antipersonnel mines surrounding them. A counterambush plan must be devised and rehearsed. Immediate action and counterattack procedures must be so thoroughly rehearsed that members of the unit must know instinctively what action is to be taken. Unit leaders must have prearranged signals which will move their men instantly into the counterambush plan.

(7) Method of Attack. —If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly on actions and alternate actions to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested. If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Reaction Force. —A reaction force, prepared to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for employment in the event a patrol is ambushed or for other purposes. The reaction force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, checkpoints, and designated helicopter landing sites, and through communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushed, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. He designates his position by reference to checkpoints, designated helicopter landing sites, terrain features, smoke panels, or other means. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to lead the reinforcements into position. A system for rapid employment of reaction forces against ambushes makes the ambush less likely to be employed by the guerrilla.

(9) Reorganization. —The reorganization after an ambush involves assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy pressing the attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization is impossible because of guerrilla action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

b. Dismounted Units

(1) General. —Immediate action (IA) drills are thoroughly taught and practiced. The underlying principles must be simplicity, aggressiveness, and speed.
(2) Immediate Action Drills. --The IA drills used, when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

(a) Where only the foremost elements of a patrol are caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling attack is carried out by the remainder of the patrol.

(b) Where the entire patrol is ambushed in open ground, an immediate assault is launched.

(3) Encircling Attack. --The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a guerrilla ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and maneuver taught in small unit tactics.

(a) Formations are designed so that only part of a patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations are practiced and the distances correctly observed, the whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opening burst of fire.

(b) As the unit advances, the patrol leader always has the terrain situation in mind. He takes control of the battle by signalling or shouting "Envelop Right (or Left)." This should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The troops will have practiced the drill and will know their positions in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of fire to cover the maneuvering element. If the leading element has smoke grenades, these are used to screen the elements caught in the killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault. --The immediate assault is used when the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road. A small patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within such an ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, requiring an assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol is in the killing zone. The patrol moves as quickly as possible to a position outside the killing zone and then assaults the guerrilla position.

c. Mounted Units

(1) General. --The guerrilla will ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and organized from which he can kill by firing at point...
blank range. The principle behind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area which the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone, unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counterattack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) Immediate Action Technique. --When vehicles are fired upon:

(a) Drivers drive out of the killing zone.

(b) Vehicle guards return fire immediately.

(c) When vehicles are clear of the killing zone, they stop to allow unloading and offensive action.

(d) Subsequent vehicles approaching the killing zone will halt short of the area and their occupants take offensive action.

(e) When vehicles are forced to halt in the killing zone, troops quickly unload under the covering fire of the guards who use smoke to provide screening.

(3) Counterattack

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can be carried out by those troops who are clear of the killing zone. If there are no such troops, then a frontal attack under cover of smoke is made.

(b) In action when troops have not entered the killing zone, the convoy commander will launch an immediate flanking attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from machineguns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops are beyond the killing zone and others are short of it, the group which has not yet entered the ambush zone should initiate the attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counterambush action is by moving into the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire
to our flanking attack and afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the guerrilla killing zone.

(e) It is possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the guerrilla's initial burst of fire. It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counterattack. This is clearly stated in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing.

(f) The techniques outlined above are practiced repeatedly in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

4 Vehicle Unloading Drill

(a) General. --In an ambush, the guerrilla first tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing zone by the use of mines or obstacles and by firing at the tires and driver. He then tries to kill the troops in the vehicle. It is essential that the troops unload instantly when a vehicle is brought to a halt in a killing zone.

(b) Vehicle Loading. --To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill. --When the vehicle is forced to stop:

1 The vehicle commander shouts "Unload Right (or Left)" to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

2 Vehicle guards immediately throw smoke grenades and open fire on the guerrilla positions.

3 Troops unload over the side away from ambush and run in the direction ordered.

4 As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, guards follow to join in the attack.

(d) Training. --Counterambush drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads; e.g., infantry squads and platoons. Where
miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a movement, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

(5) Experience.--Experience has shown, particularly in heavy undergrowth or jungle, that the most efficient ways to destroy an ambush is to immediately deliver an intensive high rate of fire into the ambush position and to conduct an immediate assault. Aggressive reaction is the key to defeat of an ambush.

507. SEARCH PROCEDURES

a. General.--Misuse of police or military authority can adversely affect operations against guerrillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material during searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies is not as damaging to a guerrilla movement as is the apprehension of the suppliers and agents. Proper use of police powers will gain respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time it may increase the civilian population's sympathy for and support of the guerrillas. Searches are preferably conducted by civil police or self-defense forces. Military searches may be required when these forces are unavailable, unwilling, or inefficient.

b. Authority.--Authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform searches and seizures in places and areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their police authority) for purposes of apprehending a suspect or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect

(1) General.--The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous acts. During a search, one Marine must always cover the searcher. However, the searcher must be tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be antiguerilla.
(2) **The Frisk Search.** --This method is a quick search of an individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is preferably conducted in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the suspect face away from him. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body, crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) **The Wall Search.** --The wall search renders the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position. It is particularly useful when two Marines must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as follows:

(a) **Position of Suspect.** --The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) **Position of Searcher's Assistant.** --The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher and to the rear, covering the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes positions. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) **Position of Searcher.** --The searcher approaches the suspect from the side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. He places his foot in front of the suspect's near foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's foot can be pushed back from under him.

(d) **Searching Technique.** --In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's headgear, then checks the hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs,
and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completion of the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(4) Search of More Than One Suspect. --When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall but far enough apart so that they can not reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. After being searched, suspects are moved to the left of the line, resuming position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching each suspect, the searcher does not pass in front of his assistant.

(5) Strip Search. --This type search is usually considered necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is preferably conducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depending on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. Clothing and shoes are removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(6) Searching Women and Children. --Marines must be reminded that the resistance movement will make maximum use of women and children for all types of tasks where search may be a threat. The search procedure must be thorough regardless of age or sex. All belongings, packages, bundles, packets, etc., must be checked for messages or contraband. It is desirable when searching women and children to have a local political chief present to dispel any later accusations of molesting.

d. Searching a Village or Built-Up Area

(1) General. --The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to such an extent that they will be driven by anger to
collaborate with them. The large scale search of a village or built-up area is normally a combined police and military operation. It is preplanned in detail and rehearsed. Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided and the information needed about the ground is obtained from aerial photographs. Both vertical and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the case of large cities, the local police may have a detailed map showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops. --Since villages and built-up areas vary, a force is task organized for each search. An organization consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accomplish the following:

(a) To surround the area to prevent escape.
(b) To establish roadblocks.
(c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces outside the area.
(d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to identify a suspect.
(e) To escort wanted persons.

(3) Command and Control. --Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. For smaller search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native police, when feasible.

(4) Method

(a) Approach. --An area is approached and surrounded before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Sometimes it is advisable to drive into the area; on other occasions, it is better to disembark at a distance. The method depends on the available approaches, exits, and the local situation.
(b) Surrounding the Area. -- During darkness, troops should approach silently by as many different routes as possible. When close to their positions, they should double time. After daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, lack of troops makes it impossible to completely surround an area for any length of time. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves. -- If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from entering the area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large-scale movement outside the isolated area.

(d) Search Parties. -- The officer in command of the operation announces the search, a house curfew is enforced, and all inhabitants remain indoors or gather at a central point.

1. Each search party should consist of at least one civilian policeman, a protective escort, and a woman searcher.

2. In searching a building, all occupants are gathered into one room. The police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to isolate suspected persons.

3. Buildings are searched from bottom to top. Mine detection and ordnance search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage. The searcher is always protected from the elements.

4. After a house is searched, it is so marked. Persons awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched building.

5. In the case of a locked house or resistance, entry is forced. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, it can be nailed up and a sentry placed outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.

6. When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house remains while his house is searched; otherwise, he is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating.
7 A problem in searching is the accusation of theft and looting which can be made against troops. In small searches, it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been stolen, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.

(e) Escorts. --Wanted persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally undertake this task, therefore, escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

e. Searching of Vehicles/Roadblocks

(1) General. --Roadblocks are necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to prevent smuggling of contraband items. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civil population understand that they are a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(a) Types. --There are two types of roadblocks, deliberate and hasty.

1 Deliberate. --This type of roadblock is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It may have no immediate specific result but serves as a deterrent to unlawful movement.

2 Hasty. --This type of roadblock is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty roadblock is intended to achieve specific purpose.

(b) Location. --Concealment of a roadblock is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back without being noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well-placed roadblock.

(c) Troop Dispositions. --A roadblock must be adequately manned to prevent ambush and surprise. An element of the roadblock
should be concealed an appropriate distance (100 to several hundred meters) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn and flee. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time, troop relief is provided at a rest area nearby so that the troops can be turned out quickly.

(d) Special Equipment Required.--For the roadblock to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and English should denote the vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point. Adequate lighting is needed at night. Communications are required among the various troop units. Barbed wire obstacles are placed across the road and around the search area. Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to stop a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method.--The roadblock may be established by placing two parallel lines of concertina barbed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between them depends on the traffic. The enclosure formed can then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the traffic which can be searched quickly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained woman searcher. An officer or NCO must always be on duty or close to the search area. All occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle being searched. The owner or driver should watch the search. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. When searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. In searching vehicles, depending on the type and cargo, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.
601. GENERAL

In areas threatened by a guerrilla force, measures must be taken to safeguard troops, installations, key civilian communities, and lines of communication. The scope of guerrilla activity threatens all elements of the forces operating against them. The characteristics, capabilities, and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be constantly studied to determine the pattern for security and the emphasis to be placed on its various aspects. Vigilance and sound security measures will not only minimize interference with operations, but will tend to discourage guerrilla operations.

602. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SECURITY MEASURES

The type and effectiveness of security measures employed depends upon prevalent conditions and operating procedures.
a. Adequate Warning. -- Adequate warning is essential for timely and effective reaction. The forces, agencies, and devices employed in normal land combat are used to provide warning. These include such security measures as: advance, flank, and rear guards; outposts; patrols; and ground surveillance radar. Continuous ground and aerial reconnaissance is conducted to detect security threats. Maximum use is made of civilian informants and other indigenous personnel.

b. Effective Communications. -- Effective communications are essential to adequate warning, control of security activities, and timely reaction. Multiple and emergency means are established to ensure reliable communications in the event of failure of the primary system as a result of malfunction, destruction, or guerrilla interference.

c. Timely Reaction. -- All elements and personnel of a counterguerrilla force must be prepared to react instantly to a security threat. Reaction forces, discussed in paragraphs 403 and 404, are particularly effective when adequate warning is provided. Immediate action drills are discussed in section 5. In all situations, weapons are kept available for instant use.

d. Care in the Establishment of Installations. -- Special attention is given to the selection of combat bases, patrol bases, and other installations. Paragraph 403 discusses the establishment of combat bases and section 5 covers the organization of patrol bases. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Since guerrillas are not as heavily armed as conventional ground forces, installations may be grouped closer together so that they may be guarded as a unit. The manner of securing an installation is altered frequently to prevent the guerrilla force from obtaining detailed accurate information after the composition and habits of the defense.

e. Supply Discipline. -- Supply discipline must be strictly enforced, and it must be emphasized to troops that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away may be recovered by the guerrillas and used against them. Arms and equipment must be salvaged from battle areas and from civilians who have collected them. Any equipment or supplies which would normally be discarded must not be left in the battle area.

f. Troop Indoctrination. -- Psychological indoctrination of troops should be oriented to minimize the anxieties which may stem from the
nature of guerrilla operations; however, contempt for the guerrilla must be guarded against. Troops in areas considered secure may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance. In units that have not experienced a surprise guerrilla attack, methodical supervision to maintain security discipline will be necessary. Since guerrilla force operations are spasmodic, long quiet periods require that particular attention be paid to security vigilance. Troop indoctrination and training are further discussed in section 12.

g. Designations of Clearance of an Area. --For security purposes, a system may be established for the designation of the degree of control existing in any specific area. Such a system, based on traffic light colors, is described in paragraph 403.

603. SECURITY MEASURES

Security measures are either active or passive; however, the best security is provided by a combination of both. Actions and measures which enhance security against guerrilla threat include the following:

a. Offensive Operations. --Constant pressure is maintained against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations to include patrols, raids, ambushes, air attack, and use of supporting fires deny the guerrilla the opportunity to conduct operations.

b. Use of Obstacles and Aids. --Appropriate use is made of physical obstacles and aids such as wire, mines, illumination, searchlight, and restricted areas. Within a network of road obstacles, deceptive operations, including communications, are conducted when appropriate. Deceptive measures such as cover, concealment, and camouflage are employed.

c. Police-Type Operations and Civilian Control. --Police-type operations and civilian control measures are essential to security. Curfew, movement restrictions, roadblocks, search and seizure, and related measures are commonly employed. These and other techniques of civilian control are covered in section 10, and certain police-type operations are covered in section 5. As a defense against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision.
e. Static Security Posts

(1) Purpose. -- A static security post is any organized security system for the protection of fixed military or civil installations and transportation facilities, such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. They are utilized as necessary to secure areas against guerrilla attack. The size of the post depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the guerrilla force, the attitude of the civil populace, and the importance of the area being secured. Static security posts may vary from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company, or maybe a battalion securing an airfield or key communication center. A battalion may establish a combat base in conjunction with a static security post, with subordinate units operating from the base within the battalion's area of responsibility.

(2) Organization. -- The organization of a static security post will vary with its size, mission, and distance from reinforcing units. Reliable communications are established between security posts and the parent unit combat base. The parent unit should be prepared to employ reaction forces to assist the security post.

(3) Composition. -- To maintain tactical integrity of military units of the counterguerrilla force, maximum use of indigenous forces is made, consistent with their capability and reliability. Militia, self-defense forces, and police may be employed for this task. Every effort is made to avoid the piecemeal commitment of combat forces to static security duty.

f. Security of Lines of Communication. -- For a discussion of techniques used in transportation security, see paragraph 606.

604. REAR AREA SECURITY

a. General Considerations. -- Rear area security in a conventional operation includes the planning for and employment of counterguerrilla measures when a guerrilla threat exists. Because the rear area is threatened by other enemy action in addition to guerrilla action, rear area security embraces a variety of defensive measures; it cannot be directed only to the guerrilla menace. Both before and during a conventional operation, the enemy's capabilities to interfere with the operation are carefully assessed and the security of the rear area is established to
accommodate the various possibilities. Accordingly, rear area security measures often represent a compromise based on enemy capabilities. For example, dispersion required under nuclear threat encourages and favors guerrilla action; when both threats exist, units are dispersed and particular attention is paid to the guerrilla threat. However, when a nuclear threat does not exist, dispersion is minimized to provide security against guerrilla threat.

b. Other Considerations. --When a guerrilla threat exists in a conventional operation, security of the rear area includes the use of the security measures covered in paragraph 603, as appropriate. Additional factors in rear area security which must be considered are:

1. Mission. --The accomplishment of the primary mission must not lose precedence, and whenever possible, enemy actions are overcome with minimum interruption to it.

2. Command. --A commander is usually assigned responsibility for the overall security of the rear area. As rear area defense commander, he is responsible for the integration of local security plans into the overall area plan. His plans provide for unity of effort and for the most efficient use of available defensive means.

3. Augmentation. --Specific combat units may be assigned the mission of assisting in security of the rear area. The type and size of the force depend on the characteristics and size of the area, enemy capabilities, and availability of forces. When the guerrilla threat is significant, the rear area units and installations cannot successfully cope with the threats alone. Such units are assigned the mission of conducting counterguerrilla operations. This assignment must be considered as secondary and temporary mission. When a major guerrilla threat is anticipated, combat units other than reserve elements may be assigned to the operation to conduct counterguerrilla operations as a primary mission. Combat units assigned a counterguerrilla mission conduct operations similar to the counterguerrilla combat operations covered in paragraph 404.

605. AIRFIELD SECURITY

a. General Considerations. --Security of Marine aviation units within an airfield complex includes an organized defense system for the
protection of aircraft, working and billeting areas, and personnel. During both conventional and counterguerrilla operations, the immediate defense network will usually be internal in nature, and the security measures and characteristics enumerated above apply as the enemy situation dictates. Organizationally, the internal security of the airfield is the responsibility of the senior aviation commander and is normally subordinate to the infantry unit, if assigned, responsible for rear area/base defense.

b. Implementation Considerations. --Because the aviation elements may occupy several nonadjacent areas within the airfield complex, the responsibility for defense may require extensive subdivision. The rear area defense force commander is responsible for the coordination of separate units into the local security plan and the integration of the local security plan into the overall airfield security plan. In addition, the following factors are included in the security framework:

1. The security force is manned by either qualified infantrymen (OF 0300) or guards (category "B" OF 8151). In some instances, further augmentation may be required from the squadrons attached to the Marine aircraft group. Additionally, each squadron will supply a provisional reaction force deployed as the enemy situation warrants under the operational control of the rear area defense force commander.

2. The rear area defense force commander will ensure that adequate means are established for reducing the possibility of damage or destruction to aircraft and equipment by enemy infiltration, sabotage, or artillery/air attack. Such measures include aircraft dispersal, protective revetments, strict control of indigenous personnel, and roving patrols supplemented by sentry dogs when available.

606. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

a. General Considerations. --In areas where guerrillas are known or suspected, the security of all forms of transportation is of paramount importance. Adequate security is not simply a matter of the number of personnel involved. It results from special training, sound movement procedures, and a general awareness of the magnitude of the problem. The following paragraphs describe procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland water movement. For counterambush techniques, see section 5.
(1) **Security of Information.** --Maximum precautions are taken to prevent the guerrillas from gaining advance information of vehicle movement. It should be remembered that:

(a) The telephone system is seldom secure.

(b) Radio messages in the clear can be easily intercepted.

(c) The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed.

(d) Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be furnished on a need-to-know basis. Drivers and escorts should be briefed as late as feasible.

(e) Plans should include alternate routes and deception measures.

(2) **Convoy SOPs.** --SOPs should be established to cover:

(a) Approval authority for convoy movement.

(b) The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.

(c) The organization of the convoy.

(d) The weapons and ammunition to be carried.

(e) The preparation of the vehicles. (Detailed instructions regarding tarpaulins, tail gates, and windshields.)

(f) Immediate action drills.

(g) Security measures.

(3) **Road Classification.** --The highway system may be classified corresponding to the degree of clearance of an area as set forth in paragraph 403, to identify the degree of control existing.

(a) **Red Roads.** --Those which are considered to be in the combat area and subject to ambush or interference.
(b) **Yellow Roads.** -- Those where there is a very limited risk of guerrilla ambush.

(c) **Green Roads.** -- Those which lie within the city limits of major towns and such other roads designated by the responsible headquarters. Subject to restrictions, which local commanders may impose, military personnel are permitted to travel on these roads in any type of vehicle.

### b. Vehicle Movement Considerations

1. **Convoy Commander.** -- The convoy commander, detailed for every convoy, will position himself where he can best control the convoy. He issues the necessary orders to initiate the march and ensures that instructions contained in SOPs and in march orders are followed.

2. **Vehicle Commanders.** -- A commander is designated for each vehicle. His duties will be to ensure alertness of all embarked personnel and to assist in maintaining convoy formation by controlling the driver. The primary mission of the vehicle commander is to command the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed. He is located in the back of the vehicle with the troops.

3. **Vehicle Guards.** -- In troop carrying vehicles, four men should be posted as guards. These men are posted two at the front and two at the rear, and each is assigned an area of observation covering the 90° from the center of the road to the side in each direction. These guards should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke and fragmentation grenades. (A phosphorus smoke grenade can be particularly useful as an antiambush weapon.) When ambushed, guards cover the troops disembarking. They can also assist in the traffic control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander if the vehicle behind halts or drops back.

4. **Briefing.** -- All personnel travelling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed to include:

   a. Details of timing, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact, and action to be taken if contact is broken.

   b. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.
(c) The distribution of personnel to vehicles.

(d) The distribution of weapons.

(e) The action to be taken in the event of guerrilla attack.

(5) Preparation of Vehicles. --Personnel traveling in vehicles must have all-around observation and fields of fire and be able to throw or fire grenades without hindrance. They must be able to debark from the vehicle rapidly without restriction. Therefore, vehicles cannot be loaded to the capacity allowable for administrative movement. Also, the configuration of the vehicle must be altered. The term "hardened vehicle" applies to a vehicle which has been prepared for counterambush action:

(a) Canvas, bows, and wooden sideboards removed.

(b) Tailgate removed or placed in the horizontal position.

(c) Front glass windshield down or removed.

(d) Doors removed or secured in an open position.

(e) A piece of pipe, wood, or metal affixed to the vehicle extending above the driver's head to prevent decapitation by wire stretched across the road.

(f) Sandbags placed on the floorboards and bed of the vehicle.

(g) Sections of scrap armorplate used to reinforce sandbags in the bed of the vehicle.

(h) Chicken wire over open windows to repel grenades.

(i) Removal of equipment that will slow up troop unloading and that is not essential to the vehicle's safe operation.

(6) Use of Armored Vehicles. --When a convoy of few vehicles is escorted on red roads, the armored vehicle should be centrally placed in the convoy. An armored vehicle at the front or rear of a convoy may be prevented from moving into the ambush area by halted vehicles. The
armored vehicle can be a mobile CP for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of about five or six and, when sufficient armor is available, one should be placed with each block. For vehicle convoys, the inclusion of an armored vehicle has two important effects on ambush action:

(a) Provides covering fire for the counterattack.

(b) Provides protection to anyone caught in the ambush by driving into the danger area and engaging the enemy at pointblank range.

(7) Convoy Communications. --Unit SOPs may designate the means and use of communications for convoys. The march order specifies the communication security required. Communications with other forces is desirable. Methods of intracolumn communications include:

(a) Visual Signals. --Visual signals are most commonly used for column control. These may be arm-and-hand, flashlight, or flag signals. Visual signaling must be easily understood, rapid in transmission, and cover all the basic column maneuvers such as starting, stopping, changing speed, and changing direction. Helicopters or other aircraft covering the column can employ smoke grenades or other such means for emergency signals. Each color is coded for a specific message such as ambush ahead, bridge out, guerrillas sighted, or road impassable. A similar system is employed for signaling from the column to aircraft.

(b) Radio Communications. --When communication security permits, radio is the principal means of communication during a march. Its use is generally specified in orders, unit SOPs, and communication operation instructions.

(c) Audio Signals. --Whistles, horns, or bugles are used to attract attention, to warn personnel of further transmission of commands, and to spread alarms. Voice commands and verbal messages are used when the situation permits.

(d) Other Methods. --A road message may be written on a board and posted along the route or displayed by an individual who stands at a vantage point where he can be plainly seen by all drivers. A message may be posted at the head of the column and picked up after the last.
vehicle of the column passes. Written messages, orders, and overlays are usually delivered during scheduled halts. Messages may be delivered by helicopter to selected helicopter landing sites along the route.

(8) Precautionary Tactics. --Troops may disembark to check any likely ambush areas before the convoy moves through. Such tactics are unlikely to surprise guerrillas in position; however, the guerrilla may move as soon as they see the troops. This examination of likely ambush positions will make the guerrillas less confident of their ability to execute an ambush without danger to themselves.

c. Security Measure Requirements by Road Classification. --The special security requirements for vehicular traffic will vary dependent upon the degree of clearance existing in the area to be traveled.

(1) Red Roads

(a) All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(b) Travel at night will be restricted to operational necessity.

(c) Movement of single military vehicles will not be permitted.

(d) Troop convoys of tactical units will provide self-protection. Armored vehicles should be used if available.

(e) Groups of administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible. The scale of escort for such convoys should be about one armored vehicle to every five vehicles.

(f) Interval between vehicles will normally be 150 meters; on red roads it is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to catch several vehicles.

(g) Convoys should always be escorted by troops.
(h) Whenever possible, helicopter or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in controlling the convoy.

(i) Red roads may be further divided into subcategories and special precautions for certain sections of road may be stated.

(2) Yellow Roads

(a) An armored escort vehicle is not essential.

(b) Personnel riding in military or civilian police vehicles will be armed.

(c) Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(d) Military personnel may travel alone in civilian cars but must be armed.

(e) Convoys up to 10 vehicles will move at normal interval and in blocks.

(f) Convoys of more than 10 vehicles should be approved by the commander of the operational area concerned. Convoys of more than 10 vehicles will move in blocks of not more than 5 or 6 vehicles.

(3) Green Roads. — There are no special measures concerning the movement of military convoys.

d. Guarding Officials

(1) When moving by road, indigenous authorities or other high ranking officials may require the protection of a troop escort. In such cases the following should be considered:

(a) The strength of the escort will depend on the circumstances; a platoon will be adequate in most instances.

(b) There should be an armored vehicle available in which the official may travel if deemed necessary.
(c) Throughout the move, the vehicle carrying the official must be closely supported by a second vehicle carrying at least one automatic weapon and "bodyguard" troops. If possible, this vehicle should be armored.

(d) The vehicle carrying the official should not bear any special distinguishing marks.

(2) Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the official on the action he wishes him to take in the event of attack. Regardless of the seniority of the official, the escort commander is in command of the move.

e. Protection of Railroads and Trains

(1) **Operation of Railroads.** --Railroads may be operated by the civil population, by the military and civilians combined, or by the military alone. In any event, liaison and protective measures must be established.

(2) **Train Guards**

(a) Train guards may be military police or other troops assigned to the duty. Economy of personnel will result if a unit is attached to a particular railroad organization for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.

(b) The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and, when possible, should have radio communications with units that can provide support in the event of ambush.

(3) **Security Measures.** --Security measures which may be taken for rail movements are:

(a) Trains should run on irregular schedules.

(b) Security elements should precede and follow trains.

(c) Flatcars loaded with sand can be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or track cuts.
(d) Automatic weapons may be mounted on cars.

(e) A right-of-way may be cleared and declared a restricted zone where shoot-on-sight conditions may apply. If clearance of the entire right-of-way is impractical, vegetation surrounding critical locations such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges is cleared.

(f) Air reconnaissance may be conducted over the right-of-way.

(4) **Security of Tunnels, Bridges, and Stations.** Critical installations such as tunnels, bridges, and stations are guarded.

(5) **Troops Embarked on Trains.** Security troops riding in regular passenger cars should disembark through all exits and windows. Because disembarking rapidly from a passenger car is difficult, the technique employed is planned and rehearsed. If practical, security troops should use flatcars.

f. **Protection of Waterways.** Critical points along rivers and waterways should be guarded. Points along the banks offering favorable ambush sites are cleared of vegetation. Other security measures include:

(1) Irregular scheduling of craft.

(2) Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.

(3) Providing security for each craft or each group of craft.

(4) Providing adequate communication means for each craft.

(5) Establishing waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.

(6) Patrolling the waterway by air.
SECTION 7

COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

701. GENERAL

a. In general, the communications capability within the Fleet Marine Forces is adaptable to counterguerrilla operations. The similarity of communications requirements between amphibious operations and counterguerrilla operations includes such things as the need for communications for command of the force as a whole, for special forms of control, and for coordination between diversified forces in the conduct of common or related operations.

b. The terrain in which the guerrilla usually operates and the methods of counterguerrilla operations impose definite limitations on the normal employment of the infantry communication system. Mountains, jungles, and other areas with heavy vegetation greatly reduce the rated distance capability of radios. The lack of roads, trails, or good traffic-ability severely restrict the employment of vehicular radio sets. The
problem is complicated further by the wide separation of units and extensive long-range patrol operations.

702. REQUIREMENTS

a. The communication system must provide the commander with the capability of control and maneuver, rapid reporting of guerrilla movements, security and warning, and for handling normal administrative and logistic requirements. A communication system is required between military and civil agencies. Ground-to-air communication is established for all air-supported ground operations. Operations characterized by continuous small unit actions require a communication system that is reliable, rapid, secure, and flexible. A clandestine communication system is often required between intelligence agents and headquarters of higher echelons. The use of civilian police, self-defense units and friendly guerrillas in civilian population control or small scale operations requires a communication system for coordination and control by the counter-guerrilla force.

b. The added burden placed on the communication system requires that the problem be met by ingenuity and improvisation as well as augmentation by personnel and equipment.

703. COMMUNICATION MEANS

a. Radio. --Radio is the primary means of communication. Great reliance is placed on portable radio equipment, capable of necessary transmission distances to control units operating in widespread areas. All units, particularly the infantry battalion and its subordinate units, require portable radios to facilitate mobility. Infantry platoons may be employed in situations that require a net of their own to coordinate patrols, raids and ambushes. Transmissions must be kept to a minimum so that high priority traffic such as reporting guerrilla contact and issuance orders to reaction forces can be rapidly transmitted. Predetermined codes will greatly assist in shortening transmission times. Emission control will enhance security and surprise. The counterguerrilla force radio equipment will include the following:

(1) High Frequency (HF). --In heavy vegetation high frequency radio sets may be used extensively; in some instances they may be required by rifle squads. HF sets are commonly used to pass intelligence.
information and control patrols during denial and harassing operations, and to control and coordinate units participating in reaction and elimination operations. In situations where increased ranges are required, HF radios may be employed rather than very high frequency (VHF) equipment. When operating in areas with heavy vegetation, the effectiveness of vertical antennas is greatly reduced, and the use of half-wave and three-quarter wave horizontal antennas is required. To give satisfactory results, antennas must be set up in cleared areas and/or elevated above the surrounding vegetation. The noise level of HF receivers can be reduced by using CW emission instead of voice transmissions and by using headsets rather than speakers. The use of single sideband (SSB) radios will greatly increase capabilities in the HF range.

(2) Very High Frequency (VHF).—FM radio sets are used to the extent that line of sight transmission conditions exist. These sets are used for short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. In this connection, manual or automatic airborne retransmission should be employed wherever the requirement exists to pass radio traffic over difficult terrain or extended distances in support of specific short-term actions.

(3) Ultra High Frequency (UHF).—UHF radio sets are used for ground-to-air and air-to-air communications. Additional UHF sets may be required to accommodate the increase in air support activity.

b. Wire.—Wire communication is used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communication to guerrilla force action dictates that wire be used only in secure areas and within combat bases and installations. However, if the area of operations is covered largely by heavy jungle growth, helicopters may be used to lay wire which will rest on top of, or high up in the growth. This technique will make it difficult for the guerrillas to locate or destroy the line. When wire is laid near roads, over unsecure routes, or long distances, guerrillas may use counterguerrilla force's communication wire to electrically detonate mines/booby traps.

c. Radio Relay.—Radio relay use is consistent with line of sight conditions and mobility of the equipment. Radio relay sites are protected against guerrilla force raids and sabotage and should be located, when possible, in secure areas or installations.
d. **Messenger.** -- Messengers are the most secure and reliable means of communication and the best means of transmitting maps, overlays, and long messages. Helicopterborne messengers are most often employed. Messengers who travel by vehicles must be provided security guards or travel with armed convoys. Reliable indigenous persons may be used; they are less conspicuous and usually have a thorough knowledge of the area, including trails. Aircraft can be used to drop and pick up messages.

e. **Visual.** -- The use of arm and hand signals, semaphore, lights, smoke, pyrotechnics, mirrors, and panels find considerable application in counterguerrilla operations, particularly at the small unit level. Panels for ground-to-air signaling and marking, and pyrotechnics for prearranged signals are the most frequently required visual means other than arm and hand signals. In patrolling, ambushing, and other small unit operations where surprise and security are essential, additional arm and hand signals may be devised.

f. **Sound.** -- The use of sound devices such as sirens, whistles, bugles, and weapon-firing may be used to signal the commencement of an attack or ambush, or for warning purposes. The use of less audible techniques such as rifle-tapping or twig-snapping may be used for warning at night, in patrol bases, or during patrolling. Airborne loudspeakers may be particularly effective in controlling the movement of large units or transmitting messages to isolated units or patrols.

**704. SECURITY**

a. It must never be assumed that guerrilla forces do not have the capability of performing communication intelligence operations or countermeasures. Normal security precautions must be observed since a guerrilla force must be credited with the capability of tapping wire lines, monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a sponsoring power or a conventional enemy force that can conduct communications intelligence operations.

b. All communication facilities are considered important targets by guerrilla forces and must be protected from sabotage or guerrilla attack.
705. COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES

a. While the guerrilla force usually will not possess sophisticated communication equipment or training comparable to the counterguerrilla force, it will normally depend to some extent on radio communication for contact with a sponsoring power, its underground element, and for control and coordination of its subordinate elements. There are different objectives to consider in countering a guerrilla force's communications. These are:

(1) Intercept and decode his transmissions.

(2) Intercept his couriers.

(3) Jam his radio traffic.

(4) Deceive and mislead him by false transmissions.

(5) Find and destroy or capture his communication equipment.

b. The countermeasure mission assigned will depend on the desired result or product. If communications intelligence is desired, then subparagraphs (1) and (2), above, are the objectives. If the guerrilla force depends on his communication equipment for information and control in a fast moving tactical situation, and is desired to deny him that information and control, then subparagraphs (3) and (4), above, are the objectives. However, it should be kept in mind that communication deception is an exacting technique that requires as much knowledge of the enemy as he has of himself. Probably the final objective will be subparagraph (5), above, and would take place concurrent with the destruction or capture of the guerrilla force itself.
801. GENERAL

The operational capabilities of Marine aviation units in counter-guerrilla warfare generally encompass offensive air support, assault support, and aerial reconnaissance. Marine air support tactics and techniques are readily adaptable to this type of warfare. See FMFM 7-3, Air Support, for detailed information on air support operations.

a. Offensive Air Support.--Offensive air support, which may be classified as either close or deep support, includes: attacking and destroying enemy installations, equipment, supplies, and personnel within the objective area; participating in the destruction and interdiction of ground and surface targets outside the objective area; and, when appropriate, the planning and conducting of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare operations consistent with the capability of assigned aircraft and equipment.
b. Assault Support. -- Assault support includes providing the vertical assault lift (troops and supplies) required by the force; providing the assault fixed-wing air transport airlift required for movement of high priority cargo and personnel; and providing airdrop of critical materials to combat elements from conventional assault transports and from high performance aircraft.

c. Aerial Reconnaissance. -- Aerial reconnaissance provides the force with a means to: obtain specific and immediate intelligence needs by visual, photographic, or electronic methods; conduct visual reconnaissance of enemy and friendly activities; adjust supporting fires; conduct active and passive electronic warfare operations and locate and communicate with isolated friendly units.

802. OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

In addition to their normal offensive air support missions, the use of attack aircraft to support pursuits, raids, reaction operations, and elimination operations utilizes both the mobility and fire power of these aircraft to the maximum. Such use also will have a deteriorating effect on the morale of the guerrilla force. Effective offensive air support may be difficult to provide and of limited value because of guerrilla capability for rapid dispersion, effective camouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of clinging to his enemy or mingling with the populace. Satisfactory results can be achieved from offensive air support against observed guerrillas when reaction to requests for strikes are prompt and under the control of a forward air controller (FAC) or tactical air coordinator airborne (TAC(A)).

a. Control and Coordination. -- Normal measures for the control and coordination of offensive air support such as the fire coordination line may not be practical in counterguerrilla operations due to extensive patrol action and the nature of the terrain. Therefore, unit commanders may find it necessary to establish additional or other control and coordination measures to ensure troop safety and coordinate offensive air support with ground operations. The difficulty of marking friendly positions by panels and/or the lack of prominent landmarks for pilots, requires extensive use of smoke and good ground-to-air radio communications. Positive identification of targets and coordinating fires with the movement of friendly troops in areas of guerrilla warfare requires extensive briefings for pilots, a thorough and up-to-date SOP for air-ground operations; good communications; and an emphasis on control procedures. As targets
are generally fleeting type targets, instantaneous response and minimum reaction time is required for decisive action.

b. Close Air Support.--Close air support missions consist of pre-planned and on call missions. On call missions are more likely to be used in counterguerrilla operations, therefore, every effort must be made to shorten the time required for planning and executing these missions.

(1) Immediate engagement of targets as they appear will allow little time for briefing pilots. Ordnance loads should be predetermined. Ground or airborne alert aircraft for on call missions provide the most rapid response to requests for close air support.

(2) Close air support provides supporting fires that other supporting arms cannot provide due to range, defilade, or the limitations of terrain. Aircraft may be the only fire support available to ground units conducting long-range combat operations. Close air support can be used to conduct flushing fires on known or suspected guerrilla areas. The ability of the pilot to observe target areas not visible from the ground permits him to attack these targets.

(3) Aircraft ordnance used in counterguerrilla warfare must be capable of penetrating heavy vegetation, being used close to friendly forces, and be able to cover wide areas. Heavy growth affords some degree of protection from blast and fragments, but high blast weapons are more effective than rockets and/or strafing fires. In open areas, strafing is the most accurate and effective weapon for use against personnel. Fragmentary bombs with VT fuses, napalm, or chemical and biological agents are extremely effective against guerrilla concentrations. The use of nonlethal biological/chemical weapons have many advantages against a guerrilla force and are most effectively dispensed by aircraft.

c. Deep Air Support. --Deep air support is normally classified as that air fire support conducted beyond the fire support coordination line. However, since the FSCL may not be used in counterguerrilla operations, it is often difficult to clearly separate deep air support from close air support. Deep air support missions conducted during counterguerrilla operations generally consist of search and attack or armed reconnaissance missions which do not require close coordination between ground forces and aircraft conducting the mission after the aircraft are airborne.
(1) Search and attack missions are normally run as a specific search mission; e.g., a limited area such as potential landing zone.

(2) Armed aerial reconnaissance missions serve a two-fold purpose. They are conducted to collect information as well as to attack targets of opportunity, such as guerrilla units, installations, and bivouac areas. They are generally conducted by high performance aircraft. Care must be taken not to subject friendly civilians to attack.

d. Air Support Radar Team.--Maximum use should be made of air support radar team's (ASRT) capability during periods of darkness and inclement weather. This action denies the guerrilla freedom of movement during the periods he could normally feel safe from air attack.

803. ASSAULT SUPPORT

Assault support operations provide for the air transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment in the area of operation by helicopters and/or fixed-wing transports. Such operations may be tactical or administrative in nature.

a. Helicopter Support.--The advent of the helicopter is the most significant innovation for the conduct of operations against guerrillas. Its introduction as a vehicle of war had a remarkable influence on certain principles of war. Detailed information on helicopter employment may be found in FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations.

(1) Effects on Principles of War.--The most favorably affected principle of war is that of maneuver, which in turn influences the application of such fundamental principles as offensive, mass, surprise, and economy of force. The use of helicopters greatly reduces the ratio of opposing forces. In this connection, two other principles of war are enhanced: economy of force--which requires the most advantageous distribution of the forces available, and its corollary, mass--which requires the concentration of combat power at the decisive place at the decisive time. Finally, the helicopter helps provide for the application of the principle of the offensive, which is the basis of tactical doctrine for defeating guerrillas.

(2) Helicopter Employment.--The advantages offered by helicopters should challenge the imagination of commanders at all echelons.
although their employment may be limited by such factors as availability, terrain, and weather conditions. Helicopters may be used:

(a) To conduct aerial reconnaissance and surveillance over known or suspected guerrilla areas in order to develop more accurate intelligence. The hover capability will facilitate detailed investigation of a specific area, but will increase the vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire.

(b) To keep detected guerrillas, suspected guerrillas, or civilians under constant surveillance during daylight.

(c) To familiarize commanders and key personnel with the terrain and other characteristics of the area.

(d) As a means for civilians, defectors, and/or patrol leaders to identify guerrilla camps and routes that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to describe by map inspection.

(e) To transport reaction forces, weapons, and equipment quickly to an area where the guerrillas can be engaged. This procedure will also ensure the commitment of fresh troops. In addition, the transported force can normally carry heavier weapons and more ammunition than guerrilla units.

(f) To keep guerrilla movements under surveillance during a fire fight, move troops from one area of the fire fight to another, and airlift troops not in direct contact to points along routes of escape.

(g) To introduce/pickup patrols and to construct/remove patrols and roadblocks in isolated areas.

(h) In an assault support capacity, by using the assault support helicopter (ASH) concept and delivering suppressive fires by hand-held weapons from transport helicopters.

(i) To resupply, deliver maintenance personnel, or withdraw damaged equipment for rear area repair.

(j) To provide reconnaissance/surveillance escort for armored columns or vehicular convoys. In this connection, they may be
used to deliver troops ahead of the column for such tasks as obstacle removal, traffic control, and security in villages along the route.

(k) For psychological warfare operations, such as leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, the frequent appearance of helicopters at many places and over a wide area has certain psychological value, suggesting intensity in the operations against the guerrillas.

(l) To evacuate casualties. This is of prime importance in the case of isolated units and patrols.

(m) To provide line of sight radio communications by acting as relay, to conduct wire laying missions when feasible, and to perform courier service.

(n) To assist in winning the support of the civilian population by rapidly transporting troops to besieged communities and conducting various mercy missions such as flood evacuation and the delivery of needed food, supplies, and medicine.

(o) To transport civil affairs personnel and civilian authorities to isolated villages and areas, permitting better control and a wider coverage of influence.

(p) To apply defoliation material on guerrilla crops, camps, and assembly areas.

(q) As a means for command control.

(r) As a means of establishing, maintaining, and checking isolated static security posts.

(s) To adjust fires, artillery, mortars and naval gunfire, and to direct and control various air support missions.

(t) In target acquisition and damage assessment.

(u) To conduct photographic missions employing hand-held cameras.
To conduct illumination missions on a limited scale, employing flares or searchlights.

To deliver chemical ordnance (CS/CN) either as a riot control measure or tactically against enemy positions or suspected enemy areas.

Although normally employed as the last minute fire suppression weapon in a selected landing zone and not as a close air support weapon the armed helicopter can provide limited close air support for ground troops in emergency situations or as an interim measure until fixed-wing support is on station.

Planning Factors: The employment of helicopters requires planning and coordination between ground, aviation, and all supporting combat units. The following factors are considered commencing with the initial planning phase and continuing throughout the operation:

(a) The extent of helicopter participation and the determination of priorities for helicopter support missions.

(b) The location and development of helicopter bases to include adequate maintenance facilities.

(c) The requirement for efficient utilization and immediate response of assigned helicopters. Centralized control of the helicopters may allow the most efficient method of utilization but the immediate response factor may be best satisfied by having the helicopters in a standby alert status at the tactical unit's combat base.

(d) The problems of loading and unloading by both air and ground units involved must be given special considerations. The pilots must be able to compensate for changes in atmospheric conditions, winds, altitudes, fuel reductions, and distances to be flown. The counter-guerrilla unit commander must be prepared to adjust his personnel and equipment to meet the changing load carrying capabilities of the aircraft.

(e) Landing zones are selected jointly by the counter-guerrilla commander and the helicopter unit commander. The troop commander is primarily concerned with selecting landing zones that can support his scheme of maneuver and tactical plan. The helicopter unit commander is concerned with the ability of the helicopters to get in and
out of the landing zone, the number of helicopters that can operate in the zone at one time, and whether or not the landing zone requires improvements.

(f) Landing zones are selected throughout the entire area of operations during the planning phase. Selected landing zones should be reconnoitered as time and conditions permit.

(g) Landing sites located in rugged or densely overgrown landing zones may require clearing. These sites may be large enough for several helicopters or only large enough to be used for emergency resupply by externally loaded helicopters. Teams composed of infantry and engineer personnel trained to debark from hovering helicopters and equipped with suitable tools are employed to clear selected landing sites.

(h) Helicopter coordination and control may require additional communication equipment and personnel to ensure adequate ground-to-air communications.

(i) Security of the helicopter in the air and on the ground presents varied problems to the helicopter unit commander and the counterguerrilla unit commander. Effective security of helicopter bases and grounded helicopters must be provided for. Security of the approach and retirement lanes against ground fire is essential. This protection is provided by use of fixed-wing attack aircraft and/or armed utility helicopters and by the selection of helicopter routes to avoid villages and known enemy positions. Special attention is given to the security of the landing zones. The possibility of guerrilla ambushes and/or mined landing zones can be expected.

b. Fixed-Wing Transport Support. Fixed-wing transport aircraft have the capability of operating from relatively short, unimproved fields. This, coupled with their air delivery capability, provides a significant extension to the logistic and operational resources of forces engaged in operations against guerrillas. For detailed information on air movement of personnel and equipment see FMFM 4-6, Air Movement of FMF Units.

(1) Administrative Movements. Administrative air movements consist of the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Tactical considerations in loading, movement, and unloading are of minor importance. Such movements may be divided into--
(a) Scheduled flights; conducted on a predetermined recurring basis.

(b) Unscheduled flights; conducted on an as-required basis.

(2) Tactical Movements.--Tactical air movements consist of movement of personnel and cargo in which loading, movement, and unloading are determined by tactical considerations. Such movements, to accomplish a specific tactical mission, are made into or near enemy controlled territory. Tactical air movements consist of the following types of operations:

(b) Air landed operations wherein tactical units and/or cargo are disembarked/unloaded after the aircraft has landed.

(b) Air delivery operations wherein supplies and equipment are unloaded from the aircraft in flight.

(3) Other.--Fixed-wing transport support is utilized for many of the same purposes as are helicopters. Such support is especially useful when missions are beyond the lift and/or range capabilities of the helicopter.

804. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

Various types of aircraft are used to provide reconnaissance and observation for the ground commander. This reconnaissance and/or observation may include photographic and electronic as well as visual to supplement or provide additional information on aerial reconnaissance and the unit's current position.

Marine Air Wing and FMFM 5-1, Marine Air Wing and FMFM 7-3, Air Support

a. Aerial Photography.--Aerial photographs provide recorded information that can be assessed objectively and reproduced in quantity.

(1) Photographic reconnaissance is conducted to provide map substitutes or supplements and to obtain information on such things as targets, target damage assessment, suspected guerrilla cultivation, newly cleared areas, roads, and trails.

(2) Photographic reconnaissance is valuable in confirming intelligence gained from other sources.
(3) Most photographic reconnaissance missions are conducted by high performance aircraft of the Marine composite reconnaissance squadron. However, the Marine observation squadron has a limited capability; aerial observers, using hand-held cameras, are capable of providing pinpoint photography of specific areas or targets.

b. Electronics Reconnaissance.--Electronics reconnaissance is the interception and analysis of enemy electromagnetic emissions other than signal communications. There are two primary categories of aerial electronics reconnaissance, radar and electronics countermeasures (ECM) reconnaissance. In counterguerrilla operations we will only concern ourselves with the radar reconnaissance. See FMFM 2-3, Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations, for detailed ECM operations.

   (1) Infrared.--Infrared is valuable in penetrating camouflage and in collecting information at night. However, its effectiveness is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation. The information obtained should be corroborated by other means. Airborne infrared detection devices can cover large areas quickly, but are limited to line of sight coverages. These devices are not vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, but are susceptible to enemy deception measures.

   (2) Side Looking Aerial Radar (SLAR).--SLAR can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator. Information obtained should be supplemented by other means such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the exact nature of the activity detected by SLAR. Airborne radar can cover large areas quickly and can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly positions. SLAR is dependent on line of sight and may be detected, jammed, or spoofed.

c. Visual Reconnaissance.--Visual reconnaissance plays an important part in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. Direct communication between the reconnaissance aircraft and tactical unit headquarters is essential. In conducting visual reconnaissance missions, the following methods may be employed.

   (1) Area Search.--An area search is a general, continuous search covering the entire area of operation for intelligence information and for detection of changes. Accordingly, the same observer should be
assigned when possible to reconnoiter the area. Although guerrillas will seldom be seen, except when surprised or on the run, there will be signs of his existence even in areas possessing good concealment.

(2) Specific Search.--A specific search is one conducted to obtain specified information concerning a limited area such as possible drop zones and/or helicopter landing zones. It may be used to follow up information gained from agents or informer reports, ground reconnaissance, or photographic or other visual reconnaissance means.

(3) Route Reconnaissance.--A route reconnaissance is essentially a specific search. It is conducted for the purpose of determining route conditions, to report on convoy movements, and in conjunction it may provide security escort for convoys. Particular emphasis is placed on locating possible ambush sites.

(4) Unit Reconnaissance.--Unit reconnaissance missions are missions required by specific units of the counterguerrilla force, and may include contact and command or staff reconnaissance missions.

(a) Contact reconnaissance missions are conducted to locate and reestablish contact with patrols who have lost communications with tactical headquarters. Long-range patrols may include the pre-planned use of contact reconnaissance for prescribed times and locations. These missions are also used to maintain contact between widely separated units.

(b) Commanders or their staffs may conduct personal terrain reconnaissance missions in the area of operations. To ensure maximum benefit, a thorough briefing should be conducted before each flight and prominent landmarks marked on the maps carried by the personnel.
SECTION 9

COMBAT SUPPORT

901. GENERAL

Employment of combat support may be limited in guerrilla warfare. Rugged terrain that provides the guerrilla an area for operating forbids unlimited movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles and restricts the employment of supporting weapons. The employment of artillery, naval gunfire, and mechanized units in quantity may not be possible, although every effort is made to provide maximum combat support consistent with realistic requirements. Areas that possess navigable coastal and inland waters will be suited for the employment of naval ships and craft. Support provided by reconnaissance and engineer units can be most effective in rugged terrain. In planning the amount and type of combat support required, a detailed study of the terrain is conducted. Care is taken in planning the combat support to ensure that it can be effectively employed. The unnecessary burden that will be imposed on logistics and the additional problem of security associated with noneffective units is to be avoided. Generally, combat support which is air transportable by certain fixed wing aircraft,
helicopter and aerial resupply drop can provide effective support in guerrilla operations.

902. FIELD ARTILLERY

a. General. -- Field artillery properly employed against guerrilla forces is a major asset to the commander. Proper employment of artillery is attained by modifying the conventional principles, techniques, and tactics. The vague enemy situation and difficult terrain require the artillery commander to exploit every means to provide adequate and continuous fire support. Although the principle of massed artillery fires is applicable against guerrilla forces, most firing will be accurate surprise fires on temporary and fleeting guerrilla targets. For a complete discussion of artillery employment against guerrilla forces, refer to FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support.

(1) Counterguerrilla Operations. -- The planning, composition, and employment of artillery units is based on the landing force plan of operation. The artillery plan is based on a careful study of the terrain, road nets, and the enemy situation. Support may be required for numerous patrols, ambushes, roadblocks, and similar guerrilla-type operations.

(2) Conventional Operations. -- The planning, organization, and employment of artillery in conventional operations differs from counterguerrilla in that two concurrent operations may be conducted; one against guerrilla forces and the other against conventional forces. Diversion of artillery from the primary mission is a guerrilla tactic and diversion must be avoided. When required, a specific force, including artillery, is assigned to conduct operations against guerrilla forces which significantly threaten conventional operations. This force operates in the same manner as it would for counterguerrilla operations.

b. Organization for Combat. -- Artillery must provide adequate fire support, including massing of fires, and the weapons employed should be those that can best support the operation. There is no standard organization for operations conducted against guerrillas. The artillery units are organized to be employed in specific terrain, to combat a certain size guerrilla force, and to support the tactics and techniques to be employed during a particular operation.
1) Light Artillery Support. — As light artillery can be moved by helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, landing craft, and on the ground, it can be delivered to areas that are inaccessible to other artillery.

2) Medium Artillery Support. — Medium artillery, self-propelled and towed, provide increased accuracy and range over light artillery. However, medium artillery requires better roads and stronger bridges.

3) Heavy Artillery Support. — Although restricted to good roads and strong bridges, its long range can provide support to deep patrols and widely separated units.

4) Amphibian Howitzers. — The amphibian howitzer (LVTH) can be employed in areas possessing poor roads, little or no bridging, and in areas too wet or otherwise unsuitable for conventional artillery. Its 360-degree turret traverse also affords rapid support in any direction.

5) Searchlight Support. — Searchlights can be employed to prevent infiltration, limit night movement of guerrillas, locate friendly patrols, and for patrol orientation. They can also be employed to assist in night close air support.

6) Target Acquisition Agencies. — If guerrillas employ mortars or artillery, sound, flash, and radar ranging can be utilized. Artillery aerial observers should be of sufficient numbers to provide constant surveillance. Because of the requirement for extensive patrolling, the number of artillery forward observers assigned to infantry units may not be sufficient to meet all forward observer needs. Therefore, small unit leaders should receive training in the rudiments of fire planning and forward observer procedures to ensure this capability is available when required.

7) Survey Capability. — In addition to normal survey requirements, need exists for a greater number of surveyed control points (SCP) throughout areas to facilitate target location, transfer firing data and computation of corrections to be applied to firing data. Extensive survey operations can also aid in orientation of patrols. To accomplish such extensive survey, augmentation of additional survey teams will normally be required. In engagements of short duration where SCPs have not been established, fire will generally be directed from an observed firing chart.
In these instances, artillery units can rapidly establish common direction by simultaneous astronomical observation. Helicopters can provide a valuable asset to rapid survey of the area of operations to establish a common grid.

(8) Changes, Modifications, and Additions.--Any changes, modifications, and additions that are incorporated in the artillery structure are carefully considered. Special training may be necessary if animals, new type equipment, or special procedures are employed.

c. Artillery Staff Planning.--Staff estimates are prepared for the commander to assist him in making decisions. The decision to provide artillery support in operations against guerrillas will require imagination on the part of the staff in preparing its plan.

(1) Intelligence.--The target acquisition agencies are exploited to locate targets. Rapid processing of target intelligence is vital in order to deliver fires as expeditiously as possible.

(2) Operations.--Fire planning and fire direction techniques follow the conventional methods. Fire direction should remain centralized insofar as possible; however, decentralization may often be necessary due to widely dispersed operations and special task assignments. The operation may require decentralization of mutual defensive fires, countermortar fires, harassing and interdiction fires, flushing and barrier fires, and fires to support attacks. Coordination and control of fires require detailed planning. Training of personnel should include training in guerrilla warfare and in techniques required for operating any special equipment.

(3) Logistics.--Related to the total guerrillas killed, ammunition expenditures by artillery may appear excessive. The requirement for displacement of artillery may result in greater than normal POL consumption. Position area security may require abnormal amounts of barbed wire, concertina, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines. Other specialized equipment is considered in planning. The movement of supplies, protection of dumps, and distribution of widely dispersed units must be provided for. The resupply of artillery ammunition is a paramount consideration in planning and conducting operations against guerrillas. The relatively great distances over which ammunition must be transported coupled with the relatively large expenditure rates and weight of ammunition, combine to create a complex logistics problem. Consideration should be given to
unit distribution resupply to batteries from control base ammunition supply points to avoid repeated handling at forward ammunition dumps.

d. **Fire Support.** --In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans utilized in conventional artillery support. Among these are:

(1) **Countermortar Fires.** --The normal countermortar techniques are utilized in target accumulation, target selection, and target attack. However, in operations against guerrillas, the target will be even more fleeting and temporary than in normal countermortar operations. Accordingly, rapid dissemination of countermortar target information is essential in order that a quick response can be made by supporting arms. Plans are prepared on active locations.

(2) **Counterguerrilla Fires.** --The accumulation and collection of counterguerrilla targets are provided by the normal target acquisition agencies and the infantry sources. Fires are planned on guerrilla installations, camp areas, communication routes, and known positions. Many of these targets may be unoccupied during firing of a counterguerrilla program; nevertheless, effective neutralization of installations may be obtained. A counterguerrilla program of fires can be prepared preliminary to supporting an infantry attack on guerrilla areas. Individual fires may be prepared to force the guerrilla into a particular area.

(3) **Defensive Fire Plans.** --Defensive fire plans are devised to protect rear area installations, to prevent infiltration in strength, and as mutual fires in defense of other installations. Defensive fire plans require careful coordination and control when planned concentrations are near friendly military installations and occupied civilian areas.

(4) **Harassing Fires.** --Harassing fires are designed to disturb the rest of the guerrilla, to curtail his movement, and by threat of loss, to lower his morale. Consideration should be given to the use of daylight harassing fires when circumstances warrant. Also, illumination fires can be employed as a method of harassment in areas where fires can be observed.

(5) **Interdiction Fires.** --Interdiction fires are fires placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.
(6) Reconnaissance by Fire. --Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause him to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas to produce a reaction from the guerrilla force. Because the fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs are taken before and after the program is fired. Maximum aerial observation is used during the firing to detect and report guerrilla activity.

(7) Flushing Fires. --These fires are prepared to support infantry operations by "flushing" the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near defined paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

(8) Barrier Fires. --Barrier fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape and denying the guerrilla reinforcements.

(9) Deception Fires. --These fires are placed away from friendly troops and are designed to deceive the guerrillas and to cover friendly troop movements. Deception fires can be used to distract and mislead the guerrilla force while friendly troops approach from other directions.

(10) Illumination Fires. --The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops, by exposing guerrilla activity, and deterring infiltration. It can be utilized for orientating lost patrols.

(11) Survey by Fire. --Location of guerrilla activity can be provided from replot data. Survey by fire using center of impact (CI) and high burst (HB) techniques with HE, WP, and illumination shells will give accurate location of targets, patrols, etc. Patrols that possess the necessary communications can determine their position or those of the enemy from adjusted coordinates provided by the artillery FDC.

(12) Chemical Fires. --Chemical fires may be utilized effectively against guerrilla forces to screen friendly troop movements, to confuse the enemy, and for casualty effect. White phosphorus (WP) is best suited to marking guerrilla activity for air or infantry attack. WP can also be used as a casualty agent, to burn vegetation, and destroy supplies. Other
toxic and nontoxic chemical shells are ideally suited to counterguerrilla tactical operations against a foe ill-prepared for it.

(13) Biological Fires. --Missiles and rockets of field artillery can deliver biological fires against personnel, animals, and crops which contribute to the guerrilla effort. These fires are ideally suited to counterguerrilla operations since nonlethal doses can be utilized to retard the activity of the guerrilla in areas that are inhabited by friendly or neutral civilians. These people can be treated or even inoculated against the biological agents used. Food can be issued to replace crops and animals of friendly civilians lost through this action.

e. Employment Considerations. --The employment of artillery requires movement to complement the infantry scheme of maneuver. Selecting position areas in rough terrain to extend the range and support capability for infantry units operating in widely dispersed areas will require extensive reconnoitering. To prevent wasteful expenditure of ammunition, forward observers and artillery air observers should be provided with a target criteria. This criteria should state what comprises a counterguerrilla target and the normal means and amount of artillery fire to be used. The coordination of fires on rear areas, farms, and built-up areas is based on guidance received from the artillery commander.

(1) RSOP. --Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position will follow the normal principles. Security and all-around fire capability are emphasized. A search for easily accessible position areas is made to prevent the requirement for building extensive roads, clearing areas, and cutting access ways. This also applies in selecting position areas for helicopterborne and airpack artillery. Security measures on the march and while occupying the position are considered. A compact position area is desirable, providing there is little or no threat of enemy counterfires.

(2) Security. --Security measures against guerrilla infiltration and attack are carefully considered by the artillery commander. In addition to planning the normal local security to include patrols and listening posts furnished by artillery personnel, employment of direct fire utilizing time-fused shells, ricochet burst with delay-fused shells, and beehive rounds to defend against guerrilla attack are considered. Direct fire sectors can be assigned to each gun section as is done in antimechanized
defense. Illumination of approaches into the position are planned. Illumination fires can be included in mutual defensive artillery fires. When not committed elsewhere, the mortar battery of the direct support battalion can provide defensive fires for the battalion installations. Joint installations and command post for artillery and infantry can provide greater protection and simplify the local defense problem. Passive defense techniques are considered. The use of wire, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines may be extensive. Emphasis is placed on the training, equipping, and employment of the security section. When organic personnel and weapons are inadequate in providing for security, the commander may obtain additional security means from the supported commander. Artillery units required to operate away from infantry protection should displace at least every 48 hours as a passive defense measure against coordinated guerrilla ground and mortar attacks. Stereotyped defensive postures should be avoided.

(3) Movement.--When providing support for operations conducted over a large area, artillery is frequently moved. Adequate roads and bridges are necessary for movement on land. Roads and access ways can be improved somewhat by organic means. In some instances, engineer support will be required to construct bridges and roads. Self-propelled artillery is particularly hampered by its size and weight when moving in rugged and undeveloped terrain. When land movement is not possible, helicopterborne or airpack artillery delivered by aerial drop are substituted.

(4) Coordination.--Fire support is carefully planned. Guide lines provided by the commander and the use of the "traffic light" system of areas contained in subparagraph 403b, will facilitate coordination. A criteria is stated by the commander to specify the number of guerrillas and the size and type installations that constitute a legitimate artillery target. The amount of ammunition that may be expended against counter-guerrilla targets may be stated, if required. The commanders can control fire discipline and preclude unnecessary expenditures of ammunition. Clearance to fire, as furnished by each agency concerned must be expressed positively; silence denoting consent is not sufficient.

(5) Observation.--In order to provide the most effective support, it is important that a completely integrated observation plan be instituted to cover each area of operation. The following observation means should be fully integrated:
(a) Observation Posts. -- Artillery and infantry observation posts should be established in conjunction with each other and fully coordinated by the intelligence officers.

(b) Aerial Observers. -- The intelligence and operations officers coordinate infantry and artillery aerial observers surveillance of the area of operations. In addition to performing observation and photographic missions, these observers relay requests of ground observers with patrols.

(c) Electronic Surveillance. -- The ground surveillance and countermortar radars of infantry and artillery should be integrated in the observation plan. Limitations imposed by terrain and vegetation may be overcome by local or isolated area employment. Adequate protection for equipment and operators must be provided.

f. Execution of Artillery Operations. -- Weapons such as tanks, antitanks, and amphibian howitzers may be included in certain fire support operations. If employed, heavy and medium artillery will normally execute fire missions on distant targets while light artillery may be able to accompany the task forces in many operations.

(1) Artillery Support Considerations. -- In providing artillery support, all problem areas need to be carefully analyzed. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of self-propelled artillery, the use of helicopterborne artillery, air delivery and resupply, and the capability of artillery communications are examined. Ammunition requirements must be considered.

(2) Techniques of Support. -- Forward observers with patrols, reconnaissance elements, and large or small task organizations will increase the number of guerrilla sightings and targets of opportunity. Forward observers operating in dense vegetation or rugged terrain should be capable of adjusting fire by sound. To provide for troop safety, fire for effect on initial data is placed at a greater distance from troops than in normal operations. Within transfer limits, adjustments on checkpoinits or terrain features will ensure accurate surprise fire on guerrilla activity and provide for troop safety. Trained aerial observers will be of particular value in adjusting fires, coordinating movements, reporting guerrilla activities, locating friendly elements, and acting as radio retransmission station for ground elements. Calibrated artillery pieces, the use of