COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
1. PURPOSE

This publication, FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, presents the tactics and techniques utilized by Marine Corps landing forces in counterinsurgency operations, including guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. It is made available to other Services for information and use as desired.

2. SCOPE

This manual outlines the origin, objectives, and characteristics of counterinsurgency operations, as well as the tactics and techniques employed by guerrilla forces. It takes its departure from the U.S. Marine Corps publication, Small Wars Manual, 1940, and places emphasis on the planning and conduct of operations against guerrillas by Marine Corps forces.

3. SUPERSESSION

FMFM 8-2, Operations Against Guerrilla Units, dated 14 August 1962, with four changes.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited. Comments and recommended changes should be forwarded to the Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities, Quantico, Virginia 22134.

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

H. W. BUSE, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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# RECORD OF CHANGES AND CORRECTIONS

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101. GENERAL

a. Throughout military history, guerrilla warfare has formed a powerful weapon in the hands of insurgent forces in their efforts to seize power from constituted authority. Given even limited popular support, numerically inferior guerrilla forces have the capability of defeating or greatly reducing the effectiveness of regularly organized military organizations unless the threat is met by positive counteraction. In weak or newly emerging nations, guerrilla warfare can effectively prevent such nations from establishing or maintaining stable government. Instability in government is an invitation to insurgency efforts to "fish in troubled waters." Inasmuch as there is an increasing number of nations going through the evolution from colony to statehood, there is a greatly increased number of nations faced with this type of revolution. This requires Marine Corps forces to possess a full understanding of the entire problem of subversive insurgency, together with the knowledge of the techniques involved in its defeat.
b. Counterguerrilla activity is a prime element of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program. It complements companion efforts to raise economic and educational levels, to stabilize and improve the political and psychological climate, to firm up the civic status, and to assist its armed forces in developing their own strength in order to contribute to national stability. These more peaceful actions, however, will often not be sufficient in themselves, and the task of meeting and defeating a guerrilla problem—created on the enemy's terms—may face our military forces. It is the purpose of this manual to outline the counterinsurgency tasks which are within the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force.

102. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. Insurgency Defined. —A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

b. Counterinsurgency Defined. —Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

c. Application. —Although counterinsurgency extends into fields which are not primary areas of Marine Corps endeavor, Marine Corps forces must be prepared to undertake counterinsurgency operations when directed. Operations against guerrillas as treated herein, are a major element of counterinsurgent activity.

103. GUERRILLA WARFARE DEFINED

Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

104. GUERRILLA DEFINED

A guerrilla is defined as a combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

105. TYPES OF GUERRILLA FORCES

a. Guerrilla Forces Emerging From a Defeated Military Organization. —As military forces of a recognized government are defeated or
forced to withdraw, members of these defeated forces, local civilians, or both, organize as guerrillas to disrupt enemy operations. A military force assigned the mission of reestablishing the recognized government may operate in conjunction with this type guerrilla force. (See sec. 13.)

b. Guerrilla Forces Opposed to the Existing Government. --Guerrilla forces may be formed to fight for a new political order through the destruction of the existing patterns of society. Guerrillas attempt to obtain popular support through passive consent or terror.

c. External Military Forces Introduced Into a Country. --Military personnel may come from another country to assist the guerrillas. This assistance may come in the form of individuals "volunteering" or in regularly organized military forces. Initially, individuals may furnish guidance on organization, tactics, and techniques, and may become key leaders. They can determine requirements for military equipment and for technicians who can be provided to operate or to instruct in the operation and maintenance of equipment unfamiliar to the guerrillas. Certain guerrillas can be evacuated to another country for specialized training unavailable in their locality. When guerrilla forces control a sufficiently large area to the extent that it can absorb additional forces, external military forces may be introduced.

106. EVOLUTION OF FORCES

a. Causes of Resistance. --Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined, or incited and is usually centered around a desire for:

(1) Political change.

(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

(3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.

(4) Economic and social improvement.

(5) Religious expression.

b. Resistance Movements. --Resistance movements may form locally or be inspired by "sponsoring powers." The evolution of the guerrilla force usually follows a sequence of events that form a pattern:
(1) The existence of a dissident group.

(2) The emergence of groups which are willing to bear arms.

(3) The appearance of strong, determined leaders to further organize and orient these groups. As members of underground organizations are identified and resistance grows, guerrilla bands form in secure areas to become the military arm of the guerrilla force.

(4) The exploitation of initial successes to convince elements of the population to support an effective guerrilla organization.

(5) The seeking and accepting of support from external sources.

(6) The employment of equipment and personnel furnished by external sources.

(7) The integration of the guerrilla forces into a regular military organization.

107. LEGAL STATUS AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

a. The Law of Land Warfare. --The law of land warfare says that members of organized resistance movements opposing military forces are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if they meet the following requirements:

(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) They bear arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949

(1) Article 3. --If both sides in a civil war or revolt request and receive military support from foreign powers, the opposing foreign
powers may not be at war with each other. In such a situation and when the belligerents have not been recognized as such, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies. Article 3 is quoted below:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum the following provisions:

"(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (put out of the fighting) by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

"(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

"(b) Taking of hostages;

"(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

"(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the international committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force by means of special agreements all or part of the other provisions of the present convention.

"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

(2) Parties to Conflict. -- The parties to such a conflict are the legally constituted government and the challenging insurgent force.
Customs of war give other States the right to intervene in a civil war if cruelties not permitted by international codes are practiced by either party.

(3) Application. --Although the Geneva Conventions are binding only in the Territories of the contracting nations, the provisions of Article 3 should be applied whenever adhered to by the opposing forces or when they can be carried out without jeopardy to the military mission.

108. CHARACTERISTICS

a. Characteristics Contributing to Successful Guerrilla Operations

(1) Surprise. --Surprise is the principle of war most essential to successful guerrilla operations. The guerrilla obtains surprise by operating in vast areas that offer concealment and freedom of movement and by conducting operations at night. Through surprise, the guerrilla seeks to overcome the enemy's advantage of numbers, organization, and supporting arms. He masses his forces at selected times and places to attack where defensive forces are weakest. Following the attack, he can quickly disperse his forces to designated areas.

(2) Mobility. --To achieve surprise and avoid fixed positions, the guerrilla relies on mobility. He obtains mobility afoot by being lightly armed, having detailed knowledge of the terrain, and by being relatively free of heavy logistic burdens. Mobility afoot offers advantages when operating in inclement weather, in reduced visibility, and in terrain which would be an obstacle to a more heavily equipped enemy. Even under adverse conditions, the foot-mobile guerrilla converges on a target, strikes unexpectedly, and swiftly disperses prior to the arrival of a stronger opposing force.

(3) Civilian Support. --The guerrilla seeks to obtain or maintain the active support of the populace in his area of operations. This support will be forthcoming in direct proportion to the feeling that is generated by the effectiveness of the guerrilla campaign or the ineffectiveness of the opposing authority. If the guerrilla force cannot gain the active support of the populace, it still attempts to make them at least passive in their support of the opposition.

(a) In general, the populace will probably contain three factions: guerrilla supporters; opposition supporters; and those who, for
one reason or another; prefer not to become involved (neutralist). Among the active supporters there are guerrilla auxiliaries, collaborators, and informers. These supporters and the guerrilla force will attempt to achieve the support of the neutral group through the use of propaganda, economic assistance, and by making them indirect participants through the distribution of captured goods, food, and property. Terroristic methods such as assassination, murder, and the taking of hostages are often resorted to by some guerrilla units.

(b) With civilian support, the guerrilla force can solve many of its logistical support problems. The civilian population will provide manpower; specialists from the various professions, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, and skilled technicians; food, clothing, and equipment; hiding places; arms and ammunition; and intelligence.

(4) Area Familiarity.--If he is a native of the area, the guerrilla has three advantages over the opposition; first, when not fighting he can appear to be a harmless civilian; second, he may have an intimate working knowledge of the terrain over which he operates; and third, he may have personal contacts with the population which may provide partial solutions to his problems of intelligence, supply, and communications. If he is not a native, the guerrilla will seek to obtain these three advantages as rapidly as possible in the area in which his band has been assigned to operate.

(5) Depth of Operations.--Guerrillas frequently are organized into many small units which are dispersed over a large area. This provides depth to their operations, simplifies logistics, and makes it difficult to locate them. They attack flanks, rear areas, small or isolated outposts, lines of communication, poorly trained and armed village guards, and similar objectives which are least prepared for or capable of combat.

(6) Favorable Terrain.--Mountains, swamps, forests, and jungles are favorable to guerrillas because their primary means of mobility is on foot. These areas do not favor a force that is dependent upon fixed lines of communication, extensive logistic support, heavy supporting arms, and mechanical means of transportation.

(7) Intelligence System.--By establishing an intelligence system composed of indigenous military personnel and civilians who are
employed by the opposition authority and its military forces, the guerrilla can acquire accurate and timely information. Children may be employed by the guerrillas as intelligence-gathering agents.

(8) **Communications.** --Communications used by guerrillas may vary from complex communication-electronic equipment to audio, visual, and messengers. Guerrillas will utilize the civilian communication system as well as fishermen, travelers, and workmen as messengers and observers. Every sympathetic civilian is a potential member of the communication system.

(9) **External Support.** --The guerrillas can usually obtain food and light weapons from local civilian sources, but may depend heavily on external sources for communication equipment, technical personnel, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. External support greatly expands the potential of the guerrilla forces.

b. **Characteristics Limiting Guerrilla Operations**

(1) **Lack of Mass.** --A limitation of the guerrilla force is its inability to achieve a final victory without external assistance. It is incapable of concentrating combat power for any extended period, unable to exploit success, and thus compelled to accept something short of victory.

(2) **Lack of Means.** --Guerrillas must often depend on seized arms and equipment and are usually denied, by nonavailability of both equipment and technicians, the use of weapons other than small arms.

(3) **Betrayal.** --The guerrilla is vulnerable to betrayal by members of his organization.

(4) **Volunteers Without Contract.** --The guerrilla commander leads a band of people who regard themselves as patriotic civilians rather than soldiers. They have no contract to bind them to their duties and may at anytime consider family obligations, crop harvests, or business to be more important than the overall guerrilla cause.

(5) **Initial Lack of Training and Discipline.** --Basically a civilian, the average guerrilla lacks the formal knowledge and the discipline which results from military training. This deficiency severely limits effectiveness during the early stages of guerrilla organization.
(6) **Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.** --The average guerrilla is susceptible to psychological warfare operations directed against him. The guerrilla may become disheartened and disillusioned with the guerrilla cause if skillful propaganda exploits his failures. For the most part, people become guerrillas because they are dissatisfied with existing conditions. To convince them that they no longer have reason to be dissatisfied is to remove their reason for being guerrillas.

109. **OBJECTIVES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE**

a. **Purpose.** --The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to contribute to the defeat of the enemy. As most guerrilla forces possess certain limitations, their specific objectives cannot be decisive military action, such as seizing and holding terrain, until expanded and formalized to the extent of conventional forces.

b. **Broad Objectives.** --The broad objectives of guerrilla warfare are to:

1. Reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness.
2. Delay and disrupt enemy operations.
3. Weaken the morale and will to resist of enemy forces.
4. Limit the enemy's development and exploitation of the territory it occupies.
5. Develop and strengthen the will of the people to resist the authority of the opposition.

c. **Means.** --To achieve these broad objectives, the guerrilla assumes the role of a swift, silent, disappearing combatant who selects the time and place of battle. His objectives are accomplished by:

1. Attacking and interrupting the enemy's line of communication.
2. Inflicting casualties on and harassing the enemy's forces.
(3) Destroying enemy supplies and installations.

(4) Capturing enemy supplies.

(5) Terrorizing the enemy.

110. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL

a. Influencing Factors. Independence, varying size, and flexibility characterize the guerrilla organization. Some of the factors influencing organization and control are:

(1) The extent of ambushes and raids.

(2) Terrain and enemy capabilities.

(3) Requirements for mobility and surprise (which tend to restrict the size of weapons to be used).

(4) Conducting psychological warfare and political indoctrination:

(a) To ensure continued loyalty and proper political ideology within the guerrilla ranks.

(b) To gain or control civilian support.

(c) To demoralize and to cause the defection of the enemy forces.

(5) The manufacture, salvage, and repair of small arms and demolitions.

(6) Training of new recruits.

(7) Requirement for limited logistic supplies.

(8) Security of the guerrilla base.

(9) Guerrilla strength.

(10) Degree of outside support and control.
b. **Size.** --Guerrilla tactical units are usually small bands of 20 to 30 men; however, several bands may join together to form units of considerable size.

c. **Support.** --Guerrillas may employ young and old, male or female, in supporting organizations and hard core cadres that mend, repair, clean, cook, farm, act as porters, and perform other similar duties. The hard core cadres, properly led, are capable of achieving selected limited objectives to regenerate support of wavering populace.

d. **Command.** --The guerrilla commander will establish succession of command and designate alternate base areas. Members of the organization normally do not question the commander's authority.

e. **Control.** --Widely separated small units operating over large areas necessitate decentralized control and provide operational latitude for the small unit commander. The commander provides the necessary guidance and direction to his unit commanders but normally leaves implementation to his subordinates. Exceptions to this general rule are:

1. Emergency measures conducted against enemy forces which threaten the security of the guerrilla force.

2. Targets assigned specifically to an area commander by the overall commander.

111. **GUERRILLA WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT**

a. **Weapons.** --Guerrillas usually possess a variety of light infantry weapons. Weapons as heavy as the 82mm mortar and the 75mm recoilless rifle are commonly employed by guerrillas; however, in some instances guerrillas may employ weapons as heavy as 120mm. Demolitions are required for the destruction of rail lines, roads, and for making grenades and mines to use in raids, ambushes, etc. They improvise additional weapons such as hand-thrown fire bombs; sharpened sticks or nails set in ditches near ambush sites and trails; thin wires stretched across roads and trails at night at heights designed to decapitate vehicle drivers. Guerrillas have a remarkable ability for producing effective explosive devices from materials discarded or lost by opposing military forces. These items include communication wire, batteries, any type of explosive or ammunition, blasting caps, plastic waterproofing material,
and ammunition boxes. Care must be taken to prevent such articles from falling into guerrilla hands.

b. Equipment. --Equipment requirements vary according to the weather and terrain. Shelters are usually made from available vegetation. A small bowl for eating and a pack are the usual equipment carried by the guerrilla. Leaders usually carry fieldglasses, compasses, and maps. Radios are used to contact external agencies. Individual medical supplies may be carried by each person.

112. GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. Planning Considerations. --The guerrilla considers the size of the enemy forces, dispositions, and their movements. He obtains a thorough knowledge of the terrain, road nets, and trails before making a plan. Large-scale operations are avoided, unless tactical surprise and a highly favorable ratio of numerical superiority is assured. The use of small detachments to strike surprise blows at isolated installations, convoys, columns, or detachments is considered in each plan. Consideration is given to the withdrawal and dispersal of the force. Since guerrilla operations are normally conducted at night, the degree of visibility required at night should receive special consideration along with the weather.

b. Areas of Operation

(1) Categories. --Guerrilla operations may extend throughout the entire area of conflict and can be divided into three general categories:

(a) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas. --This area is usually characterized by extremely difficult terrain and is the area in which the guerrilla has his headquarters and camps.

(b) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas' Enemy. --Raiding operations in this area are executed only by small guerrilla units or by individuals.

(c) Area Not Controlled by Either Force. --This is the principal battleground for the guerrilla, and he will attempt to bring more of it under his domination. Large guerrilla forces enter this area and any enemy force is apt to encounter ambush or harassment.
(2) Size. --As the situation in a given area becomes more favorable to the guerrilla, the area controlled may expand to the extent that enemy forces find themselves in a virtual siege by the guerrillas.

(3) Subdivision. --Areas of operation will normally be aligned within political subdivisions and placed under the jurisdiction of subordinate guerrilla commanders. They exercise civilian control measures, indoctrinate the local populace politically, conduct food and supply collection, levy and collect taxes, and carry out operations against the enemy.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(1) Intelligence. --Acquiring area operation intelligence is of primary importance to the guerrilla force and its external sponsoring forces. The guerrilla's existence will depend on his knowledge of the terrain, enemy strength, organization, movements, dispositions, arms, and habits. In addition, the guerrilla may be the source of information for a sponsoring force. The close relationship between guerrilla units and the civilian populace affords many valuable contacts that may provide information of enemy operations, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. The relationship frequently extends to political, economic, administrative, or psychological processes.

(2) Counterintelligence. --Guerrilla counterintelligence agents are used to cover all areas of guerrilla operations. Because of the possibility of enemy infiltration and betrayal by his own guerrillas, he must continually seek out spies and informers. Personnel recruited for guerrilla forces are carefully screened before joining and closely observed after joining.

d. Covert Operations

(1) Civil Disturbances. --While civil disturbances are not essentially military in nature, they can be an effective means to a military end. They are usually associated with urban areas, for they depend on population masses for effectiveness. Inciting a major disturbance enables the guerrilla to achieve some of the effects of combat without actually engaging his forces. Civil unrest directed against the guerrilla's enemy causes that enemy to divert forces, change policies, and weakens his combat power.
(2) **Sabotage.** — Sabotage is a most effective weapon of covert operations. Properly planned and carried out by both active guerrillas and sympathetic civilians, it affects all phases of the enemy war effort. Physically, it reduces his war potential, which reduces his morale. Sabotage causes the enemy to divert troops to security missions. The guerrilla's successes against the enemy tend to encourage civilians not previously active to commit acts of petty sabotage. These petty acts further harass and confuse the enemy. Successful sabotage results have tremendous propaganda value. These results are hailed as symbols of the resistance, serving to stimulate morale of the guerrilla movement.

(3) **Terrorism.** — Guerrilla forces may terrorize to intimidate or subjugate the civil population in order to ensure support. Acts of violence including murder, arson, bombings, and kidnappings are normally directed toward elements of the population who lack adequate protection or self-defense. Such acts are normally conducted on the person, family, or property of persons who are leaders in civil, economic, educational, or social fields.

e. **Overt Operations**

(1) **Ambush**

(a) The value of ambush lies in the surprise and shock effect. In planning an ambush, the guerrilla commander has an advantage in selecting the terrain, position, and time, which enables him to employ a small force to achieve success. The ambush is employed against moving or temporarily halted targets to kill the enemy and to capture his supplies and equipment.

(b) Three conditions for an ambush are desirable: terrain of a constricting nature, a method of halting or sealing off the target, and the delivery of maximum firepower in a short period of time.

(c) The ambush force usually permits enemy security elements to pass through the main ambush area. Attack of the main body commences upon a prearranged signal and is normally of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal. If the enemy cannot react or reinforce, the guerrilla may stay long enough to salvage any usable equipment and destroy the rest. To cover movement to and from the ambush area, the guerrilla employs extensive security measures. To cover his withdrawal,
the guerrilla may employ secondary ambushes to destroy or delay the enemy reinforcements.

(d) If the ambush fails, the guerrilla withdraws on pre-arranged signal and disperses in many directions, falling back to secondary ambush sites to destroy or delay any pursuing enemy.

(2) Raids

(a) Like the ambush, the raid is dependent upon surprise for effectiveness. However, it is directed against stationary targets and is therefore more complicated and risky.

(b) The purpose of the raid is normally the destruction of key enemy installations or the capture of personnel, supplies, or equipment. The side effects of harassment and reduction of enemy morale may prove as beneficial as the destruction of the target. Raids are also conducted to raise guerrilla prestige in an area and to gain propaganda advantages for justification of the guerrilla cause before world or area opinion.

(c) Guerrilla raids differ very little from raids planned and executed by conventional forces. Three elements are generally required to accomplish the mission: a force designated to eliminate enemy security; a force to accomplish the mission; and a force to cover the withdrawal.

f. Security

(1) Requirement. --Because of his precarious position, the guerrilla must maintain strict security. His relatively weak forces depend almost entirely upon secrecy and deception for their existence. Security is the primary protective measure against surprise, espionage, observation, and interference by the enemy. Only those personnel actively involved in directing guerrilla operations are permitted knowledge of guerrilla positions. False information may be disseminated to deceive the enemy and to assist in covering security leaks.

(2) Measures. --Measures adopted to maintain security include locating the camp and its installations in difficult terrain, keeping these facilities mobile, and maintaining alternate locations in a continuous state
of preparedness. Radio and other communication facilities maintain strictest security and are frequently moved to avoid detection.

(3) Civilian Population. --Maintenance of adequate security control of the civil population is a pressing security problem. It requires the guerrilla to have continuous knowledge of all personnel movement in his area and to maintain up-to-date information on known and suspected security risks.

g. Defensive Considerations.

(1) Limitations. --Guerrilla units avoid defensive combat. Their relative lack of mass and means places them at a distinct disadvantage in static defense against regular forces. If forced to assume the defensive, the guerrilla takes every possible advantage of terrain and his mobility to avoid being fixed in position.

(2) Encirclement Threat. --Encirclement is a major threat to the guerrilla force. The security system is oriented to provide warning of encirclement in adequate time to react. Plans are made and rehearsed that provide many alternate routes of egress from the installation or scene of action. The guerrilla leader, upon being encircled, has three possibilities for survival:

(a) Plan and execute a breakout at the earliest possible time.

(b) Dissolve his units and disappear on an individual basis, abandoning much of his equipment and supplies in order to survive to fight again.

(c) Hold his force together, find the nearest defensible terrain, and organize the strongest possible perimeter defense.

(3) The Breakout. --The breakout is usually the most feasible course of action. If he chooses to dissolve his force, the guerrilla commander may lose much of his equipment and may suffer the loss of an organization which must be rebuilt. A breakout requires careful planning. The guerrilla force attempts to slip through existing gaps. When no gaps exist, the force seeks weak points in the enemy's encirclement. If it becomes evident the breakout will fail, the guerrilla commander
divides his forces into small units to exfiltrate enemy lines to predesignated assembly areas.

(4) Exterior Support. --Guerrilla forces exterior to the encircled area may be of great assistance to the encircled forces by executing diversionary attacks.

(5) Short-Duration Defense. --When required, the short-duration defense of a position may be planned as an adjunct to other operations to gain time to accomplish a mission, to hold the enemy's main body while other units attack his flanks and rear, to allow time for reassembly of forces, or to protect their withdrawal.
201. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps forces may be called upon to participate in counterinsurgency operations in countries with which the United States has mutual security or other agreements or at the request of a country with which no prior agreement exists. A Marine Corps force may operate as part of a larger military force in counterinsurgency situations or it may be the only or principal U.S. force so engaged.

b. In countries with governments friendly to the United States, counterinsurgency operations of U.S. forces will be in accordance with the provisions of agreements between the United States Government and the government of the country concerned.

c. In some instances, U.S. diplomatic representation may not be present in the country where operations are to take place. Frequently,
however, U.S. diplomatic and other agencies will be active in the country. In such cases, military operations must be fully coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies involved.

202. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES

A clear understanding of the relationships between the military forces and other U.S. agencies in the country is essential for proper coordination of counterinsurgency operations. Other U.S. agencies which may be involved include:

a. Chief of Diplomatic Mission. --The chief of the United States diplomatic mission, the ambassador if one is designated, is normally the senior authority on foreign policy and the senior coordinator of the activities of all U.S. governmental agencies in the country to which he is accredited. The chief of the diplomatic mission does not command U.S. military forces operating in the country.

b. United States Embassy. --The ambassador's staff includes political, economic, cultural, administrative, and armed service sections, staffed by officers trained in their specialty and with experience in the country to which assigned. They maintain contact with their counterparts, both in the local government and other U.S. governmental agencies. The chief of mission closely coordinates the activities of the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), which is the country agency of the Agency for International Development (AID); and the United States Information Service (USIS), the country agency of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIS office is concerned with the field of cultural, informational, and educational exchange between the United States and the local government. This agency usually operates offices at the large population centers and under certain conditions, one-man offices in small towns of a host country. Within countries receiving U.S. economic aid, the aid program is administered by the USOM Director. While the Director is responsible to the Agency for International Development in Washington, his activities in the host country are coordinated by the chief of the diplomatic mission. The Director, AID, in Washington reports directly to the Secretary of State.

c. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). --Countries in receipt of United States military aid normally have a MAAG present to
supervise and administer the military assistance program. MAAG activities are conducted under the direction of the Department of Defense, through the unified commander involved. MAAG relationships with the chief of diplomatic mission are usually prescribed in executive orders or other instructions. The chief of mission provides foreign policy guidance to ensure that MAAG efforts are in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Depending upon the mission of the particular MAAG, these activities assist the host government in such matters as reorganization, equipping, training, and logistical support of military forces. They may be joint or uniservice.

d. The Country Team. --With many U.S. agencies operating in a foreign country, their areas of interest and responsibility often overlap. The best interests of the United States and the host country are served if activities of these agencies are well coordinated. The chief of the diplomatic mission may accomplish coordination in part through regular meetings of the "Country Team," a working group made up of representatives of all major U.S. governmental organizations operating in the country. In countries where U.S. military forces are based, the military commander or his representative normally participates as a member of this team.

203. COORDINATION PROCEDURES

a. General. --U.S. military forces operating in a foreign country fall within the chain of command extending from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commander to whose command the forces are assigned. Although the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, if present, is not in this chain of command, close coordination of military activities is effected with the diplomatic mission and other U.S. agencies. In some cases, relationships between the diplomatic representative and the military commander may be further delineated by executive order.

b. Staff Functioning. --Deviations from normal staff responsibilities, procedures, and techniques within the landing force are avoided in dealing with outside agencies. Although one senior representative to the Embassy's liaison office or country team should be appointed, the general and special staff continue to supervise and coordinate matters within their usual areas of staff responsibility. The necessity for a controlled, coordinated effort by all elements of the landing force in dealing with outside
agencies is analogous to the importance of the overall unity of effort of all U.S. agencies within the country concerned. Unilateral, uncoordinated action by landing force staff members is avoided. However, individual staff officers may work directly with U.S. agencies or local governmental authorities within the limits of established policies.

c. **Landing Force-Diplomatic Mission Coordination**

(1) The relationship between the landing force and the diplomatic mission is primarily one of coordination. Instructions concerning these relationships should be set forth in initiating directives. Coordination is facilitated by the establishment of formal liaison with the diplomatic mission and by participation of landing force representatives in the activities of the country team and civil affairs committees, if formed.

(2) Members of the diplomatic mission may not be familiar with landing force methods of operation. Orientation briefings for these officials should be arranged at an early date to avoid misunderstanding. Orientation briefings by the diplomatic mission staff for the landing force are of equal importance. The landing force may develop and recommend procedures to the diplomatic mission as necessary for the conduct of business between the landing force and agencies of the local government.

d. **Landing Force-MAAG Coordination**. --Relationships between the landing force and MAAG are normally conducted on a basis of coordination as defined in directives from higher authority. The missions of these two military activities may differ greatly. The Chief, MAAG, can be of great assistance to the landing force commander. Being well established in the country, the MAAG will have working agreements with the local military commanders and will be familiar with conditions in the country as well as with the personalities involved both in the local government and U.S. Diplomatic Corps. Assistance from the MAAG in the initial days of operation will be particularly valuable.

204. **STATUS OF ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT**

Status of Armed Forces agreements are necessary when counterinsurgency operations are conducted within a friendly foreign country. If a status of Armed Forces agreement already exists prior to arrival of the landing force, its provisions may be extended to include personnel of the landing force. However, if no such agreement exists, one should be
negotiated as soon as possible. This will normally be accomplished through diplomatic channels. The landing force may submit recommendations to the diplomatic mission as appropriate and assist the mission as required in drafting proposed agreements.

205. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

a. General. --Prior to or immediately upon arrival of the landing force in the foreign country, the landing force commander should establish contact with appropriate officials of the foreign government. Contact is made initially through the U.S. diplomatic mission, if one is present, and may continue through the diplomatic mission during the early phase of the operation. When the landing force is firmly established and operating ashore, the defense ministry of the host government may become the principal point of contact for the conduct of routine landing force business with the local government.

b. Subordinate Military Commanders. --Subordinate military commanders assigned independent missions establish liaison with local officials in their area and, work through and cooperate with these authorities within limits established by higher authority. Detailed instructions should be issued to subordinate commanders concerning their relationship with local military and civil officials. At times it is advisable to assign diplomatic advisers to subordinate commands.

c. Participation in Governmental Functions. --A landing force involved in a counterinsurgency operation will not, as a rule, participate in local police, judicial, or other governmental functions unless required by the exigencies of the situation. The landing force may reinforce local police and military forces in the suppression of dissident forces. One of the most important duties to be performed by a commander in an operation against guerrilla forces is to gain the cooperation and assistance of local police and judicial agencies. Police and judicial pressure in suppressing underground organizations, combating sabotage, controlling traffic in arms and ammunition, and enforcement of criminal and civil laws provide both direct and indirect assistance to the landing force commander.
206. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER MILITARY COMMANDERS, U. S. OR FOREIGN

a. Provision of Forces.--Operating under current doctrine (NWP-22(B)/LFM 01, JCS Pub 2), amphibious operations can serve as an important adjunct to the overall counterinsurgency mission, either in an independent or supporting role. Recognition must be given to certain factors that have a direct bearing on the execution of an amphibious operation; these are:

(1) The operation may be a completely independent operation where the entire amphibious task force (ATF) is assigned from the resources of a responsible Fleet organization to include all elements necessary.

(2) The operation may be one in which the amphibious task force (ATF) is augmented or supported by either U. S. and/or foreign forces not embarked, and therefore not placed under control of the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).

(3) The operation may include Marine forces assigned to an ATF as the landing force from a command operating in a host nation and following termination of the amphibious operation, the forces provided may revert to the parent operational commander.

(4) Combination of (1), (2), and (3) above.

b. Coordination Considerations.--Within the above types of provision of forces, particular attention must be paid to the following areas:

(1) Command Relationships

(a) Independent fleet amphibious operations will be in accordance with the doctrine set forth in NWP 22(B) and JCS Pub 2.

(b) In a situation where operational control over the landing force changes from the CATF to a supported commander, subject change is predicated on the establishment of the landing force, including Commander Landing Force (CLF), ashore and termination of the amphibious operation.
(c) CATF may assume control of forces ashore and operating within the amphibious objective area (AOA) during and subsequent to the assault phase of an amphibious operation.

(d) In some cases the supported commander may provide certain specialized units, U.S. and/or foreign, to the ATF because of the special political, geographic, hydrographic, or cultural environment. Procedures for control of these forces must be mutually agreed upon by both the appropriate fleet commander and the support commander.

(2) Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)

(a) Requirements. --The overriding consideration in determination of the AOA is that it must provide the sea, land, and air space required to accomplish the ATF mission. The size may vary from one operation to another. Normally, no problems are encountered when the objective area is located in a hostile area; however, in a counter-insurgency environment, the opposite is true in most cases.

(b) Semihostile Environment. --The environment of the proposed amphibious objective may not be entirely hostile, as visualized in NWP 22(B), in that land, sea, and air space may be within the territorial boundaries of a friendly foreign nation containing friendly forces: U.S. military, friendly foreign civilian personnel, and/or installations. The additional factors that must therefore be considered in determining the size and shape of the AOA should include the following:

1. Presence of friendly foreign military and/or civilian personnel, and/or installations.
2. Presence of U.S. military and/or civilian personnel.
3. Presence of civil air, rail, and waterways.
4. Command relationships, particularly where an amphibious operation is to be conducted in support of a unified or subordinate unified commander.

(c) Excluded Areas. --Consideration of the above factors may well result in an AOA with entirely separate dimensions for the land,
sea, and air space. The land area may abut friendly foreign installations which are inviolated; whereas air space may intersect civil air requiring a safety tunnel of exclusion. Further, commercial waterways within the land and air portion of the AOA may be excluded for the safe passage of friendly foreign traffic.

(d) **Content of Initiating Directive.** --Regardless of the above consideration that might limit the AOA in its traditional form, it must be explicitly defined and the command relationships within the AOA must be clearly prescribed and promulgated in the initiating directive as published by the responsible fleet commander. Likewise, the details of fire support and fire coordination must be expressly defined in the initiating directive in order to ensure that all forces in the AOA are fully aware of the inherent responsibilities of the CATF.

(3) **Intelligence.** --The intelligence procedures must encompass all U.S. agencies, both military and civilian. Extreme care in the dissemination process of amphibious intelligence must be exercised to ensure the validity, accuracy, and timeliness of the information.
301. GENERAL

Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential for successful operations against guerrilla forces. To conduct counterguerrilla operations without a sound intelligence basis is to invite frustration and waste in futile expenditures of time, materiel, and troop effort against an elusive enemy. To conduct effective counterguerrilla operations, both combat intelligence and counterintelligence efforts must be directed to provide answers to these basic questions: Who is the guerrilla? Where is he now? Where will he be in the immediate future? Guerrilla forces, employing to a large extent intelligence and counterintelligence measures which depend upon and integrate with a sympathetic indigenous environment, are difficult to identify, locate, and fix. The guerrilla, by virtue of his attempts to enlist both active and passive support from segments of the local populace, presents special problems to our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts not encountered in "conventional" combat operations. Before he can be separated from the civil populace, fixed, and destroyed, the guerrilla must be positively identified; all members at every combat and support
echelon must be motivated and trained to participate in this fundamental task.

a. **Timeliness.** --Rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence is essential. The elusiveness and mobility of small guerrilla forces quickly outdates information concerning their location. Reaction time for the conduct of combat operations is a critical factor and reactions must be based on reliable intelligence. A concerted effort must be made by every intelligence section to rapidly develop accurate order of battle information applicable to the projected area of operations for its unit.

b. **Personnel.** --A larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is required for counterguerrilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining adequate interrogator-translators and qualified interpreters. In addition, officer and enlisted intelligence personnel must be provided to the landing force to permit continuous operation of the combat operations center and to staff appropriate task groupments in subsequent operations ashore.

c. **Responsibilities.** --Every Marine must have an understanding of the basic techniques and value of intelligence and counterintelligence in counterguerrilla operations. This is necessary because of his own immediate requirements and because of the requirements of higher headquarters. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He must report anything unusual concerning the civil population and the guerrilla force, no matter how trivial. Small unit operations are the basis of counterguerrilla operations. Every troop leader and individual in contact with the enemy or civilian population must be thoroughly intelligence conscious. Small unit commanders must process and act promptly on intelligence information gathered by units.

302. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The guerrilla force, the civil population, and the terrain are virtually inseparable factors in guerrilla warfare. To destroy the guerrilla movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required of all three as follows:

a. **Guerrilla Force.** --The following intelligence is sought concerning the guerrilla force:

(1) Identification, composition, organization, and disposition of the guerrilla force.
(2) Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points, and trails.

(3) Strength and combat efficiency of the guerrilla force, to include: status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

(4) Guerrilla force methods of operation in tactics, politics, economics, proselytizing, and propaganda.

(5) Guerrilla force arms and equipment.

(6) Capability of guerrilla forces to attack installations and disrupt lines of communication.

(7) Supply sources of food, commodities, weapons, ammunition, and means for providing logistic support to the guerrilla force.

(8) Factors which caused or contributed to the development and continuing motivation of the guerrilla force.

(9) Relationship between the guerrilla and civil population.

(10) Relationship with and degree of support from any external forces or sponsoring power.

(11) Psychological vulnerabilities.

b. Civil Population. --Recognizing that several items of desired intelligence pertaining to the guerrilla force also bear directly on the civil population (for example, items (4), (7), (8), and (9) above), we seek the following intelligence concerning the civil population:

(1) Identification of hostile, neutral, or uncommitted and friendly elements.

(2) Motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population.

(3) Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.

(4) Effect of local authorities and police on civil population.
(5) Capability of the area to furnish food.

(6) Availability of water and fuels.

(7) Vulnerability of friendly civil population to terrorism.

(8) Estimated effect of civil populace and resources control measures, such as: curfews, search and seizures, movement restrictions, food and commodity controls, pass and tag systems, relocation, and suspension of certain civil liberties.

(9) Psychological vulnerabilities.

(10) Relationship of local authorities and police with the guerrilla force operating in the vicinity of their community.

c. **Terrain.** — An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counterguerrilla operations. Terrain information is continuously collected and processed. The resulting intelligence is promptly disseminated usually via special photo studies, reports, and overlays contained in intelligence estimates, special reports of annexes to operation plans, and orders. Particular effort is made to collect information concerning the following:

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or secure areas. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

(a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

(b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

(c) Covered withdrawal routes.

(d) Located within one day's foot movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

(e) Adequate water supply.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communication.
(4) Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on seasons when the streams are at flood stage.

(5) Areas where drinking water is not available.

(6) Areas where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

(7) Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

(8) Location of likely guerrilla or counterguerrilla ambush sites.

(9) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

(10) When guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power: location of areas suitable for airdrops, boat or submarine rendezvous, and roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas.

(11) Location of all known or suspected harboring sites for the guerrilla force.

(12) Location of all known or suspected guerrilla strongpoints, field fortifications, weapons emplacements, and antiaircraft positions.

303. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

a. Modifications. --The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of friendly units, the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, and the presence of indigenous military and paramilitary units, dictate modification of normal intelligence procedure. Intelligence section organization and functions are modified as required at all levels of command having an intelligence section. The criteria is the nature and extent of the intelligence effort required to support the mission, availability of qualified personnel within the landing force as a whole, and the personal preferences of the intelligence officer and the commander. Combat operations normally will require augmentation with interrogator-translators, air observers, counterintelligence personnel, order of battle analysts, interpreters, and possibly imagery interpreters, reconnaissance and surveillance specialists, and technical intelligence personnel.

b. Counterguerrilla Intelligence Functions. --The intelligence section at landing force level may be organized by the establishment of special
subsections to accommodate a special function. For example, a covert collection unit may be required to supervise agent activities. A records subsection may be created to develop and maintain information concerning the civil population and guerrilla force. The most important counterguerrilla intelligence functions include the following:

(1) **Combat Intelligence.** --The primary requirement of combat intelligence is to locate the guerrilla force. Emphasis is placed on overt collection of information. Most of the functions of the conventional combat intelligence subsection are applicable. Special attention is given to the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence. Careful attention to seemingly minor guerrilla preparations and activities is essential to the development of meaningful intelligence on impending guerrilla operations. Assignment of order of battle analysts to specific geographic areas is desirable to maintain continuity in concentrated analysis and development of meaningful intelligence, particularly from those sources over which the landing force has no direct control or influence.

(2) **Clandestine Collection.** --Clandestine collection is extremely important in counterguerrilla operations. Every effort is made to infiltrate the guerrilla force and hostile civilian elements with reliable agents. Indigenous persons are usually capable of infiltrating the guerrilla force; they have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain; and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with, members of the guerrilla force. Potential agents are carefully screened to ensure that they are not double agents; their reliability is constantly checked. The recruiting, training, and handling of agents requires highly trained intelligence personnel. Because of the sensitive nature of agent operations and the emphasis placed on clandestine collections, this function is usually separated from combat intelligence. However, the results of clandestine collection are given to the combat intelligence subsection. Clandestine collection of intelligence must be closely coordinated at the highest level of command having cognizance over the specific area of operations. Normally clandestine collection responsibilities will be assigned to counterintelligence personnel who have received special training in this function.

(3) **Aerial Reconnaissance.** --Functions of the aerial reconnaissance subsection are essentially the same as for conventional operations. Special attention is directed toward preplanned and on call reconnaissance and observation missions in direct support of widely separated battalions and smaller units. Included will be a continuing requirement to ensure,
under various tactical situations, compatibility of communication equipment and frequency assignments between supporting aircraft and supported ground element, particularly with regard to units smaller than battalion. See paragraph 804 for details on aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Psychological Operations. --The added emphasis of psychological operations requires that all intelligence be evaluated in terms of psychological application. The efforts of the intelligence section and the psychological operations agencies are closely related. For example, the intelligence section is interested in the guerrilla food supply; whereas, psychological operations agencies are interested in whether or not appeals developed on a food theme would cause disaffection, or even surrender. In addition to working closely with each other, intelligence personnel and psychological operations personnel provide mutual assistance in the execution of their respective tasks. See paragraph 406 for a discussion of psychological operations.

(5) Biographic Data. --Records on guerrilla commanders and members, and key members of the hostile civil population, should be maintained. Frequently, the operations or behavior of these individuals develop a pattern which, recognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against them. The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable sources of information and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas. In communities friendly to the guerrilla force, some persons are responsible for collecting food and providing other aid for the guerrillas, such as relaying messages and providing temporary security. Every effort must be made to discover these persons. Instead of immediate arrest, it is better to watch their activities and seek to apprehend the guerrillas contacting them. Establishment and maintenance of records concerning black and gray lists should be restricted to those units having the capability to administer them. Such efforts should be coordinated and supervised by the counterintelligence team assigned to the landing force.

(6) Interrogator-Translators and Interpreters. --Fleet Marine Force interrogation-translation teams are limited in number and language spread. Consequently, commands preparing for operations against guerrilla forces should utilize available personnel that have the appropriate language facility and document reading capability to assist unit intelligence personnel. These personnel must be afforded maximum possible combat intelligence training prior to operations. They may be integrated into the intelligence section of tactical units or be assigned as augmentation to, and operate under, interrogation-translation teams. In cases where
personnel with language capabilities are not available, landing force com-
mands will normally employ indigenous personnel as interpreters and doc-
ument translators for duty with interrogation-translation teams. However,
it is essential that these personnel be carefully screened and constantly
supervised by qualified intelligence personnel. Because of general lack of
military background of indigenous personnel, bilingual dictionaries should
be obtained prior to embarkation to assist in their training.

(7) Counterintelligence.--Guerrilla forces depend primarily up-
on secrecy and surprise to offset the superior combat power of the counter-
guerrilla force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely
on the effectiveness of the guerrillas' intelligence agencies, intensive ef-
fort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize his intelli-
gence system. To assist in achieving surprise in counterguerrilla opera-
tions and to counter the guerrilla intelligence system in general, assigned
or attached counterintelligence personnel will normally ensure that:

(a) Security indoctrination lectures, surveys, evaluations,
and inspections are conducted in order to maintain an adequate level of
personnel, document, and physical security.

(b) Standing operating procedures and operation orders con-
tain appropriate instructions and guidance relative to personnel, document,
physical, and related security and counterintelligence functions.

(c) Civil security measures are instituted as requirements
dictate. Such items as security screening of civilian employees, institu-
tion of curfews and other circulation control measures, and monitoring of
suspect political groups will normally be accomplished or coordinated by
counterintelligence personnel.

(d) Embarkation security measures are adequate, ensuring
the maintenance of the necessary secrecy in troop and unit movement and
protection of equipment from sabotage attempts.

(e) Appropriate advice and assistance on censorship or sus-
pension of civil communications is provided.

(f) Appropriate investigations are conducted when disregard
or violation of censorship or security regulations occur. Additionally,
counterintelligence personnel may conduct security investigations into in-
cidents wherein espionage, sabotage, or subversion are suspected.
(g) U.S. personnel who have escaped or otherwise been returned to U.S. control subsequent to capture are properly debriefed for intelligence and counterintelligence of immediate tactical value.

(h) Liaison with friendly intelligence and police organizations is maintained so that timely and accurate information concerning enemy activity may be received.

(i) Special counterintelligence operations such as the following are conducted:

1. Operation of informant nets.

2. Surveillance of known or suspected guerrilla force agents.

3. Maintenance of blacklist files and planning of operations to apprehend personnel listed therein. Special emphasis will be given to planning operations to apprehend guerrilla infrastructure personnel.

4. Reemployment of enemy guerrilla agents in aggressive counterintelligence operations.

5. Identification, neutralization, and exploitation of counterintelligence targets.

6. Such other special operations as may be directed by higher headquarters.

(8) Miscellaneous Functions. -- Other functions, which may take on added importance in counterguerrilla operations and which may require additional specialists, include such fields as communications, sociology, politics, and agriculture.

(9) Administration. -- These functions handled by the administrative subsection are not unusual in counterguerrilla operations, unless there is a requirement for large-scale maps in sufficient quantities for distribution down to and including the rifle squad level.

304. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING AGENCIES AND SOURCES

Intelligence collecting agents include trained agents, intelligence specialists, various civilian agencies and individuals, and troop units. Units
and individual troops play a prominent part in the collection effort. All troops must realize the importance of reporting, as accurately as possible, every piece of information which they obtain about the guerrilla force, civil population, and the topography of the area. The sources from which information is obtained include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Patrol Reports. --A primary source in the collection effort is the patrol report regarding: food cultivation, food dumps, camps, trails and roads, arms and ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment, and tactics.

b. Surrendered and Captured Guerrillas. --A surrendered guerrilla can be an extremely valuable source of information for both immediate tactical exploitation or for developing intelligence on a broader scale. They can be particularly useful in the role of returning to guerrilla-held areas to gain additional information or solicit further surrenders. Such use of surrendered guerrillas can best be accomplished and coordinated by higher level intelligence in units. Care must be used in handling surrendered and captured guerrillas in order to avoid nullifying the psychological advantage gained. The following points must be considered in each case:

(1) Avoid "advertising" the fact that a guerrilla is a prisoner until competent authority has decided how best to exploit him.

(2) Strictly prohibit the abuse, maltreatment, or harassment of surrendered or captured prisoners.

(3) Restrict interrogation to a minimum number of people, and ensure that interrogation is accomplished by qualified interrogators whenever possible.

(4) Expedite captured guerrillas to the landing force collection point for processing. Immediate exploitation of a captive by the capturing tactical unit should be undertaken only when such exploitation will result directly in lives saved or when a substantial tactical advantage can be expected to occur from such exploitation. Such retention must be reported immediately. Any lengthy retention must be approved by landing force headquarters.

c. Captured Documents. --All captured documents should be forwarded immediately to the landing force intelligence section for translation. In cases where interrogator-translator subteams are directly supporting widespread forward tactical units, these personnel may initially screen captured documents prior to forwarding to higher headquarters. To ensure prompt processing of documents, the following considerations must be kept in mind.
(1) Do not separate documents captured together. Documents must be translated and analyzed in context with each other in order to be meaningful.

(2) Use capture tags attached to the document or package of documents to note the identification and capture circumstances.

(3) Keep separately captured documents apart from each other with capture tags attached to each document or package of documents.

(4) Do not deface or write directly on the surface of any captured document.

(5) Make every effort to keep documents dry. If documents are wet when captured, dry by airing, if possible, prior to forwarding.

(6) Forward all wallets and personnel effects intact, annotating the contents on the capture tag.

d. Dead Guerrillas

(1) Sometimes the identification of dead guerrillas is the only means of identifying the enemy organization in the area. Identification can be accomplished best by onsite inspection and interrogation of POWs and local inhabitants by intelligence personnel when circumstances permit.

(a) If onsite inspection is not feasible, or if bodies are believed to be of special significance or require special identification, they should be delivered to a higher echelon intelligence section via helicopter.

(b) Ground evacuation of dead guerrillas should not be undertaken if decomposition has set in, or will set in before delivery.

(2) Identification techniques can be applied on the spot and include the following:

(a) Photographs. --For successful photography of the body, the face should be washed and the hair should be brushed back from the face. The eyes should be opened before photographing. A minimum of two full photos at short range should be taken.

(b) Fingerprints. --In fingerprinting, the main principle to be observed is cleanliness of both the equipment and the fingers to be printed.
(c) **Description.** --The following information is required for a description:

1. Sex.
2. Race.
3. Apparent age.
4. Height, build, and facial features.
5. Teeth, scars, and deformities.

e. **Information Obtained From Civilians and Agents.** --Unit intelligence sections should be notified of any civilian possessing information of intelligence interest. Agents are handled in accordance with procedures discussed in paragraph 303. Normally, subordinate units of the landing force should not develop their own agents or informers to acquire information. Persons claiming to be agents shall be detained and segregated and counterintelligence personnel contacted for disposition.

   (1) It is of great importance that all captured communication equipment be recovered for inspection. Units capturing guerrilla equipment should note the following:

   (a) Type of set; i.e., transmitter/receiver, transmitter, or receiver.

   (b) Make, name, and number of set.

   (c) Location at time of capture.

   (d) Frequencies shown on dials at time of capture.

   (e) Direction of the aerial (including compass bearing).

(2) Captured equipment is expeditiously reported to the unit intelligence section. Frequency dials are carefully read before the set is moved and, if possible, locked to prevent change during transit.

g. **Monitoring**

(1) Units receiving a signal of unknown origin should immediately report it to the intelligence section. This report includes frequency
and call sign. All information obtained during the monitoring is sent to the intelligence center.

(2) Documents relating to communications and those found in proximity to communication equipment are sent to the intelligence section as quickly as possible.

h. Food Cultivation

(1) Guerrillas may be forced to cultivate for food supply. If this occurs, either the crops are destroyed or used as lure to trap the guerrilla. Guidance will be necessary from experts to say whether the amount of cultivation is sufficient only for the local population, or if it is so large that the guerrillas may live off it as well.

(2) Units discovering cultivations will report:

(a) Location.
(b) Size.
(c) Type.
(d) Condition; e.g.,

Stage 1 - Freshly cut.
Stage 2 - Cut and cleared.
Stage 3 - Prepared and hoed.
Stage 4 - Growing crops tended.
Stage 5 - Growing crops untended.
Stage 6 - Harvested.
Stage 7 - Disused and overgrown.

i. Arms and Ammunition

(1) Units recovering arms and ammunition from guerrillas will report to the unit intelligence section:

(a) Description and identification of weapons.
(b) Quantity and caliber of ammunition.
(c) Date ammunition was manufactured and whether or not the ammunition is serviceable.
(d) Whether or not the ammunition has been reloaded and resized.

(2) All new ordnance items and those encountered in the area for the first time, including mines, explosives, and boobytraps, will be recovered, deactivated by competent personnel, and forwarded to the intelligence section for technical examination whenever possible; otherwise, intelligence and technical personnel should make an onsite examination of the items. In any case, a full report should be made by the capturing unit giving circumstances of capture, serviceability, condition, identification marks/numbers, and technical data.

j. Aerial Reconnaissance.--Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, is discussed in paragraph 804.

k. Local Military and Civil Authorities.--Close liaison must be maintained at all levels of command with local military and civilian authorities. The use of liaison officers at local military and governmental headquarters is advisable on a continuous basis in order to exploit the information available to those agencies. Their assistance in identifying local loyal elements and guerrilla forces must be solicited. Their knowledge of local terrain must be exploited. The information obtained should be processed through unit intelligence channels.

l. Ground Reconnaissance.--An aggressive program of ground reconnaissance must be conducted in an effort to find enemy guerrilla bands. Agent and other reports of movement and location of guerrilla elements can be used as a basis for determining the areas to be covered by fixed and moving ground reconnaissance units. Particular attention should be paid to coverage of suspected enemy safety zones, supply and ammo caches, and training areas. See subparagraph 906 for a further discussion of reconnaissance units.
SECTION 4

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

401. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps experience and knowledge in planning for amphibious operations offer a distinct advantage in planning counterguerrilla operations. Those procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning operations against guerrillas which are similar to planning the amphibious assault include the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all echelons of the forces involved. At higher echelons, parallel planning starts with the inception of the operation.

(2) The complex nature of counterguerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does not initially exist and is unpredictable
during the operation. Accordingly, plans must be flexible and responsive to meet the problems of combat and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. LFM 02, Doctrine for Landing Forces, provides additional information concerning the landing force in counterinsurgency operations.

c. This section covers such features of counterguerrilla operations as area organization, combat forces, organization of forces, conduct of combat operations, and psychological operations.

402. PLANNING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations

(1) Area Control. —The establishment of strict control within the resistance area is required, particularly when a close relationship exists between the civil population and the guerrillas. Positive control is essential in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(2) Concurrent Operations. —A number of diversified actions such as tactical operations, psychological warfare, civil populace control, and civic action (political, social, and economic) are conducted concurrently. This requires a single authority at each level of operation to assure agreement of purpose, coordination, and control.

(3) Intelligence. —The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. Friendly troop deployments, the nature of the enemy, and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population impose special requirements. Additional intelligence and counterintelligence personnel are required.

(4) Guerrilla Force. —Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strength of the guerrilla force usually includes: motivation, knowledge of the area, and irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses usually include: dependence on an unreliable supply system and general support of the civil population, and lack of good communications, air support, and heavy weapons.
(5) Application of the Principles of War. --Although counter-guerrilla operations differ from normal combat, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility is largely achieved by well-trained, fast-moving, unburdened infantry and by use of helicopters. Surprise is accomplished by superior mobility, offensive action, and good security, including deception. Mass is usually characterized, not by heavy fire power and large troop concentrations, but by sufficient forces at the right place at the right time. Economy of force is reflected in the organization of forces and organization of the area to assure that only essential forces are employed and that the most advantageous dispositions are made. Guerrillas rely heavily on surprise; good security will minimize this problem and at the same time enhance the achievement of surprise by counterguerrilla forces. Cooperation/coordination is carefully observed between counterguerrilla forces and with civil authority. Although the overall operation is complex in nature, simplicity, particularly in plans, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike normal operations, objectives essential to accomplishing the mission are seldom related to geographic features; in counterguerrilla operations the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) Small Unit Actions. --The majority of counterguerrilla operations consist of small unit actions. Because of the nature of guerrilla warfare, small units are required to establish control over the area and to make contact with the guerrillas. Small units are capable of engaging most contacts because most guerrilla groups are small in size. In addition to providing detailed coverage of an area, small units have the degree of mobility to respond to guerrilla activity.

(7) Areas of Responsibility. --The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas or areas coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific areas of responsibility are assigned to subordinate forces capable of conducting independent counterguerrilla operations within their area from a base or bases established within or adjacent to the area. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, the guerrilla activity, and the estimated guerrilla force. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion size task forces, which will be assigned an area responsibility.
Terrain. - Terrain will influence the organization of the
area, the size and composition of forces, and the tactics and
techniques employed by the counterguerrilla force.

Communications. -- The extreme dispersion of units in
operations against guerrilla forces places a heavy demand on the communica-
tion means throughout the counterguerrilla force. Augmentation by com-
munication personnel and equipment is usually required.

Specific Considerations. -- Planning for military operations
against guerrilla forces requires a detailed estimate of the situation.
Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, and social)
and the military situations. The following specific factors are considered
in the commander's estimate:

1. Terrain and Weather
   a. Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla
      and counterguerrilla operations.

2. Inhabitants
   a. Loyalty of various segments of the population to the
guerrillas.
   b. Effect of weather and seasons on both guerrilla
      and counterguerrilla operations.
   c. Existence of possible guerrilla bases.

3. Farmers and other rural dwellers.

4. Persons known to adhere to the ideologies of the
guerrillas.

5. Criminals and "tough" elements.

6. Former members of armed forces.

7. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or
tendencies.