the families of wounded and killed enlisted men.

The formal recognition of outstanding service is benefiting morale, and promotions, decorations or citations are awarded those who have distinguished themselves in action. In March 1962 about 150 lieutenants and enlisted men were promoted one grade for their "exceptional performance of duty in anti-Communist operations" in Tay Ninh Province.

Ranks

The structure of rank in the Army and Navy broadly resembles those of the corresponding French forces, while Air Force ranks parallel those of the United States Air Force (see figs. 19 and 20). The normal duties and responsibilities of servicemen in the various ranks and grades are also comparable to those in the United States forces. Because of the small number of officers holding the rank of general, however, some divisions are commanded by colonels, while majors and captains command battalions. Likewise the commandant of the Navy is a naval captain and the commander of the Air Force is a colonel.

Military Justice

The military court system consists basically of courts-martial, similar in composition and jurisdiction to the special courts of the United States Army. Each has jurisdiction over the members of the military unit within which it is established. The commanding officer of the unit within which a court functions convenes it and reviews its decisions. On a higher level are the regional military tribunals which apparently correspond to the general courts-martial of the United States Army. The regional tribunals have jurisdiction over all military personnel and over civilians charged with offenses against national security. Heading this system is the Director of Military Justice and Gendarmerie.

The regional tribunals, commonly called special military courts, are established at Saigon, Ban Me Thuot and Hue. Other special military courts may be formed and their jurisdiction defined, as needed. These courts are composed of: a president having the rank of colonel or higher who is licensed to practice law; a member who is chief of the area where the court sits; and a member who is an
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vietnamese Title</th>
<th>Literal Translation</th>
<th>United States Equivalent</th>
<th>Rank Insignia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Tuong</td>
<td>Superior General</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Tuong</td>
<td>Senior General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truong Tuong</td>
<td>Intermediate General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thieu Tuong</td>
<td>Junior General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Ta</td>
<td>Senior Grade Superior Officer</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truong Ta</td>
<td>Intermediate Grade Superior Officer</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thieu Ta</td>
<td>Junior Grade Superior Officer</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Uy</td>
<td>Senior Grade Junior Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Intermediate Grade Junior Officer</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thieu Uy</td>
<td>Junior Grade Junior Officer</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Student Officer</td>
<td>None (Cadet Military Academy)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sinh Vien Si Quan</td>
<td>Student Officer Candidate</td>
<td>None (Officer Candidate)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<td>ENLISTED MEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thuong Si Nhat</td>
<td>Senior Grade Superior NCO</td>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Si</td>
<td>Superior Grade NCO</td>
<td>First sergeant</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truong Si Nhat</td>
<td>Senior Grade NCO</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truong Si</td>
<td>Intermediate Grade NCO</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha Si Nhat</td>
<td>Junior Grade NCO</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha Si</td>
<td>Low Grade NCO</td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bich Nhat</td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bich Nhi</td>
<td>Private Second Class</td>
<td>Recruit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trung Dinh</td>
<td>Able Bodied Man</td>
<td>None (Conscript)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) General Officer: silver stars.
(2) Field Grade Officer: silver plum blossoms.
(3) Company Grade Officer: gold plum blossoms.
(4) Cadet Military Academy: gold disc with raised letter in gold.
(5) Cadet Candidate: gold disc with raised letter in red.
(6) "Si," the Vietnamese term for "student," is also applied to "noncommissioned officers" (NCO).
(7) Sergeant Major: gold disc.
(8) First Sergeant: silver disc.
(9) Chevrons for corporal: top portion silver and lower portions gold colored cloth.
(10) Chevrons for corporals: silver colored cloth.
(11) Chevrons for privates: gold colored cloth.


Figure 19. Rank Structure and Rank Insignia of South Vietnam's Army, 1961.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vietnamese Title</th>
<th>Literal Translation</th>
<th>United States Equivalent</th>
<th>Rank Insignia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai Quan Dai Ta</td>
<td>Senior Grade Superior Naval Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Insignia" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hai Quan Trung Ta</td>
<td>Intermediate Grade Superior Naval Officer</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>Hai Quan Thieu Ta</td>
<td>Junior Grade Superior Naval Officer</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
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<td>Hai Quan Dai Uy</td>
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<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hai Quan Trung Uy</td>
<td>Intermediate Grade Junior Naval Officer</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hai Quan Thieu Uy</td>
<td>Junior Grade Junior Naval Officer</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuan Uy</td>
<td>Student Officer</td>
<td>None (Cadet Naval Academy)</td>
<td><img src="image7" alt="Insignia" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENLISTED MEN</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Si Nhat(2)</td>
<td>Senior Grade Superior Petty Officer</td>
<td>Senior Chief Petty Officer</td>
<td><img src="image8" alt="Insignia" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Si</td>
<td>Superior Grade Petty Officer</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer</td>
<td><img src="image9" alt="Insignia" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trung Si Nhat</td>
<td>Senior Grade Petty Officer</td>
<td>Petty Officer First Class</td>
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<td>Trung Si</td>
<td>Intermediate Grade Petty Officer</td>
<td>Petty Officer Second Class</td>
<td><img src="image11" alt="Insignia" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ha Si Nhat</td>
<td>Junior Grade Petty Officer</td>
<td>Petty Officer Third Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ha Si</td>
<td>Low Junior Grade Petty Officer</td>
<td>Seaman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thuy Thu</td>
<td>Low Grade Seaman</td>
<td>Seaman Apprentice</td>
<td><img src="image14" alt="Insignia" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Gold colored stripes.
(2) "Si," the Vietnamese term for "student," is also applied to noncommissioned officer or petty officer.
(3) Center stripe: white.
(4) Center chevron: light blue.


**Figure 20. Rank Structure and Rank Insignia of South Vietnam's Navy, 1961.**