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1 Testimony of CPT Robert L. Hauck,
2 05331292, Headquarters Company,
3 Assistant S1, Center Troop Command,
4 United States Army Infantry Center,
5 Fort Benning, Georgia, taken at
6 Office of Inspector General, Fort
7 Benning, Georgia, at 1400 to 1515
8 hours on 12 May 1969, by Colonel
9 William V. Wilson, IG.

10
11 Q. I am from The Inspector General's Office, Depart-
12 ment of the Army, Investigations Division. I am on a case
13 about an incident that happened over in Vietnam which I will
14 give you a rundown on. For your information this investi-
15 gation concerns the alleged destruction of a village in
16 South Vietnam nicknamed Pinkville which was approximately
17 five or six miles north of Quang Ngai City at coordinates
18 728795. The incident allegedly occurred in March 1968
19 during the time Co C, 1/20th Inf, Task Force Barker, con-
20 ducted search and destroy operations on the Batangan Penin-
21 sula. The investigation is official and is being made at
22 the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The inves-
23 tigation is privileged in the sense that the report will be
24 made to the Chief of Staff. The substance thereof should
25 not be discussed with others. It will carry a CONFIDENTIAL
26 classification. The purpose of the investigation is to
27 determine the facts concerning the incidents at Pinkville.
28 I'd like to put you under oath please. Please stand and
29 raise your right hand.

30
31 (The witness was sworn.)

32
33 Please state your full name, grade and serial
34 number.

35 A. Robert L. Hauck, Captain, 05331292.

36
37 Q. Organization?

38 A. Current organization is Headquarters Company,
39 Center Troop Command, Fort Benning, Georgia.

40
41 Q. Station and present duty assignment?

42 A. Fort Benning, Georgia, Assistant S1 for Center
43 Troop Command.

44
45 Q. What was your duty assignment in March 1968 at

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1 the time Task Force Barker conducted search and destroy
2 operations?

3 A. Well, sir, O. K. I believe on 16 February was
4 my date of transfer from Charlie Co to Delta Co. I had
5 been with Charlie Co since we went to Vietnam in December
6 of--I can never remember the year--67. Then from December
7 of 67 to mid-February of 68 I was a platoon leader with
8 Charlie Co. I had the 3d Platoon. Then in the middle of
9 February I was transferred to Delta Co, 1st Bn, 20th
10 Infantry, as the XO.

11 Q. Was Delta, 1/20th, part of Task Force Barker?

12 A. No, sir, it was not. Now times mean nothing in
13 Vietnam, of course. I am pretty sure that it was 16 Febru-
14 ary, as I say, was the date of transfer.

15 Q. I have Special Order No. 39, Headquarters, Americal
16 Division, dated 8 February 68, which awarded you a Combat
17 Infantryman Badge that date, and that date I say again was
18 8 February 68.

19 A. Yes, sir, that could very well be.

20 Q. How long after that did you transfer out of the
21 unit?

22 A. Well, let me think a minute, sir. Like I say, the
23 dates and time meant nothing in Vietnam, so the date wasn't
24 readily recognizable, but I keep remembering 16 February as
25 the date of the transfer.

26 Q. At the time you transferred was LT Jensen a platoon
27 leader at that time?

28 A. No, sir. At that time our platoon leaders were LT
29 Calley--he had the 1st Platoon--LT Brooks had the 2d Platoon,
30 and I had the 3d Platoon, and LT Anderson had the Mortar
31 Platoon.

32 Q. Do you know if any of those officers are at Fort
33 Benning now?

34 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

35 Q. During the time that you served with C Co, 1/20th,
36 did you conduct any search and destroy operations?

37 A. Yes, sir, several.

38 Q. As opposed to search and clear?

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1 A. Well, here we go. Search and destroy and search
2 and clear meant pretty much the same thing. If there was
3 any destruction to be done we got our guidance from the
4 company commander who, in turn, got his guidance from the
5 S3 of Task Force Barker.
6

7 I know that one time when we were coming out of
8 Carentan, which is when we had just gotten in country, we
9 were more or less practicing because it is relatively a
10 rear area in southern I Corps, and some of the boys wanted
11 to burn and no soap, you just don't do that sort of thing
12 without permission from higher authority, so that was one
13 of the lessons that we learned early, or that I learned
14 early. There was no destruction without higher authority,
15 especially for a platoon leader. A platoon leader couldn't
16 go out and say, "We are going to search and destroy the
17 village." That means burn everything that you come across,
18 wipe out. We couldn't automatically do that.
19

20 Q. Who was the S3 of Task Force Barker, do you know?

21 A. It was Major--I can tell you what he looks like,
22 but that won't help, I know, sir--Calhoun.
23

24 Q. MAJ Calhoun?

25 A. Yes, sir. He was the brigade S1 before he went
26 to Task Force Barker as the task force S3, operations officer.
27

28 Q. Do you know his present location?

29 A. No, sir, I do not.
30

31 Q. Do you know his full name?

32 A. No, sir.
33

34 Q. C-A-L-H-O-U-N?

35 A. Yes, sir.
36

37 Q. Did you ever conduct operations in the vicinity
38 of a village called Pinkville?

39 A. Well, I never really knew. I knew the nickname
40 Pinkville and I never really knew the village it was by name.
41 I couldn't point it out on a map and say, "That is Pinkville."
42 I knew it was a big operation and I always followed the
43 operations, but I never knew its actual name, like to call
44 it Hanoi or Haiphong, I never could do that. With Task Force
45 Barker, in my platoon in particular, we operated all in the
46 Batangan Peninsula area, just as a matter of course.

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1 Q. I have Map Sheet 6739 II Series L7014, titled
2 Quang Ngai, scale 1:50,000. Would you orient yourself on
3 this map, please? Have you seen this sheet before? (Colonel
4 Wilson handed the map sheet to the witness.)

5 A. Yes, sir, I certainly have.
6

7 Q. My question is did you ever conduct operations south
8 of Song Ham Giang and north of Song Tra Khuc?

9 A. Song Tra Khuc? Let me make certain of this, sir.
10 (Pause) I am trying to--LZ Dottie, I believe, is right there
11 (indicating).
12

13 Q. Give the coordinates, please.

14 A. The grid is 633845. I'd say it is in that grid
15 square. LZ Uptight, if I can find that I am in business.
16 O. K., LZ Uptight is here (indicating).
17

18 Q. Grids?

19 A. Let's try 729848. It is right in there. Now LZ
20 Uptight was the only LZ that I was ever stationed at in the
21 Task Force Barker area and from there we operated down here
22 (indicating).
23

24 Q. South.

25 A. South to a point north of this Song Diem River.
26 The old man said we could not go south of this river. As
27 I remember specifically one day my platoon was operating in
28 this area (indicating) and Charlie was there (indicating)
29 and you can see a long way down the rice paddy. Charlie
30 was there hopping around the field and he just maybe saw
31 us at about the same time we saw him. It was too far away
32 for us to engage effectively with small arms fire, so we
33 moved in this direction (indicating)--
34

35 Q. (Interposing) South.

36 A. South again to this location right here (indicating).
37

38 Q. That's the bridge.

39 A. That's the bridge at coordinates 718802, roughly.
40 We had to stop there because the old man had told us not to
41 go south of this river and we were getting fired at from
42 this direction (indicating). Well, every conceivable--the
43 line of fire was like this (indicating) coming at us from
44 across the river. We returned the fire, but casualty
45 assessment, the damage was hard to tell.

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1 Q. When was this?

2 A. It was about a week before I left the company, sir.

3
4 Q. In February then?

5 A. Yes, sir. Like I say, that could be a week behind
6 or a week ahead because of the times. The only way we can
7 keep track of times is to have a calendar wrist watch and I
8 only wear a GI wrist watch in the field. Calendar types were
9 too flashy. We called the gunships that day, helicopter gun
10 ships. By the time the gun ships arrived on station we were
11 still getting small arms fire from the south and the west,
12 this direction (indicating). It seemed generally though
13 that the fire was coming from this village right here (indi-
14 cating), so the gun ships worked that village over. Again
15 the only assessment that we knew was the firing stopped.
16 Nobody was shooting at us any more from this village. About
17 four o'clock in the afternoon we moved back. We got more
18 fire from this area (indicating).

19
20 Q. What area?

21 A. Right in here, coordinates 725809, and the gun
22 ships suppressed the fire there and we moved back up here
23 (indicating).

24
25 Q. To the LZ?

26 A. To the LZ, Uptight, yes, sir. My platoon and the
27 2d Platoon, IT Brooks' platoon, was there. We had one man
28 wounded, one or two men.

29
30 Q. What was the enemy situation south of the Song
31 Diem Diem River?

32 A. As far as I know it was supposed to be an enemy
33 sanctuary that had never been penetrated by U. S. Forces.

34
35 Q. Do you know whose area of operations this was?

36 A. I believe it was the ARVN area. This was the
37 reasoning behind the old man not giving us permission to
38 go down there, because he couldn't get it from the ARVN's,
39 or whoever controlled it.

40
41 Q. Who was the old man?

42 A. CPT Medina, sir.

43
44 Q. How many men did you lose at that bridge?

45 A. I didn't have a casualty, sir.

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1 Q. During the time that you were with C Co did they
2 lose 21 men in a minefield in this vicinity?

3 A. No, sir, that came after. Most of those boys were
4 mine.

5
6 Q. From your platoon?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8
9 Q. Do you know where that minefield was?

10 A. I never really located it, sir, but I had ideas,
11 but they were just assumptions.

12
13 Q. What is your understanding of search and destroy
14 operations?

15 A. My understanding of search and destroy operations
16 is it applies to a village or area; encircle the area; move
17 through the area; anything that is harmful or detrimental
18 to my people or anyone else friendly who might be moving
19 into that area, destroy it.

20
21 Q. What was your understanding of search and clear
22 operations?

23 A. About the same, sir.

24
25 Q. Did you ever read any Rules of Engagement or were
26 you ever briefed on Rules of Engagement?

27 A. There was a written handout that was provided to
28 us after we had been in country approximately 30 days that
29 I read. I don't recall the exact content of it or how many
30 provisions were in it.

31
32 Q. How did you determine the difference between VC
33 and innocent civilians?

34 A. I didn't make the determination, sir. If there
35 was somebody who was suspected we called the old man and he,
36 in turn, called the S3 and they were to pick these people
37 up, or if they didn't want to pick them up they would say,
38 "Turn them loose."

39
40 Q. What were your instructions regarding bringing
41 individuals under fire?

42 A. If we were getting shot at, shoot back; if the
43 enemy was well defined, with black pajamas and weapons,
44 appeared to be evading, try to shoot at him and stop him.
45 If he gets going, he is fair game.

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1 Q. How do you tell him to stop?

2 A. Use the words dung lai. It is like these people that
3 were hopping around the rice paddies when we approached. It
4 was my experience that the innocent people, the majority of
5 them that were determined innocent afterward, never ran and
6 there were instructions put out on the civilian populace,
7 "Don't run from American soldiers," and virtually every vil-
8 lage we went into you can see evidence of these notes that
9 were written in Vietnamese and English where the civilians
10 were warned, "Don't run from the Americans. They won't harm
11 you." Usually the ones that did run or were running that
12 were captured, taken alive, were subsequently proven to be
13 VC. These individuals that I talked about earlier had black
14 uniforms on, black pajamas, and some were identified with
15 weapons by some of my troopers. The only reason we didn't
16 engage them was they were too far away, out of effective
17 small arms range, but by and large the local civilian popu-
18 lation won't run. The innocents won't run.

19
20 Q. The black pajama, did it signify VC?

21 A. Eight out of ten times, yes, sir, it does. The
22 black pajamas, I understand, is the peasant uniform for the
23 civilian. This is one reason why the VC use it. They
24 identify, first of all, as peasants and, second, it is some-
25 times difficult to distinguish them from peasants, but there
26 is no mistake when there is a rifle in a man's hand and a
27 group of people are trying to get away from him.

28
29 Q. But the peasants do wear black pajamas?

30 A. Yes, sir.

31
32 Q. Therefore, this can't be considered a VC uniform.

33 A. I wouldn't say that, sir. Let me see. The per-
34 centage of VC suspects that I captured were dressed in
35 black uniforms, black pajamas.

36
37 Q. What percentage?

38 A. I would say 85%, sir.

39
40 Q. Of the number of detainees who did not turn out
41 to be VC, how many of those were dressed in black pajamas
42 percentagewise?

43 A. I would say less than 10%, sir.

44
45 Q. And what was the normal clothing of the peasants?

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1 A. By and large it was black pajamas.

2
3 Q. Well, what I am trying to say is the VC, they
4 wear black pajamas, but the civilians also wear black
5 pajamas.

6 A. Yes, sir, I understand.

7
8 Q. It may be a VC uniform, but it doesn't necessarily
9 identify a VC. Is that correct?

10 A. That is correct.

11
12 Q. So as a criterion, when we look for somebody, the
13 fact that he has on black pajamas doesn't necessarily mean
14 that he is to be brought under fire. Is that correct?

15 A. That is correct, sir.

16
17 Q. The weapon is the main thing, or the fact that he
18 is running?

19 A. Yes, sir, the combination of the three, or pri-
20 marily the fact of the weapon and that he is moving out of
21 the area.

22
23 Q. Do women wear black pajamas also?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25
26 Q. Have you ever heard of a search and destroy
27 operation which ordered the destruction of the inhabitants of
28 a village?

29 A. No, sir.

30
31 Q. Did you work with LT William Calley--

32 A. (Interposing) Yes, sir.

33
34 Q. --on an operation?

35 A. On an operation? Not the two of us together, no,
36 sir. Usually in Task Force Barker before we got to LZ
37 Uptight--this is C Co--we operated as a company. When we
38 got to LZ Uptight I would be out one day and Calley would
39 be out the next. The 2d Platoon leader would go with either
40 one of us because he was the rookie. He would either go with
41 me, as in the case we talked about before, or he could go
42 with Calley.

43
44 Q. Who was that?

45 A. Brooks.

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1 Q. Did you ever see LT Calley under fire?

2 A. No, sir.

3
4 Q. Have you ever observed him in combat?

5 A. On radio. Actually seeing him?

6
7 Q. Yes.

8 A. No, sir. We had a company operation that went--
9 if you recall the map, the Song Diem Diem River--we had a
10 coordinated operation in Task Force Barker wherein C Co was
11 to move down to that river location in a blocking position.
12 My platoon was in the middle and we ended up at a bridge,
13 stopped at a bridge. Calley ended up on the left flank,
14 some 500 meters away, and he attempted to cross the river.
15 This I know from listening to the radio because CPT Medina
16 was with me. The old man was with my platoon that day. He
17 attempted to cross the Song Diem Diem and couldn't make it,
18 couldn't get across because he was receiving heavy small arms
19 fire. His radio operator was shot and killed that day.
20 That's the only real combat situation I have seen or heard
21 of him in.

22
23 Q. Have you ever had reason to believe that LT Calley
24 mistreated South Vietnamese Nationals?

25 A. No, sir.

26
27 Q. Have you ever had reason to believe that any
28 officers in that company mistreated South Vietnamese Nationals?

29 A. No, sir.

30
31 Q. Did you ever hear that LT Calley rounded up
32 civilians and machine-gunned them?

33 A. No, sir.

34
35 Q. Do you know the radio operators of the company
36 commander?

37 A. At that time, sir?

38
39 Q. Yes.

40 A. Let me see. I am getting a picture, but I am not
41 getting any names. (Pause) Widmer, he was a Spec 4. He
42 was one. Simons, SGT S-I-M-O-N-S. His medic operated the
43 radio a lot, too, under certain circumstances. His name was
44 White.
45

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1 Q. Grade?

2 A. SP 5, sir.

3
4 Q. Do you know who the executive officer of Task
5 Force Barker was?

6 A. I don't believe we had one, sir. I think the
7 only field grade officers we had in Task Force Barker
8 during the time I was there were LTC Barker and MAJ Calhoun.

9
10 Q. I am going to read you three or four names and if
11 you can identify them as being members of Task Force Barker
12 I would like to know. Your silence will indicate you can't.

13 A. Yes, sir.

14
15 Q. LTC Edwin D. Beers. LTC A. L. Russell, MAJ Peter
16 L. Clifford. MAJ James R. Bell.

17 A. MAJ Clifford and MAJ Bell and COL Beers were all
18 1/20th. To my knowledge they were never in Task Force
19 Barker. COL Beers was the 1/20th CO, MAJ Bell was our XO
20 when we first went there, and MAJ Clifford took over after
21 him as battalion XO.

22
23 Q. During these operations was it normal for your
24 medic to give medical attention to South Vietnamese Nationals?

25 A. Yes, sir.

26
27 Q. What type?

28 A. Just about any type he was capable of. I used to
29 harass my doc--just friendly banter, so to speak--and say,
30 "Look, Doc, you treat the Vietnamese better than us." His
31 name was Foreman, Bruce Foreman. I remember him because he
32 subsequently won a Silver Star after I left the company.
33 But we were kind of field MEDCAP program is about the only
34 way I can describe his attitude toward the Vietnamese.

35
36 Q. What was his grade?

37 A. He was a Spec 4, sir.

38
39 Q. Normally on these operations did you have a very
40 high ratio of civilian casualties?

41 A. No, sir. We very seldom saw Charlie. That area
42 was heavily mined and lined with boobytraps. In fact, our
43 operations map looked more like a minefield than anything
44 else. There were very few places we could go safely.

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1 Q. Did you normally use artillery to prepare the
2 area prior to your assaults?

3 A. In my operations I never used artillery to prepare
4 an area. I didn't use this as a technique of preparing to
5 take a position. I never used it until I got to be a com-
6 pany commander later on. The reason I didn't, to me it
7 wasn't dependable and effective enough. I would rather
8 depend on my own platoon resources and if I got in a bind
9 I would call the platoon artillery, but I would rather
10 depend on my own resources than gun ships, the gun ships
11 only after I got going with the situation.
12

13 Q. Did you ever hear of artillery being used to drive
14 the villagers into the tunnels?

15 A. No, sir.
16

17 Q. Do you know SGT Lawrence C. La Croix, L-A
18 C-R-O-I-X?

19 A. No, sir.
20

21 Q. Do you know SGT Kenneth Schiel?

22 A. Yes, sir. He was in the 2d Platoon of Charlie Co.
23

24 Q. Have you ever seen him in combat?

25 A. No, sir, I have never seen him under fire.
26

27 Q. Do you know a Spec 4 Paul?

28 A. Yes, sir. He was an interpreter. He was in the
29 headquarters part of Charlie Co. He worked directly for
30 CPT Medina and he was occasionally farmed out to the various
31 platoons as an interpreter. I believe that he had some kind
32 of language orientation or training in Vietnamese, so he was
33 to go with the platoons and assist in interpreting for us,
34 for the platoon leaders.
35

36 Q. Was he a tunnel rat?

37 A. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
38

39 Q. Was there an ARVN or South Vietnamese National
40 interpreter with your unit?

41 A. Yes, sir, for a time. It was very difficult to
42 keep those people around.
43

44 Q. Do you know who he was?

45 A. (Pause) I don't recall what his name is, sir.

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1 or was.

2
3 Q. Did you ever work with Popular Force, ARVN, or
4 National Police during these operations?

5 A. No, sir, I didn't normally.

6
7 Q. Normally what was the procedure for taking a body
8 count?

9 A. Actually physically seeing the body.

10
11 Q. Who had to see the body?

12 A. An element leader, a squad leader.

13
14 Q. Anybody lower than that?

15 A. No, sir.

16
17 Q. Have you ever heard of a hamlet referred to as
18 My Lai (4)?

19 A. Can I look at your map, sir? It might ring a bell
20 if I see it.

21
22 Q. (Colonel Wilson indicated a location on the map.)
23 (Pause) You are saying no?

24 A. That is right, definitely not.

25
26 Q. Have you ever heard of an action--

27 A. (Interposing) Wait a minute. Let's back up. That
28 village, I believe, was the target area of that operation I
29 was talking about before on the coordination of the attack
30 with Charlie Co ending up down here (indicating), and Calley
31 was over here (indicating), my platoon was here (indicating),
32 and Brooks was on the right, so we looked something like that
33 (indicating). A Co, 3/1st, was to come from the east; B Co,
34 4/3d, was to come from the south, along with tracks from
35 E Troop. The reason this comes back to me is because one of
36 my classmates was awarded a Silver Star for action in this
37 area. Now whether it was this village (indicating) or this
38 village (indicating), I don't know which, but it was in this
39 area. Also, the track commander was awarded a Silver Star
40 for his action because he pulled the platoon out that was
41 pinned down, trapped in there, so I do recall that.

42
43 Q. Well, the area that you refer to there is south
44 of the Song Diem Diem.

45 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. I thought this was not, U. S. operations were
2 not permitted in that area there?

3 A. O. K., sir. For this operation there was a
4 special clearance, the way I understand it. There was a
5 special clearance for this operation to take place.
6

7 Q. When was that?

8 A. Again, sir, I was still in the company. It was
9 either late January or early February.
10

11 Q. The way you described it to me no elements of
12 Task Force Barker moved south of the Song Diem Diem. Is
13 that correct?

14 A. Without--since this area didn't belong to us, sir,
15 the only way we could get in there, or any U. S. Forces
16 could get in there would be to ask for approval from the
17 local ARVN commander because I am almost certain this was
18 his area and that is what the holdup was. For this operation
19 I am sure that he gave us clearance to go ahead into this
20 area because, as the story goes, the ARVN's wouldn't go into
21 that area because it was too risky for them, the VC were too
22 strongly entrenched in that area. As far as I know, and all
23 I know is rumor, one rumor has it the VC were in the trees
24 and they were in built-up areas and this sort of thing.
25

26 Q. This was during the operation which you just de-
27 scribed. Is that correct?

28 A. Right. I never saw that. As I say, Charlie Co
29 stopped at a bridge here and it kind of made us mad because
30 we wanted to get into the action here, but we couldn't do
31 it because we were to block in case the VC tried to come
32 back this way (indicating), which the indication was that
33 they would because the bridge was here (indicating), and
34 that bridge is still intact. It is one of very few. Whether
35 the map says it is there, it is there. This is where Calley
36 lost his RTO (indicating). I hope I am not sounding like I
37 am hedging or trying to back up, but it is just that my
38 company never went south of that river as long as I was
39 there and the events of that one operation we have just
40 talked about are all hearsay to me. I know I was there.
41 I know where Charlie Co was, but I couldn't tell you exactly
42 where those other two companies were.
43

44 Q. These Rules of Engagement--handout that you men-
45 tioned--do you know who published that?

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1 A. I think USARV did, United States Army, Vietnam.
2 I might say, sir, that pertaining to these Rules of En-
3 gagement, or anything that was put out general orders-wise,
4 in my company, in C Co, lieutenants didn't take any drastic
5 measures without getting permission, and we'd--if something
6 drastic was to happen or we wanted it to happen, we'd call
7 the old man and he would say flat out "no" like that. He'd
8 say, "Back up a couple of paces and look at the situation
9 and see if you can do something different. If you can't,
10 come on back home."

11
12 Q. What was your opinion of your company commander?

13 A. He's the best I have ever had, sir. He was cool
14 under fire. I have seen him under fire. He was strict,
15 tight as a--like that (doubling up his fist), but he was
16 fair and he was smart, wise in the ways of maneuvering a
17 rat company.
18

19 Q. Did you ever have reason to believe that he would
20 mistreat South Vietnamese Nationals?

21 A. I knew that he didn't like them, but I don't think
22 he would go out and deliberately clobber one and just beat
23 them into the ground. I don't think that would happen.
24

25 Q. Have you ever seen either LT Calley or CPT Medina
26 act from vengeance?

27 A. How so, sir?
28

29 Q. Go into an operation with a vendetta.

30 A. No, sir.
31

32 Q. Did you ever have a photographer that worked with
33 C Co while you were with it?

34 A. No, sir.
35

36 Q. Have you ever seen a booklet titled the Southern
37 Cross?

38 A. That's the Americal publication?
39

40 Q. Yes.

41 A. Yes, sir.
42

43 Q. Is this an operational publication, or what type
44 of publication is it?

45 A. It is a news publication.

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1 Q. News?

2 A. The one I saw was dated May 68--yes, May of 68,
3 and it had little short stories about the units within the
4 Americal, 1/20th, 3/1st, 4/3d, the 96 units and 198 units
5 and this sort of thing. It was like the 1/20th is com-
6 manded by LTC Edwin D. Beers, being in Vietnam, and such
7 and such a date, and this type of thing.

8
9 Q. With photography?

10 A. Yes, sir, there were some pictures in there.

11
12 Q. Do you have a copy of this document?

13 A. I did have somewhere at home.

14
15 Q. If you do have and if you find it, would you bring
16 it in tomorrow and let me make a copy of it? I don't want
17 to take it. I want to extract something from it.

18 A. Yes, sir, I sure will.

19
20 Q. Did you ever have loud-speaker support on your
1 operations?

22 A. Most of my--I don't know what I want to say--my
23 platoon operations, no, sir. I can only recall one time on
24 a company operation.

25
26 Q. How was the loud-speaker utilized?

27 A. From a chopper.

28
29 Q. Do you know what the broadcasts were concerned
30 with?

31 A. No, sir.

32
33 Q. Did you ever know a Specialist 4 Carter?

34 A. What is his first name, sir? I had one in my mortar
35 platoon in Schofield.

36 Q. I mean in C Co.

37 A. I don't recall one, sir. I am associated with two
38 Carters that I know of.

39
40 Q. This was Herbert L., PFC.

41 A. No, sir.

42
43 Q. Do you remember the body count on the operation
44 which you previously described to me?

45 A. For the other units, no, sir, I don't.

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1 Q. Not your casualties--the enemy body count.

2 A. I think C Co got credit for one kill that day.

3
4 Q. Have you ever heard of a SGT Phu?

5 A. That might be the interpreter, sir. When you say
6 the name it sounds familiar. Sometimes I can't associate
7 faces with names.

8
9 Q. Did you observe leaflets being dropped prior to
10 your operations at any time?

11 A. No, sir.

12
13 Q. Did you ever use civilians to point out minefields
14 ahead of your troops?

15 A. I can remember one occasion where I used a civilian
16 with my point man. We were walking through a questionable
17 area. He wasn't, the civilian wasn't the least worried. He
18 made it right off the way we were going, so based on that we
19 assumed everything was all right and proceeded to march.

20
21 Q. What was the purpose of using him?

22 A. We figured if he showed signs of fear or was afraid
23 we would stay out of that area.

24
25 Q. Before an operation was it normal for the company
26 commander to brief the company?

27 A. He briefed the leaders, sir, the platoon leaders.
28 If it was a platoon operation he'd call the lieutenants in
29 and say, "O. K., you in 3d Platoon are going to this location
30 tomorrow." He would have stand-by missions for the other
31 lieutenants. For example, one lieutenant and his platoon
32 would be on alert to move out in case something happened to
33 my platoon. The other platoon would assume the defense of
34 the perimeter. If there was something that needed to be
35 explained to the company or if there was a particular morale
36 problem or something of this nature CPT Medina would call us
37 all together and say, "Look, this is what happened, this is
38 why it happened, and this is what we are going to try to do."

39
40 For example, the award of the CIB, Combat Infantryman
41 Badge. C Co was in country before any other company in the
42 11th Brigade. Our company was eligible for CIB's before anyone
43 else. Well, it just so happens that one platoon was singled
44 out by General Lipscomb to recommend CIB's. He personally
45 came down to present them, and everybody in the company was

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1 feeling pretty badly about it because we figured we had
2 all earned them as well as this one platoon. The old man
3 got the company together and said, "Look, this is the way
4 it is."
5

6 Q. On operational briefings did he ever call the
7 company together to tell them what the operation was?

8 A. No, sir.
9

10 Q. Did you know a PFC Pedrick?

11 A. Yes, sir.
12

13 Q. What was his job?

14 A. He was grenadier for awhile.
15

16 Q. In which platoon?

17 A. Mine, sir.
18

19 Q. Did you ever see PFC Pedrick conduct himself in
20 any abnormal manner in combat?

21 A. No, sir.
22

23 Q. Did you ever observe any of your personnel in the
24 unit indiscriminately shooting civilians?

25 A. No, sir.
26

27 Q. Do you know if a company-size unit submitted an
28 after-action report of an operation?

29 A. It may have, sir. I don't know.
30

31 Q. Did you say that you commanded a company over
32 there at one time?

33 A. Yes, sir. I never submitted an after-action
34 report.
35

36 Q. There was no requirement for you to do this?

37 A. No, sir. Usually the S3 kept a pretty tight lid
38 on operations and any statistics or anything peculiar that
39 happened that needed to be brought out, the S3 was right
40 there, Johnny on the spot.
41

42 Q. That is the battalion S3?

43 A. Yes, sir.
44

45 Q. Do you know the major enemy unit which was

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operating in the area of operations of C Co during the time you were with the company?

A. I don't recall it, sir.

Q. Where did you get the information that ARVN would not go into the area which you described?

A. Rumor, sir.

Q. Have you ever been given an intelligence briefing?

A. No, sir.

Q. How did you normally get information regarding the enemy situation?

A. From the commander, sir.

Q. Do you have any further information concerning the matters we have discussed?

A. No, sir, not that I can think of.

Q. No additional testimony?

A. No, sir.

Q. CPT Hauck, this is an official investigation. It is privileged in the sense that the report will be made to the Chief of Staff of the Army for such use as he deems appropriate. You are ordered not to discuss this investigation or the questions and answers covered during this interview except as you otherwise may have a right to do so in accordance with law.

A. Yes, sir, I understand.

Q. Thank you very much, I appreciate it.

(The witness was excused.)

(The foregoing testimony of CPT Robert L. Hauck was taken stenographically and transcribed by Albert F. Smith, Supervisory Shorthand Reporter, Office of The Inspector General, Headquarters, Department of the Army.)

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