FIELD CIRCULAR

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

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U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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This FC expires May 1989 unless sooner superseded or rescinded
Preface

This field circular provides basic principles for operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict as described in TRADOC Pam 525-44, US Army Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict. It is intended for use by staffs and commanders charged with duties and responsibilities related to these operations, and provides direction for other functional and branch publications.

The principles are directed toward US Army elements and apply in joint and combined operations. With appropriate modification, these principles can be applied by foreign governments receiving security assistance from the United States.

References herein to activities of terrorist and insurgent organizations and to concepts of operations of foreign governments are made for illustrative and informational purposes. The presence of the material in this circular does not constitute US Army advocacy or approval of practices that are prohibited by US law or policies.

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

This publication reflects the current thought of this agency and augments existing doctrine. It is not available through the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center. User MACOMs may reproduce and provide additional copies to units under their operational control after verification with the preparing agency.

FREDERICK M. FRANKS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commandant
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INTRODUCTION

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, military, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities up to, but not including, combat between regular forces.

Military objectives in low-intensity conflicts are derived from the overall strategy. The US Army’s mission in LIC can be divided into four general categories: foreign internal defense (FID), terrorism counteraction, peacekeeping operations, and contingency operations. FID, terrorism counteraction, and peacetime contingency operations can be found at all levels of conflict. These general categories are not mutually exclusive, but often overlap. As examples, peacekeeping forces must take precautions to protect the force from terrorism, and a peacetime contingency operation may be executed as a result of a terrorist incident.

All LIC missions require continuing emphasis on intelligence. Prior to force commitment, intelligence must be effectively collected, processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational requirements. During the execution of operations in LIC, intelligence will prove crucial. The LIC threat is more ambiguous than threats in other scenarios as guerrillas and terrorists can blend with the civilian population. Intelligence can effectively preclude the use of force or ensure selective force application which avoids unnecessary casualties.

In applying the doctrine presented in this circular, the commander must adapt the doctrine to a specific situation within a low-intensity environment. For example, the situation in each country faced with an insurgency is unique to that country. Therefore, commanders must adapt FID operations to the situation and the environment in that country. Likewise, commanders must adapt each antiterrorism program, each counterterrorist operation, each peacekeeping operation, and each peacetime contingency operation to a specific situation within a specific environment. Principles, policies, and programs applied successfully in one situation may be unsuitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. The principles presented provide only a general guide; one must use judgement to adapt them to each situation.

Foreign Internal Defense

Initially, the US effort will be directed toward assessing the threat to the host government and to US interests. The country team, under the direction of the chief of the US diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, will assess the situation in-country and recommend what type and magnitude US assistance, if any, should be provided. If the host nation requests support and US interests are involved, the US National Command Authorities (NCA) may direct the US Army to participate in FID.
When an insurgency has been recognized as a challenge to the host government's authority, the United States may assist through a security assistance program designed to improve the indigenous government's capability for counterinsurgency operations. Where there is no US security assistance organization (SAO), the United States and host nation may agree to establish such an organization and to use mobile training teams (MTTs) to provide assistance. SAO personnel can advise and assist on the military aspects of internal defense if requested to do so by the host nation and approved by the US Government. MTTs may train indigenous forces to better prepare them with the skills needed for counterinsurgency operations.

The host nation, however, is unlikely to request the presence of US troops, even in small numbers, unless the threat has reached serious proportions. When a government under insurgent attack requests foreign assistance, the government may become more vulnerable politically and psychologically. Also, the US may be unwilling to provide assistance unless a serious threat to US interests is indicated. For these reasons, one can expect contingency planning and negotiations for assistance to take place, but no formal host government request for assistance will be made until the level of intensity of insurgent activity reaches a point where the host government recognizes a serious threat to its continued existence.

Should the insurgency escalate to organized guerrilla warfare (insurgent war), US assistance efforts would probably be of a higher level. The United States could provide equipment, training, and, under some circumstances, unit advisors and support for indigenous forces. The US response would probably be limited to specially trained security assistance forces, combat support, and combat service support elements. A commitment of this size would probably exceed a SAO's capability and require the commander of the unified command to establish a command and control headquarters in the host nation.

Should the insurgency continue to escalate to a war of movement, expanded US assistance may include selected and specially tailored US combat forces. In this situation, the host government will be expected to provide the maximum possible manpower for its combat forces. US forces and indigenous forces should operate under the direction of a combined headquarters and an overall combined plan. This will be facilitated if US support elements and unit advisors or trainers are present with indigenous forces when US combat forces are introduced. Normally, US combat forces will be under the operational command of a US commander of a joint task force or a subordinate unified command.

US assistance may be initiated at any level of conflict. It is not intended that a gradual escalation of US commitment from a training effort to employing combat forces will necessarily take place. A realistic assessment should consider long-term assistance activities and the probable duration of US participation. It is possible that US combat forces will precede other elements into the host nation, however, this is the exception and not the norm.
The host nation government and US representatives will continue to assess the threat and to negotiate the level of US assistance. Even before US participation begins, planning should prepare for eventual withdrawal. United States withdrawal should be phased in conjunction with an increase in host nation capabilities, possible added support from other nations, or a decrease in the threat.

Military operations against insurgent forces should be only a part of the fight to prevent defeat of the host government. Environmental conditions in many third world countries provide a fertile breeding ground for insurgency; they are a part of the threat and must be addressed by any government that seriously attempts to prevent or defeat an insurgency. FID is part of an overall effort of internal defense and internal development. Because of the complex nature of insurgency, this circular places significant emphasis on FID.

Terrorism Counteraction

The Army's primary role in terrorism counteraction lies in protecting its personnel, units, and facilities from terrorist acts and, when directed by higher authorities, providing specially trained personnel to respond to terrorist incidents. Sound intelligence and a high level of individual awareness are essential elements of a successful terrorism counteraction effort.

The Army's antiterrorism effort is based on the need to develop an attitude towards security (force protection) that will serve under conditions of peace, mobilization, and war. Force protection includes individual, unit, and installation efforts based upon a continuous appreciation of the terrorist threat and development of a security posture in response to that threat.

The essence of force protection is to make Army personnel and physical assets less vulnerable to terrorist acts. This is done by reducing access to likely targets, and by using physical security measures and personal protection, thereby elevating the risks to an individual or group who might attempt to attack Army personnel or facilities.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping forces temporarily provide the conditions of security that permit the search for stability and a political solution to either an international or an internal conflict. In peacekeeping operations it is essential that the peacekeeping force act as an impartial obstacle to conflict.

The mission and authority of forces used in peacekeeping or peacemaking must be clearly stated. If the mission is to prevent the outbreak of fighting between the disputing parties, then the military forces must have adequate authority and sufficient strength to do that.
Peacekeeping forces are ideally composed of international contingents that are established by agreement of the disputing parties. In some circumstances, as in the case of a need to react quickly to prevent widespread bloodshed, the United States may undertake operations to restore order and enforce the peace. These latter operations, undertaken without the consent of one or more of the belligerents, are often called peacemaking operations.

Peacetime Contingency Operations

US forces may be called upon to resolve situations that, although short of conflict between conventional forces, involve US security for intelligence missions, raids, rescue missions, or other limited uses of force. For example, US forces may be required to evacuate US citizens endangered in a foreign country. This can happen when the security situation has deteriorated to a point where a host government cannot or will not fulfill its responsibility for the safety of US nationals.

Although conventional forces may perform such missions, these operations often call for exceptional combat skills and varying types of specialized training. Contingency operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict; however, when performed in a low-intensity conflict, the requirement to deal with political or other nonmilitary aspects of the operation significantly increases.
CHAPTER 1

The Environment

This chapter outlines characteristics common to many developing nations. It identifies social, political, economic, and psychological factors that may contribute to political instability and lead to internal conflict. It discusses the vulnerabilities and environmental conditions that outside governments or insurgents may attempt to take advantage of for their own purposes. It is in this setting that the US Army is most likely to be committed to FID.

In society, change is always taking place. Some may want change while others may try to prevent it. Change may be violent or nonviolent. Although dealing effectively with the forces of change has always been a problem, today change comes more quickly, making the problem more complex.

Many developing nations are experiencing rapid economic and political change with limited or underdeveloped human and material resources and very limited modern technological knowledge.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

Each developing nation is unique. Each has its own history, culture, and goals combined in a way that produces problems different from those in any other nation. Although each nation is unique, certain conditions are common among developing nations.

Developing nations are those that are progressing beyond traditional societies and that are experiencing economic, social, military, political, technological, and psychological change. This change is normally characterized as modernization, growth, and national development. The national power of a developing nation is generally on the rise, but is far below that of a developed industrial nation.

Through this change, developing nations are discarding the traditions, values, institutions, and perceptions of a traditional society and replacing them with evolving new ones. This often results in anxiety and frustration, which may create tension and disorder. Dissatisfied and ambitious individuals and organizations may attempt to take advantage of these conditions, seeking to gain power through peaceful or violent means.

Developing nations often lack a united population. Various groups
within these nations tend to be isolated; in some cases groups straddle international boundaries, and often relate to government only in local terms. Centuries of rural living or tribal dominance have established definite patterns and values. Changes in the economic and political situation disrupt these established patterns and values and can produce tension. Some may resist change which they see as threatening their traditional tribal, religious, or ethnic ways. A traditional elite unwilling to surrender or share power; a small, poorly developed middle class; and a poverty-stricken people who do not have a voice in government; all contribute to a potential for internal conflict.

Within many nations, the military often plays a major role in development. The military's impact on the modernization process depends upon its capabilities and its influence within the government, its relations with the population, the extent of internal conflict, and the presence or absence of an external threat.

The many problems of developing nations and the growing gap between the industrial and developing nations not only cause internal problems but seriously affect relationships between nations.

Social Factors

Modernization tends to change the traditional way of life of people. It often lessens the loyalties and identity of the people with race, region, tribe, family, religion, language, and traditions. Although people may give up much of their traditional values and can be influenced to adopt new values, these changes may lead to conflict. The extent to which the traditional social structure and customs of a people change during modernization varies considerably among nations.

In breaking away from familiar ways, the people seek improved conditions. Rural people without marketable skills move into already over-crowded urban areas expecting to find a better life. Often they are disappointed by a lack of employment and bad living conditions. Disappointment contributes to growing frustration and the belief that they are helpless under current conditions. This situation provides the breeding ground for loss of hope in the government, which can be exploited by individuals or groups who seek to overthrow the government. The key point is an insurgent group can offer what seems to be a way to improve conditions. Understanding this is to understand why violence can be promoted by the insurgents.

The following social factors are common to many developing nations:

- Population growth and concentrations of people increase faster than the economic growth necessary to meet the needs of the population.
A major segment of the rural population is separated from the nation's political life.

Many people tend to identify with their local, regional, tribal, ethnic, or indigenous groups, but not with the nation.

A high degree of illiteracy exists.

Rapid urbanization strains available housing, public utilities, and social services.

Expanding communications such as radio and television make people aware of better standards of living that they do not share.

The power of a comparatively small, dominant elite group is challenged.

The leadership strives to preserve its power and affluence.

A wide social, economic, and political gap exists between the small power structure and the majority of the people.

There are groups such as ethnic and tribal minorities that have not become a part of the general society.

The military officer corps is composed mainly of members of privileged groups.

The police organization is generally poorly trained and ill-equipped and, if oppressive, may be viewed as outsiders by the local population.

Available health care is minimal for a large part of the population.

Nutrition is generally poor.

Religion often has an important role in the society.

Economic Factors

Rapid and uneven rates of economic development can cause serious problems in developing nations. These changes tend to cause internal instability and create social unrest and political problems. In a crisis, important groups of people may challenge the government and turn to violent measures.

Uneven rates of economic development produce contrasts. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and technology exist alongside regions with poor economies. Poor transportation and communications facilities
often make economic and cultural relationships between regions more difficult. The following economic factors are common to many developing nations:

- Dependence on foreign sources for manufacturing and technological expertise.
- An economy dependent on one or two types of raw material exports—agricultural (coffee, rubber, cotton) or extractive (copper, oil, bauxite).
- High foreign capital investment compared with domestic investment.
- Inadequate economic, industrial, and transportation infrastructure.
- Reliance on outside sources to help development programs.
- Heavy external debt which inhibits development.
- A high proportion of jungle, desert, or other land unfit for agriculture.
- Limited availability and allocation of resources for improvement of agriculture.
- Ownership of land largely concentrated in the hands of a few.
- Subsistence level agriculture.
- Low per capita income.
- Vast income disparity between the few rich and many poor.

Political Factors

The lack of an effective administrative system and the lack of informed, popular participation in the political process are major weaknesses facing the governments of many developing nations. The governmental structure of new nations is often weak. In many nations, dictatorships and military regimes emerge to replace weak governments. These authoritarian regimes, lacking an effective, responsive civil service, have problems with governmental administration.

In many developing nations, the bureaucracy tends to favor one group over others. In rural or agriculturally oriented nations, local leadership tends to be traditionally oriented. Development of a capable, modern civil service is difficult under these conditions.
In most nations, there are powerful organizations outside the formal structure of government. These groups usually reflect special interests based on kinship, class, ethnic, religious, or regional factors, and perform functions similar to those of political parties.

Formally established political parties often exist only to support the government. While they put a stamp of legitimacy on the government, their status and objectives frequently depend upon the will of the governing authority.

The leadership experience and tradition in developing nations are often authoritarian. For this reason, when appointing key government officials, the leadership often places personal loyalties before individual capabilities. Under these circumstances most decisions, even those of minor importance, are often made only at the highest level of government.

Authoritarian decisions may conflict with, or even violate, the recognized law of the land. Any such decision, regardless of its wisdom and intent, may cause a reaction that undermines the legitimacy of the government. It may also provide a cause that opposition elements may try to use against the government. The following political factors are common to many developing nations:

- Geographical barriers have caused population groupings with little contact between the groups and lack of national governmental authority in remote areas.

- The stability of the political system often depends upon a single key political leader.

- There is reluctance to delegate authority to or within the various departments and agencies of government.

- A distinct elite class or ethnic group often controls the government.

- Instability may result from conflict between ethnic groups, interest groups, economic groups, other groups such as students or bureaucrats, or some combination of these groups.

- Government is characterized by an inadequate civil service and an inadequate political organization.

- The military is often the most organized interest group in the country and dominates or strongly influences the political arena.

- Unsolved problems created by modernization and rapid urbanization have decreased confidence in the government.

- Often, the government does not recognize or will not admit that an insurgent threat exists until it reaches dangerous proportions.
Political groups with economic interests often restrain and inhibit independent growth of a free enterprise system.

**POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT**

As a nation changes socially, economically, and politically, the people often expect more. For some individuals and groups, change brings hope for a better life while for others, it brings fear. Some regard change as too fast; others, too slow. Some feel optimistic, others disillusioned, and still others feel left out entirely. Differences may arise to the point of antagonism over what is needed, how to go about getting it, and what the government should be doing. Taking care of the problems in developing nations requires considerable time and resources. Most developing nations can respond only partially to their needs. Therefore, nations must have legitimate ways within their political system to determine priorities of need and acceptable policies and programs.

Members of a society who willingly participate in conflict against their government are usually those whose expectations have not been met, and who believe they will not be met under the existing government. Their attitudes toward conditions, the intensity of their frustrations, and the extent of governmental control affect the degree to which they will participate in political violence.

Conditions within a society, regardless of how bad, do not necessarily cause violence. For example, the people of a particular society may be living under conditions that in most countries would be considered very severe and crude. If these people have never experienced better conditions, or they reject change, they do not feel deprived or frustrated. It is unlikely that these people would be led to violence because of these conditions. The point is that dissatisfied persons are vulnerable. They are more likely than satisfied fellow citizens to join or support an organization committed to a violent overthrow of the government.

Finally, modernization and development involve changes. Changes disrupt the traditional, usual ways of doing things and relating to the world in general. These changes can cause a great deal of stress in a society. A government should try to minimize the stress, violence, and destruction that may accompany change.
HIGHLIGHTS

A developing nation--

- Is progressing from beyond a traditional society toward a developed nation.
- Is unique in that it has its own history, culture, and goals.
- Experiences the turbulent process of economic, social, military, political, technological, and psychological change.

Conditions in developing nations include--

- Disruption of traditional customs and values.
- Rising expectations.
- Inadequate industrial, educational, and technological base.
- Rising population growth.
- Rapid urbanization.
- Diverse ethnic, religious, and minority groups.
- Relatively low per capita income.
- Unstable political systems.

The potential for conflict occurs when--

- The nation rapidly changes economically, socially, and politically.
- The changes cause frustration within the society.
- The population perceives the government is unwilling to improve conditions.
CHAPTER 2

Insurgency

This chapter provides a basis for understanding insurgency. It discusses the development, organization, and legal aspects of insurgency and factors to be considered when analyzing it.

Insurgency is an attempt by an organized group to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. The motivations of the organized group can be many and varied, but almost certainly their goals include seizure of power.

All insurgencies will not fit a clearly established pattern. Some are highly charged by religious or ethnic divisions and rooted in long standing emotional issues. Some are motivated by objectives such as separatism, local autonomy, or economic issues. Although the United States prefers peaceful and legitimate change of power, insurgencies are not necessarily adverse to our best interests.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INSURGENCY

Vulnerable Population

Conditions that can affect a developing nation's ability to satisfy the wants of the populace include—

- A population expanding more rapidly than economic growth.
- Drastically low educational levels.
- Inadequate technical skills and technological know-how.
- Primitive agriculture.
- Lack of investment capital.
- Control of capital assets by foreign nations.
- Lack of raw materials.
- A small or nonexistent industrial base.
- Elites unwilling to share or give up any power.
- An inefficient, sometimes corrupt, government.
A government's inability to respond to increasing needs may result in frustration and dissatisfaction among the people. Whether the dissatisfaction leads to conflict will depend upon the people's attitudes concerning the conditions, the nation's political and cultural traditions, the nation's past experience with political violence, and the degree of political participation by the populace.

Modernization brings problems. These problems can become more serious if there is reluctance to change. This may result in groups developing hostilities toward each other and toward the government. If these hostilities become widespread, the populace becomes vulnerable.

Leadership and Direction

The mere existence of a vulnerable population will not begin an insurgent movement. There also must be leadership and direction, a leadership that can convince people that their problems are the government's fault. To provide general direction, the insurgent leadership uses a set of ideas that proposes solutions to the problems, promises a better future, and justifies violence.

Lack of Government Control

The national political climate also affects the chances of insurgent success. Even though a vulnerable population and an insurgent leadership element exist, a successful insurgency is not likely if the government has effective control throughout the country. If a government is well organized, able and willing to suppress violence, and is effective, the likelihood of an insurgency occurring and its chances for success are diminished.

CATEGORIES OF INSURGENCY

There are many strategies and techniques that insurgents can use in their attempt to gain political control of a nation. Regardless of the strategy pursued, each insurgency will become distinct, and insurgents will establish methods of operations to fit their situation and to meet their objectives. Four broad categories of insurgencies have been identified to provide a basis for comparing the unique insurgency situations. They are politically organized insurgency, militarily organized insurgency, traditionally organized insurgency, and urban insurgency.

Figure 1 provides a summation of the specific structure, objectives/strategies, vulnerabilities, and other characteristics related to each category. Some insurgencies may adopt characteristics of more than one type. The discerning quality of each category is the group's organizational strategy. Differences in the military and political strategies employed by the insurgents at the international, national, provincial, and village levels of the conflict are also evident.
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<td>Politically organized insurgency</td>
<td>Shadow government created to undermine authority of existing regime; political consolidation precedes military consolidation of contested areas.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to concentrated effort aimed at neutralizing the infrastructure and establishing administrative control in contested areas.</td>
<td>Protracted warfare; tendency toward excessive revolutionary zeal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarily organized insurgency</td>
<td>Insurgent groups hope to form focus for disaffected population; destruction of regime legitimacy by military action; military consolidation precedes political consolidation of contested areas.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to aggressive military action during early stages of rebellion because of undeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable logistics and communications networks, and lack of clandestine networks among local populations.</td>
<td>Hope to demoralize regime and attain power without extensive conventional warfare.</td>
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<td>Traditionally organized insurgency</td>
<td>No unique strategy common to all; will adopt strategy of one of the other types.</td>
<td>Limited capacity for absorbing economic and military punishment; leadership conflicts are common; leaders often lack sufficient motivation, experience as insurgents, and political discipline.</td>
<td>Recruitment on basis of ethnic exclusivity.</td>
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<td>Urban Insurgency</td>
<td>Threaten regime legitimacy through urban disruption.</td>
<td>Restricted to small areas and must hide within population; attrition resulting from military/police pressure and the psychological stress of clandestinity.</td>
<td>Often in support of wider insurgency waged in rural area.</td>
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Figure 1. The Four Broad Categories of Insurgency
Organizational strategy is determined primarily by the group's operational environment and by the training of its leaders. The operational environment includes the sociocultural makeup of the target population; the economic, political, and geographic characteristics of the area of operations; the insurgents' initial strength; the role of outside parties; and government capabilities. These factors frequently override training and ideology as a determinant of strategy in successful insurgencies; guerrillas who cannot adjust their strategy to suit local conditions rarely survive.

Many politically, militarily, and traditionally organized insurgencies have urban components despite their rural concentration. Insurgent cadres often have strong ties to the cities, and many opposition leaders have attempted city-based revolts before adopting rural-based strategies. An urban component aids a rural-based insurgency by tying up government forces and providing financial, intelligence, and logistic services. Additionally, insurgent "armed propaganda" in urban areas usually receives better media coverage than that perpetrated in the countryside.

Insurgencies of several types may occur simultaneously within the same country. However, differences in organizational strategy, as well as differences in ideology, motivation, leadership, and cadre background, make it difficult to unify insurgencies of different types.

US Army doctrine is concerned with insurgencies that use armed units to carry out violence and are, therefore, more likely to require the use of host government military forces. The doctrine is primarily designed toward defeating politically organized insurgencies. These insurgencies are the most complex, the most difficult to defeat, and the most likely to cause a government to seek US assistance. For these reasons, the remainder of this chapter will discuss the politically organized insurgency.

POLITICALLY ORGANIZED INSURGENCY

Whether the insurgent movement pursues its objectives primarily by political activities or by violence, organization is critical to the insurgent. Regardless of the strategy, a structure will generally exist and will include—

- A party or control element to perform the centralized policymaking and supervisory function. The party will normally be compartmentalized to provide security against penetration by intelligence agencies.

- Mass civil organizations that serve to connect people with the party and through which the party can effect control and receive support of people, even though many of the people may not support all of the party's objectives.

- Either overt or covert armed elements, depending on which will best meet the insurgents' goals. Examples are guerrilla forces and terrorist elements.
At the heart of every politically organized insurgency is found a tightly disciplined party. The party eventually controls military forces and mass organizations. (See Figure 2 for a simplified organization.) It also controls "liberation" committees that parallel the country's existing government at the local, subnational, and national levels. These elements are interlocked organizationally to ensure party control over their activities. The organizational relationship of the elements may vary from one insurgency to another, but the interlocking arrangement with its high degree of centralized control will usually be used. Figure 3 illustrates a type politically organized insurgent infrastructure.

The Party Core

The cell is the base of the politically organized insurgent party structure. A party member normally belongs to two or more cells—the local party cell and one or more functional cells such as school, factory, or trade organizations. Parallel chains of command exist between the party structure and the various functional organizations. These party cells and functional cells often overlap.

Party groups are normally created to control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Each party group, in turn, is responsible to a higher office known as the interparty committee. This committee is responsible to its counterpart committee at the next higher political echelon. The chain of command within the overall party structure is from the central committee at national level down through each interparty committee at national, subnational, and local level.

Figure 2. Simplified Organizational Model
Figure 3. Politically Organized Insurgency Infrastructure
Although all authority stems from the cellular party organization, functional committees carry out the party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the party executive committee, often termed the party revolutionary committee. These committees normally exist at national, subnational, and local levels. Functional cells perform their tasks under the direction of local committees. At national level, control is exercised by the secretariat of the central committee.

At each political level, the party core cellular organization and its counterpart revolutionary committee are interlocked. All members of the revolutionary committee are concurrently party members and belong to a cell in the party organization.

A party youth organization is another parallel structure and is an indispensable affiliate of a party. Members engage in many of the activities conducted in an insurgency and acquire experience in party work. This prepares them to enter the core of the organizational apparatus when they are eligible.

**Mass Civil Organizations**

Mass civil organizations are one of the primary means used by the insurgents to achieve control and influence over the population. The insurgents exploit these organizations for intelligence, logistics, and recruiting requirements. The aim is to use these organizations to recruit into the service of the party a great many individuals, some of whom will be unaware they are serving the party cause.

There are three types of organizations—popular organizations, special interest groups, and local militia. Popular organizations are the most important of the mass civil organizations in that they are generally large and are organized on a nationwide scale. They have committees at the national, subnational, and local level. Special interest groups are oriented to special issues. They have a smaller range of interests than popular organizations.

**Armed Elements**

The local militia, also considered an element of the mass civil organizations, is tasked to isolate the population from government control. The local militia is not normally in the military chain of command. It has three distinct paramilitary elements: the self-defense force, the combat guerrilla unit, and the secret guerrilla unit.

The self-defense force (local guerrillas) normally is organized, trained, and employed to defend communities and other insurgent facilities. This guerrilla force is the local instrument for inflicting damage on the government and for gaining and maintaining population control.

The combat guerrilla unit is used by the party to support insurgent military forces or is used independently to conduct small operations.
The secret guerrilla unit is used primarily to enforce the will of the party in a given area. It is composed primarily of party members.

The military forces are but one of several instruments through which the party seeks to achieve power. Politically organized insurgency allows for military reversals and the possible need to retrench, restructure, or temporarily disband should government strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based on the assumption that as long as the party core and the mass civil organizations remain intact, the military forces can be reactivated or replenished. However, without the party nucleus and mass civil organizations base, the movement cannot succeed.

Insurgent military forces often fall into two classes—main forces and regional forces. The main force is normally a body of well-trained soldiers and a highly motivated, elite fighting group. Deployable where needed, the main force usually is controlled at the national level. The regional force is made up predominantly of indigenous personnel recruited directly from the mass civil organizations or promoted from the ranks of the local militia. The regional forces normally confine their operations to a specific region or state (province).

PHASES OF INSURGENCY

Successful insurgencies usually pass through certain common phases of development. Not all insurgencies, however, experience every phase; the sequence may not be the same in all cases, and the evolution of any phase may extend over a long period of time. An insurgency may take decades to start, mature, and finally succeed. The phases of an insurgency are: Phase I, Latent and Incipient Insurgency; Phase II, Guerilla Warfare; and Phase III, War of Movement.

Phase I (Latent and Incipient Insurgency). This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur frequently and in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgency activity. Following are possible insurgent activities for a politically organized insurgency during Phase I.

- The insurgents, starting from a relatively weak position, plan and organize their campaign and select initial urban and/or rural target areas. Basic decisions regarding ideology are made and fundamental leadership relationships are determined.

- Overt and covert organizations are established. If the insurgent party is illegal, the organizations may be entirely covert. If the party is legal, overt mass civil organizations may be established. A covert party organization will exist in either case.
Psychological operations (PSYOP) are conducted to exploit grievances and raised expectations, to influence the populace, and to promote the loyalty of insurgent members.

A shadow government is formed.

Once the party is established so that it can expend effort beyond its own organization, it concentrates on gaining influence over the population; on infiltrating government, economic, and social organizations; and on challenging the government's administrative ability.

The recruiting, organizing, and training of armed elements are emphasized during the latter part of this phase.

Attacks on police forces, other terrorist activities, and some minor military operations are carried out to gain additional influence over the population, to provide arms for the movement, and to challenge the government's ability to maintain law and order. In addition, criminal activities such as armed robberies, kidnappings for ransom, and extortion may be employed to obtain funds to aid in financing the insurgent organization.

Groundwork is laid for extensive external materiel support that is essential in most cases for the expansion of the insurgency and its eventual success.

Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare). This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. Following are examples of insurgent activities during Phase II of a politically organized insurgency.

Activities initiated in Phase I are continued and expanded. Insurgent control, both political and military, over territory and populace is intensified.

Guerrilla warfare is used on a larger scale, and limited defense is conducted in some geographic areas.

An insurgent government is established in insurgent dominated areas as the military situation permits. In areas not yet controlled, efforts are made to neutralize actual or potential opposition groups and to increase infiltration into government agencies. Intimidation through terror and threat of guerrilla action increases and thus becomes more significant.

Militarily, the major goal is to control additional areas; the government is forced to strain its resources trying to protect everything at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie down government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroy lines of communications (LOCs), and capture or destroy supplies and other government resources.
Phase III (War of Movement). The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a conventional conflict between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government. Many insurgencies never reach this stage. Following are possible insurgent activities during Phase III of a politically organized insurgency.

- Activities conducted in Phase I and Phase II are continued and expanded.
- Larger units are used to fight government forces and to capture key geographical and political objectives that will assist in defeating government forces.
- If the insurgents defeat the military and the government collapses, the insurgents initiate consolidation activities. These activities may include removing potential enemies, establishing additional control mechanisms, and restructuring the society.

INSURGENCY IN URBAN AREAS

The preceding information concerning insurgent development and organization strategies generally applies to both rural and urban areas. However, there are aspects of urban insurgency that require special consideration. These include both favorable and unfavorable conditions which affect urban insurgent activity.

The following are favorable conditions for the urban insurgent.

- There are a large number of people who are potential participants in insurgent-sponsored activities such as protest demonstrations, riots, and logistical support.
- There are many services, supplies, facilities, and skilled personnel critical to the insurgent and a system can be easily developed to provide the armed insurgent with necessary logistical support—food, clothing, ammunition, and weapons.
- There is a large target audience for propaganda.
- There are contact points for foreign support, for international and national press, and for political maneuvering.
- Contacts can be made with potentially friendly foreign powers.
- A degree of safety exists because of the anonymity inherent in a large city.
- Built-up areas can serve as fortifications and convenient escape routes.
There are sources of antigovernment intelligence.

The vulnerable systems of communications, transportation, water, electricity, production, and distribution are targets for insurgent activity.

Police forces cannot cope with insurgent activities.

The following are unfavorable conditions for the urban insurgent.

Urban areas are normally the points of greatest government strength, and the insurgents are surrounded by large numbers of potential government informants.

Insurgents are required to operate under the constraints and threats implicit in curfews, checkpoints, and other governmental populace and resources control measures.

Uncontrolled or excessive insurgent terrorism may cease to serve the overall strategy.

High level insurgent leaders tend to be more vulnerable.

There is usually a concentration of influential individuals who have a vested interest in maintaining the existing political, economic, and social structures.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSURGENCY

Treatment of Insurgents

Insurgency occurs within a particular state when insurgents who have banded together for political reasons attempt to displace the established government by force. An insurgency attains belligerent status under international law when it meets the requirement for civil war (see Glossary). Under international law, another country is permitted to assist an established government threatened by an externally supported insurgent movement; however, as a general rule, another country is not permitted to assist the insurgents.

Under the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, captured guerrillas who meet the criteria for and are accorded belligerent status must be accorded prisoner-of-war status. Insurgents usually cannot meet the criteria for belligerents. Historically, insurgency has been accorded little international legal status because the condition had no status in international law before 1949. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 gave cognizance to an "armed conflict not of an international character"—essentially, insurgency. The Conventions furnish protection to captives of these conflicts by prohibiting--
Violence to life and person; in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.

Hostage-taking.

Outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

Sentences and executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court that affords all the judicial guarantees considered indispensable by civilized peoples.

US policy for the treatment of insurgents held in US Army custody during counterinsurgency operations requires and directs that they be accorded humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they are detained until they are released or repatriated. The observance of this policy is fully and equally binding upon US personnel whether they are the capturing troops, custodial personnel, or serve in some other capacity. This policy also applies to all detained or interned personnel. It applies whether they are known to or suspected to have committed acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or other serious offenses of a war crimes nature. The punishment of such persons is adjudicated and administered only under due process of law and by legally constituted authority. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In combating an insurgency, it is essential that humane treatment be accorded to civilians participating in internal conflict, and that laws be scrupulously observed to demonstrate government concern for the individual. Improper treatment of these persons serves the enemy's cause.

US commanders, senior advisors, and their subordinates should be familiar with the legal basis for their presence in a foreign country to assist its government and armed forces. At the very least, they should understand the basic rules of international law and domestic law that authorize these operations and the major restrictions imposed upon them by law.

Legal Constraints on US Operations

Three bodies of law are relevant to the conduct of US Army operations in FID: international law, consisting of customs, international agreements, and general principles recognized by civilized nations; United States law; and the law of the host nation. Collectively, these laws regulate the status and activities of the armed forces engaged in such operations and may apply in other LIC operations. Should questions arise concerning law, the Staff Judge Advocate or other official legal advisor should be consulted.
International Law. The rules of international law applicable to US, allied, and host nation forces can be found in the writings of experts, international agreements, and judicial decisions. International agreements are the most important source. They prescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US armed forces stationed abroad and of the governments of the host and allied nations and their respective armed forces. They also regulate, to some extent, the relationship between the opposing parties in internal conflicts. In this realm, the international agreements that regulate the status or activities of US forces offer the best guidance. These agreements are of three general types: SAO agreements, mission agreements, and status of forces agreements. The US Army is committed to conduct FID operations in accordance with the applicable provisions of international law of war, including those of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and others set forth in FM 7-10 and DA PAM 27-1.

United States Law. United States law—as expressed in statutes, executive orders, DOD directives and instructions, Army regulations, and directives and regulations issued by the unified command and by the Army component command—is applicable to US forces in the host nation. Areas such as military justice, control of public funds, procurement of supplies, and disposition of property continue to be regulated by US domestic law. Copies of publications containing applicable US laws should be on file at the headquarters of the SAO in the host nation.

Host Nation Law. The law of the host nation establishes the rules under which their counterinsurgency is to be conducted. This body of law emanates from the various levels of government and from the agencies functioning at each echelon. The host nation laws governing the employment of labor, currency, foreign exchange transactions, the separation of powers, local purchases, judicial procedures, control of the populace and resources, and emergency legislation in general are of major importance and must be understood by US advisors, commanders, and staff officers. Detailed guidance in this area normally is obtainable through the local US consul, a legal advisor or local attorney employed by the US diplomatic mission, or judge advocate.

Claims Administration

Activities of US Army personnel serving in allied countries will occasionally result in personal injuries, deaths, and property losses to other individuals and entities. Also, US armed forces personnel may be injured and their property, or that of the US Government, may be damaged under such circumstances. Claims against the United States which arise in foreign countries are settled under a variety of statutes implemented by AR 27-20. These claims statutes are the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act of 1964, the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Claims Act, and the Non-Scope of Employment Claims Act. Also, many claims which arise in foreign countries are settled under a status of forces agreement.
Article VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) status of forces agreement, for example, provides for the settlement of claims arising out of NATO operations. Claims in favor of the United States are settled under either the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 or the Medical Care Recovery Act, both of which are implemented by AR 27-40.
HIGHLIGHTS

Insurgency requires the following major elements:

- Vulnerable population.
- Direction and leadership.
- Lack of government control.

Insurgent categories include—

- Politically organized insurgencies.
- Militarily organized insurgencies.
- Traditionally organized insurgencies.
- Urban insurgencies.

Three phases of insurgency are—

- Phase I (Latent and Incipient) extends through periods when organized subversive incidents are frequent, but there are no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority.

- Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare) is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support and can initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

- Phase III (War of Movement) develops when the insurgency becomes primarily a conventional conflict between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

Insurgent organization:

- Party.
- Mass civil organizations.
- Armed elements.

Three bodies of law relevant to FID operations are—

- International law.
- US law.
- Law of the host nation.

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CHAPTER 3

Counterinsurgency

This chapter presents the internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, as well as basic policy, planning, and organizational guidelines for preventing or defeating an insurgency. The IDAD strategy is founded on the assumption that the host nation is responsible for the development and execution of programs to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Although the concepts and doctrine described herein are oriented primarily against the politically organized insurgency, the principles also apply to countering other insurgent strategies.

IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions—political, economic, military, and social—that respond to the needs of society. Development programs, carefully planned and implemented and properly publicized, can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to the insurgents. Security programs provide an atmosphere of peace within which development can take place.

The fundamental thrust of the IDAD strategy is toward preventing the escalation of internal conflict. Prevention is accomplished through forestalling and defeating the threat posed by insurgent organizations and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. Should insurgency occur, emphasis is placed on holding down the level of violence. The population must be mobilized to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is an overall strategy for the prevention of insurgency, and if an insurgency should develop, for counterinsurgency activities.

CONCEPTS

IDAD strategy involves the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military powers of a government, including all police and internal security forces, to prevent or defeat insurgency. The US concept is based on the strategy of integrated military and civilian programs. The primary objective under this concept is a level of internal security that permits economic, political, and social growth through balanced development programs. It is directed toward both the populace and the insurgent.

The Population

Working to correct the conditions that insurgents can exploit to promote an insurgency must be part of the national strategy. The police and military may help in winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but their efforts must be accompanied by positive economic, social, and political actions to improve the lot of the populace.
This may require programs to meet the needs of particularly vulnerable groups of people. However, economic, political, and social changes by their nature may promote unrest. Therefore, the strategy must include measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

The populace can be mobilized on behalf of the government when the people are reasonably secure from insurgent pressure. Unless the people know they will be protected from the insurgent, their response to government programs will be cautious and reluctant. In such cases, there is a tendency to believe the population is unconcerned about the outcome of the ongoing struggle.

Available resources and capabilities will seldom permit addressing all the needs of all the people at once. Problems must be carefully analyzed and priorities established objectively.

The process of integrating the populace of a country into a society that enables people to work together to achieve their goals is known as institutional development. Institutional development is concerned with promoting organizations at the community level that involve the local people. Linking national and local community groups provides the two-way communication that is essential for mobilizing popular support for national objectives.

In a general sense, institutional development involves establishing new institutions where none exist to meet needs; strengthening or modifying existing institutions; and eliminating institutions that are counterproductive from the standpoint of national unity. It is important to promote at the community level groups of people (organizations) who participate and identify with the goals of the nation. The activities may have to be inspired or directed with assistance from government agencies.

At the same time that organizations are being promoted at the community level, these organizations and programs must be developed at each level of government. Linking organizations together from lowest to highest levels provides the government with a basic structure through which it can receive "grassroots" inputs into national programs. Moreover, it binds groups of people together in organizations through which they can, by cooperative effort, satisfy their needs. These institutions provide channels of communications through which the government can exert influence and be influenced.

NOTE: The needs of people are not always easy to determine. Establishment or elimination of institutions must be acceptable to the local people and based on decisions of local leaders.

The Insurgent

National strategy must provide for isolating the insurgents from the population, both physically and psychologically, thereby denying them personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are a large part of this strategy.
A major consideration of national strategy is eliminating or neutralizing the insurgent leadership and the insurgent organization. Successfully attacking the leadership results in elimination of centralized direction and control, fragmentation of the insurgent infrastructure, disunity, and the eventual destruction of the insurgent organization.

Also of prime importance in forming a national strategy is the defeat of insurgent tactical forces. Pressure on these forces is maintained through tactical and police operations to inflict casualties, destroy supplies and equipment, and lower morale.

The inclusion of PSYOP in the national strategy cannot be overemphasized. The insurgent leadership and organization must be thoroughly discredited with the population, otherwise they will disappear underground to surface again. PSYOP actions, themes, and messages must also be directed at the individual insurgents and offer an honorable reason to surrender or at least get them to leave the insurgent movement.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

IDAD strategy, as discussed in conceptual terms above, may be placed in useful perspective by viewing it as four interdependent functions: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

Balanced Development

Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through balanced political, social, and economic development. It includes activities to alleviate frustration by providing opportunities to individuals and groups within the society. Conditions that contribute to insurgency must be recognized and preventive measures initiated early. In support of this concept, development programs should promote advances in the economic, sociological, and political fields that tend to bring overall development in balance. These programs should provide opportunities for all groups to share in the rewards of development. Recognizing and working toward correcting the conditions that render a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem of insurgency.

Security

Security includes all activities to protect the populace from the insurgent and to provide a secure environment for national development. Security of the population and government resources is an essential element in counterinsurgency. Protection and control of the population, thereby denying the enemy access to his most important resource—popular support, are prerequisites to development. The security effort should be directed toward establishing conditions whereby the local population can, with limited government support, provide for its own security.
Neutralization

Neutralization includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization. Neutralization of insurgent organizations is decisive. It is primarily the task of internal security forces. Its primary target is the leadership and control element of the insurgent movement. Neutralization can take many forms and can vary from the public exposure and discrediting of the leaders during a low level of insurgency when little political violence has taken place—to arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken—to combat action when the insurgency escalates. All efforts to neutralize the insurgent organization should be conducted within the legal system of the country, and constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities should be scrupulously observed. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential—not only for humanitarian reasons but also because it reinforces legitimacy of the government while denying the insurgents an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers, if granted by legislation or decree, must not be abused if popular support—is so essential to winning against an insurgency—is to be maintained. Balanced development will contribute to neutralization by satisfying legitimate grievances that the insurgents attempt to exploit. Denying the insurgents legitimate issues discredits their propaganda and leaders.

Mobilization

Mobilization includes all activities to motivate and organize the populace in support of the government. Popular support is essential for a successful counterinsurgency program. All governments operate within constraints. Most governments of developing nations do not have unlimited resources, popular support, or administrative capability. This social mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government, and minimizes those available to the insurgent. It also gives the government an opportunity to reinforce existing institutions and to develop new institutions that will respond to the needs of the people and will promote the legitimacy of the government. The government's ability to mobilize manpower and materiel resources and motivate its people is related to its administrative and management capabilities. Most developing nations must try to improve their administration and management as part of the counterinsurgency effort.

In developing specific counterinsurgency programs, the following components can be used as bases for programs that are available in some degree to all governments. Insurgency may be prevented or defeated—

- By providing individual and group opportunities through visible balanced development.
- By providing adequate security.
By developing and improving intelligence capabilities.

By organizing and channelizing the populace and materiel resources into positive, constructive development programs.

**PRINCIPLES**

Although each situation is unique, efforts to prevent or defeat an insurgency should be guided by certain principles. The principles presented here are conceptual in nature and intended to be used in a conceptual way. The IDAD strategy and these principles must be adapted to each specific situation.

**Ensure Unity of Effort**

Preventing or defeating insurgency requires well-coordinated action and centralized control at all levels. The organizational basis for coordinating and controlling activities, including activities conducted by security forces, is described in organizational guidance on pages 4-10 through 4-13.

**Maximize Intelligence**

Intelligence must be the basis for all action. Internal security requires an organization with special police functions capable of assessing the insurgent threat, warning the government, taking action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assisting in neutralizing it. The government must develop and improve the intelligence capabilities of all security forces.

**Minimize Violence**

Although insurgent organizations may act violently, it does not follow that a host government must respond in the same manner. Instead, it should use its resources to minimize violence and maintain law and order. Depending on the situation, governments may act decisively to shorten the duration of violence, or they may proceed with caution, extending the duration, but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, minimum essential force is the guideline. To minimize violence a government should--

- Conduct campaigns and operations in a manner that enhances popular support and promotes compliance with its laws and directives.
- Develop and support organizations that provide opportunities for nonviolent expression of discontent.
- Take actions to minimize opportunities for insurgent groups to coordinate and practice violence.
Employ disciplined security forces effectively to inhibit insurgent use of violence.

Apply controls and punishments with fairness and consistency to enhance government legitimacy and to promote compliance with its laws and directives.

Use those forces not required to maintain normal law and order to assist the populace, as in military civic action.

Ensure Responsive Government

The effectiveness of governmental policies, planning, and projects is influenced by the competency and responsiveness of the governmental structure. In many developing countries, the government must provide additional training, supervision, follow-up, and controls to ensure that subordinate personnel and organizations follow national policies and implement and administer programs properly. Critical elements in administering counterinsurgency programs are the loyalty, discipline, and morale of security forces.

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

The following guidelines, in consonance with the principles above, are the basis for the development of the counterinsurgency policy and program.

IDAD strategy should be oriented toward preventing insurgency from escalating to a level that threatens the nation and requires considerable resources to combat.

IDAD strategy should integrate all functions--security, social development, political development, and economic development--at all levels.

Planning, organization, and control of counterinsurgency functions should align with the established political organization of the nation.

Activities must be tailored to achieve specific, constructive goals.

Policies to suppress insurgent violence should be formulated before violence occurs, be based on law, be publicized, and be enforceable.

A nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network using the civil police increases the probability of success.

Neutralizing the insurgent organization, rather than inflicting maximum casualties, is the goal of counterinsurgency operations.

Development programs must include a goal of creating or strengthening a spirit of nationhood among the people.
Development programs must seek to create within the people both a desire and an ability for self-development.

The government must clearly demonstrate that it is a better choice than the insurgent organization.

The concept of minimum essential force must be employed in all situations involving the use of violence.

A public information program must be instituted to provide timely information on governmental programs and accomplishments.

PLANNING

Programs to prevent or defeat insurgency are based on national strategy. Planning is facilitated in those developing nations that have adopted central planning to promote rapid modernization and economic development. Planning should integrate all counterinsurgency programs, to the extent possible, into an overall plan. Programs designed to correct those conditions contributing to an insurgency will thus complement operations to defeat insurgent organizations. Programs planned at the national level provide the basis for activities at subnational levels (region, state, local). The planning activities at the lower levels should contribute to national plans and the achievement of national objectives. Planning provides for integrated and area-oriented execution by civil and military agencies.

A national plan should be prepared by the government to set forth objectives and broad, general guidance concerning priorities of effort, budget limitations, and resource allocation. This plan should include both short- and long-range goals and should be reviewed and updated on a periodic scheduled basis. It must include sufficiently detailed and comprehensive guidance so that it can be used for subsequent national level planning and can be a basis for planning at regional, state, and local levels. Various government departments and agencies whose resources and capabilities will be used in implementing the national plan should have supplemental plans to support it. These supplemental plans should provide specific programs and describe how these programs will be carried out. National plans must be based on realistic assessments of local conditions, resources, and the needs and desires of the people.

Plans should be developed at all political subdivisions of a nation based on national priorities, the conditions in each particular area, and higher level plans. Representatives of governmental departments and agencies at each level assist in preparing the plan by developing programs and projects relative to their areas of responsibility.

Campaigns may be developed at national or subnational levels to implement a series of operations based on the national and subnational
plans. Campaigns are characterized by a given time frame, a specified area, and specific objectives. They may include one or more of the following objectives:

- Implementation of development programs.
- Establishment of control in populated areas.
- Defeat of insurgent tactical forces.
- Destruction of insurgent base areas.
- Establishment of government strength and authority in selected areas.

It is important to ensure that activities designed to prevent or defeat insurgency are molded into a unified strategy to attain national objectives. Some of the more significant planning tasks include—

- Developing appropriate objectives and establishing priorities.
- Examining the structure of government to ensure the existence of mechanisms to effectively implement counterinsurgency plans.
- Estimating costs for procurement and operations.
- Examining conscription laws and procedures and their ability to ensure adequate numbers of personnel.
- Examining existing laws to determine their adequacy to protect the populace and provide the controls required.

The composition of the planning organization will vary with the degree of mobilization required. In latent insurgency situations, the existing government structure may be adequate to plan and coordinate counterinsurgency activities. In advanced phases of insurgency, planning and coordination may require the establishment of coordinating centers at national and subnational levels. Coordinating centers are not intended to replace or to perform the functions of government agencies, but to provide focal points for planning and coordinating the counterinsurgency effort. Organizational guidance is discussed on pages 3-15 through 3-19.

Development Planning

Development planning outlines specific programs to be undertaken by a government to improve economic, social, and political conditions and to create favorable attitudes among the people concerning these conditions. It also outlines the objectives to be attained and the policies and strategies to be used in achieving them.
Objectives. Objectives of development planning include--

- Identifying conditions that provide a potential for internal conflict.
- Defining objectives and establishing priorities.
- Determining actual and potential economic, social, and political resources and estimating their ability to attain internal development objectives.
- Selecting means to mobilize the populace and resources for the attainment of objectives.
- Providing a basis for the allocation of limited resources.
- Providing training in public administration and development techniques for all levels of government.
- Ensuring coordination and consistency of operations of different government departments and private groups.
- Ensuring coordination to provide security for the populace and an environment within which developmental operations can be conducted.

Concepts. Development planning is coordinated and supervised by a national level organization. This organization must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the existing cultural and economic system and attempt to improve the economy without unduly disrupting the cultural system. To be fully effective, planning should--

- Stimulate private participation in the development process.
- Provide private business an appropriately large share of limited resources to further economic expansion.

Programs. The more highly organized the society, the more likely it is to achieve the objectives of development programs. Through organizations and the institutions they promote, the people can become better unified in support of national programs to improve political, economic, and social conditions. In planning and executing a development program, governments may have to establish, supervise, and operate activities and organizations that mobilize the populace and contribute to development. These activities and organizations may include--

- Political.
  * Establish discussion groups.
  * Establish voting apparatus.
Establish political parties.

- Enact laws that support national objectives.

- Broaden the bases of political power through education and health programs.

  o Social.

  - Public health programs.
  
  - Public education programs and facilities.
  
  - Specialized training programs.
  
  - News media.
  
  - Civil service system.
  
  - Civic organizations.
  
  - Crime prevention programs.
  
  - Youth programs.
  
  - Recreational programs.
  
  - Community relations programs.
  
  - Women's programs.

  o Psychological.

  - Training and indoctrination programs.
  
  - Information programs.
  
  - Pictorial campaigns.
  
  - Motion picture service.
  
  - Ceremonies and contests to assemble people for orientation.

  o Economic.

  - National development bank.
  
  - Industrial development company.
  
  - Farmer's associations.
* Housing authority.
* Water resources authority.
* Customs authority.
* Land development authority.
* Electric power corporation.
* Transportation authority.
* Food distribution authority.
* Medical authority.
* Vocational and technical training programs.

Other Factors. Measures important in host nation internal development planning include—

- Recognizing the needs, expectations, and goals of the people and forming the appropriate government response.
- Recognizing the proper relationship between official and private organizations and the need for feedback between them.
- Planning for the participation of nongovernmental personnel, organizations, and groups.
- Determining the impact of security and neutralization activities on balanced development.
- Coordinating development and security force planning in the overall national development.
- Phasing balanced development to ensure coordinated action and availability of personnel and materiel. For example, personnel must be recruited and trained before work can begin.

Security Force Planning

Security force planning is based on knowledge of the threat; operational environment; national objectives, organization, and requirements; and other plans. Planning at all levels involves constant coordination between the military and civilian community. Plans must also provide for integration of foreign assistance.

Objective. The objective of security force planning is to provide for the most efficient employment of military, paramilitary, and police
resources to support the internal defense and internal development programs. The national plan provides guidance for long-range objectives, whereas lower level plans are concerned with short-range objectives.

**Concept.** Prior to and during the early phases of an insurgency, security force planning will be oriented toward development of security force capabilities and support for the development effort. During later phases of an insurgency, security forces will be required to concentrate on providing security to the population and neutralizing the insurgent. Security force planning should--

- Be responsive to nationally established priorities of resource allocation and must be closely coordinated with internal development planning.
- Provide an organizational structure and communications system that will facilitate coordination and implementation of all plans. Command and control and timely dissemination of intelligence require effective communications.
- Anticipate insurgent activities and prepare to meet them offensively to seize the initiative.
- Attempt to prevent the escalation of violence.
- Mobilize the population to assist in providing for its own security, taking full advantage of the unique capabilities of civil, paramilitary, and other military forces.

**Other Factors.** The following factors should be recognized:

- Security force operations should be oriented on control of priority areas.
- Organization should provide for clear lines of authority and assignment of functional and area responsibility.
- Plans should provide for training all security forces and all coordinating staffs.
- Objectives are not limited to neutralization of enemy forces, but are heavily oriented toward securing and gaining support of the population.
- Combat power must be applied in a manner that serves to reduce the overall scope, intensity, and duration of the insurgency. In particular, combat power must be applied selectively in order to minimize noncombatant casualties. Minimum essential force must be the guide.
The commander must consider the psychological impact of his military operations. He should not sacrifice important long-range political objectives for temporary tactical gains.

Close attention must be paid to political, economic, social, and psychological factors as well as military factors. Estimates are based on a detailed analysis of the areas of operations.

Staffs must anticipate the time involved in gaining approval for unit plans and allow enough time to process these plans at higher, lower, and adjacent levels.

The tactical situation permitting, combat support and combat service support forces (such as engineers, medical, signal, and intelligence) should be used to support development.

Plans for all military operations should consider the roles and capabilities of police, internal security, and paramilitary forces.

Local, state, and national police should be integrated into the intelligence collection and analysis schemes. These organizations combine extensive local knowledge with an existing structure designed for this purpose.

Tactical operations are oriented on the enemy and his base areas, but they also must consider internal development operations.

Administrative and logistical support plans must be prepared for both routine and emergency operations.

Contingency plans must provide for the reinforcement of military forces at lower levels when necessary.

Military Plans

This paragraph is oriented toward Army planning; however, the principles generally apply to all security forces. The military plan to the national counterinsurgency plan should be prepared by the host nation defense establishment. It should include annexes for each of the armed services and contain information of the plans for paramilitary and self-defense forces (see Appendix F for an outline). The Army's portion of the plan is referred to as the Army operations annex (see Figure 4). The annex should include all the resources and effort to be expanded. Logistic considerations should be integrated into each appendix. The annex should have appendixes on the following operations:

Intelligence. This appendix identifies all available intelligence assets and contains the guidance necessary to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population. It also provides guidance for those counterintelligence activities.
activities necessary to minimize insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The intelligence appendix should also include intelligence requirements and information pertinent to PSYOP, civil affairs, and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and support.

Psychological Operations. This appendix prescribes the military PSYOP missions, objectives, roles, and the PSYOP resources required. It categorizes the target audience and prescribes the themes. It is based on the host nation national PSYOP plan and objectives.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 4. Army Operations Annex

Civil Affairs. This appendix considers relationships between the military, civil authorities, and the people. In addition to helping the commander meet his legal and moral obligations, it focuses on programs designed to provide assistance to civil authorities and helps to organize and motivate the people to support counterinsurgency projects.

Populace and Resources Control. This appendix provides for the employment of resources and implementation of measures necessary to preserve or reestablish a state of law and order. It includes detailed information on support of counterinsurgency operations on activities such as protecting LOC, severing relations between the insurgent and the population, amnesty and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and border operations.
Tactical Operations. This appendix considers all aspects of organizing, equipping, training, and directing security forces in tactical operations. The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which development is possible. This appendix also considers the impact of tactical operations on military nontactical operations and civilian operations being conducted to achieve counterinsurgency objectives.

Advisory Assistance. This appendix describes the activities of the Army in training and supporting self-defense forces and other paramilitary organizations that may be one basis of mobilization. It also includes advice and assistance to other governmental agencies and local governmental officials.

The Army operations annex at all levels should—

- State objectives clearly.
- Be based on a careful assessment of available personnel and materiel resources.
- Consider social, cultural, political, and psychological forces stimulating or obstructing the attainment of military objectives.
- Be based on a selected course of action that considers the impact on other interrelated economic, political, military, and social factors.

ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

The following concepts concern a country's organization for coordinating, planning, and conducting activities to prevent or defeat insurgency. Examples of national and subnational type organizations are given to illustrate the principle of achieving a coordinated and unified counterinsurgency effort at each level within a nation.

The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the counterinsurgency efforts of existing governmental agencies, yet not interfere with those agencies' normal day-to-day functions. The organizational structure will vary from country to country in order to adapt to the existing conditions. It should follow the established political organization of the nation. The organizational structure should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the counterinsurgency plan.

National-Level Organization

The national-level organization is concerned with planning and coordinating programs. The major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency problems.
Figure 5 depicts a type of counterinsurgency planning and coordination organization that may be established at the national level.
Planning Office. This office is responsible for long-range plans for preventing or defeating insurgency. These plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

Intelligence Office. This office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. It also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. It is staffed mainly by representatives from intelligence agencies, police, and military intelligence.

Populace and Resources Control Office. This office develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on the operations of all forces in the security field. It is staffed mainly by representatives of branches of government concerned with law enforcement and justice.

Military Affairs Office. This office develops and coordinates broad, general plans for the mobilization and allocation of armed and paramilitary forces.

Psychological, Information, Economic, Social, and Political Affairs Offices. These separate offices--elements representing their parent national-level branches or agencies--develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.

Subnational-Level Organization

Area coordination centers (ACCs) may be established as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. These centers are responsible for planning, coordinating, and exercising operational control over all military forces and government civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all counterinsurgency efforts; and they ensure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. The ACC should establish a capability for 24-hour-a-day operations and communications. The ACC is headed by the senior governmental official who supervises and coordinates the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating counterinsurgency plans and operations within their separate areas of interest. These staffs normally are composed of selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's area of responsibility. The ACC should include members from the--

Area military command.
Area police agency.

Local and national intelligence organization.

Public information and PSYOP agencies.

Paramilitary forces.

Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD activities.

State (Provincial) Area Coordination Center. A nation's first political subdivision with a fully developed administrative apparatus usually is the state. Most of these governments are well established and have exercised governmental functions over their areas before the onset of insurgency. This is normally the lowest level of administration capable of administering the full range of counterinsurgency programs. The economic, social, psychological, political, and military aspects of these programs are focused at this level. The establishment of ACCs will help exploit this potential.

Urban Area Coordination Center. Urban areas require a more complex organization than rural areas to plan, coordinate, and direct counterinsurgency efforts. An urban area may vary from a market town of 20,000 people to a commercial/industrial city with a population of more than a million. The dense population, multi-story buildings, underground construction, public utilities, and transportation systems all require special attention. Police public safety services, social organizations, political factors, economic aspects, and communications systems must be considered.

The urban ACC is organized very much like the ACCs previously described. Urban coordination centers are established to perform the same functions for urban areas that local coordination centers perform for rural areas. However, local police, fire fighting, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation representatives also are included. When necessary, a staff capable of operating 24 hours a day is put into operation. It must be able to receive and act upon information requiring immediate operational action and coordination. When there is a state or local ACC in an urban area, it may be necessary to include the urban resources in that center and to plan, coordinate, and direct urban operations from there. The decision to establish an urban center or use the state or local center for these purposes should be based on the authority of, and resources available to, the official at the head of the urban area government. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary to ensure proper planning and coordination. Urban ACCs should be established in autonomous cities and in urban areas not having a higher level coordination center.