The Ranger Advisory effort appears to be inadequate in relation to its operational effort and number of companies. There are 3 Officers for 61 companies. Two Officers and 3 NCOs are assigned to the 30th Special Battalion; these figures are out of balance with the number of U.S. Advisors per regular ARVN-Company. It is generally conceded that the Rangers are one of ARVN's finest small unit offensive forces. It has also been advanced that small unit actions are essential to carry the war to the Viet Cong. Furthermore experience has indicated that units with American Advisors have produced better results. In order to assist further an already effective Ranger effort more U.S. Advisors are needed with the Ranger Companies. The concept would be to assign Lieutenants and Captains to Division Headquarters and let them operate out of there. The Division Ranger Advisor could give them Advisory responsibility over 2 or 3 companies for continuity purposes. They would go out for 5 or 6 days on operations and then come back to a US Advisory compound to rest and write up reports. The important thing is that one officer staying with one Ranger company for one year would be impractical. Suggest that this matter be brought up at the Senior Advisors Conference 17 Sep 62.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR
Major, Infantry
Ranger Advisor.

AS AN EXAMPLE, IN THE 31st TZ THERE ARE 27 RANGER
COMPANIES, WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF 5,771 OFFICERS AND MEN
AS OPPOSED TO 36 RANGER COMPANIES WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF
4,429 OFFICERS AND MEN. THE DIVISION ADVISORY EFFORT CONSISTS OF
27 OFFICERS, 15 NCOs, AND 6 EM RADIO OPERATORS. THE RANGER ADVISORY
EFFORT CONSISTS OF ONE DIVISION ADVISOR AND 2 OFFICERS, AND 2 NCOs,
ASSIGNED TO THE 30th SPECIAL BATTALION. IN THE 32nd. 43rd Tz THEY
1. The undersigned with Major Baldwin, Airborne/Ranger Advisor ARVN Field Command, visited the 30th Special Battalion, Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province, 28-31 August 1962. The purpose of the visit was to become acquainted with the conditions under which the 30th Battalion operated and trained, and evaluate the status of training and practicality of operational concepts.

2. We were met at Song Be airstrip by Capt Bacon, the Ranger Training Advisor assisting Major Hayes the Senior Advisor, and Major Primm the Sector Advisor. We stayed with Major Primm near the Province Chief's headquarters and residence. During the three days we had extensive conversations with Major Hayes, Capt Bacon, Lt Sgty and NCO's attached to the Ranger Training Team. We also talked with the 30th Special Battalion Commander and his company commanders. We visited the Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, and talked with Major Primm and his staff. In addition to these conversations, we observed training, inspected billets and saw many of the Province Chief's civic action programs.

3. In previous reports submitted by Major Hayes, most of the difficulties encountered in training centered around the
Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, usurping the perogatives of the Bn Commander, Capt Nhu, and sending the Ranger Companies out on operations of questionable value under his personal control, to the detriment of training and chain of command procedures.

From my observations as a result of investigation, I believe that there are three main obstacles to training of the 30th Ranger Battalion.

a. The battalion was initially designed to conduct operations in Viet Cong territory for extended periods (10 days to 3 weeks) under control of a higher headquarters (division or corps).

b. Secondly, the indications from the Sector Advisor, Major Primm, were that neither he nor the Province Chief were ever briefed on the concept of the ranger battalion and furthermore they were only notified of the purposes and arrival of the MAAG training team headed by Capt Bacon and later augmented by Major Hayes. The failure to coordinate and later to lay the ground work with the proper people in the province was a perfect setting for irritations that followed.
Thirdly, there appears to be a personality clash between
Major Hayes on one side and Major Primm and LtCol Diem on the other.
The personality clash has its roots in the aforementioned events.
Major Hayes, in my judgement, is one of the finest combat officers
in the United States Army. He is a volunteer to Vietnam and is
dedicated to his task of training the 30th Battalion. He was
given him as his only mission. He also is concerned over an
apparent lack of appreciation of basic field leadership principles
on the part of LtCol Diem. For instance LtCol Diem reportedly
does not brief the battalion or company commander before a mission,
does not issue instructions through the chain of command, and has
an apparent disregard for the welfare of his troops.

On the other hand, LtCol Diem is equally zealous in his
work and without a doubt has one of the finest community programs
underway in Vietnam. He struck me as being aggressive, enthusiastic
and competent. He sees his mission as building up his province
to withstand Viet Cong military and economic pressures. As the
work with the responsibility he uses all means at his disposal to
protect his people and defeat the Viet Cong, this includes using
the four ranger companies that Major Hayes is trying to train.
LtCol Diem has a fine working relationship with the Montagnards.
It is through these mountain tribesmen that he is able to
obtain valuable intelligence for his operations. Although occasionally
the intelligence he receives is old or misleading, the Secur
S2 Advisor told me that most of the missions are successful
because of the accurate intelligence of the Montagnard sources.
Because of Major Hayes aggressive pursuit of the training mission and LtCol Diem equally aggressive program there is an inevitable personality clash. It was reported to me that LtCol Diem told his Vietnamese officers that Major Hayes was the only American he "hated." Major Primm, Sector Advisor, supports his counterpart, LtCol Diem. While I was in Phuoc Binh there was very little communication between Major Hayes and Major Primm and LtCol Diem.

In spite of these obstacles there is some training being done and the American advisory team is gaining valuable experience. It is my opinion that even if the personality clash were eliminated (and there are some indications that a mutual respect is building up between Major Hayes and LtCol Diem) and if proper orientation were given to the Province Chief, the 30th Special Battalion will not be able to operate as originally intended because it is unrealistic to expect LtCol Diem to give away 4 of his 6 Ranger companies. I recommend that an effort be made to reconstitute the 30th Special Battalion at a different training site. It was believed by both Major Primm and Major Hayes that LtCol Diem would release the battalion staff, headquarters and headquarters company and one company (possibly the 340th) toward rebuilding a new 30th battalion. If three other provinces would contribute one company each, a new battalion could be formed and placed under III Corps' control at a training center such as Trung Lap. It is also recommended that the same training team continue in the
mission. Major Hayes and Capt Bacon have gained valuable experience and have the support of Capt Nhu, the battalion commander.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR

Major, Inf

III Corps Ranger Advisor
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

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I am hearing about another meeting to be held and the next meeting on Thursday morning. At that time I am going to outline the proposed plan and get more details of the method they will use to evaluate the current design. As a result of this talk I will be able to determine whether I think it will be worthwhile to set up for the meeting of the 7th Division.

The important matter is to notify all Colonels that the final evaluation report to General Johnson will be issued from 15 September.

However, when my meeting on Wednesday morning, I am able to recommend that it is not necessary to wait for the formal results of the 7th Division meeting.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]

[Date]

[DD HH MM SS]
1. The last report concerning the testing of the 100 modified M-1's indicated that 50 had been issued to the 7th Division on 30 July and 50 would be issued to a specific ranger company on 8 or 9 August. The 50 issued to the 7th Division have been in Division Headquarters Company until this date. They will be issued on 11 September to a company in the 2d Bn, 12th Regt. The 50 issued to the CMD were turned over to the 310th Ranger Company and their testing program is complete. The official ARVN report will not be completed until results from the 7th Division have been received. However, Major Nulsen, III Corps project officer, has talked with Captain Tuan, C.O. 310th Ranger Company, and Captain Tru, CMD ranger commander; and they indicated that their report will contain the findings in para 3.

2. The test criteria was simply that ARVN issue 50 weapons and the officers and NCO's observe for four weeks their use and accuracy during operational periods. The 310th went on operations during their four-week test period and most of men fired their weapons each time.

3. The following points were made by Capt Tuan and Capt Tru to Major Nulsen.

   a. None of the soldiers used their slings when they fired their weapons during offensive operations. The speed necessary for reaction firing prohibited their taking time to use the sling. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out during these discussions that some Vietnamese Commanders have the soldiers take off the sling so that the weapons will be carried at the ready during combat operations. However, it was also brought out that during defensive periods the sling could possibly be used to gain more accuracy.

   b. It was pointed out that lowering the sling swivel tended to unbalance the weapon while the soldier carried it at sling arms. This caused the weapon to slip around and force the butt to the front, which was rather annoying during approach marches.

   c. These comments indicate that the sling modification causes an inconvenience while carried at sling arms and does not directly affect the accuracy of fire during combat operations, since it is not used. However at least one important aspect should be brought out.
MAGTN-III-C-3
SUBJECT: Weapons Modification Project.

10 September 1962

Except for the initial testing at Quang Trung in 1961, ARVN forces have not had any range training with the modified sling. If the modified sling were used universally in training during both KD range firing and field firing exercises, practice in using the slings would promote certain techniques and confidence in the weapon that cannot be determined at this stage in testing. There may also be a certain psychological advantage gained if the ARVN soldier feels that the weapon has been modified to fit his needs.

4. To date, the indications are that ARVN will conclude that the modification does not significantly add to combat firing effectiveness. It is recommended that we wait for official report, due sometime in October, and weigh their specific findings against the advantages listed above as well as the results from the Quang Trung testing.

JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
LtCol, Infantry
Chief Eng Branch