SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending 30 April 1968


a. (C) Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during this period, continued to conduct combat operations designed to divide, locate and destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), reinforced the Capital Military District forces during the TET offensive and over-watched the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). Road clearing and route security operations continued on Highway 13 to QUAN LOI and daily convoy traffic was maintained.

(2) Operation LAM SON 68, the indirect support of the Government of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development Program, was initiated 1 February and suspended 10 March. The LAM SON area (southern portion of the division's TAOI south of LAI KHE) was the scene of the most bitter encounters the division had with VC/NVA forces during the VC/NVA TET offensive as depicted by the 1144 personnel losses inflicted against enemy forces.

(3) Operation QUAN THANG (Certain Victory), a III ARVN Corps and II Field Forces combined operation was initiated in Binh Dinh Province by the BIG RED ONE 11 March utilizing two brigades, the 2d and 3d Brigades, to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces exfiltrating from the Saigon area. The operation terminated 7 April.

(4) Operation TOAN THANG (Complete Victory), a III ARVN Corps and II Field Forces operation was initiated 8 April by the 1st Infantry Division utilizing all division assets to conduct rapid reconnaissance in force operations into likely enemy sanctuaries along infiltration routes and extensive night ambush patrol operations along VC/NVA lines of communication. The operation continues as the reporting period ends.

(5) Base Camp activities continued at the four division base camps located at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE, and QUAN LOI with emphasis on up grading perimeter defenses and base camp facilities. Base camps were subjected to VC/NVA rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle attacks throughout the period with surprisingly minor damage considering the intensity of the attacks. The 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, a II Field Forces unit, was based at DI AN upon arrival in country in mid February.

b. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength:

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<th>AGG</th>
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<td>1080</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>16221</td>
<td>17481</td>
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<td>Authorized 30 Apr 68</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>16461</td>
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(b) Gains, qualifications and status

1. Enlisted:

   a. Replacements received: 5263

   b. Outstanding requisitions: Enlisted Grades: 00E40 (1), 03Z50 (1), 11B40 (8), 11D40 (10), 11F40 (8), 11G50 (6), 13B40 (2), 13D50 (1), 31E40 (1), 31F50 (1), 31G50 (1), 31H40 (1), 36C40 (1), 42D40 (1), 63C40 (2), 63D50 (2), 71B40 (6), 73C40 (1), 73Z40 (1), 75B40 (2), 75D40 (1), 94B40 (24), 96E40 (2), 96B50 (2), 96C40 (2). E6 and below: During the quarter, emergency requisitions were submitted for 360 personnel due to shortfalls in fill of normal monthly requisitions (Feb - 109, Mar - 234, and Apr - 17). Lead time on such requisitions is 60 days and to date in April, 53 of 109 requisitioned in February have been received.

   c. Credits: None

   d. Qualifications: None

   e. Status: Same

2. Officer:

   a. Replacements received: 293

   b. Outstanding requisitions: 3

   c. Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses, however, a shortage of Captains still exists in combat arms particularly Infantry.

   d. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill being received for requested Captain requirements, particularly in combat arms Infantry and Artillery.

(c) Losses:

   (a) Enlisted: There were 4914 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ATS, and board action.

   (b) Officer: There were 195 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ATS, and board action.

(4) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

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(2) Discipline, Law and Order:

   (a) During the past quarter there were no stragglers apprehended. There
were 22 serious incidents and 22 MIs were reported to the FM during the period and 7 apprehended.

(b) There were 2 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 76 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 10 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

(5) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 204 remains processed and evacuated.

(4) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1690 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 47,132.

(b) During the quarter 4208 out-of-country REM allocations were utilized.

(c) Awards and Decorations:

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<td>Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong>:</td>
<td>7138</td>
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</table>

(5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the Division employed 850 daily hire local nationals.

(b) There were 684 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

(6) Personnel Management:

(a) Unusual situations: The shortage of middle grade MOS's, particularly in combat MOS's continues to be acute. The further liberalization of promotion policies effective in January 1968 has not relieved this situation to the extent expected. The critical shortage in maintenance MOS's reported in the previous quarters has been considerably alleviated although a sizable shortage still exists at the maintenance helper level. Outstanding requisitions still are pending to fill this requirement. A shortage in some supply MOS's, particularly Unit Supply Sergeants, is developing and emergency requisitions are being submitted for these requirements.

(b) Problems Concerning Classification, Assignment, and Utilization of Personnel: The relative number of replacements received having a physical profile ICW continues to be high, particularly in the Senior and middle enlisted grades. While HQ USARV continues to cooperate in the reassignment of these personnel, it appears that the saturation point is being reached and it is becoming increasingly evident that they must be absorbed within the division and utilized consistent with their physical limitations. In addition, when reassignment out of the division can be effected, a minimum of 90 days is required to requisition and obtain a replacement.
(1) General: During the latter days of January (previous reporting period), intelligence sources indicated that VC/NVA forces would attack key South Vietnamese Governmental Headquarters, ARVN installations and facilities with a primary attack against Saigon to coincide with the Tet holiday period. The 1st Infantry Division maintained forces deployed along Highway 13 from Di An (XT 7638) to Loc Ninh (XU 7309) dividing the two VC/NVA sanctuaries, war zones C and D, denying consolidation of forces north of Di An (See Inclosure 13). On 30 January these forces were located at six Fire Support Patrol Bases (FSPB) and 14 company size or larger Night Defensive Positions (NDP) in addition to forces at Di An and Quan Loi. Intelligence further indicated VC/NVA forces were infiltrating along the division's periphery into the Loc Son area (division TA0I south of Di An). This area had previously been a relatively secure area. To meet the threat, in addition to forces located at Di An (XT 9005) and Phu Loi (XT 8615), forces by 30 January had been deployed at three FSPB's and seven company size or larger NDP's throughout the Loc Son area along suspected routes of infiltration from which aggressive reconnaissance in force operations were conducted to interdict VC/NVA LOC and to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces in the area. On 1 February, immediately after the beginning of the Tet offensive, the 2d Brigade deployed one battalion, one troop of armored cavalry and a forward command post to Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base, OPCON Capital Military District, to assist in the security of that installation. To meet the threat in the Saigon area, the 1st Infantry Division began an immediate displacement of units to the vicinity of Saigon that eventually ended with six battalions operating south of Di An. After approximately forty days of intensified counter-offensive operations in southern Loc Son and the Capital Military District, those forces began a combined offensive operation 20th February to dislodge, destroy and drive the VC/NVA forces from all areas in the GND and Bình Dương Province. Intensified, rapid and aggressive reconnaissance in force operations continued throughout the division area as Operation DON THIE. While conducting these operations, the 1st Infantry Division continued to operate along Highway 13, conduct RIF operations in the vicinity of Loc Ninh and Son Go, assist in reconstruction of damaged and destroyed areas, secure primary base camps and overwatch the TA0I.

(2) Operation Loc Son 68. (a) Initiat. 01001 February, 1968. The operation was to be continuation of previous Loc Son operations in support of the Vietnamese Government's Revolutionary Development Program with the 1st Infantry Division supporting the operation with the 2d Brigade. However, with VC/NVA forces penetrating here-to-forces relatively secure areas, the 3d Brigade was also committed to Operation Loc Son 68.

(b) Within the 2d Brigade's TA0I is the Phu Loi Base Camp (XT 8615) home of Division Artillery, 1st Aviation Battalion, 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry and non-divisional aviation support units. The Division Artillery short term intelligence estimate, 22 Jan-2 Feb 68, concluded: The VC local force elements have the capability of launching a mortar attack against Phu Loi at any time. A major attack by fire (122mm rockets and 82mm mortars) launched in coordination with a major ground assault against Phu Loi by a regimental or larger sized force is highly probable. An attack of this type would provide the maximum psychological effect (to the VC) and loss of airmobile capability based at Phu Loi would disrupt all division operations allowing the enemy more freedom to maneuver. The period of maximum danger will be 24 to 29 Jan and 1 and 2 Feb 68.

On 31 January, prompted by intelligence reports the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry (Hqs. C and D Companies) was moved into Phu Loi, OPCON to 2d Brigade for operations in the vicinity of the base camp and OPCON to Division Artillery for base security during the night. A Company moved to Di An, OPCON 2d Brigade, and B Company, OPCON 1st Brigade, on Highway 13 at Thanh Vi. The battalion minus closed at 2130 hours as did the Headquarters, one troop and one platoon of 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry. In the event Phu Loi was attacked by fire, BG Schenbush (DC-A Acting CO) gave approval
to fire into the village of TAN PHUOC KHANH (XT 8816). A PSYOPS heli-borne
speaker from the 2d Brigade was placed on call to warn the village populace
prior to firing. A Long Range Patrol (LRP) was employed north of the PHU
LOI perimeter and at 2205 hours reported six to twelve VC moving toward its
position. The VC turned and moved into a woodline out of range of the
ambush. At 2303 hours the patrol observed a large number of VC approaching
from the north through rice paddies vicinity XT 852179. The patrol returned
to the perimeter when the VC had approached to within 150 meters of its
position. A Xenon light equipped UH60A helicopter, FAC and AO were scrambled.

B Battery, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery fired two volleys of direct fire, fuse
time into vicinity XT 851178. By this time the AO and Xenon light were on
station and the AO and LRP team leader adjusted the artillery on the VC.
The VC moved into the village of AN MY (XT 86417). The perimeter was receiving
sporadic small arms fire during this period and a light fire team was
requested. An FCL was established with air west of the 86 N-S grid line
and artillery to the east. TAC Air placed an airstrike in vicinity of XT
852179 at the original sighting by the LRP. Counter-mortar and harassment
and interdiction fire was continued by the artillery.

2. At 010037 February, 15 to 20 VC were observed at XT 872162 and the
PHU LOI base commander requested the 2d Brigade to conduct a sweep of AN MY
the following morning. In the meantime at 0205 hours, the Xenon light ship
observed 50 to 75 VC laying face down east of AN MY and radar sighted extensive
movement in the same vicinity (XT 864183). The VC moved back into
AN MY before artillery could be brought on target. At approximately 0300
hours the VC launched its TET offensive in the CTZ against BBA W, LONG
BINH, SAIGON and other areas. At 0700, PHU LOI security forces and the LRP
team were dispatched to clear the area of artillery fire and airstrikes put
in during the night. Company C, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry and elements
of the 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry moved to AN MY. Company D moved
northeast to TAN PHUOC KANH and VINH TRUONG. Company C came under heavy
small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC battalion in AN MY
as it approached the village at 0945 hours. This was the beginning of the
most significant engagement in the TAOI during the reporting period involving
the major elements of the Dong Nai and 273d VC Regiments. Because the VC
were using buildings in the village, the infantry and cavalry units were
pulled back and air and artillery brought in after political and provincial
clearance was granted. The AD-C granted final clearance for US artillery
and air to be placed on the village. Company A, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry
was given the mission to secure the bridge and block 600 meters northwest of
AN MY vicinity XT 852171. Elements (4 dusters) of A Battery, 5th Battalion,
2d Artillery (A)(SP) were diverted from their mission as security for an
engineer road clearing detail and were given a blocking mission southwest of
AN MY vicinity XT 842171 along with the Aerial Rifle Platoon, D Troop, 1-4
Cavalry. Company D, 1-28 Infantry returning to PHU LOI from reconnaissance
in force to the northeast was moved to reinforce C Company at 1305 hours.
At 1400 hours artillery fired into AN MY and the Dusters of A Battery, 2-5 Arty
moved from their blocking position to secure a landing zone for C Company,
1-28 Infantry being heli-lifted from DI AN to reinforce, closing at 1610
hours. With the Infantry on line on a north-south line and armored elements
cross attacked the US forces attacked from the east supported by artillery,
six Light Fire Teams, and Tactical Air. Heavy fighting ensued until approxi-
mately 1830 hours with the infantry advancing approximately 300 meters at
the furthest point. The VC, well equipped with small arms, grenades, RPG's,
mortars and using buildings, bunkers and tunnels in the village as cover,
were willing to stay and fight rather than break into small elements and
exfiltrate as they had done in the past. As the battle raged, 36 secondary
explosions from artillery were noted by the AO. The day-long battle resulted
in 197 VC KIA. US losses were 5 KIA and 32 WIA (14 evacuated). One A/C
was a combat loss. A total of 4493 RDS, 106 WP and 92 illumination rounds of
artillery fired in support of the AN MY engagement on 1 February. Tactical
Air support was 1,9 tons H6, 2,75 tons Napalm, 10 GBU's and 3200 rounds of
20mm.

2. On 2 February, 1-28th Infantry with elements of the 1-4th Cavalry

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and 2-5th Arty (Dusters) cross attached reentered AN MY from the south and fought house to house in a day long battle against a stubborn and determined enemy. Sweeping entirely through the village the action resulted in 80 VC KIA and 10 VC captured. In the fast moving action, in addition to secondary explosions obtained by artillery and airstrikes, ground forces located arms and ammunition caches destroying them in place. To the northwest A Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry in a blocking position and securing the bridge at XT 831191 sent a patrol (reinforced squad) north along a stream and came in contact with an unknown number of VC in scrub brush and a large regime vicinity XT 834195 at 1034 hours. A squad reaction force led by the company commander reinforced, an AO and Light Fire Teams coming on station observed 60 to 80 VC immediately north of the point of contact. The 3d platoon was ordered to reinforce by the company commander. Company B, Reconnaissance Platoon and also the Aerial Rifle Platoon, 1-4 Cavalry made airborne assaults into the area to reinforce. Contact continued until 1700 hours. Thirty-five VC were KIA.

4. On 3 February, 1-28 Infantry and elements of 1-4 Cavalry conducted operations east of PHU LOI in TAN MOOC KJNH with sporadic contact. On A February, Doglog Village (CH.INH LONG XT 8623) was sealed and searched by 1-28 Infantry and elements of 1-4 Cavalry. 38 individuals were detained. At the same time, 1st Engineer Battalion Rome plows, Tunnel Rats and a cavalry security element conducted reconnaissance in force and clearing operations at AN MY. Tunnel Rats engaged and killed one VC in a tunnel. One AK47, 12 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition were captured. Thirteen Rome plows cleared 155 acres of debris, filling spider holes and tunnels. Fifty-seven bodies not previously counted were located in tunnels and one VC captured during the day’s operation.

5. The full significance of the action at AN MY was not fully realized until an analysis of intelligence, gathered over a period of time, was made indicating that two battalions and four combat support companies, 273d VC Regiment and a battalion of the Dong Nai Regiment had been engaged. Intelligence further indicates that the VC forces were moving to attack ARVN and Vietnamese Government installations and facilities when observed and engaged by elements of the BIG RaD ONE.

(c) Other significant activity continued in Operation LAN SON 68. At 042335 February the Xetoon search light equipped helicopter again observed an estimated 50 VC vicinity XT 831204. The VC were engaged with artillery. Infantry sweeps of the area during the next two days located 29 VC KIA, 4 Russian heavy machine guns, 9 AK47’s, 1 M16, 5 pistols and 40-50 pounds of documents.

(d) On 7 February C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry conducting reconnaissance in force along a suspected VC LOC was engaged from spider holes and three houses in vicinity XT 798242 at 1030 hours. The 2d Brigade reinforced the contact with elements of B Troop, 1-4 Cavalry and I Troop, 3-11 ACR (OPCON 1st Inf Div). At 1415 hours, A Company, 2-16 Infantry made an airborne assault vicinity of XT 788248 and reinforced. Tactical Air, artillery, Light Fire Teams, AO, and FAC supported. Contact broke at 1725 hours. US casualties were 3 KIA and 29 WHA (27 evacuated). VC losses were 42 KIA (BC).

(e) On 7 February the 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for THU DUC District in the south LAN SON area. In a 2d Brigade operation, elements of 1-18 Infantry made contact in two separate areas. Company B received small arms fire from a bunker vicinity KT 798875 at 1000 hours. The bunker was destroyed by M72 fire. Sporadic contact continued until 1045 hours. At 1505 hours vicinity KT 948975, D Company received RPG and small arms fire in a built-up area. A PSYOPS ship supporting the operation instructed civilians to leave the area. Company D with A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry swept through the area. Sporadic contact continued until 1705 hours. US losses were 2 KIA, 6 WHA (6 evacuated) and 1 ACAV damaged. VC losses were 11 KIA (BC), 5 AK47’s, 5 carbines, 3 RPG-2 launchers, and 2 light machine guns captured.
(f) On 12 February C Company, 2-18 Infantry, conducting a reconnaissance in force mission in the general area of the 7 February contact (see para 5 above), engaged five VC JICs in a narrow east-west wooded area immediately south and across a stream from the previous contact. Suspecting a larger force in the woods, artillery was requested. Sweeping into the woods heavy fire was received from dug-in positions resulting in 4 US KHA and 7 WHS. Continuing the contact 6 VC JICs were located and 1 mortar (82mm) and 1 AK47 were captured. Artillery continued to support as well as a Light Fire Team and Tactical Air. I Troop, 3-11 ACR reinforced C Company. In a sweep through the area 20 VC JICs were located. Three VCs were captured along with 2 mortar tubes (82mm); 3 base plates; 35 rounds 82mm mortar ammunition; 6 AK47's; 50 pounds of rice and 2 pounds of documents. Contact broke at 1615 hours. Prisoners captured identified two weapons companies Dong Nai Regiment as participating in the contact. On 13 February 3 Company swept the area of C Company's contact and located an additional 8 VC bodies, 1 M16 rifle, 1 AK47, 1 FAM 10 radio, 1 Squad radio and 15 mortar rounds (82mm). Total VC body count for the contact was 34.

(g) On 17 February the 3d Brigade assumed responsibility for the north LAM SON area. The 2d Brigade continued operations in the south LAM SON area and TAN SON area. On 18 February the VC had blown several culverts and constructed numerous brush and log road blocks on highways in the division TAN1. In the north LAM SON area (3d Brigade), a road clearing detail consisting of the 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Engineer Battalion and the 2d Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion (Mech), 1st Engineers (with 2 tanks attached from B Company, 2d Battalion, 36th Armored) as security departed LAM KHE clearing Highway 13 to the south. The road clearing detail had cleared two-thirds of the highway to PHU LON when it came to the largest obstacle, 35 brush and log road blocks arrayed over 300 meters, beginning at the south end of an unnamed hamlet in grid X,T,7821. The hamlet lay east of the highway and extended for a 1000 meters. As soon as the convoy stopped at the road blocks, the platoon leader of the security element noted that no civilians could be seen in the village. At this time he alerted his platoon and proceeded to the point element of the convoy where the Engineer platoon leader was beginning to reconnoiter the obstacles. As he reached the point, small arms fire from an unknown number of VC in the northern portion of the hamlet was directed against several vehicles. Personnel had remained in the vehicles and the vehicles were dispersed awaiting orders. Armored personnel carriers returned fire immediately with 50 caliber and M60 machine guns. The VC fire, which was sporadic at first, built up to include machine gun and RPG fire. The convoy pulled off to the west of the road, which was an open area, and moved to the north. Running low of ammunition the armored vehicles moved into hull-defilade at the north end of the village. Artillery and airstrikes supported the contact and the armored element was re-supplied. B Troop, 1st Cavalry reinforced at approximately 1600 hours. After an artillery and Tactical Air preparation, the armored elements swept north to south through the long axis of the village. Contact was broken at 1730 hours with the VC fleeing into the jungle area to the east and northeast of the village. US losses were 1 KIA, 16 WHS, 1-1/2 ton, 1-3/4 ton, 1-5 ton truck and 1 AAV were damaged. VC losses were 92 KIA (BO). No unit identification could be established.

(h) On 19 February, the 1-38th Infantry, OPCON 2d Brigade, conducting reconnaissance in force operations in the THU DUC District at 1000 hours vicinity XT 883014 engaged and killed one VC, capturing one AK47. Contact with an unknown size VC force continued throughout the day in terrain characterized by cultivated coconut groves, rice paddies, small garden plots, small plots of sugar cane, all of which were bounded by irrigation ditches and barns. The contact was supported by artillery, light fire teams, Tactical Air, 40 and 75s. Contact was broken at 1650 hours. During the sweep of the area 22 VC KIA were located. US losses were one KIA and six WHS (evacuated). A 1st Aviation Battalion gunship received fire incurring one crewman. Continuing operations in the same general area on 20 February the battalion made contact again with an unknown size force vicinity of XT 903997 at 1115 hours. Company C leading received heavy small arms and automatic weapons.
fire from dug-in positions in a coconut grove. Lead elements were pinned down with fire developed from three sides to include fire from a 75mm recoilless rifle. An intense fire fight developed with light fire teams, artillery, tactical air, 40 and 84 supporting. Contact continued until 1530 hours when 1-28th Infantry withdrew to bring artillery in on VC positions. The VC using hugging tactics moved forward as the forward elements withdrew policing the area of weapons. Moving back into the area of contact the 1-28th Infantry located 123 VC KIA and captured 3 AK47's and 1 M1 carbine. US losses were 19 KHA and 11 WHA.

(i) On 2 March 1-26th Infantry, OPCON 3d Brigade, conducted operations in the north LMK SON area. Company D conducted an airmobile insertion vicinity XT 841281. At 0620 hours vicinity XT 844286 contact was made with an estimated VC platoon. US losses were 1 KHA and 7 WHA (evacuated). VC losses were 32 KIA. Equipment captured included 33 mortar rounds (82mm); 2 cases of 82mm mortar increments; 3 RPG rounds and 2 boosters; 4 CHICOM grenades; 12 M72 LAW's; 2 mortar base plates and 1 mortar tube (82mm); 4 ruck sacks; 1 pr field glasses; 3 AK50's; 2 AK47's; 1 SKS carbine and miscellaneous clothing and equipment.

(j) On 10 March 3rd Battalion conducted an operation in the north LMK SON area vicinity XT 841281. At 0620 hours vicinity XT 844286 contact was made with an estimated VC platoon. US losses were 1 KHA and 7 WHA (evacuated). VC losses were 1144 KIA (BC), 21 KIA (BC), 46 PAVN, 1 rubber and 867 detainees. Major items captured were 131 small arms, 47 crew served weapons, 11 small arms magazines, 1497 rounds small arms ammunition, 162 grenades, 14 recoilless rifle rounds (75mm), 132 RPG rounds, 211 mortar rounds, 2 82mm mortars, 2 105mm mortars, 42 75mm mortars, 1 pr field glasses, 1 typewriter, 2 F-RC-10 radios, 2 radio transmitters, 2 radio receivers, 1 receiver-transmitter, 1 CHICOM telephone, 3 TA-312/PT, 3 mines, 6 bangalore torpedoes, 111 pounds of documents, 1 Russian flag and 13/4 tons of rice. Destroyed were 2 crew served weapons, 50 rounds small arms ammunition, 126 mortar rounds (60mm), 6 RPG rounds, 15 sampans, 21 mines and 59 bunkers.

(k) On 11 March 1st Battalion initiated Operation QUYET THANG in Binh Dinh Province, center of mass XT 875205, with two brigades, the 3d Brigade in the northern portion and the 2d Brigade in the southern portion with emphasis placed on interdiction of VC/WNA LOC and exfiltration routes.

(a) On 13 March 1-26th Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force, OPCON 3d Brigade, in the vicinity of CHANH LUU (XT 8232) a hamlet controlled by VC infrastructure. At 1205 hours southeast of CHANH LUU in vicinity XT 831-314, D Company with elements of the 1-4th Cavalry reinforced had a claymore detonated against it and received small arms and RPG fire. Fire was returned including tank cannon fire. The fire fight ensued until 1700 hours. VC losses were 23 KIA (BC) and the following items captured: 3 AK47's, 4 AK50's, 1 M14 rifle, 1 RPG launcher, 23 grenades, 650 rounds small arms ammunition, 5 RPG rounds, miscellaneous food, clothing and medical supplies and documents. US losses were 1 KHA and 3 WHA (evacuated).

(b) Conducting reconnaissance in force into the same general area of the previous day the 1-26th Infantry with B and C Troop, 1-4th Cavalry crossed with the infantry companies made contact with an unknown size force at 1415 hours vicinity XT 832802. The contact was supported by artillery, Light Fire Teams, and Tactical Air and ensued until approximately 1700 hours. VC losses were 34 KIA (BC) and the following equipment captured: 6 AK47's, 1 CHICOM pistol, 1 RPG launcher, 9 RPG rounds, 1 hand grenade, 1 pr binoculars, 1 commercial short wave radio and documents. One female was also detained. US losses were 1 KHA and 14 WHA.

(c) On 15 March and for the third consecutive day 1-26th Infantry (-)
and 2-28th Infantry (-) made an airborne insertion at XT 82828 southeast of CHANH LUU and located a large base camp in the vicinity (center of mass XT 82829) of the previous two days contact. Fifty bunkers, tunnel complex and an underground mess hall, with stove, were located. No contact was encountered. Twelve additional VC bodies were located and the following equipment captured: 3 light machine guns, 1 RFG launcher, 1 RPG round, 2 FRO-10 radios, 1 FRO-25 radio, 1 AK-47 and 28 mortar rounds, 82mm.

(d) Beginning on 22 March through 6 April the 3d Brigade concentrated three infantry battalions, two armored cavalry squadrons and an air cavalry squadron supported by two 105 batteries and one 155 battery in AO DUTY II west of BEN CAT in the Iron Triangle. This action was taken as a result of accumulative intelligence indicating VC/NVA forces had infiltrated through the area to the Saigon area and indications were the area was again being used as a rest area for units exfiltrating from the area. The 3d Brigade elements had almost daily contact although none of the contacts were individually significant the accumulative statistics for the 15 days are significant. The tasked organizations were: 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry; 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry; 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OPCON); 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry and the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry (OPCON). Supporting artillery was by A Battery, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105); B Battery, 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery (105) and Howitzer Battery, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. VC personnel losses were 119 KIA (50), 11 KIA (15) and 3 PIV's. Equipment captured or destroyed included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual weapons</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>Blasting caps</th>
<th>1560</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Salt, lbs</td>
<td>4896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Explosives, lbs</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Milk, lbs</td>
<td>5900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms ammo</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>Eggs, lbs</td>
<td>1775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG rounds</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Pork, lbs</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifle rounds</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sugar, lbs</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar rounds</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Feas, lbs</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booby traps</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rice, tons</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) On 3 April the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-16th Infantry, OPCON 2d Brigade, established an ambush at XT 842325 one kilometer east of CHANH LUU along a suspected VC route into the hamlet. At 2145 hours the 22 man ambush was executed against approximately 20 VC killing 13. The remaining VC ran into a brush line and returned fire. Movement and fire encircled the ambush patrol indicating a larger VC force. A Light Fire Team killed six VC. Two successive artillery illuminating rounds malfunctioned and during the brief period of darkness the VC dragged away their dead. One platoon of A Company, 2-16th Infantry reinforced the ambush patrol and remained in position without further contact until day light.

(f) Operation QUEST THANG terminated 072400 April. US personnel losses were 29 KIA and 332 WHA (270 evacuated). VC personnel losses were 129 KIA (65), 173 KIA (35) and 20 PIV's.

(g) The lst Infantry Division initiated Operation TOAN THANG 080001 April with three Brigades, organic and attached units.

(a) On 10 April the 1-16th Infantry conducting reconnaissance in force to locate and destroy VC/NVA elements harassing LAI KHE base camp with 107mm and 107mm rocket fire since 31 January, located and destroyed seven bunkers, 1 100 lb bomb and 1 250 lb bomb vicinity XT 71848. In the vicinity XT 723-48 the battalion located 49 100 lb bags of rice. An estimated three VC fired on elements of the battalion at 1415 hours vicinity XT 734449. One VC was killed. During the encounter two rockets were heard fired one of which hit LAI KHE base camp. Utilizing a Scout Dog Team, two 122mm rockets were located positioned to fire. The launch apparatus consisted of two 1
sticks crossed, tied, and stuck in the ground. The rockets are detonated by eight 12-volt batteries connected in series. See picture, enclosure 18. This was the last day in the reporting period that Lai Khe received an attack by fire.

(b) An ARVN Forward Air Controller at 121830 April observed an estimated VC battalion and train element moving north in vicinity UX 593235, just south of the Cambodian border. A Light Fire Team from 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, G-4COM 1st Brigade, was dispatched from Quan Loi. At 1935 hours the LFT sighted and engaged a large VC force under trees. Twenty VC were KIA. During the engagement an estimated 50 small arms and automatic weapons were involved.

(c) In reaction to intelligence which indicated VC units had infiltrated south along the eastern periphery of the division's AO during the Têt offensive and had infiltrated and were in a rest area generally 10 kilometers south of PHUC VINH, an operation under the control of the 3d Brigade was initiated in AO DUTY III, center of mass YT 0138. See overlay, enclosure 16. Operations in the AO began 17 April and by the close of 18 April the following units were operating in the AO: 1-4th Armored Cavalry and 8 Btry, 8-66th Arty (155); 1-16th Infantry and C Btry, 2-33d Arty (105); 2-26th Infantry; 4-33d Arty (105); 2 Btry, 2-33d Arty (105) and 3 Btry, 2-33d Arty (105) and a platoon, 3 Btry, 2-33d Arty (105); 1-26th Infantry; and 3-187 Infantry (Abn). On 18 April A Troop, 1-4th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size VC force in a bunker complex vicinity XT 931333 at 1235H. Contact continued until 1730 hours. Tactical air, light fire teams, and artillery supported. After an artillery and airstrike preparation, A Troop in a box formation with tanks on line in the first echelon firing canister moved through the bunker complex completely destroying it and resulting in 57 VC KIA. The following day, 19 April, 1-4th Cavalry operating in the same general area made contact vicinity XT 943341 with an unknown size force in a bunker and tunnel complex. A Troop received small arms and RFG fire at 1247 hours. Tactical air, light fire teams, and artillery supported. A Troop from the south and B Troop from the north alternately attacked the bunker complex utilizing a box formation. Flame throwing RFG's were employed against one large bunker. Contact continued until the bunker complex was destroyed and contact broken at 1830 hours resulting in 38 VC KIA.

(d) The 1-26th Infantry in AO DUTY III engaged undetermined size VC forces daily from 18 April through 24 April in bunker complexes hidden in low thick jungle resulting in 44 VC KIA.

(e) On 211830 April D Troop, 7-1st Air Cavalry established an ambush in AO DUTY III with two platoons at XT 947310. The ambush was executed at 0030 hours 22 April against an unknown size force. Assisted by artillery illumination the kill zone was policed resulting in 20 VC KIA (BC), 11 AK47's, 1 CHICOM pistol, 40 grenades and miscellaneous equipment captured. There were no US casualties.

(f) Operation TOAN THANG continues as the reporting period ends.

(g) VC/NVA harassment of base camp areas by fire, utilizing primarily rockets and mortars, increased during the period. There were a few instances of 75mm recoilless rifle and RFG fire. Of particular note has been the increased use of 120mm rockets in attacks on Lai Khe. Beginning 31 January Lai Khe has been attacked by fire 54 days on 130 separate occasions. Approximately 857 rounds have impacted in or immediately adjacent to the perimeter of which approximately 427 rounds were 120mm rockets, 18 rounds of 107mm rockets, 1 round of 102mm rocket, 564 mortar rounds and the remainder 75mm recoilless rifle and RFG rounds. The attacks have usually been of no more than one minute in duration. Visual observations have been made of launch and firing sites ranging from 2 to 9 kilometers distance by pilots, aerial observers, patrols and counter mortar radar. The harassing fire has been fired from widely scattered areas in secondary growth jungle by small groups of VC. Damage caused by VC fires has been slight in view of the
number of rounds fired. Personnel losses for the period are 6 US KIA, 219 WIA (13 evacuated); 6 Vietnamese KIA and 48 WIA (4 serious); and 1 third national KIA and 5 WIA. Counter mortar-rocket artillery expenditures have been 37,556 rounds of 105; 21,357 rounds 155; 3,151 rounds 8", and 7,431 rounds 4.2".

(5) Casualties sustained by the 1st Infantry Division and by VC, to include VC KIA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US KIA</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US WIA</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>1413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (ac)</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>2609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Ww</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Training. Principle training activities during the period were as follows:

(1) Replacement Training System: The five schools are under a new FOI prescribed in the revised division training regulation. The course requires a minimum of 67 hours instruction. To standardize the training among the five replacement schools, lesson plans were included in the new regulation to cover the required class hours. Each school can add courses to its curriculum as needed. Approximately 75% of all instruction is practical work with emphasis on weapons, small unit tactics, night operations and safety. The following number of men attended replacement training during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>2d Bde</th>
<th>3d Bde</th>
<th>Div Arty</th>
<th>Sp6 Comd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>4724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Replacement Training Schools Seminar: A seminar was held for all replacement training school OIC's and staff supervisors. The seminar addressed the standardized FOI for all schools and the lesson plans designed to cover the FOI. Replacement schools had the opportunity to exchange ideas on training techniques. The seminar aided the standardization of replacement training and allowed each school to see its function within the division replacement training system. An additional seminar is planned within the next quarter.

(3) Mobile Training Team: This is a permanent team that conducts training for the junior infantry leader. The team is composed of one captain, a former company commander, and five NCO's, ex-platoon sergeants. These men are selected based on their experience and job performance in the division. The course of instruction presented by the team is designed to develop the junior leader and make him proficient in division small unit tactical doctrine. The MTT has trained over 3,600 students during the eleven months of its existence. It has proven to be a very useful method of accomplishing leadership training in a combat environment.

(4) Radar Training: Training on the FFS-4 and FFS-5 radars was conducted under the direction of the 1st Bde. The instructors were selected from the best qualified men in the division. They spent several days with radar maintenance personnel learning operational maintenance in order to pass this information to students. The instructors and radar sets were moved to a field location situation to provide ground surveillance of Rte 13. The course of instruction required six days for each class, including intensive practical work, on both FFS-4 and FFS-5 radars. As a result of conducting excellent training to small (4-6 man) classes, the school performed an operational function of ground surveillance along the road.

(5) ARVN Battalion Refresher Training: The 1st Infantry Division was
made responsible for conducting refresher training for 12 infantry battalions, three artillery battalions, one armored cavalry regiment and one engineer battalion. The 40th, engineer battalion and seven of the infantry battalions were successfully completed prior to this quarter. During this reporting period the artillery refresher training was completed. The remaining infantry battalions will resume training as each becomes available.

(6) Mobile Advisory Teams: The MAT teams program is organized under II FFV and III CTZ direction. 1st Division has provided 7 teams, each consisting of 1 officer, 2 NCO's, 1 medic and 1 RTO. The teams have the mission of providing a wide range of advisory functions for RP/PF units. The objective of the program has been to improve the units effectiveness and thereby enhance security of the RD effort.

(7) IMTCT teams: This program was initiated by the 1st Division with the same mission as MAT - to improve the RP/PF unit effectiveness. The team consists of 1 officer, 1 NCO, and 1 interpreter, plus specialists in medical, signal, ordnance, engineer, etc. on call. The working method of the IMTCT teams differs from the MATS teams in that the teams visit is of short duration and emphasizes high impact - low cost projects stressing Vietnamese self-help. The assistance rendered is across a broad spectrum with the team tailored to meet the needs of the unit being trained.

(8) TDY Schools in and out of Vietnam. Schools and number of personnel attending are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NO OF STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Recce</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMTAP</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAST</td>
<td>Republic of Philippines</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO 500</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Unit Armorer M-16 Rifle Training: A special US AR team conducted a one day armorer course on the M-16 rifle for armorer from all company size units from the division. The training was held at each base camp with a make up class at DI An after completion of all base camps. 175 unit armorer were trained during this instruction.

e. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) The total estimated strength of the enemy military units operating in the 1st Division Tactical Area of Interest is approximately 7,500. This figure represents a combat strength of 5,170 and 2,300 personnel providing logistical support. These figures represent an approximation at best because our knowledge of the enemy infiltration rates is not complete. The VC goal for infiltration into III CTZ is 1200 per month, however, in the period preceding and during Têt the VC attempted to double their infiltration rate and how successful they were is unknown. The rates as known now were not adequate to maintain the units at pre-Têt strength. Combat effectiveness for almost all units is marginal due to low strength and high number of new personnel.

(b) Specific reinforcements available from outside the division TAOI are from the southwest, the 9th Division, and elements of the former 165th Regiment from the east, the 5th VC Division. There has been an increase in the number of artillery units in the III CTZ (208th Artillery Regiment and elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment) and all units can be expected to have artillery in support.

(c) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the TAOI and along its periphery are:
UNIT STRENGTH CBT EFFECTIVENESS CURRENT FROG LOC

7th NVA Division
Hq & Spt Units 2,700 Non Cbt Eff Unlocated
13th NVA BN 400 N/A Unlocated
14th NVA Regt 1,200 Unk E Binh Duong
169th NVA Regt 1,100 Marginal E Binh Duong

Separate Regiment
Dong Nai Regt 1,200 Marginal NE Tan Uyen

69th VC Arty Cmd
52nd VC Arty Bn 320 Cbt Eff NW Lai Khe
C61 Ben Cat Co 60 Cbt Eff Ben Cat Dist
C62 Chau Thang Co 45 Cbt Eff Chau Thang Dist
C63 Lai Thieu Co 30 Cbt Eff Lai Thieu Dist
C64 Dau Tieng Co 60 Cbt Eff Dau Tieng Dist
C65 Phu Cuong Plt 30 Cbt Eff Phu Cuong Dist
C301 Phu Giao Co 80 Cbt Eff Phu Giao Dist
C302 Tan Uyen Plt 35 Cbt Eff Tan Uyen Dist
C303 Co 70 Cbt Eff YU 1416
C270 Co 100 Cbt Eff YU 0900
C272 Co 100 Cbt Eff YU 0114
C273 Co 100 Cbt Eff YC 0298

Administrative Service Units
51st Rear Svc Grp 500 YT 2555
52nd Rear Svc Grp 900 XT 6762
53rd Rear Svc Grp 450 XU 8716
54th Rear Svc Grp 300 YU 2042

New Units
1st VC Inf Regt 600 Marginal Thu Duc Dist
(4th LF Bn & 2d Bn 274th plus U/F Inf Grp)
211th VC Inf Bn 250 Marginal Vic Song Be
212th VC Inf Bn 250 Marginal Vic Song Be
K33 Bn, 40th Arty Regt 350 Cbt Eff NW Lai Khe

(2) Main Force Combat Units Within 1st Division Two:

(a) The 7th NVA Division consists of the 165th and 141st NVA Regiments.

1. The 141st NVA Regt moved south for the TET offensive on approximately 25 Jan 1968 from its base camp vic XT 5887. The base camp was located at XT 756712. The 1st Bn moved followed by the 2nd and 3rd Bns and the Regimental Forward Cmd Group and supporting elements. Direction of movement was South, E of Hwy 13. The regiment then (1-4 February) set up a base camp in the southern portion of the Ba Sao Secret Zone in vic XT 86 44. The Second En moved South to the vic of Tan An Xa (XT 7018) and made contact on 5 Feb 68. The 1st and 3rd Bns moved South to reinforce the 2nd Bn NW of Phu Cuong on approx 12-16 February. After suffering approximately 150 KIA in this area the Regiment moved back up to the NE towards Binh My (XT 9033) and set up a base camp on approximately 7-10 March. The 141st Regiment has remained in the general vicinity of 4-5 Kms of Binh My until the present.

2. The 165th NVA Regt prior to the TET offensive had been operating in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone Southeast of the Michelin Plantation, west and NW of Bau Bang. On 28 January an element of the Regiment was ambushed at vic XT 78649, however the main body continued to operate to the west of Hwy 13 until early February. Sometime prior to 14 Feb the Supporting Artillery Bn had crossed the Saigon River and moved south to a location approx...
4 Kms NW of Phu Cuong. The main body of the regiment moved down through Binh My (XT 9330), continued south through the Ong Dong Jungle area, crossed the Soui Ca stream moving SW and continued on through Tan Phu Khan vic XT 8817 and continued west and slightly south to an area south of Phu Cuong and north of Lai Thieu (XT 8605). This movement took place generally between 17 February and 5 March. During the period 5 March to 12 March after operating in the Lai Thieu area, the 165th moved NE through the Tan Phu Khan village area in late March and early April. The 165th Regiment then moved into a base camp area NE of Binh My and has remained there since. There is however evidence that 165th possibly made contact with 2/2 Infantry, in early April (3 April) east of Chon Thanh.

(b) The 273rd VC Regiment was the only Regt of 9th VC Division to operate in the 1st Division TAOI. During the period 1-4 Feb the 273rd VC Regiment was engaged by LRF, 1/28, 2/16, and 1/4 Cav in the vicinity of An My (XT 8415). The 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, Mortar Co, Signal Co, 2/273rd VC Regt were identified. This resulted in over 300 VC KIA (BC). On 3 February the 3rd Bn/273rd VC Regt made contact with 5th ARVN vic Thu Duc (XT 9090) which resulted in 143 VC KIA (BC). On 11 Feb, vic XT 928053, a NVA AF executed an ambush against 15 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC). Documents from the bodies indicated that they were members of the 2/273rd VC Regt/9th VC Div and the G21 Recon Co/273rd VC Regt. On 13 Feb, vic XT 870113, 3/1st Arm'd ARVN Cam made contact with an estimated VC Company plus in due-in positions. 1st ARVN Cav was supported by air strikes resulting in 80 VC KIA (BC) and 11 PWs. Interrogation of the PWs identified members of the 222 Transportation Co, C23 Medical Co, and C24 Training Co, 273rd Regt. The FW states that the remainder of the regiment was located vic XT 8603. On 15 Feb, vic XS 899999, C/1/28/1st Div found ten VC KIA dressed in green uniforms, who had been dead one day. Four VC PWs were also captured at the same location. The PWs were identified as members of the 3rd Co/3rd BN/273rd VC Regt/9th VC Div. They said that their unit had been waiting in a base camp nearby for replacements. On 19 Feb, vic Phu Lai, XT 831990, B/3/6th of the 1st U.S. Inf Div made contact with an unknown no. of VC. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) and 12 VC PW. One of the PWs, Nguyen Van De, said he was OD of the 2nd Co, 1st BN, 273rd VC Regt. He said the En was within 2 km of the above coordinates. He was captured while he was on his way to Hung Hin Village, Lai Thieu District, where he was to meet a liaison man to return him to his unit. He said that there were 4 other VC and 16 forced laborers with him at this time. One of the VC was from the 3rd BN/273rd VC Regt, and the others were from the 2nd BN/273rd VC Regt. A sweep of the area of contact by B/3-16th, 1st U.S. Inf Div uncovered 4 lbs of documents. Initial screening of the documents identified C/116 of 2nd BN (2/26th Mortar Co, 273rd VC Regt). 200810H at XT 777035, C/3/5, 25th U.S. Inf Div captured one PW who claimed to be a member of the Recon Plt, 1st BN, 272nd VC Regt. He said that on 17 Feb one company from the 1st BN participated in the attack against the Quang Trung Training Center. The location of his unit was 300-600 meters from his place of capture. On 22 Feb, vic XT 878038, as a result of a contact by A/1/16 with an unknown size enemy force, which resulted in 6 VC KIA (BC), yielded documents which identified the 273rd VC Regt. One of the bodies was identified as the regimental supply officer. On 24 Feb, vic XS 874795 1/28 received SA fire, A fire fight ensued resulting in 16 VC KIA (BC). Documents found identified the 3rd Battalion/273rd VC Regt. On 25 Feb, vic XT 850187 a LRF team found documents on a dead body which identified the Reconnaissance Plt of 273rd VC Regt. The previous night a LRF team had directed artillery fire on 50 to 100 VC that were moving through the area. On 28 Feb, vic XT 869038 A/1/16 found documents on a dead body which identified the Transportation Company/273rd VC Regt. The document was an after action report for the battle at An My on 1-2 Feb. The report showed the unit had lost 22 KIA and 48 WIA. On 28 March, vic XT 432035, a PF element captured 1 VC who was walking around the hamlet looking for food and wearing an NVA uniform. The FW stated that he was a member of the 14th Co/1st BN/273rd Regt/9th VC Div.

(c) The 5th VC Division is composed of the 274th and 275th VC Regts.
1. The 274th came into the 1st Infantry Division's TAOI on one occasion in vic XT 9521 on 28 February 1970. On 28 February 3/4 ARVN made contact with the 3rd Bn/274th VC Regt. This resulted in 2 PW's and 80 VC KIA (BC).

2. In the period 10-15 March elements of the 2nd Bn, 274th Regt were identified in the Thu Duc area. Contacts were made on 10 March vicinity XS 994945 when Recon/1-2 captured 1 VC WIA in a base camp area and again on 15 March, vic XS 931985 when B/1-18 engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The PW and documents found on the KIA identified the 2nd Bn/274th VC Regt. It is believed that the 2nd Bn/274th VC Regt had been in the Thu Duc area since the TET offensive began. It had not been identified in any contacts with other elements of the 9th VC Division. In addition captured documents indicated that the 274th Regiment was to be re-subordinated to Sub-Region 4 and that the 2nd Bn was to be used in forming a new regiment in the Thu Duc Area.

(d) The primary main force units that have operated in the Division TAOI are the Dong Nai Regiment and the Phu Loi Bn. They are treated separately here, however, it is felt that the Phu Loi Bn has become the 3rd Bn, K3, of the Dong Nai Regiment. The reason for this is that this did not become apparent until after the TET offensive started and the large number of unit identifications of the Phu Loi Bn during the reporting period.

1. Phu Loi Bn: On 31 Jan, elements of the Phu Loi Bn in conjunction with the C-61 LP Co and elements of the C-10 Sapper Bn, attacked the Headquarters 8th Inf Regt and the 2d Bn, 10th Regt in the Ben Cat Sub-sector, vic XT 7333. After sustaining 42 VC KIA, the attackers were repulsed and withdrew to the South and East. On 1 Feb the Phu Loi Bn was identified in contact with 1/26th Inf/1st US Div at An Ny Village vic XT 842176. Results of the contact were 177 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW. The PW stated he was from Unit 2000, subordinate to MIA. He said that the Phu Loi Bn was also at An Ny. If IFPF estimates of strength of the Phu Loi Bn at 450 men were correct, this contact meant a substantial loss of manpower not including WIA's. Following the contact on the 1 Feb, the Phu Loi Bn probably withdrew to Hoa Loi (XT 810240) for the purpose of resupply and recuperation from its losses. An agent report of the 6th Feb states that after having stayed at Hoa Loi for 2 days, the Bn moved toward the Loi Thieu area. Elements of the Phu Loi Bn were not identified again in contact until 20 Feb when the Phu Loi Bn Base Camp, vic XT 874161, engaged 15-25 VC. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA and 1 VC PW. The PW was from the 3d Plt, 3d Co, Phu Loi Bn. He stated that his base camp was in the vic XT 9132. After the contact on the 20th, contact was not made again until nearly a month later. During that time the Phu Loi Bn was probably resupplying and regrouping. On 16 March, an estimated VC Co attacked the Engineer School, vic XT 800146, at the same place of the Bhnh Duong Sector Headquarters, XT 814141, and the Bang Cau Co, XT 802141, were attacked by an estimated VC company. A photograph found later at the site of the attack on the Engineer School had "Phu Loi 1, C-3" written on it. As a result, it is believed that the Phu Loi Bn may have been the enemy unit involved in the contact. On 17 March, the 3-187th, 101st US Abn Div made contact with a number of VC in the vic XT 977397. Documents found on the bodies of 2 VC KIA mentioned the 3d Co, Phu Loi Bn. The following day, the 3-187th, 101st Div engaged an estimated 300 VC, in the vic XT 965378. The VC used CS to break contact after losing 49 KIA. Document readout indicated that the units in contact were the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt, C304 or 2d Co of the Phu Loi Bn and the 7th Co of the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. On 19 March, 799th ARVN TF Co captured a PW who was identified as an assault leader in the 2d Co, Phu Loi Bn, Dong Nai Regt. He stated that the K3 Bn, Dong Nai Regt and K3 Artillery 7th Div were presently located vic Hoa Loi II, XT 820249. The PW gave the strength of the Bn as 230 men of which 25% were NVA. If this were true, then the Bn must have received reinforcements. The location of the Phu Loi Bn at Hoa Loi II would mean a march of approximately 15 km during the night of 18-19 March from vic XT 965378, area of the last contact with the Phu Loi Bn on 18 March. During the period from 19 March to 29 March, numerous agent reports placed the Phu Loi Bn along the Suoi Mang stream to the west of Hoa
Loi I and II. However, one agent report on 23 March placed the Sapper Co of the Phu Loi Bn to the southeast of Lai Khe vic XT 877242. On the 2 April, 1 and 3-8th/5th ARVN Division made contact with an estimated Co size force vic XT 865081 to XT 853087. Results of the contact were 14 VC KIA. Documents found identified the intelligence/recon platoon of the Phu Loi Bn as part of the unit in contact. On 9 April, enemy forces attacked the ARVN Engineer School (XT 808146) and Phu Loi Airfield with 82mm mortar and small arms fire. The similarity to the attack on the Engineer School on 16 March in which it is believed that part of the Phu Loi Bn took part indicates that a company size unit of the Phu Loi Bn may have been again involved. Prior to the attack, the 5th, agent reports had reported the mission of the Phu Loi Bn to be to attack 5th Division headquarters and Phu Loi airfield. Agent reports also located elements of the Phu Loi Bn to the southeast of Nga Loi II prior to the attack.

2. Dong Nai Regt: On 21 Jan - 1 Feb, Phu Cuong (XT 8114) and Engineer School were attacked by enemy forces. PFW's who were captured revealed the attacking forces as elements of D800, Dong Nai Regiment with C15, Heavy Weapons Company, Dong Nai Regiment and C65 LF Co. On 2 Feb, elements of K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment along with the 273 Regiment made contact with A/2-16 Infantry and 1-28 Infantry northeast of Phu Cuong. According to a document found at a later date, the K2 Bn suffered losses amounting to 22 KIA. Following the contact on the 2 Feb, the K2 Bn may have withdrawn to the northeast where Tan Uyen, vic XT 962223, received a ground attack from an estimated VC Bn on the 4th Feb. The attacking unit may have been a battalion of the Dong Nai Regt, possibly the K2 Bn. On the 6th Feb, the D800 Bn was again identified in a contact with 2/8th ARVN south of Phu Cuong vic XT 811133. The results of this contact were 15 VC KIA and 7 VC PFW's. Interrogation of the PFW's indicated that the G2 Company, D800 En was involved. Elements of the Dong Nai Regiment were again identified on 12 Feb when the C/2-18, 1st Inf Division engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT 794231. Results of the contact were 26 VC KIA and 3 PFW's. The PFW's indicated that units in contact were the C14-82mm Mortar Co and the C127 HMG Co, Dong Nai Regt. On 15 Feb, 1/7th ARVN Division reacted against 2 VC platoons attempting to seize the bridge vic XT 799106. Results of the contact were 2 VC KIA. A notebook captured belonged to the platoon leader of an H/4 elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. The same date, contact was made by 3rd ARVN Marine Bn vic XT 877471 with an estimated 2 VC En. Results of the contact were 144 VC KIA. Analysis of documents taken from VC bodies revealed that the attacking force consisted of elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. A raillier who turned himself in on the 23d stated that the 1st Bn and one company of the 2d Bn, Dong Nai Regt had attacked Binh Loi Bridge on the 17-18 Feb with a strength of 200 men. They had lost more than one company (approx 70) as casualties. The raillier further stated that the units withdrew to the Binh Nham area vic XT 865083. On the 30th Feb, vic XT 865085, 3/7th ARVN Division made contact with an estimated VC Company, resulting in 3 VC PFW's. The PW's were from the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt but they also stated that they came from the north prior to the contact. 5th ARVN Inf Div made contact with an unknown size VC force on 7 March, vic XT 800210 resulting in 9 VC KIA and one 12.7 AA gun and several documents captured. Documents captured indicated that the enemy force in contact was the AA Co of the Dong Nai Regiment. Probably by the beginning of March the D800 and K2 En's of the Dong Nai Regiment were moving north of Tan Uyen into the Southern "Catcher's Mitt" area for the purpose of refitting, resupply and replacement of personnel. On 8 March when the 1/48/18th ARVN made contact with an estimated reinforced Bn resulting in 50 VC KIA, Captured documents indicated that possibly one of the KIA was Ba Quan, CO of the Dong Nai Regiment. On the 13th of March, the D/3-187th, 101st US Abn Division engaged an estimated 200 VC. Results of the contact were 3 US KIA, 49 VC KIA. Documents indicated that the elements involved were the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt; C306 Co, Phu Loi Bn and 7th Co, K2 Bn. The VC used OS to break contact. During the later part of March, the K2 and D800 En's probably continued to refit, regroup and resupply in the southern "Catcher's Mitt" area. An attack on 2 April on Tan Uyen may have involved the D800 Bn. Agent reports had given the mission of this Bn as attacking Tan Uyen
prior to the attack. However, neither the D200 nor K2 Bn were definitely identified in contact until the 15th of April when the K2 Bn attacked 2/43 Inf ARVN vic XT 952222 (Tan Oyen). Results of this contact were 19 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA. The VC F/Co stated he was from the 2d Co, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 23 Apr, vic XT 957387, 3/1-16 exchanged fire with one VC. Documents found in a bunker at that location identified K1 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. The Bn had apparently recently departed to avoid allied operations, leaving elements to conduct countersweep operations.

(c) 69th Artillery Command:

1. On 31 Jan 68, the 69th Artillery Command played a major supporting role in the Tet offensive on the attacks on Bien Hoa, Saigon, Tan Son Nhut, and the Hoc Mon areas. It is believed that the 52d Artillery Bn participated in the attack on Lai Khe, 1st Inf Div on 31 Jan 68. The 58th Artillery Bn was also attached to the 6th VC Div and is believed to be operating with the 272nd Regt.

2. A notebook captured by the 9th Inf Div 16 Apr 68, vic YS 312889, which possibly was from a command element of 52 Bn indicates attacks on Lai Khe - Ben Cat, dated 17 Feb 68; Thu Loi, date 27 Feb 68; Cu Chi 25 Feb 68, and a notebook which said K3 belonging to 52 Dau Tieng. Through most of the month of Feb, Lai Khe, Tan Son Nhut AB, and Bien Hoa - Long Bien received sporadic harassing fires which are believed to be conducted by the elements of the 69th Artillery Command.

2. K33 Bn, 40th Artillery Regt:

a. On 10 April 1968, vic XT 731468, elements of 1-18 Inf, 1st US Div received SA fire and observed 3 VC. The unit heard 2 rockets being launched and engaged the VC. A captured document from 1 VC KIA identified K33 Bn, 40th Artillery Regt.

b. On 15 Apr 68, vic XT 721499 1-28th Inf, 1st US Div received SA fire, called in US Artillery resulting in 5 VC KIA (X) and 2 VC KIA (poss). Documents identified the K33 Bn, 40th Artillery Regt.

c. According to II FF FDWTRN # 15-68, the 1st Bn of 294th NVA Artillery Regt infiltrated to SVN between Jan and Apr 68 with a strength of 350 men. The Bn was then assigned to the 40th Regt and became K33. After infiltration the bn operated with the 40th Regt until Nov 67 when it reportedly departed Kontum area for III CTZ.

(3) Local Force Units: During the reporting period local force units have been acting in support of the main force units, acting as guides reconnoitering objectives and supplying replacements and secondarily recruiting and propagandizing. There has been some evidence of an attempt to upgrade the local force units. There have been reports that C-61 Ben Cat Co has been upgraded to Bn size. This is an indication of the attempt by the VC to increase its troop strength in preparation for an approaching 3rd general offensive.

(4) The Tet Offensive:

(a) During the period of this report the Tet offensive occurred. The period of the offensive is or will be covered by Allied Operations Lam Son 68, Quyet Thang and Toan Thang, details of the offensive will be found in the after action reports of these operations. The following is a synopsis of what occurred.

(b) As noted in the last ORLI most Main Force VC units were located in base areas well north of Saigon (See Map Incl 15). The 156th and 86th NVA Regiments remained north of Lai Khe during the initial part of the attack. (See Map Incl 16). The first major contact with a 1st Division unit was at An Ky (XT 8417) on the morning of 1 February where in the ensuing four (4)
A day period over 300 VC from the 273rd VC Regiment were killed.

(c) The TET offensive was characterized by the initial use of Local Force Units and attacks by fire and extensive use of the 122mm rocket in stand-off attacks by fire. After the initial attack the enemy melted into the population and avoided contact with Allied Forces. On the 18th of February the second offensive started with stand-off attacks by fire on allied installations. This was for the most part, the extent of the second offensive. During the middle of March, while a majority of the main force regiments were moving north the 111st and 15th NVA Regiments were making contact with allied forces in the central Lam Son area. By the beginning of April most main force units had moved to the north of Saigon. (See Incl 17) to receive replacements, re-supply, re-equip and train. This period was characterized by primarily small contacts and countersweep operations by the VC in response to allied operations. During the last half of April indications were that the enemy was moving south in preparation for a 3rd offensive.

(5) Character of the Enemy Threat: The Viet Cong appear to be readying for a massive attack on Saigon in order to take advantage of peace negotiations scheduled for 10 May. Confirmation of this was received on 19 April 1968 from a rallier who had been the political officer for sub-region E-1 which stated that the VC were preparing to launch a new attack on Saigon. The enemy persists in his attempt to achieve his political objectives through a display of military power in combination with subversion.

f. Logistics

(1) The retrograde program initiated by the 1st S&T Bn on 19 December to return excess supplies to the supply system continued into the present period and was completed on 20 March 1968. Over 741 conex containers and 1,929 pallets/crates of excess supplies have been retrograded. Although the exact quantities are not available, an even greater volume of supplies was shipped forward to using units. This was accomplished by sending the Quartermaster, Engineer, Signal, and Ordnance Supply Officers and NCO’s from the Division Supply Office to the Class II & IV yard to screen on-hand stocks. They worked through all supplies determining requirements and placing disposition instructions on each item. The Division Supply office personnel then supervised the physical movement of the supplies into one of three areas: the unit staging area, which was divided into a sub-area for each supported unit; the retrograde pad, for subsequent movement to depot; or the stockage area, for Self Service items, clothing and other stocked items. Stocks thus staged were then either picked by local units, shipped to units at forward base camps, or shipped back to depots.

(2) Reduction of the number of items stocked by the 1st S&T Bn, which began during the previous report period, was also completed in March 1968. The number of items stocked was reduced from a high of 4,300 line items in November 1967 to the approximate 1,000 line items presently stocked. Current stockage contains primarily Self Service supply center items, hand tools, clothing batteries, and helicopter slingloading equipment. This reduction in stockage permits adequate management and storage of supplies with the personnel authorized by TOE.

(3) The 1st Infantry Division Support Command sponsored the arrival in RVN of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry during this period. Supplies and equipment necessary to establish a base camp were picked up, stored and issued.

(4) During this period two new helicopter refueling facilities (miniports) have been constructed and are being operated by the 1st S&T Bn. A miniport consisting of four 500 barrel capacity steel bolted tanks with 10 dispensing points was constructed at QJAN LOI. At DI AN base camp a miniport with two 500 barrel tanks and 10 dispensing points became operational on 30 April 1968. Both facilities were partially constructed by elements of the 168th Engineer Battalion.
(5) During this quarter the Support Command participated in the organization and operation of emergency ammunition resupply convoys. The first consisted of 103 vehicles, and the second consisted of 47 vehicles. Each convoy moved from Long Binh to Lai Khe. The significance of these convoys is that they were organized during the height of the Tet offensive and the vehicles were drawn from all base camp tenant units without regard to assignment or attachment to the Division.

(5) Improvements in PLL repair parts supply were obtained as a result of high level command interest and visits with brigade and battalion commanders by the CO, 701st Maint BN, preceded by a PLL inspection team. After PLL’s were purified, improvements in divisional PLL’s could begin. Thereafter, an intensive program was started to delete non-demand-supported items from PLL’s. During the period January through April 1968, PLL zero balances were reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent by:

(a) Eliminating items with insufficient demands,
(b) Turning in and transferring excesses,
(c) Reconciling document registers,
(d) Requisitioning needed items.

Completion of the PLL program will require an additional three months. However, substantial progress has been achieved to date as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Beginning of Period</th>
<th>End of Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines on PLL</td>
<td>19,213</td>
<td>15,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PLL deletions</td>
<td>4,136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Shipped to Depot</td>
<td>6,514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent zero balance before purge</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent zero balance after purge</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage shipped</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Value of items shipped</td>
<td>$2,648,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The programs discussed will substantially improve repair parts supply within the division; however, there will continue to be an inordinate amount of zero balances in both PLL’s and PLL’s. Further improvements will, in large measure, depend on the responsiveness of supporting repair parts depot. Currently, a 15 day order and ship time is allowed by USARV in computation of PLL’s. Actual order and ship time against normal requisitions is in excess of 45 days.

8. Organization.

(1) The general order to implement the "G" series MTOS for infantry battalions was received on 27 January 1968 and the "H" series on 28 March 1968. A study of the reduction in personnel and equipment reveals the following shortcomings:

(a) Communications. The combined loss of 48 AN PRC-25 and AN GRC-125 radios will have considerable impact on FM communications within the battalion and the four base camp perimeters. The squad radio, in its present state, is not an acceptable substitute for the PRC-25. The range of the squad radio is inconsistent and depends upon the terrain and the set itself. Two minor deficiencies are the receiver’s susceptibility to loss due to the helmet mount and the lack of a waterproofed power supply.

(b) The reduction in 2½ ton trucks among the infantry battalions approximates the loss of one truck company to the division. The loss is not consistent with any gains in outside support or with present division requirements. As an example of the increase in use of ground transportation within the division, the following is cited:

CONFIDENTIAL
Route 13 was opened early in November 1967 from Lai Khe to Quan Loi and remains open at the present time. During the three month period prior to November 1967, there was one resupply convoy to Quan Loi of 250 vehicles. The following chart shows the average convoys to Quan Loi per month since November 1967 and the corresponding decrease in C-130 requirements for resupply of Quan Loi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Convoys/Month</th>
<th>Vehicles/month</th>
<th>C-130 sorties/month</th>
<th>lbs air-cargo/month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Oct 67</td>
<td>1 (total)</td>
<td>350 (total)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 67 - Jan 68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Apr 68</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The loss of all of the wreckers, tank and pump units, and trailer mounted liquid dispensers will have an impact on the daily operations of the four separate base camps. Tankers and tank units are used primarily to haul water. The withdrawal of these assets will place a greater burden on the water trailers. The division presently has on hand 39 of the 54 water trailers authorized for infantry battalions.

(d) The authorized mixture of 1/2 ton and 3/4 ton trucks is not consistent with requirements. Rifle companies need at least one 3/4 ton truck to transport its mess by fixed wing aircraft when moving from one base camp to another to conduct operations. To take advantage of the cargo carrying capability of the 3/4 ton truck, the minimum number of 1/2 ton trucks should be authorized with the remainder of the total allowed under the "T" series MTOE (less 2 1/2 ton trucks) becoming 3/4 ton trucks. A recommended mixture is 14 1/2 ton trucks and 12 3/4 ton trucks instead of the authorized 30 1/2 ton and 3 3/4 ton trucks.

(e) The authorization for the cal .45 pistol for infantry should be for gunners (machine gunners, 81mm mortar gunner, 90mm H.E. gunners), grenadiers and certain HE personnel. When the 40mm multishot becomes readily available to the grenadiers, the cal .45 should be eliminated. The .45 caliber pistol is a primary source of accidental shootings and its authorization should be curtailed as much as possible.

(2) Reconfiguration of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (8"/155mm). In February 1968, the equipment only for a SF 155 howitzer battery was exchanged for the equipment of a towed 155 battery from the 9th Div. The present configuration of the division organic medium artillery battalion is as follows:

- One HQ, HQ and Service Battery
- Two Howitzer Batteries (155 SF)
- One Howitzer Battery (155 TMD)
- One Howitzer Battery (8" SF)

The organic medium artillery battalion did not have the capability to be air transported either by fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft within the division TAOR/TAO. The proposed organization increases the flexibility of employment of medium artillery over the current organization. It provides the division with an organic capability to react rapidly and support operations with medium artillery anywhere within the TAOR/TAO. A letter of concept justifying the new configuration is being forwarded to the Department of the Army.

h. Psychological Operations

(1) Psychological operations this quarter were aimed at three prime target groups:

(a) Civilians
(b) VC soldiers and their relatives
During the quarter a total of 26,059,570 leaflets were dropped and 638 hours and 40 minutes of broadcast time were employed, in support of the division, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
<th>BROADCAST TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>2,446,150</td>
<td>42 hours 55 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Brigade</td>
<td>6,528,820</td>
<td>372 hours 00 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Brigade</td>
<td>10,533,600</td>
<td>173 hours 10 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support</td>
<td>6,821,000</td>
<td>638 hours 40 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26,059,570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Civic action/Civil Affairs

(1) The Revolutionary Development Program was set back by the Tet offensive this quarter. As security near important American and SVN areas increased, security in out-lying hamlets decreased. As a result of the lack of safety in the outlying areas, the RD workers moved to safe areas thereby leaving many of their accomplishments for VC destruction. Recently, however, RD workers returned to their work and it was discovered that most RD areas weren't set back as much as had been thought and most workers resumed their normal schedule. During the offensive RF/PF defenses proved inadequate in most cases. G5 channels supported fortification improvements by supplying material such as concertina, cement, conexes, tin and lumber. RF/PF personnel did the work and U.S. Advisers supervised improvements. As the VC threat grew, the RF/PF attitude improved, as the threat diminished so did the RF/PF interest.

(2) In consonance with the concept that "whatever Americans built, Americans must repair," the Lai Khe area Civil Affairs Team supervised the construction of the Lai Khe market place while the hamlet administration supplied the labor.

(3) In MACVARS, the Division employed Hoi Chams to gather intelligence, to propagandize the value of rallyng, and to provide security for the team. The program appeared to be effective.

(4) One of the most important assets of the pacification program has been the establishment of community-relations committees at two of the four Division base camps. The two base camps have each had one meeting and will continue having meetings once a month.

(5) In the meetings, committees were formed to study and recommend action in areas such as sports, community support projects, medical safety and friendship councils.


a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

(1) Outside Communication Plants

(a) OBSERVATION: Outside communication plants at base camp installations subjected to enemy mortar/rocket attacks must be constructed on diverse routes with a multiplicity of cable pairs to maintain effective communication.

(b) EVALUATION: The outside plant at Lai Khe consisting of 200 pair and 50 pair cables completed last fall received a severe test during 54 days that the base camp received mortar/rocket attacks. Cable damage was sustained. However, due to the diverse routes and multiplicity of cable pairs,
communications from Division Headquarters and DTOC were effectively maintained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: NA

(2) Radio Relay System.

(a) OBSERVATION: Establishment of a twelve channel radio relay system between the 1st Infantry Division and 18th ARVN Division Forward CP was accomplished to allow close coordination during ARVN operations on the 1st Division's flank.

(b) EVALUATION: The Signal Battalion is capable of providing similar radio relay systems for short durations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Outside assistance becomes essential when such relay systems are necessary over prolonged periods.

(3) Aviator Flying Hour Authorization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Operational commitments accelerated by the TaT offensive caused aviator flying time to exceed the USARV flying hour authorization of 140 hours.

(b) EVALUATION: Particularly affected were the command and control aircraft utilized by General Officers and Brigade Commanders. The tactical situation also dictated that personnel remain in bunkers on several consecutive nights. Limited bunker space contributed further to aviator fatigue. All rated staff officers were utilized and when necessary aviators were shifted between companies on a daily basis to level out the aviator flying time in the 1st Aviation Battalion to reduce pilot fatigue.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: With reduced manning levels, missions must be screened closely to maintain aviator flying time at or below the established USARV maximum. Careful planning is paramount to insure that essential missions are performed and other transportation resources utilized where possible.

(4) Field Expedient CS Cluster: BR-1 and BR-12.

See page 4, enclosure 8.

c. Training. None
d. Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Rocket Employment Method.

(a) OBSERVATION: Two 122mm rockets were captured by 1-18 Infantry on 18 Apr vic XE 7145 on the launch site in a ready-to-fire altitude aimed at Lai Khe Base Camp. The launching configuration consisted of two sticks 3 feet long tied together to form a tripod or vertical "X" with the rocket itself forming the third leg - a field expedient method of rocket firing.

(b) EVALUATION: Until 18 April the primary recognition used by pilots and aerial observers was an L-shaped ditch and dirt mounds as a launch site. This use of a field expedient method of rocket firing made any open area, clearing, and trail or road that had mask clearance suitable for launching.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: G-2 Air instructed pilots and 40's to treat all open areas, trails, and roads as suspect launch sites and to remain cognizant of this fact during reconnaissance flights.

(2) Tapping of Landlines.
(a) OBSERVATION: A recent check of the 3d Dde landlines, which run parallel to the base camp perimeter at Lai Khe, revealed evidence of enemy wire tapping. The lines, both WD-1 and 3/4 inch multi-lead insulated telephone cable, were strung along the top of a three row concertina fence separating the base from a Vietnamese village.

(b) EVALUATION: Any wire or cables to which the enemy has access are targets for wire tapping and all information passed over these lines must be considered compromised.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When possible all wires and cables should be strung in such a manner as to deny the enemy access to them. Telephone communication should always be considered unsecure and the use of KC codes for classified elements is essential.

(3) Anti-Helicopter Mines.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 22 February a series of anti-helicopter mines were observed by a pilot upon approach into a well used dry rice paddy at XT 823254. Subsequent recon by the Aero Rifle Platoon, D 1/4 Cav, disclosed that the mines consist of a rocket motor casing, 155mm shell (less fuze and explosion) and a 3 foot bamboo pole. The mines were emplaced at a 450 to 60° angle facing the normal approach path and were approximately 50 meters apart. The bamboo pole is the triggering device and is probably activated by the helicopter rotor wash. The weapon has an effective range of 30 meters with a radius of 25 meters and has the effect of a claymore mine or canister round.

(b) EVALUATION: The weapon to be effective has to be emplaced in areas with low lying vegetation. Repeated landings within a 100 meter radius on the same line of flight facilitated emplacement location.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units were instructed to avoid setting landing patterns and pilots cautioned to be alert for emplacement of anti-helicopter mines.

e. Logistics.

(1) Semi-Permanent Aviation Fuel Dispensing Facilities.

(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable engineering effort and material of all types is required to establish semi-permanent refueling installations such as the miniports at QUAN LOI and DI AN.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found in both cases that construction was slowed as a result of the lack of detailed plans and instructions. A general lack of the required materials lead to improvisations. For example, TOE pumps were used in one system due to a lack of installation type pumping equipment. A large semi-fixed type pump was made available at the other installation; however, it was obsolete and repair parts for it were not available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That standard, detailed plans and instructions be developed by USARV for the construction of semi-permanent aviation fuel dispensing facilities. A bill of materials should be developed utilizing readily available standard items that are easily assembled or processed at the construction site. Modern, high output petroleum pumps should be made available as installation property for use in these facilities. Such equipment is the most efficient and releases TOE equipment for its rightful mission.

(2) Generator Repair Backlog.

(a) OBSERVATION: During this period, the number of generator deadlines
continued to be a problem.

(b). EVALUATION: The maintenance battalion has had 60 to 80 generators on deadline at any one time. Factors contributing to the high deadline rate in the maintenance battalion were:

1. A shortage of generator repairmen, MOS 52D20. These repairmen have always been scarce and during this period the number assigned reached a low of two. Seven repairmen are authorized by TOE.

2. Engines for the 2KW, 5KW, 10KW generators were critically short in the theater.

3. Much of the backlog was "administrative" due to the complicated procedure for "washing out" unserviceable generators. The approval action for washing out a generator (DA Form 5-23) is presently retained by the Saigon Support Command. Continual follow-up action resulted in the maintenance battalion obtaining the necessary repairmen and replacement engines. Administrative procedures for "washing out" unserviceable generators are still not responsive to the requirement of the division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That approval for "wash out" of generators be delegated to the division direct support maintenance battalion.

(3) Replacement of IU-532 Generators.

(a) OBSERVATION: The supply system cannot replace the IU-532 generators that are worn out due to sustained usage as battery chargers for the INS-4 radar batteries. (DD-422)

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the non-availability of IU-532 generators in the supply system, a search for other methods of charging the INS-4 radar batteries was made. Procedures were developed and disseminated after it was found that the following power supply units could be used as substitutes:

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continuing efforts be made to obtain replacement IU-532 generators and, as an interim measure, use the power supply units described above as substitutes for charging INS-4 batteries.

(4) Early Failure of AVDS-1790-2A Rebuilt Engine.

(a) OBSERVATION: Subject engines have been failing prematurely after installation in the M48A3 tank.

(b) EVALUATION: A record of the failures of AVDS-1790-2A rebuilt engines was maintained from 25 February to 18 April 1968, in an attempt to determine the cause of premature failures. Of seven engines checked, six were found to be blowing oil out of the oil filler tube and crankcase ventilator tube. Excessive oil consumption and excessive crankcase pressure were present also, indicating piston blow by. The Project Manager concerned was apprised of this situation. An intensive effort within the Division to keep air filters and the air induction system clean appears to be resulting in longer engine life.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That armored units which operate in a dusty climate give special attention to cleaning air filters and air induction systems. EIR's should continue to be submitted to assist ATAC in their evaluation of the problem.
(5) **Repair of Fuel Cells MIL31.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The fuel cells of the MIL31 APC crack along the bottom of the cell, near the weld.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Repair of cracks by welding has been successful in many instances; however, some do not hold. A modification work order can now be applied to the fuel cell to repair and prevent these cracks. This has been accomplished; however, it is too early to tell if it is a satisfactory solution.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That Repair Kit 5703662 as found in TB 9-2900-244-30/1 dated 15 Aug 67 be applied to all applicable vehicles whenever a leak is detected. Also, as time permits, recommend this be applied as a preventive measure.

(6) **Transportation.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** A large percentage of the 701st Maintenance Battalion resources are involved with transporting repair parts from depots.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The physical location of the aircraft maintenance company in the 1st Infantry Division is such that it is impractical to use the Headquarters & A Company tech supply as envisioned in the maintenance support doctrine. To be responsive to the aircraft repair parts requirements of the Division, the aircraft maintenance company has trained personnel to operate a small tech supply section. This section has been responsible for the exceptionally low rate of aircraft deadlined for parts and low number of aircraft repair parts line items that are at "zero balance". Staffing of the tech supply section from existing personnel assets has been partially offset by 15 contract support personnel from Lockheed Aircraft Company that were available for most of this reporting period. An HQ/MOE requesting the additional personnel to staff the tech supply section was submitted in October 1967.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That future division aviation maintenance company TOE/MOE provide 15 to 20 men for a tech supply section. If this is impractical, an augmentation unit should be provided.

f. Organization. None

8. Other.

(1) **FSTOP Tri-Language Cordon and Search Tape**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The cultural and ethnic background of civilians living in the 1st Division area of operations differs greatly from area to area; however, it is ascertained that a majority of the populace spoke or understood either Vietnamese, Montagnard (Stieng) or Cambodian dialects.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The tri-language tapes developed within the 8th Red One were used on several occasions, and proved to be effective. Additional tapes have been developed by II Field Force; this concept is being studied by HQ/MACV, for possible use throughout South Vietnam.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend that units consider the use of a tri-language seal tape when planning Cordon and Search Operations.

(2) **Night Tape Broadcast Mission**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The development of an effective night tape broadcast resulted in further removing the concealment of darkness from the enemy, thus lowering his morale and combat effectiveness.

(b) **EVALUATION:** It appears that night tape broadcasts were effective.
when directed to a specific target group/unit and a specific theme was used. This new concept was only tested, and further development is contemplated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that pending conclusive evidence contradicting night broadcasts that this tactic be considered for the following type missions: (a) nighttime seal operations, (b) after-ambush broadcasts to encourage surrender, (c) broadcasts exploiting a known weakness of a particular enemy unit.

(3) Maintenance of 1000 Watt Airborne Broadcast System for PSYOPS.

(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance of the 1000 watt airborne system has been a matter of continuing concern.

(b) EVALUATION: Maintenance problems with the system were in the following categories: (a) Speaker malfunctions in the speaker-driver/coil system, caused by vibration, and overdriving from the amplifiers, (b) Amplifier malfunction caused by speaker malfunction, or overdrive by the recorder, (c) Malfunction in the amplifier relay system caused by dirt and/or moisture. Problems were compounded by: (1) lack of trained personnel, (2) lack of an adequate supply of repair parts, (3) inherent problems of a system used for other than its originally intended purpose.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a system be designed and engineered for use in a helicopter. As an interim measure an additional two sets are being procured as back-up for the existing sets, and a repair float of spare parts is being established by the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. Cover and Deception. The employment of cover and deception in the 1st Infantry Division is frequently used in conjunction with battalion airborne operations and positioning of ambushes.

(1) Airmobile Operations.

a. The concept of airmobile operations in the division normally requires an artillery preparation to precede airmobile assaults. For deception three or four landing zones are selected, reconnoitered and an artillery preparation fired on each. The assault is conducted into one or two of the landing zones.

b. Using the same technique of artillery preparation on more than one landing zone, airmobile assaults have been faked into one landing zone lifting out and into another.

g. The concept of artillery preparation preceding airmobile assaults has also been omitted on a limited basis to gain tactical surprise after a thorough examination and evaluation of current intelligence.

(2) Movement to Ambush Locations.

a. Positioning of ambush patrols has been successfully accomplished by transporting the patrol in armored personnel carriers on an apparent reconnaissance in force. At a designated point the ambush patrol dismounts and the APC's continue on their mission.

b. Night ambush patrols have been positioned from a company or battalion reconnaissance in force. The platoon to conduct the ambush drops
out and positions as the main body continues its mission.

FOR THE COMMANDER

R. J. JOHNSON
CPT, AG
Asst AG

19 Incl

1-Organizational Structure
2-List of Key Commanders
3-1st Bde Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
4-2d Bde Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
5-3d Bde Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
6-Div Artillery Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
7-Support Command Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
8-Division Chemical Section Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
9-1st Aviation Engr Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned
10-1st Engr Engr Operational Report-
    Lessons Learned
11-1st Signal Engr Operational Report-
    Lessons Learned
12-1st MP Company Operational Report-
    Lessons Learned
13-1st Infantry Division Disposition 30 January
14-40 DUTY III
15-VC/NVA Pre-TET Locations
16-VC/NVA TET Locations
17-VC/NVA Post-TET Locations
18-Photograph, 122mm Rocket on Improvised Launcher
19-Fundamentals of Artillery

DISTRIBUTION:

3-CG, IIFFY, ATTN: G-3 Analysis
1-CG, IIFFY, ATTN: 7th MHD
3-CG, USARY, ATTN: AVHCC (DST)
1-CG, USARY, ATTN: AVHCC-MR
2-CINCPAC, ATTN: GFP-UT
1-COMH, DA
4-17th MHD
* 8 Infantry battalions and 1 infantry battalion (mechanized)

**Assigned Units**

- HQ 1st Infantry Div
  - Co F, 52nd Inf (IRP)
  - HQ Hq and Base Spt Comd
  - 1st Admin Co
  - 1st IF Co
  - 701st Maint Bn
  - 1st S&T Bn
  - 121st Sig Bn
  - 1st Eng Bn
  - 1st Med Bn
  - 1st Hq Det
  - 50th Hq Det
  - 266th C&I Plt
  - 242d C&I Det
  - 43d PI Det
  - 44th PI Det
  - 17th Mil Hist Det
  - 1st Sqn 4th Cav

- HHC 1st Bde
  - 1st Bn 2d Inf
  - 1st Bn 26th Inf
  - 1st Bn 28th Inf
  - 41st Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
  - HHC 2d Bde
    - 2d Bn 16th Inf
    - 2d Bn 18th Inf
    - 35th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
    - 61st Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
  - HHC 3d Bde
    - 2d Bn 2d Inf (KISS)
    - 1st Bn 16th Inf
    - 1st Bn 18th Inf
    - 2d Bn 28th Inf
  - HH Btry Div Arty
    - 1st Bn 5th Arty
    - 1st Bn 7th Arty
    - 2d Bn 33d Arty
    - 3d Bn 6th Arty
    - 234th F. Det (Radar)

**Attached Units**

- 340th Avn Det
- 6th Bn 15th Arty

**OPCON Units**

- B Co, 2d 34th Armor
- D Btry 71st Arty (2 QM D 50)
- A Btry 5th Bn 2d Arty (-)
- 1st Plt I Btry, 29th Arty (6 Sect)

*CONFIDENTIAL*
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