Herman Kahn Interviewed on

WORLD GOVERNMENT VS. THERMONUCLEAR WAR

AS DE GAULLE SEES THE WORLD

By Anne Weill-Tuckerman

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Fact & Opinion on Progress Toward a World of Law and Order

March, 1963

Fifty Cents
'Americans for Peace'

Taken by themselves the words "America" and "peace" both have positive connotations. Virtually everyone in the United States would agree that "America" means something good. And a very substantial majority of Americans have a deep preference for "peace." The combination of these two good words into a slogan, or perhaps the name of an organization—"America for Peace" or "Americans for Peace"—would seem, at first glance, to be a brilliant idea. So far as I know it hasn't been done. And if it were it would no doubt be considered dangerous and un-American by a significant number of Americans. Many, many more, perhaps a large majority, would be afraid to join an organization named Americans for Peace. It is a fair guess that conservatives would be afraid that Americans for Peace is a radical group, while many liberals, on the other hand, would immediately be suspicious that Americans for Peace is a bunch of ultra-nationalistic superpatriots of the right wing.

There are understandable reasons why "America" is considered a rightist word and "peace" a leftist word. "America" is the name of a nation-state, while "peace" is an international condition. The nation-state's name is raised and praised by those who want it to have unlimited freedom of action. Peace as a condition of the world community depends on the acceptance by the various states of certain limitations on their freedom of action. The nationalists stress America and the internationalists emphasize peace.

But these are not mutually exclusive concepts and the confusion cannot all be explained rationally. We have grown too accustomed to jumping at conclusions and it is time for us to be worried about that fact. Let me suggest a small experiment. Try asking a dozen or so of your friends if they are willing to support "Americans for Peace," or whether they know anything about "Americans for Peace." If more than half of them categorically decline to support whatever it is they conceive "Americans for Peace" to be, or if your conservative friends immediately suspect it to be a leftist group and your liberal friends immediately suspect that it is a rightist group, I think you will have some indication right in your local environment of the tremendous psychological barrier between us and the kind of world most of us want. It is, in fact, a monumental task which faces anyone who would encourage Americans to be for peace. It's easy enough to be for peace, but it's hard to do anything about it without being suspect.

Among people who share the desire to get on with the task of getting more Americans to be more active for peace, the most common question is, "What can I do?" The answers given are usually not very satisfactory. One of the reasons for this frustration is that they often are expecting answers of the wrong kind. For many people, doing something for peace means inventing a new idea, writing an article, making a speech—in one way or another teaching or preaching. Or, they think that doing something for peace means joining an organization, contributing money (or raising funds from those who have money) or, all too often I am afraid, creating a new organization or a new publication.

I think these are misconceptions. I want to argue that the real job to be done by Americans for peace is the job of reading, not of writing articles. It is the job of listening rather than of making speeches. It is the job of utilizing the services of existing organizations rather than creating new ones. It is the job of telling next door neighbors about sensible sounding peace proposals one has encountered. In short, peace workers should not so much expect to see results as to be results.

This may not be a very glamorous answer to the question, "What can I do?"—"You can study proposals others are making and you can talk about them to your friends and neighbors." But this may be the only truly effective way Americans can act for peace.

Dr. Whitaker, associate professor of international relations at San Francisco State College, made these remarks in a discussion of San Mateo Peace Information Center over KPFK-FM, Berkeley.

By Urban Whitaker

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Herman Kahn Interviewed on

WORLD GOVERNMENT VS. THERMONUCLEAR WAR

The author of the books, "On Thermonuclear War" and "Thinking About the Unthinkable," Herman Kahn, gives his views on the possibilities of world government and/or thermonuclear war in a discussion with Richard Hudson, editor of War/Peace Report. Kahn, formerly with The RAND Corporation, is now director of The Hudson Institute at Harmon-on-Hudson, New York.

The Interview

HUDSON: In a recent pamphlet, "Unintended War," by Arthur Waskow, you are quoted this way, "About three or four years ago I used to say, 'I'm an optimist. I think we'll have a world government during the next two or three decades.' Now I say 'I'm a pessimist. I think there's a fairly good chance of getting a world government within the next two or three decades.' This change in attitude is due to two things. We have been looking for the past six months at what the world government might look like, you know. It looks very unpleasant as far as I can see." And then Michael Brower interrupted you to ask, "As unpleasant as a major thermonuclear war?" And you replied, "That I don't know but they're close." Then in your letter to me about this you said, "A more reasonable quote would be: 'There are many kinds of plausible world governments that could be worse than many kinds of plausible thermonuclear wars and vice versa.'" I wonder if you could expand on that and let us know what you mean by world governments that could be worse than thermonuclear wars.

KAHN: This has to do with the fact that there are a range of world governments possible and a range of thermonuclear wars possible. Let's talk about the world governments first.

I've recently spent a lot of time reading ancient history and while I haven't done a careful study on it, I am willing to assert that the natural state of civilized man is in an empire of some sort. In other words, if you look historically at those peoples who have achieved some degree of civilization, they have either conquered somebody or been conquered or amalgamated with somebody. This is true of the Chinese and the Indians and the Romans and the Greeks and the other Mediterraneans, and so on.

About four or five hundred years ago, a different arrangement was created—a so-called "state system," which about two hundred years ago became a "nation state system," where nations were living in their own states and the state and the nation were, in effect, identical. This, as I said, is a rather extraordinary arrangement, is not typical of most previously recorded history and whether it will last a long time or not is in question.

Now, there are many people who believe that the nation state system is simply not consistent with modern weapon systems. Either one or the other has to go, possibly both. I am, more or less, in that school.

HUDSON: You believe that world government is desirable and necessary.

KAHN: Yes. I also think that it will come whether you want it or not. Now if you ask what was the most usual way in which different groups got together—it was usually by one side conquering the other. When the amalgamation occurred, it was almost always because of an exterior threat. I find it most improbable to believe that our current international problems are likely to be settled by people sitting around a table and producing a document which is then signed and that's the world government. I find it very improbable.

HUDSON: What about evolution? There are some people who say that the United Nations is already, to a certain extent, world government, and certainly in the case of the Congo, it's acting as a state. Do you see that we may be wise enough to reach a world government—a good world government—essentially through historical develop-
ment but perhaps, also, with some treaties and some revision of the United Nations Charter?

KAHN: It's certainly possible. I would guess that it would take longer than two or three decades to do that and, secondly, it might be a poor world government—the one nation, one vote system which the United Nations has is not a reasonable system as far as I am concerned. I don't know if I'd be satisfied with a voting system based on population either. There are reasons why I think this could be troublesome for the United States and the values which I think are important to preserve. Would I be in favor of a very complicated voting formula and one which, in effect, gave the United States, and the Western nations in general, something which would think was an undue proportion of the votes—not necessarily a majority but a fairly sizable minority?

HUDSON: Can you conceive of any kind of world government that would come into being through evolution and treaty-making and U.N. Charter revision that could be worse than a thermonuclear war?

KAHN: Well, I said something else. That I don't think you can have that kind of government within two or three decades. It's not feasible. Desirability is not a part of feasibility. But a government which was dominated by votes of the underdeveloped nations might literally end up as an extreme tyranny in which the values I think are important would disappear. It is easy to imagine a racist world government in which all the animosities of past centuries suddenly found a path of realization.

HUDSON: But such a government couldn't come into being without the consent of the United States. Presumably we would take a careful look at this and I would assume that if anything we would err on the side of caution.

KAHN: That's why you can't have it. If you are on the side of caution and they are on the side of caution, then you are incompatible. It's only if you're going to be generous—perhaps foolishly—that you can have that world government. If you're going to be niggardly about it and insist on erring on the side of caution, and everybody else is erring on the side of caution, you can't compromise. You can't come to an agreement.

HUDSON: But what I'm saying is that if you do come to an agreement, I don't believe that you could have any kind of a world government that would be worse than a thermonuclear war.

KAHN: I would even disagree with that statement but less violently. I happen to have read the Clark-Sohn proposals reasonably carefully and I've made two points about them many times. One, that if given the choice I would prefer to take my chances with the Clark-Sohn proposals rather than with the unrestricted arms race. Two, that I think the Clark-Sohn proposals could be disastrous. These are two separate remarks.

HUDSON: Why do you think they could be disastrous?

KAHN: Basically on the voting formula. The Clark-Sohn proposals turn over the balance of power to small nations. This could be good. It could work out. But when you look around the world, at the small nations, you can easily see how they would be subject to demagoguery, tyrants, pressure groups, animosities, and so on. It could be disastrous for Americans, Europeans, and so on. This is not inevitable. If it were inevitable I would prefer many kinds of thermonuclear war, though not all, to the Clark-Sohn proposals.

HUDSON: You think that there is really a serious risk in the Clark-Sohn proposals as they stand?

KAHN: Absolutely. And I think anybody that doesn't think so simply doesn't understand political institutions.

HUDSON: Have you studied the recent behavior of the United Nations? Perhaps you have seen the study that Arthur Larson did on this. He concluded that the small nations are really quite responsible.

KAHN: They have to be responsible now because if they are too irresponsible their authority disappears. In other words, the United Nations is weak. It has authority only because it can set some examples. If the small nations went out for the most extreme proposals—if they suddenly said, "We want to have a worldwide income tax and nobody should make more than the average income," you would just laugh at them. They wouldn't get anywhere so they wouldn't make a proposal like that. If you gave the group ample authority—through revision of the Charter—you would find such proposals coming up. Now, to have a much better distribution of income is a desirable thing to do. I have no objection, for example, to distributing the wealth worldwide but there are very sharp limits within which you can do that.

KAHN: Do you really believe that with the monopoly of the armed forces, as in the Clark-Sohn proposals, the new U.N. would have the same reliable respect for constitutional provisions as does the United States Congress, which often, as you know, pushes very hard? No. Constitutional government has been reasonably successful in the United States, England, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent, in France, Germany, Italy and a few other countries. Constitutional government is a relatively rare success in the world. There are about 110 nations in the world. As far as I know, less than 10 or 20 percent of them have successful constitutional governments. Why should they all of a sudden achieve this capability?

If you have a strong government, there could be constitutional provisions against doing certain things, but if it's got the authority, the military power, and a chief executive or strong legislature, you run the risk of a military takeover and a military dictatorship. I've been reading the history of the Roman empire, and I think one of the reasons why the American Constitution was so successful was that every man who came to the convention had a classical education. They'd read Greek history. They'd read Roman history. They knew about demagogues. They knew about tyrants. They knew how civilized nations could be taken over. One of our problems is that we have this very successful Constitution—the U.S. Constitution—and we assume it's got to be like that for the world. Well, I defy you to find many examples.

HUDSON: I think there are quite a few. A lot of countries in Europe—a few even in South America, Uruguay and Costa Rica are good examples.

KAHN: You think they are as stable as, say, the United States?

HUDSON: They're stable enough for me when we're weighing the risks. It seems to me that you're blowing all out of proportion the risks in a world government reached by agreement as compared with the risks of continuing on our present course.

KAHN: Let me be careful. I repeat I am willing to take my chances with the Clark-Sohn proposals if the chance is made available. But I don't kid myself that they're safe or absolutely desirable. I have another, more serious objection to the Clark-Sohn proposals.
They cannot be achieved. This is because of the reasons you mentioned. England isn't going to accept half the representation of China. Why should it? It is a more important nation than China. The same would be true for France and Germany; they are also more important nations than China. It isn't manpower that makes you important. And China isn't going to accept a representation equal to anyone of these. Why should it? -and this seems to be the number one solution to our problem of war •

HUDSON: If world government is the solution to our problem of war today and the Clark-Soehn proposals are not perfect, it strikes me that the role of institutions like the Hudson Institute should be to concentrate on these problems and I'm wondering if you have done that. The Hudson Institute states as its aim the study of national security and international order. Are you doing any policy studies in this area? Are you recommending to our government that it state our policy is to work toward a world government?

KAHN: The government has already stated that. It doesn't use the term world government because this term annoys people, but it does talk about world police forces and complete disarmament.

HUDSON: We don't talk about that all the time. More often we talk about a world of free and independent nations—and this seems to be the number one priority, and at other times we talk about the number one priority being a strengthened Atlantic community. It's not clear, I believe.

KAHN: I think that's as it should be. I happen to be one of those who thinks that the best solution is a reasonable world government or as reasonable as one you can get. I'm not dogmatic on this subject. There are many other types of international order which are conceivable to me which might end up better than world government. There are two important points about world government that Reinhold Niebuhr brings out very well. One is that it is probably not achievable without world conquest. I think he may be a little bit too pessimistic there. I think a serious crisis might cause some agreements here. Secondly, he doesn't believe that governments necessarily create communities. In other words, just because you get a world government doesn't mean you'll get a world community. I think if you waited a hundred years, you would find a world community developing within the world government quite naturally. The problem is that we may not have a hundred years.

HUDSON: Let's come back to the big hurdle as you see it—the distribution of voting power in the world government. There hasn't been enough study done in this field. There are infinite ways of organizing any parliamentary system or government system. One idea that appeals to me is a relatively simple thing. Ultimately what you're worried about is controlling the international force which is going to be a preponderant force, stronger than any national force. I think this problem might be approached by creating a force now—a small force—conventionally armed and permanent. It might be that before this force could be used, it would be required that either conciliation or mediation or adjudication be used—there could be many possibilities—and as a final requirement before it could be used, action would have to be approved by a three-quarters majority of the General Assembly, including in that majority, say, 15 of the 20 most populous powers or 12 of the 15 most populous powers.

KAHN: You're getting into trouble there. You're making the government like the Security Council. We've already tried that.

HUDSON: This would be quite a different thing from a veto. This arrangement would mean that you'd need a very strong consensus in the world community. This was available in the Congo, for example.

KAHN: Yes, but if it had not been available, then the government would not have been effective and the Congo would have gone downhill. If you're going to try to solve problems by government intervention, and if you get a government which is basically weak because it has to get this enormous consensus in order to do anything, then you may get the other problem that it cannot, in fact, restrain the arms race. It cannot prevent war.

HUDSON: This would concern me more than the opposite fear—that it could be too strong and become a tyranny. I think the trick is to get the nations to transfer sufficient sovereignty to the U.N. so that it can do its job of keeping the peace effectively. I can't imagine the nations of the world suddenly turning over too much power to the U.N.

KAHN: If you're going to trust your national security to a world government, it has to have some strength. But it might be good to have a weak world government first and then see if it can strengthen itself. It's a natural way. I suspect that you're not going to be able to have a truly democratic world government until much of the inequality around the world has been eliminated—less the cultural inequality than the economic and educational. In order to have a truly democratic world government it is essential, I suspect, to first have economic development, and this is the rock on which the democratic proposals are likely to founder. When I said that world government might be bad, by the way, I was thinking more about one coming into existence through violence than one achieved by constitutional means. Say a Martian anthropologist came down to earth and after due study concluded that these humans were very likely to have a world government 20 years from now. How would he bet that it comes about? He might think it's very simple. The humans have a war. One nation wins. Or they have a war and two nations knock each other out and a third nation takes over. After his study of history he would conclude that these are typical ways and that there is little in the current situation to indicate a high probability that this time it will be different.

HUDSON: They are typical ways, I agree, but there are other cases. There is our own case—and the case of Switzerland where you've still got a very federal system. The cantons have a large degree of autonomy and they speak three different languages.

KAHN: What you're saying is when you look over the history of the world you find a small number of examples—say, five—of voluntary confederations. You find a very large number of examples, like 50 or 100, of involuntary confederations in large and small empires. So the betting Martian looking at the record decides it's possible to do this by voluntary confederation. But it's much more likely to happen through violence. Then you might want to examine the situation and ask yourself if there are reasons why this record might be wrong. I think you will have a very

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tough time convincing yourself that the chances of voluntary confederation of the world, or of most of the world, are very high at the present time.

HUDSON: The new thing in the situation is the thermonuclear bomb. This is not just a bigger bomb. To me it's a qualitatively different thing.

KAHN: I think that's right.

HUDSON: People are beginning to understand this. Now the question is whether this weapon can assume what traditionally has been the role of an enemy. Can the problem—the bomb—be the enemy? And can this act as the incentive to achieve a form of world government?

KAHN: Let's take our Martian anthropologist again. There are two things he might notice: First, the thermonuclear bomb makes it incredibly dangerous to fight wars. But it also makes it easier than ever before for one conqueror to take over the world. Here is a two-sided sword. If a country wants to take the risk, thermonuclear weapons of even the threat of thermonuclear weapons may be an advantage to it. If people are careless about the balance of terror, for example, it may turn out to be an imbalance of terror—a nuclear Pearl Harbor, for example. The second thing the Martian anthropologist is likely to notice is that if there is a world government, it eliminates this outside enemy—the arms race—which was the cement that brought the nations together. And then the Niebuhr comment has great force: that world community does not necessarily follow world government, or in general, community does not follow having a government. It's like the Roman empire, it tends to fall apart, or maybe it's like the Congo.

HUDSON: Or maybe it's like the United States in its Civil War.

KAHN: Yes, this is very possible. And that is a very good example. Here is a nation which is more homogeneous than the world is, more prepared to join in the same government, which fought a great Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. This helped to unify it, to put it together. The people intermarried, spoke the same language, went to the same schools, lived together amicably for almost a hundred years—and then had a war in which they killed 600,000 people—which in a population of 30 million is about 2% of the population. That's a lot.

HUDSON: Of course, there is the risk of trouble under any government but again it comes back to the question of which risk you are willing to take. . .

KAHN: No, I repeat the point. This is not a question of risk, at least not between you and me. I said earlier that the Clark-Sohn proposals are suspect but preferable. I've spoken to Mr. Sohn about this and he points out that if you're going to have a compromise, that basically you have to turn the power over to the small nations, because the Russians can't agree to us having the power and we're not going to let them have the power. The small nations would have the balance of power, and, in fact, the power. I doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union would be willing to give them this.

HUDSON: Certainly that's true now. But if you look back over the social changes that have taken place, you find that climates can change rather rapidly. I can recall being in the South only five or six years ago, and being told that maybe 50 years from now there'd be a Negro in this school, or in that school. Also, not too long ago, I looked again at "Inside Africa" by John Gunther, which was published only 10 years ago. Throughout Africa, people were saying there might be independence in the Congo and other colonies in 50 years or a hundred years. Then suddenly the change started. It started fast and now most of Africa is independent. Do you preclude the possibility of other sudden changes—for example, Kennedy and Khrushchev starting to talk seriously about disarmament and some kind of government to keep the peace?

KAHN: I would say that the arrangement you talk about, Kennedy and Khrushchev getting together, might result in a condominium type empire. In any case, the U.N. already has the machinery for world government if the great world powers agree. The Security Council really has an enormous amount of power, but, it's a fact that now the Assembly does everything in the U.N. because of the Soviet Union's use of the veto. Any time the five great powers want to get together and run the world, they can do it right through the U.N. without any changes, and they could make any changes they want. The machinery is all set up. I don't expect to see such an agreement in the next few years unless the Chinese get a lot more dangerous than people expect. That is, the current members of the Security Council might combine against a China which was very provocative. Of course, we couldn't use the U.N. machinery in this way if Communist China were a member of the Security Council. In any case, I agree that change can occur overnight, particularly condominiums, agreements between the great powers. But such agreements are not likely to occur except as a result of war or crisis, and the crisis would have to be a lot more intense than Cuba.

HUDSON: How intense a crisis are you talking about? Does it actually have to result in some bombs going off?

KAHN: It would probably have to result in the evacuation of some cities—that fearful.

HUDSON: I remember two scenarios in your book. First you hypothesized a near total war beginning with an accident. Then you hypothesized a war started by a similar accident that ended with much less damage—that is to say there were still quite a few people around, including Kennedy and Khrushchev. Then Kennedy sent the Clark-Sohn book to Khrushchev with a note saying, "I've signed this, and now will you sign it?" And you felt Khrushchev might sign it. What disturbs me is that it seems people like yourself realize the necessity for world government, yet you don't do much about it. Why doesn't Herman Kahn go to Moscow and give Khrushchev a copy of the Clark-Sohn book—it's been translated into Russian now—and tell him to read it. Why can't you be researching ways to . . .

KAHN: We are, and as with any job, we have to pick the things we think are most useful. Now, I would guess if I had a few thousand dollars to spend in the interests of humanity, and I do as a matter of fact, I would not spend it on that trip to Moscow. I think it is a very faint hope that such a trip would do any good, and it might do some harm. If I spent it on educating the Russians, I would prefer spending it on educating them in the arms race in general. But it would be premature of me to spend time with them on world government. They have no real interest in it.

HUDSON: How would you educate them in the arms race?

KAHN: Don Brennan, the president of the Hudson Institute, is now engaged in helping to set up a U.S.-Soviet study group which I hope will transfer a lot of information back and forth. I think this is a very good route.

HUDSON: Do you feel that by dealing with the arms race we might prevent war long enough, say 40 years, and that in this period we could get a reasonable world government without going to or over the brink?

KAHN: You certainly have to work on that side of the house, almost irrespective of your beliefs. You have to spend your major effort on that, or a major effort. Now I happen to believe that it is possible but somewhat less likely than other possibilities. But I will spend time, as I expect the Hudson Institute will spend time, on that problem.
That is, you buy time, and you try to use that time usefully.

HUDSON: The kind of world government that might come into existence after a war would probably be quite different than a world government achieved before a war, wouldn't it?

KAHN: A lot would depend on the war. Wars can come in many sizes, and it is very important to understand that. For example, if you asked this Martian anthropologist to estimate the damage that might come into existence after a war would probably be quite different than a world government achieved before a war, wouldn't it?

KAHN: You can't predict the world. It's not because the information isn't around. If you look at it five years later, you say, "Oh, my God, how could I have not noticed that!" It's that your imagination isn't good enough. What you can do is look at trends or possibilities and try to understand them. Your understanding will be inadequate and incomplete, but presumably it is better than not trying at all. Incidentally, this last remark is controversial. Some kinds of trends you really can understand. You really do have a good idea of what the population will be 20 or 30 years from now. You have a reasonably good idea of what technology will be like five, 10, 15 years from now. You have a very good idea of what a lot of gross national products will be like five, 10, 15 years from now. You have very little idea of what the political situation will be but you have some idea of some of the possibilities.

HUDSON: What about the nature of communism? How far ahead do you think you can see on that?

KAHN: We're busy right now drawing out what we call a series of tentative future worlds. And in this we are drawing up 10 different Soviet Unions. They go all the way from Erich Fromm's view, where they are absolutely satisfied bourgeois businessmen, who are as uninterested in Communist ideology as the typical American businessman is in his Sunday church, to ideologists dedicated to conflict. We'll examine the whole spectrum. I would say that the consensus around here is that they are more like the Fromm businessman than totally and fanatically dedicated to conflict. The truth probably lies in between.

HUDSON: That would tend to make you somewhat optimistic, then, about the possibility of dealing with them, wouldn't it?

KAHN: We think we can deal with the Soviets. Very few people don't believe this—it's a question of to what extent you can deal with them.

HUDSON: In your world government studies have you considered the place of China? Is the Hudson Institute going to be suggesting that China be included in one way or another?

KAHN: The Chinese certainly must be related to all these international orders, and these possibilities go all the way from being a partner to being forcibly restrained or deterred. One could imagine that one of the most likely reasons for a world government being created is to serve as a counter to a China which is going rampant. This wouldn't be plausible in the '60s or the early '70s but it could easily be a possibility in the late '70s or in the '80s or '90s. It may be that people can unite against the arms race as an enemy. I rather suspect they can't but I'll propose that possibility. But if the Chinese, say, ever went on a very aggressive bent it would be much easier to imagine much of the world uniting against them.

HUDSON: Yes, but it would be hard to imagine resolving the situation without a war.

KAHN: You might be able to resolve it without a war. You might be able to use a containment policy. China is not basically a strong nation compared to the rest of the world.

HUDSON: Not today.

KAHN: Or even in the year 2000. They are not likely to have greater physical strength. They may have greater resolve, but not greater military or economic strength or power in the world.

HUDSON: Again, coming back to the Clark-Sohn book, is the Hudson Institute doing anything or planning to do anything on these very problems?

KAHN: Yes, we had about $25,000 of our own money to spend last year. Almost all was spent on these kinds of problems.

HUDSON: Problems of world order?

KAHN: World order, and proposals for unilateral initiatives. By and large, I'm not happy with the studies we did, and we hope to do better ones this year. The problem is not in putting in the effort, but in getting high quality work. It's surprisingly hard to get good work in this field. This may reflect the difficulties of the problems, or it may reflect the difficulties in getting work which will withstand criticism. Most people working in this area don't get enough criticism. That's because the opposition doesn't spend time criticizing their work; they just don't bother reading it.

HUDSON: I know that Clark and Sohn have been disappointed that they didn't get more criticism.

KAHN: Yes, this is right, and I think it is a disappointment. The trouble has been that mostly friends and relatives have read the book, not opponents. And yet the book is well worth spending time on, even if you disagree with much or all of it.

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De Gaulle's Big Rock

Now that de Gaulle has tossed his big rock into the pond of world affairs, what should U. S. policy be? There seem to be three general choices:

First, pretend he didn't do it. We can continue to talk about Atlantic unity as before, although we know things will never again be the same. On the military level, it seems likely that NATO can be held together sufficiently to deter any Communist temptations to aggression in Europe. But on politics and economics, de Gaulle has made it clear that he is going his own way. And—provided the nuclear stalemate does not erupt into nuclear holocaust—it is going to be politics and economics that determine the shape of the world. There is no sense in pretending de Gaulle is on our side; he is on his side, which may or may not be our side.

Second, withdraw to a Fortress America. From a strictly military standpoint, this would now seem more of a possibility than ever before. Overseas bases are not as important to security as they used to be; Polaris submarines can roam the seas and ICBMs can span thousands of miles. Such a course might be expected to have great appeal to superpatriots who are unwilling to recognize the interdependence of today's world. But such a policy would leave much of the globe vulnerable to chaos and communism.

Third, face up to the complicated world in which we live. If we can do this, there is hope. Let us not decry the fact that the world is moving into a fluid state; let us take advantage of it. We can maintain old arrangements that were good, but we should exercise more independence in seeking new ways to serve the nation and the world. We must work to create an order in which each nation can pursue its diverse economic and political aims without resorting to arms. This will obviously require serious discussions with the Communist countries, particularly Russia and China, and in the emerging multipolar world the chances of success might be better than they have been before. In any event, we owe it to ourselves and the world to try.

McNamara's 'Disaramament'

Civilian leadership in the Department of Defense is guiding the U. S. toward "a strategic policy which adds up to a unilateral disarmament program," Air Force/Space Digest, voice of the Air Force Association, charges in its February issue. In an article, "Farewell to Counterforce," Senior Editor Claude Witze asserts that "the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is being tacitly replaced by one of nuclear stalemate."

Before our pacifist friends faint in disbelief at their new adherent, let it be reported that McNamara's disarmament budget totaled $53.7 billion for fiscal 1964, almost a tenth of our gross national product and over $2 billion more than the previous year. He shaved it down to this figure from $67 billion, which was the total asked for by the services. We don't know how much more he could have cut, but we would speculate that it could be quite a few billions more without in any way endangering our security. As McNamara told the House Armed Services Commit-
is the massive superiority, the first-strike capability that is often associated with counterforce. Counterforce, or the no-cities doctrine, which McNamara reiterated, simply states that in the event of nuclear war the U.S. will aim its missiles at Soviet military targets, not cities. For reasons we have discussed before (WPR, Aug., Sept., Dec., 1962), the counterforce doctrine seems senseless. It may be best not to announce a fixed policy in advance at all, but if we are going to do this we would prefer this one: "If nuclear war breaks out we will hit the other side back with just about the same force as was used on us." And in practice we could use a little less so as to inhibit escalation.

McNamara devotes half of one page in his 162-page statement to arms control and disarmament. It is significant that he there says, "We should not lose sight of the fact that the central objective of our national policy is, in President Kennedy's words, a peaceful world community of free and independent states..." but nowhere does he mention another proclaimed national goal which would have seemed more appropriate in that context: general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, as set forth in our draft treaty outline at Geneva. When McNamara begins to take disarmament seriously, then the peace forces will know they are getting somewhere.

Test Ban Politics

The difficulty in getting a nuclear test ban treaty is not technical, and hasn't been for a long time. It is political. From a military standpoint, either side could accept the proposals of the other without jeopardizing its security. Both sides have plenty of bombs. The Soviet objection that eight to 10 inspections per year of seismic events would permit espionage—while its proposed two to three wouldn't—is not valid. The U.S. has offered every possible guarantee against espionage. On the American side, the notion that the Soviet Union could carry out an important series of tests underground without detection and identification is equally unconvincing. The Soviet Union seems to have little interest in underground testing: also, verification techniques from outside are greatly improved.

The great political implications of a test ban treaty are causing the two superpowers to go slow on the remaining technical questions. The Kennedy administration appears to have concluded that a treaty would be in the national interest, and it seems to be pushing for a treaty despite the looming possibility that it might not be able to win ratification in the Senate. To make further concessions to the Russians at this point would only increase this difficulty. Khrushchev faces an even more basic decision: In what general direction is Soviet foreign policy going to go? A test ban treaty would be interpreted by the world as the possible beginning of a rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet. Red China would probably view the Soviet action as a pact with the devil, and might even sever relations with the Soviet. Khrushchev might consider this too high a price to pay.

The big question in Khrushchev's mind may well be: If we agreed on a test ban, where would we go from there? It may be that if he felt this would be followed by other agreements, such as a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact and measures to prevent war by accident, surprise or miscalculation, he would be willing to accept the

political risks of a treaty. At this point in the negotiations it might be well for the U.S. to shift the emphasis temporarily away from the test ban to other possibilities that would interest the Soviet.

On Herman Kahn

A writer once asked, "Does Herman Kahn Exist?" It seemed incredible that anyone could speculate with such Martian detachment as Kahn does on whether millions, tens of millions, hundreds of millions or the whole world would die in a thermonuclear war. We can report faithfully that Kahn does exist and that, in fact, he is an intelligent, likeable and witty man. If he didn't exist, it might be necessary to invent him. He does not ask the question, as we usually do, "What should happen?" He usually asks, "What will happen?" His general conclusion seems to be not far from the one reached by Bertrand Russell, who last year published a one-sentence history of the world: "Since Adam and Eve ate the apple, man has never refrained from any folly of which he was capable." The last page is a photograph of a mushroom cloud.

But we cannot accept Kahn's Martian approach. It is too much like that of a football player who, when his team is behind two touchdowns in the second half, concludes after careful analysis that there is no longer any chance of winning and that therefore one should settle for an acceptable loss. With all his scholarly analysis, Kahn somehow always ends up with preposterous reasons why what should be done, cannot be done. We are looking for men who say, "This is what should be done and somehow we are going to do it." We hope there will be enough such men creating new historical factors so that when they are "cranked in" to Kahn's calculations they will produce happier predictions.

A Nuclear Canada?

Why in the world would Canadians want nuclear weapons on their soil? To have them would make Canada a Soviet target, whereas otherwise it might not be. Canada's good friend and neighbor, the United States, can and will supply all the nuclear deterrence needed for Canadian security. For its part, Canada is now contributing to the conventional forces of the West, which is a logical role for the country.

American pressure on Canada to accept nuclear weapons precipitated the election to be held April 8, and this issue is a big one in the campaign. Let us hope Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, the Conservative Party leader, concentrates on his anti-nuclear position and avoids anti-Americanism. Lester B. Pearson, the Liberal opposition leader, is said to want to keep the nuclear issue out of the campaign, perhaps because he is doubtful that the people are with him on accepting nuclear weapons.

Canada was the first power that could have made nuclear weapons for itself but deliberately refrained from doing so. It thus became the first member of the non-nuclear club, and as such it has had a special role in the disarmament talks. It would be distressing, and a dangerous precedent for other non-nuclear club members, if at this late date Canada abandoned its non-nuclear policy.
AS DE GAULLE SEES THE WORLD

Viewing the Cold War as a passing phase of history, the French president expects relations between the Soviet bloc and the West to grow slowly closer. The great problem, in his eyes, is not communism but the underdevelopment of most of the world.

By Anne Weill-Tuckerman

The person of General de Gaulle has always created strong emotional feelings in France and abroad. In the United States he has been called in turn a dedicated idealist, a prophetic statesman and an arrogant and anachronistic megalomaniac.

These emotional reactions may spring from the fact that the French president does not think, speak or act on the wavelength used by other political leaders of our times. He is an embodiment of patriotic feelings and pride that belongs more to epic literature than to the jet age; he is completely oblivious to personal popularity, wanting to be only a symbol, not a father-image or even a brother-image. He is direct and candid to the point of bluntness when he chooses to make known his views on problems which he thinks are ripe for action. He knows no compromise, trusting the “reality” of his political conclusions to carry them through.

In recent controversy, de Gaulle the man has been a target much more than what can be called the Gaulist philosophy, which is a combination of axiomatic political realism and a vision of the future based on geopolitics and spiritual values. When de Gaulle speaks in the name of Europe, it does not mean that he has elected France to be the leader of Europe. It means rather that he, de Gaulle, happens to be for the moment the exponent and the guarantor of this European personality.

He sees also a dilution, already apparent, of the “reality” of his political conclusions to carry them through.

“De Gaulle has stated many times his conviction that the “countries of the East,” the Communist countries, will eventually come closer to the West. He thus sees the Cold War in its present form as a passing phase of history, with the decisive and dangerous split developing not between the Soviet bloc and the West, but rather between the developed and underdeveloped nations, or, to a large extent, between north and south. He does not see this prospect as an immediate one, far from it, but as a natural process of people who have a common heritage of civilization, who are moving ahead simultaneously, in technical progress and economic growth. He sees also a dilution, already apparent, of Soviet communism as a dynamic and expanding ideology. “France believes,” de Gaulle said, “that by virtue of the modern rate of activity, the condition of men tends to become alike everywhere and that the virulent opposition of the various regimes is destined to diminish.” Furthermore, expansionist China, which is at an earlier stage of economic development and social progress, confronts Russia with a direct menace and should push her

Mrs. Weill-Tuckerman, a native of France who has become an American citizen, has been a correspondent of Agence France-Presse at the United Nations since its opening in 1946.
into a renewed consciousness of her European ties against the peril from the East.

To realize this greater Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," it is essential in de Gaulle's view not to lock the Iron Curtain but to let it be ventilated with as many fresh air currents as possible. On the other hand, it is imperative to stand extremely firm in the face of any and all Soviet threats or attempts at intimidation, and to be able to back up this firmness with the necessary arsenal.

This explains the full French support given to the Kennedy administration in the Cuban crisis of last October, and de Gaulle's opposition to any negotiations with Moscow following Khrushchev's threats over Berlin. De Gaulle's reasoning goes as follows: Moscow is trying to change the world balance unilaterally. No negotiation can possibly be undertaken until the Soviets remove their threats. The West has but to wait and not to panic. Any willingness to negotiate would be a sign of weakness which would be immediately exploited for further threats and unilateral moves. If, on the other hand, the West remains resolute, the Soviets will ultimately withdraw their threats because, de Gaulle is convinced, the men in the Kremlin do not want to risk a nuclear holocaust which would engulf millions of their people and the Communist state structure.

The French president deeply believes that, in the absence of true disarmament measures, the "balance of terror" prevents for the moment a world nuclear conflagration. He has repeatedly expressed his gratitude for the American "nuclear umbrella" which has protected France and Western Europe in the years following the war. However, he believes times have changed, and the NATO Treaty is in need of drastic revision.

His main reason for this view is that development of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union has created a situation, clearly demonstrated by the Cuban affair, where the use of nuclear weapons by either giant is almost inconceivable because it would be suicidal. Thus, the "nuclear umbrella" has lost some of its effectiveness for countries other than the United States. Surely, the United States would come to the support of its Allies in a head-on conflict. But what about French interests, European interests, which may be at variance with those of the United States? Washington did not consult Paris or London or Bonn on the Cuban quarantine. What if Moscow had retaliated at Berlin? The risk was taken by the Americans, but the European countries were also involved. The present secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev could lead to bilateral agreement on other issues, without European participation. Soviet interests may conflict with European interests in many other areas, as they have in the past in the Middle East and Africa. In such cases what would be the positions of the United States, which opposed the Anglo-French Suez expedition?

De Gaulle concludes from this situation that the United States cannot and should not have the sole power of decision on military matters affecting countries of the Western Alliance. A multinational nuclear force under NATO would still be under American control, because it is inconceivable that other members of NATO would override an American veto. Thus, the need for a Franco-British nuclear force, which could and would cooperate with a NATO multilateral force and an American force.

The concept of the French nuclear force is based on de Gaulle's view that "in our times, a non-nuclear country is negligible." France has surmounted her post-war weakness, with the help of the United States. Europe is being born, more powerful than before with its joint efforts in the Common Market and in political evolution toward unity. France and Germany, whose conflicts had triggered wars over centuries, have come together in a spectacular and profound rapprochement. The Atlantic Alliance, of course, should remain, as people on both sides of the Atlantic are linked by the strongest ties of common origin, tradition, friendship and interests. But Europe must have its own complete sovereignty, as an equal partner in the Atlantic world.

For Disarmament

What about disarmament? De Gaulle favors it, of course. But he sees no signs so far of any serious move in that direction. He does not consider a test ban as a real measure of disarmament, because such a ban would leave intact enormous stocks of arms, growing every day with the production of new weapons. De Gaulle notes that negotiations on a test ban between the United States and Russia usually are revived when both giants have just concluded a considerable series of explosion. France started late to achieve its nuclear armament, the force de frappe (striking force), without the outside help Washington gave to London. Unless the three other atomic powers take real measures of atomic disarmament, France will surely pursue this program, which began before de Gaulle and could be expected to continue even if he disappeared from the scene.

More than a test ban, de Gaulle believes that a first crucial move toward disarmament would be the limitation of missiles and nuclear vehicles which are still capable of being put under effective control, which nuclear stocks no longer can be. He has proposed this idea, which originated with the French expert Jules Moch. Khrushchev accepted it, in the context of a U. N. disarmament plan, but coupled it with the elimination of foreign military bases, which makes it unacceptable. France is committed to disarmament measures if negotiations enter a substantial and sincere phase between the nuclear powers. That day, France will reenter disarmament negotiations, in Geneva or elsewhere. Meanwhile, de Gaulle thinks that disarmament conferences are more than useless, because they give a sense of false security and serve most-

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(Continued on page 16)
Planning a 'Strategy for Peace'

How fast are nuclear weapons likely to spread? How should nuclear sharing be handled in the Western Alliance? What are the prospects for outer space? What should be the role of the United Nations in an armed world and in a disarmed world? Should the U.S. undertake a program of independent initiatives in world affairs to improve prospects for peace?

These were the questions faced by five sub-groups in the fourth Strategy for Peace Conference, held Jan. 17-20 at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia. About 100 persons, including representatives of the government, private and university research organizations, foundations, the defense industry and other groups, took part.

The conference was a memorial to Thomas B. Slick, one of the principal creators of Strategy for Peace, who was killed in a plane crash last October 6. The conferences are being carried on by C. Maxwell Stanley, who was previously co-chairman with Slick.

The five sub-groups spent their time in an interchange of information and ideas rather than in drafting agreed statements of position. However, they did issue reports summarizing their discussions. Among the points made were these:

The Ninth country problem (chairman, John B. Phelps, Institute for Defense Analyses): A widespread proliferation of weapons is not as imminent as might be supposed, and should it occur it would be most serious in relation to local disputes. In order to get the non-nuclear nations to remain that way, considerable progress toward disarmament on the part of the major powers will be necessary. On China, a realistic approach might be to accept the inevitability of its becoming a greater power and proceed to tackle the other powers from that point. It was felt that China and other nations should be brought into disarmament talks, and that perhaps even limited measures such as a test ban might be the occasion for thus enlarging the dialogue.

Nuclear sharing (chairman, James E. Dougherty, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania): A multilateral nuclear force is preferable to the proliferation of independent national deterrents. A European nuclear force which was not coordinated with the U. S. strategic deterrent might be vulnerable to the danger of being dealt with separately. Thus, NATO is at the crossroads—or, even, "at the clover-leaf." Efforts should now be made to reorganize it, with a view to moving toward the eventual goal of Atlantic political community.

Outer space (chairman, John F. Loosbrock, editor, Air Force/Space Digest): At this time there are no compelling military or political reasons for the U.S. to put bombs into space. However, these weapons may well be attractive to the Soviet Union because of the opportunity they could provide for quickly achieving strategic parity. It would be in the interest of peace and stability to discourage bombs in orbit. In the absence of effective legal, political and military sanctions the development of an earth-to-orbit anti-satellite system should be vigorously pursued. Such a system might be owned and operated multinationally (e.g., the U.N.) or possibly bilaterally.

The United Nations (chairman, Louis B. Sohn, professor of international law, Harvard University): The U.N. today is quite different than the one contemplated in the original Charter. While some of the changes which have occurred were consistent with the text of the Charter, others resulted in the stretching of the letter of the Charter, though it can be argued that they stayed within the spirit of the Charter. The main changes of this character resulted in the downgrading of the Security Council and in the build-up, first, of the powers of the General Assembly, and second, of the powers of the secretary general. . . . While a large amount of effort is being spent on the technical aspects of disarmament, we believe a much greater amount of research needs to be done in the area of peace-keeping, and that special attention needs to be paid to defining more precisely the role of the United Nations in a disarming and a disarmed world.

Independent initiatives (chairman, Charles E. Osgood, director, Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois): Almost all participants favored unilateral initiatives of some sort, but many different kinds were discussed, and not everybody saw the utility of all types. Among the criteria set forth for judging initiatives were that they should: (1) maintain national security, (2) induce reciprocation from the other side, and (3) generate internal support. It was suggested that the question of internal support was the most difficult and important criterion for the whole program. Altogether the group submitted more than 100 specific suggestions for unilateral steps, although these were not evaluated against the criteria. Among them were restructuring the Soviet image of U.S. military deterrence by publicizing arms control efforts of American officers, ending travel curbs, establishing a World Betterment Fund for international cooperation projects, calling a White House Conference on Peace, setting up a Soviet-American radio news program which would present both viewpoints and be heard in both countries, building model farms abroad.

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Minority Report of the Economic Subcommittee
On Independent Initiatives to Reduce World Tension

"On the basic hypothesis that we desire to modify the Soviet Union from an aggressive, have-not nation to a satisfied, status quo nation, we propose injecting "creature comforts" into the Soviet Union by donating one shipload each of hula hoops, transistor radios, bubble gum, poodle sweaters, high-octane carburetors, Maidenform bras, Edsels, Princess telephones, stereo sets, zip guns, troika-in movies, Metrecal, comic books, psychiatrists' couches, juke boxes, Kleenex, first Khrushchev family records and Fairbanks scales."

Chairman: "I follow you except for the last item. Why the scales?"

"The Russians have the Czechs now. If we give them the balances, can democracy be far behind?"

Capt. Paul Schratz, U.S.N., Joint Chiefs of Staff
ON THE PEACE FRONT

Peace and Politics

A "Peace-Politics Clearing House" designed to link groups interested in support of candidates who emphasize importance on the Politics of Peace" held in Washington in January and attended by representatives of peace organizations, political, labor, civil rights and student groups concerned with the peace issue, and candidates who ran for Congress on the Democratic, Republican, Liberal Party and independent tickets.

The Clearing House is an outgrowth of a conference held in Chicago last August in which peace organizations and "peace candidates" met for a preliminary exchange of views. It will publish a newsletter as a means of exchanging information and opinion between groups across the country, sponsor research into political activity, and make recommendations on joint fund raising for candidates, coordination with additional organizations, and the stimulation of local efforts in the 1964 campaign.


'No First Strike' Policy

The Federation of American Scientists is now urging that the U.S. state clearly that it will not initiate a massive nuclear attack except in response to such an attack first launched at the U.S. or its Allies by the Soviet Union.

Taking note of McNamara's recent testimony (see editorial, p. 8), F.A.S. pointed out that "a Western strategic strike in response to a Soviet non-nuclear provocation would be both inhuman and irrational," since "the Western Alliance has the resources necessary to protect these vital objectives by means of local or tactical forces."

F.A.S. has previously advocated a "no first use" policy on nuclear weapons, and it has reaffirmed that position. However, its new statement adds: "Until such a "no first use" policy is adopted, we urge that the United States should at least adopt an explicit "no first strike" policy.

It explained the difference: "A 'no first use' policy means that under no circumstances would the United States be the first to employ nuclear weapons in any situation. Such a policy naturally assumes adequate non-nuclear forces to cope with a major non-nuclear attack. A 'no first strike' policy, on the other hand, means that the United States would never be the first to launch massive nuclear attack, but would retain the option of responding to non-nuclear attack, either with tactical nuclear weapons or with limited use of strategic weapons against targets not involving cities. A 'no first strike' policy could be announced and implemented immediately, without waiting for any massive build-up of non-nuclear forces."

F.A.S. (1700 K St, N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.) is a nationwide organization of 2,500 scientists in all disciplines concerned with the impact of science on national and international affairs.

Canadian Opinions

Before the recent controversy in Canada over stationing U.S. nuclear warheads on Canadian soil, only two out of five Canadians understood what sort of missile armament Canada had. Some 42 percent knew that Canada had missiles "capable of carrying nuclear warheads but no such warheads." But, one in nine believed that there were nuclear warheads already on Canadian bases.

These statistics were set forth by the Canadian Peace Research Institute (340 Bloor St, W., Toronto 5, Canada) in another report on its recently concluded study of a cross section of adults throughout the country. The attitude study sought Canadian opinions on questions of defense, disarmament and foreign policy.

Some other discoveries:

Four out of five Canadians think a strong permanent United Nations Army would protect national freedom. But only one in three would want to increase Canada's share of its cost-about one per cent of the Canadian defense budget.

Only one Canadian in six had heard of the Disarmament Division in Canada's Department of External Affairs. But when they were told of the agency's purposes—to advise on disarmament policy, brief negotiators and coordinate peace research projects—44 per cent of those polled thought the seven-man staff of this group should be increased. Some 30 per cent felt that it was just about the right size, and 5 per cent felt that it should be reduced in size or abolished. The rest—20 per cent—had no opinion.

For a Livable World

Council for a Livable World (301 Dupont Circle Bldg., 1346 Conn. Ave., N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.) is the new name for the Council for Abolishing War, which physicist Leo Szilard was instrumental in establishing. The decision to change the name was taken by the council's board of directors "because a certain amount of confusion and misunderstanding had been occasioned by the original name. Abolishing war is a

Peace ACTION for the Month

SUPPORT A. C. D. A. EXPANSION

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can use the help of all peace workers. The Agency is asking for $15 million for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1963. Some $11 million will be for research and $4 million for agency operations. (Current year's operations are based on a $6.5 million appropriation.)

There are hints of increased activity on the part of rightwing groups opposing the agency. In addition, Congress is in a penny-pinching mood, and may be reluctant to more than double the appropriations of the agency.

Also needing support: A request by the agency to Congress that the $10 million appropriation limitation on it be removed. Unless this is done, the agency's life will be renewed every time its appropriation level reaches $10 million. If the ceiling is removed, the agency will have the same status as the other executive departments, that is, it will be a continuing agency without dollar limitation and with authority to bring its budget to Congress automatically as authorizations and appropriations are considered for each fiscal year.

Why not write to your senators and representative today?

MARCH, 1963
necessary step in establishing a livable world, but it is not sufficient. The council's new name serves to make its long-range goals explicit."

Advisors to the council include Richard J. Barnet, Roger Fisher, Robert Gomer and Hans J. Morgenthau.

During 1963 the council will commission at least 12 papers by outstanding scholars on various aspects of disarmament, national security, nuclear strategy and foreign policy. First paper in the series is an analysis of current nuclear strategy and the U.S. military posture, by Michael J. Brower, School of Industrial Management, M.I.T. Distribution of the papers will be limited.

The council is also examining the possibility of initiating a program of joint studies by Russian and American scholars and scientists. One such joint study concerns securing the peace in a disarmed world.

BRIEFS:

United World Federalists (820 13th St., N.W., Wash. 5, D. C.) held an opening-of-the-session breakfast for members of Congress, which was attended by a number of Democrats and Republicans from both Houses, including Senators Joseph S. Clark (D-Pa.) and Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), and Reps. Edith Green (D-Ore.), Fred Schwenkel (R-Iowa), Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.).

Col. Paul H. Griffith, past national commander of the American Legion, has been elected president of Arms of Friendship, Inc. (4150 Henry Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.). This organization, founded by a group of veterans in 1958, works to promote peace through increased people-to-people contacts between Soviet and American ex-service men and their families. (See report in WPR, August, 1962.)

A New York Peace Information Center (218 E. 18th St., N.Y. 3, N.Y.) has been established to provide a place where individuals and groups can become acquainted with the range of literature, films, speakers, program materials, activities and organizations concerned with peace.

Women Strike for Peace (1822 Mass. Ave., N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.) held its first eastern regional conference in Philadelphia in February. About 100 representatives from 40 communities attended the session to evaluate the first year of the group's activity and to plan for 1963. In one action, the women wired President Kennedy urging him to reinstate the U.S. moratorium on nuclear tests "to demonstrate our nation's sincere wish to conclude a binding test ban treaty with the Soviet Union."

LISTENING POST


"The very nature of the traditional foreign policy . . . not . . . merely the means of putting it into operation" is questioned in this provocative book. Williams sees basic conflicts in American foreign policy in the past 50 years. On the one hand, it has been guided by a genuine desire to help others help themselves, and the principle of self-determination which implied that they were capable of helping themselves. On the other hand, however, it has too often insisted that others must solve their problems precisely as we have solved ours. This has led, Williams concludes, to a policy of "informal empire," which is the "tragedy" because the policy is inherently self-defeating. Expansion of this kind only produces greater opposition, greater tension and greater risk of nuclear catastrophe. The central issue for American policy at mid-century, as he sees it, is "how to sustain democracy and prosperity without imperial expansion and the conflicts it engenders."

This reviewer feels Williams has oversimplified events to substantiate his thesis. Nevertheless, he performs a service in questioning the conventional wisdom of the past half century.

—William W. Cowan


In this layman's survey of the Radical Right by the late Mark Sherwin, news editor of the New York Post, the profound and unscrupulous hostility to the United Nations is exposed. The John Birch Society is "implacably" opposed to it. Leaders of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade want a complete overhaul of it. The American Nazi Party refers to it as "the Marxist United Nations" and wants it abolished. The Minutemen thrive on propaganda like: "Do you know that you can be arrested for speaking against the U.N. on the street corner and you'll be tried by the World Court? It's in the U.N. Charter. Read it!"

The book is convincing that the Radical Right poses a genuine threat to American democracy as well as the world itself.

—Jack C. Voelpel

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A highly-informative and thought-provoking study, "Verification and Response in Disarmament Agreements," has been issued by the Institute for Defense Analyses. The report is the result of a six-week study by a group of experts held last summer at Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The study was administered by the institute under contract with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The report is issued in the form of a 23-page summary and two annexes totaling 225 pages. Among the participants were Arthur W. Barber, Richard J. Barnet, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, David H. Frisch, Louis Henkin, William A. Higinbotham, Hans J. Morgenthau and Louis B. Sohn.

The gathered experts plunged in depth into the intricate problems of verification for various kinds of arms control and disarmament. One point stressed was that inspection is only one of many kinds of verification; other means include intelligence, open sources, voluntary self-disclosure and "common knowledge." One basic assumption of the study was that for the foreseeable future agreements would not be possible if they required either drastic reductions of national sovereignty or major transformations in Soviet society. Therefore the measures considered were limited in scope, such as a nuclear test ban or a cutoff of production of fissionable material, or stopped short of general and complete disarmament, aiming at some level of stabilized deterrence. It was recognized that anything approaching a full disarmament would raise a host of political questions outside the limits of the study. In general, the conclusion seemed to emerge that proper verification systems could be devised for most arms control and disarmament agreements.

It is encouraging to see that when human resources are applied to problems, possible solutions begin to emerge. It would be even more encouraging if further summer study groups would address themselves straight to the political problems involved in disarmament. Also, it would be interesting to see the results of some of the joint American-Russian study groups that are currently being proposed.

—Richard Hudson

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A thorough-going analysis of last year's efforts of the peace candidates, "Peace at the Polls," by Roger Hagan, appears in The Nation of February 2. After discussing the question of working within the major parties vs. a "third force" approach, Hagan concludes that it is too early to choose between them.
Plan Now for ICY

To the Editor:

The 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly produced an exciting idea. It suggested that the 20th anniversary of the U.N. in 1965 be designated International Cooperation Year and it called for the creation of a preparatory committee of 12 member states which is to be announced shortly. Your readers may be interested to know that the resolution: "Invites non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and any other appropriate organizations in member states to begin making plans for special efforts and projects for the International Cooperation Year, and to render all assistance to the preparatory committee."

This seems to me to be an unusual opportunity for imaginative planning of new efforts to create a climate of understanding through a variety of activities. I hope you will keep us informed of progress through your columns.

GEORGE BEEBE
Executive director, Institute for International Order
New York, N. Y.

Why Study Peace?

To the Editor:

At this stage I don’t know what good it does to study peace. It has become so technically involved that it’s a matter for experts. We the plain people can do nothing, except squawk. And up to date the politicians have completely ignored the protests. Added to this is public indifference and apathy. The public is so thoroughly brainwashed by the mass media that only a severe crisis that hits everybody would have any effect.

Talk to anybody on these matters and at once we are suspected of being "Communists." After that they avoid us. The public is too rich and prosperous—the middle class, that is—but this is the class that holds the whip hand of power.

There is also the matter of fragmentation in the peace movement. I have no statistics but would guess there are scores or even hundreds of peace groups, each with its own publication—all competitive, of course. Who could subscribe to all? To me this seems a weakness. When they all consolidate into one movement, perhaps it can achieve enough political power to boot out some of the ancient dinosaurs from Congress.

R. VAN PELT
Portland, Oregon

On ‘Americanism’

To the Editor:

Veterans groups such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars are strong in their feelings about “Americanism.” This is as it should be, but when I talk with my fellow veterans I ask them: “What is ‘Americanism’?” I suggest that we should take our lead from the Founding Fathers themselves, and that our highest duty consists of meeting the issues of our generation with the same intelligence and sense of responsibility with which they met the issues of their generation.

My own conclusion is that the most important issue of this generation is not winning the Cold War by forcing the Russians to adopt our form of capitalism, but rather to win it by keeping the peace, by preventing an irritation from growing into a holocaust, and by strengthening the United Nations into a true federal world government which can keep the peace. I am sure our Founding Fathers, who created the federation that today keeps the peace among our different states, would if they were alive today understand very well the need to apply the federal principle on a world basis.

JULIUS A. CALDWELL
Captain, A.U.S., Retired
New York, N. Y.

Directory Defended

To the Editor:

May I suggest that two parts of the February, 1963, issue of WPR be combined? I refer to the editorial entitled, “Let’s End the Cold War,” and Norman Thomas’s “Open Letter to Peace Workers.” There just might be a peace movement in the U.S.A. if a goodly number of leaders (I should really say “leaders”) of “peace” groups would heed your advice and stop fighting the Cold War, i.e., red-baiting and witch-hunting. I could name names (as many persons could), but will simply state that, to the best of my knowledge, there is right now a quiet boycott of the international peace/disarmament directory by several big “peace” groups. Why? Because the directory does not “buy” their ethnocentric, arrogant and jingoist attitudes.

I submit that it is not the fault of the directory that the Communist Party of the U.S.A. happens to have peace/disarmament literature while the Republican and Democratic parties do not (at press time in February) have such literature or even detectable committees or subcommittees in these areas. The directory could easily have been intellectually dishonest and untrue to the facts (i.e., joined the Cold War). However, on page 41, one will find listings for a committee of the National Association of Manufacturers and the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (and that is quite a spread).

LLOYD WILKIE
Publisher, international peace/disarmament directory
Yellow Springs, Ohio

“We witness in this half of the century a great emergence of new nations. They are weak, inexperienced, fragile. If independence is to be kept, as well as achieved, they must have a refuge, a sanctuary where they can feel secure. The United Nations satisfies that craving for security.”

William O. Douglas

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As DeGaulle Sees the World

(Continued from page 11)

ly as a propaganda forum. This attitude has extended at times to the United Nations itself. Calling the organization "the dis-United Nations," de GauBe has accused it of amplifying disorder, divergence and demagogy, and of making Iy as a propaganda forum. This attitude has extended at times to the United Nations itself. Calling the organization "the dis-United Nations," de GauBe has accused it of amplifying disorder, divergence and demagogy, and of making irresponsible decisions based on a majority rule which does not reflect the true balance of forces at work in the world.

The French armament program also has a non-military objective. Nuclear research, a field where military use and civilian use cannot be separated, is essential for the technical progress of a modern nation. If France stopped its military nuclear program now, it would lag behind in its economic development, which has priority not only for its own future, but for its part in the progress of underdeveloped countries.

De Gaulle said to the French National Assembly last December, "in order that a solution may be gradually found to the world's greatest problem, that is, the accession of all peoples to modern civilization, France must carry what weight it can by developing its economic, technical and cultural capacities so as to lend vast assistance to others . . . especially to the states of Africa, Algeria included, toward which our historic mission shall henceforth manifest itself through cooperation."

This is the end result of de Gaulle's decolonization policy. As early as 1944, at the Brazzaville conference, he outlined a plan which would give autonomy to the French colonies and promote their development. His long struggle for the French recognition of Algerian independence is still fresh in everyone's memory. The independence granted to the African states previously forming French Occidental and Equatorial Africa substituted cordial cooperation for colonial rule in a smooth transition.

In the dissolution of the French colonial empire, de Gaulle saw a "natural and salutary necessity of our times," due to the surge of independence movements of colonial peoples. He found that colonialism had become, in the framework of modern economies, a wasteful anachronism. He also saw an opportunity for France to concentrate its energies on the rebuilding of Europe, and to create new ties based on genuine assistance to and collaboration with the developing countries.

France today, according to statistics of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, spends a higher percentage of its gross national product than does any other country for aid to underdeveloped regions. In 1961, this aid represented 2.41% of the French G.N.P., as compared with 1.32% for the United Kingdom, 1.17% for West Germany and 0.97% for the U. S. In addition to bilateral aid, both public and private, France ranked second, in 1960, after the U. S. in new national aid commitments to multinational bodies. In 1962, French multilateral aid totaled approximately $100 million and represented more than 10% of the French public aid granted to the developing countries.

At U.N. Conference

The largest number of papers—about 200—presented to the recent U. N. Geneva Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas came from the French delegation, which, incidentally, was the second largest, after the British delegation. Also, France under de Gaulle has backed the "U. N. Development Decade" and has expressed approval of the idea of organizing an International Conference on Trade and Development, which would deal both with regional economic groups and with the organization of the world market product by product. These and other developments my augur for further friendly moves by de Gaulle toward the U. N.

In one of his recent television addresses to the French people de Gaulle mapped out the following program:

"We shall help this assembled Europe and its daughter, America, to reorganize their alliance in order to better defend the Free World and to act together in all parts of the earth. We shall help the peoples aspiring to self determination, especially those that are bent under the totalitarian yoke. We shall help toward progress those who have been prevented from partaking of it. We shall help the West and the East to ease world tensions and to achieve disarmament, provided the Soviet empire ceases to wave firebrands, while, at the same time, releasing flocks of frightened doves . . . . France believes that the future of modern civilization can lie only in understanding, cooperation and, finally, union among the countries that created civilization, and continue to create it, and have spread it throughout the world."

"It seems to me that the United Nations must develop in the same manner as every sovereign state has done. If the United Nations is to have a future, it must assume some of the attributes of a state. It must have the right, the power and the means to keep the peace."

U Thant

Richmond Research Corporation
130-41 91st Avenue
Richmond Hill, New York
Manufacturers of 8-mm. movie projectors

"The scientist looked into the hell of the bomb long before anybody else did. One of the things that trouble me is that nobody believes us when we predict the hell, and that even the responses we scientists make to the hell, both inside and outside government, are not appropriate to the magnitude of that hell. I think it is obvious now that weapons are completely out of proportion, that they no longer have any function as a continuation of foreign policy."

Hans Bethe

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