(b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla force and guerrilla support activities.

(c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.

(d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(e) Knowledge of the attitudes, customs, and traditions of the indigenous population.

(3) Guerrilla Resources. -- The resources available to the guerrilla force, including the following:

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.

(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.

(c) The availability of water and fuels.

(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) Sponsoring Power. -- Guerrilla force relations with any external sponsoring power, including the following:

(a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.

(b) Communications with the guerrilla force.

(c) Capability to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) Guerrilla Organization. -- The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including the following:

(a) Their origin and development.

(b) Their strength, morale, and status of training.

(c) The personality of the leaders.
(d) Relations with the civil populace.

(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.

(f) Status of equipment and supplies.

(g) Effectiveness of communications.

(h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.

(6) **Friendly Forces.** --The size and composition of friendly forces available for operations against the guerrillas, including the following:

(a) Own forces.

(b) Other military units available in the area if needed.

(c) Civil police, militia, and self-defense units.

(7) **Local Relationships.** --The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla force.

403. AREA ORGANIZATION, COMBAT BASES, AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

a. General

(1) **Requirements.** --The operational area and military forces must be organized to provide:

(a) Unity of action and area administration with civil forces.

(b) Secure bases from which to conduct operations.

(c) Security detachments for protecting critical military and civil installations, essential routes of communication, and key communities.

(d) Forces for conducting tactical operations against guerrilla forces.
(e) Forces for civil populace control and tasks of a police nature such as road blocks and search and seizure.

(2) Indigenous Personnel. --To minimize the requirement for military units, maximum use is made of indigenous organizations and individuals, consistent with their reliability and capability, and policy agreements. Organizations such as village self-defense units, police, or friendly guerrillas may exist or be organized to provide local defense and to assist in establishing and maintaining civil populace control. Support for indigenous organizations, such as arms, ammunition, food, and communication equipment, is normally required. Individuals may be employed as laborers, informants, guides, interpreters, and translators. For detailed discussion, see section 11.

(3) Terrain. --Terrain will affect the organization of the area and the organization of forces. Area boundaries should not divide key terrain features. Guerrillas are likely to exist in areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps. Conversely, since the guerrillas must seek their support from the local population, they can be encountered in hamlets and villages, particularly in rural areas. Such areas are difficult to control and therefore may limit the size of the lower echelon areas of responsibility and influence the organization of forces as a result of the following:

(a) The requirement for extensive patrolling emphasizes the role of infantry. The need for support by artillery and air does not diminish however. Constant pressure by aggressive well-trained troops will keep the guerrillas off balance.

(b) The use of combat support elements may be precluded or their effectiveness limited. This is particularly true in the case of tanks, trucks, and certain artillery pieces.

(c) The requirement for air support, particularly helicopters, is emphasized.

b. Area Organization

(1) Boundaries. --The entire area of operations is subdivided into areas of responsibility using clearly defined boundaries. Although it is desirable for areas of responsibility to coincide with political
subdivisions to ensure maximum cooperation from civil authorities, in many cases, boundaries must be dictated by overriding military considerations.

(2) Area and Sector Assignment. --Areas of responsibility are normally assigned to infantry battalions. Sectors of the area of responsibility may be further assigned to subordinate rifle companies. It may be necessary to further assign definite sectors to platoons.

(3) Size. --The size of the area assigned to a battalion depends on the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla activity, size of the guerrilla force, the forces available, and the mission. For example, if the area is heavily infested with guerrillas, sufficient forces are available, and artillery is assigned to battalions, the limits of their areas may roughly correspond to the range of artillery fire support. On the other hand, it is conceivable that battalions may be assigned areas as large as 300 square miles. Naturally, a battalion cannot expect to operate concurrently over an area that large. If the battalion commander cannot assign company sectors encompassing the entire area, he must divide the area into sectors and determine a priority for their occupation and clearance, coordinating with adjacent units, as necessary. In such cases, particular attention must be paid to the movement and regroupment of guerrillas from occupied sectors to cleared sectors.

(4) Pursuit. --Area or sector boundaries should not prevent the pursuit of guerrilla forces into an adjacent area or sector. Operation orders, SOPs, or other means of coordination should provide for this contingency.

(5) Flexibility. --It must be realized there are no firmly established rules or principles governing area organization. The differences in areas, which are certain to exist, must be accommodated by flexibility in both planning and execution. Changes in the situation, or experience factors, will often produce changes to the initial area organization.

(6) Identification of Degree of Area Control. --For the benefit of troops and civil populace and for purposes of security, it is desirable to identify the degree of control existing in any specific area. The following designations based on traffic light colors may be used:

(a) RED AREA. --Area under part-time or continuous control of guerrillas. Any persons therein are suspected members of
the guerrilla force. Troops will maintain a combat status and vehicles must travel in convoys with an armed escort.

(b) **YELLOW AREA.** --Area in which guerrilla forces periodically appear but which is under neither friendly nor guerrilla control. Troops must carry individual weapons in such areas and must not move alone. Vehicles must have at least one guard, armed, riding in the open. Curfew and other population control measures are strongly enforced.

(c) **GREEN AREA.** --Area under positive friendly control. Stringent population control measures are lifted. Troops must not move alone. Vehicles may travel without guards.

c. **Combat Bases**

(1) **Location.** --Combat bases are established by battalions within or immediately adjacent to their area of responsibility. In some cases, particularly where the battalion area of responsibility is large, rifle companies may establish combat bases in their sectors. A combat base is moved as often as necessary for security purposes and to remain within effective striking range of guerrilla units. Patrols operating from battalion or company combat bases may establish temporary patrol bases to extend their operations. When practicable, helicopters and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment and support of troops to reduce the number of combat bases. See paragraph 603 for a discussion of combat bases established in conjunction with a static security post.

(2) **Size.** --A combat base is the focal point for all tactical operations conducted in the area concerned; however, the base may also accommodate elements conducting nontactical missions in the area. The size of the base will vary with the size of the unit and will be in response to security considerations. Establishment and maintenance of communications with operating units is an additional consideration.

(3) **Security.** --A combat base is located to facilitate its own security. The defense of the base is a major consideration since the majority of troops will be absent most of the time conducting operations. Whenever possible, bases are established on the most defensible terrain in the area. Positions encircling the area are prepared and protective
obstacles are employed. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive positions and occupied as required.

(4) Organization. --The comfort and health of the troops are major considerations in the organization of a combat base. Whenever practical, overhead shelter is provided. Messing facilities are established and operated to meet the irregular arrival and departure of forces. Either standard or field expedient showers should be constructed; this and other water needs require an adequate water supply. Some form of physical recreation is provided. Although the highest standards of discipline and sanitation are maintained in the combat base, troops not on guard should be made to feel that it is a place to rest and relax. To maintain good morale in his unit is one of the major challenges presented to a commander during counterguerrilla operations.

d. Organization of Forces

(1) Adaptability of FMF Units for Counterguerrilla Operations. --The flexibility inherent in the Fleet Marine Force for forming task groups to conduct amphibious operations is readily adaptable to counterguerrilla operations. The doctrine for organizing battalion landing teams is particularly applicable. It is not only significant that FMF units can be rapidly task organized for counterguerrilla operation, but it is equally important that while so employed they retain the capability to revert quickly to the amphibious role for which they are primarily designed. The organization, training, and equipment of FMF units for helicopterborne operations in the amphibious assault especially qualify such units for counterguerrilla operations.

(2) Size and Composition. --The force initially committed should be carefully organized to effect destruction of the guerrillas. Insufficient combat power and faulty organization can only lead to a long frustrating period of indecisive activity. Initial assignment of insufficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would have been required originally. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the guerrilla force, and the attitude of the civilian population. The fact that guerrilla forces usually operate in extremely difficult terrain and without air support, heavy caliber weapons, and armor, reduces the requirement for certain types of combat support forces and combat service support forces. However, the nature of guerrilla force operations usually requires that the counterguerrilla
force be provided with augmentation in such fields as psychological warfare, civil affairs/military government, intelligence, and communications.

(3) Battalion-Size Task Forces. --Whatever the size of the overall force operating against guerrillas, the formation of battalion-size task forces will normally be required. The independent or semi-independent nature of the operations and the diversified missions normally require that a battalion receive augmentation and/or unit reinforcements prior to the conduct of operations. Reinforcements may include appropriate units of reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, motor transport, amphibian vehicles, and engineers. Augmentation may include intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, communications, maintenance, military police, medical, and aviation. Battalion task forces must be prepared to revert to normal land combat operations under their parent regiments, when the hostile threat requires action by larger forces.

(4) Organization. --Within the battalion task force and/or its subordinate rifle companies, units are most frequently organized as follows:

(a) Patrols. --Patrols are extensively used and may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced company. Patrols must be specifically organized and equipped to perform one or more of a variety of missions, and if necessary, for extended commitment over a long period of time. Organization may include appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and members of the civil police. See section 5 for a discussion of patrolling.

(b) Reaction Force. --A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to rapidly engage reported guerrilla forces or reinforce other friendly forces. This force ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by foot, surface vehicle, or helicopter.

404. CONDUCT OF COUNTERGUERRILLA MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. General. --The doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla operations is based on both experience and theory. Experience has shown that there is no pat solution to the problem of defeating guerrillas, that variations in method of operation will be required with each new situation.
Among other things, guerrilla-counterguerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation by the opposing commanders. Commanders must be ever alert to change or adapt their tactics to meet the specific situation at hand.

b. Sequence of Operations. --In general, counterguerrilla operations are conducted in the following sequence:

(1) Organization of the Area. --A commander assigned the mission of combating a guerrilla force moves his unit into the area, establishes subordinate areas of responsibility and combat bases, and employs appropriate security measures. Subparagraph 403c discusses combat bases; and section 6 discusses troop and installation security and the security of transportation.

(2) Isolation of the Guerrilla Force. --Measures directed at populace control and isolation of the guerrilla force from all forms of support are initiated. Much of this effort is accomplished by police-type operations and conducted by either military or civil forces or a combination of both. For a discussion of civil populace control measures see section 10. A discussion of search procedures is contained in section 5. Military responsibilities in connection with the civil populace are discussed in section 10. Psychological operations are commenced to create civilian support for the counterguerrilla effort and civilian and guerrilla disaffection from the guerrilla cause. Paragraph 406 discusses psychological operations. Denial operations (discussed below) to deny guerrillas contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power, are initiated.

(3) Actions Against Guerrilla Force. --Harassing operations, primarily patrolling, are conducted against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations in general are discussed below and the tactics and techniques of patrolling are discussed in section 5. Reaction operations (discussed below) are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against the civil community or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Elimination of Guerrilla Force. --Once a guerrilla force has been located and can be fixed, elimination operations (discussed below) are conducted against it.

(5) Post-Destruction Operation. --After the destruction of the guerrilla force, military forces may participate in the efforts to prevent its resurgence.
c. Concurrent Operations. --While the sequence above is considered normal, it is not intended to indicate that one step of the sequence must be successfully concluded before the initiation of the next. Conversely, the conduct of these steps should overlap in time, with police-type operations, psychological operations, and combat operations being conducted concurrently.

d. Combat Operations. --In general, the four types of combat operations normally conducted against guerrillas include denial operations, harassing operations, reaction operations, and elimination operations. For a discussion of small unit tactics and techniques in connection with these operations, see section 5. The four types of combat operations are as follows:

(1) Denial Operations

(a) Objectives. --Operations to deny the guerrilla force contact with, and support by, an external sponsoring power are initiated early and conducted concurrently with other operations. Denial operations require effective measures to secure border or seacoast areas to prevent communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla force. The scope of these operations will vary and will be determined by such factors as the extent of the border or seacoast area, terrain, and methods and extent of external support.

(b) Conduct. --The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment, whether by air, land, or water, must be determined at the earliest possible time. Border areas are secured by the use of patrols, static security posts, ground and aerial observers, and reaction forces. Extensive use is made of informers and agents. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, and cleared areas are established along the border. Radio direction finding and jamming may be required. Ground surveillance radar is used. Interdiction by various fire support means may be employed and when appropriate, blockade operations by Navy ships and craft.

(c) Other Considerations. --The achievement of success in denial operations may be exceedingly difficult. External support is an important feature of guerrilla operations and as denial operations are intensified, his methods of contact will become more difficult to detect, and often frustrating to a commander of a counterguerrilla force. Perseverance and ingenuity will be essential to success.
(2) **Harassing Operations**

(a) **Objectives.** -- Harassing operations are conducted night or day to prevent guerrillas from resting, conducting operations, and receiving support. Such operations will inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge about the terrain and the enemy. Harassing operations are executed primarily by extended patrols and larger combat units. Since guerrilla troop and supply movements are generally executed to provide concealment during the hours of darkness and inclement weather, maximum use must be made of harassing fires, both aviation and artillery, during these periods. The use of air support radar teams to control air-strikes is very effective in supplementing artillery range limitations.

(b) **Conduct.** -- Harassing operations are conducted primarily by the use of:

1. Aerial and ground reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units, bases, and camps.
2. Continuous aerial surveillance during daylight hours.
3. Extensive patrols and raids against guerrilla bases, camps, outposts, and supply caches.
4. Ambushes.
5. Airstrikes and artillery fires, especially during the hours of darkness and inclement weather.
6. Mining guerrilla routes of communication.

(3) **Reaction Operations**

(a) **When Conducted.** -- Reaction operations are conducted by mobile combat reaction forces operating from combat bases. Reaction operations are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against civil or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance. Reaction operations are often conducted in connection with denial and/or harassing operations.

(b) **How Conducted.** -- When a guerrilla force is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage and destroy the guerrilla.
force. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatched if needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Reaction operations will often consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. Once the escape of the guerrilla force has been blocked, the attack is continued to destroy it. The mobility required to envelope and block is provided by helicopters, ground vehicles, and by accelerated foot movement.

(c) Preplanning. --Throughout counterguerrilla operations, commanders at all echelons continually locate possible targets at which the guerrilla might strike and prepare plans for decisive reaction. Guerrilla targets might include important road and railroad junctions, desolate stretches of road and railroad, bridges, key military and police installations, civilian communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and homes of important persons. Reaction plans for such situations are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Potential guerrilla targets should be carefully reconnoitered. To facilitate reaction to a guerrilla attack on such targets, each target and rendezvous point near the target are assigned a code identification. Whenever possible, helicopter landing zones or truck release points are used as rendezvous points. By use of a code designation for the potential target and rendezvous points, orders to the reaction force can be simplified.

(d) Night Operations. --Since guerrilla forces are most active during the hours of darkness, reaction forces must be prepared to conduct operations under the same conditions.

(4) Elimination Operations

(a) Characteristics. --Guerrillas not destroyed by denial, harassing, and reaction operations are often forced by such operations into situations which will require elimination operations aimed at their destruction. Elimination operations are difficult to execute, and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops are thoroughly briefed and, when practicable, rehearsed. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature disclosure of the operation. Elimination operations usually possess the following characteristics:

1. Guerrilla Force Located. --A guerrilla force is definitely located. This may be accomplished during the conduct of denial
harassing, or reaction operations. Forces conducting elimination operations are rarely committed to operations in suspected areas.

2 Guerrilla Force Vulnerable. --The guerrilla force is in a reasonably vulnerable situation, susceptible of being fixed in position, or engaged by surprise attack by the counterguerrilla forces.

3 Guerrilla Force Large. --The guerrilla force is most often of considerable size.

4 Friendly Force Larger. --A force conducting elimination operations is normally much larger than the located guerrilla force. Depending on the size and location of the guerrilla force and the tactics to be employed, it will vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced division; however, one or two reinforced battalions will be most common.

5 Containment. --As a prerequisite to destruction of the guerrilla force, every effort is made to contain it. In elimination operations, the degree of success is most often proportionate to the degree of containment. A frontal assault will rarely find an objective, because the guerrilla will seldom defend terrain, favoring withdrawal or escape to engagement. Efforts to fix or contain the guerrilla force will include encirclement, double envelopment, blocking positions on routes of escape, use of supporting fires, or the convergence of two or more forces on the guerrilla force. If the situation does not favor or permit containment, it may prove successful to conduct surprise attacks against the guerrilla force, followed by aggressive pursuit.

6 Daylight Execution. --The final steps taken to contain a guerrilla force, and all operations conducted against the guerrillas after containment, are accomplished during daylight hours. Escape is the normal guerrilla reaction to being contained, and darkness facilitates its achievement.

7 Helicopter Utilization. --Mobility requirements suggest the employment of helicopterborne troops whenever possible. The use of helicopterborne troops allows a greater freedom of movement, more rapid execution, and an excellent chance of achieving surprise.

(b) Encirclement. --The encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and
achieving decisive results. The remainder of this paragraph (404) discusses the considerations related to encirclement and the various destruction tactics used when encirclement is achieved.

1 Troop Requirement. --The terrain, size of the guerrilla force, and troop availability will determine the troop density of the encirclement. In turn, troop density will dictate the destruction tactics following encirclement. The encirclement usually requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and the use of helicopterborne reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

2 Timing. --The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation is aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the guerrillas. Surprise and security may be achieved by conducting the movement to encirclement during the hours of darkness. The encirclement should be completed during early daylight hours to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

3 Occupation of Line of Encirclement. --Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Maximum use of helicopterborne troops will contribute speed to the early phases of the encirclement. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement. A guerrilla force may be expected to react immediately upon discovering that it is encircled. To attempt escape, the guerrillas will probe for gaps, attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt exfiltration of the encirclement, individually or by small groups. Accordingly, every effort is made to simultaneously occupy the entire line of encirclement or if this is not possible, the most likely escape routes are covered first. In addition, upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions, and deploy strong patrols to their front so that early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received.

4 Aircraft Employment. --Aviation plays an important role in operations featuring encirclement. Attack aircraft are employed in a close air support role. Observation aircraft and helicopters are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and as a command vehicle for the commander to control his forces. Helicopters are used to rapidly transport troops to the line of encirclement, or to shift forces from one area to another. The armed helicopter may be used to close the encirclement.
in those areas that cannot be otherwise dominated by other supporting arms, and to prevent the enemy from fleeing the encirclement. Additionally, helicopters equipped with loudspeakers can be used to direct movement of civilians as well as warn the indigenous population not to flee.

5 Elimination of the Guerrilla Force. --Once the encirclement is established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

a Enticement to Surrender. --The guerrillas are enticed to surrender by psychological warfare techniques such as loudspeaker broadcasting and use of leaflets. This technique has proven effective historically and should not be disregarded.

b Contraction of the Encirclement. --Operations may consist of a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger forces, it is more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

c Dividing the Area. --Another technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each sub-area. This technique may also be used in conjunction with contraction of the line of encirclement, after "critical mass" occurs.

d Hammer and Anvil. --Another technique, usually employed after some degree of contraction, is to have a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the stationary force by offensive action. Either element may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element, while the stationary element holds the guerrilla force in place. This technique is most effective when the blocking or stationary force is located on, or immediately in the rear of a natural terrain obstacle.
Variations. --Variations of the operations described above include such techniques as having forces encircle an area and await the enemy attempt to escape as he is subjected to intense saturation type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical aircraft. Flushing fires are discussed in paragraph 902.

e. Mission Terms. --The familiar statements of missions and tasks found in operation plans and orders will not always convey a clear picture of the type of operation to be conducted in counterguerrilla warfare. Below are described three mission terms which are considered more precisely descriptive of missions or tasks likely to be assigned to the counterguerrilla force and/or its subordinate units. They are: seize and occupy, search and destroy, and clear and hold.

(1) Seize and Occupy. --The objective of this mission is the seizure and occupation of a designated area for development of a base to be used for subsequent operations. It is a likely initial landing force mission. This mission may be repeatedly assigned subordinate elements of the landing force as the required network of combat bases is developed.

(2) Search and Destroy. --The objective of this mission is to locate the enemy and either destroy him or drive him from the area. Troop units are assigned this task when the exact location of the enemy is unknown. This mission is sometimes referred to as "search and clear," or "fix and destroy." The terms are essentially synonymous.

(3) Clear and Hold. --Although similar to a "search and destroy" mission, the main emphasis of this mission is to hold the designated area. Elements of the landing force are most likely to receive a clear and hold mission when sufficient forces are available to consolidate and control the designated area; or when participating in internal defense operations, the host country military, paramilitary, or governmental agencies are prepared to follow up with measures designed to restore an area to firm, friendly government control on a permanent basis.

405. OPERATIONS FROM MOBILE SEA BASES

a. General. --Landing force units operating against guerrilla units from a mobile sea base are an effective means of combating insurgency. As previously discussed in subparagraph 403c, the doctrine for operations against guerrilla units normally requires that combat bases be established
Par. 405 FMFM 8-2

to serve as a focal point for operations. The mobile sea base concept is entirely compatible with this doctrine.

b. Flexibility.--Counterinsurgency forces based at sea possess the mobility and flexibility required for operations against guerrilla units. Furthermore, the problems associated with a buildup of forces ashore for support and security are greatly reduced.

c. Mobility.--The inherent mobility of the amphibious task force as a whole, combined with that of helicopterborne units, will normally ensure a mobile sea base superiority in this capability.

d. Movement Means.--Operations against guerrilla units which are conducted from mobile sea bases may employ either landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles, helicopters, or a combination of these movement means as follows:

(1) Helicopters.--Helicopters are particularly suited to operations against guerrilla units and to operations from mobile sea bases. Helicopters can lift landing force elements directly from the mobile sea base into surprise attacks against guerrilla units or to positions to block avenues of escape during encirclement operations. Helicopterborne forces operating from mobile sea bases are free from dependence on beaches, airfields, or overland lines of communication.

(2) Landing Craft/Amphibian Vehicles.--Landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles will be the primary movement means in situations where unfavorable geographic or meteorological conditions restrict the employment of helicopters. Generally, areas possessing a system of waterways near the coast will be favorable for landing craft and amphibian vehicle employment.

(3) Combination of Means.--The use of both helicopters and waterborne craft and vehicles will provide the ideal tactical movement means in some situations. Operations of this type may include landing by one means and withdrawal by another. Other examples include the convergence of forces against insurgent elements, or the conduct of encirclement operations where there is a significant advantage in the commitment of forces from several directions.

e. Concept of Operations.--Landing force operations from a mobile sea base may be conducted as independent operations, as a part of an
amphibious operation, or in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. The concept of employment in each of these general categories is discussed in the following subparagraphs:

(1) Independent Operations. —When operations from a mobile sea base are conducted as independent operations comprising the total military effort of the counterinsurgency, their speed and flexibility contribute to their effectiveness. During periods of political uncertainty, for example, the establishment of a military force ashore may be an untimely, undesirable, or irrevocable move. In contrast, in operations from a mobile sea base, the landing force may be committed at a precise time and place, with ready withdrawal as an inherent operational characteristic.

(2) Operations as Part of a Larger Force. —Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed as part of large-scale counterinsurgency amphibious operations as follows:

(a) Initiatory. —To initiate operations preparatory to the full employment of larger forces at a particular time and place.

(b) Search. —To determine the whereabouts of insurgent forces and to develop the situation ashore in order that the remaining forces may be committed at the most advantageous time and place.

(c) Exploitation. —To exploit those situations where other landing force elements have contacted or contained insurgent forces.

(d) Isolation. —To conduct denial and/or interdiction operations aimed at isolating the insurgents from their source of supply.

(3) Operations in Conjunction With Other Counterinsurgency Operations. —Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. In these situations the landing force may be employed either as a reaction force in coordination with forces ashore, or as a force to operate in areas otherwise inaccessible.

f. Navy Elements. —The Navy elements of a mobile sea base force; e.g., landing craft with operating personnel; may be employed in support of landing forces, either U.S. or indigenous. Navy support capabilities include troop mobility on inland waterways, resupply, surveillance, denial
of waterways to insurgents, and training of indigenous personnel in the naval aspects of warfare in inland waterways areas.

g. **Particular Applicability.** --The doctrine for operations against guerrilla units expressed in other sections of this manual is valid for such operations conducted from a mobile sea base. Although mobile sea base forces are effective in harassing and denial operations, they are particularly suited to the conduct of reaction and elimination operations.

h. **Employment Considerations.** --Employment considerations which require emphasis include the following:

1. **Reaction Force.** --Regardless of the size of the force or the mission, an element of appropriate size is retained, normally aboard ship, as a reaction force to rapidly engage reported insurgent forces or reinforce other friendly forces.

2. **Preparatory Measures.** --To minimize delay in reaction and elimination operations, the following preparatory measures are initiated early in the operation and developed throughout:

   a. **Landing Areas.** --Potential landing beaches and helicopter landing zones are selected, reconnoitered, classified as to suitability, and are assigned an identifying code.

   b. **Targets.** --Potential targets for insurgent action are located, reconnoitered, and assigned a code identification. Reaction plans for such situations are prepared in detail, and whenever possible, are rehearsed.

3. **Harassing Forces.** --Forces conducting harassing operations such as ambush and raid patrols are committed and withdrawn according to precise schedules and usually remain ashore for several days.

4. **Reaction/Elimination Operations.** --Two general types of employment apply to mobile sea base helicopterborne forces in reaction or elimination operations:

   a. **Simultaneous Landing.** --The simultaneous landing of units adjacent to insurgent forces in landing zones favoring immediate encirclement. This employment exploits surprise and avoids troop
exhaustion but is dependent upon the availability of suitable landing zones.

(b) Coordinated Action. —The second type of employment involves landing, assembly, and reorganization prior to the attack or pursuit of guerrilla units. Coordinated action is facilitated by establishing control of small units before engaging the insurgent forces, thereby minimizing danger to helicopters and troops in the landing phase.

(5) Readiness. —A high state of operational readiness is essential. The requirement for quick response to situations ashore frequently will be a dominant factor.

(6) Withdrawal. —The capability to withdraw and return to the parent ship is an inherent characteristic of operations from a mobile sea base. A major consideration is the determination of the time of withdrawal. In certain harassing operations such as patrolling, the hour of withdrawal can be preplanned. In reaction or elimination operations, or at any other time contact with insurgent forces is made, withdrawal is not conducted until the insurgent force is destroyed or contact is completely broken. Based upon these contingencies, planning for operations from a mobile sea base must ensure flexibility and freedom of action for forces ashore.

(7) Fire Support. —Fire support will include field artillery, either previously established ashore or accompanying the combat units; naval gunfire to the limit of its ranges; and air support. The air support capability should be emphasized as it may be the only fire support means available in operations at great distances inland.

1. Austere Helicopter Bases. —The depth of operations ashore may be extended significantly by the temporary establishment of austere helicopter bases at points near the extreme radius of action from parent ships. These temporary bases are essentially refueling stations and when helicopters are the only means of stockpiling fuel, their availability for other operations is greatly reduced. Therefore, a decision to conduct operations beyond the helicopters' radius of action from their parent ship must be carefully weighed, and should employ minimum forces necessary to accomplish the mission. When helicopter bases are established, they should be simple, well-guarded, and should exist for a limited duration. If for no other reason, these operations should be conducted
periodically for the purpose of convincing the insurgents that they have no safe haven beyond the radius of action of the helicopters from their parent ship.

406. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. Mission. — In a counterguerrilla warfare situation, the mission of psychological operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and civilian agencies in the control and administration of the area of operations.

b. Responsibilities. — Psychological warfare operations are planned and conducted at all echelons. All personnel participating in operations against guerrillas should have an understanding of the purpose and themes of the psychological warfare program supporting the operation. Commanders must maintain liaison with psychological warfare agencies at higher echelons and must:

   (1) Constantly seek guerrilla psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited.

   (2) Plan and conduct psychological operations to provide direct support of combat operations.

   (3) Plan and conduct psychological operations to facilitate civilian control, promote civic action programs and enhance the prestige of the duly constituted government.

   (4) Assist in the evaluation of psychological warfare programs by collecting and forwarding feedback information. Close liaison with intelligence and civic action agencies must be maintained by psychological warfare personnel to accomplish this important facet of psychological operations.

   (5) Ensure when possible that the psychological effects of military operations are favorable. These psychological effects tend to have greater impact than the effects of propaganda. Often the psychological advantage or disadvantage resulting from tactical operations may weigh more heavily on the ultimate outcome of the conflict than the tactical advantage gained or lost. Commanders should always consider the security of the people. All possible amends should be made for unpreventable damage inflicted by combat.
c. **Reference.** --FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, provides basic information with regard to the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, its organization, procedures, methods, and techniques. It further describes the procurement and use of intelligence for psychological warfare, the nature of propaganda and the means of communication utilized in its dissemination, and the operational employment of psychological warfare in support of military operations.

d. **Psychological Indications.** --Psychological indications are those evidences or manifestation of attitudes, whether positive or negative, which may point to the existence of guerrilla or civilian psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda. Personnel participating in combat operations against the guerrillas and those in contact with the civil populace must be alert to psychological indications. Essential elements of information (EEI) may be announced to assist in the determination of indications. Indications may be vague clues, definite signs, or information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured guerrillas; obvious resentment against (or respect for) their leaders among prisoners; or worry (or lack of worry) among civilians or captured guerrillas about conditions in the area.

e. **Propaganda.** --Propaganda is planned and employed in operations against guerrillas to achieve the following:

1. **Demoralize, divide, and disorganize the guerrilla force.**
2. **Induce defection of guerrilla force members.**
3. **Reduce or eliminate civilian support of the guerrilla force.**
4. **Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the guerrilla force.**
5. **Win the support of noncommitted civilians.**
6. **Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.**
7. **Win approval for the presence of the military force.**
f. **Target Audiences.** --For purposes of planning and conducting the propaganda program, the population in the area is divided into the following target audiences:

1. Guerrilla units.
2. Underground elements.
3. Civilians sympathetic to the guerrilla; those who provide information, supplies, refuge, and other assistance to the guerrillas and the underground.
4. Uncommitted civilians.
5. Civilians sympathetic to the forces operating against the guerrillas.

g. **Propaganda Themes.** --Propaganda themes are based on recognizable aspects of friendly civil programs and on the following potentially divisive characteristics of target audiences:

1. Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the guerrilla force and civil populace.
2. Rivalries between guerrilla leaders.
3. Danger of betrayal.
4. Harsh living conditions of guerrilla force.
5. Scarcity of arms and supplies.
6. Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the guerrilla forces.
7. Terror tactics and other inhuman practices employed by guerrillas.

h. **Techniques.** --The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in most psychological warfare techniques. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, and emotional appeals to persuade the target audiences to adopt a course of action.
rather than to order it to take such a course of action. When the guerrilla force or its civilian supporters are demoralized, the authoritative approach may be effective.

i. Inducements. -- The granting of amnesty and rewards may induce the guerrilla and his civilian supporters to defect from the guerrilla movement.

j. Attitude. -- The conduct and attitudes of the individual participant in operations against guerrillas will have a decided psychological influence on the civil populace, and indirectly the guerrilla force.

k. Communication Media. -- Psychological warfare media are the means or channels of communication to the guerrilla force and civil populace. Media of particular interest to the force conducting operations against guerrillas include the following:

(1) Leaflets. -- Leaflets and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrols, and agents. Depending on the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet, it may be either primarily textual or primarily pictorial. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. Weather and enemy countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of leaflets. Surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes have proved valuable in past operations against guerrillas.

(2) Loudspeakers. -- Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles or aircraft as well as lightweight public address equipment that can be hand carried are employed in close support missions. Loudspeaker appeals may be made from aircraft over areas known or suspected to contain guerrillas. During elimination operations, particularly when an encirclement is achieved, loudspeaker surrender appeals are made to the guerrillas. If effective, such appeals will reduce the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance. Loudspeaker appeals should be brief, and made in simple, easily understood language. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification. Surrender appeals should always include specific instructions on how to surrender. Loudspeaker messages are particularly effective when used in conjunction with specific combat actions. For example, a message to an encircled force may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.
(3) **Radio Broadcasts.** --Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both guerrilla and civilian targets. The audience is limited, however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate wave length and who will listen if they can.

(4) **Other.** --Imagination and ingenuity will produce other effective psychological warfare media. Examples are: village bulletin boards, periodic newsletters, and face-to-face persuasion by personnel in contact with civilian population.

407. **RIVERINE OPERATIONS**

a. **General.** --In areas where land transportation systems are inadequate or cannot be used, increased emphasis must be placed on waterborne and airborne transportation means. Heavy reliance will be placed on the helicopter to support both tactical and logistical operations. The increased mobility provided by the helicopter over conventional land transportation is even more vital when the primary alternate means are slow, channelized, relatively vulnerable rivercraft. Due to the micro-relief of most delta river areas, ground observation and orientation will be difficult. Helicopters will be required for some of these tasks. Armed helicopters will be valuable for patrolling waterways to prevent the escape of enemy forces during assault operations. The many dispersed, small unit actions will require helicopters for resupply and medical evacuation. Due to the sparsity of firm, dry ground in a delta area, helicopters may be required to operate from LPHs to support riverine operations. Also, it may be necessary to employ special techniques, such as hovering to load and unload troops and supplies, in certain areas. Load factors will probably require adjustment due to the poor hovering-out-of-the-ground effect.

b. **Waterway Utilization.** --In spite of the advantages of the helicopter, they will frequently not be available in the desired quantity and, in any event, there will be a requirement to use the waterways. A waterway, like a road or railway, is simply a means of communication. If waterways are regarded as such, it will be evident that the tactical principles which govern their control and use for military operations are essentially the same as those which apply to land lines of communication. It follows, that the type of equipment required for such operations on the water, while differing in appearance from that used on land,
will need to serve comparable purposes. The requirements for mobility, armor, firepower, and transport capacity, which are satisfied on the ground by a range of wheeled and tracked vehicles, will have to be met on the waterways by an array of floating craft, adapted to achieving the same ends. Moreover, ground oriented forces will need to learn to look upon waterways as something other than obstacles to be crossed; while maritime forces operating inland will need to become familiar with the principles of ground combat which will influence the characteristics and employment of the craft which they employ. It is significant that these same considerations are applicable to the amphibious attack, and thus, much of the doctrinal basis of those operations has some application—of varying dimensions—in river warfare.

c. Reference. --FMFM 8-4, Doctrine for Riverine Operations, sets forth the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed by Marine Corps forces conducting operations in a riverine environment.
SECTION 5

SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

501. GENERAL

a. Applicability. --Operations against guerrillas are characterized by small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This section contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. It includes establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambush, counterambush action, and search procedure. See FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, and FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad, for additional details on special tactics and techniques.

b. Historical Examples. --To show the importance of small unit operations, two historical examples are given: an operation conducted in August 1954 in the Philippines and an operation in 1954-55 in Malaya.

(1) The Alert Platoon. --Counterguerrilla operations were conducted by the Philippine Army during the period 1946-60. Beginning in
September 1950, through personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

(a) Typical of small unit operations was the action of the alert platoon of the 17th Battalion Combat Team in the vicinity of Manila, 16-17 August 1954. About midnight, an intelligence agent reported the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for an attack. Immediately, the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With two civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. The terrain and a full moon favored their movement. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

(b) About 200 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions. At 0430, 17 August, the first group advanced toward the objective while members of the second group positioned themselves along the guerrilla's avenue of withdrawal. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they formed into skirmishers about 60 yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry opened fire, but was immediately knocked down. A fire fight continued for about 20 minutes and then the guerrillas broke contact. Attempting to withdraw, they were shot by members of the second group from their ambush positions. This was only one of hundreds of such actions that took place during this period.

(2) Operation "Nassau."--During the period 1948-1960, the British conducted many difficult operations in Malaya. By 1951, the British forces established well-defined objectives and then began a counterguerrilla operation.

(a) Victory in this counterguerrilla operation is attributed to good intelligence work, effective communications, rapid deployment of troops, and food control measures. Rapid deployment was achieved by deploying small units in battalion controlled operations.

(b) Operation "Nassau," typical of the battalion-sized operations in Malaya, began in December 1954 and ended in September 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about 30 yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a...
system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about 21 December 1954. On 9 January 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp, day and night, so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them.

(c) Plans were modified; harassing fires were restricted to nighttime only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for three months without results. Finally, on 21 March, an ambush party, after 45 hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map and local morale rose a little.

(d) Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon accounted for two more terrorists. The number 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food.

(e) On 7 July, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, 23 terrorists remained in the swamp with no food and with no communications to the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population were lifted.

(f) This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells; 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition; and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each terrorist represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" was considered a success for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.
502. PATROLLING

a. General. — Aggressive small unit patrols are a necessity in counterguerrilla operations. To make contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops will be occupied primarily with patrol activity in an effort to locate them. Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results. Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics, variations of normal techniques is necessary.

b. Patrol Authority. — The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although overall patrolling policy and certain special patrols may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and need for rapid response makes it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalions, companies, or platoons may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination problems, and troop availability. The actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority are improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. The assignment of operational areas will require considerable coordination to avoid patrol clashes and to permit the pursuit of guerrillas from one area to another. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their parent command(s). Although patrol authority may be decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. To prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOPs should be devised.

c. Planning and Preparation by the Command. — The echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols has numerous responsibilities in connection with their planning and preparation. Depending on the echelon, responsibilities may include all or most of the following:

(1) Training. — Preparation of training programs and exercises relative to patrolling with emphasis on the locale and situation wherein operations are to be conducted.

(2) Selection of Patrol Leaders. — Selection is based upon experience and leadership abilities. Insofar as possible, patrol leaders are rotated to avoid excessive use of a selected few.
(3) **Formulation and Assignment of Patrol Missions.** --Only the commander of the echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols can approve the assignment of patrol missions.

(4) **Patrol Order.** --This order provides the instructions, information, and guidance needed by the patrol leader to plan, prepare, and accomplish the mission.

(5) **Coordination.** --Ensures coordination among the staff, patrol leader, and other units.

(6) **Assignment of Control Measures.** --Assigns control measures such as time of departure, time of return, checkpoints, general route, and communications.

(7) **Arrangements for Support.** --Includes arrangements for fire support, logistic support, transportation, and the assignment of personnel with special qualifications needed to accomplish the mission.

(8) **Supervision.** --Commanders and staff officers actively supervise all phases of patrol planning and preparation, giving patrols the benefit of their own training and experience.

(9) **Debriefing.** --Debriefs patrol upon return.

d. **Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.** --The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order, and after making sure he understands all instructions, information, and guidance, uses the patrol planning steps in his planning and preparation for the patrol mission. The patrol planning steps are:

(1) **Plan Use of Time.** --The patrol leader mentally outlines everything that must be done before departing on his mission and allots time for each action. The technique of "backward planning" helps to allow time for all necessary actions. The sequence may vary according to such factors as availability of personnel for coordination, times at which a reconnaissance can be made, and extent of coordination by the command echelon.

(2) **Study the Situation.** --Enemy and friendly troop dispositions, strengths, and capabilities will influence the patrol's route, size, organization, weapons, and equipment.
(3) **Make a Map Study.** -- A thorough map study will assist in the reconnaissance and may influence patrol size, organization, equipment, and route.

(4) **Coordinate.** -- The patrol must coordinate movement, fire support, and transportation. The commander may perform some of the coordination, but the patrol leader should doublecheck to ensure complete understanding.

(5) **Select Men, Weapons, and Equipment.** -- Selection of men and weapons will normally be limited to the patrol leader's own unit, and the size is usually prescribed by the command.

(6) **Issue a Warning Order.** -- As soon as possible, the patrol leader issues a warning order to all members of the patrol. (See fig. 1.)

(7) **Make a Reconnaissance.** -- While the patrol prepares, the patrol leader makes a visual (aerial, if possible) reconnaissance.

(8) **Complete Detailed Plans.**

(9) **Issue the Patrol Leader's Order.** -- (See fig. 2.) The patrol leader orally issues the detailed plan to the patrol. By the use of visual aids and questions, he determines that all members of the patrol understand their jobs.

(10) **Inspect and Rehearse.** -- The patrol leader holds rehearsals (day and night, if the patrol operates at night) to ensure operational efficiency of the patrol. In rehearsals, the patrol members must become thoroughly familiar with the action they are to take during the patrol. The patrol leader holds an inspection before and after rehearsals to determine the physical and mental state of preparation of the patrol.

f. **Debriefing.** -- An SOP for the immediate debriefing of returning patrols is essential. The entire patrol should participate, using a terrain model or large scale map, in tracing the patrol's routes and correlating various actions and observations of the patrol members. Debriefing must be done in a relaxed and informal atmosphere. The use of a debriefing form will assist the patrol leader in making his report. The debriefing officer can prepare a thorough report as the debriefing progresses. (See fig. 3.)
FMFM 8-2

Par. 503

FORMAT FOR PATROL WARNING ORDER

The patrol warning order consists of the following minimum items of information:

1. A brief statement of the enemy and friendly situation.
3. General instructions:
   a. General and special organization.
   b. Uniform and equipment common to all, to include identification and camouflage measures.
   c. Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.
   d. Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and who will supervise patrol members' preparation during patrol leader's absence.
   e. Instructions for obtaining rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
   f. The chain of command.
   g. A time schedule for the patrol's guidance. As a minimum, include meal times and the time, place, and uniform for receiving the patrol leader's order.

Figure 1.--Format for Patrol Warning Order.

503. ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE

a. General.--To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are established by company or smaller units and occupied for a few days or less.
FORMAT FOR PATROL LEADER’S ORDER

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. --Weather, terrain, identification, location, activity, and strength.
   b. Friendly Forces. --Mission of next higher unit, location, and planned actions of units on right and left, fire support available for patrol, mission, and route of other patrols.
   c. Attachments and Detachments.

2. MISSION
   What the patrol is going to accomplish.

3. EXECUTION
   Subparagraph for each subordinate unit.
   a. Concept of operation.
   b. Specific duties of elements, teams, and individuals.
   c. Coordinating instructions.
      (1) Time of departure and return.
      (2) Formation and order of movement.
      (3) Route and alternate route of return.
      (4) Departure and reentry of friendly area(s).
      (5) Rallying points and actions at rallying points.
      (6) Actions on enemy contact.
      (7) Actions at danger areas.
      (8) Actions at objective.
      (9) Rehearsals and inspections.
      (10) Debriefing.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   a. Rations.
   b. Arms and ammunition.
   c. Uniform and equipment (state which members will carry and use them).
   d. Method of handling wounded and prisoners.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
   a. Communications.
      (1) Signals to be used within the patrol.
      (2) Communications with higher headquarters--radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times to report, and special code to be used.
      (3) Challenge and password.
   b. Command.
      (1) Chain of command.
      (2) Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader in formation.

Figure 2. --Format for Patrol Leader’s Order.

b. Deception. --A patrol base is secretly occupied. Secrecy is maintained by practicing carefully planned deception techniques. Deception plans should include the following considerations:

   (1) If possible, the march to the base is conducted at night.
### PATROL REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION OF PATROL</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAPS:**

- **A. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL**

- **B. TASK**

- **C. TIME OF DEPARTURE**

- **D. TIME OF RETURN**

- **E. ROUTES (OUT AND BACK)**

- **F. TERRAIN**

- **G. ENEMY**

- **H. ANY MAP CORRECTIONS**

- **I. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION**

- **J. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY**

- **K. CONDITION OF PATROL**

- **L. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:**

**Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit of patrol leader**

**M. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY INTERROGATOR**

**Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit/date of debriefing**

---

**Figure 3.**--Patrol Report Form.

(2) The route selected avoids centers of population.

(3) If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol in remote areas are detained.
(4) Patrols crossing inhabited areas deceive the populace by marching on indirect routes.

(5) At night, in the desert or in dense vegetation, navigation and control require special consideration.

(6) Scouts operate forward of the main body of the patrol.

(7) Bases are located beyond areas that are patrolled daily.

(8) If security permits, smokeless fuel is burned.

(9) The base is not established on an existing trail and normally not more than one trail should be made into the base. It is camouflaged and guarded.

(10) After a reconnaissance, the base is occupied as quickly and quietly as possible. Security is established beyond sight and hearing of the base.

(11) The route to the base is selected by use of photos, maps, ground, and aerial reconnaissance.

(12) If practical, the patrol leader makes an aerial reconnaissance.

(13) Terrain features that are easily identified are selected as checkpoints and rest breaks.

(14) Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued. If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

c. Locating the Base

(1) The base must be secret and secure. A patrol operating from a base unknown to the enemy increases the possibility of guerrilla contact. A secure base permits the troops to rest.

(2) The base should be located on dry, easily drained terrain for health and comfort.
(3) The base must have facilities of terrain suited for the erection of adequate radio antennas.

(4) If it is anticipated that an airdrop or a helicopter resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone or landing point should not be located too close to the base.

d. **Layout of a Base.** --All units should have an SOP for quickly establishing a base. After an SOP has been used during training, laying out a base becomes simple routine. The patrol leader indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.

e. **Sequence of Establishment.** --A suggested sequence for establishing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:

1. **Leaving the Road or Trail.** --The jungle and heavy woods provide the best security from surprise and the best conditions for defense. Generally, the best method to use in leaving the trail or road is:

   a. Select the point to leave the trail or road.

   b. Maintain security while the column moves off the trail.

   c. Have men at the end of the column camouflage the area where the exit was made from the trail.

   d. Continue movement until a suitable bivouac site is reached.

2. **Occupation of the Bivouac Site**

   a. This occupation is based on a platoon of three squads, but the force may be larger or smaller. Using the clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.
(b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader stands in the center of the base, indicates 12 o'clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each squad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. One fire team maintains security and the remaining two prepare positions for defense.

(3) **Digging-In.** --The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to be occupied. Shelters are not erected until adequate individual protection is assured. Clearing of fields of fire is accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) **Sentries.** --Upon completion of defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least one sentry; the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted closer to squad positions than during daylight. Additional sentries may be posted on the trail and on key terrain features.

(5) **Water.** --A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point and spots selected for drinking and for bathing. Normally, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for 24 hours or less. Security is provided.

(6) **Garbage.** --Each squad digs a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat menace.

(7) **Perimeter Path and Marking Trails.** --Narrow paths are cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position and around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may be strung waist high along each path as a guide.

(8) **Smoking.** --Smoking is permitted only when authorized by the patrol leader. Police of the trash incident to smoking must be strictly supervised.

(9) **Radios.** --Personal radios must not be permitted on patrol.
f. Base Alert. --The critical periods for defending the base are dawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:

1. Enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the nature of the ground to his front and flanks.

2. Allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

3. Provides a definite cutoff period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the morning alert, the daily routine begins.

4. Enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment.

g. Alarm. --The patrol must have a suitable alarm system to signal the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This alarm system should not sound foreign to the operational area and must not be easily detectable by the enemy. The system must be designed so as to allow sufficient reaction time by the patrol.

h. Administration of a Base

1. Cooking Fires and Smoke. --The smell of cooking and smoke can carry up to 200 meters in the woods or jungle. Fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy or when guerrilla patrols are active. If cooking is permitted during daylight hours, only smokeless fuel is used.

2. Location of Heads. --Heads are located in protected areas.

3. Disposal of Garbage. --Garbage and trash must be disposed of as it occurs. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and food are buried and camouflaged.

4. Water Purification. --The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.
(5) **Cooking.** --When each man carries his own rations, cooking will be done on an individual basis. If 5-in-1 or 10-in-1 type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. **Leaving a Base.** --Before leaving the base, all signs of occupation are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. A careful check is made for discarded cigarette butts, empty cigarette packs, and trash from ration containers. The area is left to appear as though it had not been occupied.

504. **ATTACKING GUERRILLA HOUSES AND CAMPS**

a. **Attacking Houses.** --In planning an attack:

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers, or intimidated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.

(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(4) The patrol is no larger than required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.

(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.

(6) All available cover is used.

(7) All avenues of escape are covered either physically or by fire.

(8) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. **Attacking Camps.** --Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.
A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used. The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches. This can be traced on the ground. The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction, slowly and cautiously. Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of withdrawal. After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance. When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event of refusal, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

c. Destroying Captured Bivouacs. --The value of a camp as a known enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites they have previously found satisfactory, particularly if shelters have been constructed.

505. AMBUSHES

a. General. --An ambush is an effective means for attacking patrols, columns, and moving vehicles. It is normally executed in terrain which affords concealment, such as trails, roads, bridges, stream crossings, and similar features. The terrain must afford concealment to the ambushing unit. Maximum fires are placed on the target. As a rule, an effective ambush lasts only a few minutes. There are two types of ambushes: immediate and deliberate.

b. Immediate Ambush. --An immediate ambush is one initiated by the unexpected approach of the enemy. The situation provides little or no time for planning, reconnaissance, or detailed position choice. Success in this type of ambush is dependent upon discipline, prior training, and decisive leadership.

(1) On signal from the individual first seeing or hearing the enemy, the nearest elements of the ambush group take cover and remain
still, even though the most desirable positions cannot be reached. Other elements seek better positions but on the same side of the road or trail as the first elements. Machinegun positions are chosen with as much care as the circumstances allow.

(2) Ideally, the ambush leader signals open fire when the enemy is within the ambush. However, if the ambush is discovered, any member may give the signal.

(3) Cease fire, pursuit, and reassembly are conducted by SOP as the leader directs.

c. Deliberate Ambush. --An ambush is deliberate when there is time for planning, preparation, briefing, and, if possible, rehearsal.

(1) Planning

(a) Intelligence. --Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents, photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Information such as sightings of smoke, camps, patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks is evaluated prior to selecting the area for the ambush. The commander obtains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and the manner in which the guerrilla will react when ambushed. Details of the enemy might include:

1. Time of movement, strength, organization of the guerrilla patrol, and type of supplies and arms carried.

2. Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties, and similar detachments.

3. The guerrillas’ technique of patrolling.

4. Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between men.

(b) Clearance. --The time of departure, route used, location of ambush, time of return, signs and counterguerrilla patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with those forces that need to know.
(c) **Time Factor.** --The time for departure and establishing the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla patrol to be ambushed, the necessity for being undetected, and the route which the patrol will use.

(d) **Security.** --Security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the operation. Briefings and rehearsals are conducted in secure places. Secrecy is maintained in coordinating other operations that may take place in the vicinity of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconnaissances to the front, flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. The password, signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are established. A secure route over which the ambush party can move to the ambush site is selected. The plan will normally provide for the patrol to move to the ambush site during darkness.

(e) **Ground.** --Terrain which affords cover, concealment, and command of the site is selected for the ambush. All possible approaches are considered.

(2) **Preparations**

(a) The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:

1. Weapons are zeroed and tested.

2. Ammunition, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(b) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes:

1. Thorough briefing.

2. Rehearsal, when time allows.

3. Final checking of weapons.

(3) **Preliminary Briefing.** --A first briefing should be given at the base camp to all members of the ambush group. It should be given in time to allow adequate preparation and rehearsal. A thorough preliminary briefing will reduce the time required for final on-site briefing. The
preliminary briefing may be in the form of a five-paragraph order and it should particularly set forth all signals to be rehearsed and used:

(a) Enemy approaching.
(b) Commence firing.
(c) Cease firing.
(d) Check killing zone.
(e) Withdraw from killing zone.
(f) Withdraw from ambush position.
(g) Abandon the position.
(h) Reassemble.

(4) Final Briefing. --A final briefing is held in the ambush area. This is limited but must include:

(a) Positions and directions of fire.
(b) Variations from rehearsal in individual tasks.
(c) Orders on completion of ambush.
(d) Review of checklist of common causes of ambush failure:

1 Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
2 Disclosure by footprints.
3 Lack of fire control.
4 Leaders badly positioned.
5 Lack of all-around security.
preliminary briefing may be in the form of a five-paragraph order and it should particularly set forth all signals to be rehearsed and used:

(a) Enemy approaching.
(b) Commence firing.
(c) Cease firing.
(d) Check killing zone.
(e) Withdraw from killing zone.
(f) Withdraw from ambush position.
(g) Abandon the position.
(h) Reassemble.

(4) Final Briefing. --A final briefing is held in the ambush area. This is limited but must include:

(a) Positions and directions of fire.
(b) Variations from rehearsal in individual tasks.
(c) Orders on completion of ambush.
(d) Review of checklist of common causes of ambush failure:

1. Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
2. Disclosure by footprints.
3. Lack of fire control.
4. Leaders badly positioned.
5. Lack of all-around security.
6 Misfires and stoppages through failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.

7 Lack of noise discipline; i.e., talking, coughing, shifting about, clattering water canteens.

8 Springing the ambush too early.

9 Using a poor signal to spring the ambush.

10 Lack of sufficient firepower being placed along the entire ambush position.

11 Failure to pursue by fire when the ambushed guerrillas jump into the underbrush.

12 Failure to boobytrap or block off opposite side of trail and escape routes.

(5) Rehearsal. --Rehearsals will increase chances for success. Rehearsals are not carried out at the ambush site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

d. Conduct of the Deliberate Ambush. --The principles of offensive and surprise dominate the ambush. Positioning of the ambush group, discipline in waiting, and fire discipline are paramount factors in applying those principles.

(1) Positioning

(a) Killing Zone. --The ambush group commander, after reconnaissance, chooses a killing zone and determines the extent of the position, bearing in mind that guerrillas usually move with long intervals between one another. A killing zone of 60 to 100 meters is desirable.

(b) Positions. --Having chosen the killing zone, the commander assigns elements of the group to specific positions which cover in depth the killing zone and all approaches to it. Positions in line of fire from friendly troops and in spaces difficult to cover by fire are given over to obstacles.
(c) Obstacles. --Obstacles consist of mines, Claymore weapons, sharpened stakes, ditches, barbed wire, or any other devices that can kill, wound, or delay the guerrillas. All members of the ambush group must be familiar with the locations and nature of obstacles used.

(2) Discipline in Waiting. --Lying in ambush is a real test of training and battle discipline. Once the group is in position, each individual should be carefully concealed but able to see his complete sector of fire and be prepared to open fire on signal. While waiting, all hands should be alert to detect any sign of improper concealment and noticeable noises or odors. Hair tonic, shaving lotion, and, particularly, insect repellent, can betray an ambush.

(a) Short-Term Ambush. --In an ambush planned for less than 12 hours, all positions should be manned constantly with all hands lying alertly in waiting.

(b) Long-Term Ambush. --When an ambush is set for longer than 12 hours, relief must be planned. One method is to divide the group into three parties; one lying in ambush; one in reserve; and one at rest. On relief, ambush goes to reserve; reserve to rest; and rest to ambush. Firing positions are relieved successively, never all at once. Parties in reserve and at rest will establish security, maintain silence, and refrain from cooking or smoking. When the group is not large enough to divide into three parties, sufficient people to maintain observation will lie in ambush positions while the balance rest. The party at rest will provide its own security. At indication that enemy approach is imminent, the reliefs in reserve and at rest quietly return to firing positions.

(3) Fire Discipline

(a) Opening Fire. --All members of the ambush group must clearly understand the signals and method for opening fire. The commander will designate the individual who is to open fire. When there are several possible approaches into the ambush, alternate positions are chosen from which firing shall begin. Ideally, firing is withheld until the entire enemy party is within the ambush.

(b) Spotted Ambush. --If the ambush is prematurely spotted, any individual in the ambush group may initiate firing. Caution must be exercised, however, to ensure that the ambush has really been spotted.
A moving guerrilla is naturally wary and constantly searches the trail as he moves. He may look directly toward an ambush position but not actually see it, if it is properly concealed. At times he may even appear to be in eye contact with the ambusher. Firing must be withheld until the guerrilla takes a positive action such as shouting an alarm or attempting to shoot or flee.

(c) Positions in Depth. --In organizing the ground, the ambush group commander will have established positions in depth on all avenues of approach to the chosen killing zone. These positions serve two functions:

1 Security. --Personnel in positions of depth alert the main ambush positions, by prearranged signal, of the approach of the enemy; during the ambush they watch for possible arrival of enemy reinforcements or counterattack by enemy elements which may have escaped ambush; after the ambush they provide cover for the search of the killing zone and for the main body's withdrawal from the zone.

2 Escape Prevention. --When the ambush is sprung, positions in depth should not open fire unless their assistance is vital to success. Rather, they should hold fire on the chance that additional enemy troops will pass by to enter the killing zone. As the enemy attempts escape, however, fire is opened from depth to kill him or drive him back into the killing zone.

(4) Night Ambush. --Although the techniques used in day and night ambushes are generally the same, night ambush requires some additional considerations.

(a) Positions for night ambush are relatively close together for ease of control. The ambush group moves into position, not during darkness, but, at the latest, while there is sufficient daylight to allow good orientation.

(b) Weapons firing down trail have fixed flank limits of fire to eliminate danger to friendly troops.

(c) Difficulty of concealment is lessened at night but so is shooting accuracy. Emphasis is placed on the use of automatic weapons and shotguns.
(d) Immobility and silence are doubly stressed. No relief of firing positions is made. Any movement or noise is attributed to enemy approach.

(e) All hands must be positively familiar with signal systems and fire control instructions.

(5) **Illumination.** --The success of a night ambush may depend on artificial illumination. Only in open country with a bright moon and no chance of clouds is it possible to rely on an unilluminated ambush. Infrared devices such as sniper scopes may be used to great advantage. As a general rule, all night ambushes are provided with artificial illumination. Illumination at ground level is placed to prevent the ambush party from receiving glare. There are a variety of night illumination aids available: hand illumination grenades, trip flares, rifle grenades, hand fired illuminants, parachute flares fired by mortars, artillery, naval gunfire, and parachutes dropped from aircraft. One possible method of employing illumination is to commence firing before illumination. Illumination is then fired behind the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing zone and to collect arms and equipment should have illumination. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

(6) **Postambush Procedure**

(a) **Search.** --The ambush is terminated by arranged signal. When firing ceases, an appointed detail, under cover of the other members of the group, conducts a search of the area. The search party checks the ground and the bodies of the dead, collecting documents, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Equipment too heavy or bulky to carry is destroyed.

(b) **Assembly and Withrawal.** --On signal, the ambush group abandons firing positions and assembles as planned under cover of the men in appropriate positions of depth. When assembled and organized, the main body is joined by the covering party and the entire group withdraws unless a reambush has been planned.

(c) **Reambush.** --Most military forces, including guerrillas, try to recover their dead and wounded. The practice may be named
on political, disciplinary, religious, or purely humane reasons. Although most such recoveries will be made by relatively large or well-supported forces at an appreciable time after the ambush, some will be made immediately afterwards by small parties. When knowledge of the enemy indicates the latter habit, the ambush group commander may leave a small party in position at the killing zone to repeat the ambush. Normally, such a reambush, if not productive within one to two hours, should rejoin the main body for abandonment of the area.

506. COUNTERAMBUSH ACTION

a. General

(1) Planning. -- In planning for defense against ambush, initially consider the available forces. The small unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely plans for the following:

(a) The formation to be used.

(b) March security.

(c) Communications and control.

(d) Special equipment.

(e) Action if ambushed.

(f) The reorganization.

(2) Formation. -- A dismounted unit employs a formation that provides for all-around security while en route. March interval is based on the type of terrain, limits of visibility, size of the patrol, and to a certain extent, on the means of control available. The interval between individuals and units at night is closer than during daylight. The interval is great enough to allow each succeeding element to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. However, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol leader is located forward in the formation but not so far that he cannot move throughout the formation as the situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they may distribute their firepower evenly. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.
(3) March Security. --Security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary whether the unit is on foot or motorized. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until followup units can be deployed to assist in countering the ambush. However, if not detected, the enemy may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The alternative is to move adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled like frontal security, and plans are made for the rear guard to assist in countering the ambush either by envelopment or by supporting fire. Aircraft flying reconnaissance and surveillance missions above the column increase security. If the column is ambushed, fighter and attack aircraft can provide support. Communications between these elements is a must.

(4) Communications and Control. --Consistent with security, all available means of communication are used to assist in controlling the small unit. March objectives and phase lines may be used to assist the commander in controlling his unit. Communications with security elements is mandatory. Detailed prior planning, briefing, and rehearsals for all units will assist in control. Alternate plans are made to prevent confusion and chaos. An ambushed unit notifies higher headquarters as soon as possible to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) Special Equipment. --It is often necessary to provide the unit additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineer tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always necessary, including panel sets or smoke grenades for identifying the ambush to aircraft.

(6) Action If Ambushed. --If ambushed, the most immediate reaction should be intensive fire into the suspected hiding places of the attackers. Determine the flanks of the attacking unit and begin a flanking movement. The ambushed unit must suppress the natural reaction to hit the deck and dive for cover. Ambush sites usually have booby traps and