SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation SCOTLAND II

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
APO 96490

1. (U) OPERATION: SCOTLAND II

2. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 150800 April 68-271200 May 68.

3. (U) LOCATION: Northeastern Quang Tri Province.

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Robert N. MacKinnon
CO 2nd Bde, 1st Air Cav Div

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

   a. HHC 2d Bde

   b. Maneuver Unit
      1-5 Cav
      2-5 Cav

   c. Arty Support
      1-/7 Arty (- C Btry)
      1-30 Arty (GS)

   d. Other
      B-8 Engr Bn
      2d FSE
      B-15 Med Bn
      2d Flt A 15 SAS Bn
      B-27 Maint
      2d Plt, 545 MP Co
      TM 191 MI Det
      TM, 5 WMR Sqdrn
      TM, 7 Psyops Bn
      TM, 371 KRU
      PIO Tq, 15 Admin Co
      ALO TM
      TM, 13 Sig Bn
7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Weather: Climatic conditions as forecasted for the Khe Sanh area prevailed during the operation and did not seriously hamper airborne operations within the AO. Ground fog and haze prevailed until mid-morning, with scattered and broken ceilings to 2500-3000 feet. Weather conditions at aircraft lagger points restricted airborne movements to a greater extent than did the Khe Sanh weather. Precipitation was negligible except for heavy showers on 7 May. Winds averaged 7-15 knots with the temperature ranging from 72-100 degrees.

b. Terrain: Heavy bombing and artillery fires throughout the AO materially altered the landscape. Numerous LZ's existed, and movement was generally unrestricted throughout the AO. Areas of dense canopy and underbrush existed, mostly in the Southern portion of the AO, but did not present any problem to troop movement. Observation and fields of fire from elevated positions were unrestricted. Numerous trails and improved footpaths were prevalent throughout the area.

c. Enemy: Units identified in contact with elements of the 2nd Brigade were 5th Bn, 2nd Regt, 304th Div (Confirmed by POW). Combat operations during the report period were characterized by light ground contact. Enemy forces employed indirect fire weapons against LZ's and company fire bases, and made one ground attack against a 2nd Bde LZ which was repulsed.

8. (C) MISSION: Find, engage and defeat the enemy and to conduct combat operations within AO to relieve pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base Area.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Operation Scotland II began on 150800 April 1968 with the 2d Brigade becoming OCON to TF Quick, a force subordinate to the 3d Marine Division. The 2d Brigade was deployed with two (2) battalions, 1-5 Cav with its CP at LZ Wharton and 2-5 Cav with its CP on LZ Snappero. The 2d Brigade CP was located on LZ Wharton. On 17 April 68, the 1-5 CP displaced to LZ Snoopy, later called LZ Peanuts, while the Brigade CP displaced to LZ Snappero.

b. On 3 May 1968, Col Robert N Mackinon assumed command of the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, relieving Col Joseph C McDonough who served as Brigade Commander since 29 September 1968.

c. The 1-5 Cav conducted operations in the Western part of the AO (Incl 1) with one company providing security of HILL 471 and one company providing security for LZ Peanuts. The two maneuver companies initially conducted operations in the vicinity of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. On 22 April 68, the two companies then shifted their emphasis to the South, until 3 May, when they returned to the Northern half of the AO.

d. The 2-5 Cav conducted operations in the Eastern part of the AO (Incl 1) with one company providing security for LZ Snappero. One company conducted operations in the vicinity of XD 8533, while the other two companies conducted operations to the South of LZ Snappero and then to the Northeast in the vicinity of LZ Wharton.
On 5 May 68, B, C, and D 1-5 were extracted from the AO to LZ Stud, with D 1-5 then being further deployed to C-1. On 6 May 68, A, B, and C 1-5 were airlifted to Dong Ha, as was A 2-5 Cav. On 7 May 68, the remainder of the 2-5 Cav, as well as the 2d Brigade CP, displaced into the Concordia Square AO, as Operation Scotland II terminated at 071200 May 68.

In Operation Scotland II the 2nd Bde had available the following fire support.

(1) Artillery Support:

(a) 1st Bn 77th (105-MM Towed) - DS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bn 77th (105-MM Towed)</th>
<th>A Btry 1-77 Arty</th>
<th>B Btry 1-77 Arty</th>
<th>1st Bn 76th Arty (155-MM Towed)</th>
<th>1 Searchlight-attached</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) A Btry 1-77 Arty</td>
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<td>(2) B Btry 1-77 Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) A Btry, 1st Bn 30th Arty (155-MM Towed)</td>
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<td>(4) 1 Searchlight-attached</td>
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(b) B Btry, 2d Bn 20th Arty (ABA) reinforcing 1-77 Arty

(c) The artillery supporting the 25th and 1st Marine Regt were also available and fired in support of the 2nd Bde.

(2) Air Support: Close air support was available from the 7th Air Force.

Aviation support was provided, for the most part, by Brigade resources and by the 11th Aviation group. On occasion, marine helicopter support was received.

The following is a recapitulation of aviation support for the 2d Bde:

(a) UH-1H Support

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<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hrs</th>
<th>Cargo (Tons)</th>
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<tr>
<td>227th ASHB 1,872</td>
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<td>306</td>
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<td>229th ASHB 2,649</td>
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<td>2d Bde AVN 726</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS 5,295</td>
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(b) CH-13G

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</table>

(c) CH-47

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<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hrs</th>
<th>Cargo (Tons)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228th ASHB 776</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1.234</td>
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</table>

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED
In addition to Bele scouts the 2d Bde was supported by 1 Troop 1-9 Cavalry who provided both white (recon) and red (gun) teams on a mission basis.

b. The first significant contact occurred near the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp when A & D 1-5 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 13 NVA KIA. On 24 April 68, the two companies swept through the camp meeting no resistance.

c. On 29 April 1968, D 2-5 FOB was attacked by an unknown size enemy force vic TD 826320 resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW's from the 304th Division and 12 AK-47's, 2 AK-50's, an RPG and a B-40 rocket launcher captured.

d. The largest contact occurred when an estimated Sapper company attempted to overrun LZ Peanuts. During the day of 4 May 1968, LZ Peanuts received an artillery attack which hit the ammo dump of A 1-77 Arty destroying 6 105 howitzers. At 0250 hours on 5 May 1968, a 50MM mortar attack was launched, followed by a sapper attack west NV. company at 0300 hours from the South, West and North. Contact continued until 0440 hours when the enemy retreated. Results of the contact were 29 NVA KIA killed and 17 AK-47's and 3 B-40 rocket launchers captured.

II. LOSSES FOR OPERATIONS:

| NV KIA | 69 |
| PW | 2 |
| DETAINEE | 0 |
| C/S WPNS | 8 |
| IND IV WPNS | 43 |
| LG CAL RDS | 1,260 |
| S/A RDS | 29,699 |
| HG/AIMES | 1,085 |
| RICE | 7900 LBS |
| US KIA | 10 |
| US WIA | 60 |
FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Inc

ROBERT D. DRISCOLL
1st LT, Infantry
Asst. Adjutant
AVDABB-C

3 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation CONCORDIA SQUARE

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
APO 96490

1. (U) OPERATION: CONCORDIA SQUARE

2. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 081000 May 68-171000 May 68

3. (U) LOCATION: Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, RVN (See Incl 1)

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Robert N. Mackinnon

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

   a. HHC 2d Brd
   b. Maneuver Units
      1-5 Cav
      2-5 Cav
   c. Arty Support
      1-77 Arty (- C Btry)
      1-30 Arty (GS)
   d. Other
      B-8 Engr Bn
      2d FSE
      B-15 Med En
      2d Plt A 15 S&G Bn
      B-27 Maint
      2d Plt, 515 MP Co
      2 Squads 25th Plt (Scout Dog)
      TM, 191 MI Det
      TM, 5 WTR En
      TM, 7 PSTOPS Bn
      TM, 372 RRU
      PIO TM, 15 Admin O’s
      ALO TM
      TM, 13 Sig Bn

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DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:  

a. Weather. Climatic conditions as forecasted for the Dong Ha area prevailed during the operation and did not seriously hamper airborne operations within the AO. Ground haze was encountered twice until mid-morning, with unlimited ceilings and visibility thereafter. Precipitation was negligible. Wind averaged 5-10 knots from the NW with the temperature ranging from 74-99.

b. Terrain. The 2nd Bde operated in Northern Quang Tri province along the coastal plains. Scrub brush was the predominant type of vegetation in the area. Tree stand, ditches, and sand dunes restrict ground observation and fields of fire to 150 meters. Movement was generally unrestricted throughout the AO.

c. Enemy. Units identified in contact with elements of the 2nd Bde were 2d Bn and 3rd Bn's 48 Regt, 320th Div; 15th Bn (Trans) 320th Div; 15th Trans to; 48th Regt; 5th Trans Co 9th Group; 228th Bn, 350th Regt, 330th Div; 330 Div Hq Co; 17th Bn, 27th Regt, 304th Div; 7th Bn, 56th Regt, 324th Div. (All confirmed by POW). Elements of the 2nd Bde were in moderate to heavy contact throughout the operation.

8. (C) MISSION: Conduct combat operations within AO to locate, destroy or capture the enemy and to interdict his infiltration route.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. The 2d Brigade deployed from the Scotland II AO to the vicinity of Dong Ha prior to the commencement of Operation Concordia Square. At 0816C May 68 the 2d Brigade assumed control of the AO (Incl 1) with two (2) Air Cavalry battalions, 1-5 Cav and 2-5 Cav.

b. The 1-5 Cav was responsible for the Southern portion of the AO with the CP located at Firebase C-1. On 11 May 68, 1-5 Cav was tasked with the mission of providing 1 Company to secure Highway 1 within their AO up to Firebase C-3. This requirement continued throughout the Operation. On 11 May 68, the 1-5 Cav was reinforced with a tank platoon from Company C, 3d Marine Tank Battalion.

c. The 2-5 Cav was responsible for the Northern half of the AO (Incl 1). Their CP was located at Dong Ha, initially, but deployed to Firebase C-1 on 11 May 68. On 16 May 68, 2-5 Cav conducted a joint operation with the 1st ARVN Division to open Highway 1 from Firebases C-1 to A-2.

d. During the entire operation the 2d Brigade CP was located at Dong Ha with its rear elements located at LZ Jane.

e. In Operation Concordia Square the 2d Bde had available the following fire support:

(1) Artillery
(a) C Btry
A Btry 1st Bn 30th Arty (155MM Towed) OPCON 1-77

(b) B Btry, 2d Bn 20th Arty (ARA) Reinforcing.

(c) The Artillery organic and attached to the 3d Marine Division Artillery was also available and consisted of 105MM howitzers, 155MM howitzers, 175MM guns, 8 in Howitzers and 4.2 mortars.

(2) Air Support: Close air support was available from the 7th Air Force.

(3) Naval Support: Naval ships, to include both cruisers and destroyers were in general support of the 3d Marine Div.

f. Aviation support was provided by Brigade AVN along with 1st Air Cavalry Divisional resources from the 11th Aviation Group. The following is a recapitulation of aviation support provided to the 2d Bde:

(1) UH-1H Support

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>HRS</th>
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<tr>
<td>227th AHB</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>229th HHB</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bde Avn</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1790</td>
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(2) OH-13 G

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<tr>
<td>2d Bde Avn</td>
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</table>

(3) CH-47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>HRS</th>
<th>CARGO (TONS)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228th AHHC</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Aerial Reconnaissance was provided by Brigade Scouts and by teams from A Troop 1-9 Cavalry. A 1-9 Cav had available as an average, one red (gun) team and one white (scout) team daily in support of 2d Brigade.

(1) General: The 2d FSE continued to support the 2d Bde combat operations and the Marine LSU continued to substitute for the FSA.

(2) Supply & Services: Provided by the Marine Class I yard.
(a) Class I: Class I at Dong Ha met the requirements of the Brigade.

(b) Class II & IV: The supply of Class II did not meet the requirements of the Brigade. There was a limited supply of clothing, boots, socks, towels, heat tabs etc. Supply of barrier material (Class IV) was unsatisfactory since lumber was not available.

(c) Class III: Class III items were limited but sufficient to meet minimum requirements.

(d) Class V: Class V items were sufficient.

(e) Laundry and Bath: Laundry services were available at Quang Tri. No bath unit was available.

(f) Water Point: The water point at Dong Ha did not have a pump which is necessary to fill the water blivots which are slung out to field.

(3) Transportation:

(a) Land: Satisfactory

(b) Air: Satisfactory

10. EXECUTION:

a. Operations during Concordia Square were characterized by heavy contacts occurring both from daylight and night operations. Contact was established with numerous different enemy units since the main infiltration route passed thru the Red AO, 2-5 Cav experienced outstanding success conducting company size night ambushes to interdict this infiltration route. Almost as a routine, Firebase C-1 received artillery fire at approximately 1300 hours daily.

b. The first major contact involved all companies of the 1-5 Cavalry vicinity of YD 2367 (See Incl 1) when, on 9 May 68, they made contact with an estimated enemy battalion. Friendly casualties from the contact were 17 KIA and 42 WIA. On 10 May 1968 after artillery and airstrikes were placed in the area through out the night, the 1-5 Cav swept the area resulting in 147 NVA KIA & 57 individual weapons and 10 crew-served weapons captured.

c. Also, on the night of 10 May 1968, D 2-5 Cav conducted a company size ambush vicinity of YD 24379 (See Incl 1). At 2205 hours, an infiltration group of approximately 200 NVA moved to within 25 meters of the ambush before the command to open fire was given. The results of this highly successful ambush were 47 NVA KIA, 2 NVA WIA, 10 individual weapons captured and no friendly casualties.

d. On 11 May 1968, A,B, & D 1-5 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity of YD 24379 (See Incl 1) resulting in 5 US KIA and 21 US WIA. Enemy casualties from the initial contact were 47 NVA KIA and 4 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured. After extensive artillery fire and airstrikes were placed in the area through the night and into the next day, the 1-5 swept the area finding an additional 35 NVA KIA and 8 individual weapons captured.
and one crew served weapon. Total enemy losses from the contact were 82 NVA KIA and 72 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured.

On 14 May 68, D 2-5 Cav again conducting a company size night ambush engaged 50 individual vicinity of YD 243693 (See Incl 1) resulting in 20 NVA KIA, and 5 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon captured.

Heavy contact was established by two companies of the 2-5 Cavalry with an estimated reinforced enemy battalion vic YD 248742. Contact was broken and artillery and airstrikes were called into the area for the next two days. The battle area was never swept due to the termination of the Operation.

12. (G) RESULTS OF OPERATION:

| NVN KIA | 347 |
| PW     | 15  |
| DETAINEE | 18 |
| G/3 WPNS | 21 |
| INDIV WPNS | 139 |
| LG C/L RDS | 92 |
| S/L RDS | 860 |
| HG/MINES | 38 |
| US KIA | 25  |
| US WIA | 117 |

13. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Marking Panels:

(1) Observation. Marking friendly positions with smoke grenades can draw indirect enemy fire.

(2) Evaluation. During the operation the enemy possessed the capability of employing accurate indirect fire on friendly positions. If smoke grenades were used to mark friendly locations for aircraft, the enemy could use it as a target for artillery. It was found that the use of marker panels served to mark friendly positions as well as smoke grenades, without drawing artillery fire. When US issue panels were not available, field expedient methods were used.

(3) Recommendation: When the enemy has the capability to deliver accurate indirect fire, marker panels should be used to mark friendly locations instead of smoke grenades.

b. Tank-Infantry:

CONFIDENTIAL
(1) Observation. The use of armor in conjunction with infantry in attacks against fortified enemy positions is a highly successful tactic.

(2) Evaluation. 1-5 Cav employed a platoon of tanks in support of an operation against a fortified village. The tanks were positioned with the assaulting infantry. The tanks delivered suppressive fires with their .50 caliber machine guns and delivered accurate bunker destruction fires with their main armament. The suppressive fires allowed the infantry to advance within close proximity of enemy positions in order to mop up the bunkers stunned or breached by the tanks main armament. Helicopters were employed as air cover to detect and neutralize enemy anti-tank measures.

(3) Recommendation. Commanders should consider the use of tanks against fortified positions whenever they are available. The added accurate firepower, shock action and mobility enables the advancing infantry to close with and finish the enemy while restricting casualties.

c. Night Ambushes.

(1) Observation. When the enemy is not familiar with the terrain night operations, especially ambushes, can be highly successful.

(2) Evaluation. The main infiltration route from the North into this part of the area passed through the 2-5 Cav I:0. One company would conduct limited operations during the day and establish night ambushes. The infiltration groups from the North were not familiar with the terrain and received poor training prior to infiltrating. Enemy elements had little or no security in front of their main body and were easy prey to a well established ambush.

(3) When operating in an area which has known infiltration routes, night operations should be emphasis as much as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT P. DRISCOLL
1st Lt., Infantry
Asst., Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals
Declassified after 12 Years

PERINTREP
S-68
1-31 MAY

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PERINTREP WAS PREPARED BY
THE ORDER OF BATTLE SECTION,
191ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DET.
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION, APO
SAN FRANCISCO 96490

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION PERIODREP NR 5-68

For the Period 010001H to 312400H May 1968

1. (C) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

During the reporting period, 1st Air Cav Division units terminated Operation Delaware (19 April - 17 May 68) in the Aashau Valley and initiated Operation Jeb Stuart III in Base Areas 101, 114, and "The Street Without Joy" area. Ground contact had remained light in the Aashau, and the heaviest enemy action occurred in the last few days of the operation in the form of heavy artillery and small arms fire from an area between the valley and Base Area 611. In the Jeb Stuart III AO, the enemy employed 122mm rockets in several attacks by fire against 1st Air Cav Div LZs. Ground activity remained relatively light to moderate throughout the three operational areas of Jeb Stuart III until the last portion of the month, when 1st Air Cav elements participated in a battalion sized contact with the 5th Bn, 812th NVA Regiment, killing 105 NVA and capturing 11.

a. Operation Delaware-Lem Son 216: This operation, which had been initiated on 19 April, was terminated during the reporting period (17 May 68). The Third Brigade has continued to operate in the northern half of the Aashau Valley, with 1st Brigade continuing its operations in the central portion of the valley.

(1) 1st Brigade (Operation Delaware-Lem Son 216): Activity in the 1st Brigade AO consisted primarily of light contacts during the first three days of the reporting period. On 04 May, elements of 1-8 Cav, operating via YD 366008, found a weapons cache containing 440 K-44 bolt action rifles and one ENF. 2-8 Cav continued its assessment of a cache found on 23 May, via YD 364012, which contained approximately 100 rds of 75mm BR ammo, 500 rds of 37mm ammo, 5000 rds of 12.7mm ammo, one flamethrower, a large amount of medical supplies, and 400 bolt action rifles (Type 53). On the same day, via YD 361019, D 1-8 Cav rounded a truck park and an ammunition cache containing 12 Soviet type 13 ton trucks (two operable), 3000 rds AK-47 ammo, 1000 rds SKS ammo, 10 lbs of TNT, 30 CHICOM grenades, eight boxes of tools, and three tons of truck parts. Another cache found by 2-8 elements on 05 May via YD 365001 contained 27 9mm SMGs, six 75mm RRs, three 60mm mortar sights, one 82mm mortar sight, two 50 cal HMGs mounted on wheels, 611 K-44s, 500 assorted individual weapons, 1900 rds of 37mm ammo, 300 rifle grenades, 96 CHICOM grenades, 2600 rds of 7.62mm ammo, 22 boxes of meat, 43 boxes of assorted foodstuffs, 51 rds of 122mm arty ammo, 9000 rds 50 cal ammo, and over 17,000 rds of 23mm AA ammo. B 2-8 Cav, operating via YD 367012 on 06 May, discovered another large cache. Initial assessment resulted in the following equipment found: 1200 rds 23mm AA ammo, 6000 rds 37mm ammo, 300 rds 57mm ammo (type unknown), 28 rds 85mm ammo (type unknown), 40 road wheels for tracked vehicles, 500 track blocks (possibly for light tanks), 150 sledge hammer heads, 150 pick heads, 1000 large nails, 50 lbs TNT, 1000 gals motor oil, 1000 rds AK-47 ammo, 11 K-44 rifles, 16 rifle grenades, and 500 gals of grease. Another large enemy complex was found on 12 May 68, when...
1-8 Cav elements operating via YD 364013 discovered an underground hospital and bunker complex containing 1300 lbs of medical supplies, including sulfas drugs, penicillin, 15,200 rds AK-47 ammo, 900 rds 9mm ammo, 200 blasting caps, 123 cases of pull-type fuses, 60 rifle grenades, 20 cases of plastic waterproofing, one K-44, one RPG, 1000 picks and rakes, 140 rds 76mm gun ammo, 50 gas mask filters, 12 rds 60mm mortar ammo, one damaged microscope, six 55-gal drums of oil, 200 rds 37mm ammo, 20 first aid kits, 6 lbs TNT, and one gas detector kit. 1-9 Cav elements engaged that was estimated as a company sized element on 13 May via YD 357019, and received eight secondary explosions. The element also observed what was believed to be an ammo dump exploding. 1-8 Cav also found another large enemy administrative area and cache via YD 363017, containing 10.00 picks and rakes, 78 55-gal drums of POL products, several boxes of truck parts, one truck engine, one new rear end, two red trucks previously destroyed by air strikes, 125 quart cans of beef and pork, 10 cases of preserves, 800 bars of soap, 600 tubes of toothpaste, 25 cases of foodstuffs in bar form, 10 quarts of beef bouillion, one minigun, one M-60 MG, one SKS, two K-44s, three cases of medical supplies, 20 lbs of unknown foodstuffs, two 75mm RRs, and 750 rds of 37mm ammo. B 1-8 Cav, operating southwest of this location (via YD 389807), also discovered a vehicle repair parts storage area containing 15 cases of truck parts in good condition, two boxes of ignition parts, 20 clutch plates, 15 coils, 100 carburetors, five generators, six flywheels, 20 pistons, five starters, 200 brake shoes, six new batteries, three radiators, one transmission, and 40-50 lbs of documents. A 1-8 Cav on 13 May discovered two caves 60' long (via YD 352010) that appeared to be an underground hospital containing 25 beds and a large amount of medical supplies. On 14 May there were no large finds in the Brigade AO, but enemy resistance increased in the form of heavy artillery attacks from an area west of the valley. LZ Stallion (YD 378400) received approximately 50 rds of mixed artillery (122mm, 130mm, and an unknown type) at approximately 1200 hours, and 15-20 rds of 82mm mortar fire in the early evening. On 15 May, LZ Stallion received three more indirect fire attacks of mixed 122mm and 130mm fire, with a total of 55-60 rounds being fired on the LZ. It 1620 hrs the LZ received a fourth indirect fire attack of 20-25 rounds of 60mm mortar.

(2) 3rd Brigade (Operation Delaware-Lam Son 216): On 02 May 68, A 2-7 Cav, operating 5 km northwest of A Lupi airfield (via YD 347038), found an enemy company sized base area containing several bunkers with two feet of overhead cover, and an interlocking trench network, and captured two enemy 37mm L4 weapons. Near the same area a truck park was also discovered, containing two 2½ ton trucks previously destroyed by air strikes. On 03 May, 2-7 elements operating via YD 358032 again found two 37mm L4 weapons in good condition. 5-7 Cav elements added one more captured 37mm L4 weapon on the same day. This weapon, found via YD 266105, had been previously destroyed by air strike. On 04 May, 1-7 Cav discovered what appeared to be a storage area for a battalion sized enemy engineer unit. Found in the area were 100 sticks of C-4, 262 pick heads, 259 shovel heads, 58 hammer heads, two cases of TNT, and 540 rds of AK-47 ammo. A primary aspect of enemy resistance in the 3d Bde AO was the employment of indirect fire attacks against friendly LZs. During the period 01 thru 10 May, a total of 10 indirect fire attacks were launched against 3d Bde elements in the A Shau, with six of these attacks occurring on 06 and 07 May. In the heaviest attack during the reporting period, LZ Tiger (YD 2508) received, on 06 May, an
estimated 250-300 rounds of large caliber fire, including 122mm rockets, 82mm mortar, and 75mm RR fire. Direct fire from a 37mm AA weapon, as well as fire from an unknown type tracked vehicle was also received during one of the attacks.

(3) Analysis and Conclusion (Operation Delaware-Len Son 216):
Initially, the enemy in the Ashau Valley employed a heavy volume of antiaircraft fire against assaulting elements. As the operation progressed, resistance was light, and came in the form of scattered ground contacts, with the enemy elements seemingly showing reluctance to commit themselves in any protracted engagement. Only during the latter phase of the operation, as 1st Air Cav elements began their extraction from the valley, did the enemy show major resistance to 1st Air Cav units, and this resistance came primarily in the form of artillery attacks against 1st Cav Lqs. It is believed that the majority of the ground elements in the Ashau withdrew shortly before the arrival of 1st Cav forces in the area, leaving only a token delaying ground force in the area. The large numbers of documents, electrical equipment, and other enemy equipment captured west of A Luoi airfield indicated that a forward command and control element had been operating in this area (vic YD 355005) prior to the operation. The element BMH TRAM 7, a regimental sized transportation unit, indicated by documents as the overall control unit for the valley, is one of the major subunits of the 559th Transportation Group, which controls the main infiltration and comms liaison route running through Laos. It is believed that resistance was of a token nature, primarily because a major portion of the equipment and supplies initially in the valley had already been shipped into other areas. It is also probable that the rear headquarters for Binh Tram 7 was probably located in Base Area 612, and was not seriously threatened by an operation in the valley area itself. Although the capture of large amounts of supplies and equipment has seriously hampered the enemy on a temporary basis, it is not felt to have been a major blow against his overall logistical capability. A more important aspect of the operation has been the denial of the 547A-548 highway complex as a major route of supply infiltration to the enemy. It is felt that the enemy will continually attempt to re-open this supply route, and that his operations, particularly in the Thua Thien area will be significantly hampered until he is able to do so.

b. Operation Job Stuart III: 1st Cav elements in Operation Job Stuart III were split into three operational areas. 1st & 2d Bde's operated in Base Area 10L and the surrounding area, while 3d Bde elements operated in the "Street Without Joy", centered around the graveyard, vic YD 5640, and in conjunction with elements of the 1st ARVN Division in Base Area 11L. In Base Area 10L, even though continual indications of heavy infiltration were received, ground contact remained light, with the enemy continuing to employ indirect fire attacks of both mortar and rocket against 1st Cav units. Activity in the "Street" area was characterized by continual squad-sized contacts, and the enemy's employment of 60 and 82mm mortar fire against friendly ground troops, both during ground contacts, and while friendly troops were deployed in night defensive perimeters. Large amounts of rice were captured in the "Street" area as 1st Cav elements concentrated on denying enemy access to the current rice crop. In Base Area 11L, ground contact was light to moderate, with 1st Air Cav and 1st ARVN discovering
two major hospital complexes, a regimental or larger CP area, and several other enemy base areas. Camp Evans received a total of seventy 122mm rockets during the reporting period, in a total of six attacks. Most of the rounds were launched from the Co Bi Than ridge area, just north of Base Area 114.

(1) Base Area 101 (1st & 2d Brigade A0, Operation Jeb Stuart III): On 17 May, LZ Sharon (vic YD 3349), received five 122mm rockets from suspected locations vic YD 332443 and YD 319398. 1-9 Cav elements in a visual room of the enemy positions received heavy fire and observed a heavily used trail with commo wire running along it. Six air strikes were called in, and 13 bunkers and commo wire were destroyed. There were also 5 enemy KIA by the strikes. 2-1-8 Cav received a sapper type attack on 18 May from an estimated battalion (-) enemy force. The enemy employed heavy fire and a lot of charges. The attack was repelled, and 12 NVA were KIA with one NVA captured. Initial interrogation revealed that the attacking force was made up of elements of the K-4 Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment. On 24 May, an OP of the 1st Bde. (vic YD 325389) received 42 mortar fire and 11 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy heavy weapons platoon. The friendly element engaged and moved into the suspected enemy location. Found in the enemy area were items of miscellaneous military gear, 11 blocks of TNT, 2030 rounds of AK-47 ammo, one claymore mine, eleven 122mm rockets, eight 82mm mortar rounds, 23 60mm mortar rounds, and various medical supplies.

2-8 Cav operating vic YD 2840 on 25 May received nine 122mm rockets. Ground elements reacting to the firings found two rocket positions, vic YD 336387, which could be used to fire on several friendly LZs in the area. On 28 May, A 3-5 Cav made contact with an estimated enemy battalion on the coast, northeast of Quang Tri city. Three companies of 1-12 Cav, 1st Bde, and 1-8 Cav, 1st Bde, were air assaulted into the contact area, and by the end of the day 40 enemy had been killed. The action in this vicinity continued through 30 May, with final assessment resulting in 105 NVA KIA and 11 NVA captured. Initial interrogation of FV's revealed that the contact was with elements of the K-5 Battalion, 812th NVA Regt. FV's indicated that the battalion had moved into the HAI VINH (V) area to protect the rice harvest.

(2) "Street Without Joy" (3d Brigade A0, Operation Jeb Stuart III): Prior to the official initiation of Jeb Stuart III, 4-31 Inf elements operating in the "Street" area (vic YD 5243) received M-79, mortar and L3 fire from an unknown enemy force on 09 May. The contact resulted in a total of 40 NVA KIA. On 11 May, vic YD 528428, an aerial observer from 1-30 Artillery spotted 20 enemy in the open, and called in artillery fire which resulted in 18 NVA KIA. 2-7 Cav units in the "Street" area found two rice caches on 13 & 15 May totalling approx 22 tons. Two other large caches totalling approx 113 tons were found by 2-7 Cav elements in the "Street" area on 16 May. On 19 May, 2-7 Cav elements operating vic YD 607395 were in contact with a company sized enemy force, and killed 9 NVA. An assessment on 21 May of enemy activity in the "Street" area revealed that during the period 14-21 May 2-7 Cav elements had participated in 13 squad sized and 11 platoon sized contacts. 13 Mortar attacks were also received during this time period, while friendly elements killed 97 enemy. On 21 May, 2-7 Cav elements called in A-10 and artillery via YD 609395, which resulted in 10 enemy KIA (included in the 37 BC for 1-21 May). Ground action continued to be composed primarily of squad-sized contacts through the end of the reporting period.
(3) **CONFIDENTIAL**

Base Area 114 (3d Brigade AO, Operation Jeb Stuart III): From 1-6 May, LRP teams deployed along the Co Bi Than Tha Ridge had several sightings of up to 20-man groups of enemy, and on 5 May Camp Evans received 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire from positions located along the ridge. 1-9 Cav elements operating via YD 515227 on 6 May found what appeared to be an enemy training area and base area, including 12 huts (8' x 12' x 18') well camouflaged with one bunker (4' x 6') inside each hut. Tunnels connected each hut, and camo wire, was strung in the area. Silhouette targets which had been recently fired on with small arms were also found. A-31 Inf on 11 May discovered a medical tent base area in Base Area 114, believed to have recently been occupied by a major headquarters. In the area a sand table model of Hue Citadel, four typewriters, two AN/GRC-87 radios, and an ammunition storage area were found. In further assessment of the area on 21 and 22 May, a tunnel complex, including a main tunnel 30' wide and 3' high was found dug into the side of the mountain. Four other tunnels branched off into rooms, one of which was 6' high and had a bed inside. A second room appeared to be a medical treatment room. The third room was a radio repair room and the fourth was a latrine. Several documents, seven telephones, and a switchboard were also found. Arms and ammunition found in the same general area (via YD 497214) included two 60mm mortars with base plates and bipods, one M-1 carbine, one SKS, 300 rds B-40 rocket ammo, 130 rds of 60mm mortar ammo, 20 rds of 82mm mortar ammo, four AP mines, three AT mines, 50 cases of 40-x-47 ammo, two CHICOM claymores, five US claymores, two cases of K-44 ammo, one CHICOM telephone, 200 bars of plastic explosives, 13 cases of booster charges for B-40's, 100 assorted uniforms, and twelve 122mm rockets. Documents found in the area indicated that the complex had probably been used by elements of MRTTH headquarters. (See Annex E). On 23 May 2-3 ARVN operating via YD 552210 found 10 NVA KIA on 22 May. Documents picked up on the area indicated 2d Co, 1st BN, 503d Regt and 2d Co, 2d BN, 803d Regt, possible elements of the 29th NVA Regt, and K-200, the Rear Service and Transportation Staff Section of MRTTH. 2-1 ARVN Regt operating via YD 505216 on 24 May made contact with an unknown sized enemy force, killing 12 NVA and capturing one IMG, 2 BAR's, 63 SKS, thirty B-40 rockets and 10 rds of 82mm mortar ammo. On 25 May, 1-3 ARVN Regt, reacting to intelligence reports of an enemy medical complex, found an enemy hospital via YD 500187 consisting of 16 structures with bunkers 12' x 12' wide, with 16 bottles penicillin, 1 jar of Chloroform, 15 used plasma jars, and various supplies and equipment. Documents found in the area indicated that the hospital had probably supplied medical support to the majority of the NVA units operating in the Hué, Highway 547, Base Area 114 areas. On the same day, elements of 1-7 Cav found a rocket position via YD 552217 10' wide and 50M long on a ridgeline, which had probably been used in the attack on Camp Evans (see par 2i). Resistance in the base area
increased on 26 May with 1-3 ARVN coming into contact with an estimated two enemy companies via YD 500189. Air strikes and artillery called into the area resulted in seven NVA KIA. On 27 May 2-12 Cav found a battalion sized hospital complex containing a large amount of medical supplies, maps, clothing, and documents. On the last day of the reporting period, 2-12 Cav discovered a large enemy bunker complex via YD 474136 with approximately 50 well-fortified, recently used bunkers.

(4) Analysis and Conclusions (Operation Jeb Stuart III): Although ground contact remained light, agent reports from 15 to 31 May and IR readouts continued to indicate the infiltration of large enemy units into Base Area 101. Concentration of activity appeared to be just north of the eastern mouth of the Ba Long valley, and in the western portion of 101. It is believed that the majority of the units normally operating in the Base Area concentrated during the reporting period on securing a maximum portion of the rice harvest. With the end of the harvest, enemy units can be expected to return to their base areas in preparation for future operations against allied installations. In the Base Area 114 - Co Bi Than area, it is felt that the discovery and destruction of several large complexes will hamper and delay, but not seriously limit, enemy actions in this area. Agent reports indicated the movement of large enemy units in the Co Bi Than Ridge area just east of Base Area 114 during the last two weeks of the reporting period. A PV captured shortly after the end of the period (via YD 482136) stated that he was the 16th Signal Bn, 803d NVA Regt. He also stated that the regimental headquarters and 2d Bn, 803d Regt, had moved from an area north of Hue on 25 May, and that they were located via YD 4517.

The PV also indicated that the other two battalions of the regiment were to follow into the same area in the near future. The movement of the 803d into this area is probably for the purpose of resupply and training of replacements for troops lost in contacts with the 101st Abn Div north of Hue.

(5) General Analysis (Formation of New Enemy Unit South of Hue City): 101st Abn Div INTSM 150-68 reported that on 19 April, raidier Pham Van Nghia stated he was a member of the 22d Regt. He also stated that the K4, K10, and K13 battalions were subordinate to the 22d Regiment. C-2/501st Abn captured a PV who stated he was a member of the 2d Co, K10 Bn (LK 610th), 5th Regt. The PV was captured in Huong Thuy District via YD 535235. He stated that the 5th Regt consisted of the K4 Bn, 12th Sapper Bn, K10 Bn, and a newly infiltrated unit designated the 615th Bn. He also reported that the 5th Regiment's base camp area was in the vicinity of the Hu Ke mountain area (via YD 7605). 101st Abn Div INTSM 142-68 reported that a PV captured after the 21 May attack on Hq, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, stated that he was a member of the Chi Thua Bn, which was the new sapper battalion of the Cong Truong 5 (5th Worksite). Documents containing enemy signal information, captured by the 1st ARVN Div on 20 May via YD 502206, listed the following battalions for the 5th Group: K904 Bn, K810 Bn, and K815 Bn. 101st Abn Div also reported that a PV captured in a contact east of Hue City on 1 Jun 68 stated that he was a company commander from the K10 Bn, 5th Regt. He further stated that the K2, K4, K10, and 12th Sapper Bns were the subordinate units of the regiment. Based on the above information, the probable composition of the new 5th Regt, LKA 22d Regt, is as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{Battalion} & \text{Company} & \text{Subordinate} & \text{Unit} \\
\hline
K2 & A & 12th Sapper & K10 Bn \\
K4 & B & 12th Sapper & K10 Bn \\
K10 & C & 12th Sapper & K10 Bn \\
\end{array} 
\]
5th Regiment (AKA 22d Regiment Hq)
K10 Bn (610 Bn, formerly indep)
K4 Bn (804 Bn, formerly indep)
115th Bn (nearly formed)
K22 Bn (11 Sapper Bn)

2. (c) ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:

   a. Strengths and Dispositions: Annex A.

   b. Order of Battle: Annex A.

   c. Reserves and Reinforcements: Annex A.

   d. New Enemy Tactics: Omitted.

   e. Air Defense: (See Annex B). During the reporting period there were
   285 incidents of aircraft receiving ground-to-air fire. Grid squares showing the
   heaviest density of firings were YD 2000 (21 firings), YD 3000 (21 firings),
   YD 5020 (26 firings), and YD 5040 (47 firings).


   g. Antiaircraft Units: (1) During the May portion of Operation Delaware, a
   total of six 37mm AA weapons were captured in the Asah Valley. During the
   entire operation (19 April-17 May), there were a total of 13 37mm AA weapons,
   five 12.7mm AA weapons, and no 23mm AA weapons captured by 1st Cav units. A
   total of 17,955 rounds of 37mm ammunition, 62,096 rounds of 23mm ammunition, and
   30,015 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition were also captured. The recent capture of
   four 23mm AA weapons (28 May) by 101st Bn Div vic YD 481031, and two 23mm AA
   weapons on 22 May vic YD 482027 combined with the capture of a large number of 25m
   rounds in the valley indicates that these weapons were probably being used as
   security for the Highway 5471A complex while the 37mm weapons and the 12.7mm
   weapons were intended for security in the valley itself. Of the thirteen 37mm AA guns found in the valley during operation Delaware, only three were found in
   prepared positions. The remainder of the guns were found buried in pairs in
   cache areas except for two, which were found destroyed by air strikes. These
   two weapons had common wire leading to them, but no Fire Direction Center was
   found. The guns which were buried were probably buried in their firing positions
   since the pits were connected by filled in trenches.

   (2) There is no exact TOE listed for an Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment,
   but a "Type" TOE listed by MACV indicates that an AAA regiment would have eight
   AAA companies, with a total of 84 AAA weapons in the regiment, ranging in size
   from 12.7mm AAA Weapons to 100mm AAA weapons. Documents captured in the Asah
   during Operation Delaware indicated that the AAA unit in the area was the 280th
   AAA Regiment. The documents also indicated that the regiment was broken down
   into battalion size rather than company size units. The Third Battalion, 280th
   AAA Regiment, was most frequently mentioned in documents found in the vicinity of
   the 37mm AAA weapons, and it is probable that the battalion was the unit
responsible for the 37mm AA weapons. The 2d and 4th Bns, 280th AAA Regiment, were also mentioned in documents found during the operation, but their location could not be determined. The following was extracted from 3d Bde, LACD IN T S M NR 139-68:

SUBJECT: Diagram and Explanation of 37mm Gun Emplacement, Found by Units of 3d Bde on Operations in A Shau Valley. (Vic YD 315075)

LEGEND

- Unocc - pen 4' deep
- Occ - pen 4' deep
- Sleeping bunkers
- Steel cable atoh to gun to enable trucks to pull guns to road fr pen
-
- Commo wire
Armored Units: (1) The following sightings indicating the presence of an armored unit in the Ashau were reported during the last half of Operation Delaware:

(a) On 7 May vic YD 234063, a USAF ELIC observed what appeared to be an estimated six tanks. Air strikes were called in with negative assessment due to the weather.

(b) On 8 May vic YD 248052 a tracked vehicle was observed moving into a treeline. Three air strikes were called in with negative assessment on the tank.

(c) On 4 May vic YC 459009 an estimated ten tracked vehicles were sighted. Artillery and artillery were called in, possibly destroying three of the vehicles.

(2) During Operation Delaware, despite numerous sightings of tracked activity, and the destruction of one PT-76 tank and three other tracked vehicles, only one set of documents gave indication of the designation of the armored unit operating in the valley. In the abandoned PT-76 tank, discovered vic YC 392969, during the April portion of the operation, documents identified the 3rd Co, 3rd Bn, 203rd Armored Regiment. "TOE for this regiment is reported to be 4 armored battalions, with one battalion equipped with 36 PT-76 Tanks, one battalion with 34 tanks, and two battalions with 36 mixed PT-76 and T-34 tanks each, giving the regiment a total of 144 tanks. No hard intelligence was received during the operation which would indicate the presence of either T-34 or T-54 tanks in the valley. Based on the document readout, and the type sightings and armored equipment found, it is estimated that there were elements of one and possibly two armored companies operating in the Ashau Valley area. The companies were probably elements of the 3rd Armored Battalion, 203rd Armored Regiment. It is believed that the 203rd Armored Regiment probably has a security mission throughout the length of the Commo Liaison Route operated by the 559th Transportation Group, with specific emphasis placed on the security of commo-supply stations along the route. Fw Hoang Van Hung, captured on 7 May 68 near Duc Tri, stated that on 1 or 2 May 68 he saw a convoy approaching from the direction of Laos, and proceeding northeast toward Hue. He identified the tanks from a Pan 381-10 as similar to the Soviet Heavy Assault Gun JSU-152. The tanks were Russian-made, but had Vietnamese drivers. The cadre in his unit referred to them as 18-ton tanks (the JSU weighs 51.2 tons).

1. Artillery: Although both 122mm and 130mm artillery fire were received during the last portion of Operation Delaware, no documents were found which would indicate the designation of the artillery units in the area. Heavy artillery attacks received on 14 and 15 May were believed to have come from an area west of the Valley, vic YD 315614. A total of 866 rounds of 122mm artillery were found in the Ashau during Operation Delaware. Although this is a possible indication of a heavy artillery capability east of the valley, no information has been reported that would further substantiate the presence of 122mm artillery in the Base Area 114-Hue area.
J. Engineers: (1) A cache found via MD 255064 near four 37mm gunemplacements contained large amounts of engineer type equipment and supplies. Material found in the caches included the following items: 100 sticks of C-4, 252 pick heads, 253 shovel heads, 56 hammer heads, and 2 cases of TNT. F. W. Hoang Van Hung, Cpl, 1st Bn 7th Regt 559th Div (559th Group) captured near Luoi on 7 May 68, stated that there were many large units in the Lushau Valley. The 1st Bn, 7th Regt, provided security for the 2d Bn, 7th Regt, which was a truck transport battalion. Documents picked up in the valley indicated that large amounts of explosives and detonators were sent to the 3rd and 4th battalions. It is possible that these two battalions were engineer units operating in the valley.

(2) Conclusion (Operation Delaware): The discovery of heavy road equipment (two disabled Russian bulldozers), the capture of large amounts of TNT and explosives, combined with the construction of Highway 547A and the discovery of a total of five bridges of various types of construction all confirm the existence of at least a battalion sized engineer unit which operated in the Lushau Valley prior to Operation Delaware.

3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS:

a. Enemy Identification: Annex A.

b. Enemy Organization: 1st Cav OB Book and 1st Cav OB Update.

c. Casualties: 231 KIA (BC)

d. Morale: Omitted.

e. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Barriers, Fortifications, and Obstacles: (See Annex C).

f. Details of Administrative Installations and Support: (See Annex D).

g. Weather: (1) Operation Delaware-Jan Son 216: May in the Delaware AO was characterized by typical spring transitional weather. The general pattern was scattered clouds during mornings and late evenings, broken showers with cloud bases 2500-3000 feet with attendant thunderstorms during afternoons, and moderate to occasionally heavy fog between 2400 hrs and mid-morning. Weather conditions, although not optimum, were generally better than anticipated. Conditions for continuous day-long airmobile operations existed on only two days during the operation. Approximately 4.2 inches of rain fell during the operation as precipitation was not a major weather factor. Maximum temperature was 100 degrees, the minimum was 65 degrees. The mean relative humidity was 83%.

(2) Operation Jeb Stuart III: The operation was relatively unaffected by weather. The only weather affecting operations in any degree were afternoon and evening thunderstorms. These thunderstorms were localized. Thunderstorms occurred in 13 days during May. The thunderstorm activity occurred between 1200 hrs and 2200 hrs and the remainder of the time the AO was unaffected by weather. Maximum temperatures for the month were: extreme 108 degrees, mean 92 degrees. Minimum temperatures were: extreme 71 degrees, mean 75 degrees. Rainfall was 3.47 inches. Mean relative humidity was 83%.

h. 1st Air Cav units captured 72.73 tons of rice during the reporting period.
4. (c) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

   a. Espionage: Police Special Branch, Quang Tri, reported that an NVA Lieutenant recently infiltrated from the north, would "Chieu Hoi" at Quang Tri for the purpose of penetration operations in the Quang Tri area. The lieutenant underwent 10 days of training after his infiltration in preparation for his assignment. The identity of the lieutenant is unknown. It has been reported that buffalo keepers have been trained by the VC to act as security guards in the Hoa Luong, Khe Tri, Nam Dong, Ta Rau, Cu Chanh areas, Nam Hoa District. Their mission is to warn VC/NVA units of the approach of allied forces by tying a piece of colored paper or cloth on a long stick and waving it in the air. Sources continue to report that the VC are using well trained attractive young women, who have a knowledge of the English language, for the purpose of collection information from American soldiers. Hanoi Central Intelligence Department is reported to have recalled Vietnamese females of Chinese descent from foreign countries, where they were undergoing intelligence training, and sent them to South Vietnam to obtain positions in the embassies of the United States, Korea, Japan, and Nationalist China. They have also been directed to obtain employment at US centers at Province level. These women are to replace personnel presently in place who have proved incapable, or who have been doubled by Free World Forces.

   b. Sabotage: No reports of sabotage or attempts at sabotage have been reported on any US installation during the reporting period.

   c. Political: The VC political structure in the area continued to suffer large losses during the reporting period. CI sources indicate that many cadre have been eliminated by FWF operations in the area and by artillery and air strikes. The VC have intensified their recruitment program and have used threats of terrorism in order to induce the people to comply with their demands.

   d. Propaganda: Propaganda during the reporting period has been directed at the peace negotiations in Paris. The people have been told not to discuss the peace talks, that peace would come sooner or later, that the situation in Paris at the present time was one of confusion, and that there had been discord among the President, Vice-President, and Premier. They have been told that because the liberation troops have dominated the battlefields, the Hanoi government was in a position to demand that the US comply with Hanoi's conditions concerning the negotiations.

5. (c) ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

   Enumeration:

   (1) Attack installations and friendly forces in the Jeb Stuart III AO with up to a regimental size force.

   (2) Conduct rocket and/or mortar standoff attacks on selected installations throughout the AO.
(3) Attack the key cities of Hue and Quang Tri.

(4) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include:
   (a) Interdiction of Highway #1.
   (b) Small scale attacks and ambushes.
   (c) Terrorism and sabotage.
   (d) Propaganda activities.
   (e) Use of mines and booby traps.

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ANNEXES: 1 - Order of Battle
         E - Air Defense
         C - Enemy Defenses
         D - Administrative Support
         E - Information Derived from Captured Documents, Interrogation Reports, and Agent Reports

DISTRIBUTION: See Distribution

OFFICIAL:

SPRY
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12
SUBJECT: PART I SITREP for period 290001H to 292400H May 63. BR 152.

1. (C) Operations Summary: Combat operations continued today in the area of the cordon, and the enemy body count continues to rise as a result of the last two days' actions by elements of the FIRST TEAM operating in the 1st ARVN DIV AO. Artillery fires were directed against the encircled enemy force during the night, and several enemy were killed as they attempted to infiltrate out of the cordon formed by the battalion(+) force. One company was withdrawn from the cordon area after conducting operations there during the morning and air assaulted back into the 1st Brigade AO southwest of LZ SHARON where it resumed normal combat operations. Elsewhere in the 1st Brigade area battalion-size forces continued operations in Base Area 101 and in the area to the north vicinity of LZS BETTY, SHARON & PEDRO. Two air assaults took place in the rice-growing area of the 2d Brigade sector, and also in that vicinity reconnaissance operations continued by the ground element of the 1 ACR reconnaissance squadron. Other units continued security of WUNDER BEACH and SKYKING AVE, while a battalion continued combat operations in the vicinity of LZ JANE and the area southeast. Approximately fourteen tons of rice were discovered by 3d Brigade ele-
ments conducting search and clear operations along Route 555 on the coast. Elsewhere in the 3d Brigade AC the base defense bn at CAMP EVANS conducted a company-sized air assault of CINCEMS, and other elements continued local patrols and night ambushes to secure the CAMP EVANS - QL-1 area. In Base Area II, a battalion-sized force continued to drive through the southern-most portion of the base area and one element conducted an air assault ahead of the battalion(-) force. The 3d ARVN Regt and another battalion of SKYtroopers continued operations in other sectors of the base area and in adjoining area with no significant contact.


b. 2d BDE(-): (1-5 CAV, 2-5 CAV, 3-5 ARM CAV): 1-5 CAV: A & B Cos cdt opns E from YD 307392 & YD 425355 to YD 402399 & YD 435357.
respectively. C, D & E(-) Cos cont sety LZ JANE. 2-5 CAV: Co A AA to YD 193469. B Co cdt opns vic YD 496494. C Co cdt sety LZ HARDCore; 1 plt cdt mini cav at YD 452488 then cdt opns to LZ HARDCore. D Co AL fm YD 461416 to HAI LANG and assumed bridge sety and road sweep of QL-1.

E Co(-) cdt opns fm HAI LANG to bridge at YD 473433. 3-5 AM CAV: A Trp OPCON 1st Bde. B Trp cont sety LZ HARDCore & SKYKING AVE. C Trp cont sety LZ WUNDER BEACH. 2-12 CAV OPCON to 3d Bde.


2-12 CAV: A & C Cos cdt opns SE fm YD 478167 & YD 478151 to YD 480153 & YD 482143 respectively. B Co cdt opns SW fm YD 478167 to YD 469150. D Co AA to YD 47153, cdt opns SE to YD 456146. E Co(-) cont sety LZ MEREDITH.
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

d. 3d ARVN Regt: (2-1 Bn, 1-3 Bn, 2-3 Bn): 2-1 Bn: Cdt cpns S to YD 507197. 1-3 Bn: Cdt cpns SE to YD 514169. 2-3 Bn: Cdt cpns S to YD 499135.

e. 1-9 CAV: D Trp cdt cpns vic YD 493503.

2. (C) Plans Summary: Combat operations will continue against remnants of the enemy force recently encircled by elements of the FIRST TEAM in the 1st ARVN DIV A0. Other elements will continue normal combat operations in all areas of the JEB STUBT III A0 without significant change. Two company(-) air assaults are planned in the 1st Brigade A0 as is one platoon-size air assault. The cavalry troop conducting operations in the 2d Brigade A0 will continue operations and will be withdrawn late in the day. Other elements in the "rice bowl" on WUNDER BEACH and in the vicinity of IZ JANE will continue combat operations in assigned sectors. The battalion-size forces operating on the coastal plain and in the vicinity of CAMP YVANS and QL-1 will continue combat operations in those areas. Elements of the FIRST TEAM and the 3d ARVN Regt operating in Base Area 114 and surrounding vicinity will continue operations in search of enemy forces and installations.

a. 1st BDE(1-8 CAV, 2-8 CAV, 1-12 CAV): 1-8 CAV: A & C Cos will cont sety IZs SHARON & PEDRO. B Co will cdt cpns vic pres loc; 2
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

plts will AL to YD 277433, cdt opns, AL to YD 346477. D Co will cont
opns vic pres loc; 2 plts will AL to YD 292463, cdt opns, then AL
back to YD 322463. 2-8 CAV: A & C Cos will cdt opns SB & E respective-
ly fm pres loc. B Co will cdt opns vic pres loc. D & E(-) Cos will
cont sety IZ ANNE. 1-12 CAV: A, D & C Cos will cdt opns vic pres loc
in cordon area. D Co will cont sety IZ BETTY. E (-) will cdt opns
vic pres loc. A 3-5 ARM CAV: (CONF) will cdt opns vic pres loc.

b. 2d BDE(-): (1-5 CAV, 2-5 CAV, 3-5 ARM CAV): 2-5 CAV: A &
B Cos will cdt opns to YD 334408 & YD 420307 respectively. D, D & E(-)
Cos will cont sety IZ JANE. 2-5 CAV: A Co will cdt opns S fm pres loc.
B Co will AL to IZ HARDCORE. C Co will AL to YD 136444. D & E(-) Cos
will cont sety of bridges & road sweep of QL-1. 3-5 ARM CAV: B Trp
will cont sety IZ HARDCORE & SKYKING AVE. C Trp will cont sety IZ
WUNDER BEACH.

c. 3d BDE: (1-7 CAV, 2-7 CAV, 5-7 CAV, 2-12 CAV): 1-7 CAV:
A Co will cdt opns W fm pres loc. B Co will cdt patrols E fm pres loc.
C Co will AL to IZ JACK and begin sety opns; 1 plt will remain at IZ
LON. D Co will AL to C Co loc then will cdt opns W. E Co(-) will AL
to IZ JACK then will cdt opns SW. 2-7 CAV: A Co will AL to B Co loc
then cdt opns vic YD 5548. B Co will AL to IZ JEANNE & assume sety of
the IZ and vic. C Co will cont sety ops along 555. D Co will cont ops SE fm pres loc. 5-7 CAV: A, D & E(-) Co will cont ops vic pres loc.
B Co will cont sety of bridges & road sweep of CL-1. C Co will cont sety of CAMP EVANS; 1 plt will cont sety IZ MEREDITH. 2-12 CAV: A, C
& E(-) C; will cont sety of CAMP EVANS; 1 plt will cont sety IZ MEREDITH.

B Co will cont ops to YD 475140, YD 475136 & YD 455160 respectively. B Co will cont ops to YD 467140 then NW. E Co(-) will cont sety IZ MEREDITH.

d. 3d ARVN Regt: (2-1 Bn, 1-3 Bn, 2-3 En): 2-1 En: Will cont ops S fm pres loc. 1-3 Bn: Will cont ops S fm pres loc. 2-3 En: Will cont ops SW fm pres loc.

3. (C) Todeys Losses: Opn JEB STUART III

a. Friendly:
    (1) US: 6 KIA, 17 WIA(17 evac), 1 Ab/C det(non-hostile)
    (2) ARVN: 2 KIA, 4 WIA(4 evac)

b. Enemy:
    (1) BY US: 38 KIA, 5 PW, 12 TMC, 8 CSM, 0 Lr cal rds, 11 mines/gren, 0 SA ammo, 17.6ST/0 rice/salt.
    (2) BY ARVN: 1 KIA.
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

1. (C) Cumulative Losses: Opn JEB STUART III, 171100H to 272400H May 68.
   a. Friendly:
      (1) US: 46 KIA, 256 WIA (221 evac), 1 MIA, 44 A/C dest.
      (2) ARVN: 9 KIA, 77 WIA (57 evac).
   b. Enemy:
      (1) BY US: 166 KIA, 17 FW, 1 Htn, 64 M.G., 12 GSWG, 73 Ig
          cal rds, 110 mines/gren, 3438 SA ammo, 33 875/T rice/salt.
      (2) BY ARVN: 74 KIA, 0 FW, 85 M.G., 5 GSWG, 815 Ig cal rds,
          151 mines/gren, 7200 SA ammo, 2.2T/1.5T rice/salt.

5. (C) Fixed Wing TAC Air Support:
   a. Nr of sorties: 42
   b. Ordnance: 77.8 tons bombs, 10 tons explm.

6. (C) Bushmaster Opns: 38 ambushes, neg results.

7. (C) Friendly Wpns lost Today: No reported losses.

8. (C) Significant Enemy Contacts:
   a. 1st BDE: (1) 0040H, YD 326305, B 2-3 CAV, rec LW fire fm
      3-4 bksf, res 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA (evac). (2) 1215H, C Trp (-)
      3-5 ARM CAV, YD 47605, rec SA fire, res 2 US WIA (evac), (3)
      1000H, B 1-12 CAV YD 43602, rec SA fire, res 1 US WIA (evac).
      (4) 1230H, A Trp 3-5 CAV,
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

YD 427605, rec SA fire, res 2 US WIA(evac).  (5) 1405H, D 2-3 CAV, YD 326386, rec AW fire in 4-5 bkr, res 2 US KIA.  (6) 1632H, A 1-12 CAV, YD 426603, an indiv threw gren in bkr, when he went to ck area, he was shot in inside bkr, res 1 US KIA.  (7) 1345H, A 1-12 CAV, YD 426602, fd 1h NVA KIA.  (8) 142CH, A 1-12 CAV, YD 426603, eng 2 indiv evading to bkr, res 2 NVA KIA. At 1720H, they eng 2 more indiv at same loc in bkr, res 1 NVA KIA.  (9) 0115H, B 1-12 CAV, YD 435605, board mov to their W eng w/SA & arty. At 0351H, rec AW fire em cst 6 indiv who attempted to penetrate perimeter, eng, res 2 NVA KIA.  (10) 053CH, E 1-12 CAV, vic YD 426603, fd 11 NVA KIA.  (11) 0745H, 1st Dde Scts, YD 437610, obs and eng 1 NVA, res 1 NVA KIA.  (12) 1155H, C Trp 3-5 ARM CAV, YD 427-605, rec SA fire, res 1 US WIA(evac), 1 NVA KIA by SA.  (13) 1600H, 8th Engrs, YD 427603, eng 3 NVA, res 3 NVA KIA.

b. 2d BDE: (1) 1235H, D 2-5 CAV, YD 506437, rec 6-8 rds SA, eng w/SA, res 1 US WIA(evac).  (2) 1937H, B 2-5 CAV, YD 496444, rec 1 B-40 rkt and SA, res 2 US KIA, 1 US WIA(evac).  (3) 1315H, D 2-5 CAV, YD 506437, fd 2 NVA KIA in 2 graves.

c. 3d BDE: (1) 0740H, D 3-7 CAV, YD 510339, had 3 US WIA(evac) fm chicom gren BT.  (2) 1925H, C 2-7 CAV, YD 575464, rec 2 mtr rds & 1 B-40 rkt, res 2 US WIA(evac).
d. Other Units: A 1-9 CAV, 0855H, XD 420616, obs 1 NVA, eng
res 1 NVA KIA.

e. ARVN: O920H, 1-3 ARVN, XD 500120, made contact w/VC,
contact broke 0935H, res 2 ARVN KIA, 1 ARVN WIA(ovac), 1 VC KIA.

GP-4
**IMMEDIATE PRIORITY**

**CONFIDENTIAL ADVACT-0 8E15014**

**SUBJECT:** PART II SITREP for period 220000H to 250000H May '99. Nr 150.

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DECLASSIFIED

Eng. 180 Tab. 11
1. (U) 1ST AIR CAV DIV, INTSUM NR 150
2. (U) 290001-292400 MAY 68.
3. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY. OPERATION JEB STUART III CONTINUED AS ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST BDE KILLED 36 AND CAPTURED SEVEN ENEMY, BRINGING THE TWO DAY TOTAL FOR THE BATTLE NORTHEAST OF QUANG TRI TO 76 ENEMY KILLED AND ELEVEN ENEMY CAPTURED. NORTH OF THE GRAVEYARD D AND C 2-7 CAVALRY CAPTURED FOURTEEN TONS OF RICE. D 2-7 HAD ONE CONTACT WITH AN ESTIMATED ENEMY SQUAD. NORTH OF THE NY CHANH RIVER AREA D 1-9 CAVALRY CAPTURED MORE THAN TWO TONS OF RICE. IN BASE AREA 114 1-3 ARVN HAD LIGHT CONTACT. THERE WERE TWO INCIDENTS OF GROUND TO AIR FIRING.

4. GROUND ACTIVITY

(A) 1-9 CAV.

(1) A TRP. 0715 HRS YD 433605 ENG W/RKTS & DEST ONE BKR & ONE HUT 12' X 8'. 0855 HRS. YD 420618 ENG W/RKTS & DEST TWO RECENTLY CONSTR BKRS 8' X 10'. 0905 HRS OBS ONE INDIV EVADING, ENG, RES ONE NVA KIA. 1815 HRS YD 439549 OBS FIVE INDIUS BURYING APPROX ONE T RICE, INDIUS EVADED, ACFT ENG & DEST RICE W/MP.

(B) D TRP. 0745 HRS YD 495504 FD INSIDE TEMPLE SEV JARS CONTAINING 2,500 LBS RICE & DOGS (WILL EVAC). 1715 HRS YD 493503 FD IN ROOF OF CHURCH TWO AK-47'S, FOUR DUG'S, ONE HNG, ONE 82MM L. ORT & BASE PLATE, & THREE MORTAR SIGHTS (WILL EVAC ON 30 MAY). 1820 HRS FD ONE 500 LB BOMB W/FUSES & EXPL REMOVED (DEST), ALSO FD

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS
DCD DIR 5200.10
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

ONE 82MM MORTAR BASE PLATE (WPN EVAC). 1810 HRS FD 800 LBS RICE (DEST). 1940 HRS FD ANOTHER CACHE CONTAINING 2000 LBS RICE, WILL KEEP CACHE UNDER OBSERVATION UNTIL 30 MAY.

(2) 1ST BDE, 1 ACD.

(A) 1-8 CAV. LZ SHARON BASE DEF (YD 3349). 0100 HRS N SIDE OF PERIMETER REC FOUR RDS SL. FIRE, NEG C.S. DID NOT ENG. C CO. 2230 HRS YD 244493 JAB ELE OBS 7-8 INDIVS MOVING N TO S, ENG W/SA'S, NEG ASSESS. 2233 HRS OF OBS THREE-FOUR INDIVS WHO APPEARED TO BE FOLLOWING JAB ELE, ENG W/NEG ASSESS. D CO. 0600 HRS YD 32602 FU ONE DTC (CLASS UD).


(C) 1-12 CAV. A CO. 1345 HRS YD 428602 FD 14 NVA KIA, ONE ING, & ONE 82MM MORTAR BASE PLATE (WPN EVAC). 1420 HRS YD 428603 ENG TWO INDIVS WHO EVADED INTO BRK, RES TWO NVA KIA. 1720 HRS ENG ONE INDIV IN BRK, RES ONE NVA KIA. 1632 HRS ENG EN
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IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

BKR W/GRENADe, ATTFPT TO CHECK BKR, REC SA FIRE, ONE US KIA. B CO.


0745 HRS YD 437610 IN SUPT OF 1-12 CAV ACPT OBS ONE INDIV HIDING IN BKR, ENG W/M-60, RES ONE NVA KIA. 8TH ENGR BN. 1600 HRS IN SUPT OF 1-12 CAV ENG THREE INDIVS INSIDE BKR, RES BKR DEST & THREE NVA KIA. (NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL 19 INDIVS WERE DETAINED DURING THE RPT PERIOD; CLASS TWO VG, SIX IC, ELEVEN UD).

(3) 2D BDE, 1 ACD.

(A) 1-5 CAV. A CO. 2029 HRS YD 408397 AMB ELE ENG FIVE-SIX INDIVS MOVING NNW ALONG TRL, RES FIVE EN POSS KIA.

(B) 2-5 CAV. HHC. 1420 HRS YD 499454 CC ACPT PU TWO DTNS (CLASS TWO CD). A CO. 1330 HRS YD 494467 PU ONE BAG LIED

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(C) 3-5 CAV. B TAP. 0808 HRS YD 474537 FD ONE PRESS DET MINE HIDDEN UNDER PIPELINE, MINE CONSISTED OF 20 LBS PLASTIC, DEST, NEG MARKINGS FD IN AREA.

(4) 3D BDE, 1'ACD.

(A) 1-7 CAV. D CO. 0825 HRS YD 569217 FD FT FRTS HOLDING W, ALSO 100M TO THE W, FD THREE WELL-BUILT BAGS W/CAMOUFLAGE & OH COVER (DEST). 2310 HRS LZ LONG (YD 5721), DETECTED FOSS MOVEMENT NEAR LZ, ENG W/GRENADES, NEG ASSESS.

(B) 2-7 CAV. E CO. 0925 HRS YD 546489 FU THREE DTNS (CLASS ONE NVA PW, ONE VC PW, ONE CD), ALSO FU ONE CHICOOM CLR (EVAC). 1330 HRS YD 552488 FD TOTAL OF 12 CACHES CONTAINING 8000 LBS RICE (WILL EVAC TO HUONG DIEN (D) 30 MAY). C CO. 1304 HRS YD 575464 FD CACHE CONTAINING 20000 LBS RICE (6000 LBS EVAC TO HUONG DIEN (D), REST WILL BE EVAC 30 MAY). 1925 HRS YD 575464 REC TWO 60CM MORTAR RDS FM 800M TO W, ALSO REC ONE UNK TYPE RD, POSS RIFLE GRENADE, TWO US WIA (NOT EVAC), ENG & CALLED IN ARTY W/NEG ASSESS.
D CO. 1200 HRS YD 54,2477 REC SA & IN FIRE FM EST EN SQD TO SE, ONE US WIA (MEDDEVAC), ENG & CALLED IN ARTY, ARTY REC ONE SEC EXPL, NEQ FURTHER ASSESS. 1230 HRS YD 54,7475 PU THREE DNS (CLASS ONE CD, TWO IC).

(C) 5-7 CIV. D CO. 0740 HRS YD 51,0339 THREE US WIA (MEDDEVAC) FM BT CHICOM GRENADE W/TRIP WIRE, FD POSS FRESH BOMB ACROSS ROAD. 0905 HRS YD 50,0335 FD SIX SPIDER HOLES & TWO BKRS 2' X 4' X 3' DP (DEST). 1002 HRS YD 50,4334 FD TWO BKRS 2' X 4' X 3' DP. A SMALL AMOUNT OF RICE, SOME COOKING UTENSILS, & A BLASTING CAP & PULL FIRING DEVICE FM BT (ALL DEST).

(D) 2-12 CIV. C CO. 1501 HRS YD 58,0146 FD 30-40 BKRS (DEST). D CO. 1120 HRS YD 44,9150 FD WELL CAMOUFLAGED L-SHAPED TRENCH W/TRT RUNNING TO SSE.

(5) 3 REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV.
1-3 ARVN. 0920 HRS YD 50,0180 REC FIRE FM EST FIVE EN, TWO ARVN KIL, FOUR ARVN WIA (MEDDEVAC), ENG, RES ONE NVA KIL.

D. AIR ACTIVITY

(1) GROUND TO AIR

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<td>B 229</td>
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(2) VISUAL SIGHTINGS. YD 57,2319 COMBO WIRE RUNNING BETWEEN TWO POLES TOWARD RAILROAD TRACKS. YD 46,7162 SMOKE TRL RUNNING N TO S. YD 46,3154 WELL USED TRL RUNNING NE TO SW.
4. (c) Enemy Losses: Operation JEB Stuart III

A. US

(1) KIL: VC 0, NVA 38 (Total 11/155 KIIs)

(2) POSS KIL: 5

(3) PWS & Returnees:

(a) PWS for Period: VCC 2, NVA 3

(b) Returnees for Period: VCC 0, NVA 0

(c) Cumulative PWS for OPN: VCC 11, NVA 6

(d) Cumulative Returnees for OPN: VCC 1, NVA 0

(4) Detainees:

(a) Total for Period: 15

(b) Disposition for Period: PW 5, Civil Defendant 8, Innocent Civilian 2, Doubtful 0, Returnee 0, Not Yet Class 0

(c) Cumulative Detainees for OPN: 108

(d) Cumulative Disposition of Detainees for OPN: PW 17, Civil Defendants 30, Innocent Civilians 59, Doubtful 0, Returnees 1, Not Yet Class 0

B. GVN: 0

C. FMAP: 0

D. Nr of Captives Interrogated: 5

E. Nr of Returnees Interrogated: 0

F. Nr of Hard Copy PIRS Published: 0

G. Nr of Civilians PIRS: 5, Avg Time 24 HRS

H. Enemy Guns Captured or Destroyed: 12 Indiv WPNs, 8 C/S WPNs (Total 64/12 WPNs), 11 Mines/Grenades, 17.65 T RICE. Known
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

WPNS SN'S: AK-47 (92468776, 10045362, 10032068, 11083691, 3225), SKS (13635), M-2 CARB (10093231), SKS (0223214, 64850), RFG (926-516).

5. (C) OBSTACLES & BARRIERS
   A. HOLES. NO CHANGE.
   B. MINES.

B 5-7 G.V. 0725 HRS YD 467387 in SUPT of MINES; KEEP TN, PD

ONE MINE W/15 LBS TNT & BAMBOO PRESS TYPE ELECTRICAL FIRING DEVICE (DEST), NEG MARKERS PD IN AREA.

8. (C) ENEMY MOVEMENT, LOCATION & IDENTITY
   A. DOCUMENT R/O

THREE VC MAPS PU BY C 2-12 G.V. YD 483166, 271415 K.I.X 68.

ONE SHEET IS OF LAOS – NVA BORDER AREA WITH NO NOTATIONS ON IT.

THE OTHER TWO MAPS ARE ADJACENT SHEETS OF THE S PORTION OF OUR AO.

(YD 4114 TO 6644 TO 4108 TO 6608). THESE MAPS HAVE NOTATIONS WHICH
APPEAR TO BE LOCATIONS OF FRIENDLY (US OR ARVN) INSTALLATIONS. ON
THE REVERSE OF ONE SHEET IS LISTED: PHO TRACH (PHONG DICH (D) HQ),
BONG BONG (CAMP EVANS), MY CHANH BRIDGE AND AN LC.

B. DETAINED STATEMENTS

(1) ONE DETAINED CLASS CD, PU BY B 2-5 G.V. YD 503457, 29 MAY 68, STATED THAT VC HAVE COLLECTED RICE FM THE PEOPLE OF VINH

AN (H) (YD 5045) IN AUG 67 & APR 68, FIVE CINS EA. TIME FM EA.

FAMILY. THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TOLD THE NEXT COLLECTION WILL BE IN
AUG 68.

(2) NVA & VC POW'S CAPT BY ELE OF 1-12 G.V. 29 MAY, VIC

10. (U) WEATHER. FORECAST FOR JEB STUART III AC. 2400-1000H. 10000' SCATTERED, 30000' BROKEN, VIS 6 MI, WINDS IT & VARIABLE. PATCHY VERY IT FOG IN VALLEYS H/SUNRISE. 1000-1800H. 3000' SCATTERED, 10000' SCATTERED, 30000' BROKEN, VIS 6 MI, WINDS VARIABLE 8K, FEW THUNDERSTORMS/IN SH AFTER 1430 H. TEMP MAX 98°, MIN 75°, LDI 3600'.

11. (U) NO CHANGE.

12. (U) NO CHANGE.

GR4
1. (C) Operations Summary: The effectiveness of the FIRST TEAM rice denial plan became more evident in the last two days as friendly elements operating in the 1 ADC AO discovered over 230 tons of hidden rice. The discovery was initiated by Popular Force elements conducting operations in the 2d Brigade AO, and additional rice was uncovered by SKYTROOPERS working in cooperation with the PF. In the same area the SKYTROOPERS also confiscated approximately 20,000 piasters in enemy funds. In the 1st ARVN DIV AO, the results of the last three days' contact has risen to 106 enemy killed. The battalion (+) force operating in that area continued withdrawal today with the air assault of two companies back into the 1st Brigade AO in western Base Area 101. Elsewhere within DA 101 one battalion continued normal combat operations, and other 1st Brigade elements conducted two company-size air assaults north of the base area. A battalion-size force continued to secure LZs BETTY, SHARON & PEARL and conducted combat operations in the vicinity. In the 2d Brigade area the brigade(-) continued operations to secure the rice harvest and the surrounding area. Along the coast a battalion-size force of the 3d Brigade continued operations along Route 555 and in the vicinity of LZ JEANNE, while one battalion
continued operations to secure CAMP EVANS - CL-1 and vicinity. South of CAMP EVANS a battalion continued operations in the Piedmont hills region and in the vicinity of northern base area 111. Further to the south in DA 111, a battalion continued similar operations in the vicinity of LZ MENDELTH and in the southern-most portion of the base area. The 3d AIR VN Regt, operating in eastern DA 111 and in the area to the southeast, also continued combat operations without significant contact.

a. 1st DDE(1-3 CAV, 2-5 CAV, 1-12 CAV): 1-3 CAV: A & C Cos cont scty LZs SHARON & PEDRO respectively. B Co AK fm YD 346177 to YD 277442. Cdt opns vic then 3A to YD 353463. Cdt opns to YD 353461. B Co cdt opns N to YD 323487 then rtn to YD 323472.


1-12 CAV: A Co cdt opns SE fm YD 128607 to YD 132600. B Co cdt opns vic YD 132608. C Co AK fm YD 130610 to YD 254356 then cdt opns to YD 256396. D Co cont scty LZ BETTY. E Co(-) AL fm YD 130610 to YD 254356.

A 3-5 ARM CAV: Cdt opns E fm YD 128605 to YD 132600.

b. 2d DDE(1-3 5 CAV, 2-5 CAV, 3-5 ARM CAV): 1-5 CAV: A Co cdt opns NW fm YD 402399 to YD 391486. B Co cdt opns NW fm YD 43537. SE to YD 428389.

C, D & F(-) Cos cont scty LZ JANE. 2-5 CAV: A Co cdt opns vic YD 493468. B Co AL fm YD 486444 to LZ HARDCORE. C Co AL fm...
INHEDATE
PRIORITY

LZ HARDCORE to YD 496444 then cdt opns NE to YD 506453. D Co cont
scoty HAI LUNG, bridges & road sweep of QL-1. E Co(-) cont bridge scoty
at YD 437433. 3-5 ARM CAV; A Trp CFPON 1-12 CAV. B Trp cont scoty LZ
HARDCORE & SKYKING AVE. C Trp cont scoty LZ MUNDER BEACH. 2-12 CAV;
CFPON to 3d Bde.

c. 3d FDP: (1-7 CAV, 2-7 CAV, 5-7 CAV, 2-12 AV): 1-7 CAV: A
Co cdt opns vic YD 547203, B Co cdt opns W to YD 435140, then run to
LZ STELLA. C Co AL fm YD 555215 to LZ JACK & assumed scoty of LZ; 1
plt remained at LZ LONG. D Co AL to LZ HELEN then cdt, opns E to YD
545213; 1 plt remained at LZ HELEN & assumed scoty. E: 2o(-) AL to LZ
JACK then cdt opns W to YD 472295. 2-7 CAV: A Co AL fr: LZ JEANNE to
YD 555488, then cdt opns to YD 555440. D Co AL fm YD 542435 to LZ
JEANNE & assumed scoty of LZ. C Co cdt opns vic YD 575464. E Co cdt
opns E fm YD 537479 to YD 557472. 5-7 CAV: A, B & E(-) Cts cdt opns
vic YD 574290, YD 502306 & YD 549282 respectively. C Co cdt opns vic
YD 497361 & cont scoty of bridges & road sweep of QL-1. C Co(-) cont
scoty CAMP EVANS; 1 plt cont scoty LZ HEREDIT, cont scoty road sweep of
QL-1. 2-12 CAV: A Co AL to LZ HEREDIT fm YD 460153 & assumed scoty. B
Co cdt opns SE fm YD 469150 to YD 471137. C Co cdt opns S fm YD 462-
143 to YD 461136. D Co cdt opns SE fm YD 453140 to YD 451140 then W
to YD 454143. E Co(-) cont scoty LZ HEREDIT.
d. 1-2 Cav: C Trp Inf plt inserted at YD 472503, cdt cnns vic of LZ, then was extracted. D Trp cdt cnns NW in YD 493503 to YD 477-523.

c. 3d ARVN Regt: (2-1 Bn, 1-3 Bn, 2-3 Bn): 2-1 Bn: 1st Co cont secty LZ MIGUEL. 2d Co cdt cnns N to YD 501206. 1-3 Bn: Cdt cnns E to YD 520163. 2-3 Bn: Cdt cnns E to YD 507138.

2. (C) Plans Summary: Remaining elements (2 companies) of the FIRST TEAM in the 1st ARVN DIV AO will be extracted and will air assault back into the AO of the 1st Brigade west of Base Area 114. Another company-size air assault will take place on the western side of the THACH HAI River, and that same element will then air assault back to its original location south of LZ SHARON. Other elements of the 1st Brigade will conduct operations in the vicinity of their present locations. In the 2d Brigade AO, one company-size air assault will take place in northern BA 101, and a platoon-size mini-cav operation is planned in the "rice bowl" area. The ground recon element of the 1st ARVN recon squadron operating in this area will be extracted late in the day. Other elements will continue normal operations without significant change. Operations in the 3d Brigade area will also continue without significant change by battalion-size forces operating along the coast, in the vicinity of CAMP EVANS, in the area south of CAMP EVANS and in Base Area 114. Elements of the 3d ARVN Regt will continue
operations in the vicinity of their present locations. A platoon of infantry of the 1 ACD recon squadron will be inserted into the vicinity of the Da Nang Pass (AT 973933) to recover bodies of individuals missing in a downed aircraft since 2 Feb 68.

a. 1st BDE: (1-6 CAV, 2-6 CAV, 1-12 CAV): 1-6 CAV: A & C Cos will cont sety LZs SHARON & PECOC respectively. B Co will AL to vic YD 2h15, cat opns NE then AA to YD 353461. D Co will cat opns vic pros loc. 2-6 CAV: A, B & C Cos will cat opns SW, S & E respectively fn pros loc. D & E(-) Cos will cont sety LZ ANNE. 1-12 CAV: A & B Cos will AL to YD 256396 & cat opns N & S respectively. C Co will cat opns E fn pros loc. D Co will cont sety LZ BETTY. E Co(-) will cat patrols vic pros loc. A 3-5 ARM CAV: Will rtn OPCON 3-5 & will cat opns SE to LZ WUDEY BEACH.

b. 2d BDE(-): (1-5 CAV, 2-5 CAV, 3-5 ARM CAV): 1-5 CAV: A & E Cos will AL to LZ JANE & assume sety LZ. C & D Cos will AL & AL respectively to YD 392400 & YD 3h3446 respectively and cat opns vic. B Co (-) will cat local patrols. 2-5 CAV: A Co will cat opns vic YD 4945. B Co(-) will cont sety LZ HARDGER; 1 plt will cat a mini-cav opn. C Co will cat opns vic YD 4944 & YD 5045 w/RF & PF elements. D Co will cont sety HAL LANG & bridges and road sweep of QL-1. E Co(-) will cont sety of bridge at YD 437433. 3-5 ARM CAV: A Trp will be released OPCON fn 1st Bde. D Trp will cont sety LZ HARDGER & SHYRING AVE. C Trp will...
cont scty LZ WUNDER LEACH. 2-12 CAV: will remain CPCCN to 3d Ldo.

c. 3d BDE: (1-7 CAV, 2-7 CAV, 5-7 CAV, 2-12 CAV). 1-7 CAV: A Co will cdt opns W & SW fm pres loc. B Co will cdt opns N fm LZ STEEL. C Co will cont scty LZ JAC.l 1 plt will cont scty LZ LON. D Co will cdt opns W & SW fm pres loc. 1 plt will cont scty LZ HELEN. E Co (-) will cdt opns S fm pres loc. 2-7 CAV: A Co will cdt opns S fm pres loc. 3d CAV: B Co will cont scty LZ JEANNE. C & D Cos will atk NW & SE respectively along Hwy 555. 5-7 CAV: A, D & E(-) Cos will cdt opns vic pres loc. B Co will cont bridge scty & road sweep of QL-1. C-Co will cont scty CAMP EVANS and road sweep of QL-1. 2-12 CAV: (CPCCN). A Co will cont scty LZ MEREDITH. B, C & D Cos will cdt opns vic pres loc. E Co(-) will AL on order of loc of B Co, C Co & D Co.

d. 1-9 CAV: D Trp will cont opns vic pres loc. will be extracted by C Trp. E Trp Inf Plt will be inserted vic AT 973533 to recover bodies fm 1 A/C A/C missing since 2 Feb. 68.

e. 3d ARVN Regt: (2-1 Bn, 1-3 Bn, 2-3 Bn): 2-1 Bn: Will cdt opns SW fm pres loc. 1-3 Bn: Will cdt opns SW to YD 537155. 2-3 Bn: 1st, 2d & 3d Cos will cdt opns to YD 497150, YD 520127 & YD 519134 respectively.

3. (C) Today's Losses: AAM 82 3rd III

a. Friendly:

   (1) US: 2 KIA, 16 WIA (14 evac) (4 WIA non-hostile) 0 A/C

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(2) ARVN: 0 KIA, 0 WIA.

b. Enemy:

(1) By US: 12 KIA, 9 FW, 4 IWC, 1 CSWC, 3 Lg cal rds, 15 mines/gren, 110 SA ammo, 104 T/0 rice/salt.
(2) By ARVN: 2 mines/grenades.

5. (c) Cumulative Losses: Opn JEB STUART III, May 68.

a. Friendly:

(1) US: 50 KIA, 277 WIA(240 evac), 1 KIL, 14 A/C dest.
(2) ARVN: 9 KIA, 77 WIA(57 evac).

b. Enemy:

(1) By US: 201 KIA(adj), 26 FW, 1 RTH, 68 IWC, 13 CSWC, 81 Lg cal rds, 125 mines/gren, 3540 SA ammo, 14 275 T/0 rice/salt.
(2) By ARVN: 74 KIA, 0 FW, 65 IWC, 5 CSWC, 815 Lg cal rds, 153 mines/gren, 7200 SA ammo, 2.2 T/15 T rice/salt.

6. (c) Fixed Wing: TAC Air Support:

a. Nr of sorties: 30

b. Ordnance: 42 tons bombs, 3.5 tons napalm.

6. (c) Bushmaster Ops: 33 ambushes, see para 8. b. (2)

7. (c) Friendly Wpns lost Today: No reported losses.

8. (c) Significant Enemy Contacts:
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a. 1st BDE: (1) 1355H, A 1-12 CAV, YD 1236ch, rd 6 NVA KIA in area of yesterday's contact. (2) 0029H, A 2-8 CAV, YD 362393, rec AW fire fm several bkr, res 1 US WIA(evac). (3) 1920H, YD 364393, A 2-3 CAV, rec 14 rds 62mm mort, res 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA(evac).

b. 2d BDE: (1) 0750H, B 2-5 CAV, YD 453463, 3 US WIA fm sec expl as a result of throwing gren into bkr. (2) LATE RPT; 252145H, E 2-5 CAV, YD 458422, amb els obs several indiv moving W to E along a trail, eng, res 1 US KIA, 2 NVA KIA.

c. 3d BDE: (1) 0340H, C 2-7 CAV, YD 570495, eng and killed 1 VC sniper. (2) 1120H, D 1-7 CAV, YD 552216, fd 1 NVA KIA, probably by M-79. (3) 1735H, D 2-12 CAV, YD 471435, obs and eng 5 NVA moving towards their psn, res 1 NVA KIA, 2 US WIA(not evac).

d. ARVN: None

c. Other Units: (1) 0345H, D 1-9 CAV, YD 453503, rec 10 rds 60mm mort, res 3 US WIA(evac). (2) 0920H, YD 454504, D 1-9 CAV, an NVA FW led ele to bkr w/a door. Then the FW opened door, jumped in, and an explosion followed, res 1 NVA KIA.

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IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY

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1. (U) 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIV INTRA MB 151.

2. (U) 300001-302450 MAY 68.

3. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITY. OPERATION JEE STUART III CONTINUED AS
REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES OF HAI LUNG DISTRICT KILLED SEVEN ENEMY
AND BEGAN EVACUATION OF 220 TONS OF RICE CAPTURED YESTERDAY IN THE
LX CHANG RIVER AREA. IN THE SAME AREA, A 2-5 CAVALRY CAPTURED NINE
tons and D 1-9 CAVALRY CAPTURED ONE TON OF RICE. IN THE CONTACT
ARE. NORTHEAST OF QUANG TRI CITY, A 3-5 CAVALRY AND ELEMENTS OF
1-12 CAVALRY FOUND 29 MORE NVA KILLED FROM YESTERDAY’S CONTACT.
THROUGHOUT THE AREA OF OPERATIONS, ONE NINE AND FOUR BOOBY TRAPS
WERE FOUND. THERE WERE SEVEN INCIDENTS OF GROUND TO AIR FIRING.

A. GROUND ACTIVITY

(1) 1-9 CAV.

(A) A TRP. 0830 HRS YD 273426 ENG W/RTS & PART DEST
ONE BKR 2' X 4'. 0845 HRS YD 274429 OBS THREE BKRS 4' X 6', ENG
W/RTS, DEST ONE BKR, PART ENG TWO BKR.

(B) B TRP. 1137 HRS YD 595216 PU ONE DYN (CLASS UD).
1558 HRS YD 476312 ENG & SINK DESERTED SIMPL.

(G) C TRP. 1530 HRS YD 468526 INF FD 4" DOCS (EVAC).

(D) D TRP. 0445 HRS YD 493503 REC 10 RDS 60MM LQRTAR
FIRE, THREE US WIA (REDEV/G), EN LOC UNK. 0745 HRS YD 498496 FD
ONE T RICE HIDDEN UNDER FLOOR OF HUT (DEST). 0920 HRS YD 494504
PU ONE DYN WHO ADMITTED HE WAS NVA, FW LED FD/LY TRPS TO A BKR W/

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

DOOR, Fw OPENED DOOR & JUMPED INTO BKR SETTING OFF GRENADE, RES
ONE NVA KIA, CHECKED BKR & FD 20000P & DOCS (EVAC), ALSO OBS ONE
INDIV IN CRN UNIF EVADING, ENG, RES ONE EN POSS KIA. 1110 HRS
YD 5064.96 FD TRAPDOOR IN REAR OF TEMPLE, FD INSIDE 20-30 LBS FILLS
& LIQUIDS, ONE US STETHESCOPE, THREE BUNDLES OF SURG G.UZE, & 10"
RED DOCS (ALL EVAC).

(2) 1ST BDE, 1 ACD.

(A) 2-8 C.V. A CO. 0825 HRS YD 362393 REC AM FIRE
FN SEV BKR, ONE US WIA (NEDEVAC), ENG & A/S PUT IN. NEG ASSESS.
1300 HRS YD 361395 ENG ONE INDIV EVADING NE ALONG TRL, NEG ASSESS,
CHECKED AREA & FD FIVE BKR & TWO HUTS W/BKRS INSIDE & TWO SMALL
STOVES, AREA USED APPROX ONE WK AGO (ALL DEST). 1820 HRS YD 364-
394 REC 14 RMS 82MM MORTAR FH SW, ONE US KIA, THREE US WIA (NEDEV.C),
AND ENG SUSP EN LOC W/NEG ASSESS. B CO. 1650 HRS YD 325386 REC
SL FIRE FH W, NEG CAS, BDE SCTS ON STATION HAD NEG SIGHTINGS, CALLED
IN ARMY W/NEG ASSESS.

(B) 1-12 C.V. A CO. 1355 HRS YD 428609 FD THREE
NVA KIA FM PREV DAY'S CONTACT, ALSO FD ONE NVA COMPASS PREV DEST,
& SIX RMS 82MM MORTAR (DEST). 1820 HRS YD 435595 REC SA FIRE FN
S, NEG CAS, AREA EXPANDED ON SUSP EN LOC W/NEG ASSESS. 1645 HRS
YD 435595 OBS FOUR EN E OF REF LOC & FOUR EN TO THE W. DID NOT
ENG DUE TO CIVS IN AREA, BDE SCTS CHECKED AREA W/NEG SIGHTINGS.
B CO. 1146 HRS YD 435605 FD FOUR CHICOM GRENADES & ONE 750 LB DUD
BOMB (DEST). 1630 HRS YD 432607 WHILE CHECKING BKRS IN AREA OF
PREV DAY'S CONTACT FD THREE NVA KIA, ONE HPD WIA, FOUR CHICOM
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IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

GRENADES, ONE 60MM MORTAR RD, 50 RDS AK-47 AMMO, misc MIL GEAR &
& DOCS (WFN & DOCS EVAC). C CO. 1145 HRS YD 432614 FD BT CONSIST-
ING OF 1/4 LB BLOCK TNT W/TRIP WIRE (DEST), NEG MARKERS FD. 1545
HRS FD TWO MORE TNT BT'S W/TRIP WIRES (DEST), NEG MARKERS FD.
1245 HRS YD 432614 FU ONE DTN (CLASS IC). D CO. 1115 HRS YD
313475 FU SIX DTNS (CLASS SIX IC). 1910 HRS YD 333502 FU ONE DTN
CLASS IC).

(3) 2D BDE, 1 ACD.

(A) 1-5 C.V. A CO. 0700 HRS YD 408397 REF INCIDENT
IN Volving AMB BIE AT 292029 MAY AT REF LOC, 1ST LT CHECK FD ONE
K-50 SMG, TWO AK-47 MACS W/60 RDS AMMO, TWO M-26 GRENADES, misc
MIL GEAR, & NUMEROUS BLD TRLS HEADING SE, ALSO FD NINE PAIR HCM
SANDALS & FIVE HATS (WFN EVAC). C CO. 0940 HRS YD 392458 FD ON
ACCESS ROAD TO LZ JANE, NINE CONSISTING OF 10 LBS TNT W/BOARD &
BLASTING CAP DETONATOR, DEST, LEFT CRATER 3 1/2' DF & 5' DLH.
1403 HRS YD 370438 FD BT 105MM ARTY RD W/TRIP WIRE (DEST), NEG
MARKERS FD.

(B) 2-5 C.V. A CO. 1015 HRS YD 493465 FD THREE T
UNBAGGED RICE & TWO T BAGGED RICE (WILL EVAC). 1015 HRS YD 494472
FD THREE T BAGGED RICE & ONE T UNBAGGED RICE (WILL EVAC). 1920
HRS YD 493468 FD 800 LBS RICE (WILL EVAC). B CO. 0750 HRS YD
493463 ENG BKR W/GRENADE & REC ONE LG SEC EXPL, THREE US WIL. FH
SEC EXPL (MEDEVAC). 1500 HRS YD 459516 FU NINE DTNS (CLASS 9 IC).
E CO. 292145 MAY YD 458422 AMB BIE OBS SEV INDIVS MOVING W TO E
ALONG TRL, ENG, RBS TWO NVA KIA, ONE AK-47 CAPT, REC FIRE, ONE US

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KIA, OTHER INDIVS EVIRED.

(4) 3D BDE, 1 ACD


1220 HRS YD 549204 FD & DEST ONE HUT & ONE BKR. 1341 HRS YD 549204 FD BKR & TRENCH COMPLEX, FOSS EN CP AREA, ALSO FD BID STAINED CLOTHING IN AREA (ALI DEST). D Co. 1100 HRS YD 552216 FD ONE NVA KIA (BC) BY K-79 FIRE, SEV DAYS OLD. 1500 HRS YD 547214 FD TRJ JUNCTION W/TRIS HEADING W & SW, ALSO FD ONE CAVE & ONE BKR IN AREA.

(B) 2-7 C.V. A Co. 1140 HRS YD 555488 FD TWO DTNS (CLASS TWO IC). C Co. 0840 HRS YD 570465 REC FIRE FM SNIPER, NEG CAS, ENG W/SA, HES ONE KIA, ONE SKS C.FT (EVLC).

(C) 5-7 C.V. LZ EVNS BASE DEF (YD 5332). 2159 HRS HEARD MOVEMENT 300M S OF LZ, ENG W/K-79, MOVEMENT CEASED, NEG FURTHER ASSESS. A Co. 0716 HRS YD 555290 FD BT CHICOM GRENADE W/TRIF WIRE (DEST), NEG MARKERS FD. E Co. 2050 HRS YD 549282 OBS LT VIC YD 542289, ENG W/ARTY, NEG ASSESS.

(D) 2-12 C.V. B Co. 1440 HRS YD 472140 FD TRJ HEADING SE W/COMO WIRE ALONG IT, CHECKED TRJ TO YD 473140 W/NEG FURTHER FINDINGS. 1735 HRS YD 474135 OBS FIVE INDIVS W/G/HOULAGE, ENG, HES ONE NVA KIA, CAPT ONE SKS, & SMALL AMOUNT RICE, REC SA'S FIRE, TWO US WIA (NOT MEDEVAC), OTHER INDIVS EVIRED, NEG FURTHER ASSESS.
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

(5) 3D REGT, 1ST ARMN DIV.

2-3 ARMN. 1215 HRS YD 507145 FD SEV HUTS & BKR'S & OBS.
TWO INDIVS EVADING, ENG W/NEG ASSSESS (HUTS & BKR'S DEST). 1630 HRS
FD 10 HUTS, 10 BKR'S, 30 UNITS, FOUR FLOCKS, FOUR G.I.S MASKS, TWO CANS
AK-47 LANO, & TWO CHICOM CLAYMORES.

(6) OTHER UNIT ACTIVITY

HAI LANG (D) PF UNITT. 291330 MAX YD 494459 FD 220 T
RICE IN FALSE GRAVES, RICE WAS UNSHelled & STORED IN 100 KILO
BAGS, EVAC TO HAI LANG (D). 0130 HRS YD 493468 ENG UNK SIZE EN
FORCE, RES SEVEN EN KI, TWO AK-47 CAPT, SEVEN FDY KI.

D. AIR ACTIVITY

(1) GROUND TO AIR

DTG  COORD  ALT  UNIT  ACFT  REMARKS
271720  YD 518397  UNK  A 227  UH1H  UNK, UNK, DEST
301030  YD 492448  600'  C 229  UH1H  LH, NEG HITS
1430    YD 323367  10'  C 1-9   UH1H  S., NEG HITS
1503    YD 323367  30'  C 1-9   OH6A  S., NEG HITS
1545    YD 344397  50'  C 1-9   OH6A  AM, 2 HITS, NFLY
1605    YD 468526  5'   C 1-9   UH1H  S., NEG HITS
1610    YD 476326  30'  B 1-9   OH13  S., NEG HITS
1945    YD 327488  500'  15TH BDED UH1H  AM, NEG HITS

(2) VISUAL SIGHTINGS. YD 457148 EIGHT BKR'S 5' X 4' UNDER
HVY CANOPY. YD 476326 TWO OR MORE PT HITS HEADING SW ALONG BEACH
THRU HVY BRUSH. YD 455424 ONE EN KI. IN KHAKI UNIF W/FOUCH &
PAPERS IN HAND, EST KI4 W/I LAST FEW HRS. YD 469269 WELL USED

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DE PRIORITY

TRL RUNNING E-W W/NEW TRENCHWORK ALONG TRL. YD 604261 ONE LG ARTY RD. YD 437184 A/S DEST TWO BKS & DNG TWO BKS. YD 555469 A/S DNG TWO STRUCTURES & DEST TWO BKS. YD 570420 A/S DEST THREE BKS & UNCOV 204 OF TRENCHLINE.

4. (C) ENEMY LOSSES: OPERATION JEB STUART III

A. US

(1) KIA: VC 1, NVA 11 (TOTAL 12/189 KIA'S)

(2) FOSS KIA: 1

(3) PWS & RETURNEES:

(A) PWS FOR PERIOD: VC 1, NVA 8

(B) RETURNEES FOR PERIOD: VC 0, NVA 0

(C) CUMULATIVE PWS FOR OPN: VC 12, NVA 14

(D) CUMULATIVE RETURNEES FOR OPN: VC 1, NVA 0

(4) DETAINNEES:

(A) TOTAL FOR PERIOD: 13

(B) DISPOSITION FOR PERIOD: PW 9, CIVIL DEFENDANT 0, INNOCENT CIVILIAN 4, DOUBTFUL 0, RETURNEE 0, NOT YET CLASS 0

(C) CUMULATIVE DETAINNEES FOR OPN: 121

(D) CUMULATIVE DISPOSITION OF DETAINNEES FOR OPN:

PW 26, CIVIL DEFENDANTS 31, INNOCENT CIVILIANS 63, DOUBTFUL 0,

RETURNNEES 1, NOT YET CLASS 0

B. GWN: 0

C. PWMAP: 0

D. NR OF CAPTIVES INTERROGATED: 9

E. NR OF RETURNNEES INTERROGATED: 0

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F. NR OF HARD COPY PINS PUBLISHED: 0

G. NR OF ELECTRONIC PINS: 0, AVG TIME 24 HRS

H. ENEMY WNS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED: 4 INDIV WNS, 1 C/S

   TOTAL 68/13 WNS), 15 MINE/GRENDES, 110 SA 3330, 2 IG G/L
   AMN, 10.4 T AICE. KNOWN WNS SN'S: SKS (9199092, 11346467).

5. (C) OBSTACLES & BARRIERS

A. ROADS. NO CHANGE.

B. MINES. NO CHANGE.

6. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY

   3-5 CA On A TRF 281420 HAY YD 433607 RES OF CONTACT, FD 23
   NVA KIA (ADD 23 TO TOTAL NVA KIA FOR ORP).

8. (C) ENEMY MOVEMENT, LOCATION & IDENTITY

A. DOCUMENT R/O

   A 1-9 CA, YD 508492, 30 MAY 68. SEVERAL OF THE Docs WERE
   LISTS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THEY WERE APPARENTLY PERIODIC INVENTORIES
   & WERE DTD UP INTO JUN & MAY 68. ONE NOTEBOOK MENTIONED PHAM TUI
   TION (17) (FEMALE) WAS A MEDIC FOR CB64, DTD JAN 68. A PAPER HEAD-
   ED KT81, DTD 26 DEC 67 SHOWED THE CO OF THE HAI LUC (D) HOSP TO BE
   HUH HOA. THE HOSP CODE NR IS 15FQ. A PAPER DTD 8 MAR 69 INDICATES
   HONG VINH IS A DR OF DISTRICT HOSP, CB64. A PAPER DTD 28 FEB 68 SIGNED
   BY TRAN XUAN TRUONG, CO OF CB63. LAN NHG IS A DR IN CB63. MEDICAL
   SUPPLY REQUISITIONS DTD 22 MAR 68 SHOW MEDICAL UNIT XT7. INTRODU-
   CTION PAPER FOR ASF, NGUYEN HUH AI, EIDM D1N UNIT, DTD 18 MAR 68.

   1 ACH OB CAT: NO INFORMATION CARRIED ON CODES GIVEN, OR ON HOS-
   PITALS.